post-truth politics, bullshit and bad ideas: ‘deficit...
TRANSCRIPT
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Post-TruthPolitics,BullshitandBadIdeas:
‘DeficitFetishism’intheUK
JonathanHopkin
LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience
BenRosamond
UniversityofCopenhagen
Introduction
Ithasbecomefashionabletotalkoftheadvanceddemocracieshavingentereda
phaseof‘post-truthpolitics’(Lockie2017,Rose2017,Suiter2016).Theriseof
populistandanti-elitemovements,andtherejectionofbasicprinciplesofreason
andveracitycharacteristicofmuchoftheirpoliticaldiscourse,hassparkeda
gooddealofmediainterest,althoughsofarlittleinthewayofsystematic
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scholarlyattention.Theconceptof‘post-truth’canbetracedbacktoRalph
Keyes’broadersocialcritiqueofdishonestyanddeception(2004),butmore
recentlytheideahasbeguntobeappliedtopolitics,albeitmainlyoutsidethe
academicsphere.Post-truthpoliticsisdefinedvariouslyasafocuson‘politics’
ratherthanconcrete‘policy’(Roberts2010),amistrustofauthoritative‘experts’
(Drezner2016)andevenabrazenwillingnesstolieandthestraightforward
refusaltoacceptclearlydocumentedfacts(TheEconomist2016).Theelectionof
DonaldTrumptotheAmericanPresidencyandthesuccessfulcampaigntoleave
theEUintheUnitedKingdomareperhapsthetwomostwidelydiscussed
examplesofthegenre.
Itistemptingtoclassifytheseinstancesofpost-truthpoliticsunderthefamiliar
rubricofpopulism.And indeed, therearemanygoodreasons foranalysingthe
likesofTrump,formerUKIPleaderNigelFarageandothersinthisway(Mudde
2004). Their rhetorical utterances canbeunderstood as typical of a particular
modeofreasoning(Laclau2005)orindeedasaformofpoliticsinitselfthatmore
orlessmanifestsitselfintotoasadistinctivemodeofcommunication(Jagersand
Walgrave2007).However,oursuggestionhereisthattheapparentlooseningof
the relationshipbetweenpolitical rhetoricand ‘truth’ (orputanotherway, the
diminishingimportanceofanchoringpoliticalutterancesinrelationtoverifiable
facts)isamuchbroaderphenomenonthatisnotconfinedtothespacesinhabited
bypopulistpoliticians.Norisitamatterofmainstreampoliticaldiscoursetaking
onamorepopulistformorsimplyadoptingthestandardtropesofpopulism.In
thispaperwetreattheseformsofpoliticalutteranceasconsequential,anduse,by
wayof illustration,keydebatesincontemporarymacroeconomicpolicyaround
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public debt and budget deficits. So-called ‘austerity’ policies have beenwidely
adoptedinthefaceofmuchacademicopposition,andhavesurviveddespitethis
oppositionbeingborneoutbytheexpectedpoorresults(Blyth2013).Following
HarryFrankfurt(2005),wesuggestthattheriseandresilienceoffailedideasin
thepoliticalsphereisusefullyunderstoodthroughtheiroperationas‘bullshit’.We
gofurthertosuggest(a)thatthesimultaneousriseofbullshitinpoliticaldiscourse
andtheriseofausterityasthedominantfeatureofmacroeconomicpolicyisnot
coincidental and (b) that the rise of bullshit (and thus of austerity policies) is
rootedinthebroaderhollowingoutofwesterndemocraticpolitics.
Frankfurt began his essayOn Bullshit with thewords ‘one of themost salient
featuresofourcultureisthatthereissomuchbullshit.Everyoneknowsthis.Each
ofuscontributeshisshare’(2005:1).Itisourcontentionthatthisbroadstatement
is of ever growing importance to the political sphere too. In advanced
democracies, political discourse is increasingly dominated by what Frankfurt
defines as ‘bullshit’: deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, which is
indifferent to facts. Politicians’ defence of spending cuts as a way out of the
economicdownturn,anotionrejectedbyalmosttheentireeconomicsprofession,
revolves aroundhomely notions of ‘tightening belts’ and ‘putting our house in
order’.Itisfrequentlyaccompaniedbyclaimsthat‘thereisnomagicmoneytree’,
despite thewidespread use of central bankmoney creation since the financial
crisis.
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Why the escalation of bullshit in our political life? This paper argues that the
growthofbullshitisarealphenomenonthatisbestunderstoodasaconsequence
ofthesideliningofconventionalpoliticalideologies,andoftheorganizationsthat
have traditionally articulated and promoted them: formally organized political
parties.Thisdeclineisinturnafeatureoftheentrenchingofneoliberalisminthe
advanceddemocracies,whichhastendedtoindividualizepoliticalaction,placing
aheavycognitiveburdenoncitizenstryingtomakesenseofthepoliticalworld,
whilst severely constraining the range of political actions that democratic
institutionsarepermittedtopursue.Inthe‘void’(Mair2013)leftbyideologically
coherentpoliticalparties,asetofnewopportunisticpoliticalactorshaveemerged,
performing the classic function of legitimating democratic government and
communicatingwith citizens, butwithout the parties’ intellectual and political
substance.Theresultisapoliticaldiscoursesuffusedwithbullshit.
Thepaperproceedsasfollows.FirstweoutlineFrankfurt’sconceptualizationof
bullshit and apply it to the political sphere. We then connect this concept of
bullshittothedeclineofmasspartiesandtheemergenceofanew,depoliticized
formofdemocraticgovernance.Weillustratethesetrendsthroughashortcase
studyofthedebateaboutfiscalpolicyintheUK,describedmemorablybyStiglitz
(2010)as‘deficitfetishism’.Thefinalsectionconcludes.
TheConceptofPoliticalBullshit
Asatheoreticalstartingpoint,weassumethatwhatissaidinthesphereofpolitics
isconsequentialforpoliticaloutcomes.Rhetoricalutterancesmatterbecausethey
havethecapacitytoshapeactors’problemandsolutionsetsand,morebroadly,
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theyhavethecapacitytoconstruct theworld inparticularways,which inturn
define the parameters of what is both politically possible and normatively
appropriate(Hay2004). Anowhugecorpusof ideationalscholarshipexplores
themanyandvariedwaysinwhichideas-propositionsaboutthesocialworld–
intendedtoguidehumanbehaviour–‘matter’inthepoliticalsphere(seeAbelal,
BlythandParsons2010,Béland andCox2010).Politicsmaybeseen lessasa
domainofcompetingfixedinterestsandmoreasaspaceinwhichideasviewith
oneanothertoactivelyconstitutethoseinterests(Blyth2003). Ideasmayform
the backdrop to political debates, creating broad intersubjective premises that
define thescopeofwhat isdeemed tobe technicallypossibleor (forexample)
socially just. Ideasmayhaveparticularsalience inmomentsofuncertaintyand
crisiswhere there is aheighteneddemand fornewproblemand solution sets.
Communicative discourse and political rhetoric are notmerely epiphenomena,
butpotentiallyactiveshapersofsocialreality.
Oneofthemostinterestingpuzzlestoemergeoflateisthequestionofhow‘bad
ideas’(orwithQuiggin[2010]andKrugman[2012],‘zombieideas’)emergeand
survivewithinthepolicyprocess,andit isherethattheconceptofbullshithas
particularutility.Bad ideasmaybedefinedas claimsabout theworld that are
easilyrefutedorcontestedbyappealingtoanarchiveofauthoritativeknowledge
(Schrad 2010). Salient examples include young earth creationism and climate
changedenial.Whatmakes theseparticularbad ideasworthyof study is their
strongtractioninpolicydiscoursedespitetheirmanifestlackofscientificveracity
(Matthijs and Blyth 2017). Additionally, both creationism and climate change
denialarerathermorethanresidualartefactsofignoranceor(atbest)pseudo-
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science (Gordin 2012). Rather, they have been active shapers of public policy
debate,mostobviously–thoughnotexclusively–intheUnitedStates.Thatsuch
ideas are kept in circulation through (for example)well orchestrated lobbying
(Jaquesetal2008)orvia theexploitationofmediabalancingnorms(M.Berry
2016, Mooney 2004) is well established.What is also striking – again a solid
research finding – is the extent to which citizens in democratic societies are
themselvesactivecarriersofmisinformation(Kuklinskietal2000).Forexample,
there are well-established discrepancies between public perceptions of
immigrationlevelsintheUKandthestatisticalrealities(DuffyandFrere-Smith
2014).Thesameistrueofexaggeratedpublicperceptionsaboutlevelsofbenefit
fraud(Mulheirn2013)ortheclaimoftenmadebyUKpoliticians(onbothsidesof
thepoliticalspectrum)thattherearesomecommunitiesinBritainwherethreeor
fourgenerationshaveneverhadajob(MacDonald,ShildrickandFurlong2014).
Claimssuchasthese–thatBritainisoverwhelmedbyimmigrants,whointurn
becomeamajorfiscaldrainontheExchequer,which,inanycase,issufferingfrom
levels of domestic benefit fraud (that eclipse revenues lost through forms tax
evasion/avoidance) rooted in a cultureofworklessness and sloth amongst the
poorestmembers ofUK society – can all be refutedwith an appeal to various
sourcesofharddata.Thepuzzlebecomes,simply,whydosuchclaimscontinueto
havecurrencydespitebeing falsehoods.Frankfurt’sanswer is that the truth in
relationtosuchutterancesisirrelevant.Thisisbecausetheseclaimsarenotlies;
rathertheyarebullshit.
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ThusFrankfurtmakesakeydistinctionbetweenlyingandbullshitting.Alieisa
form of utterance that pays heed to the truth. To speak a lie is to knowingly
pronounce a falsehood. To bullshit, on the other hand, is to practice a type of
speechact that isnot triangulated in relation to the truth andwhichproceeds
withouteffectiveconcernfortheveracityoftheclaiminquestion.AsFrankfurt
putsit:
Telling a lie is an act with a sharp focus. It is designed to insert a
particularfalsehoodataspecificpointinasetorsystemofbeliefs,in
ordertoavoidtheconsequencesofhavingthatpointoccupiedbythe
truth.Thisrequiresadegreeofcraftsmanship,inwhichthetellerofthe
liesubmitstoobjectiveconstraintsimposedbywhathetakestobethe
truth.Theliarisinescapablyconcernedwithtruth-values.(Frankfurt
2005:51)
A lie is a constrained form of speech act, whereas the bullshitter is afforded
considerablymore freedom tomake claims in relation to the realworld. In its
purestform,itisnotpossibletosubmitbullshittoadjudicationinacourtoftruth
wheretheclaimisstraightforwardlytestedagainstthefacts.Ideal-typicalbullshit
is immune to any attempt to scrutinize a claim against the empirical record.
Confronting the bullshitter with ‘the facts’ is unlikely to be a successful
argumentativestrategy.This,inanutshell,iswhatmakesbullshitsomuchmore
dangerousandsociallycorrosivethanlying.
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Ofcourse,muchreliesontherelationshipbetweenthesupplyofandthedemand
forbullshit.IfDonaldTrumpistreatedasthearchetypicalbullshitter(Heer2015),
thenwealsoneedtoknowsomethingabouthisaudienceandthemechanismsby
whichunverifiable nonsense becomes the basis of a distinctive politics. Extant
researchonthequestionofreceptivitytobullshittendstoplaceahighpremium
onthewaysinwhichtheinternethasbeenfundamentaltonotonlydemocratizing
thedistributionofinformationandknowledge,butalsoincreasing‘ouraccessto
unreliable information’ (Barr2015). Researchalso suggests that theappealof
vacuousstatementstendstocorrelatewithlowerlevelsofeducation,beliefinthe
paranormal,acceptanceofalternativemedicineandsoon(Pennycooketal2015).
Frankfurthimselfspeculatesonwhybullshithasbecomemoreprevalentoflate.
He suggests, first, that bullshitting is common in public situations where the
speakerisrequiredtopronounceonmatterswheretheydonothaveexpertise
(2005: 63). The transformation of expertise and its key avatar ‘the expert’ is
another topic, but there are some obvious links with Tetlock’s well-known
discovery that ‘experts’ are spectacularlybadatmaking reliablepredictions in
preciselythosefieldsinwhichtheyclaimprofessionalexpertise(Tetlock2005).
Moreover,Frankfurtassociatestheprobableriseofbullshitwith‘thewidespread
convictionthatitistheresponsibilityofacitizeninademocracytohaveopinions
abouteverything,orat leasteverythingthatpertainstotheconductofhis[sic]
country’saffairs’(2005:64-65).Healsospendsthefinal fewpagesofhisessay
implying(thoughnotarguingthrough)thattheriseofrelativist(or‘antirealist’)
conceptionsoftruthhasbeenanimportantdeterminantoftheriseofbullshitin
publicandprivatediscourse(2005:64-67).
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Atthispointitisworthdwellingbrieflyontherelationshipbetween‘truth’and
post-truth politics (where bullshit flourishes). It should be clear from the
foregoing that we are interested in how certain forms of rhetoric give rise to
particularpoliticaloutcomes.Inthepoliticalsphere,truthistypicallycontested,
constructedandsubjectto framingstrategies(Enfield2017).AsEnfield(2017)
goesontoargue,politicsisneveramatterofestablishingthepreciseveracityofa
claimor of using the polity as an area for settling truth in a rational-scientific
sense.Theobjectivetruthofastatementislessimportantthantheconsequences
of widespread acceptance of the statement. In Arendt’s ideal typical space of
politics-aspaceof‘factualtruth’–politicaljudgmentemergesfromtheinterplay
ofalternativeperspectives(Arendt1967).Atthesametimethiscivicdiscourse
operateswithintheextra-political(scientific)contextof‘rationaltruth’.Thuswe
shouldexpect–asafeatureofnormalpolitics–anissuelikeclimatechangetobe
treatedverydifferentlyintherespectivedomainsof‘factual’and‘rational’truth.
Thismeansthatbullshitclaimsandbullshittingpoliticalactorscouldbepresent
inanydemocraticpolitical formation.As such,wearenotarguing thatpolitics
beforetherecentperiodwasnotvulnerabletobullshit,butwedowanttoexplore
the idea that bullshit as amode of political expression has become a defining
characteristic of recent politics in advanced democracies. This emergence of
bullshit isperhapsexplainedby twophenomena: theerosionof thecontextual
linkagebetweenfactualandrationaltruth(Weyn2017),andtheweakeningofthe
institutionalpre-requisitesofArendtianpoliticalpractice.
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Ourargument,developedinthenextsection,istosuggestthattheexplanationfor
the proliferation of bullshit may indeed reside in key transformations in the
character of democratic politics. However, we take a rather different line to
Frankfurt (or indeed to some of the psychological research on bullshit) by
associatingtheproliferationofbullshitwiththehollowingoutofdemocraticparty
politics in advanced capitalist democracies, thereby downgrading explanations
thatplacetheburdenupontechnologicalchangepureandsimple.Weagreewith
Frankfurtthattheriseofbullshitisassociatedwithcertainepistemicshifts,but
ratherthanfocusonthepostmodernturn(asheseemsinclinedtodo),wefocus
instead on the particular role played by neoliberal rationalities in normalizing
bullshitasamodeofexpressionwithinpoliticaldiscourse.
TheDeclineofPartiesandtheRiseofBullshit
Thereareabundantexamplesofpoliticalbullshit,butourinterestintheconcept
was sparked by the remarkable and counter-intuitive success of the idea of
‘austerity’ in the aftermath of the financial crisis (Blyth 2013; C. Berry 2016).
Despiteanoverwhelmingconsensusamongstprofessionaleconomiststhatfiscal
retrenchment in the context of monetary policy at the zero lower bound will
inevitablyprolonganeconomicdownturn,politicalappealsto‘tightenbelts’and
cutbackonwastefulspendinghavemetwithwidespreadpopularapproval.Not
only has public opinion been inconsistent with the state of knowledge in
economics,whichisinitselfunremarkable,butithasnotevolvedasexpectedin
response to the very slow, and in some cases non-existent, recovery from the
financialcrisis.Despitehalfadecadeofausterianpolicies leadingtostagnation
andatbestpallidgrowth,appealstobelt-tighteningremainelectorallypowerful.
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Even where governments have been punished for presiding over economic
slumps, public opinion has remained broadly supportive of the broad idea of
austerity(Pew2013:Ch.1,Q33).
Thesuccessofausteritydiscoursechallengesconventionalunderstandingsofhow
democratic politics interacts with economic policy. Conventional political
economy reasoning tells us that voters will reward governments that deliver
growth,andthatpoliticianswillavoidtaxrisesandspendingcutsbecauseofthe
electoral costs associated with them. In line with this thinking, over the past
quarter century or so economic policy-making in advanced democracies has
become increasingly technocratic and insulated from political pressure.
Independent (and in theEurozone countries, supranational) centralbanksand
constitutionalized fiscalconstraintsensurethat impartialexpertscanmakethe
right decisions about policywithout being influenced by popular demands for
unsustainablegrowth.Theassumptionunderlyingtheseinstitutionsisthatvoters
instinctivelyrejectausterity,preferringinsteadcredit-anddeficit-fuelledgrowth
intheshort-run,whateverthelong-termconsequences.
Post-crisispoliticsintheadvanceddemocraciesturnsthislogiconitshead.Faced
withtheriskofdeflation,thecoldrationalityoftheexpertsandtechnocratshas
produced a range of unconventional and even unprecedented monetary
measures,suchasquantitativeeasingandnegativeinterestrates,andsomeare
evenhypothesizingsuchunorthodoxideasashelicopterdropsinanattemptto
shake the economy into life. In contrast the gut instincts of thepublic at large
appear to be markedly pro-cyclical, responding to scarcity with abnegation.
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Attemptstocountertheausteritynarrativehavefallenflat,mostnotablywhen,in
apre-election edition leaders special editionof theBBC show ‘QuestionTime’,
formerUKLabour leaderEdMilibanddenied that the financial crisishadbeen
causedbyexcessivegovernmentspending,totheaudibleincredulityofthestudio
audience.1
Thisstateofaffairsremindsusthatmaterialinterestsandrationalpolicychoices
oftenhavelittleplaceinpoliticaldebate.AsBlyth(2003)putsit,‘structuresdonot
comewithaninstructionsheet’.Thedamagingeffectsofausterityontheeconomy
seemnot to dent its political appeal, sowe need to examinewhy citizens and
politiciansarticulateandreceiveeconomicideasinthewaytheydo.Oneofthe
key features of Economics is that it produces a form of knowledge which is
generallyspeakinghardforindividualswholackspecificspecializedtrainingto
access.NotonlyisunderstandingEconomicstechnicallydemanding,developinga
knowledgeofEconomicsalsohasuncertainand likely limitedpayoffs. Inother
words, voters are advisedly ‘cognitive misers’ when it comes to gathering
informationaboutkeyeconomicpolicydecisions.Instead,theyaremorelikelyto
taketheircuefromthepronouncementsofauthoritativeopinionleaderswhom
theyidentifyashavingtheirinterestsatheart,orwhosimplysoundplausible.
Traditionally in democracies political parties have played this role for many
citizens. In V.O. Key’s classic definition, parties ‘perform the function of the
articulation of the interests and aspirations of a substantial segment of the
citizenry’ (1964: 9). Rather than having to make laborious calculations of the
benefits to them of different policymeasures themselves, voters were able to
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allowpartiesandtheircandidatestodefinethesebenefitsforthem.Partieshad
aninterestinarticulatingstableandcoherentsetsofpoliciesinordertobuilda
reliablesocialconstituencythatwouldgivethembothareservoirofvotesanda
supplyofvolunteeractiviststomaintaintheirorganizationsandstandforpolitical
officeunderthepartybanner(Duverger1954).Inthe‘goldenage’ofpartiesmany
voters identified strongly with a particular party and trusted that party to
representtheinterestsofpeoplelikethem.Theclassic‘massparty’hadnotonlya
robustorganizationalapparatustorootitdeepinthefabricofsociety,butalsoa
setofideologicalbeliefsthatcouldserveasaheuristicforvotersinevaluatingthe
likelyconsequenceofdifferentpolicychoices(vonBeyme1985).
The decline of the mass party and the increasing individualization of voter
behaviourhasunderminedparties’abilitytofulfilthisroleinthepoliticalsystem.
Votersarelesslikelytoidentifywithanyparty,joinapartyasamember,reliably
supportthesameparty,orindeedevenvoteatall(Mair2013,ch.1).Parties’ability
todefinevoters’interestsforthemhasdeclinedasvotersarelesslikelytotrust
partiesandpoliticiansgenerally.Thedominantmodelsofvotingbehaviourinthe
scholarlyliteratureseevotersas‘consumers’ofpolitics,choosingbetweenamenu
of options on the basis of perceptions of governing competence (‘valence’)
(Whiteleyetal2013).Theliteratureon‘cognitivemobilization’(Inglehart1970,
Albright2009)associatesthesechangeswiththeemergenceofamoreeducated
population,unwillingtodefertotheauthorityofelitesandkeentoexpresstheir
ownopinionsonpoliticalaffairs.
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Yet even in the context ofmass literacy and compulsory education through to
adulthood,mostvotersremainrelativelyunqualifiedtomakesuchjudgements.
Survey data routinely shows that the average citizen has inconsistent and ill-
informedviewsaboutpolitics,andvotingdecisionscanbeswayedbyrandomand
irrelevantevents(AchenandBartels2016).Evenwherecitizensavoidflatlyfalse
beliefs, they have difficulty thinking about public policy problems in an
appropriateway. Converse (1964) argued thatwhilstwell informed elites and
activists are able to conceptualize policy issues and assess alternatives, less
informed citizenshave a limited ability to dealwith the abstract concepts and
empiricalgeneralizationsrequiredinsuchdiscussions.Instead,poorlyeducated
citizens have ‘limited horizons’, ‘foreshortened time perspectives’, and rely on
‘concrete thinking’ (Converse 1964: 11). Whilst elites can have relatively
sophisticatedbeliefsystemsbasedonabstractconcepts,amongstlessinformed
citizens ‘objectsshift fromtheremote,generic,andabstract tothe increasingly
simple,concrete,or“closetohome"’(1964:10).WhilstConverseresearchedthe
politicalbeliefsofalesseducatedpopulationhalfacenturyago,itremainsthecase
thatveryoftenvoterssubscribetoviewsthataredemonstrablyfalse,andfailto
change theirmindswhen exposed to contrary evidence (e.g. Bartels 2008). As
Caplanputs it, ‘voter irrationality isthekeytoarealisticpictureofdemocracy’
(2007:3).Moreeducatedvotersarenot immunefromirrationalattachmentto
demonstrablyfalsebeliefs(Hamilton2011,KahanandCorbin2016).Theframing
(Chong and Druckman 2007) of political issues by elites therefore becomes
crucial.
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Thedeclineoftrustinpoliticalpartiesandothercollectiveinstitutionstherefore
places a great intellectual burden on citizens, a burden that they can not be
expectedtocarry,notonlybecauseofthehighcostsofgatheringandprocessing
complexinformationaboutpoliticsandpolicy,butalsobecauseinthecontextof
masspoliticstheyhavenoindividualincentivetodoso.‘Bullshitisunavoidable
whenever circumstances require someone to talkwithout knowingwhat he is
talking about’, Frankfurt notes (2005: 63). ‘Thus the production of bullshit is
stimulatedwheneveraperson’sobligationsoropportunitiestospeakaboutsome
topicexceedhisknowledgeofthefactsthatarerelevanttothattopic’(Frankfurt
2005:63). Votersareplacedpreciselyinthissituation:theyarecalleduponto
make judgments about complex matters they understand poorly, under
unreasonabletimeconstraints,withnodiscernableconsequencesforerror(atthe
individuallevel).Notsurprisingly,voters’politicalviewsarelikelytobesuffused
withbullshit.
In the caseof austerity, ill-informedvoters strugglingwith the complexity and
abstractionofmacroeconomics–difficultiestrainedeconomiststhemselvesoften
failtograsp–arelikelytoshunabstractconceptssuchasaggregatedemandand
liquidity preference for the ‘concrete thinking’ of thehouseholdbudget. In the
household, a decline in economic activity is best dealtwith by austerity, since
deficitswillnothaveanystimuluseffectonrevenue.Aninabilitytoconceptualize
andobservetheeconomyasawholewill leadtotheerroneousconclusionthat
economy-widespendingcutsarenecessaryinadownturn.Indeedthereasoning
maynotevenbesoexplicitlycausal.ArecentYouGovsurveyfoundthatmoreUK
votersfeltspendingcutswerenecessarythanfelttheyweregoodfortheeconomy
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(Dahlgreen2015),suggestinganinstinctiveormoralisticreactionratherthana
considered,ifmisguided,causalnarrative.AsBerelsonetalargued
For many voters political preferences may better be considered
analogoustoculturaltastes…Bothseemtobemattersofsentiment
and disposition rather than ‘reasoned preferences’. While both are
responsive to changed conditions and unusual stimuli, they are
relatively invulnerable to direct argumentation and vulnerable to
indirectsocialinfluences.Botharecharacterizedmorebyfaiththanby
convictionandbywishfulexpectationratherthancarefulpredictionof
consequences.(Berelsonetal1954:310-311).
Representative structures such as political parties and trade unions have
traditionallyprovidedasolutiontothisproblem.Byestablishingrelationsoftrust
with theirsocial constituencies, theseorganizationscoulduse their intellectual
andmaterialresourcestodeveloppolicyproposalsinbroadercollectiveinterests.
Theirabilitytosurviveinthelongrundependedupontheirsuccessindelivering
beneficialpoliciesandconvincing theirvoters/membersof that success. In the
absence of such trust-bearing institutions, citizens are burdened with the
responsibilityofdecidingforthemselveswhichpolicieswillbenefitthem.Lacking
thenecessaryresources,theywilltendtobelieve‘commonsense’storiesrather
thanspecializedknowledge,creatinganintellectual‘marketforlemons’(Akerlof
1970).Bad ideasmaydriveoutgoodones, since intellectualand informational
asymmetriesmakeitlesslikelythatcostlyinvestmentsindevelopinggoodideas
willpayoffpolitically.
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Austerity Politics in Britain: non-partisan politics in defiance of
macroeconomiccommonsense?
The decline of political ideologies and the organizational infrastructure that
supported them has,we argue, givenway to a discursive free-for-all inwhich
intellectualcoherenceandempiricalfalsifiabilityareincreasinglyabsent.Inthis
sectionweexaminethecharacteristicsofpoliticalbullshitwithaviewtolaying
somefoundationsforstudyingitsystematically.Todothis,wefocusontherole
played by bullshit in the domain ofmacroeconomic policy, specifically around
questionsofgovernmentdebtandbudgetdeficits.Wefocusontherecentdebate
ondeficit reduction in theUK to illustrate the dynamics of political bullshit at
work.Although themore spectacular casesofDonaldTrumpor theBrexiteers
havecapturedtheattentionofobserversofpost-truthpolitics,wecanseeclear
evidenceofthesameindifferencetotruthinthemainstreampoliticalconsensus
arounddeficitreductionafterthefinancialcrisisofthelate2000s.
Forthepurposesofthissection,wefocusoninter-partypoliticsintherunupto
andinthe immediateaftermathof the2015GeneralElection.Theelectionwas
notableforreturningasinglepartyConservativemajoritygovernmenttooffice
forthefirsttimesince1992.Themostcredibleelectoralanalysespointtoonekey
variablefoundinopinionpolldataasthekeyexplanationfortheelectionresult:
theconsistentperceptionthattheConservativePartyscoredsignificantlyhigher
oneconomiccompetencethattherivalLabourParty(Reeves,McKeeandStuckler
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2016). The Conservatives were able to maintain an advantage on this metric
throughouttheelectioncampaigninspiteofinchoaterhetoricabouta‘longterm
economic plan’ and the apparently reckless presentation of uncosted (and
seeminglyadhoc)proposalson(forexample)NHSfunding.Thisreputationfor
economic competence had been forged and retained, despite the previous
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition’s failure to meet its own budgetary
targets,arecordoffallingrealwages,aproportionateincreaseinso-called‘zero-
hour contract’ employment, a failure to deal with the UK’s poor productivity
performance and a generalized programme of austerity with well-publicised
socialcosts(Hopkin2017).2
Despitetheseprimafaciefavourableconditions,duringtheelectioncampaignthe
LabourParty found it impossible toshakeoffoneparticularlydamagingclaim:
thatthefiscalprofligacyofthepreviousLabourGovernment(whichleftofficein
2010)had(a)lefttheincomingCon-LibDemcoalitionwitharuinousgapbetween
public expenditure and government revenues and (b) left the UK economy
especially exposed to the effects of the global financial crisis. In short, the
macroeconomic imprudenceof thoseLabourgovernmentshadcausedboth the
deficitandthecrisis.Thenotionof‘Labour’srecession’becameastaplerhetorical
markerduringtheelectioncampaign.ThenarrativeofLabourprofligacyiseasy
enough to refute (for example, Skidelsky 2015,Wren-Lewis 2015a), yet in the
immediateaftermathofelectoraldefeatmanyinthepartyseemedtoconcedethat
Labour did overspend and that under Ed Miliband’s leadership it became
unnecessarilyunfriendlytobusiness.Itfollows,usingthislineofreasoning,that
acceptanceofthemantrasof‘deficitfetishism’(Stiglitz2010),andthusausterity,
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would be central and necessary components of any economic strategy that it
presentstotheelectoratein2020.Putanotherway,theargumentamountedto
theclaimthattheonlywayforLabourtoclosetheeconomicpolicycredibilitygap
withtheConservativeswastopositionitselfasapartyoffiscalrectitude,where
fiscalrectitudeisdefinedmoreorlessexclusivelyintermsofspendingcutsinthe
pursuitofbudgetsurplusesanddrasticreductionsintheUK’sdebttoGDPratio.
ThecentralityofdeficitfetishismtorecentUKmacroeconomicpolicydebatehad
theeffectofelevatingthegovernmentbudgetbalancetothestatusofkeymetric
fortheassessmentofaggregateeconomicwelfare,governmentcompetenceand
government credibility. This is a relatively recent occurrence, and there is an
interesting story to be told about how and why other indicators, such as the
currentaccountbalance,havebecomemuchlesssalientasindicatorsofeconomic
health(CliftandTomlinson2008).Indeed,asTonyDolphin(2014)suggestedon
notingthattheUKhadrecordedthreestraightdecadesofcurrentaccountdeficits:
‘ThisisasignthatthereisafundamentalflawintheUK'seconomicmodel.’This
may be true, but balance of payments data is no longer, it seems, electorally
consequential. The phrase ‘electorally consequential’, as used here, does not
assumethatincumbentgovernmentswilllosevotesforpoorperformanceonkey
economic metrics. Rather it means that the metric in question, the debate
surrounding it and the repertoire of analogies that are used to illustrate its
saliencebecomekeyshapersofelectoralpoliticsandtheparametersofwhatis
deemedpossibleinpolicyterms.
20
Theextentofdeficit fetishismisperhapsbestgraspedbyrevisitingtheLabour
Party’s2015ElectionManifesto(LabourParty2015).Theveryfirstpageofthe
manifesto promised a ‘Budget Responsibility Lock’ – an assurance that all
manifesto pledgeswere fully costed and that an incoming Labour government
wouldlegislatetoensurethatallfuturepartymanifestocommitmentswouldbe
auditedbytheOfficeforBudgetResponsibility(OBR).Themanifestocontained
twofurtherkeypassagesdesignedtopresentLabourasapartyoffiscalrectitude:
ALabourgovernmentwillcutthedeficiteveryyear.Thefirst lineof
Labour’sfirstBudgetwillbe:‘ThisBudgetcutsthedeficiteveryyear’.
ThismanifestosetsoutthatwewillonlylayaBudgetbeforetheHouse
of Commons that cuts the deficit every year, which the OBR will
independentlyverify.Wewillgetnationaldebtfallingandasurpluson
the current budget as soon as possible in the next parliament. This
manifestosetsoutthatwewillnotcompromiseonthiscommitment.
(LabourParty2015:2)
ThenextLabourGovernmentwillbalancethebooks.Wewillonlylay
aBudgetbeforetheHouseofCommonsthatcutsthedeficiteveryyear,
whichtheOffice forBudgetResponsibilitywill independentlyverify.
Wewillgetnationaldebtfallingandasurplusonthecurrentbudgetas
soonaspossibleinthenextParliamentandthesefiscalcommitments
willnotbecompromised.Wewilltackletherootcausesofthedeficit
bybuildingamoreproductiveeconomywithlivingstandardsthatrise
year-on-year.(LabourParty2015:17)
21
Yetonthedayaftertheelection,aFinancialTimesheadlineread:‘EdMiliband’s
move to the left lostLabour theelection’ (Pickard2015).3While themanifesto
didn’tpremisetheachievementofitsfiscalcommitmentspurelyonreductionsin
publicexpenditure,4theprevailingassumptionthatdeficitsaretobeavoidedin
normal times, is indicative of subscription to a particular form of economic
orthodoxy.Aprimaryindicatorofthisallegianceinthemanifestowasthepledge
tokeeptheUK’srateofcorporationtaxasthemostcompetitiveintheG7(Labour
Party2015:19).Thereisstrongevidencethatcorporatetaxcompetitionandthe
consequent ‘race to the bottom’ reduces the capacity of governments to raise
revenuethroughprogressiveformsofpersonaltaxation(GanghofandGenschel
2008).Thusacommitmenttomaintainingcompanytaxationatacompetitively
lowlevelcouldpotentiallyeroderevenuesfrompersonaltaxationregardlessof
themarginalrate.Underaregimecharacterizedbydeficitfetishism,compromised
revenues in the absence of expenditure cuts can only damage a government’s
budget balance. It follows that surpluses can only be delivered through
expenditurecutsortheachievementofacceleratedgrowth(whichspillsoverinto
animprovedtaxtake).
Furthermore, Labour (via then shadowChancellorChrisLeslie) soon indicated
thatitwaswillingtosupporttheConservativegovernment’sproposaltoenacta
so-called budget surplus law (Sunday Times, 5 July 2015).5 The idea of
‘constitutionalizing’fiscalrectitudethroughbalancedbudgetlawsisneithernew
nor unique to the UK, but it was propelled to the top of the political agenda
following Chancellor George Osborne’s Mansion House speech on 10 June
22
(Osborne2015).,afewweeksaftertheelection.Withanappropriatelyrhetorical
nod in the direction of Victorian values via an approving reference to the
Commission for the Reduction of National Debt that last met in 1860 under
Palmerston, Osborne clarified the scope and purpose of such ameasure: ‘we
shouldnowaimforapermanentchangeinourpoliticaldebateandourapproach
tofiscalresponsibility–justastheyhavedoneinrecentyearsincountrieslike
SwedenandCanada.’(Osborne2015)6Claimingthattheelectionresultof2015
represented the ‘comprehensive rejection’ of ‘those arguing forborrowing and
morespending’,thespeechproposedtheideaofa‘permanentsettlement’:
Asettlementwhereitisacceptedacrossthepoliticalspectrumthat:
-withoutsoundpublicfinances,thereisnoeconomicsecurityfor
workingpeople.
-thatthepeoplewhosufferwhengovernmentsrununsustainable
deficitsarenottherichestbutthepoorest.
-andthattherefore,innormaltimes,governmentsoftheleftaswellas
the right should run a budget surplus to bear down on debt and
prepareforanuncertainfuture.(Osborne2015,emphasisadded)
Ofcourse,theideaisfarfromuncontroversial(TheGuardian,12June2015)7and
analysisby IMFeconomists (Ostry,GhoshandEspinoza2015)suggests that in
countriessuchastheUKwith‘fiscalspace’(essentiallywherethemarketishappy
tobuydebtandwheredefaultriskisunlikelytoaddapremiumtobondyields),
thereisnodrastictechnicalreasontoreducedebttoGDPratios.IndeedtheOstry
etalanalysisgoesfurthertosuggestthatthecostsofpayingdownthedebtare
23
likely to eclipse the small reduction in sovereign risk. AsWren-Lewis (2015b)
pointsout, in theUKcase thiswould involve sustainingadebt toGDPratioof
roughly 80%,with annual budget deficits of around 3%. The rapid erosion of
government attention towards the deficit after the vote to leave the European
UnioninJune2016confirmsthatdeficitreductionwasnotinfacttheonlypossible
policy.
Whatisinterestingaboutthisdevelopingstoryisthewideninggapbetweenthe
tighteningpartisanconsensusarounddeficitfetishism(atleastuntilthesurprise
election of Jeremy Corbyn to the leadership of the Labour Party in September
2015)ontheonehandandtheclear indicationsthat thetechnicalproprietyof
perpetual surplus budgeting (and thus, in all likelihood, austerity) remains a
contestedtopicamongprofessionaleconomists.Deficitfetishismmayrepresenta
component of the trend to ‘depoliticisation’ that has been characteristic of the
Britishpolitics of economicmanagementover recentdecades (Burnham1999,
2001,2014).ThetextofOsborne’sMansionHousespeechquotedaboveconforms
reasonablywelltothecentralclaimsofthedepoliticisationliterature–thatstate
managersseektoremoveaspectsofeconomicpolicy-makingfromthearenaof
politicalconflict.Indeed,deficitfetishism,asunderstoodhere,wasonthebrinkof
becomingpoliticallynon-controversialintheUK–atleastintermsofthetwomain
parties.8 Also, as we have seen, deficit fetishism circumscribes the range of
plausiblepolicyinstrumentsandinsertscertainfundamentalbarriersintheway
ofdevelopingeconomicpolicyalternativesalongbroadly(neo)Keynesianlines.
Yet, thedissensusintheeconomicblogosphereisstriking.Admittedly,muchof
24
thecritiqueofthepositiontakenbythemainstreampoliticalclassondeficitshas
beendevelopedbyanassortmentofcentre-leftKeynesiansandbroadlyheterodox
economists.Eveniftheprofessionaleconomicscommentariatdoespositionitself
on this issue more-or-less according to the political spectrum, then it is still
strikingthatthishasnotbeenthecaseintermsofinter-partycompetition.The
intellectual authorization of deficit fetishism is visible and traceable. Its
importanceinsecuringinfluenceinEuropeanpolicycircles(anditsarticulation
withtheordoliberalframesoftheEUmacroeconomicestablishment)shouldnot
beforgotten(Blyth2013,Dellepiane-Avellaneda2015,Sinclair1999).Butnon-
austerianalternativeshavebeenreadilyavailableand,ifanything,haveenhanced
their position since the onset of the crisis (the IMF being perhaps the most
interestingsiteinthisregard–seeespeciallyBan2015).Thequestionathandis
whythebalance(oratleastthecontention)withintheprofessionalliteraturehas
nottranslatedintopoliticalcontestationacrosstraditionalpartypolitics?
TheBritishcasediscussedhereseemstobeanexemplarofpoliticalbullshit.For
akeyperiodatleast,aneasilycontestable(ormoreorlessrefutable)setofclaims
–aboutLabourprofligacyinofficeandabouttheneedtoreducebudgetdeficits
and public debts at all cost – became an uncontroversial premise of British
macroeconomicdebate.Thisisnotjustacaseofthesuccessfulpropagationofa
particularnarrativeononesideofthepartisandivide.Therealstoryhereisthe
capacityofthedualclaim(amixtureofhistoricalassertionandaquasi-technical
viewofwhatisbestfortheeconomy)torhetoricallyentrapthepartytowhom
that very claim did themost damage. The literature on rhetorical entrapment
remindsusthatactorsdonothavetobepersuadedinordertoadoptapositionor
25
agreetoanoutcometowhichtheywerehithertoopposed.Itisenoughforthem
tobeunabletoargueagainstapropositionforthemtoaccedetoit(seeHansen
2006, Krebs and Jackson 2007, Schimmelfennig 2001). Thus adding political
bullshitintothemixallowsustopositsituationswhereitbecomesimpossibleto
argueagainstclaimsthathaveneartozeroveracity.
TheAgeofBullshit:PoliticalDiscourseinthe21stCentury
Understanding the success of political bullshit is an important challenge for
politicalscience,sinceitisinconsistentwithmanyoftheassumptionsofstandard
models,predicatedastheyareonactorshavingsomeconnectionwithashared
reality.Herewediscusssomeavenuesofenquirythatmaycontributetoabetter
understanding of the apparent growth of bullshit discourses in the advanced
democracies.
Theadoptionofpro-cyclicalmacroeconomicpoliciesintheUKafterthefinancial
crisisisaparticularlyusefulcase,becauseweobserveabullshitpoliticaldiscourse
justifyingapoliticalchoicethatdamagedthematerialinterestsofmanyvoters,yet
wonwidespreadsupport.ThedifficultiesoftheUKLabourpartyinwinningbroad
support for an alternative more intellectually plausible account are particular
significant because they are inconsistent with past experience. The consensus
viewinpoliticaleconomyinthepost-warperiodwasthatpoliticalpartiesofthe
leftwouldfavourexpansionarypoliciestosecurefullemployment,whilstthoseof
therightwouldprefercontractionarypoliciestocontaininflation(Hibbs1977).
Thereasonsforthiswereclear:thosepoliciesimpliedalternativedistributionsof
gains and losses for theparties’ respective constituencies. By adopting amore
26
expansionaryapproach, leftpartieswouldimprovetheconditionoftheir lower
incomevoters,whoweremoreexposed tounemploymentand lessexposed to
inflationaryrisk.
IfUKLabourwasunabletosustainsuchapolicyinthe2010s,itwasnotbecause
itselectoratenolongerhadasharedinterestinmoreexpansionarypolicy:Labour
MPs continue to represent the regions of theUKwith the lowest incomes and
highest unemployment. So we need to examine other reasons why political
bullshitappealedsostronglytoBritishvoters,andwhyLabourfounditsodifficult
topushbackagainstit.
There are perhaps two related lines of argument might seek to explain why
debt/deficitbullshithasbeensosuccessful in theUK.The first,advancedmost
forcefullybyWren-Lewis,concernstheroleofthemediareproducingparticularly
corrosive formsofeconomic illiteracy–ofwhich the idea thatdeficitsare ipso
facto ‘bad’ isastrongexample. Indeedhehascoined the term ‘mediamacro’ to
describetheparticularwayofnarratingtheeconomyassociatedwith(especially)
the broadcast media. He defines mediamacro as ‘a set of ideas about
macroeconomicspromulgatedbythemediathatseemverydifferenttothemacro
taughttoeconomicstudents’(Wren-Lewis2015c).9Mediamacrodoesnotworkin
isolation from the political sphere, and it is here that perhapswe can see the
performativeaspectsofpoliticalbullshit:
Whatwegetasaresultisabiasagainstthefacts.InthecaseofLabourand
thedeficit,becauseLabourchosefatefullynottochallengetheConservatives
27
onthis,themediatakesthisasconfirmationthatitmustbetrueratherthan
checkingthefactsthemselves,orshyawayfrompresentingthefactsbecause
thatwouldbeseenas‘toopolitical’.Myththenbecomesafactthatevensome
LabourMPsstartbelieving,andwhensomeoneactuallystandsupforthe
factstheyareassumedtobedishonestoraslightlymadprofessor.(Wren-
Lewis2016)
Thesecondlineofargumentwouldponderwhysomebullshitclaimsarebetter
placedtosecuretractionthanothers.Inthisrespect,thefestishizationofdeficits
as ‘bad’tapssomewhatsuccessfullyintoaparticulartypeoffolkwisdomabout
theeconomy–themoreorlessstraightforwardanalogizationofaneconomy(in
thecaseoftheUK,amonetarysovereign)withahousehold.Needlesstosay,using
household debt as a metaphor for sovereign debt is an egregious fallacy of
composition(Krugman2013,Matthews2013).Butideassuchas‘maxingout’the
‘nationalcreditcard’(see, forexample,TheTimes15September201510),while
meaninglesstoeconomists,offeraclearandtime-efficienttoolfortranslatinga
particularviewofeconomicproprietyintopublicdiscourse.
Howeveritisnotclearwhythesefactorsworksomuchmorestronglytodaythan
in the post-war period, when Hibbs observed a clear political debate around
distinct and plausible macroeconomic theories between the major political
parties. What has changed, we suggest, is that the fundamental shifts in the
politicaleconomyofadvanceddemocraciessincethe1970shavebothstripped
politicalpartiesoftheirpowertodecidepolicy,andthereforeweakenedthemas
carriers of coherent ideologies and policy programmes. In this post-party
28
environment(whichColinCrouch[2004]describesas ‘post-democracy’),policy
decisionsarethepreserveofunelectedtechnocratssuchascentralbankers,and
electedpoliticiansnot only cando little to influence the fundamental leversof
policy, but also believe that their job is to intervene as little as possible in
economicmanagement.
Thispromotesthesuccessofpoliticalbullshitintwomainways.First,thefutility
ofsupportingpoliticalpartieswhosepurposeisnolongertomanagethestateto
thebenefitofbroadsocialinterests,butinsteadistopromotethepoliticalcareers
of party officeholders and aspirant officeholders, weakens the connection
between voters, activists and the party leaders. As a result, party machines
becomeincreasinglydistant fromthesocial intereststheynotionallyrepresent,
andmorereluctanttoexpressclearidentifiablepolicypositions(KatzandMair
1995,BlythandKatz2004).Second,whenthemainpolicydecisionsaredrivenby
technocraticrationalesorconstrainedbythepressuresoffinancialmarkets,the
pay-offfordevelopingconcretepolicyproposalsdiminishes,whilstthepay-offfor
producinginoffensiveorvaguelyplausiblebullshitdiscoursesremainsintact:bad
ideasdriveoutthegood.
Butwecangofurtherandsuggestthatthereisanintimaterelationshipbetween
the hollowing out of democracy described by Mair and others and the very
discourse that is used to underpin austerity. The intellectual antecedents of
austerity thinking (time inconsistency, public choice critiques of government
overload, Bocconi school thinking on fiscal deficits etc) are also inherently
suspicious of democratic contestation, and popular intervention in the
29
management of the economy more generally. One of the ways in which this
skeptical view of government economic interventionism plays out is in its
reluctancetoacceptthekindsofexpertisewhichunderpinspoliciesdesignedto
make the economy work more efficiently and equitably. Hostility to scientific
discourseabouttheeconomic,andresortinsteadtothehomelybullshitofsound
money,protectionofpropertyand freemarketexchange isaneffectivewayof
generatingsupportforpolicieswhichmaynotbeinthebroadpublicinterest,but
whichappealtobroadpublicsentiments.
Conclusions
Inthispaperwehavearguedthatthereisaconnectionbetweenthesimultaneous
riseofbullshitinpoliticaldiscourseandtheriseofausterityanddeficitfetishism
asthedominantfeatureofmacroeconomicpolicy,andthattheriseofbullshit(and
thus of austerity policies) is rooted in the broader hollowing out of western
democraticpolitics.Politicalpartiesseemlessconnectedtotheirelectoratesand
lesslikelytodevelopclearideologicalandpolicypositionswhichappealtotheir
voters and allow them to defend their interests. This is a function of parties’
declining ability to use policy levers in favour of their electorates due to the
successofneoliberalreformersinentrenchingthedepoliticizationofkeypolicy-
makingpowersandremovinglargeareasofeconomicpolicyfromthesphereof
politicaldebate.The ‘hollowingout’ofdemocracydescribedbyPeterMairhas
made clear ideological statements less profitable for parties, leading to party
competition revolving increasinglyaroundbullshitdiscourseas thepayoffs for
developing soundpolicydeclineandbad ideas– inakindofGresham’s lawof
30
ideationalcontestation11-driveoutgood.
Our argument here poses a challenge to political science. As well as taking
seriouslythewaysinwhichideasanddiscoursesshapesocialinterests,wealso
needtoconsiderthatmuchpoliticaldiscourseismeaninglessandunfalsifiable:in
short, it is bullshit. We arrive at a situation where voters are not simply
overwhelmedwithinformation;muchofthatinformationisbullshit,andvoters’s
capacities to distinguish plausible truth claims from bullshit is severely
compromised.Thisproblemisnotrestrictedtothediscoursesofcontemporary
populists such as Donald Trump; indeed our focus has been the apparently
technocraticand‘responsible’claimsoftheeliteconsensusthatprecededwhatis
often described as ‘post-truth politics’. Developing the tools to observe and
understandtheoriginsandusesofpoliticalbullshitshouldbecomeapriority.
Notes
1. Seehttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/letters/11578326/Ed-
Miliband-loses-credibility-by-refusing-to-admit-that-the-last-Labour-
government-overspent.html[accessed18May2017]and
http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2015/04/milibands-refusal-to-
admit-that-labour-overspent-could-cost-him-dear/[accessed18May
2017]
31
2. AsignificantimprovementintheTories’ratingforeconomiccompetence
appearedtocoincidewiththeretreatfromstrictausteritybudgetingin
2013.See
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/aug/12/guardian-icm-poll-
tories-economic-confidence[accessed18May2017]
3. TonyBlairhadsaidmuchthesamesixmonthsearlier:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2891948/Miliband-Left-wing-
win-election-says-Blair.html[accessed18May2017]
4. Themanifestoalsopromisedariseinthemarginalrateofpersonal
taxationforthehighestearners(areturntothe50prate)anda
generalisedcrackdownontaxavoidance.
5. http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/article1577182.e
ce?CMP=OTH-gnws-standard-2015_07_05[accessed18May2917]
6. OnSwedenandtheSocialDemocrat-ledgovernment’swishtorelaxthe
budgetsurplustarget:http://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-seeks-to-
drop-budget-surplus-target-1425379037(WallStreetJournal,3March
2015)[accessed18May2017].
7. http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jun/12/osborne-plan-has-
no-basis-in-economics[accessed18May2017]
8. AggressivedeficitreductiontargetswerealsooutlinedintheUKIP
Manifesto(UKIP2015:8-9).TheLiberalDemocratmanifesto(Liberal
Democrats2015)spokeinratherlessprecisetermsaboutreducingthe
deficit’fairly’.Buttherewasnoquestionthatannualdeficitsshouldbe
eliminatedanddebttoGDPratiosshouldbereducedsignificantly.
32
9. Wren-Lewissuggestsfurtherthatmediamacrotendstobetheworkof
politicaljournalistsratherthantrainedeconomicscorrespondents.
10. http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/politics/article4557053.ece
[accessed18May2017]
11. Wearegratefultooneoftheanonymousrefereesforthissuggestion.
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