Privatization CP

1NC

The United States Federal Government should privatize water

The counterplan solves for environmental protection and allocation Clare Brown and Block 19 (Clare Brown and Walter Block, Loyola University New Orleans, 2-2-2019, "Free Market for the Environment", Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 116-125, https://ideas.repec.org/a/rnp/ecopol/ep1906.html, accessed: 7-13-2021)//yeed

The tragedy of the commons is responsible for many , if not all, of the environmental problems concerning natural resource preservation that we face in modern society. The tragedy of the commons

describes a situation in which resources held “in common”, namely, public resources, are depleted or

mistreated by collective action. Basically it means lack of private ownership and almost inevitably leads

to a misallocation of resources . And yet, the predominating kinds of solutions proposed to solve these

problems involve increased government regulation —effectively expanding the scope of the very

tragedy of the commons which lies at the heart of the problem in the first place . The present paper

advocates an alternative: free market environmentalism. It is not a contradiction in terms, despite how that phrase sounds to the

modern ear. In this paper we attempt to demonstrate that laissez-faire capitalism is our last best hope for protecting the environment. Free market environmentalism centers around private property rights and thus a

decentralization of environmental decision-making. Effective choices made about scarce resources

must be based upon free market price signals and incentives . The lack of laissez-faire capitalism

applied to earth’s natural resources distorts both of these indicators —causing poorly made and

oftentimes destructive decisions . A free market solution to the environment creates the most value for

society , allows for open and continuous entrepreneurial innovation , and economically empowers those who are the most environmentally vulnerable.

2NCs

Solvency - General

Solves AND perm failsClare Brown and Block 19 (Clare Brown and Walter Block, Loyola University New Orleans, 2-2-2019, "Free Market for the Environment", Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 116-125, https://ideas.repec.org/a/rnp/ecopol/ep1906.html, accessed: 7-13-2021)//yeed

The present paper advocates an alternative: free market environmentalism. centers around private property

rights and thus a decentralization of environmental decision-making. Effective choices made about

scarce resources must be based upon free market price signals and incentives . The lack of laissez-

faire capitalism applied to earth’s natural resources distorts both of these indicators —causing poorly

made and oftentimes destructive decisions . A free market solution to the environment creates the most

value for society , allows for open and continuous entrepreneurial innovation , and economically

empowers those who are the most environmentally vulnerable .

The burden of section 1 is to expound upon our claim that the profit and loss system is the last best hope for ecological soundness. In section 2 we turn our attention to private property rights. The burden of section 3 is to deal with

underdeveloped countries and their relation to the environment. We conclude in section 4 with a discussion of pollution.

In matters of environmentalism, capitalistic endeavors that produce profits are widely thought of as evil polluters that can only do great harm.

Condemning capitalism for the deterioration of the environment suggests that the only way to preserve the planet is to regress to a lower standard of living. This, however, is not at all our fate. We can

reconcile determination to preserve and protect natural resources with a desire for economic

growth and continued prosperity . In fact, the two go hand in hand in the free market .3 Voluntary

exchanges inherently create wealth for society because they are voluntary: both buyer and seller

believe that they are gaining something in the transaction, else they would not engage in the trade . These unobstructed commercial interactions channel resources, products and services to those who value them most. This is because they are the ones willing to pay the greatest amount, and there are no external forces, such as government interference , persuading or forcing the resources in another

direction. When this trade involves natural resources, it opens up opportunities not afforded by state ownership. Richard Stroup4 identifies three ways in which resource owners gain by trading: across uses, across space, and across time. Across uses allows individuals to direct their resources to their most valuable and productive activities —for example, “out of low-valued crops into ones that earn them more money.”

Across space enables the resource to be put to its most highly valued use , regardless of geographic distance. For instance, moving the production of oranges from Maine to Florida. Finally, across time allows

resource owners to gain from “conservation or speculation by saving resources until they become more valuable” [Stroup, 2016]. Being afforded the unrestricted option in the free market to make these kinds of

decisions about natural resources allows for specific solutions to unfold.

Privatization solves. Chris Edwards 16 (Chris Edwards is the director of tax policy studies at Cato. He is a top expert on federal and state tax and budget issues. Before joining Cato, Edwards was a senior economist on the congressional Joint Economic Committee, 6-28-2016, "Options for Federal Privatization and Reform Lessons from Abroad", Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/options-federal-privatization-reform-lessons-abroad#bureau-of-reclamation, accessed: 7-12-2021)//yeed

The federal Bureau of Reclamation is at the center of water policy in the arid American West. For more than a century, the agency has built and operated dams, canals, and hydropower plants in the 17 western states. It owns 76 hydropower plants and is the largest wholesaler of water in the nation.376 It has 5,200 employees and net budget outlays of $1.5 billion annually.

Reclamation’s policies have created economic distortions and environmental damage . Numerous

dams were not worth the cost of construction and only won approval because of pork barrel

politics . About four‐fifths of the water that Reclamation supplies today goes to farmers, who receive it at a fraction of its

market value. Subsidized irrigation water causes various environmental harms, including

inefficient water use, high salinization levels in rivers, and damage to wetlands .

In the 19th century, irrigation was a state, local, and private concern. The Mormons, for example, arrived in Salt Lake Valley in 1847 and within a year had created an irrigation system covering 5,000 acres.377 But lobbying by western interests, such as the railroads, paid off with the

Reclamation Act of 1902, which launched massive federal dam building. From the beginning, projects were chosen based on politics, not because they made sense on a cost–benefit basis.378

Despite Reclamation’s huge investments to increase supply, the western United States is in the midst of a serious water crisis today. Groundwater levels are falling and surface sources of water are tapped out. Major river systems in the west have been engineered by federal and state water infrastructure to maximize water consumption. But the drought of recent years has exposed longstanding failures in government

policies .

The underlying problems of western water stem from misguided policies on water prices and water transfers. Governments have kept prices artificially low for so long that they have encouraged water use in low‐ value activities . Water subsidies combined with federal farm subsidies have encouraged inefficient agricultural production.

Restrictions on water transfers between users add to the problems . Surface water in the western states is

generally allocated by government rules, not by markets. Farmers who receive Reclamation water often do not have the option to resell it, so it gets locked into low‐ value uses . Water shortages are often caused by

restrictions on transfers, not overall supply problems . The solution is to end the subsidies and

liberalize rules on transfers so that water prices reflect market supply and demand . That would

promote efficiency and benefit the environment .

Water policy issues are hugely contentious in the western states. In the long run, they cannot be solved in Washington,

nor should they be. Water policy should be handled by the states, which should control their own water infrastructure. Congress should transfer water infrastructure to state and local governments, who in turn should consider privatizing it . The single largest

Reclamation project is the Central Valley Project; its huge facilities are all located in California and should be transferred to that state.

In the 1990s, efforts were made to devolve Reclamation facilities. Under its “reinventing government” initiative, the Clinton administration sold federal water projects to local irrigation districts.379 About 19 Reclamation projects were transferred to nonfederal owners.380 Experience has shown that local control of water

infrastructure increases efficiency as a result of lower labor costs , less paperwork , and faster

decisionmaking .381

Congress should privatize the 76 hydropower plants owned by Reclamation . That reform should be combined with privatizing the PMAs that transmit the power produced in Reclamation dams.

In a 2015 book, former commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation Daniel Beard describes how the agency “ destroyed hundreds

of miles of free‐ flowing rivers , promoted excessive water use , and sent billions of dollars in

subsidies to a small number of people.“ 382 With decades of expertise on water issues under his belt, Beard called for abolishing the Bureau of Reclamation, and Congress should heed his advice.

Solvency – Biodiversity/Environment

Solves BioD and environment Clare Brown and Block 19 (Clare Brown and Walter Block, Loyola University New Orleans, 2-2-2019, "Free Market for the Environment", Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 116-125, https://ideas.repec.org/a/rnp/ecopol/ep1906.html, accessed: 7-13-2021)//yeed

There are a great variety of environmental problems across the world, and as such people should be free to have access to a great variety of

solutions. Some are already playing out in the market. For example, in order to keep high-quality streams full of water and sustain fish populations, water markets have begun to develop. Farmers who have the right to

divert stream water often use large amounts of it for their fields, and streams can dry up. To prevent this,

some fishermen are willing to pay cash to lease the rights to the water from the farmers. This privately generated market shifts the water to a higher-valued use [Block, Nelson, 2015].

A market can also exist for garbage : Consider a city that disposes of garbage in a landfill. If the city is located in an area where underground water lies near the surface, disposing of garbage is dangerous, and very costly measures would have to be taken to protect the water from contamination. Such a city may gain by

finding a trading partner with more suitable land where a properly constructed landfill does not threaten to pollute water. Such a landowner may be willing to accept garbage in return for pay [Stroup, 2016].

Creative solutions such as these can be credited to the entrepreneur, or, in this case, “ enviropreneur ”. 5 He is most successful in the free market, where the profit and loss system is able to do its job

and act as a filter . When entrepreneurs detect a profit opportunity, they invest. If successful, their profits

attract other producers, and the consumer benefits from the increased competition that ensues as

sellers compete for customer dollars . The only way in which they can earn more profits is by satisfying customer wants and needs. When entrepreneurs are free to invest in endeavors involving natural resources, it results in their responsible use, so as to reduce costs. It will also bring about their conservation because of

the potential for future profits .6 Through competition in the free market, those who succeed in putting

resources to their most valued use are rewarded by profits , and those who fail are penalized by

losses . Government decision making receives none of these signals that profits and losses provide because they are not subject to such direct and impactful consumer assessment of their activities .7

This is one of the reasons why government is unable to solve our environment al crises . Optimal solutions

require the involvement of the private sectors and the trial and error involved in entrepreneurship . The

way to enable such entrepreneurship to flourish is private property rights.8

Solvency – Climate Adaptation

Privatization solves climate adaptation Sam Ori 17 (Sam Ori is the executive director of the Energy Policy Institute at University of Chicago, 10-15-2017, "It’s Time to Let the Free Market Work for Water", WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/articles/its-time-to-let-the-free-market-work-for-water-1508119456, accessed: 7-15-2021)//yeed

In the U.S., yields from four major crops will drop by as much as 40% on average by the end of the century due to a warming climate, according to a recent study in the journal Science. And while reducing carbon emissions to minimize future warming is by far the most cost-effective means for avoiding this outcome, it is increasingly clear that some amount of

adaptation will also be needed.

In the agricultural sector, that likely means significant crop migration over the long term—areas in the northern U.S. and southern Canada are likely to become more important sources of grain production, while yields decline in the south and middle of the country due to higher summer temperatures. This transition will take time and require significant investment, to say nothing of the distributional consequences for farmers who can’t simply move their land northward. Meanwhile, many regions of the country will increasingly rely on expanded irrigation to produce the same crops at similar levels.

America’s farmers already account for 80% of our consumptive water use. To make good use of scarce water resources

in a climate-stressed future, it will be critical to ensure that water flows to the highest-value applications. Economists and other researchers have pointed out over and over again that markets offer the most effective means for solving these kinds of problems.

But for markets to work, we need to let them.

Unfortunately, the markets for water are failing in many U.S. states today, especially in the West, due to a web of poorly defined and unevenly enforced property rights that have given rise to misaligned incentives and uncertainty.

New evidence from Idaho suggests that clarifying these rights could have big payoffs. The state is home to the Snake River Basin, among the largest irrigated regions in the U.S. Yet, for decades regulators failed to document, measure or enforce water rights adequately. Then, in the late 1980s, the state embarked on a historic water rights adjudication process almost unprecedented in scale. Over the following years, Idaho settled a water rights case every 90 minutes—a process that affected one in 10 Idahoans.

It turns out the effort, completed in 2014, was well worth it. Clarifying property rights led to a 140% increase in water-rights trading, according to a forthcoming analysis by University of Chicago researcher Oliver Browne, a doctoral candidate leading this pioneering work. Critically, more water trading means more water flowing to higher-value uses. Buyers of water in Idaho were able to extract $34 per acre more value from their land than the respective sellers. This effect,

combined with an expansion of crop acreage, increased agricultural production by $250 million annually following the

reforms. Clearly, the benefits outweighed the one-time cost of $94 million spent updating the system .

Idaho’s water-rights situation is not unique. Its solution doesn’t need to be either. California, which got a glimpse of what the future could look like under climate change with its historic drought in recent years, has similar property-rights problems. So, while a market exists in the region, many don’t opt into it. That creates situations like the one the state faced over the past several years, when confusion has reigned over where scarce water supplies should flow.

And while relatively arid western states have historically faced the most complex water issues, states in the Midwest and Southeast are not immune from water-rights conflicts. These issues may intensify in the coming years as farms in states like Indiana and Michigan begin to switch from strictly rain-fed agriculture to higher levels of irrigation as hotter summer temperatures increase water stress, a trend the Sciencepaper

researchers say has already begun. As more areas of the country make the switch, establishing well-functioning markets that direct water to its highest-value uses would place the country in a much better position to manage

climate adaptation .

Ultimately, we may also need to face some hard truths. Irrigation is important, but expensive. Well-functioning water markets may very well signal to farmers that more water isn’t a long-term solution. They may need to switch to a different crop, or not grow any at all. Irrigation might not be the solution to every farmer’s problems, and markets can help them face that reality. In fact, water markets need not be limited to agricultural participants. By some estimates, cities value water nearly 10 times as much as farms. Yet, during the recent drought in California, urban utilities spent millions of dollars trying to incentivize their customers to conserve water, while some agricultural users were insulated from market forces. Expanding water markets to include a more diverse set of participants would greatly improve their efficiency.

The best available research indicates that climate change will present a significant challenge to American agriculture, in turn placing added stress

on water supplies. Markets are our best bet to allocate that increasingly scarce resource and minimize

the costs of climate adaptation. We just need to let them work .

Solvency – Drinking Water

Water privatization key to securing safe drinking water and promote best practicesAdam A. Millsap 10-5-2016 [Adam A. Millsap, Senior Fellow for economic opportunity issues at Stand Together and the Charles Koch Institute, "Privatizing Water Facilities Can Help Cash-Strapped Municipalities," Forbes, accessed at https://www.forbes.com/sites/adammillsap/2016/10/05/privatizing-water-facilities-can-help-cash-strapped-municipalities/?sh=60962ab24b5c] SYu 7-13-2021

In their recently released 2016 Annual Privatization Report, the Reason Foundation provides some insightful survey data from the Public Works Financing annual water partnerships survey. First, the size of the water/wastewater outsourcing market was $2.2 billion dollars in 2015, up 5% from 2014. More than 2,000 water

facilities operate under some sort of public-private partnership, including those in some large cities such as Milwaukee and Tampa. Nearly all of the municipalities currently using a private water company are satisfied with the service they are receiving. From 2006 to 2015, 2,529 municipal contract renewals came up and 90% were renewed, as

shown in the table below. Why privatize? More generally, there is no compelling economic reason for local governments to be the sole producer of water. Harvard Economist Andrei Schleifer has written extensively on private vs. public ownership, and one of his key points is

that public ownership may be preferable to private ownership when there are significant opportunities for deteriorations in quality that cannot be adequately avoided via contracting. As an

example of this Mr. Shleifer cites prisons. In order to increase profits, private prison operators may replace highly trained, expensive prison guards with poorly trained, cheaper guards who mistreat prisoners. This deterioration in quality is hard to prevent with a contract since it is difficult to specify the proper training in words and difficult to ensure that the guards consistently act in accordance with the appropriate standards.Control Authority in New London, Connecticut, entered into a public-private contract with Veolia North America, eventually giving greater responsibility to the company for the operation of the city’s water and wastewater facilities. According to Barry J. Weiner, chairman of the water authority,

private companies bring a range of resources and expertise that help public facilities keep up with

advances in technology . And in New London’s case, Veolia has been diligent about inspecting and maintaining all systems so that potential problems

are identified before they become serious or expensive to repair. Water, however, does not meet this criterion. First, water quality is relatively

easy to contract for; simply specify the allowable amount of the various contaminants. Water quality is also

relatively easy to monitor , and compared to prisons there are more people interested and capable of monitoring it—consumers,

government officials, media and watchdog groups. A public-private partnership has several benefits versus a completely public system. First , private firms often operate in many different jurisdictions, which means they

have more experience and are able to institute best practices based on their accumulated

knowledge. Second , there is more oversight . The firm has an incentive to provide the specified water quality in

order to maintain their business with the city and to avoid being sued for breach of contract. Local government

officials can easily monitor the firm since they only need to focus on water quality and availability .

If either the government or the firm fail to do their job, the other entity can alert residents . Third ,

private companies are often better situated to maintain the infrastructure than public ownership , and

public choice analysis helps explain why. Under complete government ownership, rate increases are a political

decision rather than a business decision . There is a strong incentive for government officials to keep

rates low , especially during election years, since rate increases rarely lead to votes. Moreover, it’s difficult for

politicians to commit to making necessary infrastructure improvements since the deterioration of a city’s water

infrastructure is a long process that’s hard for the average voter to notice. A politician can get more votes by allocating

tax dollars to conspicuous things like additional policemen or shiny, new fire trucks—it’s hard to trot out a new water main at a campaign rally. Low rates may satisfy consumers in the short run, but they often lead to neglected capital improvements. A report released last year by the American

Water Works Association estimated that America’s water infrastructure needs $1 trillion of investment over the next 25 years, or $40 billion per year! Some opponents of water privatization note that it sometimes results in rate increases rather than the decreases often touted by its proponents. The evidence on whether rates rise or fall is mixed, but considering the underinvestment over the last several decades, some rate increases are

inevitable, regardless of public or private provision. In fact, many municipalities, especially smaller ones, are engaging in some sort of privatization in order to ensure that their infrastructure complies with stricter environmental and testing regulations. The importance of competition Municipalities that privatize their water systems can enter into short

or long term contracts, and each has its pros and cons. Short-term contracts increase competition since firms will have to compete more often for the right to manage the water system. The drawback is that firms will be less willing to invest in

costly infrastructure improvements since shorter contracts mean less time to recoup the large, upfront costs. Alternatively, long-term contracts provide firms with an incentive to invest but decrease the benefits of more frequent competition. Entering into a long-term contract may

require more diligent oversight on the part of city officials since the firm will not be subjected to the same level of competition. If a city only wants a firm to operate the water system while it retains the responsibility for infrastructure improvements, then a short-term contract is more appropriate. If a city lacks the expertise or cannot afford to make the necessary infrastructure improvements, then a long term contract will likely be required . City

officials and residents need to remember that privatization itself is not a panacea. The key to effective privatization is maintaining competition. Private firms can quickly become inefficient and wasteful when sheltered from competitive market forces. That being said, in many cases

water privatization can improve infra structure, lower costs and provide residents with the

clean, safe water they expect.

Solvency – DroughtWater trading as a private commodity solves droughtJohn Ford 15 (John Ford is an attorney with Law & Stein., 8-15-2015, "Let free market determine price for water", Orange County Register, https://www.ocregister.com/2015/08/15/let-free-market-determine-price-for-water/, accessed: 7-15-2021)//yeed

As California searches for solutions to our ongoing drought, we would do well to look to how Australia successfully responded to a similarly severe drought nearly 20 years ago. In 1995, Australia found itself in the midst of the most serious drought since European settlement began. Rivers were drying up, and farms were going fallow all over the country. The crisis was so severe that Australia was forced to do something that was considered radical at the time: It adopted a market price for water.

The basic argument for a water market is straightforward. People should pay for the resources they use and they

should pay what the resource is actually worth. If people have to pay a market price for water, then they will be

encouraged to conserve in the ways that are the most economically efficient . In California, there is no

market price for water. Water in this state is artificially cheap – this low price encourages overconsumption that is harmful to both our economy and our environment. A market price for water would solve this problem.

Australia proved the theory behind water markets could work in the real world. Australia is subject to regular (often severe) droughts. The severity of the drought that began in 1995 forced Australia to try a variety of measures to combat water scarcity. It tried everything, from mandated cutbacks to building huge, expensive desalination plants. Nothing worked. Then, in 2007 Australia adopted a national system for trading water rights, building on smaller programs created in a previous drought by some of Australia’s states. In doing so, they created a national market for water.

After water markets were adopted, water consumption in Australia fell by 35 percent. Today, water consumption in Sydney is only about 83 gallons per person per day. Compare this with 193 gallons a day in Irvine, 186 gallons in Anaheim and 219 gallons in Orange. Australia got its citizens to conserve by using prices. Because they have to pay the market price for water, residents of Sydney pay about $6.50 per 1,000 gallons of water. In Irvine, the cost is much less, at only $3.19 per 1,000 gallons. But because people in Sydney use so much less water, the average person there pays only about $196 per year for water, whereas residents of Irvine pay about $228 per year for water.

Put simply, markets worked. A modest price increase resulted in significant conservation with only a modest impact on consumers’ pocket books.

In California, there is no market price for water. Of California’s 58 counties, 22 restrict any trading of water for any reason. Water in California is governed by a convoluted morass of regulations and bureaucracy. The state has 3,000 separate water districts and agencies, many of which exist only to sell water to each other at artificially low prices. Orange County alone has 28 separate water agencies.

This bureaucratic tangle means that instead of adopting a rational system of water trading based on market prices, we have responded to our drought by putting restrictions on when a restaurant can serve a glass of water to its patrons. No serious person believes this sort of rule will have a measurable impact on conservation.

If leaders in Sacramento want to do something that would actually alleviate the drought in a way that would protect both

our environment and our economy , they should take inspiration from Australia, do away with pointless

red tape and adopt a market price for water .

Solvency - Econ

Solves AND Econ INBAdam A. Millsap 16 (I am the Senior Fellow for economic opportunity issues at Stand Together and the Charles Koch Institute. I write about urban development, population trends, labor markets, and federal and local urban public policy. My writing has appeared in national outlets such as USA Today, US News and World Report, Real Clear Policy, and The Hill, as well as regional outlets such as the Detroit Free Press, Las Vegas Sun, Cincinnati Enquirer, and Orange County Register, among others. In addition to my research I have taught courses in economics at Florida State University, Clemson University, and George Mason University and I have stellar reviews on Rate My Professor. I earned my master’s and PhD in economics from Clemson University and a BS in economics and a BA in comparative religion from Miami University in Ohio, 10-5-2016, "Privatizing Water Facilities Can Help Cash-Strapped Municipalities", Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/adammillsap/2016/10/05/privatizing-water-facilities-can-help-cash-strapped-municipalities/?sh=5968bc8a4b5c, accessed: 7-14-2021)//yeed

After the Flint, MI water crisis earlier this year, some suggested that the city should privatize its municipal water service. This suggestion was met with criticism and arguments that privatization fails to improve quality or decrease costs. Others simply don’t like the idea of a private

company having anything to do with the production of one of life’s necessities. But the private production of water and sewage services is often advantageous for consumers and taxpayers, and it’s more common than many people realize.

Before we discuss the pros and cons of privatization, it’s necessary to specify what privatization entails. In her work on common pool resources, Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom defines providers as anyone who arranges for the provision of a good or service. Producers, meanwhile, are anyone who constructs, repairs or takes actions that ensure the long-term survival of the product. Often they are one and the same, but not always.

Under many privatization agreements a water company becomes the producer—being responsible for infrastructure upgrades, repairs and daily water production—while the municipality remains the provider and ultimate owner of the infrastructure.

Privatization in the United States

In their recently released 2016 Annual Privatization Report, the Reason Foundation provides some insightful survey data from the Public Works

Financing annual water partnerships survey. First, the size of the water/wastewater outsourcing market was $2.2 billion dollars in 2015, up 5% from 2014. More than 2,000 water facilities operate under some sort of public-private partnership, including those in some large cities such as Milwaukee and Tampa.

Nearly all of the municipalities currently using a private water company are satisfied with the

service they are receiving . From 2006 to 2015, 2,529 municipal contract renewals came up and 90% were renewed, as shown in the table below.

Source: 2016 Reason Annual Privatization report and Public Works Financing March 2016 report.

More generally, there is no compelling economic reason for local governments to be the sole producer of water. Harvard Economist Andrei Schleifer has written extensively on private vs. public ownership, and one of his key points is that public ownership may be preferable to private ownership when there are significant opportunities for deteriorations in quality that cannot be adequately avoided via contracting.

As an example of this Mr. Shleifer cites prisons. In order to increase profits, private prison operators may replace highly trained, expensive prison guards with poorly trained, cheaper guards who mistreat prisoners. This deterioration in quality is hard to prevent with a contract since it is difficult to specify the proper training in words and difficult to ensure that the guards consistently act in accordance with the appropriate standards.

Water, however, does not meet this criterion. First, water quality is relatively easy to contract for ; simply

specify the allowable amount of the various contaminants. Water quality is also relatively easy to monitor, and compared to prisons there are more people interested and capable of monitoring it—consumers, government officials, media and watchdog groups.

A public-private partnership has several benefits versus a completely public system. First, private firms often operate in many different jurisdictions , which means they have more experience and are able to

institute best practices based on their accumulated knowledge.

Second, there is more oversight . The firm has an incentive to provide the specified water quality in

order to maintain their business with the city and to avoid being sued for breach of contract . Local government officials can easily monitor the firm since they only need to focus on water quality and availability. If either the government or the

firm fail to do their job, the other entity can alert residents.

Third, private companies are often better situated to maintain the infrastructure than public ownership, and public choice analysis helps explain why. Under complete government ownership, rate increases are a political decision rather than a business decision. There is a strong incentive for government officials

to keep rates low , especially during election years, since rate increases rarely lead to votes.

Moreover, it’s difficult for politicians to commit to making necessary infrastructure improvements

since the deterioration of a city’s water infrastructure is a long process that’s hard for the average voter to notice. A politician can get more votes by allocating tax dollars to conspicuous things like additional policemen or shiny, new fire trucks—it’s hard to trot out a new water main at a campaign rally.

Low rates may satisfy consumers in the short run, but they often lead to neglected capital improvements . A report

released last year by the American Water Works Association estimated that America’s water infrastructure needs $1 trillion of investment over the next 25 years, or $40 billion per year!

Some opponents of water privatization note that it sometimes results in rate increases rather than the decreases often touted by its proponents. The evidence on whether rates rise or fall is mixed, but considering the

underinvestment over the last several decades, some rate increases are inevitable , regardless of public or private provision. In fact,

many municipalities, especially smaller ones, are engaging in some sort of privatization in order to ensure that their infrastructure complies with stricter environmental and testing regulations.

The importance of competition

Municipalities that privatize their water systems can enter into short or long term contracts, and each has its pros and

cons. Short-term contracts increase competition since firms will have to compete more often for the

right to manage the water system. The drawback is that firms will be less willing to invest in costly infrastructure improvements since shorter contracts mean less time to recoup the large, upfront costs.

Alternatively, long-term contracts provide firms with an incentive to invest but decrease the benefits of more frequent competition. Entering into a long-term contract may require more diligent oversight on the part of city officials since the firm will not be subjected to the same level of competition.

If a city only wants a firm to operate the water system while it retains the responsibility for infrastructure improvements, then a short-term contract is more appropriate. If a city lacks the expertise or cannot afford to make the necessary infrastructure improvements, then a long term contract will likely be required.

solves sluggish economyChris Edwards 16 (Chris Edwards is the director of tax policy studies at Cato. He is a top expert on federal and state tax and budget issues. Before joining Cato, Edwards was a senior economist on the congressional Joint Economic Committee, 6-28-2016, "Options for Federal Privatization and Reform Lessons from Abroad", Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/options-federal-privatization-reform-lessons-abroad#bureau-of-reclamation, accessed: 7-12-2021)//yeed

Privatization will likely be on the agenda in coming years. Budget deficits are here to stay, so policymakers

will be looking for ways to reduce spending and raise revenues . Policymakers will also be looking for

ways to boost America’s sluggish economic growth . As time passes, policymakers will be able to draw on ever more foreign privatization successes. We know that postal services, air traffic control, passenger railroads, and other activities can be successfully moved to the private sector because other countries have now done it.

Any activity that can be supported by customer charges, advertising, voluntary contributions, or other sorts of private support can be privatized . Government activities may be privatized as either for‐

profit businesses or nonprofit organizations, depending on the circumstances. The important thing is to move

activities to the private sector , where they can grow , change , and be an organic part of society

connected to the actual needs of citizens .

Water privatization improves the economy too.Block and Whitehead 2 (Walter E. Block Ph.D., Harold E. Wirth Eminent Scholar Chair in Economics, Professor of Economics, Loyola University and Roy Whitehead, Professor of Business Law, University of Central Arkansas, “Environmental Takings: The Case for Full Water Privatization”, Date Accessed: 7-13-21)

Private property rights have benefitted every arena of human experience they have touched. The economy of the Soviet Union fell apart mainly because of the absence of this system. The U.S. economy is one of the foremost in the world largely due to its relatively greater reliance on this institution. And yet, there are vast areas in which private property rights play no role at all: namely oceans, seas, and other bodies of

water . But why should we expect that there would be any better results from such “water socialism” than we have experienced from socialism on land? Indeed, the evidence is all around us to this fact: whales are an endangered species; fish stocks are precipitously declining; oil spills are a recurring problem; droughts are becoming increasingly severe and prolonged , and not

only in the underdeveloped countries of the world; rivers are polluted, some so seriously that they actually catch fire; lakes are becoming

overcrowded with boaters, swimmers, fishermen, etc., and there is no market mechanism to allocate this scarce resource amongst the competing users; deep sea mining (manganese modules) is

in a state of suspended animation due to unclear titles; and the legal status of off-shore oil drilling rigs is unclear. Most revealing, water covers some 79% of the earth’s surface but accounts for only a small

percentage of world gross domestic product (GDP ). While no one expects an exact proportionality between surface coverage and contribution to economic welfare, such a strong disparity suggests that the economic system pursued in these two realms may not be totally unrelated to these results.

Our claim is that we have no warrant to believe that socialism, the absence of private property rights, is anymore workable on land than on water. It is time—indeed, it is long past time —to explore ways in which this institution can be applied to aqueous resources.

Solvency – Pollution solves pollution Clare Brown and Block 19 (Clare Brown and Walter Block, Loyola University New Orleans, 2-2-2019, "Free Market for the Environment", Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 116-125, https://ideas.repec.org/a/rnp/ecopol/ep1906.html, accessed: 7-13-2021)//yeed

The free enterprise system is all too often blamed for pollution. Corporate greed is the charge launched against the marketplace for this problem.

But this criticism is without merit. Instead, a quite different analysis is the correct one. In the 1830s and 1840s in the U.S., there was a spate of environmental pollution court cases.15 Typically, a housewife would complain that a factory had dirtied the washing hung on her clothesline. Or, a farmer was the plaintiff and a railroad the defendant. The charge was that sparks from the latter caused the former’s haystacks to burn. Was the complainant always successful? Not at all. But, when the evidence was sufficient, the courts were open to complaints of this sort, and typically awarded financial damages and an injunction.16 This had several salutary effects. The railroad was led by an “invisible hand” to implement spark and smoke prevention devices. The factory, via the same considerations,

substituted cleaner burning, but more expensive anthracite coal for the dirtier burning, but cheaper sulfur variety. Environmental forensics was born since it now behooved the forces of justice to determine, as precisely as possible, from whence sprang the environmental trespass.

But then, unhappily for economic liberty, toward the end of the 19th century, and the beginning of the 20th, a sea change overcame the judicial system. The message emanating from the bench was in the direction of, “Sure the defendant has violated

your private property rights, your stinking, lousy, selfish private property rights. But, the public good (Drum roll, please!) demands that they be violated.” Why the 180 degree alteration? At that time in our history, the U.S. government was attempting to overcome

Great Britain as the number one military power in the world. This cannot be attained by placing the interests of housewives and small farmers ahead of railroads and steel mills. The government did offer a sop to

the victims of smoke pollution: minimum smokestack height regulations. Thus, the problem was hidden , not under the rug,

but in the clouds. The moral of the story is that pollution is by no means a market failure . Rather, it was due

to the blunder of government , in turning against its self-styled role as protector of private property rights.

Pollution arises because resources are not privately ownedGoodstein, 95 (Eban Goodstein is an economist, author, and public educator who directs both the Center for Environmental Policy and the MBA in Sustainability at Bard College. “The Economic Roots of Environmental Decline: Property Rights or Path Dependence?” https://www.jstor.org/stable/4227020, Accessed 7/14/21)

Environmental economics has developed over the last 25 years by exploiting the theoretical apparatus of neoclassical microeconomics. In particular, environmental problems have been viewed through the lends of property rights: pollution arises because all resources (air, water, land) are not privately

owned . This theoretical framework has led to a simple policy focus: simulate the outcome that would be achieved if all resources were privately owned (and markets were competitive). The two principal mechanisms that have been suggested for achieving this result, marketable permit systems and effluent taxes, are together known as Incentive-Based (IB) regulation.

Solvency - SDGs

Private sector realizes sustainable development essential for planet and implement SDGsHestad, Environmental Change Institute at Oxford University – Ph.D., 2021

[Dina, “The Evolution of Private Sector Action in Sustainable Development,” International Institute for Sustainable Development, February 2021, JSTOR, accessed 7/13/2021, ddi-tmur]

The Private Sector as Partners

As Unilever’s former Chief Executive Officer Paul Polman observed, many companies and private sector actors now see themselves as partners in achieving sustainable development and they engage in this pursuit in a myriad of ways. Some realize sustainable development is essential not just for the future of their business, but for the planet.

Companies with sustainability business models or corporate social responsibility portfolios, philanthropists, impact investors, and institutional investors now spend considerable effort to work with international institutions, governments, and civil society organizations to generate sustainable and green growth. The private sector forms a key part of implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 17 (partnerships), with the expectation they will contribute with capital investment in the face of dwindling public resources.

Solvency – Warming/Resources

Solves warming and resources Clare Brown and Block 19 (Clare Brown and Walter Block, Loyola University New Orleans, 2-2-2019, "Free Market for the Environment", Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 116-125, https://ideas.repec.org/a/rnp/ecopol/ep1906.html, accessed: 7-13-2021)//yeed

Now that the foundations of free market environmentalism have been established, we turn to its effects on underdeveloped countries since many of these nations contain some of the world’s most abundant and important natural resources. Due to their focus on developing economically, environmental concerns are often neglected, and there is substantial abuse of natural resources. However, it is very

possible for these countries to simultaneously increase wealth while solving environment al

problems. The key exists, of course, in the free market. Firstly, the indication is that economic growth (income per

capita) increases most in nations that are the most economically free. [Gwartney et al., 1996, 2017] demonstrated the

existence of this causal connection. Further, nations that boost their income per capita subsequently increase

their environmental quality . This is demonstrated by the “Environmental Kuznets Curve”.14 The original “Kuznets Curve” [Acemoglu, Robinson, 2002] is used to show a relationship between economic growth and income inequality. Th e curve has been

adapted to describe the relationships between income and the environment. This “Environmental Kuznets Curve” indicates that in very poor nations, as income increases, environmental deterioration at first increases with it. However, at some turning point as income continues to increase, environmental improvement begins .

This relationship indicates that on a nation’s path to development, there will be some environmental setbacks, but

this is not a reflection of economic prosperity as a detriment to the environment. If this pattern holds true, it is a

necessary progression , and the only way for a nation to attain ecological improvement . The reasons are

clear. Once a country begins development and industrialization, environmental damage will occur due to greater natural resource use and the relatively dirty and inefficient technology that exists in these early stages.

However, “as economic growth continues and life expectancies increase , cleaner water , improved air

quality, and a generally cleaner habitat become more valuable as people make choices at the

margin about how to spend their income” [Yandle et al., 2002]. The country is able to move further out on its

production possibilities curve . People’s priorities will not shift to a concern for environmental

quality until they reach an income level that allows them that option . Once that level is reached,

entrepreneurial innovation creates cleaner tech nology and a continued elevation of

environmental quality and rectification of past environmental problems . But the increase in income alone will

not allow this: also required are capitalist economic institutions. The free market not only facilitates this wealth effect but, along with property rights, it also continues to guide optimal environmental

decision-making after the nation reaches the turning point .

As evidenced by the failure of government policy and the innovative success of private enterprise, it is clear that the free market

produces optimal decisions regarding natural resource use . These principles can be applied to

natural resource abundant developing nations to accelerate economic and environmental

improvement .

Solvency – Water Sustainability

Solves water sustainability Dr. Mohammed Yousef Al-Madfaei 09, Executive Director of the Integrated Environment Policy and Planning Sector at the Environment Agency, 2009, "The Impact of Privatisation on the Sustainability of Water Resources", International Water Association, https://www.iwapublishing.com/news/impact-privatisation-sustainability-water-resources, accessed: 7-14-2021, //yeedImpact of privatization

From 1990 onwards, private participation in the water sector in developing countries started increasing and a growing number of governments are turning to the private sector to build, recover, expand and/or operate their water and sanitation networks. In the years up to 1997, more than 90 projects, in thirty-five countries, about water resource management have been undertaken by the

private sector. Hence, it is observed that the private capital investment for water projects in developing countries is increasing together with the increase in the number of projects (Gray, 2001).

Case studies published in academic literature show that private sector participation in the water sector is

likely to result in improved managerial practices and higher operating efficiency (Comair, 2005). On the whole, available

evidence suggests that private involvement can improve , significantly , service provision to the poor and save budgetary resources for other, perhaps pro-poor, projects . In many cases, poor households show high motivation to pay for improved services with contingent valuation studies (Tynan, 2000). Most common developments achieved by private sector participation in water sector can be categorized into:

Improvement in water service quality ;

Improvement in water production efficiency ;

Diminished water losses ;

Strengthening of management of the water sector, and

Enhancement of customer care .

To achieve these improvements, the private sector has invested in the expansion of coverage and in regular maintenance and has enhanced billing and revenue collection activities. This, indeed, required a significant rise in the cost of water, as observed in England, France, Mexico, Kenya, Tanzania etc. (Nyangeri Nyanchaga, 2003; Azpiazu et al., 2003; Mashauri, 2003; Torregrosa, 2003; Bakker, 2003). The

demand reaction to these privatization improvements can be summarized by overall satisfaction with the services, but accompanied with complaints about the high water cost. Interestingly, privatization was accompanied with variable average per capita consumption rates. It is reported that, after water privatization in Kenya

for instance, the average per capita water consumption increased in parallel to the water cost increase

(Nyangeri Nyanchaga, 2003). This can be attributed to the improvement of water quality and service under privat ization , which

rendered the current increased price as still cost-effective .

Private participation can also improve competency in the water sector in several ways . Introduction of competition

brings efficiency gains ; the most important of which comes from changing the incentive structure, inducing innovation and influencing

investment decisions . Privatization may also affect water prices where more than one scenario exists. First, if prices were initially fixed at below-cost levels, then prices

after privatization would need to increase as prices should cover production cost . Second, efficiency

savings achieved under privatization will generally lead to a drop in prices with some gains passed

on to consumers. This is due to the decreased efficiency losses , proper maintenance and consequent saving

of water which have been otherwise lost and need to be replaced adding up to the cost. Third, the total cost of private financing may bring about an increase in prices. Hence, prices after privatization will reflect full costs and the consumer

will be charged instead of the taxpayer .

Positive Experiences from selected countries

England and Wales is a typical example of private participation in infrastructure. Privatization in the water sector started in 1989 when the regional water authorities, owned by the central government, were privatized by flotation on the stock exchange (Bakker, 2001; Bakker, 2003; Dore et al., 2004). The reasons behind this included the efficiency of the private sector and the financial ability of private companies to finance the large investments needed to repair the water systems in addition to increased competition (Dore et

al., 2004; Bakker, 2003). These private companies were responsible to provide the entire cycle of services from extraction of raw water, delivery of processed water and collection, treatment and discharge of wastewater (Bakker, 2003).

This privatization ‘entailed a change in the ownership, financing and regulation of the water industry’ (Bakker, 2003). To this end, England developed extensive regulatory frameworks for the water sector to protect consumers and public health: “companies were forbidden from disconnecting domestic consumers (even for non-payment of bills), and were required to create special, low tariffs for vulnerable consumers. They were also required to submit strategic financial plans as well as resource development and water supply management plans to an economic regulator and an environmental regulator for review” (Bakker, 2003).

As such, an environmental regulator, an economic regulator and a drinking water quality regulator were created where the economic regulator relied on price caps and yardsticks to improve competition (Dore et al., 2004; Bakker, 2003; Littlechild, 1988). However, it is believed that such regulatory efforts have heavy requirements with regards to information (Van den Berg, 1997). At that time, the water industry in England and Wales was best characterized as “publicly regulated private monopolies operating on modified market principles” (Hay, 1996; Bakker, 2003). Nonetheless, the water industry in England has been re-regulated (Bakker, 2003). Some companies have entered into delegated management contracts, and many have replaced equity financing with bond financing.

Today, in England and Wales, nine of the ten water companies that were privatized by public flotation in 1989 continue to operate as private companies (Bakker, 2003). Nevertheless, in 2001, the tenth company was restructured into a not-for-profit water utility as a potential to lower the cost of capital and reduce customer bills after prices increased beyond inflation rates since 1988. Glas Cymru, a utility company, now runs as a private company owned by its members (Bakker, 2003). In general, it is reported that privatization in England and Wales has led to water quality and environmental improvements but at higher water prices (Dore et al., 2004).

In Australia, Sydney Water, a State Owned Company operated till 1995, and thereafter as a Statutory Authority incorporated in 1995, was responsible for capturing, storing, treating and distributing water in Sydney. Faced with major capital expenditure to improve and expand water treatment capacity, and having established private enthusiasm to pay for services, Sydney Water decided to subcontract to private companies for privately built, owned and operated (BOO) systems of water treatment. Prices were regulated by a Government Pricing Tribunal, now an Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal. Following some abnormal climatic conditions that led to the deterioration of water quality, major concerns have been raised about quality of services unforeseen in the contract, putting the contractual relationship under pressure. It remains to be seen what impact such events might have on risk sharing, contractual transparency and regulation (Chapman & Cuthbertson, 1999).

Another considerable efficient case is that of Bolivia. In Santa Cruz, the largest city in Bolivia, home to one million people, the world’s largest co-operative, known as SAGUAPAC operates. It has proved to be highly competent and successful. The unaccounted-for-water levels are relatively low, all connections are metered, the number of employees per 1000 water connections is quite low and there is a 96 percent bill collectionefficiency rate. Its positive impact can be attributed to two key advantages: its co-operative structure shields management from excessive political interference: it can put into operation investment projects much faster and more competently than other companies since it is not bound by legal delays; and it can finance an external loan more easily. Nevertheless, a successful co-operative is an exception rather than the rule, as the experience with the co-operative model in different sectors worldwide is rather disappointing (Crespo et al., 2003).

In parallel, a study done by Megginston and Netter (2001) that reviewed 61 cases of water privatization concluded that privately managed firms tend to be more productive and profitable than public firms in both developed and developing countries (Megginston & Netter, 2001).

In Senegal, after signature of contract with Saur in 1996, water production increased by 20% between 1997 and 2002, the number of customers increased by 50% between 1996 and 2003, and the network commercial rate improved from 68% in 1996 to 80% in 2006 (Carcas, 2004; UNESC 2005). Similarly, a management contract between Suez and Johannesburg Water in 2001 for the suburb of Soweto in South Africa reported dramatic decreases in leakages and unaccounted-for-water losses (Blanc & Ghesquières, 2006).

In the city of Indianapolis, where it has created a successful public-private partnership with Veolia Water, the city is gaining economic and environmental benefits where the

partnership saves local governments an $85 million during the 20-year contract. In addition, it has also greatly improved the problem-ridden billing system, and caused the drop of customer complaints down from 500 in 2001 to an annual average of 30 (DLC2003).

Public – private partnership has been practiced in the water sector for two decades now, and it has shown that the private sector can help mobilize

financing , implement investment programs, and improve performance of service delivery . Therefore,

PPP is worth considering as one way of bringing in efficient management skills and fresh funds and relieving government of fiscal and administrative burdens. However, it is unrealistic to expect that any short term privatization can overcome the inherited institutional and operational in-efficiencies of the public sector. Privatization has encountered several problems, such as unfavourable macroeconomic conditions, political involvement, inadequate incentives, and weak regulatory frameworks (Nyangeri Nyanchaga, 2003). It is worth re-iterating that the failure to establish clear regulatory frameworks, threaten the sustainability of any private sector involvement.

Solvency Advocate – PPP

Empirical examples show partnership key to innovative water managementBill Dicroce 1-12-2019 [Bill Dicroce, president and CEO of Veolia North America, which is headquartered in Boston and provides contracted water and wastewater services to municipalities across the US and Canada. , "Private management of water systems can pay off," CommonWealth Magazine, accessed at https://commonwealthmagazine.org/economy/private-management-of-water-systems-can-pay-off/] SYu 7-12-2021

But an important distinction to this debate has been lost amid the clamor, due in large part to the often misleading

term privatization . While privatization may imply the transfer of ownership from a public utility to a private company, in most cases what’s actually taking place is a partnership; a private company oversees

operations and maintenance but ownership and the ability to set rates remains in the hands of the public utility. This partnership dynamic has a strong track record of addressing some debilitating issues affecting publicly owned and operated water systems. Private water companies can enable municipalities to reduce maintenance and labor costs,

realizing greater efficiencies from systems improvements. First and foremost, private companies enhance quality and safety by using advanced technologies and resources that are often beyond means for public systems. Private companies introduce sophisticated purchasing practices which enable economies of scale from higher volume purchases and increased bargaining

power. Private companies also bring state-of-the-art technologies that improve efficiency and ensure consistent water quality. Most cash-strapped municipalities have avoided the investments needed to upgrade eroding and outdated water infrastructures, and this has left them vulnerable to contamination issues, ruptures, and a variety of other problems. These neglected systems have made municipalities especially vulnerable to flooding at a time when research shows storms becoming increasingly destructive. In

Massachusetts, there have been many success stories of municipalities that have partnered with private companies to oversee water and wastewater services, including award-winning projects in Lynn and Brockton that have been recognized by the Commonwealth for outstanding environmental quality. Public-private partnerships have led to innovative financial structures in which third-party sources, such as union pension funds, invest in upgrades and capital improvements on behalf of municipalities. In many cases, the source of that financing is publicly and locally based, and not generated by private trading on Wall Street. For instance, a decade ago, the Water Pollution

Solvency Advocate – SOHOs

Policymakers pursuing diversity of opinions, practicing sustainable transformations, and supporting SOHOs contributes to a sustainable worldHestad, Environmental Change Institute at Oxford University – Ph.D., 2021

[Dina, “The Evolution of Private Sector Action in Sustainable Development,” International Institute for Sustainable Development, February 2021, JSTOR, accessed 7/13/2021, ddi-tmur]

*SOHOs – Sustainability-Oriented Hybrid Organizations

Recommendations for Future Engagement

There are a range of actions policymakers should consider when engaging with the private sector to achieve sustainable development.

First, diversity in the private sector is not the enemy. Diversity of opinion and conflict is key to redefining the problems we are facing, shifting perspectives, and designing strategic solutions that achieve results (Gillard et al., 2016). There will continue to be “bad actors” on different issues. Indeed, who is a bad actor depends entirely on your perspective. With respect to the sustainability agenda, there will continue to be agents that lobby to maintain the status quo and argue the trade-offs to profit are unacceptable. But conflict can be harnessed and lead to innovation while the shunning of individuals and corporations can lead to shadow spaces of disinformation and increased polarization. So, it is important to experiment with ways to constructively engage with those working against progressive action. But we cannot sit idly by. Acts of principled outrage are required when corporations are systematically and deliberately harming people’s lives and environmental life support systems. In those instances, policymakers need to take decisive action through changing laws or policy, or by other means.

Second, we cannot rely too heavily on the potential of impact investing and similar profit-driven approaches for achieving sustainability. It is important that private sector partners continue to innovate with new sustainability-oriented financing mechanisms and profit-driven ventures as there is room for sustainability gains by reducing environmental harm and greening the existing economic system in the short term. But it is also important to recognize the limitations of its potential given the immense challenges associated with achieving absolute decoupling of growth from greenhouse gas emissions and the likelihood this approach would perpetuate drivers of inequality and environmental degradation in the long run. Policymakers should look to the considerable research and practice on how to achieve sustainable and equitable transformations (O’Brien, 2018; EEA, 2018; Sharma, 2017). Such approaches can help with taking a whole systems and holistic approach to analyze whether profitdriven approaches are truly achieving sustainability or just delaying the decline of the natural and social systems that support human life on this planet.

Third, transformers such as SOHOs need support. They need enabling legal and policy environments that facilitate rather than hamper their emergence and success—such as legal mechanisms that allow companies to balance profit and purpose instead of being required to pursue returns for shareholders. These innovating entrepreneurs and ventures can be the gardeners that sow the seeds of a new economic system that has regenerative equity as its purpose and can contribute to a more sustainable world.

2NC PTX Net Benefit

PTX NB Robert Kuttner 20 (Robert Kuttner is co-founder and co-editor of The American Prospect, and professor at Brandeis University’s Heller School. His latest book is The Stakes: 2020 and the Survival of American Democracy. In addition to writing for the Prospect, he writes for HuffPost, The Boston Globe, and The New York Review of Books, 7-7-2020, "Privatizing Our Public Water Supply", American Prospect, https://prospect.org/environment/privatizing-our-public-water-supply/, accessed: 7-14-2021)//yeedIn order to recover from the COVID economic depression, America will need a massive public infrastructure effort. This will do triple duty—in addition to providing stimulus and jobs, it will modernize our museum-quality public facilities, and accelerate an overdue green transition.

The House Democrats have made a good start with HR2, the Invest in America Act—but with one weird exception: A provision slipped into the bill by the

water privatization industry and its Congressional allies would create incentives to privatize

America’s water supply systems , one of the few essential services that are still mostly public thanks to the heroic struggles of our Progressive Era forebears, who

worked to assure clean and affordable water via public systems.

In the House, the offending language was inserted by Rep. Bill Pascrell of New Jersey, whose state is home to water privatization companies, and Richie Neal of

Massachusetts, the industry-afflicted chair of the House Ways and Means Committee. And in the Senate, oddly, the companion measure, drafted by the water privatization industry, is sponsored by Tammy Duckworth.

Joe Biden take notice.

A word about water privatization. About 83 percent of Americans get their drinking water from public systems, according to an authoritative report by the leading research and advocacy group, Food and Water Watch.

Conversions from public water to private water have been costly fiascos.

Privatized systems are typically less reliable, far more expensive, and prone to corrupt deal-making. The average community with privatized water paid 59 percent more than those with government supplied water. In New Jersey, which has more private water than most, private systems charged 79 percent more. In Illinois, they charged 95 percent more. Private water corporations have also been implicated in environmental disasters. The French multinational, Veolia, issued a report in 2015 certifying that Flint, Michigan’s water system met EPA standards, but neglected to mention high lead concentrations.

Conversions from public water to private water have been costly fiascos. One gambit by private water companies following a privatization is to grab land needed for watersheds, and sell it to developers.

Poor cities and Black and Latino communities are more at risk, according to a report by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. In the heavily Black Philadelphia suburb of Chester, the mayor of the financially stressed town, Thaddeus Kirkland, is proposing to sell its reservoir and municipal water system to a private company for $200 million.

This is a classic pattern in the privatization game. The city gets a one time infusion of cash which temporarily gets the current mayor out of a jam—and the residents pay more.

There is invariably a more extreme fiscal squeeze in cities that are Black and poor, and suffer from low income, low tax base, and inadequate federal support. The color of water, like the color of so much else, is structurally racist.

The Chester system that Mayor Kirkland proposes to sell off has been public for more than a century. But when you’re broke, you start selling off the furniture.

The ground has been softened for the latest privatization initiative by the underfunding of EPA clean water support. Currently, according to the group, In The Public Interest, there are 1,326 community water systems that are in serious violation of EPA clean water standards.

In this context, private water companies offer to take the problem off local government’s hands. The fallacy, however, is that many privatized systems are also out of compliance.

The key provision in the Duckworth bill would give water systems that converted from public to private an extra three years to come into compliance. The bill requires no capital commitment from the private company, and includes weakened enforcement even after the three years grave period.

Why is Sen. Duckworth a lead sponsor of this travesty? Her office has not replied to my request for comment. Water in Illinois is overwhelmingly public. Her press release on the bill reads like rewrite of the industry press release.

Meanwhile on the House side, heroic efforts by clean water activists and American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees have just removed the single worst feature of the House bill. In the latest draft, the major benefits are limited to water systems that are already privatized; no incentives are created for new privatizations. It would be better if the provision were stripped from the Democrats’ infrastructure bill entirely.

AFSCME’s role is a reminder that public worker unions are advocates not just of employees, but of the importance of safeguarding the public realm from relentless efforts to privatize it.

Donald Trump’s version of an infrastructure program is more and more privatization . Turn public systems over to private corporations, which will presumably invest in them, and stick consumers and citizens with the higher costs.

The progressive alternative is adequate funding for all necessary things public.

Privatization is a logical enough ploy for Republicans —both ideologically and to reward industry

allies. What in hell are Democrats doing supporting this stuff ?

2NC A2 Citizen Suits Solve

Citizen suits failDavid E. Adelman & Jori Reilly-Diakun 21 (, 3-18-2021, "Environmental Citizen Suits and the Inequities of Races to the Top – University of Colorado Law Review", University of Colorado Law Review, https://lawreview.colorado.edu/printed/environmental-citizen-suits-and-the-inequities-of-races-to-the-top/#1_The_Legislative_Origins_of_Wholesale_Rulemaking_and_Retail_Enforcement_Litigation_Under_the_Major_Pollution_Statutes, accessed: 7-16-2021)//yeed

1. Targeted Reforms to Facilitate and Support Citizen Suits

A set of criteria for deriving an optimal volume of citizen suits does not exist. However, government enforcement rates under the pollution statutes show that the

current volume of citizen suits is far below the level that even limited government funding permits .

[212] Similarly, given the enormous number of federal actions potentially subject to suit, a huge disparity exists between the volume of citizen suits and the number of federal actions reasonably subject to legal challenge. We infer from this disparity that resource constraints are the limiting factor. Studies of agency rulemaking also suggest that environmental organizations participate in a small proportion of agency proceedings that occur annually and that, by extension, the volume of litigation is substantially lower.[213] Moreover, even if citizen suits were filed at higher rates, opposition within Congress likely would have risen more rapidly than it has and would exceed the high level that exists today in the current deregulatory political climate.[214]

Any reforms to liberalize access to citizen suits must consider these political realities and the absolute limits posed by the enormous disparity that exists between the number of citizen suits filed annually and the potential universe of cases. It is unlikely that political opposition can be neutralized, but reforms can nevertheless circumvent the greatest sources of opposition and critique of citizen suits. The most potent sources of opposition to citizen suits have been driven by perceptions that they are not in the interest of the general public, that they are filed principally for obstructionist objectives, or that they undermine government regulatory programs and priority setting. The challenge is to mitigate these concerns and misperceptions while still addressing the structural barriers to filing citizen suits that are of greatest importance—particularly distributional inequities.

Relative to the other environmental statutes, the CAA stands out for the paucity of citizen enforcement suits. Most CAA litigation involves wholesale challenges to national regulations, which are often driven by the complexity of CAA permits and state-level programs. Although the permitting process (and permits themselves) could be simplified and made more transparent, the inherent complexity of air emissions from major industrial sources will remain a significant obstacle. In short, CAA permits could never reach the simplicity of permits under the CWA, which maximize transparency and facilitate citizen oversight. Thus, while permitting reforms are an attractive option, practical constraints and industry opposition are likely to limit their viability and efficacy. Similar issues are likely to arise for permitting under other statutes, such as RCRA, which involve equally complex permitting regimes.

It goes without saying that the most promising reforms will focus on citizen suits for which there is broad support and opposing arguments are weakest. One of our central findings is the concentration of citizen suits in a few states and the absence of any significant association between numbers of citizen suits and permit compliance rates. Creating incentives for the filing of citizen suits based on low local enforcement rates, the impacts of violations

on human health or welfare, or disparate impacts on underserved communities would minimize opposition. Moreover, it would align incentives for filing citizen suits with the goals that prompted Congress to authorize them in the first place . The simplest way to augment incentives would be to create a strong presumption in favor of attorney’s fee awards in cases that meet these types of criteria.[215]

Alternatively, organizations or individuals filing such cases could be given a portion of the fines levied against a defendant. Such reforms would offset recent trends in attorney’s fee awards and leverage the limited resources available for filing citizen suits by focusing resources on critical lapses in enforcement and structural inequities reflected in the geographic distribution of citizen suits. We also considered direct,

upfront forms of support, such as federal grants or tax incentives for private-sector funding of citizen suits, but we expect that the political opposition and weak economics would be fatal strikes against them. More equitable distribution of foundation resources and other funding are the only other realistic options in the current political climate.

Identifying similar criteria for enhancing incentives to file citizen suits under the natural resource statutes is more challenging and likely to be more politically contentious. Because most of these cases involve challenges to federal action, there is nothing analogous to the enforcement data that is available under the pollution statutes. Instead, the claims turn on allegations that a federal agency is violating a

statutory requirement over which it typically has a significant degree of discretion. While clear geographic disparities are apparent in the natural resource cases, even taking into account the amount of federal land in each state, this

alone would not be a reliable metric for prioritizing cases, as other legitimate factors can influence the number of cases filed. Chronic agency lapses below legal requirements would be a more direct metric, but evidence of them would be dependent on independent reports (e.g., Congressional Research Service) or, somewhat circularly, a related series of successful citizen suits. Accordingly, a reliable set of criteria

for conditioning incentives does not appear to be available for natural resource cases. Nevertheless, if sufficient political support could be organized, lowering the bar for obtaining attorney’s fees, such as through shifting the presumption to favor litigants, would be justifiable simply based on the low numbers of citizen suits filed and could be a valuable component of legislative reforms. The challenge is that few, if any, options exist for finessing the entrenched political opposition, which makes even modest reforms exceedingly unlikely to succeed.

2. Facilitating Coordination of and Transparency About Citizen Suits

The dearth of information on citizen suits is one reason misperceptions about them persist. No one has had a clear understanding of how citizen suits operate in practice, whether they serve the ends Congress had in mind, or whether they do so effectively and equitably. Making information about the filing of citizen suits publicly available in a centralized database would enhance accountability, correct misperceptions about environmental litigation, and facilitate coordination between environmental organizations and other plaintiffs. Moreover, this information is already public; it merely exists in an inaccessible form or the information is incomplete as with the DOJ data. Centralizing the collection and improving the quality of litigation data would also be of great value to researchers and policymakers. This reform should also be attractive to critics of citizen suits insofar as it would enhance transparency and simplify the monitoring of cases.

New legislation could establish a program for compiling data on environmental citizen suits within the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which already collects data and issues reports on litigation under NEPA. An expanded database for environmental citizen suits would require dedicated funding to ensure data quality and could be facilitated by reporting requirements for lead litigants. The new legislation could be readily integrated with citizen suit provisions under each of the federal environmental statutes or as a stand-alone provision for cases filed under the Administrative Procedure Act.

In essence, this reporting provision would be an expansion of existing sixty-day notice provisions for environmental citizen suits, which generally require “notice of the alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limitation, or order.”[216] The proposed revision would modify these requirements to extend to all citizen suits[217] and require notice to CEQ.[218] To minimize the burden of this more robust reporting requirement, CEQ could be required to establish a database linked to CEQ, the federal courts, the agencies responsible for impacted statutes, and DOJ.[219] This would allow CEQ to create a single portal for reporting information to the federal government and would allow the courts to monitor compliance with the reporting requirement. The information would then be made available by CEQ through its website.

If legislation is not feasible, a similar, though less comprehensive database could be established by members of the environmental community and supported by interested funders. Based on conversations with lawyers at environmental organizations, we find that litigation is often decentralized within organizations and that communication between groups is frequently limited, particularly in cases of retail litigation that are of primarily local concern.[220] Thus, environmental organizations typically lack the capacity to coordinate and track the filing of citizen suits relevant to their work. Similarly, beyond the organizations themselves, foundations and other funders are likely to be interested in this information, as litigation figures so prominently in the work of many environmental organizations. Having a perspective not only on individual or closely associated cases but also on the broad trends and outcomes of citizen suits would enhance funders’ ability to evaluate the effectiveness of the organizations that they support.

A centralized and publicly accessible database for citizen suits, whether supported publicly or privately, would also put positive pressure on organizations to consider the distributive impacts of their decisions. The resulting transparency would enhance the perceived legitimacy of citizen suits and provide an antidote to unfounded criticisms of them. In the longer-term, this information would raise awareness and understanding of the important roles that citizen suits play and ideally generate the political support needed for the types of reforms discussed in the preceding section.

3. Educating Judges About the Patterns, Impacts, and Value of Citizen Suits

Judges play a central role in the filing and outcomes of citizen suits as the final arbiters. Yet, as our data show, outside the D.C. Circuit and several federal districts, most judges hear fewer than a handful of environmental citizen suits over the span of a decade. Most judges, therefore, have only episodic exposure to cases and anecdotal impressions of citizen suits. Informing them about the broader context of environmental litigation and the factors that motivate it would help to neutralize potential biases judges may have about environmental disputes and litigants. This is particularly important today because high-profile, intensely politicized cases, such as the litigation over oil and gas pipelines and coal-fired power plants, often have high salience in the media and thus may cause judges to form inaccurate views about citizen suits.[221] For example, misperceptions would be mitigated through information about the low-volume and selective nature of the citizen suits filed, including the success of environmental plaintiffs relative to other classes of administrative challenges.

Combating judicial bias is of greatest importance for rulings over which judges have especially broad discretion. We are thinking particularly of decisions on attorney’s fee awards, but this may also be true of constitutional standing determinations and rulings on compliance with administrative procedures, where judges tend to be less deferential to agencies. Similarly, in the context of suits involving private, third-party defendants, courts may view cases differently if they recognize just how rare they are. For example, a judge may be more reluctant to allow state agencies to preempt a citizen suit without a clear showing of a state agency’s intent to adequately follow through with meaningful enforcement measures if the suit is not viewed as part of a flood of special-interest litigation.[222]

Concerns about judicial discretion are especially important in light of the dramatic declines recently observed in median attorney’s fee awards. For the cases in which plaintiffs prevailed, courts in some states granted attorney’s fee awards in as few as 10 percent of cases, while courts in other states granted attorney’s fee awards at much higher rates. It is difficult to square the national average for granting attorney’s fees—roughly 45 percent of the cases in which plaintiffs prevailed—with either the low overall volume of citizen suits or the high success rates of environmental plaintiffs. The recent declines in attorney’s fee awards, for similar reasons, appear to be completely unwarranted. Having a broader perspective on citizen suits and their social value, we hope, would provide a useful corrective to unfounded skepticism about environmental plaintiffs and the devolving trend in attorney’s fee awards across the country. It would also help to counteract environmental plaintiffs’ aversion to filing cases in circuits outside the Ninth Circuit and counteract the concentration of citizen suits in a small number of states.

Conclusions

Citizen suits, by almost any measure, are underperforming. In most states, citizen suits are rarely filed, and they are concentrated in

states where public support is high and environmental programs are, as a consequence, relatively robust. Contemporary debates about citizen

suits are fixated on narratives that are disconnected from these realities and thus are blind to the shortcomings of citizen suits that matter in practice. This Article draws on data collected over two presidential administrations to correct misperceptions about citizen suits among proponents and critics and to reevaluate the appropriate role of citizen suits in light of the severe resource limits.

We find little to no evidence of the pathologies that critics commonly raise and little evidence that citizen suits systematically offset the shortcomings of government implementation or enforcement of environmental laws. Citizen suits can establish important precedent , provide effective checks on agency

rulemaking, and draw attention to grave deficiencies in federal programs . They do not, however,

backstop day-to-day implementation or enforcement of federal laws; the numbers of permits and government actions are simply overwhelming relative to the number of challenges that can feasibly be brought by nongovernmental organizations and individuals. As a consequence,

environmental plaintiffs and organizations must wield citizen suits strategically and triage cases carefully.

These realities place a premium on thoughtful prioritization and coordination of citizen suits, including

consideration of distributional inequities. Our empirical work reveals deep inconsistencies and inequities in the filing of citizen suits that are overlooked by commentators across the political spectrum . This Article

seeks to ground the debate over citizen suits in the empirical record, identify reforms that are politically viable, and address the

most pressing shortcomings of the current legal framework.

2NC A2 Capitalism turnLaundry list prove capitalism and ownership don’t affect water rates – utility size, infrastructure, and topographyZhang et al., Cornell – Postdoctoral Associate, 2021

[Xue, MARCELA GONZÁLEZ RIVAS, University of Pittsburgh - Assistant Professor, MARY GRANT, Food & Water Watch and Food & Water Action - Public Water For All Campaign Director, Mildred E. Warner, Cornell – Professor, “Water Pricing and Affordability in the US: Public vs Private Ownership,” Cornell Working Paper, June 2021, https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/socarx/7mc4r.html, accessed 7/14/2021, ddi-tmur]

There are many other factors, besides ownership, that might affect water rates: size, source of water, age of system, etc. (comprehensive reviews of the factors affecting water prices include González-Gomez & García-Rubio, 2018, Zetlan & Gasson, 2013). The size of the utility may make a difference in water pricing because of economies of scale (Carvalho, Margues, & Berg, 2012). Larger utilities can reduce costs of operation through their ability to obtain cheaper prices for larger orders for inputs and materials given their size. For example, scale economies help explain higher levels of efficiency in water utilities in Portugal (Correia & Marques, 2011). But, in the case of investor owned utilities, whether these savings get passed on to ratepayers in lower prices depends on whether they get passed on to shareholders as profit instead.

Water prices also are affected by infrastructure system conditions and age, which in the US has been a decades long challenge (ASCE 2021). In the US, federal funding for water sector infrastructure has been declining since the mid-1970s (Congressional Budget Office, 2015; University of North Carolina, 2015). This decline, combined with increased demands for meeting water quality and environmental compliance, has often resulted in increasing water service rates, as utilit ies raise rates to modernize and maintain water systems infrastructure. In the context of limited federal funding, water rates are affected in areas where systems need new investment in upgrading, operation and maintenance (Jacobson, 2016; Mack & Wrase, 2017; Walton, 2015). In fact, aging infrastructure is one of the key challenges across water utilities in the US, according to the 2019 Survey of the American Water Works Association (AWWA, 2019a). In response to COVID-19, the 2021 American Rescue Plan allows funding for upgrading municipal water and sewer systems (US Treasury, 2021).

Other physical characteristics affect water rates, such as topographic characteristics of the place and water source, as this has implications for the technology used and the costs incurred to access water. Water is generally classified into ground and surface water, and while both sources can provide safe drinking water, the process of treating groundwater tends to be less costly than that for surface water because, in general, it is less polluted and more reliable during drought periods (González-Gomez, et al. 2018; Howe, 2005; Safe water, 2017). Therefore, in regions where severe drought is recurrent, water utilities will incur higher costs for water production (AWWA, 2019b; Wait & Petrie, 2017).

The characteristics of the cities where utilities operate, such as population density and population growth, can also potentially affect what water utilities charge for services, as it is more cost efficient to maintain infrastructure in areas with higher densities (Bel & Warner, 2008). Utilities also need to consider the costs of infrastructure maintenance and expansion in areas experiencing population growth to keep up with increasing water demand, which contributes to increasing costs (Jacobs & Howe, 2014). By contrast, in communities with small or declining population, water systems face sunk

infrastructure costs and a declining consumer base, which can also lead to higher rates (Grant, 2020; González Rivas, 2020; Jacobson, 2016; Pauli, 2020).

Other factors that capture the structural conditions of a place, such as socio-economic characteristics of the population served, are also important factors to consider. Communities with a higher percentage of poverty may face more problems in ensuring affordability (González Rivas, 2020; Lakhani, 2020; Mack & Wrase, 2017; NAACP, 2019; Swain et al., 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic has raised attention to the need to address water affordability. During the pandemic, many states and hundreds of cities passed moratoria to prevent water disconnections for low-income households (FWW, 2020). A study of water shut off moratoriums found US cities with higher income, larger shares of people of color and higher levels of income inequality, were more likely to protect low-income consumers from water shutoff (Warner, Zhang & González Rivas; 2020). Water affordability programs are needed to address the water access challenges of the lowest income households in the US. States, municipalities and utilities all have a role to play (Homsy & Warner, 2020; Pierce, Chow & DeShazo 2020; Pierce et al., 2021; Swain et al. 2020).

2NC A2 Perm

Perm fails – government regulations impairs market efficiencyClare Brown and Block 19 (Clare Brown and Walter Block, Loyola University New Orleans, 2-2-2019, "Free Market for the Environment", Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 116-125, https://ideas.repec.org/a/rnp/ecopol/ep1906.html, accessed: 7-13-2021)//yeed

For the market to function properly and reveal ideal environmental solutions, private property rights must not only exist, but also be defined , defendable , and divestible —what Stroup [Stroup, 2016]

calls the “3-Ds”. Ownership must be proclaimed and ownership rights clearly defined, else a potential buyer will be unwilling to make a purchase , as uncertainty in this respect is highly problematic .

Government regulation often creates this uncertainty concerning ownership and therefore causes

not only a reduction of its value ,9 but also its misuse. For example, “water flowing in most streams in the United States has no owner, although the owners of property next to the water have a right to reasonable use of the water” [Stroup, 2016]. Also, no one directly owns wildlife, though state governments have some control over it. Both of these situations are subject to the tragedy of the commons.

There is also considerable confusion regarding the protection of habitat for endangered species under the Endangered Species Act, the results of which are often ineffective. This is exemplified when compared to the ventures of private citizens. After a successful career, Ted Turner—American media mogul and founder of CNN—began buying ranches across the West and Southwest of the United States and in South America. He currently

owns approximately 2 million acres of personal and ranch land. Turner created his own endangered species fund, which has successfully removed two species from the endangered list by means of restoration on Turner’s private property.10 Th is kind of protection is unmatched by eff orts of government.

Once ownership is explicit, their rights must be defendable in the courts. This affords the owner protection

against any physical harm to his property . Legal recourse enhances the longevity of the

resource ’s value . Finally, owners should be free to sell or lease their resource at will. This, again, increases

wealth . The potential for profit provides strong incentive to properly preserve the resource —so that

it may be fully appreciated by those who value it most. This may be the current owner, as is the case in the Ted Turner

example, or it may be another user to whom the owner can sell or lease his rights. In either case, the rewards to the owner for the

upkeep of the resource are the profits he will receive . The value added to the society that allows these kinds of ownership and transactions to materialize is that the resource is being put to its most valued use—as indicated by the economic decision-making on the part of its participants. The only way that members of the society can

reveal what they want to these producers and entrepreneurs is through a free flow of information that exists only under laissez-faire capitalism.

The decisions governmental regulators make are not directed by this infor mation because it has

no way of reaching them [Hayek, 1937, 1945]. For this reason, their decisions are often directed by distorted

signals and incentives , and by special interests11. This means that the objectives of those with the greatest ability to influence public officials and regulators are often the ones pursued. The result is

“ regulatory capture ”. 12 Regulatory agencies are meant to act in the “public interest”, but

corruption and special dealings lead to these agencies becoming dominated by the very industries they were charged with regulating. In the end, they serve the interests of the corporations. Inefficient and unfounded regulations and laws do little to solve environment al problems ; they even make them

worse . An example of this is the failure of the “Superfund”13—“a trust fund administered by the Environmental Protection Agency to provide temporary emergency federal funding for the cleanup of chemical waste if responsible parties could not be found or were unable to

pay.” Among a number of misdirected and unproductive undertakings, the Superfund wasted a great deal of money cleaning up the “Love Canal” chemical dump in New York. “A flawed and later discredited study” led to a crisis

surrounding its cleanup. Later studies found there to be no real evidence of longterm health threats, but the damage was already done.

“As is often the case when government legislates in ignorance , the law has been enormously costly and

ineffective ” [Burnett, 1996]. If it were instead the responsibility of a private enterprise to conduct the cleanup, there would

have been a more thorough investigation of the circumstances since they would incur the costs of the

cleanup themselves. The inevitable c ost- b enefit a nalysis that occurs in private decision-making

would have produced an outcome considerate of the real effect on society . Government is essentially

unaffected by money squandered in their uninformed decisions [Hazlitt, 1946].

In the realm of government regulation , often individuals or organizations make decisions differently

than they would in the free market. They are forced to act in ways directed by the hand of

government, and are limited in their endeavors by strict regulations . Those who succeed do so not by satisfying

customers and utilizing resources at their highest value, but by effectively playing in the political arena. Rather than

investing in their property and in innovation to increase profits, they focus on lobbyists to give them an advantage in the government controlled market. This produces no value for society and does nothing to solve environmental problems. Conversely, free market exchanges not only direct producers to what society truly wants, but also provides them with the means to maximize wealth . Therefore, the discovery

of environmental and natural resource solutions in the free market results in economic empowerment .

Solves bioDClare Brown and Block 19 (Clare Brown and Walter Block, Loyola University New Orleans, 2-2-2019, "Free Market for the Environment", Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 116-125, https://ideas.repec.org/a/rnp/ecopol/ep1906.html, accessed: 7-13-2021)//yeed

For the market to function properly and reveal ideal environmental solutions, private property rights must not only exist, but also be defined , defendable , and divestible —what Stroup [Stroup, 2016]

calls the “3-Ds”. Ownership must be proclaimed and ownership rights clearly defined, else a potential buyer will be unwilling to make a purchase , as uncertainty in this respect is highly problematic .

Government regulation often creates this uncertainty concerning ownership and therefore causes

not only a reduction of its value ,9 but also its misuse. For example, “water flowing in most streams in the United States has no owner, although the owners of property next to the water have a right to

reasonable use of the water” [Stroup, 2016]. Also, no one directly owns wildlife, though state governments have some control over it. Both of these situations are subject to the tragedy of the commons.

There is also considerable confusion regarding the protection of habitat for endangered species under the Endangered Species Act, the results of which are often ineffective. This is exemplified when compared to the ventures of private citizens. After a successful career, Ted Turner—American media mogul and founder of CNN—began buying ranches across the West and Southwest of the United States and in South America. He currently

owns approximately 2 million acres of personal and ranch land. Turner created his own endangered species fund, which has successfully removed two species from the endangered list by means of restoration on Turner’s private property.10 Th is kind of protection is unmatched by eff orts of government.

Once ownership is explicit, their rights must be defendable in the courts. This affords the owner protection

against any physical harm to his property . Legal recourse enhances the longevity of the

resource ’s value . Finally, owners should be free to sell or lease their resource at will. This, again, increases

wealth . The potential for profit provides strong incentive to properly preserve the resource —so that

it may be fully appreciated by those who value it most. This may be the current owner, as is the case in the Ted Turner

example, or it may be another user to whom the owner can sell or lease his rights. In either case, the rewards to the owner for the

upkeep of the resource are the profits he will receive . The value added to the society that allows these kinds of ownership and transactions to materialize is that the resource is being put to its most valued use—as indicated by the economic decision-making on the part of its participants. The only way that members of the society can

reveal what they want to these producers and entrepreneurs is through a free flow of information that exists only under laissez-faire capitalism.

2NC A2 PDCP

Aff must include increased EPA regsEPA ND (Environmental Protection Agency, ND, "Regulatory and Guidance Information by Topic: Water", US EPA, https://www.epa.gov/regulatory-information-topic/regulatory-and-guidance-information-topic-water, accessed: 7-14-2021)//yeed

EPA enforces federal clean water and safe drinking water laws , provides support for municipal

wastewater treatment plants, and takes part in pollution prevention efforts aimed at protecting

watersheds and sources of drinking water .

Aff A2 Privatization

Turn – Econ

Privatization decks employee benefits and healthcare that destroys economiesFood and Water Watch May 2009 [Food and Water Watch, non-governmental organization group focused on government accountability relating to food, water, and corporate overreach, " Water Privatization Threatens Workers, Consumers and Local Economies accessed at https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wp-content/uploads/unionJobsFinal-web.pdf] SYu 7-13-2021

From Atlanta to Indianapolis, dramatic staff cuts have followed private takeovers of public water and sewer systems. In a survey of 10 drinking water and wastewater privatizations, corporate takeover led to an average job loss of 34 percent (see table 1 and figure 1). Poor work environments – For corporations, downsizing the workforce can cut costs and boost profits, but for employees, it means either losing their jobs or seeing their workload mushroom to potentially unmanageable levels. With the same amount of work but fewer

hands available to help, downsizing frequently leads to service problems and low employee morale . Loss of expertise

and experience – Even when the number of jobs does not decrease considerably, turnover in the

workforce can lead to loss of key technical skill and expertise . Corporations often lay off or force into retirement

veteran employees with valuable experience because they earn higher pay. In their stead, they bring in lower-paid, less qualified personnel. This change, too, can have damaging effects on service quality and work environments. The Center

for American Progress Action Fund, a progressive thinktank, found similar trends prevalent in federal government contracting: “ Without

decent wages , benefits, and working conditions, work quality can sometimes suffer due to high

turnover, inadequate training and experience, and low morale.”2 Service problems – After job cuts, service

problems frequently plague cities . Fewer employees are available to make repairs and respond to customer concerns.

Backlogs of work orders can accrue. When maintenance falls by the wayside, equipment wears out faster and the public must pay higher replacement costs. Meanwhile, poor upkeep can lead to sewage spills, wasted water and putrid odors. Private operators could vio late state and federal

environmental standards and force cities and towns to pay penalties and fine s (see table 1). 2. Workers could

see cuts in their pay and benefits. For the workers who are not fired, transferred or forced into early retirement, compensation packages usually worsen after privatization. Lower wages and salaries – People earn less money working for water and sewage corporations than for local governments, according to data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (see table

2): • Workers earn 7.4 percent less at private utilities. • Water and sewer treatment plant and system operators earn 5.9 percent less at private utilities. • Meter readers earn 5.8 percent less at private utilities.31

Fewer benefits – Compared to local governments, the private sector offers far fewer benefits: • An additional

one in three workers lacks access to retirement benefits . • An additional one in five workers lacks

access to life insurance . • An additional one in seven workers lacks access to medical insurance (see table

3). • Workers have to pay more than twice as much of their monthly health insurance bills. Private sector employees are paying an extra $350 every year just for their health insurance (see figure 2).32 Community costs – The growing number of people without insurance or with inadequate coverage is increasing the price of

healthcare for the entire nation . When people cannot pay their medical bills, everyone else must pick up the tab. Indeed,

benefits are an important part of an employee’s compensation package. Without employer provided health

insurance , many households could not afford medical care and may forgo treatment until it becomes an emergency. The

delay is not only dangerous but also expensive . Fortunately, the law requires hospitals to provide care to emergency

admission patients regardless of their ability to pay. Afterwards, hospitals recover those costs by negotiating higher treatment rates with insurance companies, which raise premiums on individuals and businesses.

Businesses then make their employees pay a higher portion of their overall premiums. As a result,

everyone ends up paying more.33 By failing to provide health insurance to their workers, businesses are privatizing

profits , socializing medical costs and contributing to the growing price of everyone’s healthcare. 3.

One in three union members could lose their union. With less job security and reduced compensation packages, it is not surprising to learn that labor unions represent a smaller portion of workers in

private utilities than in local governments, according to data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (see figure 3). Union density, or the portion of workers who are members of a trade union, is 15 percent lower in private utilities than in local governments. That means if local governments had the same union density as private utilities, union workers would lose

their union (see figure 4).35 Union busting – While the union membership rate in local governments has remained fairly constant since 1983, it has fallen by more than 10 percentage points in private utilities.36 A report by the Center for Economic and Policy Research, an economic policy think tank, attributes the decline Table 3. Benefits in local government and private sector jobs (2007) 8 Water Privatization Threatens Workers, Consumers and Local Economies in private sector unionization to “aggressive — even illegal — employer behavior [that] has undermined the ability of workers to create unions at their

workplaces.” The researchers estimated that employers illegally fire one in seven union activists who try to organize their workplaces through election campaigns.37 Many multinational water corporations have actively sought to bust unions. That’s because organized workforces fight layoffs, reductions in compensation and other undesirable labor policies.

Without unions, employees are at-will, so a company can fire them for no reason , and employees have far less input on their salaries and wages and benefit packages A study published in Public Administration

Review found that privatization of sanitation services leads to less unionization, concluding, “In other words, union opposition to contracting is quite rational, for contracting often spells the elimination of the union in the contracted workplace.”38 For

example, water workers in Wilkes-Barre, Pa., lost their union when American Water took over the water system in 1996. Five years later, they held a drive to re-unionize but lost the election,39 after the company distributed what union officials told The Times Leader were “threats, half-truths and lies.”40 In Lynn, Mass., sewage plant workers with

IUECWA Local 201 threatened to go on strike in 2007 when Veolia wanted to cut back benefits. Ric Casilli of Local 201 told The Daily Item, “Veolia wants to take members out of the union — that’s not going to happen.”41 Economic damage –

Unions benefit workers and the economy : • With all else equal, the typical worker will earn 11 percent

more by joining a union . That’s an extra $90 a week for a fulltime employee. • Union workers are 28 percent more

likely to receive employer-provided health insurance . Better compensation allows union

members to purchase more goods and support our consumer-driven econ omy. 42 So, by obstructing

unionization, water privatization hurts the economy The Bottom Line Water privatization is bad for

workers, bad for consumers and bad for local economies . Multinational water corporations cut jobs, decrease wages and benefits and fight unions. They take their profit off the backs of their employees and out of the quality of

their service. Water and sewer systems must remain in public hands. Instead of irresponsible private control of water,

communities need sound public management that respects workers’ rights, maintains a qualified workforce, encourages good service and helps keep money local. Public utilities provide the good union jobs that can help boost a weak economy and protect our valuable water resources for generations to come.

Turn – Racial CapitalPrivate water sector is a system of racial capitalism dependent on racialized and gendered slavery, imperialism, and genocide Schroering, University of Pittsburgh – BA in Environmental Studies, 2021

[Caitlin, “Constructing Another World: Solidarity and the Right to Water,” Studies in Social Justice, Vol. 15, no. 1, 2/8/21, https://doi.org/10.26522/ssj.v15i1.2435, accessed 7/14/2021, ddi-tmur]

To be clear, the violence of capitalism is not new, as Cedric Robinson so meticulously details. The current global system of racism and capitalism, as Robin D. G. Kelley writes in the foreword to Black Marxism, “did not break from the old order but rather evolved from it to produce a modern world system of ‘racial capitalism’ dependent on slavery, violence, imperialism , and genocide ” (Robinson, 2000, p. xiii; Murphy & Schroering, 2020). Following Debadatta Chakraborty (2020), I argue we ought to add patriarchy to this list. As one participant at the Summit noted, “we fight for our water [and] our life… need to fight for dignity for women and other disenfranchised groups .” Summit

speakers noted at various points the gendered dimensions of access to clean water and sanitation and

asserted that women and children are most affected. Water justice is also racial and gender

justice . Systemic injustice in its various and interrelated forms, including imperialism, colonialism, patriarchy, and racial capitalism is not new; but it is also true that the particular form of finance capital does create a different form of rapaciousness. There is a narrative that public services do not work and that the private sector can do it better, when in reality, the evidence (including the trend

of remunicipalisation) shows the opposite . As one of the Abuja Summit participants noted, a few decades ago, when he was a child, there was a pump at the end of each street in Lagos. Each home did not have piped water, but each street did. People had access to clean, affordable water. Now they do not. Why? Because a complicated process of neoliberal austerity measures led by the World Bank and IMF and other financial institutions working with governments and corporations have made sure that public investment in infrastructure stopped.

Turn – Cap BadCap Bad Turn:Link – capitalist class leverages market environmentalism to shore up individual entrepreneurial freedomsGreiner, Vanderbilt - Assistant Professor of Sociology, 2020

[Patrick Trent, “Community water system privatization and the water access crisis,” Sociology Compass, Vol. 14, Issue 5, 3/6/20, https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12785, accessed 7/12/2021, ddi-tmur]

*CPR – common pool resources

Recent research by scholars of community water system management has begun to consider that, perhaps, privatization practices have shifted in such a way that the traditional terms of the debate are no longer able to readily capture the extent to which private ownership, governance, and management approaches are present and effective (Bakker, 2004; Bakker, Kooy, Shofiani, & Martijn, 2008; Bakker, 2014; Pierce, 2015; Greiner, 2016). Prior to the development of such understandings, it was common for studies to draw distinct lines that left many decision makers and activists either unabashedly supporting the broader complex of policies that are often identified as falling under the umbrella of market environmentalism (Bakker, 2004), or condemning what came to be known as the neoliberalization of nature (Castree, 2008; Kathleen, 2003) and/or accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003). Bakker (2014) usefully defines market environmentalism as the reliance upon market tools and strategies (e.g., encouragement of resource ownership by private firms/public disinvestment, the use of pricing schemes such as full cost resources pricing and ecosystem service pricing, the implementation of economic dis/incentives, and the creation of resource-specific trading markets) to effectively govern natural resources. In other words, in order to ensure the long-term viability of common pool resources, and the populations that must rely on them, proponents of market environmentalism hold that the state's role in environmental management must be eliminated and replaced by the private sector.

Applying a critical eye to market environmentalism, those who have contributed to scholarship on the neoliberalization of nature (including Bakker, 2004, 2005) conceptualize such processes as part and parcel of the broader neoliberal economic turn that was initiated in the Reagan-Thatcher era. Understood in concert with the global project of neoliberalization, scholars of the “neoliberalization of nature” (e.g., Kathleen, 2003; Bakker, 2005; Castree, 2008) typically identify the efforts of market environmentalism to introduce economic logics to the management of natural resources as a collective strategy of the capitalist class, wherein the state and supranational institutions are simultaneously reshaped, and enlisted, in an attempt to dismantle publicly shared mechanisms of economic control and shore up “individual entrepreneurial freedoms…private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2005, p 2). Similarly, albeit much more broadly, Harvey's (2003) accumulation by dispossession is used in many instances (Bakker, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2005; Castro, 2007; Goldman, 2007; Spronk & Webber, 2007; Roberts, 2008; Araghi, 2009; Ahlers, 2010; Jaffee & Newman, 2013; Gellert, 2015; Greiner, 2016) to identify the privatization, or enclosure, of natural resources and commons spaces as actions that are necessary in order to close fundamental contradictions within capitalist socio-economic relations. More precisely, accumulation by dispossession draws upon the work of Luxemburg (2004) and Marx (1976) to dislodge primitive, or primary, accumulation2 from the nascence of capitalism and reestablish it as an ongoing process whereby markets are continually infused with new sources of labor and capital.

It would seem then, that the controversy surrounding the presence of market environmentalism strategies in water management, sanitation, and distribution sectors has less to do with the existence of private firms in water management per se, although that is certainly an important part of it, than with the expansion of private holdings at the expense of established public systems. Put differently, the fierce opposition to water privatization over the course of the last four decades is tightly bound up with the more general opposition to neoliberal processes of enclosure, especially their rapid expansion to—and imposition upon—Global South nations.

--EXT – Link – Cap bad turn

Private ownership results in higher water prices and less affordability after controlling all other factorsZhang et al., Cornell – Postdoctoral Associate, 2021

[Xue, MARCELA GONZÁLEZ RIVAS, University of Pittsburgh - Assistant Professor, MARY GRANT, Food & Water Watch and Food & Water Action - Public Water For All Campaign Director, Mildred E. Warner, Cornell – Professor, “Water Pricing and Affordability in the US: Public vs Private Ownership,” Cornell Working Paper, June 2021, https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/socarx/7mc4r.html, accessed 7/14/2021, ddi-tmur]

Our model results show that, among the largest 500 water systems in the US, private ownership results in higher water prices and less affordability, after controlling for all other factors. Private ownership has the largest effect on average annual water bill of all model variables. Results show that the average annual water bill is $144 more in the privately owned water systems than in the publicly owned water systems. Also, in the communities with privately owned water systems, low-income households spend 1.55% more of their income on their water bills. These results hold after controlling for other factors that would affect water price and affordability: regulatory environment, water supply, age of system, and community demographics.

Privately owned water systems annual bill significantly higher than public sectorZhang et al., Cornell – Postdoctoral Associate, 2021

[Xue, MARCELA GONZÁLEZ RIVAS, University of Pittsburgh - Assistant Professor, MARY GRANT, Food & Water Watch and Food & Water Action - Public Water For All Campaign Director, Mildred E. Warner, Cornell – Professor, “Water Pricing and Affordability in the US: Public vs Private Ownership,” Cornell Working Paper, June 2021, https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/socarx/7mc4r.html, accessed 7/14/2021, ddi-tmur]

Water system characteristics: Ownership, Regulation and Age of Infrastructure

Our primary interest is in the difference in price and affordability by public and private water systems. We created a dummy variable to measure if the water system is owned by a private company. While there is a broader range of ownership structures in the US for smaller systems (EPA 2021), our study focuses on the largest systems, which include public (government and cooperative) and private (investor owned) utilities. Among the 500 water systems, 321 are government owned, 121 are cooperative and 58 are investor owned. In our data, water systems owned by the private sector have a significantly higher annual bill ($501) than water systems owned by the public sector ($315). Low-income households also spent a higher percent of income on water if the utility is owned by the private sector (4.39%) than if it is owned by the public sector (2.84%). We expect that private ownership will be related to a higher water price and less affordability after controlling for other factors.

Turn – Human RightsTurn – Water privatization eliminates human rights and marginalizes communities to maximize profitGupta, Corporate Accountability - Associate Research Director, 2021

[Neil, “Veolia and Suez merger directly threatens human right to water,” Corporate Accountability, June 30, 2021, https://www.corporateaccountability.org/blog/veolia-suez-merger-threat/, accessed 7/16/2021, ddi-tmur]

Time and again, water privatization has failed communities , and Veolia and Suez’s track records are especially egregious.

At its core, privatization shifts the priority of a water system from providing universal service to maximizing profit for shareholders . Following privatization, there have been double- and even triple-digit rate increases that have an outsized impact on people with low incomes who are already struggling to meet

their daily needs.

The United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights found that “privatization often involves the systematic elimination of human rights protections and further marginalization of the interests of low-income earners and those living in poverty.” In communities that are already dealing with systemic exploitation and an intentional lack of investment, water privatization is especially harmful .

Veolia and Suez have faced opposition on every continent they operate in because of their track record of rate hikes, job cuts, and corner-cutting that jeopardizes public health.

In Osorno, Chile, a Suez subsidiary mismanaged the water system for years, which culminated in an incident that left about 98% of the population without water for over 10 days . Despite over 90% of voters calling to end the contract, the notoriously litigious Suez threatened to take Chile to international arbitration if the local regulator pursued de-privatization. After intimidating the Chilean government, Suez sold off its local subsidiary, walking away with millions and shielding itself from accountability.

In Flint, Michigan, Veolia was brought in to assess the city’s water months after residents began to raise serious safety

concerns about it. The corporation told the city its water was safe even as Veolia employees privately discussed concerns about potential lead contamination . At the same time that Veolia was dismissing safety

concerns of residents with statements like “some people may be sensitive to any water,” it was jockeying to secure a multimillion dollar privatization deal in Flint.

What’s more, the merger’s impact on water access isn’t going to be felt equally within countries or around the world. As is too often the case, Global South and low-income communities will likely bear the brunt of the fallout from this multibillion dollar deal.

Consolidating power into the hands of an even smaller group of wealthy individuals and institutional shareholders in the Global North with expansion plans for the Global South threatens to worsen

an already unjust status quo.

--EXT – human rights

Consequences of privatization orders of magnitude worse – prefer community control Gupta, Corporate Accountability - Associate Research Director, 2021

[Neil, “Veolia and Suez merger directly threatens human right to water,” Corporate Accountability, June 30, 2021, https://www.corporateaccountability.org/blog/veolia-suez-merger-threat/, accessed 7/16/2021, ddi-tmur]

Corporate mergers like this are rife with issues of transparency and accountability. But, when the “product” is a human right, the consequences of such a deal can be orders of magnitude worse .

Governments should reject this corporate power grab, prevent the privatization of the water sector, and instead return water systems to community control with robust public funding. And people around the world should call on their elected officials to stop privatization in their own communities and stand in solidarity with those already fighting for their human right to water.

Water privatization undermines human rights to water because water is bought and sold as a commodity – leads to economic inequality and capitalismFletcher et al 18 (Cory Fletcher - Political Science, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands; Anja van Heelsum - Political Science, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands; Conny Roggeband - Political Science, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands, “Water privatization, hegemony and civil society: What Motivates Individuals to Protest About Water Privatization?”, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17448689.2018.1496308)

Conflicts over water privatization are conflicts over hegemony; it is a question of whether water is a private good, to

be bought and sold as a commodity, or a public good, and thus to be considered as a human right

(Davidson-Harden, Naidoo, & Harden, 2007, p. 7). The dominant global neo-liberal hegemony of water marketization – as opposed to water as a human right – remains largely unchallenged and state-centric (Bakker, 2013). A counter-hegemonic discourse is necessary to challenge the dominant hegemonic ideas and replace them ‘by undermining the political economic foundations of liberal democracies’ (Baer & Gerlak, 2015, p. 1529). Without a coherent counter-hegemonic agenda, which is ideologically supported by water activists both locally and globally, the dominant hegemony of water marketization will remain

largely uncontested. This is troubling because neo-liberalization of primary resources is sporadic and reliant upon profitability, and thus structural economic inequality becomes intertwined with the

provision of water (Baer & Gerlak, 2015, p. 1540).

We consider the issue of water privatization as a conflict of interest between the public provision of water and the corporate interest of private management. This is a global conflict that emerged in the 1980s and

increased significantly during the 1990s (Bakker, 2013, p. 253; Opel, 1999). The discussion about private management in the provision of water was, and still is, framed as a conflict between state failure with public utilities and water access for the poor (Bakker, 2013, p. 254; Dellas, 2011, p. 1917). During the early 1990s, this conflict was framed as a ‘simple rational-choice problem that can only be resolved by pricing water’ (Agnew, 2011, p. 472). This rationale was affirmed as the fourth principle in the Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development in 1992, in which it was claimed that water ‘should be recognized as an economic good’ (World Meteorological Organization, 2016).

This led to water sector liberalization which, facilitated by privatization policies, allowed private companies from France, Britain and Spain to expand their activities internationally (Bakker, 2013, p.

254). Privatization programmes were encouraged by the World Bank, which required states to ‘open up public utilities for sale, lease or concession’ (Jaffee & Newman, 2013, p. 321). However, the World Bank has been criticized for

allowing its agenda of privatization to undermine the human right to water (Food and Water Watch, 2015).

Turn – NeolibTurn and no solvency – water privatization leads to variegated neoliberalism and target racial minorities and shrinking urban populations means utilities struggleGreiner, Vanderbilt - Assistant Professor of Sociology, 2020

[Patrick Trent, “Community water system privatization and the water access crisis,” Sociology Compass, Vol. 14, Issue 5, 3/6/20, https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12785, accessed 7/12/2021, ddi-tmur]

While Cochabamba brought concerns with water privatization to the global community's attention, it is far from the only instance of water privatization that has led to issues of community water access. In fact, in an analysis of the 500 largest water systems in the United States, Food and Water Watch (2016) found that households that receive their water from utility systems that have been privatized pay 59% more on average than households who receive their water from publicly owned systems. It is also the case that the burdens of privatization are not shared equally throughout the nation, or the world. This inequity partially results from the fact that, throughout the 21st century, increasing awareness of the technical difficulty and political contentiousness of water privatization has shifted the logic employed by firms seeking to privatize water utility systems. This logical transformation largely consists of firms being more selective about when and where they enter into a contract with a municipality, and has led some to refer to the privatization of water utilities as a variegated neoliberal process (Brenner, Peck, & Theodore, 2010; Bakker, 2013; Greiner, 2016). The term variegated neoliberalism is meant to suggest that neoliberal approaches to water resource management are only applied in those places and times when privatization is likely to be politically uncontentious and economically beneficial to the firm taking over the utility. As a result, firms will target municipalities that are unlikely to attract political attention, do not require high levels of repair and investment, and are in areas where rate hikes are able to be financially managed by the populations experiencing them (Bakker, 2013; Greiner, 2016). In a nation like the United States, where residential segregation is high, such a logic has important environmental justice implications (Butts & Gasteyer, 2011).

For instance, research has shown that U.S. political units with higher percentages of racial minorities, as well as those with lower overall population sizes, are more likely to have private water utilities in them than their whiter, more populous counterparts (Greiner, 2016). Such findings suggest that firms attempt to privatize water utilities in these spaces, as they are less investment intensive and likely have less political capital to mobilize to shut such projects down. Similarly, research has demonstrated that areas with a greater number of racial minorities are subjected to higher water utility rates, while areas that are home to fewer households—and are more rural—tend to pay more for their water as well (Butts & Gasteyer, 2011). Taken together such findings can inform the current water access crisis in important ways. Water utilities in urban, more populous areas tend to provide water at a lower cost as a result of the fact that the burden of maintaining and, when necessary, extending the infrastructure is shared among a greater number of people. However, in the United States, many urban populations are shrinking as higher efficiency in the manufacture sector leads to a decline in the number of available jobs, a phenomenon that has hit the Rust Belt cities in particular, but is occurring everywhere (Butts & Gasteyer, 2011). An important result of this transition is that municipalities will struggle to effectively maintain their infrastructure, and may feel the need to introduce substantial price increases in water utility services in order to meet that need—a possibility that is projected become more and more problematic as time goes on (Mack & Wrase, 2017).

If we take seriously the notions that places with higher numbers of minorities, and places with lower populations are more likely to experience privatization, while keeping in mind that these areas also tend to pay higher prices for their water system services, then a concerning possibility is that the experiences of Camden, NJ, and Cochabamba, Bolivia will become more common in the future. This is worthy of concern, as privatized water utilities tend to have a record of less adequate service, particularly in areas where customers are unable or unwilling to afford rate hikes and in areas with smaller populations (Pierce, 2015). For an example, we can return to the case of Camden. The State's audit of United Water's performance in Camden demonstrated that the company had failed to meet its contractual obligations on a number of counts. For example, Boxer (2009) found that between 2004 and 2008, the management provided by United Water resulted in losses of 45% of the city's water supply a year. This loss, in turn, cost the city an average of $1.7 million dollars a year in annual revenue. Additionally, United Water failed to collect more than $4.5 million dollars in rates that were over 90 days past due. United Water also required Camden to pay $3.2 million dollars in charges for changes to the contract that the city never approved. This $3.2 million was in addition to $12.1 million dollars that was billed to Camden by United Water without documentation or city approval. What's more, Boxer's audit also noted that United Water provided “inadequate system maintenance for assets such as water storage tanks, fire hydrants and well casing vents” posing “potential health and safety risks to city residents” (2009, p. 6). A similar case can be seen in the privatization of the water utility system that serves the population of Atlanta, Georgia during the 1990s, where “water ran orange to brown for many customers and… low pressure or insufficient water treatment made the water unsafe to drink” (Arnold, 2009, p. 800). These are some of the most visible cases of problems that have occurred in the wake of privatization, but it should be kept in mind that there are many other instances of inadequate service from privatized systems as well (Hall, Lobina, & Corral, 2011).

Turn – Water Scarcity

Water privatization increases water scarcity and sustains global corporate capitalism – empirics prove Dilworth 07 (Richardson Dilworth - assistant professor of political science at Drexel University, author of The Urban Origins of Suburban Autonomy (Harvard University Press, 2005) and editor of Social Capital in the City: Community and Civic Life in Philadelphia, “Privatization, the World Water Crisis, and the Social Contract”, https://drexel.edu/~/media/Files/histpol/Publications/dilworth/DilworthPrivatization%20the%20World%20Water%20Crisis%20and%20the%20Social%20Contract.ashx?la=en)

To deny someone the right to water is tantamount to denying them the right to life, and to set a price on water is to set a price on life. It comes as no surprise then to find a good amount of anxiety and contention over who gets to set

the price of water and how much they charge. And over the past two decades, throughout both the developed and developing world, setting the price of water has fallen increasingly to private companies at the same time as various demographic changes have increased water scarcity . Thus we hear water described simultaneously in terms of both a

humanitarian crisis of global proportions— one standard though very rough figure is that more than one billion people lack access to safe drinking water ~Davis 2005, 146; Black 2004, 28!—and as the “oil of the 21st century” ~Wessel 2005!.

The lively discussion over the myriad roles played by private companies in the distribution of the world’s water—known collectively as “public-private partnership,” “private sector participation,” or merely “privatization”—falls roughly into two types, which I will here call “technical” and “moral.” The technical discussion, dominant in academic and policy circles, revolves around the relative costs and benefits of public versus private supply of water in terms of water quality, water pricing, capital investment, extent of water service, and environmental protection ~see the

review of this literature by Davis 2005!. The moral discussion, dominated by activists ~Petrella 2001; Barlow and Clarke 2002; Shiva

2002! and activist journalists ~Rothfeder 2001; Ward 2002; International Consortium of Investigative Journalists 2003; Holland 2006, focuses on water privatization as a facet of global corporate capitalism, with particular stress laid on the fact that the water industry is dominated by only a few transnational corporations, aided by World Bank and International Monetary Fund loan provisions requiring private sector participation in water infrastructure development ~Conca 2006, 221–3; Davis 2005, 154; Center for Public Integrity 2003!. To the extent that

these authors concern themselves with the actual effects of privatization, it is usually to discuss a few well-known cases of failed privatization efforts, such as that which occurred in Cochabamba, Bolivia ~Finnegan 2002; Barlow and Clarke 2002, 154–5; Black 2004, 78–9; Conca 2006, 238; Davis 2005, 166–8!.

CP Fails – Biophysical Limits

No Solvency – biophysical and socio-cultural attributes of water make privatization an “uncooperative commodity” – information, culture and fluidityGreiner, Vanderbilt - Assistant Professor of Sociology, 2020

[Patrick Trent, “Community water system privatization and the water access crisis,” Sociology Compass, Vol. 14, Issue 5, 3/6/20, https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12785, accessed 7/12/2021, ddi-tmur]

In the case of water distribution and sanitation services, there are additional, more precise reasons why difficulties are encountered following privatization. The biophysical attributes of water do not easily lend themselves to commodification. Water, unlike most other resources and commodities, tends to move and is referred to as a “flow resource” (Bakker, 2007:442). Water's flow complicates attempts to manage it to a significant degree. Water's constant movement exposes it to many different environments and pollutants, and keeping track of just what environmental factors water being distributed to particular populations has been exposed to, how severe the exposure is, and even where water is going (leaks are quite common in water utility systems and result in about 25% of distributed water being lost, on average [Garcia & Thomas, 2003]), makes the collection of perfect information extremely difficult and costly. Importantly, perfect information is a requirement of well-functioning markets, and in the case of water, it is necessary in order for pricing to occur correctly (see Bromley, 1999 for a good overview of markets). Put differently, the difficulty of attaining information about water results in an inability to effectively incorporate the cost of externalities and resource scarcity into it as a commodifiable good. In a practical sense, this means that it is very difficult to signal that particular water systems are causing public health issues (e.g., the Flint, MI water crisis) or that they are in danger of water scarcity (e.g., day zero in Cape Town, South Africa) through pricing alone (Bakker, 2005). Furthermore, water is heavy and, as suggested by its tendency to flow, fluid. A result of these two attributes is that water is very difficult to exchange on a market without a dedicated infrastructure in place to accommodate it (Bakker, 2005).

Compounding the challenges to commodification processes that derive from water's biophysical characteristics, is the fact that water is necessary to human life and is deeply entrenched in innumerable cultural practices and religious traditions (Bakker, 2007). The physiological and socio-cultural import of water makes it highly likely that the transfer of water resources, and the utilities used to manage them, from public to private hands will be a politically contentious affair. Combined, the biophysical and socio-cultural characteristics of water make it an “uncooperative commodity” (Bakker, 2005; Bakker, 2007) and work to make the process of privatizing water utilities and resources a much more challenging feat than the privatization of other goods.

CP Fails - CorruptionTurn and no solvency – privatization infrastructure cost brings natural monopoly and causes corruptionGreiner, Vanderbilt - Assistant Professor of Sociology, 2020

[Patrick Trent, “Community water system privatization and the water access crisis,” Sociology Compass, Vol. 14, Issue 5, 3/6/20, https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12785, accessed 7/12/2021, ddi-tmur]

Even more problematic for the belief that privatization might bring greater competition to the water utility and sanitation services sector is the high cost of infrastructure development, which creates the conditions necessary for a “natural monopoly” (Roland, 2008) to arise. In such circumstances, the high cost of developing the fixed capital, or infrastructure, necessary to service provision, and the fact that infrastructures necessarily must be placed in more or less the same locations, stifles the ability of firms to compete and would likely lead to a single operator dominating the field. Yet, speaking abstractly once again, even if such difficulties could be overcome the most common issues with privatization arise from the process of privatization itself. That is to say, the act of transferring goods held by the public to a private entity provides many opportunities for corruption to take hold. For an example, one need to look no farther than the rapid privatization of the Russian economy following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In that well-known instance, it is estimated that roughly 70% of privatized entities were handled in such a way that insiders were given 51% of firm shares before auctions began (Alexeev, 1999). The fallout of such political opportunism is readily apparent in the rampant wealth inequality that has taken hold in Russia since, as research has shown that the Gini index for income inequality increased from a fairly low 0.3–0.4 in 1989 to above 0.6 in 1996 (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2006; Novokmet, Piketty, & Zucman, 2018), placing it for a time among the most unequal nations in the world.

CP Fails – Info Asymmetry No Solvency – market failures attributed from information asymmetries prevent privatizationGreiner, Vanderbilt - Assistant Professor of Sociology, 2020

[Patrick Trent, “Community water system privatization and the water access crisis,” Sociology Compass, Vol. 14, Issue 5, 3/6/20, https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12785, accessed 7/12/2021, ddi-tmur]

3 | THE CHALLENGES OF PRIVATIZATION

In an abstract sense, the unrealized promise of efforts to privatize water systems, along with other public goods for that matter, can be attributed to the market failures that often characterize sectors dominated by public entities. Such sectors are rife with information asymmetries that prevent truly profit-maximizing logics from being realized (Roland, 2008; Stiglitz, 2008). For instance, it can be quite difficult for operators to effectively estimate individual demand, the adequacy of supply to meet such demand in the future, or the extent of equipment in disrepair— particularly in sectors that rely upon extensive and hidden infrastructure, such as water and electric utilities. One example of such difficulties, albeit in the electricity sector, are the rolling electricity blackouts that literally left Californians in the dark, and footing the bill of price hikes, in the summer of 2000. This very public market failure developed as a result of an unanticipated capacity shortage, and an inability for Californian utilities, such as Edison and Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), to freely raise customer rates. The lack of adequate information concerning the function of the wholesale energy trading market, combined with a cultural belief that electricity should be provided affordably, ultimately resulted in PG&E filing for bankruptcy, and the Californian government, not to mention the population it represents, spending U.S. $7.6 Billion to purchase the electricity that the private utility firms could no longer afford to acquire (Woo, 2001).

CP Fails – Politics No solvency – public-private partnerships and independent service providers fail – poor design, political opportunism and competitionGreiner, Vanderbilt - Assistant Professor of Sociology, 2020

[Patrick Trent, “Community water system privatization and the water access crisis,” Sociology Compass, Vol. 14, Issue 5, 3/6/20, https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12785, accessed 7/12/2021, ddi-tmur]

Such opposition was, in truth, quite a surprise for many decision makers in the years following the neoliberal turn, as the justification often cited for the push to privatize was the inadequate performance of publicly owned firms. As proponents of privatization would argue, the dynamics of private businesses introduced incentive structures that were missing within public institutions (Estrin & Pelletier, 2018). Other common arguments suggested that the profit-maximizing decision-making processes of private companies would eventually lead to higher levels of efficiency, and that the competition that characterized markets unfettered by government regulations would ensure such a profit-maximizing rational was present (Stiglitz, 2008)—ultimately establishing a general equilibrium that would maximize the benefits received by all (Roland, 2008). When it came to the provision and sanitation of water, it was argued that such dynamics would lead to improvements in the function of extant systems, as well as a rapid expansion of water system infrastructure to unserved populations around the globe (Davis, 2005). Some support has been found for such ideas. For example, in a cross-national study, Kariuki and Schwartz (2005) found that competition among small scale independent service providers, or small-scale private service providers, led to a general decline in the cost of water service. Most would now readily admit, however, that such assertions were deeply ideological in nature (BraadBaart, 2007), and had little empirical or theoretical weight behind them. Research concerning the failure of private water distribution firms to achieve such goals around the globe has since underlined the dubious nature of many of the claims used to back privatization projects. For instance, in an examination of the efficacy of private participation in public water system management, or public-private partnerships, during the 1990s Braadbaart (2005) found that poor design and political opportunism led to a fairly high rate of failure in such efforts. Similarly, Ahlers, Schwartz, and Perez Guida (2013) found that in Mozambique, even small independent service providers did not compete with one another in ways that benefitted them or their customers.

CP Fails – Severance Costs

Severance costs and adjustment failure costs make privatization and environmental markets ineffectivePappas & Flatt 19 (Michael Pappas, Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law & Victor B. Flatt, Dwight Olds Chair in law and Faculty Director, Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources (EENR) Center. University of Houston Law Center and Distinguished Scholar of Carbon Markets. Global Energy Management Institute, University of Houston. “The Costs of Creating Environmental Markets: A Commodification Primer”, https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1397&context=ucilr, Date Accessed: 7-12-21)

There are challenges in creating complex institutions in general and in markets in particular. This Part

addresses the role of underappreciated costs in impeding the formation and success of markets, particularly for certain environmental “goods.” While some of these concepts have been discussed in previous literature, this Part identifies

additional important considerations and aggregates this thinking into an overarching explanation of why certain markets may not emerge and remain difficult to create.

First, Section A draws upon the insights and legacies of economists Friedrich Hayek, James Buchanan, Elinor Ostrom, Ronald Coase, and Harold Demsetz to suggest that attempts to create complex institutions, like markets, should be approached with a healthy caution. Further, it applies

their work to argue that the fact that markets have not emerged in certain areas may indicate that such markets would be inefficient because the costs of establishing the markets outweigh their benefits.

Following on this observation, Sections B and C then discuss two core sets of costs that influence market emergence and success: “severance costs” and “adjustment failure costs.” Specifically, Section B examines severance costs,

which are the costs associated with defining, enforcing, and transacting in marketable “goods.” To pluck an environmental good from its interconnected ecological and legal context and to attempt to define it as a severable, stand-alone commodity can be costly. Additionally, when such an environmental good is not necessarily associated with tangible, physical ownership or when it has not historically been commodified, further challenges arise in creating the complex institutions

necessary for such markets to function. If severance costs are too high, property interests may never be defined or transactions may never occur.

Section C then addresses adjustment failure costs inherent to the pricing system. In all markets, pricing results from an iterative trial-and-error process, and it takes time (and misallocations) for supply and demand to align (assuming they ever do). The adjustment failure costs associated with such pricing delays and corrections may be trivial in some markets, but they can be particularly high and material in the context of non-fungible or irreparable goods. Since environmental goods in particular may display

such non-fungible or irreparable characteristics , consideration of adjustment failure costs is crucial because high adjustment failure costs may exceed the potential gains of the market system. Thus, the adjustment failure costs that arise from the iterative function of markets represent another key factor in the emergence and success of markets.

CP Fails - Water Quality

No Solvency - water is a protected heritage, not a commercial product – unpredictable supplyAngelakis et al., Agricultural School of Messara – Greek Ministry of Agriculture, 2021

[Andreas N., Mohammad Valipour, Abdelkader T. Ahmed, Vasileios Tzanakakis, Nikolaos V. Paranychianakis, Jens Krasilnikoff, , Renato Drusiani, Larry Mays, Fatma El Gohary, Demetris Koutsoyiannis , Saifullah Khan, “Water Conflicts: From Ancient to Modern Times and in the Future,” Sustainability, Vol. 13, no. 4237, 4/11/21, https://doi.org/10.3390/su13084237, accessed 7/14/2021, ddi-tmur]

1.2. Water Governance

Water is a natural resource produced at unpredictable , unstable, and uncontrollable rates . That is why, rightly so, Article one of the Council of Europe Directive (EU/60/2000/EU) Water Resources Management Directive stipulates that: water is not a commercial product like any other but ,

instead, a heritage which must be protected , defended, and treated as such. However, beyond that,

it is necessary to ensure the quality of the water supply , even in cases of “emergency”, such as the

one that the world is going through. That is why in most of the States, such as the USA , Germany,

Japan, and the Scandinavian countries, the control of the water supply services are under public

and/or municipal control .

Incentives CP

Generic 1NC

The United States Federal Government should create a system of comprehensive financial incentives targeted at resolving [insert affirmative harm areas]. The United States Federal Government should provide all necessary funding and technical assistance to appropriate private sector entities engaging in efforts to resolve [insert affirmative harm areas]

General Solvency

Solvency – General

Private conservation works – more innovative & better fundingOwley 15 (Jessica Owley is a professor of law at the University of Miami School of Law and former Director of Environmental Program at SUNY Buffalo Law School, “The Increasing Privatization of Environmental Permitting”, Akron Law Review, https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1042&context=akronlawreview, 6/15, DA-7/13/21 )The above outline of private mitigation programs already indicates where some concerns relating to this form of privatization might emerge.

There are, however, many strengths that private actors can bring to the table. For example, private conservation organizations may have greater expertise in land conservation technique s, may be able to operate more quickly and flexibly, and may have motivation to find innovative ways to increase land protection.174 Land trusts and mitigation bank operators work closely with the land and may have sophisticated understandings of the parcels on which they operate . Land trust staff, for example, is often composed of longstanding community members.175 They may have even better understanding of local weather patterns and ecological features than the public agencies. In

particular, they might have superior knowledge of local access points and potential struggles (trespassing, dumping, lack of community support). Moreover, permittees may feel more comfortable working with private organizations than with government agencies

where relations may be hostile, or permit applicants resentful.176 Many proponents of privatization assert that it is more efficient to allow private organizations to take on public duties instead of increasing government bureaucracy.177 In

conserving land, private agencies may be able to acquire important parcels quicker and may have access to additional funding sources.178 Land trusts can often work quickly to protect lands in advance of threats.179 They can harness public support and acquire large parcels faster than government agencies and potentially with less local opposition.180 Private organizations may also be able to provide services similar to those provided by public agencies but at reduced costs.181 Many land trusts for example use volunteers for monitoring conservation easements.182 Even paid employees may be cheaper than public employees because of reduced overhead costs including salaries, benefits, and costs associated with bureaucracies. Some theorists argue, however, that efficiency arguments are “bogus.”183

For example, Buchheit argues that often privately-run systems like schools, hospitals, and prisons are more costly.184 Private organizations may be more innovative as well.185 When it comes to management decisions regarding the lands, they may have a freer hand than agencies do to experiment with different land conservation techniques or rules. Land trusts could consider conservation easement amendments or even land swaps. Mitigation banks can experiment with different

restoration, creation, and enhancement techniques in attempts to increase the value of their banks. Profit-maximizing motives will align with a desire to increase wetland function and habitat value. This may lead to more innovation and experimentation than we would expect to see with public agencies that do not feel the same economic pressure.

Solvency – Biodiversity

Incentives are critically needed to save biodiversity Casey et. al ’06 (Frank Casey, Director of Conservation Economics, Sara Vickerman, Senior Director of Biodiversity Partnerships, Cheryl Hummon, Senior Conservation Incentive Specialist, and Bruce Taylor, Director of Oregon Biodiversity Program, “Incentives for Biodiversity Conservation: An Ecological and Economic Assessment”, Defenders of Wildlife, Date Accessed: (7-13-2021) https://defenders.org/sites/default/files/publications/incentives_for_biodiversity_conservation.pdf

The conservation of intrinsic and utilitarian values associated with biodiversity will require the cooperation of private landowners, with participation enhanced through incentive mechanisms. There are three major reasons why the role of private landowners and incentives are important: the location of listed and at-risk species, the need for conservation tools that are complementary to regulation and the lack of markets for public goods like species and habitat conservation. Listed Species Distribution and Land Ownership and Fragmentation Eighty-five percent of the species listed as threatened or endangered by the federal government are in that condition, at least in part, because of the loss or degradation of the habitats they need to survive (Wilcove et al. 1998). Although the federal government owns and/or manages more than 30 percent of the nation’s land area, federal lands support only about 33 percent of known populations of threatened and endangered species (Groves et al. 2000). Thus, 67 percent of the known populations of threatened and endangered species occur either in aquatic habitats or on the 1.485 billion acres of non-federal lands. At the species level, Hudson (1993) noted that about 50 percent of the species listed as threatened or endangered (728) were found exclusively on private lands. Private agricultural, forestry and other rural lands are an extremely important component of non-federal lands, with 92 percent used for private crop, forestry and/or livestock production. In 2001, land in agricultural production accounted for almost 50 percent of all land in the contiguous 48 states and comprised 401 million acres of cropland, 522 million acres of pasture and range land and 405 million acres of forest land. About 34 million acres of cropland are currently idled by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Conservation Reserve Program. With so many threatened and endangered species occurring solely on private rural lands, the identification of effective and efficient incentive mechanisms and the implementation of effective landowner conservation incentive programs are crucial. Private agricultural land use and management have contributed significantly to the decline of biodiversity conservation in the United States. Over time, habitat loss associated with modern farming methods on more than 400 million acres of cropland brought about dramatic reductions in many wildlife species in North America (Wildlife Management Institute 1995; Risley et al. 1995). In 1995, nearly 84 percent of 663 plant and animal species inhabiting the contiguous 48 states were listed as threatened or endangered because of agricultural activities. Specifically, 272 species (41 percent) were listed exclusively due to agricultural development, 115 (17 percent) because of fertilizer and/or pesticide use and 171 (26 percent) due to grazing (Lewandrowski and Ingram 1999). There are increasing threats to biodiversity conservation in the United States, primarily through uncontrolled conversion and fragmentation of land to uses (mostly urbanization) that have little or no habitat value. Over the five-year period of 1992 to 1997, there was a combined loss of nearly 20 million acres of rural lands, as represented by diminishing cropland, grassland, range, pasture and forested land categories. Those lands that are the most suitable for the maintenance of native biodiversity and ecosystems (grassland, range and forest land) accounted for three-fourths of the decrease or about 15 million acres. Part of this loss was offset by the increase in special recreation and wildlife use lands (federal and state parks, wilderness areas and wildlife refuges) of 9 million acres. Nonetheless, from 1992 to 1997, there was a net loss of about 11 million acres of rural lands, posing a significant risk to

biodiversity conservation. Most of this loss may be attributed to increasing sprawl and urbanization and the conversion of land to uses that are unsuitable for supporting species and their habitats. For example, between 1997 and 2001, almost 9 million acres of rural lands were developed– 46 percent of which were forest land, 20 percent cropland, 15 percent rangeland and 16 percent pastureland (Natural Resources Conservation Service 2003 need reference). Combined, forest land and rangeland conversion accounted for about two-thirds of the growth in developed land from 1997 to 2001. These trends continued through 2003. An important condition for the successful application of incentive mechanisms for biodiversity conservation will be to implement more effective land-use and development policies.

Solvency - Conservation

Incentives harvest conservation and innovationNathan Paulich ’10, Author and Florida State Law School alumni, “Increasing Private Conservation through Incentive Mechanisms”, Stanford University, date accessed (7-14-21) https://www.dropbox.com/sh/7y3kpw6m825tncl/AAC0RJFKXVOOgOrwUYSkv1nRa?dl=0&preview=Increasing+Private+Conservation+through+Incentive+Mechanisms.pdf

The concept of incentive-based species conservation is simple: private landowners will be more likely to embrace and engage in conservation efforts if they are not forced to pay the entire bill. Instead of punishing landowners for having endangered species on their land, it is time to reward and encourage them to create positive externalities that benefit the public at large. Given the marginal success of the ESA, a more innovative approach—one embracing incentive mechanisms that encourage private conservation—should be preferred going forward. Incentives offer a promising alternative to command and control regulation that can increase conservation and stewardship on private land. Similarly, incentives have the potential to promote active habitat management while reducing or eliminating the perverse incentives created by a purely regulatory regime.

The ESA has taken some steps towards using incentives to promote conservation efforts among private landowners. Section 10 was added to the ESA to alleviate the strict restrictions on private landowners. Since then, the ESA has embraced programs such as Habitat Conservation Plans, Safe Harbor Agreements, and Candidate Conservation Plans with some success

Incentives good: they reward conservation efforts and change private landowner behavior Nathan Paulich ’10, Author and Florida State Law School alumni, “Increasing Private Conservation through Incentive Mechanisms”, Stanford University, date accessed (7-14-21) https://www.dropbox.com/sh/7y3kpw6m825tncl/AAC0RJFKXVOOgOrwUYSkv1nRa?dl=0&preview=Increasing+Private+Conservation+through+Incentive+Mechanisms.pdf

The growing consensus in the economic literature is that failure to compensate private landowners will have significant negative effects on the environment, illustrating the necessity to use incentive mechanisms that reward conservation efforts. Wealth and incentives matter for conservation purposes. There is a correlation between compensating private landowners and increased habitat quality, indicating that incentive mechanisms have a positive influence on the environment. Incentives are a powerful tool for changing behavior and have proven more effective than “education, persuasion, prompting, or feedback.” Incentives have the “ability to tap into decentralized behavior-coordinating mechanisms” and give agencies more flexibility to implement policies and decisions “adaptively.” Incentives, such as compensation programs and market-based solutions, will help change private landowners’ negative behavior toward the ESA and improve conservation efforts on private land.

More incentives cause landowners to contribute more for conservation of habitatsPaulich,10 (Nathan Paulich. J.D., Florida State University College of Law. “Increasing Private Conservation through Incentive Mechanisms,” https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/paulich.pdf, Accessed 7/13/21)

Reducing the costs associated with creating and maintaining HCPs has had the effect of creating

more incentives for private landowners to participate in the program.193 Increased certainty frees up

money and increases land values, which allow the landowner to contribute more for species

conservation and stewardship efforts.194 These assurances also provide conservation benefits for

listed and unlisted species ,195 including increased protection for endangered plants and habitats not currently occupied by listed species.196 Additionally, the assurances “provide a framework of funding and cooperation” important for adaptive management techniques.197

Solvency – Environment

Market based regulatory tools is a market solution that works, harnessing environmental protection.Pappas and Flatt 19 (Michael Pappas, Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law and Victor B. Flat, Dwight Olds Chair in Law and Faculty Director at EENR Center, “The Costs of Creating Environmental Markets: Commodification Primer, 9 U.C. Irvine L Rev. 731 (2019), Date Accessed: (7-12-2021) https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1397&context=ucilr

Offering something of a hybrid between laissez-faire markets and commandand-control regulation are “market-based regulatory tools.” As discussed in more detail below, these tools harness market forces, such as pricing mechanisms, property rights, and economic incentives, but they do so in the context of a regulatory structure, often with a predetermined normative baseline of environmental protection. Though market-based tools are not necessarily new, they have become increasingly popular over the last three decades as a darling approach for innovative environmental governance. Market-based regulatory tools begin with some regulatory scheme that creates the underlying market conditions. Though neoclassical economics has suggested that markets form naturally, today’s scholarship often emphasizes the role of government and law in providing the security needed for markets to function. Central to this role of law is the definition of property rights and rules of exchange. Many environmental interests have historically not been considered property or subject to market economics. This is because the environmental amenity may be considered as something owned by all, such as with the public trust doctrine, or because disagreement over legal entitlements to the amenity may not allow the clear definition of a property- or other-rights- boundary.

Market solutions work; they must be prioritized.Pappas and Flatt 19 (Michael Pappas, Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law and Victor B. Flat, Dwight Olds Chair in Law and Faculty Director, Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources (EENR) Center, University of Houston Law Center, and Distinguished Scholar of Carbon Markets, Global Energy Management Institute, University of Houston, “The Costs of Creating Environmental Markets: A Commodification Primer, 9 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 731 (2019), Date Accessed: 7-12-2021)

Can environmental problems be “ solved ” with a market solution ? In some cases, policies suggest that the answer

is yes , and market-based environmental programs already exist. Examples include markets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, offsetting wetlands’ ecological functions, or allocating fishing rights. However, in other cases the answer appears to be no. For instance, we don’t see an organized market wherein a person can sell her right to clean air to the highest bidder. This disparity raises the question: what separates instances where market based solutions are desirable (or even allowable) from those where they are not?

Though there is much controversy over the use of markets in the environmental realm, the defining conversation surrounding the appropriateness of market mechanisms for environmental governance has centered on normative arguments over the appropriateness of markets at all. This normative question about rights and commodification is exceptionally important , and its primacy should not be diminished . However, the

very normative questions about the appropriateness of markets may be related to how well such markets could possibly work. The potential effectiveness of a market can inform its appropriateness and desirability. This Article identifies “severance costs” and “adjustment failure costs” as the two primary criteria associated with market emergence, durability, and, ultimately, effectiveness. Severance costs are those costs associated with defining, enforcing, and transacting in marketable “goods.” Adjustment failure costs are the costs associated with the delays, misallocations, and pressures inherent in

the iterative process of market pricing. The Article argues that severance costs and adjustment failure costs offer powerful insights for the appropriateness of market-based governance in the environmental context and beyond, because if these costs are too high they can outweigh the benefits of a market system. After identifying the importance of severance costs and adjustment failure costs, the Article then assembles them into a framework. This model offers guidance for sorting, selecting, designing, and improving market-based programs. With the model, policymakers can not only assess whether market-based governance would be

appropriate for particular resource contexts, but also choose which market-based approaches might be most likely to succeed . For

instance, the model can identify conditions where specific market-based programs (such as capand-trade or Pigouvian-tax systems) are more- and less-

likely to be effective . Practically speaking, this empowers policymakers with a diagnostic tool for environmental governance in scenarios ranging from nutrient pollution in the Chesapeake Bay, to allocation of western water rights, to preservation of endangered species habitats. Moreover, the model is also applicable to market-based governance in many other areas, such as transfers of human tissues or professional licensing regimes.

Solvency – Pollution

Incentive based approaches have been integrated for pollution previously---resulted in dozens of applications and growth (state and local levels for programs).US EPA 18, Environmental Protection Agency is an independent executive agency of the United States federal government tasked with environmental protection matters, "The United States Experience with Economic Incentives for Pollution Control," US EPA, 02-01-2018, https://www.epa.gov/environmental-economics/united-states-experience-economic-incentives-pollution-control//Abhi

Over the the last 20 years, and particularly during the past decade, economic incentives have been increasingly used to control pollution and improve environmental and health protection. The 2001 Report assesses the role of economic incentives for controlling environmental pollution and documents hundreds of uses of economic incentives for controlling pollution at all levels of government to both supplement and substitute for traditional regulatory approaches.

The 2001 Report finds two general trends concerning the use of incentives:

Increasing diversity of economic incentives used by EPA--Although historically EPA has relied on regulations to reduce pollution and improve the environment, it has begun to use a wide variety of economic incentive mechanisms in recent years.

Increasing application at other levels of government–Dozens of such applications are discussed in the report but there are hundreds more. Both the number of applications and their diversity is growing rapidly at the state and local level. Incentives are particularly useful in controlling pollution that has not already been subjected to traditional forms of regulation.

The 2001 Report also concludes that economic incentives for environmental pollution control:

Provide a unique contribution to environmental management--In many cases incentives generate benefits beyond what is possible with traditional regulations; sometimes they are applied where traditional regulations might not be possible. They are particularly useful for small and geographically dispersed sources. They can also provide impetus for technological change.

Provide cost savings relative to traditional regulatory approaches–Demonstrated theoretically, based on at least 40 studies. One study estimates potential savings of widespread use of economic incentives could reach $45 billion annually. On a practical level, acid rain trading savings are at least $700 million annually.

Have wide applicability to specific environmental problems–Although a wide variety of incentives are available, any particular one may be effective in managing only a fairly narrow range of problems. The report suggests which incentives are most useful for what problems.

Economic incentives are expected to be particularly useful in controlling pollution not subject to regulation For instance, citizens can be encouraged to reduce curbside solid waste by recycling, composting and other means if there is a disposal charge based on the volume of solid waste.

Examples of economic incentives discussed in the report include:

Trading of sulfur dioxide allowances in the Acid Rain program, which encourages utilities to find least cost compliance strategies;

Subsidizing farmers and others to conserve habitat and control pollution;

Basing air emission permit fees on the quantity of emissions and charging for the disposal of industrial effluents in water treatment plants;

Requiring a deposit on beverage containers to encourage recycling, which now occurs in ten states; many states have a similar system for lead acid batteries;

Imposing liability for natural resource damages caused by oil and hazardous material spills, a incentive to encourage pollution prevention;

Encouraging reductions in toxic emissions by broadly disseminating information about emissions through hazard warning labeling and in communities through the annual Toxics Release Inventory; and,

Promoting voluntary programs such as Energy Star, Waste Wise, XL and other programs that reduce pollution by assisting and rewarding voluntary actions to reduce energy use and limit pollution.

The 2001 Report is an update and extension of the United States portions of a previous 1992 EPA report and a previous 1997 report to EPA including many additional economic incentive instruments. These previous reports included a section on foreign experiences with incentives which is not included in this 2001 report, but in November, 2004 a report on the International Experiences with Economic Incentives for Protecting the Environment was published by EPA.

Solvency – Water Pollution

Incentives stop water pollution Allen Blackman ’06, author and expert on environmental and natural resource policy in developing countries, “Economic Incentives to Control Water Pollution in Developing Countries: How Well has Colombia's Wastewater Discharge Fee Program Worked and Why?” Recourses Organization, date accessed: (7-14-21) https://www.resources.org/archives/economic-incentives-to-control-water-pollution-in-developing-countries-how-well-has-colombia039s-wastewater-discharge-fee-program-worked-and-why/#:~:text=The%20two%20economic%20incentive%20policies,EPA's%20sulfur%20dioxide%20emissions%20trading

In 1997, Colombia initiated an innovative nationwide program to stem water pollution. Instead of requiring firms to cap emissions of pollutants at specified levels--the conventional command-and-control approach--the new program created economic incentives for emissions reductions by charging polluters a fee per unit of pollution emitted. By some accounts, water quality in key watersheds improved soon after the program was put in place, and several well-known evaluations deemed the program a success. Yet many of these evaluations were based on early data and were conducted by parties involved in the design and implementation of the program. Few objective, up-to-date studies have appeared. One chapter of a recent World Bank-funded RFF report on Colombian environmental policies, which I co-authored, aims to fill this gap. It assesses Colombia's wastewater discharge fee program from 1997 until 2003, when significant reforms were implemented. The chapter finds that although the program was beset by a number of serious problems during this stage, its reputation as a success is not unfounded. In several watersheds, pollution loads do appear to have dropped significantly after the program was introduced. The reasons typically given for this achievement are not the whole truth, however. While many proponents claim the incentives that discharge fees created for polluters to cut emissions in a cost-effective manner were responsible for reduced discharges, the incentives they created for regulatory authorities to improve permitting, monitoring, and enforcement were probably at least as important.

Solvency Mechs

Ag

Farmers go where the money goes; if they are incentivized to engage in sustainable agriculture, they will—and they care about the environment too.Eubanks 9 (William S. Eubanks II, Associate Attorney at Meyer Glitzenstein & Crystal, J.D., L.L.M.; “A Rotten System: Subsidizing Environmental Degradation and Poor Public Health with Our Nation’s Tax Dollars,” June 5, 2009, https://pubcit.typepad.com/files/eubanks-1.pdf; Date Accessed: 7-16-2021)

By moving away from corn and commodity crop subsidies in favor of paying farmers for employing some of the sustainable

agricultural methods enumerated above, Congress will foster a much more effective piece of legislation that

is more aligned with the original goals of the Farm Bill. As seen with our nation’s massive corn production tied solely to subsidies, farmers will farm wherever the money is . If sustainable agriculture is what results in subsidies, sustainable agriculture will likely be what farmers undertake on their farms in order to survive. Further, all

available data indicates that many farmers genuinely want to grow healthier foods, maintain their communities, and conserve their

natural ecosystems, but they have been pressured to farm corn and other commodity crops because that is where past profits could be garnered. Although most farmers in the United States do not want Farm Bill subsidies eliminated or phased out,

farmers “show strong support for programs focused on conservation ” and seem very concerned about the status of the natural

environment. This is not surprising considering the interdependent relationship between healthy farms and a healthy environment: long-term farm health requires a

high functioning local ecosystem that can sufficiently supply all of a farm’s needs. To prevent degradation of this important ecosystem, which suffers from “the tragedy of the commons” under the current Farm Bill subsidy regime, the proposed sustainable agriculture subsidy system will pay farmers to protect this common pool resource.

Subsidization will bring cleanliness, sustainability, and justice to agriculture. Moreover, it can fight world hunger.Eubanks 9 (William S. Eubanks II, Associate Attorney at Meyer Glitzenstein & Crystal, J.D., L.L.M.; “A Rotten System: Subsidizing Environmental Degradation and Poor Public Health with Our Nation’s Tax Dollars,” June 5, 2009, https://pubcit.typepad.com/files/eubanks-1.pdf; Date Accessed: 7-16-2021)

Subsidizing sustainable agriculture will also have large ripple effects throughout the United States

and the world. Both domestic and international hunger will be lessened as more land —mostly land that is currently

cultivated for corn production and other commodity crop production—becomes available for production of healthy fruits and vegetables, which are much more efficient means of harnessing the sun’s energy and converting it into calories for human consumption. Since more

American land will be available to produce domestic food and because sustainable agriculture will see less crops wasted for animal feed or processing, more foreign lands will be available for local food production rather than having to commit these lands to cultivating food for American consumption. Further, as a result of having less American corn, cotton, wheat, rice, and soybeans on the global market, the United States will find itself in better standing with quasi-governmental entities such as the World Trade Organization, and foreign farmers will have more

opportunities to fairly compete in their own markets. As global agricultural markets stabilize, less immigration to the United States will occur from Central America because farmers will be able to survive on their plots of land in the absence of subsidy-induced trade distortion. Finally, rural farming communities will be able to sustain some semblance of their past strength, which author and agriculturist Wendell Berry argued could only be regained with a “revolt of local small producers and local consumers against the global

industrialism of the corporation.” Thus, the time is now for a revolution —a truly “green” revolution against

our nation’s unjust agricultural policies , which can only end when the Farm Bill once again protects our nation’s farmers, the natural environment, and ultimately, the American public.

CAFOs

Subsidies should be given to diversified farms, which are more environmentally favorableGurian-Sherman 8 (Doug Gurian-Sherman, senior scientist in the Union of Concerned Scientists Food and Environment Program. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep00054.1?seq=3#metadata_info_tab_contents, 2008, Accessed 7/16/21)

It is useful to ask whether alternative methods of producing livestock have also benefited from Title I crop subsidies. Have these subsidies favored CAFOs over other means of producing livestock that have fewer externalities? Diversified farms —those that produce both grain and livestock— are one

alternative to specialized CAFOs , which grow little or no grain. 18 For example, national survey data (Boessen, Lawrence, and Grimes 2004) found that 94 percent of small hog producers grew corn and 90 percent grew soybeans, while 84 percent of medium-sized producers grew corn and 80 percent grew soybeans. Fewer hog CAFOs grew corn (73 percent) and soybeans (68 percent). ese data did not include a subcategory for the largest hog CAFOs, which could have indicated whether these very large operations also grow some of their own grain, and did not reveal the percentage of feed grain produced on-farm in each size category. Other data indicate that CAFOs have much less cropland available, relative to the amount of animals, compared with smaller operations (Kellogg et al. 2000). Medium-sized operations of 150 to 300 AU (animal units) had 0.17 AU per acre of cropland available to receive manure in 1997, while CAFOs had 1.7 AU per acre—or 10 times less land per animal. Smaller and medium-sized

diversified farms would generally be expected to use all of the manure produced by their animals,

in an economically and environmentally favorable manner (provided their cropland is near the

livestock operation). Finally, alternatives that integrate animal and crop production can provide

benefits to farms and society alike, in the form of higher profitability and reduced externalities . Linking manure to cropping systems, for example, creates major economic, social, and environmental benefits for an entire region. Considering the relatively limited research currently available on ways to improve alternative animal farming systems, further research is needed to expand these benefits.

Chinese Ag

Chinese CAFOs have no incentive to clean up after themselves, causing serious harm to the environment. However, studies show that if given economic incentives, they will engage in cleaner agriculture.Chen et al. 15 (Yao Chen, School of Economics and Management, Nanjing Tech University; Shu-Jin Wang, College of Economics and Management, Nanjing Agricultural Technology; Chung-Chou Tsai, College of Economics and Management, Nanjing Agricultural Technology; and Chang-Jiang Zhang, a School of Economics and Management, Nanjing Tech University; “Assessment of subsidies to minimize environmental pollution by Intensive Hog Feeding Operation (IHFO),” Journal of Cleaner Production, October 9, 2015, http://ir.nsfc.gov.cn/paperDownload/1000018576466.pdf; Date Accessed: 7-16-2021

IHFO = Intensive Hog Feeding Operations, similar to CAFOs.

In fact, it is hard to avoid wastewater from Biogas method thoroughly; and secondary pollution often caused by biogas slurry. Although there is no wastewater

emission in Fermented Bed method, too much labor is needed for litter disposal and delivery, especially for large-scale IHFO. A shortage of labor results in the rising price of labor . The higher the price, the lower

the enthusiasms for farmers use organic fertilizers, the more press of manure disposal and the smaller the role of subsidies in the process of manure disposal. Some manure disposal facilities are built with subsidy, but it doesn't work in operation. The current benchmark of sewage charge is far less than the cost of investment in environmental governance of hog farms, lax monitoring, resulting in the stimulation of sewage

charge on the manual disposal is ineffective. Part of scholars and researchers attribute the problem to the subsidy

policy itself , for example, Zhou and Ying (2009) believes the current subsidy mechanism of agricultural cleaner

production need to be improved . Zhao and Zhang (2011) proposed to set up the agroecological compensation

mechanism regarding to the problems that structural adjustment of farming industry and manure utilization of livestock and poultry in Erhai catchment in China.

Incentives significantly reduced the pollution of Chinese hog farms -- It will work on KAFOs as well.Chen et al. 15 (Yao Chen, School of Economics and Management, Nanjing Tech University; Shu-Jin Wang, College of Economics and Management, Nanjing Agricultural Technology; Chung-Chou Tsai, College of Economics and Management, Nanjing Agricultural Technology; and Chang-Jiang Zhang, a School of Economics and Management, Nanjing Tech University; “Assessment of subsidies to minimize environmental pollution by Intensive Hog Feeding Operation (IHFO),” Journal of Cleaner Production, October 9, 2015, http://ir.nsfc.gov.cn/paperDownload/1000018576466.pdf; Date Accessed: 7-16-2021)

IHFO = Intensive Hog Feeding Operations, similar to CAFOs.

First, policy measures of Fermented Bed subsidy, Biogas subsidy , sewage charge and others can

play a positive role in regulating producer's selection and guiding producers to use

environmentfriendly production methods . And it doesn't work until the threshold of policy variable is reached. The social benefit may achieve the maximum if the Biogas subsidy is increased by 200 Yuan per head or the Fermented Bed subsidy by 100

Yuan per head. Second, Investment subsidy for Biogas and Fermented Bed both has an obvious effect on

large-scale Hog Farms , while litter subsidy for Fermented Bed has effect just on medium-scale Hog Farms. The maximal value of social benefit in

Biogas pattern is 328.47 Yuan per head, while in Fermented Bed pattern the maximum value is 321.26 Yuan per head. By comparison, benefit of Biogas pattern is slightly higher. Third, from the perspective of maximization of social benefit, the moderate scale of Biogas project is BC3, and the moderate scale of Fermented Bed is FC2. Through the adjustment and propaganda of subsidy policy, government should actively guide producers who have adopted the corresponding pattern to select

the optimized scale. Forth, sewage charge can stimulate IHFO to have more emphasis on manure disposal and

increase the implementation effect of subsidy policy . Government should improve the levying pattern of sewage charge, and refine

the charge program, using network technology to scientifically monitor the wastewater emission of Hog Farms. Then intensity of charge should be

increased to motivate producers to adopt environment-friendly production pattern .

Compensation ProgramsCompensation programs work to promote efficient and ideal conservation of resourcesNathan Paulich, 2010. “Increasing Private Conservation through Incentive Mechanisms”, Stanford Journal of Animal Law and Policy, pg. 137-138, https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/paulich.pdf, Date Acsessed: 7-12-21, AWD.

The fear behind a compensation requirement is the implicit belief that compensating private landowners for regulation will come at the cost of environmental

conservation.226 This, however, may not be true. Not only does a system of uncompensated land use lead to perverse incentives for government agencies and private landowners, with the effect of hampering conservation efforts,227 compensation programs may actually increase cooperation in conservation efforts and lead to more efficient and effective use of private lands . A compensation requirement for regulation will require the government to assess the costs and benefits of regulations more carefully .228 Taxpayers forced to compensate for environmental protections will either be willing to accept the costs of the regulation or they will not.229 This

would increase efficiency because if the taxpayers are unwilling to fund the regulation then the regulation should not be imposed on the private landowner.230 Compensation would likewise increase transparency and accountability for government agencies231 and would result in “a more efficient balance among the resources devoted to species protection and recovery .”232 Government agencies would thus be forced to take into consideration the inherent tradeoffs and costs-effectiveness of their decisions .233 This would motivate agencies to look at more optimal incentive mechanisms and combine the tools available to reach maximum conservation levels rather than relying solely on direct regulatory mechanisms.234

Conservation/Endangered Species

The United States federal government should substantially increase its protection of water resources by financially incentivizing private land owners to engage in environmental conservation efforts and the preservation of endangered species.

Privately owned land makes up a majority of the U.S. and is imperative to global sustainability.Rodriguez et al. 18 (Shari L. Rodriguez, Department of Forestry and Environmental Conservation, Clemson University; M. Nils Peterson, Fisheries, Wildlife, and Conservation Biology Program, Department of Forestry and Environmental Resources, North Carolina State University; Frederick W. Cubbage, Department of Forestry and Environmental Resources, North Carolina State University; Erin O. Sills, Department of Forestry and Environmental Resources, North Carolina State University; and Howard D. Bondell, School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Melbourne, “What is Private Land Stewardship? Lessons from Agricultural Opinion Leaders in North Carolina”, https://doi.org/10.3390/su10020297, Date Accessed: 7-13-21)

Conservation in private land plays a pivotal role in global sustainability. Further, due to the privatization of water,

forests, farm land, and fisheries in South America, Africa, and Asia, conservation on private land is an issue of growing importance. In the United States

(US), privately owned lands (hereafter private lands) constitute 99% of the nation’s croplands, 61% of grasslands and pasture, and 56% of forests and provide habitat for more than 75% of endangered species .

Historically, conservation efforts have focused on public lands, leaving the private lands that dominate the US

landscape at risk of unsustainable land management practices, and urban sprawl and development. Finding ways to

encourage sustainable decision-making and conservation practices on private lands (e.g., prescribed fire,

conservation of endangered species) is, therefore, paramount to maintaining the ecosystem services provides by private lands.

Incentives are imperative to habit management.Paulich 10 (Nathan Paulich, J.D., Florida State University College of Law, 2010, “Increasing Private Conservation through Incentive Mechanisms”, Stanford Journal of Animal Law and Policy Volume 3, https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/paulich.pdf, Date Accessed: 7-12-21)

A major problem with the ESA is that the statute “ is inherently reactive rather than proactive ,” making it “ ill-

suited ” to encourage active habitat management practices that can be vital to species survival . The

ESA prohibits private landowners from degrading or destroying habitat and thus deters harmful behavior, but it does nothing to compel helpful

actions . For meaningful ecosystem and species conservation, more must be done than simply having regulation that

punishes landowners who destroy habitat. If private landowners do not engage in active habitat

management , listed species will continue to suffer from population declines. Active habitat management practices “include prescribed burnings, alien species control, reduced use of the land for grazing, or reduced use of pesticides on the conserved land to maintain habitat suitable for species recovery.” The ESA ,

however, does not require private landowners to undertake any of these techniques. The ESA largely ignores this concern, failing to include habitat preservation or ecosystem protection into the Act and not requiring landowners to manage land in ways that encourage species to occupy the land in the future. Incentives may

offer the only solution to motivate private landowners to participate in active stewardship and must

be utilized more to promote conservation .

Conservation Easements

Conservation easements solvePaulich 10 (Nathan Paulich is an Employment and Labor, Environmental and Natural Resources, and Class Action lawyer, “Increasing Private Conservation through Incentive Mechanisms”, Stanford Journal of Animal Law and Policy Volume 3, 2010, DA – 7/12/21)Conservation easements are a voluntary exchange that appears to provide a solution t o the inherent tension of balancing conservation efforts with private land development.272 Conservation easements are negotiated between the private landowner and the government or nonprofit organization on a property-by-property basis and can be a flexible tool for private landowners. 3 The agreement can be tailored by the private landowner to satisfy individual concerns while still serving the conservation goals.274 The typical

conservation easement is negative275 and in gross276 because the easement usually requires the private landowner to give up their right to develop the land in the future to achieve the conservation goals.277 The holder of the conservation easement is responsible for enforcing

the development restrictions.278 Private landowners have the option to donate or sell the easement.279 A private landowner donating a conservation easement will experience market costs associated with reducing the fair market value of the land as a result of the restricted use and out-of-

pocket transaction costs like legal and appraisal costs.280 In exchange for donating the conservation easement, the landowner has the potential to receive tax breaks .281 The landowner may receive federal charitable income tax deductions, gift deductions, and estate tax deductions,282 as well as state and local tax benefit s for the easement.283 Conversely, a landowner who sells the conservation easement may receive the value of the opportunity costs of conservation.284 Although financial incentives motivate most private landowners, still others may donate or sell conservation easements out of altruistic reasons.285

CRPLandowners need clear financial incentives to enroll in CRPWachenheim et al 14 (Cheryl J. Wachenheim is a professor at the Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics at North Dakota State University and holds a PhD in agricultural economics and farm management, William C. Lesch is a professor and dean at the College of Business at St. Ambrose University, and Neeraj Dhingra works in the Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics at North Dakota State University, “The Conservation Reserve Program: A Literature Review”, Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics, https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/164829, March 2014, DA – 7/14/21)Although most of the literature considering CRP enrollment response to changing economic conditions is dated and not reflective of current

conditions, the currency of the message that landowners respond to financial incentives remains important . The literature in general suggests that significant increases in CRP rental rates would be required to maintain CRP enrollment in the recent market environment. And, in fact program rules accommodate this as the maximum bid rate is based on soil productivity and the associated average cash rent for the county; the latter of which generally reflects

current market conditions. However, uncertainty about the costs and financial benefits appears to remain as one hindrance to enrollment that may otherwise be attractive to the landowner.

CRP is being threatened nowOh and Guan 20 (Juhyan Oh is a PhD student at the Food and Resource Economics Department at the University of Florida and Zhengfei Guan is an assistant professor at the Food and Resource Economics Department at the University of Florida, “Conservation Reserve Program: Overview and Discussion”, University of Florida IFAS Extension, https://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/publication/FE973, 2020, DA – 7/14/21)

The CRP now faces the possibility of financial cuts and budget constraints . Some opponents of this policy believe the United States should cut the budget for this program because of its shortcomings and to decrease the federal budget deficit. Because increases

in commodity prices in the last decade have decreased the total acres of land in the CRP, the US Congress reduced the CRP acreage cap in the 2014 US Farm Bill. According to the Senate Agriculture Committee, it was estimated that the CRP cap would be reduced to 26.5 million acres in 2015, then to 25.5 million acres in 2016. The acreage cap has been set at 24 million acres for fiscal years 2017 and 2018. Also, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that mandatory

spending on conservation programs would decrease by US$200 million between 2014 and 2018. Some studies in the literature argue that it is inevitable that the CRP will be "right-sized" and reformed when it is worth returning high-quality land to production (Knight 2012) and

suggest that a penalty-free early-out for CRP contract holders be considered, which could reduce enrollment of quality land. Since CRP participants consider land prices as well as commodity prices to determine whether they will continue to participate in the CRP (Wu and Weber 2012), it is difficult for the government to forecast and adjust the size of the CRP. Under the budget deficit situation, for optimal enrollment of the program, the CRP initiative may need to assess its economic effects on agricultural production and rural employment as well as its environmental benefits.

CRP (Conservation Reserve Program) works to help the environment Stubbs 14 (Megan Stubbs is a specialist in agricultural conservation and natural resources policy, “Conservation Reserve Program (CRP): Status and Issues”, Congressional Research Service, https://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/R42783.pdf, 8/29/14, DA – 7/13/21)The greatest concern over a reduced level of CRP acres is a reduced level of environmental benefits. Since its inception, research has shown that CRP has contributed to reduced levels of soil erosion, water quality improvement, and wildlife habitat development. While these benefits vary across the country, some conclude that without CRP there could be additional environmental degradation from agricultural production .27 Table 3 includes a list of conservation practices applied on CRP land that is set to expire from the program between FY2015 and FY2017. It is unknown how many of the practices would expire as a result of acres not reenrolling in CRP due to the reduced number of authorized acres. It is also unknown whether these practices would be maintained without a CRP contract. Landowners may choose to continue these practices voluntarily or through other federal, state, or local assistance. In large part, the majority of practices that could be lost if allowed to expire would be grasslands, both native and introduced species, new and existing plantings. According to FSA, since 2002, CRP has reduced soil erosion by 325 million tons from pre-CRP levels each year. Since the

program’s inception in 1986, CRP has reduced more than 8 billion tons of soil erosion . Through FY2010, CRP has enrolled more than 2 million acres in wetlands and over 2 million in buffers. Other annual conservation benefits include an equivalent of approximately 52 million metric ton net reduction in carbon dioxide (CO2)

from sequestration, reduced fuel use and nitrous oxide emissions avoided from no fertilizer use; more than 2 million acres of wildlife habitat established ; and a reduction of about 607 million pounds of nitrogen and 122 million pounds of phosphorus .28 From a wildlife perspective, it is estimated that CRP land produces over 13.5 million pheasants and 2.2 million ducks each year through habitat availability.29

Disincentives

Disincentives solve malpractices – past legislation proves that the cost of violating the law outweighs any benefits with the external benefit of increasing public approval and private profit. Casey et al, '06 (Frank Casey is a Director of Conservation Economics. Sara Vickerman is a Senior Director of Biodiversity Partnerships. Cheryl Hummon is a Senior Conservation Incentives Specialist. Bruce Taylor is a Director of Oregon Biodiversity Program, No Publication, https://defenders.org/sites/default/files/publications/incentives_for_biodiversity_conservation.pdf, 2006, Accessed: 7-12-2021) //ILake-HG

Regulatory and economic disincentives are laws, policies and economic instruments that define required

environmental performance standards and prescribe the form of economic penalty for non-compliance.

Regulatory policy has also often prescribed specific technologies to accomplish conservation goals. It is

believed that the presence and enforcement of regulatory standards and penalties are what drive landowners to

comply with environmental laws through participation in incentive programs. This section will provide a description of

each regulatory mechanism followed by an assessment and recommendations. Developing voluntary incentives for biodiversity or habitat conservation does not mean

a retreat from national laws to prevent species extinction. Results of public opinion polls indicate that a majority of citizens prefer existing or higher standards for endangered species and other wildlife protection (Batie and Ervin 1999).

Furthermore, incentives must operate within a regulatory framework “to ensure that a minimum habitat is maintained, contracts are enforced and promises are kept” (Brown 1999, p. 464). There are three general types of policy instruments that

constitute disincentive mechanisms: governmental regulation, conservation compliance and financial charges. Governmental Regulation The primary purpose of environmental regulations is to protect public goods such as clean air, clean water and

our biodiversity heritage. Governmental regulations to conserve and/or restore individual species and their habitats are both

direct and indirect in nature and are conceived and enforced at the federal, state and local levels. The preeminent form of government regulation with respect to biodiversity and habitat conservation is the federal Endangered Species Act, which prohibits any “take” of a

species that has been listed as threatened or endangered. The act may constrain the use of private lands from certain uses, depending on the habitat needs of particular species. Some other federal laws that invoke regulations that impact the quality of

habitat include the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act and Coastal Zone Management Act. Many state governments have their own (and sometimes more

restrictive) regulations that impact these same resources. It is generally recognized that regulatory mechanisms that “set the rules of the game” are

both needed and desirable to achieve specific environmental goals and to protect the public interest (Batie and Ervin 1999).

With respect to the biological effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act, only nine species have been lost since its inception. Regulatory mechanisms are an important complement to incentives. From the

standpoint of the public and the policy maker, regulations are relatively cheaper to administer than incentive programs, especially if there is minimal compliance monitoring. However, if there is a need to monitor landowner behavior, then costs can become quite high. Meeting regulatory requirements on the part of the private landowner can be substantial in the absence of incentives. From an

economic standpoint, there is ample evidence that it is more efficient to set environmental goals and let the regulated community choose the means to reach those goals (Batie and Ervin 1999). Setting technology standards by specifying which physical technologies and management practices are to be employed to meet an environmental objective generally

constrains cost-effective solutions and innovation . There is currently much discussion about changes to the Endangered Species Act.

These discussions are centered on three major points: making the law more effective at recovering species and protecting and restoring habitats, decreasing the costs of landowner compliance, and developing incentive mechanisms to assist landowners in conserving at-risk species and their habitats. We believe that part of this

discussion should include the recognition that the act can also generate both public and private economic benefits related to species and habitat conservation . Conservation Compliance Compliance mechanisms require a basic level of environmental performance as a condition of eligibility for income support programs (Claassen et al. 2001). Compliance has

been primarily associated with federal Farm Bill legislation that penalizes producers who cultivate on highly

erodible soils or who destroy wetlands. The penalties consist of taking away government subsidy or income payments. Under the “Sodbuster” and

“Swampbuster” provisions of the 1985 Farm Act, payments are withheld from farmers who cultivate highly erodible land without an approved conservation plan or who drain wetlands, respectively (Classsen et al. 2001). Violation of Swampbuster

regulations can mean the loss of eligibility for all farm program benefits —including price supports and loans, commodity and disaster payments – until the violation is remedied (Claassen et al. 2001).

Fee Simple Acquisition

Fee simple acquisition solvesPaulich 10 (Nathan Paulich is an Employment and Labor, Environmental and Natural Resources, and Class Action lawyer, “Increasing Private Conservation through Incentive Mechanisms”, Stanford Journal of Animal Law and Policy Volume 3, 2010, DA – 7/12/21)A fee simple acquisition for the purpose of conservation involves a government agency, land trust, or non-profit organization purchasing all the property rights from a private landowner.251 It is a voluntary transaction between the

landowner and conservator that allows market forces to determine the price of the transfer.252 The conservator will typically pay the private landowner the value of the land, including current and future opportunity costs, in order to use the land in

a more profitable way.253 Fee simple acquisitions provide several benefits. They have high potential for active management of habitat because the government has ownership and management responsibilities.254 Similarly, monitoring costs and enforcing use restrictions are low with fee simple acquisitions if a single person or organization owns the land in its entirety.255 There are low to moderate administrative costs associated with fee simple acquisition resulting from the government’s need to

manage the land.256 Although fee simple acquisitions are often the simplest conservation mechanism , the costs associated with purchasing all the rights in the property can be very high.257 The acquisition may also result in “conservation overkill” because

the conservator may not engage in activities such as farming that are compatible with conservation.258 Regulators may, however, be able to lease the land under controlled conditions to private entities to engage in these commercial activities. This would allow the land to be used efficiently for conservation and commercial purposes and allow regulators to recover some of the acquisition costs associated with purchasing the fee simple acquisition. Fee simple acquisitions offer the government a viable option to purchase land with high conservation and low development value. They have successfully been used to create public goods by using the purchased land for parks, wildlife preserves, and nature trails.259 Although fee simple acquisitions remain an option for regulators and alleviate the fiscal illusion concerns, their overall viability is limited due to the high costs associated with acquiring full property rights. Politically, fee simple acquisitions will never be able to gain bipartisan support to be more than just a minor conservation tool because purchasing large tracks of land or high volumes of land is too costly and, conversely, picking and choosing only certain land to conserve would not satisfy broad conservation needs.

Food

Working with organizations key solve pandemic global hunger challenge Bradley, chief health and nutrition officer of Herbalife Nutrition, and Arnold, president and CEO of Feed the Children, 2021

[Kent and Travis, “The Ongoing Need to Fight Food Insecurity After the Pandemic,” U.S. News, 4/29/21, https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2021-04-29/the-ongoing-need-to-fight-food-insecurity-after-the-pandemic, accessed 7/16/2021, ddi-tmur]

The pandemic has impacted the world in ways no one could have imagined. Seemingly overnight, global supply chains were disrupted, businesses came to a standstill, and the population grappled with the most significant health crisis in a generation. The pandemic laid bare another global challenge – hunger.

According to a recent food insecurity survey commissioned by Herbalife Nutrition and Feed the Children, 6 in 10 Americans have faced food insecurity at some point in their lives. Of those, 73% experienced it for the first time since the start of the pandemic. The faces of food insecurity defied stereotypes as lines of cars were depicted snaking around food banks in the United States. People who were previously donors suddenly found themselves on the other side of the donation line.

These developments quickly worsened the critical needs to an already strained system of providing food and services, and pivoting to expand those services with less resources. As we begin to consider a post-pandemic world, we need to focus on the growing problem of food insecurity and its implications on personal growth and the economy. We need to accelerate business and nonprofit partnerships working together with government and nongovernmental organizations to fuel people with the nutrition they desperately need for a healthy future.

Offshore Drilling/Subsidies

Oil prices are incredibly sensitive to subsidies, especially from offshore drilling.Peter Erickson, Adrian Down et. Al, 2017. Peter Erickson joined SEI in 2008 after 8 years consulting on environmental issues for cities and states throughout the United States. He received a B.A. from Carleton College in 1998, with a major in geology and extensive studies in mathematics, Adrian Down was a Staff Scientist in the U.S. Center, based in Seattle. Adrian’s research focused on energy and climate change policy, with emphasis on the role of urban areas in climate change mitigation and on the economics of fossil fuel production and consumption. Michael Lazarus, “Effect of government subsidies for upstream oil infrastructure on U.S. oil production and global CO2 emissions”, Stockholm Environmental Institute, http://sa.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/file/US-oil-and-gas-production-subsidies.pdf, Date Accessed: 7-16-21, AWD.

Likewise, Figure 1c for offshore oil in the Gulf of Mexico shows that more than 70% of the cumulative oil resource comes from subsidy-dependent projects . However, the economic drivers are different. The capital costs of offshore, mostly deep-water oil platforms are higher , but fewer of the producers meet Internal Revenue Service ( IRS) definitions of an independent producer , so they do not qualify for some of the most generous subsidies . For these offshore projects , the fraction of fields that are economically attractive (even with subsidies) at $50 per barrel is much smaller . Indeed, our results for offshore oil are also the most sensitive to assumptions about hurdle rate and oil price. This is due both to the smaller number of offshore projects, and to the fact that many of the profitable ones are barely above the 10% hurdle rate . Figures 1a–1d display results for the current oil price of $50 per barrel. As noted, the impact of subsidies is highly sensitive to oil price , and that this sensitivity could have important policy implications . Figure 2 shows how the effect of subsidies

varies substantially by price. At very low oil prices (e.g. $30 per barrel, as displayed on the left side of the chart), almost no new (discovered but not yet producing) fields would be developed , even with subsidies. In this case, expected revenues do not cover project costs plus the 10% return needed to justify taking on the project risk, and the projects do not proceed. Most existing, already-producing fields would be able to cover their operating costs,

however, and would continue to produce. At $40 per barrel, new investment begins , even without subsidies. At $50 per barrel, investment in onshore fields takes off. At $60, investment in offshore fields begins to accelerate . At $100 per barrel, nearly all discovered fields would be economic : 40 billion barrels in already producing fields, and more than 60 billion barrels in discovered but not-yet-producing fields. More speculatively, Rystad estimates that more than 50 billion barrels of not-yet-discovered fields could be economic at $100 per barrel, for a total of nearly 160 billion barrels of economic U.S. oil resource . Figure

2 shows each type of field in a different color, with subsidy-dependent fields displayed in orange. Subsidies increase field development most strongly at lower prices . At $40 per barrel, almost all new investment would be subsidy- dependent . At $50 per barrel, as discussed above, nearly half (45%) of discovered fields – 20 billion out of 43 billion barrels – would be subsidy dependent . As prices increase above $50 per barrel, already- discovered fields become less dependent on subsidies. For example, if future oil prices rise to $80 per barrel and beyond in real terms,

less than 10% of production from discovered, yet-to-be-developed fields would be subsidy dependent. At $100 per barrel, a price level seen as recently as 2014 but which may not return until 2030, according to the EIA (2016b), subsidies might have very little effect on investment in currently discovered but undeveloped fields, or on the resulting oil resource available. Instead, nearly all of the subsidy value would go to extra profits. While subsidies can be structured to phase out at high market prices, the largest subsidies to oil do not. In fact, the percentage depletion allowance subsidy actually grows as oil prices rise . Among the basins evaluated here, the greatest impact at $100 per barrel would be for offshore Gulf resources . This is because the region has the highest concentration of fields with high break-even costs .

Large amounts of subsides are contributing to the offshore drilling industry. Elizabeth Bast, Alex Doukas et. Al, 2015. Elizabeth Bast is the Executive Director of Oil Change International. She has over 20 years of experience working at the intersection of environmental and social justice issues, pressuring governments and financial institutions to protect the climate, the environment, and communities, Alex Doukas is the Lead Analyst in Oil Change International's Stop Funding Fossils

Program, et. Al: Sam Pickard, Laurie van der Burg and Shelagh Whitley, “Empty promises G20 subsidies to oil, gas and coal production”, Oilchange International, https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/Full_report.pdf, Date Accessed: 7-16-21, AWD.

National subsidies to oil, gas and coal producers in the US amount to $20.5 billion annually , with almost all of

those subsidies being received in the form of tax or royalty breaks that benefit producers. Federal subsidies amount to $17.2 billion annually , while subsidies in a number of oil-, gas- and coal-producing states average $3.3 billion annually. US President Barack Obama has pledged to act on fossil fuel subsidies, but he has met resistance. In every budget the Obama administration has sent to Congress, efforts to remove major subsidies have been blocked . In spite of these calls to phase-out subsidies, the administration’s domestic energy strategy remains focused on an ‘all-of-the-above’ approach, supporting the expansion of domestic

fossil fuel production (The White House, n.d.). Many of the largest US national subsidies take the form of tax exemptions for specific production activities and investments . For example, Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs) are a tax-advantaged investment structure with an estimated cost of $3.9 billion per year. Similarly, deductions available for ‘intangible drilling costs’ – soft costs incurred in preparation for drilling activities that have no salvageable value, such as

survey work or ground clearing – cost US taxpayers an average of $2.6 billion annually. The US is set apart from other G20 countries by the sheer variety of tax exemptions for fossil fuel producers . The deduction for oil spill remediation costs allows companies to deduct the cost of cleaning up and addressing the effects of oil spills as a standard business expense . A recent and notable example occurred in 2010 when BP claimed a $9.9 billion tax deduction due to $32.2 billion in reported cleanup costs for the Deepwater Horizon exploration drilling rig blowout and oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The value of this subsidy is estimated to have been $679 million in 2014, however, the exact value is challenging to calculate as it is considered confidential, and because the level of subsidy is highly dependent on the number and extent of spills that incur remediation costs, which can vary greatly from year to year . In 2015, BP reached a final settlement with the US government and five state governments totalling $20.8 billion . However, only $5.5 billion of this is in the form of a non-tax-deductible penalty, and the remainder can be written off by BP (Wood, 2015).

Federal subsidies for the oil and gas industry let them save huge amounts of money. Alex Doukas, 2015. Alex Doukas is the Lead Analyst in Oil Change International's Stop Funding Fossils Program, “G20 subsidies to oil, gas and coal production: United States”, Oil Change International, https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1084.1740&rep=rep1&type=pdf, Date Accessed: 7-16-21, AWD.

The federal subsidies to fossil fuel producers represent an increase of 35% over levels when President Obama took office in 2009, in spite of calls to remove several major subsidies in every budget that the Obama administration has sent to Congress. This uptick in subsidies reflects the substantial increase in oil and gas producing activities in the US during that time. The vast majority of US national and state

subsidies, by both volume and number of subsidies, come in the form of tax breaks and royalty relief, rather than direct spending. Tax and royalty exemptions for oil and gas producers are among the largest federal subsidies for fossil fuel production in the United States. Among the largest of the quantifiable subsidies to US oil and gas producers are corporate tax exemptions for master limited partnerships ( MLPs ), which stood at $3.9 billion when estimated in 2012 (Koplow, 2013). MLPs are corporate structures that are able to avoid corporatelevel income taxes entirely, and which can distribute cash

to owners on a tax-deferred basis. Oil and gas producers dominate MLPs , with 77% of MLPs by market capitalisation associated with fossil fuels. Fossil fuel MLPs have grown from a market capitalisation of $325 billion in 2013 to $532 billion as of May 2015 (Koplow, 2015), although recent declines in oil and gas prices may dampen the tax benefits (and thus associated subsidy) of MLPs for the time being. Another large tax break for oil and gas producers is the deduction for intangible

drilling costs, which our analysis found to be worth $2.6 billion annually. This provides a 100% tax deduction for costs not directly part of the final operating oil or gas well (such as labour costs, survey work and ground clearing), including exploration and development costs (Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, 2013a). Similarly, the percentage depletion allowance is assessed as the excess of percentage over cost depletion for oil and gas producers. This measure, estimated annually to cost $1 billion for oil and gas, and a further $200 million for coal, allows

independent fossil fuel producers to deduct 14% to 15% of large investment costs, including for exploration, from income taxes. One more accounting practice, the ‘last-in, first-out’ accounting practices employed by oil and gas companies, is also

estimated to cost taxpayers more than $1 billion annually . This accounting method allows a company to report the value of every good sold as that of the most recent one added to its inventory (Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, 2013b). This effectively allows companies with physical inventories to overstate the cost of production , lowering their reported (rather than actual) income . Lost royalties on offshore drilling represent another large subsidy to oil and gas producers. The 1995 Deep Water Royalty Relief Act provided royalty relief for leases sold between 1996 and 2000, in water 200 metres or deeper (Taxpayers for Common Sense, 2009). This royalty relief is estimated to represent a loss to taxpayers of $2.1 billion in 2014. In addition, a number of leases issued during the period of the Act did not include price thresholds that would trigger royalties as intended, reportedly due to a clerical error, which could cost taxpayers billions in additional foregone revenues (ibid)

Property Rights Innovations

Text: The United States Federal Government should- Increase coordination between public-private easement and state-fed

programs- Develop and implement existing recommendations - Maintain full value of tax deductions

The Internal Revenue Service, state tax departments, land trusts, county tax assessors and appraisers should increase monitoring of appraisal processState and local governments should

- Monitor self-regulation standards- Provide training, technical assistance, and financial and logistical guidance to

existing and future participants in those programsHere’s what the CP does Casey et al, '06 (Frank Casey is a Director of Conservation Economics. Sara Vickerman is a Senior Director of Biodiversity Partnerships. Cheryl Hummon is a Senior Conservation Incentives Specialist. Bruce Taylor is a Director of Oregon Biodiversity Program, No Publication, https://defenders.org/sites/default/files/publications/incentives_for_biodiversity_conservation.pdf, 2006, Accessed: 7-13-2021) //ILake-HG

The federal government has increasingly become involved in private landowner easement programs

where it is the easement holder. There are currently seven federal easement programs. Five are administered through the U.S. Department of Agriculture: the Farm and Ranch Land Protection Program, the

Wetland Reserve Program, the Grassland Reserve Program, the Healthy Forests Reserve Program

and the Forest Legacy Program. The Coastal Wetlands Conservation Grant Program and a western region Grassland Easement Program are managed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The scope and structure of federal easement programs differ16. First, the actual physical resource to be protected varies between programs: active farm and ranchland, wetlands, grasslands

and forests. Second, the easement options vary. For instance, the wetlands program offers two different term easement options and a permanent option. Alternatively, the grasslands program offers term and permanent easements, but also land rentals. Third, easements differ in who pays the costs. While the wetland and grassland programs pay the full cost of an easement, the farm and ranch easement program requires contributions by either state or private entities. Lastly, program size and the amount of funding received

differ among the programs, with the majority of federal resources thus far going to the Wetland Reserve Program.

SolvencyCasey et al, '06 (Frank Casey is a Director of Conservation Economics. Sara Vickerman is a Senior Director of Biodiversity Partnerships. Cheryl Hummon is a Senior Conservation Incentives Specialist. Bruce Taylor is a Director of Oregon Biodiversity Program, No Publication, https://defenders.org/sites/default/files/publications/incentives_for_biodiversity_conservation.pdf, 2006, Accessed: 7-13-2021) //ILake-HG

Assessment Conservation easements are the only type of property rights tool that has been adequately assessed in terms of

biological effectiveness and economic efficiency . Specific conditions have been identified as contributing to the

biological effectiveness of an easement program. One condition is that the value of an easement cannot be destroyed through punitive tax laws17 that devalue use of easements for habitat conservation. For example, agricultural or forestry land on which a conservation easement is placed, and that can potentially generate recreational income, is taxed at a

higher rate in Wisconsin. Thus, there can actually be disincentives for restoring and conserving natural habitat. In addition, the effectiveness of public agencies and private

organizations in using easements to protect environmentally sensitive areas depends on the specific land-use restrictions that each individual easement contains (Wiebe et al. 1996). These restrictions may vary widely from one agreement to the next.

1nc card probablyCasey et al, '06 (Frank Casey is a Director of Conservation Economics. Sara Vickerman is a Senior Director of Biodiversity Partnerships. Cheryl Hummon is a Senior Conservation Incentives Specialist. Bruce Taylor is a Director of Oregon Biodiversity Program, No Publication, https://defenders.org/sites/default/files/publications/incentives_for_biodiversity_conservation.pdf, 2006, Accessed: 7-13-2021) //ILake-HG

For easement incentives to be more effective in conserving wildlife habitat we have a few recommendations. First, there needs to be more

coordination between public easement programs at the state and federal levels, and also between public and private easement programs. In addition, recommendations should be developed and implemented that would decrease the time and financial resources needed to establish and maintain conservation easement agreements. There have been some recent proposals to reduce the federal tax deduction that a landowner can take for donating a conservation easement, from the full value of the donation to just 33 percent of that value. However, reducing deductions would discourage some landowners with the most economically

valuable conserva- • tion easements, such as for grazing lands. The full deduction needs to be maintained (Anderson and Christensen 2005). If the goal is to stop inflated easement valuations, then the Internal Revenue Service, state tax departments, land trusts, county tax assessors and appraisers need to police the appraisal process ,

and specific standards are needed for appraising conservation easements. There may be a limited role for self-regulation among conservationist land trusts, to curb any abuses (Parker 2004). However, self-regulation will

require rigorous accredited standards that are periodically monitored with public oversight . The Land

Trust Alliance has developed new guidelines that member land trusts are required to have appraisers use, if the

land trusts want accreditation. The alliance requires land trusts to inform potential easement donors about the Internal

Revenue Code appraisal requirements, that the donor should use a qualified appraiser who follows the

Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, and that the land trust will not participate in a

donation where it has concerns about the value of the deduction.18 In the private sector, there is a need to develop the capacity of land trusts to effectively enhance, restore and protect wildlife habitat and biodiversity values. The rigor of conservation easements held by land trusts to encompass habitat restoration and long-term

stewardship goals need to be expanded. Existing state and federal conservation programs can provide assistance for

restoration and enhancement of conserved habitats, and land trusts can provide a service by actively guiding landowners through these programs. Ensuring appropriate long-term management to maintain these habitats and

protect the public’s conservation investments will also require land trusts to adopt appropriate management language within easement language. Land trusts will need training, technical assistance and financial support to address all of these issues.

Safe Harbor Agreements

Incentives and SHAs benefit species without alienating landownersPaulich, 10 (Nathan Paulich. J.D., Florida State University College of Law. “Increasing Private Conservation through Incentive Mechanisms,” https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/paulich.pdf, Accessed 7/13/21)

Safe Harbor Agreements (SHAs) provide private landowners who voluntarily undertake

conservation efforts assurance from regulators that their efforts will not subject them to additional

restrictions .204 With SHAs, the landowner enters into an agreement with the FWS to “restore, enhance or create habitat” for the benefit of a listed species.205 The existing habitat on the property at the time of the agreement is the “baseline”206 and the landowner’s responsibilities with respect to the ESA are frozen at that level.207 Essentially, the landowner agrees to improve conditions for a species over a

specified period of time and may return the property to its baseline at the end of the agreement.208 Under an SHA, the landowner is authorized to “take endangered species that may inhabit the property in the future as a result of the landowner’s stewardship activities.”209 SHAs have been

successful in promoting active habitat management efforts and reintroducing species to private lands.210 SHAs have been utilized successfully for species like the red-cockaded woodpecker that nest in mature longleaf pine forests.211 Instead of preemptively harvesting the timber,212 resulting in economic and ecological inefficiencies, landowners can instead participate in SHAs. These SHAs allow woodpeckers to inhabit the forests until the timber reaches proper harvesting age, benefiting both the landowner and the woodpecker. SHAs, however, “can only do so much.”213 Their conservation benefit may only be temporary because landowners only have to return the property to the baseline condition.214 Furthermore, there are a limited number of situations—like that of the red-cockaded woodpecker—in which private landowners’ and species’ interests align perfectly so that landowners will seek out SHAs. SHAs have the positive effect of promoting conservation without alienating private landowners .

SHAs, coupled with incentive mechanisms that compensate good stewardship ,215 could increase

the utility of these plans and promote lasting active habitat management practices . Landowners who undertake conservation efforts should not be subject to greater restrictions as a result of those efforts, but that promise alone is not enough to entice a significant number of landowners to participate . Incentives ,

including compensation, can help to increase participation rates and usher in meaningful conservation results.

What the CP doesCasey et al, '06 (Frank Casey is a Director of Conservation Economics. Sara Vickerman is a Senior Director of Biodiversity Partnerships. Cheryl Hummon is a Senior Conservation Incentives Specialist. Bruce Taylor is a Director of Oregon Biodiversity Program, No Publication, https://defenders.org/sites/default/files/publications/incentives_for_biodiversity_conservation.pdf, 2006, Accessed: 7-12-2021) //ILake-HG *edited for problematic language

Safe Harbor Agreements Description Safe harbor agreements constitute a legal innovation to assist landowners with the uncertainties of managing their lands that are habitat to listed species. The purpose of an

agreement is to promote the management and conservation of targeted species. Participation is voluntary and may

include provisions for proposed or candidate species if a participant chooses. Under safe harbor agreements, participants

are guaranteed a reduction in liability and are ensured that they will be exempt from any future

regulations not included in their agreement. All non-federal landowners are eligible to participate in the program, but their land must contain, or be potentially suitable habitat for, listed threatened and endangered species. Safe harbor agreements are designed to encourage landowners to voluntarily maintain or enhance habitat on their property to attract threatened or endangered species without fear of future land-use restrictions. A landowner may not face penalties if he/she engages [they engage] in voluntary wildlife survey and monitoring activities. A safe harbor agreement contains two main elements. First is the

delineation of a set of baseline conditions that describe the initial number and location of individuals of the listed species and a measurement of the habitat size and quality. The second consists of establishing a monitoring program designed to assess the success of a recovery effort. At the conclusion of the agreement term, landowners are allowed to return the property to the baseline condition and still be covered by the assurances of the agreement. The agreement may be amended to add a non-covered listed species, for which the relevant agency and the participant would agree on proper enhancement or maintenance actions. At the end of a safe harbor agreement a landowner may develop the covered property or undertake other activities that result in a legal “tak ing” of the threatened or endangered species (Minette and Cullianan 1997), provided that there are protections for the minimum and previously defined “baseline population.”

SolvencyCasey et al, '06 (Frank Casey is a Director of Conservation Economics. Sara Vickerman is a Senior Director of Biodiversity Partnerships. Cheryl Hummon is a Senior Conservation Incentives Specialist. Bruce Taylor is a Director of Oregon Biodiversity Program, No Publication, https://defenders.org/sites/default/files/publications/incentives_for_biodiversity_conservation.pdf, 2006, Accessed: 7-12-2021) //ILake-HG

The authors conclude that safe harbor has been “remarkably successful” (p. 639), because it removes

regulatory burdens associated with attracting endangered species to property as a result of engaging in conservation activities. Wilcove and Lee (2004) also found that technical assistance to restore habitats for endangered species, and cost-share incentives for endangered species, were also very important complementary incentives that enhanced the effectiveness of safe harbor agreements. There has been a

steady increase in the number of private landowners participating in safe harbor agreements since the program began in 1995. In 2002, 189 landowners had enrolled nearly 2 million acres of land and were

restoring habitats for 21 endangered species, and no landowner had withdrawn or exercised the right to alter the restored habitats (Wilcove and Lee 2004). By 2005, participation had increased to 325 landowners ,

protecting 36 species over about 3 million acres (Environmental Defense 2005). This growth in participation and

the number of species and acres covered is one indicator of its economic benefits, as demonstrated by the

growth in private landowners willing to participate. Wilcove and Lee (2004) state that although the safe harbor mechanism is too

new to determine its biological effectiveness, they note that there have been some notable successes with respect to the recovery of the northern aplomado falcon in the Southwest, the nene goose in Hawaii and the red-

cockaded woodpecker in North Carolina. For the red-cockaded woodpecker, about 35 percent of

the total population lives on safe harbor lands (Environmental Defense 2005). In addition, safe harbor agreements

have been signed that run for 30 to 80 years , indicating that safe harbor may be an effective

conservation tool because it meets the requirement for a sufficient temporal scale .

Subsidies

Subsidies solve Paulich 10 (Nathan Paulich is an Employment and Labor, Environmental and Natural Resources, and Class Action lawyer, “Increasing Private Conservation through Incentive Mechanisms”, Stanford Journal of Animal Law and Policy Volume 3, 2010, DA – 7/12/21)Subsidies are a flexible tool that encourages private landowners to take part in conservation efforts by offering financial incentives.260 Subsidies often take the form of cash, loans, grants, or tax incentives offered by regulators and non-government organizations to the landowner to either maintain their land in its undeveloped state or to mitigate the impact of development on the environment.261 The programs are voluntary and generally require the private landowner to submit an application, a conservation plan, and receive approval through a final inspection of the land prior to being paid.262 This process gives the government considerable discretion in choosing which projects satisfy the predesigned conservation goals in the most cost efficient

manner.263 Subsidy programs may be effective at promoting active habitat management because regulators

would have the ability to tailor the conservation efforts to a specific species.264 The short-term nature of subsidy contracts allows regulators to ensure the landowner has actively managed the land before agreeing to renew the

contract.265 Landowners would also have low incentives to preemptively destroy habitat because the programs

are voluntary and the landowner is paid for their conservation efforts.266

US-Mexico Transfer Payments

Transfer payments and binational abatement solve wastewater pollution in US-Mexico Fernandez 07 (Linda M Fernandez is an associate professor at the VCU School of Business in a joint appointment with the VCU Center for Environmental Studies who specializes in economics, 11/1/2007, accessed – 7/15/21, “Economic Incentives and Policies to Improve Quality in a Binational Coastal Watershed”, https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8db34956)

Incentives for controlling wastewater pollution consist of preventing loss of property upstream and protecting public and environmental health downstream. Results show that

coordinated binational abatement involving transfer payments from downstream to upstream is optimal for minimized costs, damages, and stock of wastewater and sediment pollution. Mexico’s location and lower marginal cost advantage make it economical to pay for abatement upstream and avoid more severe damages. The negative externalities from wastewater are internalized by analyzing the watershed as a binational single unit through cooperation. Mexico gains less than the U.S. from cooperation for the baseline case. This is due to lower marginal damage costs than downstream in the U.S.. Abatement will be attractive to upstream Tijuana if there is incentive to avoid damages.

Upstream abatement increases the likelihood of success for reduction in pollution in the watershed. Transfer payments to Mexico enable control at the source of pollution and hence drive down the stock. For Mexico to cooperate, the compensation varies according to different types of sharing rules for all cases. If transboundary cooperation for infrastructure had been envisioned when the original wastewater infrastructure was conceived, it is possible that more reliable and less costly infrastructure could have been constructed as shown by the difference between the noncooperative and cooperative cases in the baseline analysis. While the population criterion for reasonableness to allocate shares of costs savings indicates a minor amount for transfer payment in all cases, this method is questionable as population may mean growth inducing activities would dictate more financial incentives for impacting water quality negatively. Permanent characteristics of land and hydrology imply the upstream has a higher share corresponding to the 90% amount Mexico holds in the watershed. Transfers could increase dramatically with both characteristics as criteria. Transfer payments from downstream to upstream are large in the baseline case with the Chander/Tulkens cost sharing rule and the Shapley value.

The TSS stock is lowest with both sharing rules. Asymmetry in financial resources between upstream and downstream makes transfer payments imperative. Tijuana’s municipal budget is a proportion (0.05) of San Diego’s budget [(INEGI, 2000); (SANDAG, 2003)]. One criterion of the Helsinki Rule is used by NAFTA institutions for allocation in the Tijuana River watershed as well as the rest of the U.S.-Mexico border. The BECC and NADBank include population as a criterion for projects they approve and

fund. The current amount of finances and technical assistance devoted to Tijuana for helping control upstream wastewater and sediment is lower than it should be in all cases as shown in the difference between transfers using the Helsinki rule with the population criterion versus any other sharing rule included in this analysis.

Transfer payments to Mexico could be higher to abate wastewater. These findings are significant

from the perspective of directing available resources in a binational context to solve both countries joint watershed problems. The model and results from the analysis are useful to other efforts worldwide given the amount of these watersheds and the increasing number of conflicts in need of a formal method to solve transboundary problems.

2NC A2

2NC A2 “Incentives Fail”

Incentives give landowners reason to protect environments on their landStern, 6 (Stephanie Stern, Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola Chicago University School of Law. “Encouraging Conservation on Private Lands: A Behavioral Analysis of Financial Incentives,” https://arizonalawreview.org/pdf/48-3/48arizlrev541.pdf, Accessed 7/13/21)

Because of the limitations of regulation and the elusiveness of attitude change, attention has turned to incentives as a way to rapidly alter stewardship behaviors.50 Conservation incentives aim to

motivate preservation , active management practices , and restoration activities while reducing the demoralizing or alienating effects of solely penalty-based systems. Incentives also provide a mechanism for compensating landowners for projects that create public benefits or positive externalities. Conservation is costly both in terms of management expenses and the opportunity costs of leaving land undeveloped. For example, studies have estimated that the opportunity costs from foregoing development or timbering to preserve habitat for the red-cockaded woodpecker range from $43,000 to $100,000 for each breeding pair.51 Incentives and other market-based programs enable landowners to internalize

a greater share of the benefits of their actions.

The government lacks detailed information about the cost functions of individual sources necessary for environmental regulations – incentive programs solveHahn & Stavins 91 (Robert W. Hahn - Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute; Adjunct Professor, Carnegie Mellon University, Robert N. Stavins - Assistant Professor of Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, “Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?”, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/5065794_Incentive-based_environmental_regulation_A_new_era_from_an_old_idea)

Although uniform technology-based and performance standards may be effective in achieving established environmental goals and standards,

they often do so at relatively high costs to society. Uniform emission standards, the dominant policy mechanism chosen to attack a number of environmental problems, 22 tend to lead to inefficient outcomes in which firms use unduly expensive means of controlling pollution.23 The reason is simple: the costs of controlling pollutant emissions vary greatly among and even within firms. Indeed, the cost of controlling a unit of a given pollutant may vary by a factor of 100 or more among sources, depending upon the age and location of plants and the available

technologies. 24 Any given aggregate pollution level can be met at minimum aggregate control cost if, and only if, firms control at the same marginal cost, as opposed to the same emission or control level.

Theoretically, the government could achieve such a cost-effective allocation of the pollution control burden among sources if it could ensure by some means that all sources controlled at the same marginal control cost. However, such an approach would require the government to have detailed information about the cost functions of individual firms and sources - information that the government clearly lacks and could obtain only at great cost, if at all.

In contrast to traditional command-and-control approaches, policy mechanisms based on economic incentive systems ensure that firms "automatically" 26 undertake pollution control efforts in precisely the manner and degree which will result in the cost-effective allocation of the overall control burden. Moreover,

economic incentive approaches generally provide firms with incentives to find cleaner and less

expensive production technologies. Most incentive-based approaches fall within one (or more) of five major categories: pollution charges, marketable permits, deposit-refund systems, market barrier reductions, and government subsidy elimination. These categories are discussed in the following sections.

Economic incentives crowd-in conservation when livelihoods depend on the continued resource. Steven M. Smith, 2018. Steven M. Smith is an Assistant Professor of Economics and Business. He joined the Mines faculty in 2017 following a post-doctoral fellowship at Haverford College. His research focuses on how society determines the governance of natural resources and the implications of those governance structures. Water is frequently a central feature of the research. Accordingly, he is also an Affiliate Faculty of the Hydrologic Sciences and Engineering Program at Mines. “Economic Incentives and Conservation: Crowding-in Social Norms in a Groundwater Commons”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0095069617304059, Date Accessed: 7-15-21, AWD.

By adopting a price, the users have shifted up their marginal cost curves, meaning the payout structure has changed and users should pump less water on economic grounds. The crowding literature generally

suggests that any conservation that occurred before may be crowded out . But most evidence of crowding-out stems from scenarios where market-mechanisms are introduced to a context previously working without financial dependencies . In contrast, resource users whose livelihood depends on the resource have been shown to respond positively to conditional cash incentive s, with the increased conservation persisting even once the payments are ceased (Andersson et al., 2018). Not only have the users previously

made explicit economic considerations for the use of the resource, but they also stand to gain economically from the conservation of the resource. Behavioral responses to the introduction of market-based regulations may differ in these contexts where the “inflictor” of the externality is also subject to the same externality such as road congestion, fisheries, and, the

present context, groundwater exploitation (Heres and Lin Lawell, 2017). This is distinct from the realm of asymmetric moral or altruistic decision-making cases, such as picking up your child on time or volunteering blood donations. In this context, the price may crowd-in conservation by acting as a commitment signal . Because the fee is internally imposed the adoption communicates to all users a collective commitment to achieve a better equilibrium (Vyrastekova and Soest, 2003). Further, for the conditional cooperators, the fee may erode their need for retaliation (by over pumping), creating a larger group of unconditional cooperators (Rodriguez-Sickert, Guzmán and Cárdenas, 2008; Narloch, Pascual and Drucker, 2012; Rode, GómezBaggethun and Krause, 2014).

Economic incentives are effective at spurring conservation behavior – they avoid perverse incentives associated with command & control regulationPaulich 10 (Nathan Paulich, J.D., Florida State University College of Law, “Increasing Private Conservation through Incentive Mechanisms,” 3 Stan. J. Animal L. & Pol'y 106, 131-151, 2010)

The concept of incentive-based species conservation is simple : private landowners will be more

likely to embrace and engage in conservation efforts if they are not forced to pay the entire bill . Instead of punishing

landowners for having endangered species on their land, it is time to reward and encourage them to create positive externalities that benefit the public at large. Given the marginal success of the

ESA, a more innovative approach--one embracing incentive mechanisms that encourage private conservation--should be preferred going forward. Incentives offer a

promising alternative to command and control regulation that can increase conservation and

stewardship on private land . Similarly, incentives have the potential to promote active habitat

management while reducing or eliminating the perverse incentives created by a purely regulatory

regime . A. The First Generation of Incentives Mechanisms The ESA has taken some steps towards using incentives to promote conservation efforts among private landowners. Section

10 was added to the ESA to alleviate the strict restrictions on private landowners. Since then, the ESA has embraced programs such as Habitat Conservation Plans, Safe Harbor Agreements, and Candidate Conservation Plans with some success. [*132] 1. Habitat Conservation Plans The addition of section 10 incidental take permits in the 1983 Amendments to the ESA was the first move away from a purely command and control regulatory regime. Under section 10, developers may prepare Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs) as a way of dealing with section 9's take prohibition. A HCP permit is required for private development projects that will result in the "take" of a listed species. HCPs are prepared as part of the incidental take permit and provide landowners with a degree of flexibility and assurance not found in other provisions of the ESA. The plans are negotiated between the government and private landowners and usually result in high transaction and administration costs. Landowners are typically required to survey the existing habitat on their land, prepare a plan to minimize and mitigate any take of a listed species, and continue to monitor the species population, among other things. Although larger landowners see HCPs as a way [*133] of minimizing some of the costs of complying with the ESA, the high transaction costs and often extended approval process can discourage small landowners from preparing HCPs. Arguable the greatest benefit of HCPs is the certainty provided to private landowners. In 1994 the "No

Surprises" policy was adopted as a way to induce greater participation in HCPs. The policy guarantees private landowners that if they adhere to the HCP's conservation activities--even if the plan fails to adequately compensate for the actual species habitat loss--any additional financial or conservation obligations will be limited. This allows the landowner to factor in the costs associated with conservation and protects the landowner from having to pay for unforeseen circumstances that would require the HCP to change. By reducing the regulatory uncertainty going forward, the market value of the land is increased. Landowners also benefit from a long-term reduction in the "cost of processing development permits" and facilitating the "negotiation of changes in development plans necessitated by market conditions." Reducing the costs associated with creating and maintaining HCPs has had the effect of creating more incentives for private landowners to participate in the program. Increased certainty frees up money and increases land values, which allow the landowner to contribute more for species conservation and stewardship efforts. These assurances also provide conservation benefits for listed and unlisted species, including increased protection for endangered [*134] plants and habitats not currently occupied by listed species. Additionally, the assurances "provide a framework of funding and cooperation" important for adaptive management techniques. Despite the few success stories of HCPs, there have been many complete failures. Critics argue that HCPs do not have a basic scientific foundation and are reactive because the program only involves mitigation of the development's effect and does not promote conservation efforts aimed at recovery. Even though HCPs are not perfect, they continue to be a viable alternative for private landowners and are a significant improvement over a strict command and control regulatory regime. To date, 1017 HCPs have been approved, indicating landowners and regulators see HCPs as an improvement over strict command and control regulation. A properly prepared HCP can address private landowner concerns and simultaneously advance conservation. Because private landowners are involved in the program, the number of resources available for threatened and endangered species, and efforts to conserve on private land, are improved. 2. Safe Harbor Agreements Safe Harbor Agreements (SHAs) provide private landowners who voluntarily undertake conservation efforts assurance from regulators that their efforts will not subject them to additional restrictions. With SHAs, the landowner enters into an agreement with the FWS to "restore, enhance or create habitat" for the benefit of a [*135] listed species. The existing habitat on the property at the time of the agreement is the "baseline" and the landowner's responsibilities with respect to the ESA are frozen at that level. Essentially, the landowner agrees to improve conditions for a species over a specified period of time and may return the property to its baseline at the end of the agreement. Under an SHA, the landowner is authorized to "take endangered species that may inhabit the property in the future as a result of the landowner's stewardship activities." SHAs have been successful in promoting active habitat management efforts and reintroducing species to private lands. SHAs have been utilized successfully for species like the red-cockaded woodpecker that nest in mature longleaf pine forests. Instead of preemptively harvesting the timber, resulting in economic and ecological inefficiencies, landowners can instead participate in SHAs. These SHAs allow woodpeckers to inhabit the forests until the timber reaches proper harvesting age, benefiting both the landowner and the woodpecker. SHAs, however, "can only do so much." Their conservation benefit may only be temporary because landowners only have to return the property to the baseline condition. Furthermore, there are a limited number of situations--like that of the red-cockaded [*136] woodpecker--in which private landowners' and species' interests align perfectly so that landowners will seek out SHAs. SHAs have the positive effect of promoting conservation without alienating private landowners. SHAs, coupled with incentive mechanisms that compensate good stewardship, could increase the utility of these plans and promote lasting active habitat management practices. Landowners who undertake conservation efforts should not be subject to greater restrictions as a result of those efforts, but that promise alone is not enough to entice a significant number of landowners to participate. Incentives, including compensation, can help to increase participation rates and usher in meaningful conservation results. 3. Candidate Conservation Agreements Candidate Conservation Agreements (CCAs) are voluntary agreements in which landowners agree to undertake conservation efforts for candidate species or species that may be listed in the future. The hope behind CCAs is that proactive conservation efforts will make listing unnecessary in the future. Private landowners may receive CCAs with "assurances" that if the species is listed in the future, no regulatory obligations exceeding the CCA will be imposed. Like SHAs, CCAs are a promising tool that can be coupled with incentive mechanisms to compensate stewardship. B. Solutions for Private Landowners: Current and Future Incentive Mechanisms The growing consensus in the economic literature is that failure to compensate private landowners will have significant negative effects on the environment, illustrating the necessity to use incentive

mechanisms that reward conservation efforts. Wealth and incentives [*137] matter for conservation purposes . There is a correlation

between compensating private landowners and increased habitat quality, indicating that incentive mechanisms have a positive influence on the environment. Incentives are a

powerful tool for changing behavior and have proven more effective than "education, persuasion, prompting, or feedback." Incentives have the

"ability to tap into decentralized behavior-coordinating mechanisms" and give agencies more flexibility to implement policies and

decisions " adaptively ." Incentives, such as compensation programs and market-based solutions, will help change private landowners' negative behavior toward the ESA

and improve conservation efforts on private land. 1. Compensation Programs Professor Richard A. Epstein posed the question: "if the protection of endangered species is so important, why should the public not pay for it?" This is the contention of many private landowners forced to foot the bill of conservation on private land. Why should a select--often unfortunate--few individuals be forced to pay for the greater good in society simply because their land contains habitat for threatened and endangered species? Instead of creating animus and perverse incentives among private landowners that will limit conservation efforts, many scholars have argued a better mechanism would be to compensate these landowners. Voluntary compensation programs would help eliminate many of the perverse incentives associated with command and control regulation and align private landowners' interests with conservation goals. The fear behind a compensation requirement is the implicit belief that compensating private landowners for regulation will come at the cost of environmental conservation. This, however, may not be [*138] true. Not only does a system of uncompensated land use lead to perverse incentives for government agencies and private landowners, with the effect of hampering conservation efforts, compensation programs may actually increase cooperation in conservation efforts and lead to more efficient and effective use of private lands. A compensation requirement for regulation will require the government to assess the costs and benefits of regulations more carefully. Taxpayers forced to compensate for environmental protections will either be willing to accept the costs of the regulation or they will not. This would increase efficiency because if the taxpayers are unwilling to fund the regulation then the regulation should not be imposed on the private landowner. Compensation would likewise increase transparency and accountability for government agencies and would result in "a more efficient balance among the resources devoted to species protection and recovery." Government agencies would thus be forced to take into consideration the inherent tradeoffs and costs-effectiveness of their decisions. This would motivate agencies to look at more optimal incentive mechanisms and combine the tools available to reach maximum conservation levels rather than relying solely on direct regulatory mechanisms. [*139] A compensation program would have a positive influence on private landowners. While compensating landowners for fair market value will not pay the full subjective value of the land, it will lessen the opposition to the conservation efforts of the ESA. A complete compensation program would likely limit private landowner opposition to the ESA and would help eliminate premature development of property and destruction of habitat essential for species conservation. In addition to eliminating perverse incentives, a compensation program will encourage private landowners to take into account the economic and ecological value of their land and direct efforts to maximize this value. Private landowners will have incentives to voluntarily learn about potential ecological use of their land and will engage in proactive practices that enhance ecological value. Similarly, private landowners would be more willing to provide information about species on their land if they don't live in fear of uncompensated regulation. Direct compensation programs are not perfect, however. While the programs can provide a cost-effective way for governmental agencies to fix short-term needs, they can be ineffective with long-term or permanent preservation because the programs become expensive and there is uncertainty that a private landowner might holdout for more money. These programs still require monitoring and enforcement to ensure that private landowners comply. Full compensation programs may also create perverse incentives among private landowners "to make socially inefficient investments in their [*140] property." Compensation programs are also not immune to cries of cost-inefficiency and political opposition. Furthermore, requiring taxpayers to fit the bill can also raise a revenue issue and create its own inefficiencies. Despite these concerns, purchasing private lands for public use in conservation efforts appears to be the most effective answer, but its viability as an option is limited to only a small portion of species because of obvious financial and political constraints. A voluntary purchase regime is not always feasible for large continuous tracks of land because of potential landowner holdout. In this situation, the government can utilize eminent domain or, preferably, use other incentive mechanisms that target large land more effectively such as market-based solutions. Compensation will provide a solid foundation for promoting conservation efforts on private land, but it must also be paired with broader reform to the ESA. Although the federal government has not embraced a compensation program, states have begun experimenting with incentives that reward private landowners through compensation. Compensation programs have included fee simple acquisition, subsidies, and conservation easements. a. Fee Simple Acquisition A fee simple acquisition for the purpose of conservation involves a government agency, land trust, or non-profit organization purchasing all the property rights from a private landowner. It is a voluntary transaction between the landowner and conservator that allows market forces to determine the price of the transfer. The conservator will typically pay the private landowner the value of the land, including [*141] current and future opportunity costs, in order to use the land in a more profitable way. Fee simple acquisitions provide several benefits. They have high potential for active management of habitat because the government has ownership and management responsibilities. Similarly, monitoring costs and enforcing use restrictions are low with fee simple acquisitions if a single person or organization owns the land in its entirety. There are low to moderate administrative costs associated with fee simple acquisition resulting from the government's need to manage the land. Although fee simple acquisitions are often the simplest conservation mechanism,the costs associated with purchasing all the rights in the property can be very high. The acquisition may also result in "conservation overkill" because the conservator may not engage in activities such as farming that are compatible with conservation. Regulators may, however, be able to lease the land under controlled conditions to private entities to engage in these commercial activities. This would allow the land to be used efficiently for conservation and commercial purposes and allow regulators to recover some of the acquisition costs associated with purchasing the fee simple acquisition. Fee simple acquisitions offer the government a viable option to purchase land with high conservation and low development value. They have successfully been used to create public goods by using the purchased land for parks, wildlife preserves, and nature trails. Although fee simple acquisitions remain an option for regulators and alleviate the fiscal illusion concerns, their overall viability is limited due to the high costs associated with acquiring full property rights. Politically, fee simple acquisitions will never be able to gain bipartisan [*142] support to be more than just a minor conservation tool because purchasing large tracks of land or high volumes of land is too costly and, conversely, picking and

choosing only certain land to conserve would not satisfy broad conservation needs. b. Subsidies Subsidies are a flexible tool that encourages private landowners to take part in conservation efforts by offering financial incentives . Subsidies often take

the form of cash, loans, grants, or tax incentives offered by regulators and non-government organizations to the landowner to either maintain their land in its undeveloped state or to mitigate the

impact of development on the environment. The programs are voluntary and generally require the private landowner to submit an application, a conservation plan,

and receive approval through a final inspection of the land prior to being paid. This process gives the government considerable discretion in choosing which projects satisfy the predesigned

conservation goals in the most cost efficient manner. Subsidy programs may be effective at promoting active habitat

management because regulators would have the ability to tailor the conservation efforts to a specific species. The short-term nature of subsidy contracts

allows regulators to ensure the landowner has actively managed the land before agreeing to

renew the contract . Landowners would also have low incentives to preemptively destroy habitat because the programs are voluntary and the landowner is paid for their

conservation efforts. Subsidies, however, can be expensive because the government incurs high administrative costs to run the application process. Because subsidies are voluntary, the government's ability to target specific habitats is limited by the participation of private landowners. Subsidies also do not perform well in conserving habitat in perpetuity [*143] because the programs stop development but do not require conservation. Furthermore, many subsidies are paid yearly and give the landowner the option to develop free of repercussions if the value of the land developed exceeds the price of the subsidy. Subsidies also encourage private landowners to act strategically in the negotiation process to drive up the price to exceed the opportunity cost by using their superior knowledge of the land and the regulators' conservation goals. c. Conservation Easements Conservation easements are a voluntary exchange that appears to provide a solution to the inherent tension of balancing conservation efforts with private land development. Conservation easements are negotiated between the private landowner and the government or non-profit organization on a property-by-property basis and can be a flexible tool for private landowners. The agreement can be tailored by the private landowner to satisfy individual concerns while still serving the conservation goals. The typical conservation easement is negative and in gross because the easement usually requires the private landowner to give up their right to develop the land in the future to achieve the conservation goals. The holder of the [*144] conservation easement is responsible for enforcing the development restrictions. Private landowners have the option to donate or sell the easement. A private landowner donating a conservation easement will experience market costs associated with reducing the fair market value of the land as a result of the restricted use and out-of-pocket transaction costs like legal and appraisal costs. In exchange for donating the conservation easement, the landowner has the potential to receive tax breaks. The landowner may receive federal charitable income tax deductions, gift deductions, and estate tax deductions, as well as state and local tax benefits for the easement. Conversely, a landowner who sells the conservation easement may receive the value of the opportunity costs of conservation. Although financial [*145] incentives motivate most private landowners, still others may donate or sell conservation easements out of altruistic reasons. Today every state has a conservation easement statute. These statutes have become the most popular conservation tool in the private sector, drawing praise from landowners, government agencies, and conservation organizations. Conservation easements enjoy two major advantages over typical command and control regulation. First, conversation easements do not cause the political and private opposition that regulation does because they are voluntary. Second, easements are efficient in meeting conservation goals because the government or non-profit organization only has to purchase the rights required for conservation. This allows the conservator to target habitat-rich lands suitable for conservation at market price. Conservation easements offer a relatively inexpensive solution to conserving large tracts of habitat because the conservator only has to purchase the specific rights needed for conservation. Government agencies like conservation easements because they require few new administrative burdens. In practice, however, conservation easements pose problems associated with complex contract issues and difficulty in monitoring and enforcing the easement's terms. They may also suffer from poor management techniques or change in property ownership that may make it difficult to conserve the land in [*146] perpetuity. Other problems may include changes in science, land development patterns, and future needs in the area. Proper valuation of the property right interests might be challenging because of the difficulty associated with predicting which properties will be developed in the future. Conservation easements provide regulators with a better option to conserve large habitat-rich tracks of land than fee simple acquisition or subsidies because the conservator only needs to purchase the easement to restrict development. Private landowners with high habitat and low development potential will be attracted to the program because the compensation for the easement will alleviate the temptation to engage in inefficient development in order to receive some economic benefit rather than face regulatory restrictions. Conservation easements also offer an exciting tool for high-wealth individuals with large real estate holdings. High-wealth individuals can cover the high market and transaction costs associated with donating easements and have estates large enough to take advantage of the charitable income tax deductions and gift and estate tax deductions for conserving habitat-rich land. Individuals with the majority of their wealth tied up in land might be attracted to the estate tax benefits of conservation easements because reducing estate taxes through conservation easement donations will help diminish the hassle and costs for beneficiaries who might otherwise be forced to liquidate assets in order to pay taxes above the exclusion amount within nine [*147] months of the decedent's death. The tax savings alone, however, may not cover the full costs associated with donating conservation easements and motivating factors such as stewardship goals might also need to be present to prompt a donation. 2. Market Based Approaches An alternative to a government compensation program is creating markets where private landowners are rewarded for their conservation efforts. Markets offer a promising tool for conservation efforts because they "replace bureaucratic decision-making with basic economic incentives to coordinate more efficient decisions by private actors." Empirical evidence shows that incorporating market solutions that exchange property rights will better meet ecological concerns than a purely government run system. Conservation banking and tradable development rights combine regulation with market forces

to promote conservation. a. Conservation Banking " Conservation banks represent a new approach to endangered species management that has the potential to dramatically improve the plight of endangered species while radically reducing the cost of doing so."

Conservation banking provides an incentive for private landowners to actively manage their land to improve the quality and quantity of habitat for listed species. The landowner will be allotted credits for their conservation bank depending on the habitat and number of species found on their land. Developers are often required to mitigate the adverse effects of their projects through either onsite mitigation or the purchase of [*148] mitigation credits offsite. This creates a market for the private landowner who conserves their land to sell the development credits to developers subject to command and control regulation. The developers will purchase credits from these private landowners if it is more economically feasible than engaging in onsite mitigation. Developers like conservation banking because it saves time and money, increases options, and simplifies the regulatory process with the purchase of negotiated credits. If profits are being made by bank owners, more private landowners will be attracted to utilizing

their land for conservation efforts. Thus, a private landowner with land that has a high potential to serve as habitat for listed

species is more likely to conserve their land and profit from selling mitigation credits than to engage in a perverse

incentive to destroy habitat in order to avoid regulation or prematurely develop land in order to get some value. Increased participation by private landowners also has

the positive effect of increasing conservation efforts and will lower the price for credits because of the new market competition. Of critical importance to successful conservation banking is the initial planning stage. Conservation banks are voluntary and the private landowner will negotiate with the regulator on a case-by-case basis. As discussed, the number of credits a bank owner will be [*149] allotted is largely dependant on the quality and quantity of the habitat. Prior to being able to sell credits, the bank owners must receive approval by the regulator. A downside to conservation banking is the high administrative costs associated with establishing the market and providing the necessary oversight. The bank owners are required to preserve the habitat in perpetuity and often must designate a conservator for the bank and set aside necessary funds to pay for the management of the habitat. Fortunately, the actual monitoring costs for conservation banking are not high because private landowners' incentivesalign with the conservation efforts. Regulatory agencies like conservation banking and believe it is beneficial for species because it promotes an orderly system to conserve land in perpetuity and attracts individuals with expertise to create and manage the habitats. Conservation banking also has high potential for private landowners to create and preserve large habitat reserves with species-specific habitats. This is imperative for species conservation because most species require large continuous tracks of land with very specific habitat needs. The current command and control regulation completely misses the boat with providing this type of habitat and often results in fragmented habitat reserves on private land that can [*150] lead to extinction. Conservation banking is also the best incentive mechanism for assuring conservation of habitat in perpetuity. Critics of conservation banking argue that banking is limited in scope and is not likely to contribute to species recovery. The requirement to keep the bank in perpetuity fails to address the fact that most species' "habitat quality is ephemeral." Similarly, endangered species may only temporarily occupy a given area and may disappear from the land as a result of natural succession, disturbance, or even chance events. However, active management practices associated with conservation banking can help alleviate some of these concerns. Conservation banking has proven to be the most effective conservation mechanism for areas that have healthy markets with strong development pressures due to of buyers and sellers. The conservation requirements of the area's developers are consolidated to a single landowner or organization who is motivated by profits gained by providing optimal conservation for species and habitat. As a result, conservation goals will be met and the long-term government

costs will be reduced. The landowner's incentive to engage in active management to increase the quality of

the habitat on their land is something that is largely missing under the current command and

control regime . To thrive, most species need more than simply maintaining the status quo of the land. Promoting conservation banking, where private landowners want to

undertake the necessary conservation efforts to increase the profitability of their land, is the type of promising incentive [*151] mechanisms that can help change the dismal record of the ESA on private land. The incentive to conserve habitat in order to prosper financially makes conservation banking a more effective tool at protecting threatened and endangered species than current incentive mechanisms like HCPs.

-- Ext Incentives Work

Market based incentives encourage further action to reduce pollution by companies beyond the planZhang 13 (Bei, Lixia Committee Office of the Communist Party of China, “Market-based solutions: An appropriate approach to resolve environmental problems”, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10042857.2013.777526, 6/20/13)

As mentioned above, market-based solutions give the companies a greater incentive to use the new technologies

and equipment. Incentives which will influence the individual’s behavior to a considerable extent. People will accept a policy more easily if either the benefits increase or the cost decreases . One may pour their wastes to a close-

by river if they do not need to pay for that. This can be regarded as a result of “tragedy of the commons” which means that if people can use valuable resources such as the water or fishery industry without restriction, the resources will be damaged or exhausted by people who want to share its value (Anderson and Leal 2001), because there is no incentive to stop gaining benefits in such an easy and cheap way. That is what market-based solutions try to

change in the environmental protection process. Market-based solutions connect the “incentive” with “economy” and show that making use of an environmental protective incentive in an appropriate way could finally achieve a cost-efficient process. This is how the market-based solutions operate, they connect the environmental missions with the financial incentives. Because of this factor, the market-based solution often “pays firms to clean up a bit more if the sufficiently low-cost method (technology or process) of doing so can be identified and adopted” (Stavins 2003). Moreover, this kind of incentive drives companies to try and develop better technologies in their own interests and, ultimately, achieve a way to reduce pollution.

2NC A2 “Regs K2 Solve”

Regulations failSoden, Steel 99 (Dennis L. Soden, Professor at University of Texas at El Paso, Brent S. Steel, Public Policy Professor and Director at Oregon State University. “Handbook of Global Environmental Policy and Administration,” https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=0WwvtskrUE0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA81&dq=command+control+regulations+good&ots=VoSIqd94x8&sig=SiBz7cNtfYgcCEpQ3YgnrFaqTCI#v=onepage&q=command%20control%20regulations%20good&f=false, Accessed 7/14/21)

A second and, perhaps, more serious problem with C&C regulations is that they do not create

appropriate incentives for regulated industries or for regulators . In the case of regulated industries,

C&C regulations do not create incentives for polluters to reduce pollution below the standards set or reduce the social costs of pollution in the most cost-effective manner. Limiting discharge of pollutants into the air or water does simply that and no more. Limits on discharges provide no incentives for polluters to reduce discharges below the regulatory limits when it could be done in a cost-effective manner.

Environmental Laws make cooperation from big-business polluters less likelyWilson 4 (Molly J. Walker Wilson, J.D., University of Virginia School of Law. Ph.D. Psychology, University of Virginia School of Arts and Sciences. “A Behavioral Critique of Command-and-Control Environmental Regulation,” https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/frdmev16&i=232. 2004, Accessed 7/15/21.

Because the current system does not capitalize upon the information psychologists have about cognitive biases, the scheme created by current environmental laws, far from securing perfect compliance, actually makes cooperation on the part of big-business polluters less likely. Two psychological phenomena are relevant to this argument. The first is polarization, the tendency of like-minded individuals to become more extreme in their views as a result of discussing these views. 39 The second is called devaluation, and occurs when one party undervalues a plan proposed by another party, simply because the two parties are on opposite sides of a figurative (or literal) bargaining table.40 Together, these biases have the effect of undermining any potential for goodwill on the part of

potential polluters toward environmental objectives . Since the government cannot continuously monitor every facility, creating a situation that encourages cooperation is critical. Ironically, the very rationale behind the current system-the desire to discourage efforts to manipulate environmental laws-leads to a policy scheme that results in just the opposite.

Command-and-control regulation adopt normative baseline of acceptable environmental conditions – fails to understand emergent order of markets or offer incentives for improvementPappas & Flatt 19 (Michael Pappas, Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law & Victor B. Flatt, Dwight Olds Chair in law and Faculty Director, Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources (EENR) Center. University of Houston Law Center and Distinguished Scholar of Carbon Markets. Global Energy

Management Institute, University of Houston. “The Costs of Creating Environmental Markets: A Commodification Primer”, https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1397&context=ucilr, Date Accessed: 7-12-21)

This is because the market system is a process, not an outcome, so it guarantees no normative baseline.20 As one commentator put it, “the market order is something very different from a tool which is purposely made to serve chosen ends . . . . Since it does not ‘aim’ at any particular objectives, we cannot criticize it if some particular value that might be named is not in fact achieved by it.”21 Or, more colloquially: “Capitalism does not produce justice, any more than knife fights do.”22 Justice is simply not the aim of a market, nor is environmental preservation, nor is

any other particular outcome. In fact, some schools of economics suggest that it may even be an oversimplification to say that a laissez-faire approach would lead to efficiency. A functioning market process may guarantee information gathering knowledge acquisition, and price setting,24 but it cannot guarantee environmental protection.25 It is for this reason that many environmental laws, particularly command-and-control regulation, reflect an explicit unwillingness to accept the chance result or emergent order of markets and instead adopt a normative baseline of acceptable environmental conditions. To return to our example from above, the modern environmental statutes will not leave penguin protection to chance; they will dictate the level of penguin protection, regardless of the demand for washing machines. Such mandates, however, come with

their own costs and criticisms as well. Costs of the command-and-control approach include the costs of its administration and enforcement, the costs of compliance (including any inefficiencies therein), and the costs of resource losses due to imperfect enforcement.26 Additionally, such regulatory regimes can result in static (even stagnant and outdated) regulations that offer little incentive for improvement, do not account for marginal utility among users, and do not have the benefits of a price mechanism to allocate resources.27 Because command-and-control regimes are shaped by government actors, they

also come with the baggage of politics and bureaucracy. Policymakers have various incentives for ossification, indecision

and abdication of responsibility,28 and private entities have incentives to engage in rent seeking to secure more favorable regulatory standards.29 Scientific uncertainty can additionally exacerbate these problems by leaving wiggle room for interest groups to shape policies.

--Ext Regs Fail

Command and control policies have a negative effect on firms and resource allocation efficiencyTang et al. 20 (Hong-Li, School of Economics and Trade, Hunan University, “The impact of command-and-control environmental regulation on enterprise total factor productivity: A quasi-natural experiment based on China’s “Two Control Zone” policy”, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0959652620300585#!, 1/6/20)

Command-and-control environmental regulation is a traditional environmental policy that is still widely used in developing countries.

This study examined a rarely discussed but significant issue for environmental sustainability and economic development—the impact of command-and-control environmental regulation on enterprise total factor productivity growth—

based on a large enterprise-level sample. Employing China’s “Two Control Zone” policy as a quasi-natural experiment, we used a Chinese industrial enterprise panel dataset from 1998–2007 to estimate the effects of command-and-control environmental regulation in a

difference-in-difference framework. It is found that command-and-control environmental regulation had significantly hindered the growth of enterprise total factor productivity, and this negative effect was lagging and continuous. In addition, we leaned that this negative effect mainly came from the increase in costs of enterprises and the negative impact on the enterprise resource allocation efficiency . When considering enterprise heterogeneity in terms of pollution intensity, size, and ownership, the study further found that the negative effects are exacerbated for enterprises in more heavily polluting industries, those of smaller size, and those owned by foreign companies, respectively. Our research is a reexamination of the Porter hypothesis in China, and fills the gap in the literature on the micro effects of command-and-control policy on enterprise total factor productivity for developing countries. Based on a rigorous empirical analysis, we conclude that it is difficult to achieve a win–win scenario with sustainable environmental development and enterprise total factor productivity growth under command-and-control environmental regulation. Environmental regulations should have clear objectives and take a flexible approach, and it is necessary to adopt diversified environmental regulation policies based on market instruments

2NC A2 “Perm Do CP”

Economic incentives empower the private sector to protect water resources – distinct from federal government protection OECD ’11, UN Water is a green economy practice, “Economic instruments as tools for water management in the transition towards a green economy”, OECD (2011a), date accessed (7-15-21), https://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/green_economy_2011/pdf/session_1_economic_instruments.pdf

A strong capability to innovate is essential to establish the capacity for breakthroughs and new patterns of production and consumption. An economic policy instrument for water management is, by definition, an incentive or a set of incentives designed to produce a desired change in individual (and co-operative) decisions in those activities in which water services are used in the economy. They are means to the collective ends of water management. Water is a basic input in many production processes. It is also essential for human life and for the preservation of water-related ecosystems and the biophysical flows of services they provide. Not surprisingly the specific decisions that can be targeted by EIs in water policy are pervasive and cover a wide array of situations. Among the decisions and expected targets of EIs for sustainable water management, the following can be mentioned: • A quantifiable reduction in the quantity of water services demanded by a defined set of users in some economic activities at certain particular places. This is, for example, the case of incentives to reduce water demand for irrigation, household consumption or manufacturing. • An increase in the efficiency with which these water services are produced. This refers to EIs designed to abate the pressures on water bodies stemming from the need to satisfy a given demand of water provision services. These tend to include incentives to promote more effective irrigation systems, investment for improving water distribution networks or replacing assets, better water transport systems, use of recycled water in manufacturing processes, etc. Within the same category some other EIs can be found with the potential to reduce the negative impact of providing the economy with waste disposal and treatment services. They include, for example, incentives for investing in more efficient effluent treatment plants, reducing pollution loads, etc. • A substitution of water supply sources in order to reduce pressures on water bodies associated with the provision of a given set of water services both to production and consumption activities. This is, for example, the case of incentives which promote the substitution of alternative resources (such as recycled or desalinated water) for freshwater or shift water supply from some traditional sources to others with lower negative impacts. • A reduction in the impact on the structure and functional activity of water (providing) ecosystems produced by specific economic activities. This may be the case of incentives to promote agricultural practices that increase soil conservation, reduce deforestation, minimize floodplain occupation, etc. • A reduction in risk exposure to extreme events such as droughts and floods as in the case of incentives to deter land settlements in hazard zones or to promote water stress-resistant crops in drought-prone areas. There are many different alternative EIs that depending on the economic and institutional framework can be designed and implemented in the transition to a green economy. The following table presents a general classification of the challenges presented above and the set of EIs that can be mobilized to help in its solution.

The counterplan is a market based instrument – distinct from the command-and-control regulation of the affirmativeNCEE’05, national center for environmental economics, “INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT”, NCEE, date accessed (7-15-21) http://freshwater.issuelab.org/resources/23231/23231.pdf

The guiding definition of economic incentives (EIs) for this paper is quite broad: any instrument that provides continuous inducements, financial or otherwise, to encourage responsible parties to reduce their releases of pollutants or make their products less polluting. In essence, with incentives sources view each unit of pollution as having a cost, whereas under more traditional regulatory approaches pollution may be free or nearly so once regulations have been satisfied. These incentives provide monetary and near-monetary rewards for polluting less and impose costs of various types for polluting more, thus supplying the necessary motivation to polluters. Such an approach can influence the polluting behavior of small firms, farms, and consumers, all of whom are difficult to address through traditional command and control measures. Incentives also can be used to motivate polluters to improve upon existing regulatory requirements. Included within the definition of economic incentives for managing the environment are • pricing mechanisms, including fees, charges and taxes, for application to air pollution, water pollution and solid waste • deposit-refund systems to encourage recycling or the proper disposal of the product as well as performance bonds, which also may be viewed as deposits with subsequent refunds • pollution trading systems • subsidy systems, including grants, low-interest loans, favorable tax treatment, lending practices of international banks, and preferential procurement policies for products believed to be environmentally friendly • liability as a mechanism for compensating victims when sources release pollution that causes harm to human health and the environment and also as a mechanism for encouraging sources to comply with existing environmental regulations • information disclosure that can affect the polluting behavior of firms and product purchase decisions by consumers • voluntary measures and non-monetary rewards through which governments encourage firms and individuals to improve their environmental performance Market based instruments (MBIs), which include the first four of the above approaches, and EIs more broadly, have a number of advantages over traditional command and control (CAC) methods for controlling pollution. One, these tools give those responsible for sources of pollution (hereafter referred to as “sources” or “polluters”) an incentive to reduce pollution below permitted amounts when it is relatively inexpensive to do so. That feature, in turn, provides a motivation for sources to become smarter regarding pollution control options and costs. Technological improvement and innovation will be stimulated, resulting in greater opportunities to reduce pollution at low cost. Finally, some EIs such as fees and information disclosure are uniquely well suited to many of the pollution problems the world now faces. The more widely dispersed and smaller the sources, the more difficult it is to rely on traditional CAC methods of Introduction 2004 3 source-specific limits, inspections and enforcement. EIs harness forces of the market to give all sources, large and small, the motivation to find the least cost means of limiting their polluting activities. In principle, environmental inspections and enforcement become less necessary as sources pursue their own self-interest and control pollution. These features are especially important in developing nations where resources to deal with pollution are severely limited. EIs also are widely used for allocating natural resources to competing users. Long ago, farmers in England recognized the problem of communal grazing lands. Without charges to control use, or fences to delineate private property, the common grazing lands were over grazed and unproductive. Similarly, groundwater tables in many parts of the world are declining rapidly because the water is free except for the cost of operating one's pump.

2NC A2 “Perm Do Both”

Perms fail – People hate government imposition and will begrudgingly comply, if at all. However, they have more positive responses if they are asked to volunteer or incentivized. Kallis et al. 9 (Giorgos Kallis, Ph.D. in Enviornmental Studies, Researcher at Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona, co-author of the EU Water Framework Directive; Isha Ray, Ph.D. in Applied Economics, Professor at the Energy and Resources Group at Berkley University; Julian E. Fulton, Masters in Civil and Environmental Engineering, Professor at the Energy and Resources Group at Berkley University; and James E. McMahon, Ph.D. in Molecular Biophysics, Department Head of Lawrence Berkley National Laboratory; “Public Versus Private: Does It Matter for Water Conservation? Insights from California”, Environmental Management 45(1), December 5, 2009, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2815296/, Date Accessed: 7-15-21

Responses changed considerably when the question concerning conservation took a mandatory tone. Users had a less positive view of mandatory restrictions on car washing and garden watering (50% positive in the public utilities and 36% in the private) than to

voluntary appeals for the same cutbacks . Disaggregating the data into pairwise comparisons shows that Felton and Ben Lomond account

for a large part of the aggregate public–private difference. The differences in attitudes to mandatory restrictions, with users in the private utilities being overall less accepting of these, are statistically significant for both Ben Lomond vs. Felton and San Jose vs. San Francisco. Differences in Thousand Oaks are within the limits of statistical error.

Users who responded positively to even mandatory cutbacks often referred to the collective character of droughts, their civic responsibilities, and their duty “to help

the environment”. One Ben Lomond respondent put it succinctly: “I would comply. I’m a citizen”. However, several respondents in public and private

utilities alike said that they did not like mandatory orders and the water agencies “ controlling [their]

lifestyle ” .

No respondent made a spontaneous comment on the public or private character of the provider for this question, except in Felton. Answers there were

characteristically negative, with many saying they would be “ annoyed ” or “ angry ” if restrictions were applied. Twelve respondents referred explicitly to the private character of the company with phrases such as “they are gouging us” or “I don’t trust them”. Other Felton respondents saw conservation as part of their civic duty, sometimes switching in the course of the short interview between seeing themselves as citizens of the state and as customers of the company. So while some said “as a Californian I have to conserve water if my State faces a crisis”, others, or even the same respondents, might say something like “no, they [the company] are taking advantage of the situation”.

Wetlands CP

Wetlands CP 1NC

The United States Federal Government should create a program of private nature reserves for wetlands throughout the United States, providing landowners with substantial economic incentives to engage in wetland conservation.

The counterplan solves for wetlands protectionBonells 12 (Marcela Bonells, J.D., Stetson University College of Law, “Private Nature Reserves: An Innovative Wetland Protection Mechanism to Fill in the Gaps Left by the SWANCC and Rapanos Rulings,” 36 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 1, 4-5, 2012)

While federal wetland protection efforts remain essential, additional protection mechanisms , including non-

regulatory private conservation incentives , are necessary to achieve a more robust and

coherent national wetland protection framework . One potential non-traditional incentive for private wetland

conservation is the creation of a network of private nature reserves to supplement existing programs. Many countries

utilize private nature reserves as a flexible biodiversity conservation tool . With a private nature reserve, landowners

voluntarily designate their property as a reserve , undertaking certain conservation measures

and land use restrictions in exchange for economic incentives . For instance, in Colombia, private nature reserves,

or Reservas Naturales de la Sociedad Civil [RNSCs] [Nature Reserves of Civil Society], are voluntary biodiversity conservation mechanisms under the Sistema Nacional de Areas Protegidas [SINAP] [National Protected Areas System]. RNSCs require landowners to set aside

conservation areas in their property, while allowing for productive, sustainable uses of their land. Thus, landowners can benefit

from [*5] the goods and services of the ecosystems they are protecting and are eligible for economic

incentives and technical assistance. Much like traditional regulatory tools, private nature reserves have drawbacks. One of the main criticisms associated with these reserves is their lack of permanence. Additionally, to achieve designation the government must consider the land biologically important, a process that can be lengthy and cumbersome. The management and reporting requirements of these reserves can be burdensome, and government monitoring and enforcement can be difficult. Finally, there is limited data about private nature reserves, since they are relatively novel tools. Therefore, the extent of their ecologic effectiveness has yet to be fully determined. However, some of these shortcomings can be addressed by reforming the designation process, as well as the management and reporting requirements associated with these

reserves. This paper will propose that a network of private nature reserves, such as RNSCs, can be a flexible mechanism

to incentivize private wetland conservation in the United States , particularly of isolated wetlands.

These reserves would effectively address jurisdictional issues under Section 404 and would help stem the

continuous loss of wetland function s in the United States.

2NC Solvency

Counterplan solves for wetlands protection – landowners are incentivized to participateBonells 12 (Marcela Bonells, J.D., Stetson University College of Law, “Private Nature Reserves: An Innovative Wetland Protection Mechanism to Fill in the Gaps Left by the SWANCC and Rapanos Rulings,” 36 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 1, 4-5, 2012)

Private nature reserves offer a great deal of ecological , economic , and social benefits . One of the

key ecological features of private nature reserves is their ability to protect biodiversity . Private nature reserve systems aim to attain

"landscape-scale conservation objectives." Consequently, they are designed based on " core and buffer " principles . For

example, under this approach, private nature reserves are commonly established adjacent to protected ,

" core areas," which prohibit many human uses. These areas usually contain representative ecosystems,

biodiversity hot spots, and sufficient habitat capable of sustaining self-propagating indigenous species. Buffer zones, which allow sustainable land

uses, surround these core areas, and connect to other protected areas through biological corridors. Buffer zones provide "extended habitat for [*15] some species" and limit "adverse spillover effects on the core" of the protected area. Because of their ability to protect

biodiversity, private nature reserves are described as " biological islands," commonly used to protect the

remnants of rapidly disappearing ecosystems , like wetlands , and endangered or threatened species. Additionally,

private nature reserves play a significant role in the creation of biological corridors , linking

isolated fragments of fragile ecosystems for species and genetic resources protection . Even small reserves

can provide important ecological advantages, like serving as habitat for migratory birds. Because wetlands are among the most biodiverse ecosystems on earth, their

conservation is paramount. Thus, private nature reserves can help to achieve this goal. The ability of private nature reserves to

protect biodiversity can be particularly important in the case of isolated wetlands in the United States that contain features such as prairie potholes, which serve as resting areas for migratory birds, and vernal pools, which play a critical role as spawning areas for amphibians. Private nature reserves also protect habitat threatened by development or left underrepresented by a country's system of publicly owned lands, such as protected areas or parks. As a result, they can serve as a temporary conservation mechanism for threatened ecosystems, and stop habitat [*16] fragmentation until

governments undertake permanent conservation measures. In the United States, private nature reserves would be instrumental to help protect fragile ecosystems, like wetlands, which are currently underrepresented in the federally owned lands system, which includes protected

areas. More importantly, private nature reserves, like RNSCs, would afford protection to wetlands no longer falling

within the CWA's jurisdiction . Therefore, private nature reserves could provide temporary protection until the federal government passes

wetland protection legislation to fill in the gaps left by SWANCC and Rapanos. Finally, private nature reserves can effectively serve as buffer zones to protected areas. For instance, while some RNSCs adjacent to protected areas require landowners to undertake conservation measures, they also allow sustainable uses and production systems. Examples of RNSCs that serve as buffer zones include: the nature reserves around La Cocha Ramsar Site, mentioned earlier, and La Planada, a nature reserve adjacent to a government forest reserve and a proposed United Nations Biosphere Reserve. In the United States, private nature reserves could also serve as buffer zones to protected areas, such as the Everglades National Park, and fragile ecosystems, like the North Dakota prairie potholes. Because federal and state governments have not adequately protected these wetland complexes, which are under significant pressure from agricultural activities and urbanization, private nature reserves could provide effective protection, helping mitigate these pressures. Private nature reserves, like the RNSCs, also offer a number of economic incentives. From the landowner's perspective, the flexible management structure of private nature reserves, which allows sustainable activities like ecotourism, production systems, and wildlife utilization, make them potentially profitable. This flexibility captures "the economic value of biodiversity," making "conservation a financially competitive land use" for landowners. Additionally, landowners may receive property tax exemptions, income tax [*17] deductions, and economic assistance to manage their reserves. Therefore, private nature reserves allow landowners to derive significant economic benefits from the very ecosystems they protect. From the government's perspective, private nature reserves may also result in cost savings. Because the land remains in private hands, the government does not have to purchase it or undertake its management. Given the current state and federal fiscal crisis in the United States, private nature reserves would be a very cost-effective wetland protection tool. Finally, private nature reserves offer social benefits. By actively and voluntarily protecting wetlands, landowners become part of the decision-making

process over resources in their lands, instead of feeling left out of the process, as is often the case with command and control regulation. Private nature reserves can also help dissuade landowners' aversion towards government regulation, since

operating a private nature reserve rewards landowners for their conservation efforts . This incentive-based approach can also encourage environmentally conscious landowners, who may not otherwise have the means, to engage in conservation activities. Lastly, private nature reserves can help create environmental awareness and encourage collective conservation efforts among landowners, helping facilitate information exchanges and strengthening conservation efforts.

Financial incentives lead to increased conservation practices---water managers utilized this tool globally (New York, Catskill Catchment, South Africa).Alanna Rebelo 19, completed her MSc cum laude in the Department of Conservation Ecology and Entomology at Stellenbosch University, "Financial incentives could spur cities and land owners to protect wetlands," Conversation, 6-5-2019, https://theconversation.com/financial-incentives-could-spur-cities-and-land-owners-to-protect-wetlands-118277//Abhi

New York City processes about 1 billion gallons of water every day. To do so, it doesn’t rely on water filtration plants alone. It also depends on the natural filtration capacity of the upstream Catskill Catchment.

The catchment’s soils and wetlands act like carbon filters and kidneys. They purify water, providing a sustainable supply of clean water to the city’s residents.

This happens because water managers in New York realised that water quality and security wasn’t purely dependant on built infrastructure. Valuable ecological infrastructure like ecosystems are crucial too.

Years ago they set about ensuring protection of this ecological infrastructure in the Catskill Catchment, through sustainable management, planning and land acquisition.

Analysis of the world, from experts

Most importantly, the city partnered with landowners. Landowners received financial assistance to adopt more sustainable land-use practises and to place portions of their land into conservation easements.

As a result, New York was able to fend off the need to spend significant capital (US$ 6 billion dollars) on a new water treatment plant by investing upfront in nature.

This approach is known as Payments for Ecosystem Services. These are market-based incentives offered to landowners in exchange for sustainably managing their land and providing ecosystem services to downstream beneficiaries, such as landowners, cities and businesses.

In addition to its water-related benefits, this investment into ecological infrastructure also reduces risks to disasters such as floods and fires, and has biodiversity benefits. In South Africa, there is at least one possible type of ecological infrastructure that a market-based incentive could be applied to: wetlands.

Wetlands are often referred to as the Earth’s kidneys. That’s because they provide the same vital functions as these organs. This includes water purification and water flow regulation.

Despite their value, wetlands are being destroyed by human threats and invasive species. The National Biodiversity Assessment 2011 found that over 65% of South Africa’s wetlands and river systems have been damaged and half have been lost.

In light of the rapidly disappearing wetlands, we took a closer look at the ecosystem services provided by one threatened wetland type: South African Palmiet wetlands. Our research found that there is a strong case to strategically set aside Palmiet wetlands for the ecosystem services that they provide.

Palmiet wetlands are typically unchannelled peatlands. They occur in the bottom of valleys, dominated by the unique and endemic plant species, Palmiet (Prionium serratum). They’re found mostly throughout the southern Cape and southern KwaZulu-Natal.

Palmiet wetlands occur mainly on privately-owned land, where landowners are incentivised to enhance food production. Some of this land falls within South Africa’s Strategic Water Source Areas, which make up only 8% of the country’s area, but accounts for half of its water supply.

The rich soils associated with Palmiet peat-beds are favourable for agriculture. But many of the valley-bottom areas associated with these wetlands are not suitable for agriculture, as they’re relatively narrow and face high risks of frequent flooding. This risk is likely to be exacerbated by anthropogenic climate change.

The flip side is that wetlands transformed for agriculture are often degraded by extensive erosion. This results in lower water tables (less water available in the soil to plants) – and that translates to decreased agricultural productivity.

Furthermore, the perception of wetlands as “wastelands” has resulted in Palmiet being mechanically removed, which is widely believed to “improve river flow”. In reality, wetland degradation is neither beneficial to landowners nor to downstream beneficiaries.

Ecosystem services are a valuable tool to objectively analyse the trade-offs to society presented by different land-use scenarios.

We compared ecosystem services between wetlands used for agriculture and pristine Palmiet wetlands. Wetlands included the Theewaterskloof and Goukou wetlands in the Western Cape, and the Kromme wetland in the Eastern Cape.

We found that pristine Palmiet wetlands provide a far greater suite of water-related ecosystem services to downstream beneficiaries, and that agriculture in these wetlands is marginal. Previous research in the Kromme valley has shown that only about 50% of the landowners are able to make ends meet by farming alone.

Some landowners only derive profit by protecting their crops in the wetlands from floods, by performing illegal mass-reconstruction of the valley-bottom. They channelise and dredge wetlands and build berms. These unsustainable farming practises have major implications for water quality and security for downstream beneficiaries.

Two of the Palmiet wetlands studied occur upstream of important water sources for large cities – Churchill Dam for Port Elizabeth; Theewaterskloof Dam for Stellenbosch and Cape Town. Protecting the Palmiet wetlands through a payments for ecosystem services system would be a beneficial strategic move.

There needs to be collaboration between private landowners struggling with marginal agriculture and decision makers in cities threatened by water shortages, failing infrastructure and debt, to ensure the most effective use of South Africa’s critical ecological infrastructure.

2NC A2 “Court Key”

Court action is unnecessary - the counterplan resolves uncertainty surrounding Clean Water Act jurisdictionBonells 12 (Marcela Bonells, J.D., Stetson University College of Law, “Private Nature Reserves: An Innovative Wetland Protection Mechanism to Fill in the Gaps Left by the SWANCC and Rapanos Rulings,” 36 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 1, 4-5, 2012)

Although the United States employs a wide array of wetland protection mechanisms, ranging from traditional regulation to agricultural payments

and private land conservation incentives, stemming the continuous loss of wetland functions requires additional tools. Furthermore, recent Supreme Court decisions , which narrow the federal government's jurisdiction over isolated

wetlands and question its Commerce Clause authority under the CWA, have resulted in uncertainty over wetland

protection . This article proposes the creation of a network of private nature reserves , similar to the RNSCs in

Colombia, as an additional private wetland protection mechanism. Private nature reserves offer promising methods to help stem wetland losses in the United States and to overcome the jurisdictional uncertainty created by recent

Supreme Court rulings. In particular, private nature reserves can effectively help protect ecologically and

economically valuable isolated wetlands , which like vernal pools and prairie potholes , may no longer

fall within the protection of the CWA .

2NC A2 “Perm”

Perm fails – regulation crowds out private conservation efforts – it creates a chilling effect with landownersHolmes 20 (Henry Holmes, J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law in Cleveland, Ohio, Protecting Wetlands: Environmental Federalism And Grassroots Conservation In The Prairie Pothole Region, 10 Ariz. J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 365, 367-369, 2020)

Conservation organizations may conserve wetlands outside the scope of regulation . Working

with private landowners is imperative in a region where 90 percent of land is in private ownership .

A study conducted by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (USFWS) estimated that 88 percent of wetlands and other bodies of water in

the PPR are geospatially isolated from navigable waters. Where the 2015 Rule was enjoined, federal regulation did not extend to the majority of wetlands in the PPR, given the SWANCC decision that struck down the use of the Migratory Bird Rule. In Minnesota, the 2020 Rule now excludes isolated [*392] wetlands from regulation, absent any state regulation that would delegate such authority to the state agencies. Agricultural exemptions under CWA § 404 for prior converted croplands and other exemptions in the Farm Bill legislation also suggest that very few prairie potholes on private lands are subject to federal regulation. Other mechanisms for conserving wetlands in the PPR are consequently critical in achieving optimal wetlands protection. Part IV addresses these private conservation mechanisms in particular. There are a number of

reasons why private conservation --instead of regulation--may produce better results for isolated

wetlands . When federal regulation extends to certain prairie potholes as it did under the 2015 Rule, permitting

requires case-by-case analysis that can be costly and uncertain for private landowners . This

approach undermines environmental protection by creating conflict . Perverse incentives exist for

landowners to either ignore regulation or do nothing for fear of litigation and the costs involved . Violating federal law certainly has significant consequences, to the extent violators are held criminally and civilly liable under the CWA. The

latter--doing nothing--is a more likely scenario, but it may not be optimal for wetlands conservation. While regulation may discourage

dredging or filling isolated wetlands, it often creates conflict and falls short of improving the quality of these

assets. Private conservation offers an attractive solution. A. National Public Goods Proponents of expansive federal involvement in regulating state resources argue that because certain national public goods provide non-excludable benefits to residents in other states, these goods are likely to be under-protected by state governments. Professor John List has published some empirical research that suggests that states may underinvest in habitat conservation where the benefits of such action would be partly realized in other states. Consider such parallels to [*393] wetlands in the PPR, which may produce waterfowl that are hunted elsewhere or capture carbon that improves global air quality. List's assertion is indeed plausible when applied to certain wetlands and may justify the appropriate level of federal government regulation. It does not follow, however, that wetlands conservation must be provided by government per se. Nobel laureate Ronald Coase published an influential article challenging the long-held assumption that the lighthouse is an example of a service that could only be provided by the government. The assumption was that a lighthouse is a public good with benefits that are difficult to restrict to those that pay. Coase counters this assumption by looking at private lighthouses in 18th and 19th century Britain that charged user fees at the dock to generate revenue. Prairie potholes, and other isolated wetlands, are in some ways analogous to a Coasean lighthouse. Conservation groups can generate private funds from individuals who benefit from pothole conservation, such as duck hunters. In this way potholes are national public goods that are not necessarily non-excludable resources. Thus, the efforts of private actors are a viable alternative to government regulation. Where isolated wetlands that provide a national public good may be undervalued by the state and thus unregulated, private actors may fill those gaps by bearing some of the costs of conservation. Of course, the most important question is whether private conservation in those instances will equal or exceed the degree of wetlands protection achieved through regulation. The work of DU in the PPR suggests it may, provided that adequate private and governmental incentive programs are in place. [*394] B. Regulatory Distrust Breeds Conflict Private organizations have been successful in building relationships with private landowners--who generally distrust federal regulators--by aligning economic incentives with voluntary conservation objectives without expensive oversight and fear of further impositions. As the father of wildlife ecology, Aldo Leopold, writes, "conservation will

ultimately boil down to rewarding the private landowner who conserves the public interest." It is important to consider how expansive federal regulation may inhibit private landowner conservation . Philip Howard, a well-known leader of

government and legal reform, discusses America's current governing system and the consequences of expansive federal regulation. Howard challenges the theory that regulatory uniformity achieves "clear law" by providing compelling examples of regulatory dysfunction. One such case is a family-owned apple orchard in upstate New York that is subject to about 5,000 requirements from 17 different regulatory programs. Many of these regulations impose impractical compliance measures that may have crippling consequences for farmers and small business owners. As

Howard observes, "American government is failing because it preempts the active intelligence and moral judgments of people on the ground." It is not difficult to understand why this system of governance creates conflict. These assertions are certainly applicable to the PPR, where federal

regulation breeds conflict. The 2020 Rule may reduce conflict and present an opportunity for private

organizations to work with landowners to conserve the public interest . Potholes and other isolated wetlands that are scattered across the region capture and store agricultural runoff, provide critical flood protection, [*395] sequester carbon emissions,

provide clean drinking water, and support a vibrant ecosystem. Given the significance of these national public goods, private organizations have an important role in working with private landowners by bearing some of the costs of wetlands conservation.

PPP Solvency Mech - Wetlands

Public-private partnerships crucial to wetlands and habitat conservation Holmes 20 (Henry Holmes is a J.D. candidate at Case Western School of Law, Summer 2020, accessed – 7/15/21, Arizona Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, “Protecting Wetlands: Environmental Federalism and Grassroots Conservation in the Prairie Pothole Region”, https://www.perc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/henry-holmes-protecting-wetlands-final.pdf)

Purchasing conservation easements that protect wetlands and grasslands from cropland conversion is the principal tactic for the USFWS to permanently protect duck habitat .171 Between 1998 and 2012, the USFWS and its conservation

partners spent $152.2 million on easements in the PPR. DU was the principal provider of private matching funds, contributing $26.9 million—about 17 percent of total funding.172 Precipitous increases in commodity prices during the 2000s increased the cost of easements, but also necessitated the development of a more advanced Geographic Information System (GIS) easement-targeting strategy.173 These technological mapping improvements combined existing USFWS priority areas with the probability of cropland conversion and cost of protection areas to provide a more accurate picture of easement costs relative to the benefits lost per potential acquisition unit.174 Landowner

demand is also a critical component to the conservation easement strategy. More than 1,500 landowners across the Dakotas and Montana are interested in enrolling their land in conservation easements.175 Where demand currently exceeds funding, DU has responded by launching a five-year private funding goal of $65 million through

2024, which would unlock an additional $130 million in public funding.176 In 2017, 86,633 acres were protected through easements in Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota—a testament to the collective efforts of private fundraising and revenue generated through the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund.177 The Fund generates revenue through the sale of Duck Stamps, which duck hunters are required to purchase annually; appropriations authorized by the Wetlands Loan Act; excise taxes on hunting equipment, such as ammunition; and access permits to national wildlife refuges.178 In this way, hunters who benefit from more wetlands bear some of the costs of conservation. Conservation easements allow landowners to maintain ownership of the land and continue farming and ranching, provided they refrain from plowing grasslands and draining wetlands.179 Easements run with the land, ensuring perpetual wetland and grassland conservation. Given that crop prices have declined since reaching record levels in 2013, agricultural land values and the cost of easements have declined or stabilized across most of the PPR.180 Decreasing federal regulation under the 2020 Rule, particularly in states where the 2015 Rule was enjoined, will have a marginal impact on the

cost of easements.181 Conservation easements, therefore, are currently economically attractive for both private landowners and conservation groups DU also purchases high-priority lands at market value from willing sellers.182 This provides an appealing incentive for farmers and ranchers to retire debt and receive financial security from the sale.183 High-priority lands have much of their waterfowl habitat value intact, but are at high risk of environmental degradation because they are adjacent to intensively cropped lands or unprotected by conservation easements.184 A central element to the revolving lands strategy is ensuring that wetland restoration provides economic and ecological returns for future buyers, who can realize returns from natural working lands.185 After restoring habitat on the property, DU places a conservation easement on the land.186 The easement ensures that the restorative measures are realized in perpetuity. The land is then sold on the open market and the capital from the sale is re-invested for the next land

purchase.187 In addition to purchasing property interests, DU provides financial incentives and technical assistance to ranchers and farmers to engage in their own wetlands conservation. For ranchers, this includes grassland restoration and fencing and watering systems for livestock. Farmers receive funds to plant non-cash cover crops outside of the normal growing season to provide soil nutrients and additional wildlife habitat. Cover crops are also an attractive alternative to tile draining, a subsurface drainage system (SDS) detrimental to surrounding wetlands.188 Farmers have used SDSs for decades in Iowa and Minnesota, where historic wetlands losses total 89 percent and 80 percent, respectively.189 In the last twenty years, SDS use has expanded rapidly in the Dakotas, where rising commodity prices increased demand for wetland and grassland conversion to cropland.190 DU has responded, for example, by planning to

enroll 30,000 acres in cover crop management in North Dakota alone by 2020.191 DU’s programmatic solutions are vital for wetlands conservation in the PPR, but they are insufficient alone to maintain critical habitat and duck production capacity.192 Federal conservation grants, effective incentive programs, and publicprivate partnerships are critical to wetlands protection, particularly as a complement to private conservation in

the stead of state or federal regulation over isolated wetlands. One example of federal funding is the North American Wetlands Conservation Act, which provides matching grants to organizations that have developed wetlands conservation partnership projects benefiting migratory birds.193 Private organizations enhance

federal programs by providing matching investment and on-the-ground implementation on private lands . Changes to the Agricultural Act in 2014 (2014 Farm Bill) improved government incentive programs by making crop insurance premium subsidies contingent on conservation compliance.194 Added constraints to farm subsidies, however, are effective only because the 2014 Farm Bill included modifications to certain programs to ensure that the benefits exceeded the costs of meeting compliance requirements.195 One instance of inducing conservation compliance was extending coverage to “shallow” agricultural losses not normally covered by crop insurance. 196 A recent economic analysis conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture suggests that changes to crop insurance programs translate to strong compliance incentives for farms in the PPR with potentially convertible wetlands.197 Lastly, voluntary partnerships like the PPJV are critical vehicles for agency and private sector cooperation because they leverage public and private resources to address specific regional

conservation needs.198 Private organizations, such as DU, are able to build and maintain relationships with private landowners to maximize the benefits associated with public-private partnerships. Private conservation efforts and federal programs shift the costs of wetlands protection from private landowners to public stakeholders through revenue and excise taxes, incentive programs, and private contributions. Decreased federal regulation in the PPR may reduce conflict associated with wetlands protection because it provides private organizations with an opportunity to work with willing landowners to provide economic incentives for conserving more wetlands.199

Aff A2 Incentives CP

Regs K2 Solve

All main parties involved in water management favor command and controlOh, Svendson 15 (Christina Oh, Communications Manager of Worldwide Public Affairs at The Walt Disney Company at MA International Studies Aarhus University Denmark, Gert Tinggaard Svendsen Dept. of Political Science Aarhus University. “Water Management Policy in California: The Status Quo of Command-And-Control,” https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Gert-Svendsen/publication/284750224_Water_Management_Policy_in_California_The_Status_Quo_of_Command-And-Control/links/565d794708ae1ef9298284fd/Water-Management-Policy-in-California-The-Status-Quo-of-Command-And-Control.pdf, 2015, Accessed 7/14/21)

In spite of less cost-effectiveness, Stavins (2003) explains that CAC instruments have predominated because all of the main parties involved have reasons to favor them : affected firms, environmental

advocacy groups, organized labor, legislators, and bureaucrats. Traditionally, legislators have

found CAC regulations attractive . First, many legislators are trained in law, which may predispose them to favor legalistic approaches (ibid: pp. 12-13). Second, standards tend to help hide the costs while taxes generally impose these costs more directly and explicitly. The benefits of market mechanisms are often “invisible to consumers, while the costs they impose as fees or taxes are all too plain” (Stavins & Whitehead, 1997, p. 111).

Their analysis is wrong, it doesn’t account for the cost of abandoning command and control – empirics flow affCole and Grossman 99 (Daniel, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Peter, Butler University, “When Is Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection”, https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1591&context=facpub)

Portney's prediction reflects a belief that marginal benefits fall as the quantity of pollution control increases, while the marginal cost curve rises steeply. The same supposition is reflected in Figures 1-6 of this Article, all of

which display downward sloping marginal benefit curves and upward sloping marginal cost curves. But in fact the actual benefits of the Clean Air Act have not only continued to rise since 1981, they have risen at a faster rate than total costs. This suggests either that Portney was incorrect about the shape or position of the curves post 1981, or more likely, that he presumed that marginal cost and benefit curves were static when they were not. In fact, both of these curves have shifted during the history of the Clean Air Act. As Portney expected, marginal costs increased-increments of control are more costly today than they were twenty years ago. But benefits increased even more . Apparently, the marginal benefit curve shifted upward even more than the marginal cost curve, as additional and more highly valued benefits accrued from reduced air pollution. Whatever the explanation, the evidence is clear that the Clean Air Act has provided increasing net benefits to society throughout its history. Between 1981 and 1990, annualized and inflation-adjusted compliance costs rose by 17%, from $20.9 billion to $25.3 billion." During this period, emissions of all "criteria" air pollutants78 fell and air quality improved significantly. National emissions of criteria pollutants, excluding

lead, declined by an average of 11.2%; the average reduction jumps to 24% if lead is included because lead emissions fell by 87%

between 1981 and 1989. 79 Thanks to these emissions reductions, national ambient concentrations of criteria pollutants fell between 1981 and 1988 by an average of 22.6% (only 10.6% if lead is excluded).,0 The

EPA has priced many of the benefits of emissions and ambient concentration reductions under the 1970 Clean Air Act. Its mean estimate of benefits (in constant 1990 dollars) grew from $355 billion in 1975, to $930 billion in 1980, to more than

$1.2 trillion in 1990.81 In fact, the increase in total benefits exceeded by a substantial margin (both nominally and in percentage terms) the increase in the costs of complying with Clean Air Act regulations. Contrary to the prevailing wisdom, the 1970 Clean Air Act's predominantly command-and-control regulatory regime grew increasingly efficient between 1970 and 1990, producing far more benefits than costs for society. Indeed, according to the EPA, the "net, direct, monetized benefits" of the Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990 "rang[ed] from 4.3 to 28.2 trillion dollars, with a central estimate of 13.7 illion dollars. ' 2 Whether or not this central estimate is accurate, the important point for present purposes is that the Clean Air Act has continued to produce some level of net social benefits throughout its history. In a recent interview, Paul Portney asserted that any analysis of the Act would conclude that its benefits

outweigh its costs.8 3 And after conducting an extensive review of the literature, Davies and Mazurek concur: "Taken as a whole, the benefits of the Clean Air Act seem clearly to outweigh the costs. 84 Still, according to the "conventional story" outlined earlier in this Section, the Clean Air Act would have been more efficient (i.e., would have produced greater net benefits for society), had it relied from inception on more flexible market-based approaches. But that story ignores significant economic, institutional, and technological constraints that existed when Congress enacted the 1970 Clean Air Act. To be accurate, any comparison of costs and benefits must include an assessment of the transaction costs that such a large-scale shift in regulatory regimes would have entailed. And there is no question that a shift from a predominantly command-and-control regime to a marketbased system would have entailed substantial, perhaps prohibitive, transaction costs. This is most obviously true with respect to costs of monitoring and enforcement, which tend to be higher for market-based programs, such as emissions trading, than for command-and-control regulations.

Incentives Fail

Landowners are motivated by ethics, not financial incentives Selinske et al 17 (Matthew J Selinske is a postdoctoral fellow studying conservation science and conservation psychology at RMIT University in Melbourne, Australia, Benjamin Cooke is a senior lecturer at RMIT in Australia based in the Bachelor of Environment and Society Program, Nooshin Torabi is a professor at RMIT in Australia focusing on Interdisciplinary Conservation Science, Mathew J Hardy is a PhD candidate focusing on private land conservation in Australia, Andrew T Knight, and Sarah A Bekessy, “Locating Financial Incentives Among Diverse Motivations for Long-Term Private Land Conservation”, Ecology and Society, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26270074, June 17, DA – 7/13/21)If PLC programs are to deliver conservation benefits on private land that are sustained and supported by landholders, the instruments utilized need to be positioned within an overarching strategy that recognizes a dynamic social-ecological context (Gunningham and Young 1997).

Financially incentivizing enrolment can be a useful tool to draw landholders into a PLC program, but landholders’ ongoing participation in programs is driven by a variety of factors that are not necessarily related to economic considerations (Selinske et al. 2015). Our case study results reinforce the need for flexible and diverse approaches to conservation policy

that emphasize a suite of policy mechanisms. There is substantial evidence from our case studies and existing research that financial incentives are not well suited to being the foundation upon which PLC policy and programs should be built. to the Policy makers need to be open ways in which landholders’ “ practical and emotional attachment s” (Trigger et al. 2010:1070) to their landscapes manifest through their stewardship ethic and connect with, reinterpret, or resist program objectives. Ideally, to secure conservation benefits on private land, program design would consider what is required to foster stewardship over the long term. We suggest that recognizing social-ecological complexity and responding to the dynamism and uncertainty that this entails (which makes the rigidity of some financial incentive programs less attractive) needs to be considered upfront when designing PLC policy. To enhance a landholder’s ability to respond to change, we need cooperation and critical reflection among and between the

different actors in PLC program design and implementation. Financial incentives that do not foster collaboration and ongoing stewardship may be problematic in the long-term, especially in the face of indefinite political support for conservation initiatives. As we have argued, an approach to PLC that centers on the context of implementation and responds to a diverse range of landholder stewardship motivations benefits both landholders and conservation organizations, enhancing the potential for long-term ecological benefits.

Economic incentives alone don’t work, individual farmer’s attitudes towards their local environment make them more likely to pay higher costs for environmental solutions. Kristin Floress, et. Al. 2017. Kristin Floress is a Research Social Scientist at the US Forest Service and has a PhD in Natural Resources Social Science. “Toward a theory of farmer conservation attitudes: Dual interests and willingness to take action to protect water quality”, Pg. 75, Journal of Environmental Psychology, https://www.fs.fed.us/nrs/pubs/jrnl/2017/nrs_2017_floress_001.pdf Date Accesed: 7-13-21, AWD.

Within the environmental management literature, both rational self-interest approaches based upon economic motivations and those incorporating dimensions of morality have been criticized for not having greater integration and thus power in understanding the complexity of factors that play a role in farmers' decisions

(Chouinard et al., 2006). Even so, many financial policy tools that encourage voluntary adoption of conservation practices are based upon the premise that farmers want to maximize self-interest (Sheeder &

Lynne, 2011), but are found to be incomplete . For example, Shortle, Ribaudo, Horan, and Blanford (2012) note that economic incentives have largely failed to improve water quality , and others have found that financial incentives alone don't account for changes in behavior (e.g., Czap, Czap, Khachaturyan, Lynne, & Burbach, 2012; Sheeder & Lynne, 2011). The failure of financial policy tools to change behavior is increasingly recognized as resulting from what has long been recognized in psychosocial disciplines:

farmers, like most people, are likely not driven exclusively by narrow self-interest but also by the welfare of others such as their local community or the natural environment (Czap et al., 2012; Van Vugt, 2009). Bishop, Shumway, and

Wandschneider (2010) found both private and social costs impacted farmers’ willingness to adopt manure digester technology. Similarly, Reimer et al. (2012) found that attitudes towards responsibility for water quality were influenced by stewardship attitudes and that farmers were also willing to accept reduced profits or increased costs because of “off-farm benefits ”. Thompson et al. (2015) found three groups in their cluster analysis of farmers according to stewardship and farm-as-

business attitudes: almost all farmers in their study had positive stewardship attitudes , but varied in terms of whether they viewed their farm in terms of yield maximization . Some farmers may be “pure cases” of either being driven more

by stewardship or by business, but many will engage in practices with an environmental outcome though it may be more costly to themselves (Chouinard et al., 2006).

CP Fails – Ag

Water quality protection is supply-driven, not demand-driven, making the system inefficient. James Shortle, 2017. James Shortle is a Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Agricultural and Environmental Economics Policy Reforms Needed for Better Water Quality and Lower Pollution Control Costs Source: Choices , Vol. 32, No. 4), pg. 4, Published by: Agricultural & Applied Economics Association, URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26487421.pdf?casa_token=Ynvecb6orHsAAAAA:V5-vrTb6WQmLE6NsBL7JPfKesGOIfkiyInv9TUO__NPKh6D5y9kOPlwkhIEb7vDzaAti8SkcJOBj1WIBloWwMCGhosGUX4sfF_qpHnyv0cAVvoR9HNE Date Accessed: 7-13-21, AWD.

Finally, a fundamental limitation of the current approach is that it relies on payments to farmers . This essentially holds water quality protection hostage to the amount of public conservation spending . Conservation investments are already budget-constrained, with demand for funds routinely in excess of supply . The importance of this restriction is likely to increase as federal and state discretionary budgets are increasingly squeezed by entitlements and unfunded pension obligations (Shortle et al., 2012). Fundamentally, the traditional voluntary compliance model for water quality protection makes water quality protection in agriculture supply driven rather than demand driven. Details of pollution control investments that are funded by the public and of fundamental importance to water quality protection depend on the choices individual farmers make about whether or not to participate in water quality programs and the control practices they are willing to adopt from the menu supported by those programs. This kind of system can assure desired water quality outcomes and efficiency in the use of public funds only if the payment model can effectively limit funding to critical source zones and to water quality practices that are cost-effective , induce eligible farmers to adopt the most efficient practices even when there are few or no private benefits from their use, and allocate sufficient public funds to get the job done. This is not the existing system.

CP Fails – Market Complexity

Markets are too complex and only work spontaneously, fiating market policies won’t workPappas and Flatts 19 (Michael, Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Professor of Law, Victor, Dwight Olds Chair in Law and Faculty Director, Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources (EENR) Center, “The Costs of Creating Environmental Markets: A Commodification Primer”, https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1397&context=ucilr, 3/19)

Moreover, attempts to build complex institutions in other contexts demonstrate similar challenges and teach the

same lessons of humility. For instance, attempts at “development economics” and “nation building” have rarely succeeded. Such complex systems may emerge, but they defy attempts at creation by fiat . For example, development-economics attempts to import market systems to other cultures have been marked by a “long history of ineffective efforts.”85 As commentators have observed,

development-economics measures that are focused on merely imposing market policies are unlikely to work.86 Rather, market systems tend to emerge from a fortuitous mix of underlying institutions.87 Unfortunately,

we do not seem to know exactly the right mix of institutions, and even if we did, those institutions would likely prove difficult to change.

Tradable Permits CP

Neg Cards

Tradable Permits in rationingNational Research Council ’02, Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, “The Drama of the Commons”, National Academy Press WASHINGTON DC, date accessed (7-16-21), https://www.nap.edu/read/10287/chapter/1

One of the new institutional approaches for coping with the problem of rationing access to the commons involves the use of tradable permits. Applications of this approach have spread to many different types of resources and many different countries. A recent survey found 9 applications in air pollution control, 75 applications in fisheries, 3 applications in managing water resources, 5 applications in controlling water pollution, and 5 applications in land use control (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1999:Appendix 1:18-19). And that survey failed to include many current applications. Tradable permits address the commons problem by rationing access to the resource and privatizing the resulting access rights. The first step involves setting a limit on user access to the resource. For fisheries this would involve the total allowable catch. For water supply it would involve the amount of water that could be extracted. For pollution control it typically specifies the aggregate amount of emissions allowed in the relevant control region. This limit defines the aggregate amount of access to the resource that is authorized. These access rights are then allocated on some basis (to be described) to potential individual users. Depending on the specific system, these rights may be transferable to other users and/or bankable for future use. Users who exceed limits imposed by the rights they hold face penalties up to and including the loss of the right to participate.

Water tradable permits decrease pollution and lower water consumption Borghesi 13 (Simone Borghesi - Department of Political and International Sciences, University of Siena, “Water tradable permits: a review of theoretical and case studies”, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09640568.2013.820175)

In the last few years, the rapid economic and demographic growth in many regions of the world has caused a rise in problems tied to water scarcity and pollution. In order to deal with these problems the introduction of a system

of market incentives in water management has been proposed. In particular, in the literature increasing attention has been devoted to the implementation of market mechanisms based on pollution and consumption rights.

These mechanisms, better known as tradable permits, are similar to those applied to air pollution, and more recently, adopted at an international level for the reduction of CO2 emissions requested by the Kyoto Protocol.

In the case of water resources, two forms of tradable permits can be distinguished: those that consent a maximum limit of water pollution and

those allowing a maximum limit of water use. In a system of tradable water pollution rights, hereafter referred to as TWPR, the water management authority establishes the maximum amount of emissions according to the carrying capacity of the ecosystem in question. The total amount of emissions is subdivided into a fixed number of permits or rights to pollute, that can be initially allocated according to the past levels of pollution (grandfathering) or via auction. The holders can trade the rights purchased in a secondary permit market. A polluting point source, for example, which has low pollution abatement costs can increase its depuration capacity and sell permits to sources who, instead, have high

clean-up costs. In this way the total cost of reducing pollution is minimized since the depuration effort is carried out by the firm who can meet the objectives with lower costs. The tradable water abstraction rights programme, henceforth TWAR, is structured in a similar way; in this case a regulatory authority sets the water consumption cap, that is, the maximum amount of water abstraction allowed in the hydrographic basin, and allocates the corresponding abstraction rights among the users of the basin who can then exchange them according to their present and/or future expected water consumption needs. Therefore,

the agents who can use water more efficiently and reduce its consumption will have an incentive to do so for a twofold reason: to avoid purchasing costly abstraction rights and to possibly gain revenues from selling the rights at disposal that are no longer needed once they manage to lower their water consumption.

Aff A2 Tradable Permits

CP Fails

Cap and Trade systems are hard to set and maintain, knowledge limitations and political pressure make them unrealistic to conservation effortsMichael Pappas & Victor B. Flatt (2019)., “The Costs of Creating Environmental Markets: A Commodification Primer”, 9 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 731, Available at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr/vol9/iss3/7, pg. 745-746, Date Accessed: 7-12-2021, AWD.

As cap-and-trade systems revolve so fundamentally around the cap, the primary challenge of deploying such systems is in setting and enforcing such a cap . As with price setting, this raises issues of knowledge limitations and political pressures,

albeit slightly different ones. In terms of knowledge limitations, cap-and-trade systems necessitate the complexity of calculating a meaningful cap in the context of scientific uncertainty and subject to the challenges of defining, allocating, and enforcing the entitlements under that cap.63 This may still be less perplexing than price setting, because setting a cap requires only identification of a desired level of resource use,64 whereas price setting requires not only identifying a desired level of resource use but also then calculating a price

likely to bring about that level of use. Nonetheless, setting a cap alone is no small feat . In terms of political pressures, cap-and-trade programs can be susceptible, at least initially, to the same rent seeking behavior that is likely to impact price setting. Moreover, cap setting is likely subject to the same unidirectional error that can result in caps being systematically set on the generous (i.e., less protective) end.65 Additionally, even after caps are set, there is the challenge of retaining a “hard cap” that stands firm against pressures to loosen limits and allow more resource use .66 Political incentives often push legislators to relax hard lines , whether with budgets or caps, especially when the squeeze is felt immediately but

the benefits do not manifest within an election cycle. As a result, it may be politically difficult to maintain hard caps if the price becomes high and there is not a large constituency to protect the cap.67