states counterplan

7/31/2019 States Counterplan

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States Counterplan Core

***States Counterplan***

***States Counterplan***.....................................................................................................................................................................................1States Counterplan 1nc..........................................................................................................................................................................................3States Counterplan 1nc..........................................................................................................................................................................................4Theoretical Defense of the States Counterplan........................................................................................................................................................5

NCCUSL Solvency.................. ............ ............ ............ ........... ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ........... ............ ........... ..... ...6

NCCUSL Solvency.................. ............ ............ ............ ........... ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ........... ............ ........... ..... ...7Solvency Social Services....................................................................................................................................................................................8Solvency Social Services....................................................................................................................................................................................9Solvency Social Services..................................................................................................................................................................................10Solvency Federal Modeling..............................................................................................................................................................................11Solvency Bioethics / Medical Research.............................................................................................................................................................12Solvency Disease.............................................................................................................................................................................................13Solvency Health Care.......................................................................................................................................................................................14Solvency SCHIP..............................................................................................................................................................................................15Solvency Native Americans..............................................................................................................................................................................16Solvency Environmental Justice / Urban Renewal.............................................................................................................................................17Solvency Education..........................................................................................................................................................................................18Solvency Education..........................................................................................................................................................................................19Solvency Domestic Violence............................................................................................................................................................................20Solvency Immigration Services.........................................................................................................................................................................21Solvency Immigration Services.........................................................................................................................................................................22

Solvency School Lunches.................................................................................................................................................................................23Solvency Employment Policies..........................................................................................................................................................................24Solvency Homelessness....................................................................................................................................................................................25Solvency AT: Race to the Bottom.....................................................................................................................................................................26Solvency AT: Race to the Bottom.....................................................................................................................................................................27Solvency AT: Race to the Bottom.....................................................................................................................................................................28Solvency AT: Conservative States....................................................................................................................................................................29AT: Federal Pre-emption.....................................................................................................................................................................................30AT: Federal Pre-emption.....................................................................................................................................................................................31AT: Supreme Court Strike Down.........................................................................................................................................................................32AT: States Link to Politics...................................................................................................................................................................................33AT: States Dont Solve Soft Power......................................................................................................................................................................34AT: States Discriminate against Minorities...........................................................................................................................................................35AT: Permutation Do Both....................................................................................................................................................................................36***Lopez Counterplan 1nc****...........................................................................................................................................................................37Lopez Solvency..................................................................................................................................................................................................38Lopez Solvency Narrow Ruling........................................................................................................................................................................39

Lopez Federalism Net-Benefit.............................................................................................................................................................................40Lopez Federalism Net-Benefit.............................................................................................................................................................................41AT: Permutation Do Both....................................................................................................................................................................................42AT: Permutation Do Both....................................................................................................................................................................................43Generic AT: Lopez DAs.....................................................................................................................................................................................44AT: ESA DA No ESA Overturn.................. ............ ........... ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ........... ............ .......45AT: ESA DA No Impact to ESA.......................................................................................................................................................................46AT: ESA DA ESA Bad Turn........... ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ........... ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ .......... ..... ..... ..... ....47AT: Terrorism DA No Link..............................................................................................................................................................................48AT: Terrorism DA No Impact...........................................................................................................................................................................49AT: Unpredictability DA.....................................................................................................................................................................................50AT: Unpredictability DA.....................................................................................................................................................................................51AT: Courts Link to Politics..................................................................................................................................................................................52AT: No Test Case................................................................................................................................................................................................53***Aff Answers to States***...............................................................................................................................................................................54States Counterplan Illegitimate............................................................................................................................................................................55Federal Solvency.................................................................................................................................................................................................56Federal Solvency.................................................................................................................................................................................................57Federal Key Strike Down..................................................................................................................................................................................58Federal Key Soft Power Advantage...................................................................................................................................................................59Soft Power Extensions.........................................................................................................................................................................................60Soft Power MPX Extensions................................................................................................................................................................................61Perm Do Both Cooperative Federalism.............................................................................................................................................................62Cooperative Federalism Extensions......................................................................................................................................................................63Links to Politics..................................................................................................................................................................................................64***Aff Answers to Lopez***..............................................................................................................................................................................65AT: Lopez Counterplan Rolled Back.................................................................................................................................................................65AT: Lopez Counterplan Rolled Back.................................................................................................................................................................66AT: Lopez Counterplan Doesnt Solve Federalism............................................................................................................................................67Terrorism DA 2ac...............................................................................................................................................................................................68ESA DA 2ac.......................................................................................................................................................................................................69


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ESA DA 2ac.......................................................................................................................................................................................................70ESA DA Link Extension...................................................................................................................................................................................71ESA DA MPX Extension..................................................................................................................................................................................72Unpredictability DA 2ac......................................................................................................................................................................................73Unpredictability DA 2ac......................................................................................................................................................................................74Unpredictability DA Link Extension.................................................................................................................................................................75Unpredictability DA Link Extension.................................................................................................................................................................76


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States Counterplan 1nc

The 50 states and territories, through the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform

State Laws, should ___(Insert plan mandates).

The counterplan is competitive and legitimate tests the necessity of federal governmentaction and avoids the disadvantage and is not multi-actor because it fiats the single

enforceable action of the NCCUSL this is real world

Razook 2kNim Razook, Professor of Legal Studies @ Oklahoma, 2000, Uniformity Private Laws, American Business Law Journal, pg. np

The means advanced by our polity to achieve regulatory uniformity are instructive for three reasons. First,examples of interstate cooperation via interstate compacts, agreements or uniform state laws appearto be the foil for national intervention. That states have somehow managed to overcome thecollective action problems associated with efforts to cooperate and to reach some cooperative solution suggests that thecosts of interstate cooperation are apparently not insurmountable obstacles. Second, efforts by thestates to forge their own solutions can illuminate the underlying reasons for such cooperation in asystem in which the forces of maximization discourage such efforts. This section suggests that they do so

often to retain their autonomy and to avoid federal preemption. Finally, comparing the efforts of theConference in promulgating and advocating uniform state laws with the decisions by Congress topreempt historically state-governed areas of law leads to a discussion of whether the Conference'sefforts might influence Congressional preemption decisions.

The counterplan solves - A decentralized approach to Social Services solves best a

laboratory effect allows for state experimentation, successful approaches, and subsequent

federal modeling*

Fossett, Professor @ U of Michigan, et al 7James W. Fossett, Alicia R. Ouellette, Sean Philpott, David Magnus, and Glenn McGee, Federalism and Bioethics: States and Moral Pluralism,Hastings Center Report37, no. 6 (2007): 24-35

A decentralized program structure, by contrast,provides for more experi-mentation in program designand management, in accordance with Jus- tice Brandeiss oft-quoted comment that states can function as laborato-ries of democracy. There is frequently no clear consensus on the most ap- propriate way to manage complex programs and littleevidence on the likely consequences of alternative strategies. Allowing for variations in program structure andimplementa-tion bothpermits the tailoring of program management to local conditions and allowsother states and the federal government to gain valuable information on the most effective meansof improving program perfor-mance.Numerous domestic programs, ranging from TANF and Medicaid toenvironmental protection, education, and workforce development,permit the administering federal agencies togrant states waivers of existing program requirements or otherwise to alter program structure andmanagement, frequently in major ways.36 States and federal offi-cials pay close attention to theresults of these experiments, which are circu-lated via publications and conferences sponsored byassociations both of elected officials, such as the National Governors Conference and the Na-tional Conference of State Legisla- tures, and of specialized program ad- ministrators, such as the

National As- sociation of Medicaid Directors. Pro- gram features that seem to work are frequently adoptedby other states and incorporated into subsequent federal policies. Many of the features of the TANFprogramwhich re- placed the Aid to Families with De- pendent Children program (AFDC) as the countrys primary welfare pro- gramfor low income families in 1996grew out of earlier waivers of particular AFDC program requirements. These waivers allowed statesto experiment with a variety of ways of discouraging welfare dependence and encouraging self-support among low income families.


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States Counterplan 1nc

The counterplan wont be rolled back states have been delegated extreme lenience for

providing social services

Foer 5Frank, senior editor at The New Republic and a contributing editor for New York magazine, The Joy of Federalism,http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/06/books/review/006FOERL.html?pagewanted=4

Prodded by a Republican Congress and a conservative Supreme Court, Clinton actuallypresided overthe revitalizedfederalism that Sandel imagined, and even spent time in the White House huddling with Sandel and Putnam. Federalism suitedhis declared ambition to move beyond the era of ''big government.'' In 1995, he signed a lawprohibiting the national government from imposing new burdens on the states without firstproviding funds to cover any costs. The welfare reform package he ushered into law a year latergave states enormous latitude in remaking social policy.

Public and political pressure means enforcement is guaranteed

Volden 97Craig, Profesor of Political Science, The New Federalism, Google Book


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Theoretical Defense of the States Counterplan

1. The counterplan is predictable. The 1nc Fossett evidence is indicative of a comparative

literature base surrounding social services. The key question is where we should devote

attention: the federal government or the states.2. The counterplan is reciprocal. The affirmative fiats hundreds of politicians to vote for the

plan, for the plan to be upheld by the Supreme Court, and to be enforced by the executive.

The negative should be allowed to fiat domestic governmental actors.

3. The counterplan is not multi-actor fiat. The counterplan fiats 50 governors act in unison

through the NCCUSL. The 1nc Razook evidence describes this process as common,

enforceable, and predictable.

4. The counterplan tests the federal key warrant. The affirmative can read any advantage

based off of federal action, and that is offense against the counterplan. If the negative cannot

test the federal warrant, there will be a topic explosion because any harms area can then be

an affirmative

5. The counterplan increases affirmative ground. They can read disadvantages to any state

acting, or to the NCCUSL acting as a whole.

6. The counterplan increases education. The counterplan increases education about non-

federal agencies and politics. Since the affirmative does not use the states, only the negative

provides this education.

7. The counterplans education has more value than the affirmatives fairness claims. The

chief issue of political science is the designation of sovereignty.

Columbia Encyclopedia 1Federal Government, Accessed April 15, 2009, http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/f/federalg.asp

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT [federal government] or federation, government of a union of states in which sovereignty is divided betweena central authority and component state authorities. A federation differs from a confederation in that the central power acts directly uponindividuals as well as upon states, thus creating the problem of dual allegiance. Substantial power over matters affecting the people as awhole, such as external affairs, commerce, coinage, and the maintenance of military forces, are usually granted to the central government.

Nevertheless, retention of jurisdiction over local affairs by states is compatible with the federal system and makes allowance for local

feelings. The chief political problem of a federal system of government is likely to be the allocation ofsovereignty, because the need for unity among the federating states may conflict with their desirefor autonomy.

8. Best policy option justifies negative actor testing. Since the judge is simply an individual

in a room seeking solutions to problems, there is no reason his or her ballot should be limited

to the federal government.

9. Err negative on theory. The affirmative speaks first and last, chooses the topic, and has

nearly infinite prep time to delegate towards defending their plan.

10. Reject the argument not the team If the affirmative wins that the counterplan is

illegitimate, that is a reason that the counterplan should not be considered in the judges

decision. Voting affirmative on theory is a non-starter because it does not affirm the

resolution.


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NCCUSL Solvency

NCCUSL compacts are enforced and implemented

Zimmerman 2Joseph Zimmerman, Professor of Political Science at Albany, 2002, Interstate Cooperation: Compacts and Administrative Agreements, pg. np

All compacts enacted into law by state legislatures establish a contractual relationship between the partystates which is protected from impairment by the US Constitutions contract clause (Art. I, s. 10). Byentering into compacts other than advisory or study ones, states surrender part of their sovereignauthority since compacts, in common with international treaties, supercede any conflicting statelaws. In effect, a compact establishes the equivalent of a uniform law in all or part of the territory ofthe compacting states.

NCCUSL compacts are actual law there is no risk of backsliding because of the significant

trust in governors appointees

Ribstein and Kobayashi 96Larry E. Ribstein and Bruce H. Kobayashi, Foundation Professor and Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law, 1996,An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. Legal Stud. 131, pg. np

The commissioners draft, approve, and lobby forenactment of uniform laws. NCCUSLemphasizes that the commissioners have long tenure and receive no compensation beyond reimbursementfor expenses. This purportedly ensures that the commissioners will work for the "public good," freefrom "partisan political considerations." But the commissioners do have private interests that affectthe content of uniform laws. First, they contribute their time for which they receive a return in theform of reputational benefits from having participated in drafting uniform laws. Commissioners can sell their expertise throughlaw practice and as expert witnesses on the background of uniform laws.

There are several examples of all 50 states acting in unison

Panko 3Ron Panko, Staff, 2003, Bestwire, REGULATORS EYE INTERSTATE COMPACTS TO PRESERVE STATE REGULATION, pg. np

About 200 interstate compacts are in existence, including 14 in which all 50 states participate, saidMcCarty. The odds of larger states joining an insurance compact are much lower than for smaller states because larger states realisticallywon't want to cede power, he said. But Florida is spearheading an effort to collaborate with Texas and California on some insurance

matters, he added.

Uniform compacts are common occurrences

Zimmerman 92Joseph Zimmerman, Professor of Political Science @ Albany, 1992, Contemporary American Federalism: The Growth of National Power, pg. 50-51

An interstate concordat has the potential to effect cooperative action and settle disputes. In particualr, acompact preserves the authority of the concerned states and obviates or reduces the need forCongressional preemption to solve a regional problem. Compacts also can eliminate a potentialdisadvantagelack of uniformityin a federal system since a uniform system of law can beestablished by compacts in two to fifty states. A great advantage of this interstate cooperativedevice is its ability to formulate a common policy within a region with distinct interests andproblems or a multistate agency to build and operate facilities or provide services. In other words,

political power can be centralized at the regional level where desirable.


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NCCUSL Solvency

NCCUSL action can act in every area of the law

Ribstein and Kobayashi 96Larry E. Ribstein and Bruce H. Kobayashi, Foundation Professor and Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law, 1996,

An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. Legal Stud. 131, pg. npWHILE a large literature has used economic analysis to examine lawmaking by public legislatures, the economic literature on legislation sofar has paid little attention to the potentially influential role that may be played by private or pseudopublic groups, such as the NationalConference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), the American Law Institute, and the American Bar Association. This

article addresses this gap in the literature by analyzing the adoption of uniform state laws proposed by the NCCUSL.The NCCUSLoperates by promulgating uniform law proposals, which are then considered for adoption by statelegislatures. The NCCUSL has proposed uniform laws in virtually every area of state law. Some,notably including the Uniform Commercial Code, have been adopted in nearly every jurisdiction.
http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=c13855824aea3855502556031c82bb6a&csvc=bl&cform=2758.-2&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAA&_md5=9c3402c5958665ae0992cefa5dd8eeb9#n2http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=c13855824aea3855502556031c82bb6a&csvc=bl&cform=2758.-2&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAA&_md5=9c3402c5958665ae0992cefa5dd8eeb9#n2http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=c13855824aea3855502556031c82bb6a&csvc=bl&cform=2758.-2&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAA&_md5=9c3402c5958665ae0992cefa5dd8eeb9#n2


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Solvency Social Services

State social services are more effective than federal approaches wont get rolled back and

avoids political problems of the plan

Nathan 5Richard, is codircctor of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, Federalism and Health Policy, Health Affairs Vol 24 No 6Over two centuries, the U.S. federal form has proved to be opportunistic. The role and activities of U.S. governmentshave changed as U.S. societal values and conditions have changed. The principal question examined in this paper is: Does U.S.federalism enhance or impede the development of social programs, particularly for health care? The argumenthere is that U.S. federalism's dominant effect has been to expand the scope and spending of thesocial sector. The recent history of Medicaid provides evidence for taking this position. In the current

period, the national government has tried a number of retrenchment strategies for Medicaid.However, state governments have dug in their heels; Democrats and Republicans alike havestaved off Washington's attempted Medicaid rollbacks. Lawrence Brown and Michael Sparer expressed a similarview in 2003. They found that fiscal federalism was a factor in "prompting coverageexpansions duringgood times (the feds paid most of the bill) and deterring cutbacks even in bad times (every state dollar saved meanttwo or three federal dollars lost)."^ It is arguable that we are seeing another health-related example of this upward push of state policy ini-

tiative in the actions of California, Illinois, Connecticut, and New Jersey to support embryonic stem cell research, which are now, andsurprisingly quickly, being expressed in a changed, supportive national policy on this controversial issue. I return now to comments that

federalism is dynamic and opportunistic. Where one stands depends on where one has power. Although it might be

easier and more efficient for a political faction to advance its goals centrally,when one's faction is out of power at thecenter, it is equally logical to advance them from the periphery.

A state-by-state approach to social service policies allows innovation and a race-to-the-top

comparatively more effective than unitary federal action

Nathan 5Richard, is codircctor of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, Federalism and Health Policy, Health Affairs Vol 24 No 6

In the 1980s, when the pendulum of social policy nationally swung toward con- servatism, therewas a similarspurt in state activism in response to President Ronald Reagan's policies to cut domesticspending. States reshaped programs to reflect state priorities, increased their funding of

programs in areas in which the federal government had become less active, and assumed morecontrol over the activities of local governments and nonprofits.^ In these and other ways, states in- creasedtheir influence vis-a-vis the federal government and their relationships with local governments andnonprofits. More recently. Randy Bovbjerg and other Urban Institute scholars pointed to the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-countability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 as an example of a state initiative that stimu- lated national policy activism: "HIPAA adapted some stateand small group insurance market reforms and applied them nationally."' The key to the argument about the essentially pro-

governmental activist influence of federalism cycles over time is to convince the reader that in liberal times nationally,recalcitrance and opposition to change by some states have not been as important for socialpolicy as the state-push factor in conservative periods. The historical record and the Medicaidexperience support this position, but I grant that definitive proof is a hard standard to satisfy for theories of this kind.Medicaid in Tiie Federaiism Context Although it is complex territory, we need to try to unpack the whys and hows of the state-push factor

for Medicaid in U.S. federalism. Intrinsic characteristics of federalism have put liberal/innovative states in aposition to lead in conservative periods. Changes that states make in these periods, because they

are easier to develop and test in relatively small places (as opposed to having to be adopted nationally), have ademonstration/replication effect on other states. Such changes would not be as likely to occur and bediffused in a unitary political system. When a particular state policy innovation is shown to besubstantively and managerially feasible, this gives activist leaders in other states confidencethat they can do similar things, providing them with a knowledge base for adopting new orchanged policies and reducing apprehensions about doing so.


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States solve better federal action is perceived as a social service ceiling, while state action

encourages private and federal reciprocation

Nathan 5Richard, is codircctor of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, Federalism and Health Policy, Health Affairs Vol 24 No 6This state-push factor in the case of Medicaid in recent years has had a notable protective andexpansionist influence, despite the U.S. political culture in which individualism and generalskepticism about government's role in social policy is strongly manifest. An underlying reason why thisoccurs is that many federal grant-in-aidprograms, including Medicaid, are structured to give states flexibil- ity insetting benefit levels and determining how benefits are defined. If there had to be one nationwidestandard ("one size fits all") forthebenefits and services provided under social programs such asMedicaid, the ultimate effect would be less expansive. This floor-setting accommodation to diversity in socialpolicy (sometimes aided by federal waivers for human services for "demonstration-type" initiatives)permits establishinghigher standards and benefits in some states. It has also been an instrument for providing federalmatching funds for existing health programs (such as mental health and retardation, drug and alcohol treatment, andschool health programs), such that in New York, as the saying goes, "Medicaid is a verb," by enabling the state to use Medicaid funds for

programs that are already part of a strong base of publicly supported health care services.

The states are much more effective than the federal government at delivering social services

Gilman 7Michele Gilman, Associate Professor of Law, 2007, IF AT FIRST YOU DON'T SUCCEED, SIGN AN EXECUTIVE ORDER: PRESIDENTBUSH AND THE EXPANSION OF CHARITABLE CHOICE, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 1103, pg. np

Presidentialists do not argue that Congress lacks transparency; for better or worse, it does. Rather, they contend thatCongress is prone to factionalism and responds only to state and localpork barrel concerns. Thus, thePresident is better suited to take broad, national concerns into consideration in shaping national policies. However, where humanservices are concerned, state and local influence is arguably the goal, and federalism is thedefining model. Most social services are delivered at the local level, where officials are deemedbetter able to identify and respond to the unique needs of their communities. For instance, what ittakes to help the jobless in New York City is very different than what it takes in rural North

Dakota. In today's human services system, the federal government's role is mainly to disburse fundsto state and local governments and establish overarching goals; local governments then decide howbest to structure their programs. President Bush's charitable choice initiative thus runs counter to the highly devolved anddecentralized system of social service delivery in this country as well as to his own commitment to federalism and professed preference forlocalized solutions to social problems.

State governments are more accountable than federal ones

Calabresi 95Steven Calabresi, Assistant Professor at Northwester, 1995, Michigan Law Review, pg. np

d. Improved Quality of Governmental Decisionmaking and Administration. Decentralized governments make betterdecisions than centralized ones for reasons additional to the whip they feel from competition.Decentralization ensures that "those responsible for choosing a given social policy are made awareof the costs of that policy."74This helps ensure a more informed weighing of costs and benefits

than often occurs at the national level where taxpayers often may be less cognizant of the socialcosts of particular legislation.
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States solve and avoid politics

Fossett, Professor @ U Michigan, et al 7James W. Fossett, Alicia R. Ouellette, Sean Philpott, David Magnus, and Glenn McGee, Federalism and Bioethics: States and Moral Pluralism, Hastings Center Report37, no. 6 (2007): 24-35

First, a federalist system is better than a national structure at managing conflicts arising from moralplural- ism. Absent a national consensus on how to deal with complex and controversial bioethical issues, a single na-tional structure may be unable to take action at all, given the intense political cross-pressures

bearing on it. Both the advocates and the detractors of embryonic stem cell research, for example, have beenfrustrated by the lack of apparent consensus on how to proceed with such research. As a result, neithergroup has been able to as- semble a stable majority coalition in Congress.

States are more effective at reaching the needs of the population

Fossett, Professor @ U Michigan, et al 7James W. Fossett, Alicia R. Ouellette, Sean Philpott, David Magnus, and Glenn McGee, Federalism and Bioethics: States and Moral Pluralism, Hastings Center Report37, no. 6 (2007): 24-35

A second, related advantage is that federalism provides advocates with multiple forums withinwhich to press their claims. The role of national and state governments in check- ing eachother and moderating each others policies has been claimed as a major advantage of the federal

system since the Federalist Papers. Hamiltons original justification along these lines is instructive: Power being almostalways the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to check theusurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards thegeneral government. The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make itpreponderate. If their rights are in- vaded by either, they can make use of the other as theinstrument of redress.

States are comparatively more effective at administering social services

Volden 97Craig, Profesor of Political Science, The New Federalism, Google Book


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Solvency Federal Modeling

The counteprlan is a state-push that percolates to federal action that is void of the political

problems of the plan

Nathan 5Richard, is codircctor of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, Federalism and Health Policy, Health Affairs Vol 24 No 6THE EXPANSION OF MEDICAID In the 1990s and in recent years, however, has not been so much afunction of congressional initiatives as it has the product of state initiatives.^^ Historically, states haveperformed this role, providing a state-push factor in social policy. In fact, as states have takenmeasures in recent years to protect and expand their Medicaid programs in the face of Washington'sefforts to damp down the growth of the program, a nascent political and programmatic basemay be building now for a future expansionist cycle in national policy to improve health carebenefits and services^when the stars are aligned centrally for doing so.

States better understand local needs and concerns they are first movers and laboratories

Litz 8Franz T. Litz, Senior Fellow, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, 2008, Accessed April 14, 2009,

http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-basics/climate_change_101In addition to the states role as first movers and policy laboratories on important issues, statesoften bring an understanding of the unique circumstances within their boundaries. As on-the-groundimplementers, states have greaterknowledge of the regulated entities, easier and more frequentcontact with facilities, familiarity with information sources, and experience with forcingcompliance.

Social security proves that uniform state action is modeled by the federal government

Engel 5Kristen Engel, Professor of Law at Arizona, 2005, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 54, pg. np

For these reasons, the ultimate significance of state actions on global climate change lies in the degree to which such actions influence the

policies of the larger jurisdictions of which the states are a part - either the federal government or the international community. Stateclimate changepolicies can have this kind ofinfluence in a number of ways. One way of influencing these

larger jurisdictions is by developing new programs or approaches that are subsequently adopted bythe federal government based on the idea of the states as "laboratories of democracy." History isrife with examples of federal legislation that has drawn heavily from ideas being developed at thestate level, social security being a prominent example.

State action is modeled federally spills over and has an international impact

Golden 99Dylan, JD Candidate UCLA Law, UCLA Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Lexis

Individual states vary widely in their fossil fuel consumption and in the amount of carbon dioxide they release into the atmosphere. California emits as much carbon dioxide as all of Scandinavia combined.46Texas is theseventh largest carbon dioxide producer.47Some states emit a globally negligible amount of carbon dioxide. Some conservative interests may therefore oppose the CCTI on the grounds that it involves a further expansionof federal power into an area which is properly under the jurisdiction of states. Those who believe firmly in strong state governments are similar to the "Greens" (discussed below) in that the "rent", in this case the penalty, atstake in the CCTI is non-economic. [*188] This group does have some justificat ion for their position. Attemp ted state action involving manipulati ng markets, generally through the tax system, in the name of theenvironment tells us a great deal about how various stakeholders - such as business entities, environmental interest groups, and political groups - might respond to federal or international action. 48State legislatures also

provide a forum to raise issues and change perceptions.49State environmentalpolicy frequently influences Congress.50State actionincreases the feasibility of federal action because: familiarity aids the political process, legislators

understand the politics in terms of income, consumption and their regional interests, administrativeagencies know how to [*189] administrate and may estimate impacts, interest groups know wherethey stand, and practical experience can guide legislative drafting.51Such grassroots action may alsostimulate support among the populous by encouraging people to take personal responsibility for theenvironment.52Action at the state level may also spurmore informed federal action, which in turncould spur international action. State-federal agreements are possible on the carbon tax issue and the commerce clause doesnot prohibit joint or unilateral action. 53Energy taxes have already been implemented jointly in the case of gasoline taxes. 54
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Solvency Bioethics / Medical Research

Leaving bioethics policy in the hands of the states is the most effective approach

Fossett, Professor @ U Michigan, et al 7James W. Fossett, Alicia R. Ouellette, Sean Philpott, David Magnus, and Glenn McGee, Federalism and Bioethics: States and Moral Pluralism,Hastings Center Report37, no. 6 (2007): 24-35


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Solvency Disease

All 50 states can effectively provide preventive health care and disease management they

are efficient and fill-in gaps left by federal action

Burke 7Courtney, Director at Rockefeller Institute Health Policy Research Center, What Do the Presidential Candidates Health Care Proposals Have inCommon? One Important Answer: They Rely on the States, New York State Health Policy Research Center,http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/health_care/2007-11-29-federal_health_care_reform_will_rely_on_states.pdf

Health care is one of the most talked-about issues in the 2008 presidential campaign. And for all thedifferences among the leading candidates, there are also important similarities. Among these, one stands out: thecentral role the 50 states will play in health care reform, regardless of who wins the White House. A majorityof the candidates, whether Democratic or Republican, say that the health care system needs to increase preventive care, use informationtechnology to decrease costs, and give patients better information about providers and outcomes so they can make informed decisions.These are all good ideas. The primary differences among candidates proposals are the level of financial responsibility for paying for care(i.e., who pays more the individual versus the employer versus government); whether coverage is mandatory or not; and which entityhas more responsibility over the provision of care. Republican candidates tend to favor a system that relies more on the individual and

private insurers rather than employers or government to purchase and manage care, while most Democratic candidates propose building

on the employer-based system and expanding public programs. Regardless of which approach one favors, none of the leadingcandidates calls for diminution of the large role that state governments play in financing,

regulating, monitoring, and administering the nations health care system. And several proposals call forexpanding that role, with varying levels of specificity. For instance, Mitt Romney has said let the states create their ownplans, while Hillary Clinton, John Edwards, and BarakObama all favor providing more coverage through thestate administered Medicaid and State Childrens Insurance Health (SCHIP) programs. States already play anotable role in financing and administering publicly funded health insurance to people qualifyingfor the Medicaid program, which provides care to over 50 million people a year. Government fundedhealth care also is provided to an additional four million children through the State Childrens Health Insurance Program. The federal

government shares in the cost of these programs, but both are largely administered by the states. States also play a large role

in providing incentives to employers and insurers to provide health care coverage, and inregulating insurers and the products they provide. The role that states play in financing care is significant: states spentapproximately $155 billion on the Medicaid program alone in fiscal year 2004. The financial role of states in providinghealth care means that they have been implementing cost controls, restructuring delivery systems,

and finding ways to modernize care delivery. States have employed several strategies to providecare, control costs or restructure their delivery systems. Most states already operate diseasemanagement programs to improve care and control costs. Other states are experimenting withprovider payment systems that pay more for better performance. Such state initiated reforms arenot unusual. In fact, states often are carrying out reforms at the very time that there is debateabout reform and how to do it at the national level.


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Solvency Health Care

States are more effective that the feds at administering health care initiatives

Burke 7Courtney, Director at Rockefeller Institute Health Policy Research Center, What Do the Presidential Candidates Health Care Proposals Have in

Common? One Important Answer: They Rely on the States, New York State Health Policy Research Center,http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/health_care/2007-11-29-federal_health_care_reform_will_rely_on_states.pdf

There are benefits to having a state-administered system of health care. Innovation and consensuscan be easier to achieve because there are fewer people involved than might be the case in anational program. The system can be more responsive to the inevitable need for change, because it issmaller and closer to the ground than a national system.

State action on health care is modeled by the federal government

Burke 7Courtney, Director at Rockefeller Institute Health Policy Research Center, What Do the Presidential Candidates Health Care Proposals Have inCommon? One Important Answer: They Rely on the States, New York State Health Policy Research Center,http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/health_care/2007-11-29-federal_health_care_reform_will_rely_on_states.pdf

Inability to achieve national consensus, current initiatives of states to improve access to health care,

and the unlikelihood of comprehensive reform at the national level portend that states willcontinue to hold an important place when significant reforms in health care take place in the nearfuture, and will continue to control major aspects of Americas health care system. History shows that thefederal government often replicates what has already been done by states. Bottom line: if youare interested in health care reform, keep an eye on the states.


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Solvency SCHIP

SCHIP ensures that states have the ability to provide medical care to children, pregnant

women and immigrants

NILC 9National Immigration Law Center, 2009, FACTS ABOUT New State Option to Provide Health Coverage to Immigrant Children and PregnantWomen, Accessed April 14, 2009,http://www.nilc.org/immspbs/cdev/ICHIA/ICHIA-facts-2009-04-01.pdf

The recently enacted Childrens Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA) provides stateswith a new opportunity to provide affordable health coverage to many immigrant children andpregnant women through Medicaid and the Childrens Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Thisnew law was drawn from earlier legislation, the Immigrant Childrens Health Improvement Act (ICHIA), which hadlongstandingbipartisan support. By allowing states to cover more immigrant children and pregnantwomen, the new law begins to address some of the health inequities and disparities in our healthcare system. This fact sheet highlights the key elements of this new law.
http://www.nilc.org/immspbs/cdev/ICHIA/ICHIA-facts-2009-04-01.pdfhttp://www.nilc.org/immspbs/cdev/ICHIA/ICHIA-facts-2009-04-01.pdfhttp://www.nilc.org/immspbs/cdev/ICHIA/ICHIA-facts-2009-04-01.pdf


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Solvency Native Americans

Alaska proves that the states can succeed at providing social services to Native Americans

ISER 5Institute of Social and Economic Research, 2005, Table of Recommendations, Accessed April 14, 2009,

http://www.alaskool.org/resources/anc/anc05.htm

The Alaska Area Native Health Service, the Alaska Department of Health and Social Services, and others whoprovide funds for substance abuse prevention and treatment should conduct an outcome evaluation of the effectivenessof programs that they fund and, when relatively unsuccessful approaches are found, redirect the funding to fill in the gaps in the treatmentsystem and implement new and different methods to reduce the incidence and prevalence of substance abuse. The Alaska Department ofHealth and Social Services and the Alaska Area Native Health Service should use existing funds to support the establishment of an Alaska

Native Family Development Center modeled after the successful Kakawis Centre in British Columbia, monitoring and evaluating itseffectiveness over time for possible expansion.

Both the states and federal government have provided services to Native Americans

Balu 95Rekha Balu, Chicago Based Free-lance writer, 1995, Indian Identity Who's drawing the boundaries?, Accessed April 14, 2009,http://www.nativeweb.org/pages/legal/identity.html

Because the tribes rely on funding for educational, social, and public works services from the federal

and state governments, they have been dubbed "dependent sovereigns." State and federal money directed totribes finances such crucial services as the development of sanitation and sewage systems, theproviding of adequate health care, and the establishment of schools on the reservation ortransportation to schools in neighboring areas.

States have the authority to provide any benefits to Native Americans

Cooper 7Robert Cooper, Tennessee Attorney General, 2007, State of Tennessees Authority to Recognize Indian Tribes, Accessed April 14, 2009,http://www.state.tn.us/environment/boards/tcia/pdf/ag_opinion.pdf

Congress has acknowledged that state governments have the authority to recognize Indiantribes. Congress created a cause of action for the misrepresentation of goods as Indian produced and defined Indian tribes to includeany Indian group that has been formally recognized as an Indian tribe by a State legislature or by a State commission or similarorganization legislatively vested with State tribal recognition authority 25 U.S.C.A. 305e(d) (2000). Tennessees General Assembly

provided the Commission with the authority to recognize tribes under Tenn. Code Ann. 4-34- 103(6). A tribe recognized by the State of

Tennessee would be able to bring a lawsuit against a person for offering a good in a manner that falsely suggests it is Indian produced

pursuant to 25 U.S.C.A. 305e (2000). Federal regulations make benefits available to state-recognized tribes. For example, theDepartment of Health and Human Services provides direct funding for Community Services BlockGrants for organized groups of Indians that the State in which they reside has determined areIndian tribes. An organized group of Indians is eligible for direct funding based on Staterecognition if the State has expressly determined that the group is an Indian tribe.

Tennessee proves that states can provide any benefit to Native tribes

Cooper 7Robert Cooper, Tennessee Attorney General, 2007, State of Tennessees Authority to Recognize Indian Tribes, Accessed April 14, 2009,http://www.state.tn.us/environment/boards/tcia/pdf/ag_opinion.pdf

Currently, Tennessee laws do not provide any direct benefits to Indian tribes that are recognized bythe State pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 4-34-103(6). They do provide benefits to Indian individuals by makingthem eligible to receive scholarships, grants, or any other benefits afforded to minorities from theUniversity of Tennessee system, the board of regents system, or any Tennessee school system. Tenn.Code Ann. 4-34-201 (1994). The statute defines Native American as an individual recognized as Native American by a federally

recognized tribe or a state. Id. As discussed, supra, federal programs do provide benefits to Indian tribes recognized by states. Thefederal government does not have the sole right to recognize Indian tribes. Congress hasacknowledged that states have the power to recognize Indian tribes by extending benefits and rightsto state-recognized tribes. The State of Tennessee has the authority to recognize Indian tribes, so aslong as there is no conflict with federal laws.


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Solvency Environmental Justice / Urban Renewal

The states empirically solve environmental justice issues

Eady 3Veronica Eady, Professor of Environmental Policy, 2003, Environmental Justice in State Policy Decisions, pg. np

In September 1993, EPA chartered its formal federal advisory committee, the National Environmental JusticeAdvisory Council (NEJAC), a multi-stakeholder advisory body that provides independent advice, consultation and recommendations to the

EPA Administratoron matters related to environmental justice.4 The NEJAC model has been fairly successfulat achieving broad stakeholder buy-in and gathering public input on a variety of environmentaljustice matters. A number ofstates, including Massachusetts, have imported the model to guide stateenvironmental policy-makers through the process of crafting their own environmental justicepolicies and programmes. One might argue that state versions of the NEJAC model have been more successful

than NEJAC itselfbecause they have been empanelled for the discernable goal of drafting environmentaljustice policy. While NEJAC has provided an ongoing public forum for community activists and a process for making concrete policyrecommendations, one flaw in NEJAC and all federal advisory committees is that EPA is not obligated to take its advice. States, on theother hand, may ostensiblybe more inclined to implement the advice of advisory bodies that have cometogether for a clear and specific purpose to develop an environmental justice policy.

Massachusetts proves the states are effective with local control over environmentally friendly

housing

Eady 3Veronica Eady, Professor of Environmental Policy, 2003, Environmental Justice in State Policy Decisions, pg. 168-170

These were anti- sprawl legislation, known as the Community Preservation Act, the Massachusetts Brownfields Act (Chapter206 of the Acts of 1998) and Executive Orders under both former Governors William F Weld and Argeo Paul Cellucci calling for

sustainability (Executive Order No. 385, Planning for Growth) and affordable housing (Executive Order 418, AssistingCommunities in Addressing the Housing Shortage), respectively. Not surprisingly, Massachusetts regulators did not haveto look hard to find the tools and legal authority to support an environmental justice programme.Policy-makers also met enthusiastic if sober- public support for the MEJAC process. With Massachusetts placing all of itsenvironmental agencies under the umbrella of a single cabinet office , the Executive Office of EnvironmentalAffairs (EOEA), the Commonwealth was in a position to make a broad policy statement on

environmental rights. Not only was the secretariat positioned to make a statement protecting allindividuals from a disproportionate share of the environmental burden with respect to new sitingdecisions, it was able to ensure an equal share of environmental benefits, including access to open space,

parks, state-run ice skating rinks and swimming pools, and funding. Also quite significantly,Massachusetts took theopportunity to promote sustainable technologies and businesses focusing on clean production in themost environmentally distressed communities.

Local control is better for achieving environmental justice

Morello-Frosch 2Rachel Morello-Frosch, Professor of Environmental Science, 2002, Environmental Justice and Regional Inequality in Southern California,Environmental Health Perspectives 110.2, pg. np

Third, a regional focus in environmental justice research is crucialbecause industrial clusters,

transportation planning, and economic development decisions are often regionally rooted. Thus

, theequity question is how the social and environmental health effects of such industries are distributedwithin the regions that host them. Fourth, minority and low-income communities in the region havebecome increasingly concerned about whether they bear a disproportionate burden of exposures toair pollution and their associated environmental health risks. Thus, our collaborative is connected tocommunity-based strategies for achieving environmental justice and rooted in a region whereorganizing on various environmental health issues is already happening.


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Solvency Education

Education services should stay within the control of the states

Manna 6Paul Manna, Associate Professor of Government, 2006, Conductor, schoolmarm, or struggling substitute teacher?, History Policy Conference,

Accessed April 14, 2009,http://pmanna.people.wm.edu/research/Manna2006PolicyHistoryConference.pdf

First, historical or developmental studies of federal education policy tend to over- emphasizemachinations inside the Washington beltway. Scholars commonly assume that to understand federal policy, one needs tocarefully examine federal decisionmaking. That is certainly a useful starting point, but it is surprising that state and localgovernments do not loom larger in these narratives given how the United States allocatesresponsibility for K-12 education. Despite Washington's expanding role, citizens still prefer state and localgovernments to control the nation's schools. Additionally, the fiscal federalism of education hasremained quite stable for over decades. Federal spending has grown, but Washington has never financedmore than 10 percent of the nation's overall educational expenditures; for roughly thirty years the federalcontribution has hovered near 7 percent, mere pennies on the dollar when compared to what state and local governments provide. And eventhough federal grant programs in education, especially Title I of the ESEA, have come with more prescriptive requirements, in general,

grants remain quite fluid and flexible policy too.

States serve as the best avenue to provide services in the school system federal policiesencourage fracturing and cant ensure accountability

Powell 96John Powell, Professor of Law at Ohio State, 1996, In Pursuit of a Dream Deferred: Linking Housing and Education Policy, pg. 21

Although education is not a fundamental right under federal law, a number of state courts recently have found that educationis a fundamental right under theirstate constitutions, and nearly all states ensure adequate schooling under theirconstitutions. These constitutional mandates create an affirmative duty on the part ofindividual statesto address issues of education and obviate the need for showings of intent or causation. Statesshould be, and have been, held liable for segregative and inadequate conditions in housing and schools, even where these harmscannot be linked directly to state action. The racial and economic segregation of schools often stems from the policies and actions ofmultiple actors, including housing and planning authorities and education officials. Likewise, housing segregation often results from the

measures implemented by school officials in addition to those enacted by land-use authorities. Because of the way federalcourts fracture the responsibility for segregation among government agencies, litigators oftenfail or cannot join all the necessary parties.

Education is explicitly a state power

McConki 96Pace Jefferson McConkie, National Litigation Project, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 1996 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 389

Since 1954, the most prominent battles regarding race, civil rights, and federalism have been in thearena of public education - an arena not "enumerated" in the federal constitution and whichtraditionally falls under the rubric of state and local governmental responsibilities. In the landmark Brownv. Board of Education decision, the Supreme Court ruled: Today, education is perhaps the most important functionof state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrateour recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic publicresponsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument inawakening the child to cultural [*398] values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his

environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of aneducation. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.46
http://pmanna.people.wm.edu/research/Manna2006PolicyHistoryConference.pdfhttp://pmanna.people.wm.edu/research/Manna2006PolicyHistoryConference.pdfhttp://www.lexis.com/research/#n46http://pmanna.people.wm.edu/research/Manna2006PolicyHistoryConference.pdfhttp://www.lexis.com/research/#n46


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Solvency Education

The states are the best mechanisms for improving educational quality

Radhdert 4Mark Radhdert, Professor of Law at Temple, 2004, Vision and Revision, Temple Political and Civil Rights Law Review, pg. np

What about other branches of government? In theory, state legislatures could take steps to restructure publiceducation in ways that would enable more public school student diversity and stem thedeterioration of urban educational quality. States could choose to consolidate school districts,stretch them across city-suburb political divides, or alter attendance zones and policies to enablecross-registration between city and suburban schools. They could revise funding structures toprovide new infusions of resources to the cities, creating magnet educational opportunities like the onesimagined by the district court in Jenkins.

Local control of schools is at the foreground of the need for continued federalism

Parker 4Wendy Parker, Professor of Law, 2004, Connecting the Dots, W and M Law Review, pg. np

At one level, asking whether federalism is the reason for allowing local control in school desegregation jurisprudence is troublesome. TheCourt has, at times, emphasized the need for local control on grounds traditionally associated with federalism. On another level, however,

the Court could be employing federalist rhetoric to reach a desired result. In addition, guessing why the judiciary reaches a particular resultsurely cannot be reduced to a single concept. Yet, one cannot disconnect the idea of local control from federalism. Local control, at itscore, prefers state and local authority over federal intervention; and this approach is, by definition, federalism at work. In addition, the

American history of education rests on a solid foundation of "local control" of schools. Schools are typically governed notby the national government, but by state and, particularly for primary and secondary schools, localgovernments. Granted, public schools are not operated entirely independently of the national government, but local and stategovernance stillpredominates in theory and practice.

State action is comparatively more effective than action through the Department of

Education

Prilles 6Wilfredo B. Prilles, Jr., Ford Foundation International Fellow, July 2006, Towards Greater Local Control of the Public School System, AccessedApril 14, 2009, NewsBreak, http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1708&Itemid=88889404

A centrally-managed system for the long run will continue to yield the same inadequate results. Today, theDepartment of Education (DepEd), with its 400,000 workforce, is the biggest bureaucracy in the nationalgovernment, and will only continue to grow bigger as it tries to keep up with the rising school-agepopulation. It will increasingly become difficult to manage such a bureaucracy, and expect it torespond to unique challenges that differ by locality. Moreover, there is very little chance to exactaccountability over education outcomes from an organization whose local divisions and districtsrespond more to their regional and national superiors rather than the local communities they serve.


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Solvency Domestic Violence

The states are the effective approach for addressing violence against women

Hagan 1Jennifer Hagan, Juris Doctorate, 2001, Spring Depaul Law Review, pg. np

The states' legislative response to the problem of domestic violence represents the first step incombatting gender-bias in the state legal system and improving the lives of domestic violencevictims nationwide. Over the last twenty years, state legislatures have taken steps to address the need for moreaggressive domestic violence legislation and the presence of gender bias in the legal system. As aresult, the increasing public acknowledgement of the domestic violence epidemic has created asituation where state politicians cannot afford to ignore the need for legislation dealing withgender-motivated violence, unless they risk being voted out of office. This public accountability,along with the financial incentives provided by the VAWA I, has encouraged the enactment of state anti-violencelegislation across the country.

All states acknowledge the need to protect victims of violence

Hagan 1

Jennifer Hagan, Juris Doctorate, 2001, Spring Depaul Law Review, pg. npStates have acknowledged the need for women to feel protected by the system, both when they firstleave the abuser, as well as during the period when they are seeking justice. Accordingly, every statehas enacted civil protection order statutes and provisions for emergency ex-parte relief for victimsattempting to leave an alleged abuser. These protection orders demand that the alleged abuser stay away from the victim, herhome, her workplace, and her family, until the outcome of the case or for a specific duration. The protection statutes alsoprovide support for the victim in her attempt to regain control of her life, providing that the statewill charge the abuser criminally if he violates the order.

State judges have a lower animus

Hagan 1Jennifer Hagan, Juris Doctorate, 2001, Spring Depaul Law Review, pg. np

When enacting legislation, the states did not forget the judiciary and the inherent gender bias thatstill lingers within courtrooms. Many states, taking advantage of the funding made available through the VAWA I, havecreated task forces to study the gender bias in the courts and have made recommendationsconcerning the issue. As a result of these findings, which have shown that gender bias is still rampant, educationalprograms and training sessions concentrating on remedying judicial bias have been implementedby the states. Many of these programs are specifically targeted to the treatment of domesticviolence crimes and its victims. This in turn not only improves the way victims are treated, but alsoenhances the judge's ability to understand the situation that he or she encounters in the courtroom.

States solve while preserving privacy for women

Sullivan 96Kathleen Sullivan, 1996, Professor of Law at Stanford, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 735, pg. np

This counterargument might continue by noting that despite the continuing gender bias that Congress considered in the Violence Against

Women Act, the states today are hardly the backwaters with respect to women's rights that the southernstates were with respect to race relations in the 1950s and 1960s. Rape laws have been widelyreformed and sexual violence units have been instated in state law enforcement offices. Finally, theprivacy preserved by state action doctrine might well be good for women; among other things, itallows reproductive autonomy and all-women colleges.


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Solvency Immigration Services

Immigration jurisdiction is shared; the states can act also

Huntington 8Clare Huntington, Professor of Law at Colorado, 2008, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, Vanderbilt Law Review, pg. np

Although the federal government is traditionally understood to enjoy exclusive authority overimmigration, states and localities are increasingly asserting a role in this field. This development has sparked vigorousdebate on the propriety of such involvement, but the debate is predicated on a misunderstanding of the nature of federal exclusivity. Challenging the conventional wisdom that the Constitution precludes a meaningful role for

state and local involvement in immigrationa structural preemption argumentthis Article argues that the Constitution allows immigration authority to beshared among levels of government. After establishing the correctness of this view of immigration authority, this Articleargues that the constitutionality of state and local involvement should be assessed through the lens oftraditional federalism values. A federalism lens does not necessarily validate any particular state and local regulation,

but in lieu of the blunt tool of structural preemption, it is a far superior means fordetermining theproper allocation of immigration authority among levels of government, leading to a morenuanced assessment of the interests at stake.

The states will be more generous in social service provisions than the feds

Schuck 7Peter Schuck, Professor of Law at Yale, 2007, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, University of Chicago Law Forum, pg. np

An interesting feature of these critiques of the plenary power doctrine is that its critics (with the notableexception of Peter Spiro) seem eager to embrace its corollary - the principle that federal authority overimmigration preempts the states from playing any independent role in the development andadministration of immigration law and policy. This conjunction of positions, which mightotherwise seem illogical or at least awkward, is probably best explained by ideology and politics. As I have explained elsewhere,the immigration law professoriate occupies a position at the extreme left in the national debate overimmigration. On the evidence from the post-1996 period, however, it is not at all clear that statesunconstrained by the plenary power doctrine and its preemption corollary would treat legalimmigrants more harshly than the federal government would - or than reasonable (i.e., non-xenophobic)voters might think wise or fair. Some states (or more likely, localities) might do so, but the the largestimmigrant-receiving states are in fact consistently more generous to immigrants, even including

undocumented ones, than are federal policymakers.

The states can provide assistance to immigrants they dont rely on the feds

Zimmerman and Tumlin 99Wendy and Karen, The Urban Institute, Occasional Paper Number 24, http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/occ24.pdf

Many states have chosen to provide considerable assistance to immigrants, particularly when the costs areshared with the federal government. Despite fears of a race to the bottom with states providing as fewbenefits as possible, nearly every state has opted to maintain TANF and Medicaid eligibility forimmigrants who were already in the United States when the federal welfare law passed. But evenwhere the costs are borne by the states and localities, many states have stepped in to provideassistance. Over half the states have opted to provide one of the four key substitute programs to immigrantslisted above.


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Solvency Immigration Services

States play an increasingly important role in immigration services


It has been over two and a half years since the federal welfare law passed, but states are not done setting policy forimmigrants. States face a host of immigrant- related decisions that have not been addressed here, such aswhether and how to enforce the new affidavits of support signed by immigrants sponsors. The federal government mayrestore benefits to more legal immigrants, leaving states with new decisions about whether to shift theirsubstitute programs to cover populations still ineligible for federal benefits. States may also choose to change thedecisions they have made at any time. They may scale back benefits if economic times worsen or theymay provide more benefits if the impacts of restrictions on immigrant families is too great.

The only problem with current policy is variance uniformity solves


States with more extensive safety nets for their low-income populations tend to be the states that

choose to provide assistance to immigrants, leaving immigrants in those states with greater access to assistance than theimmigrants living in states with weak safety nets. As a result, states often have both a new substitute program for immigrants and anexisting one, or they have neither one. In fact, over half the states have neither a new or existing state-funded cash assistance programavailable to post- enactment immigrant families during their first five years in the United States. The same is true for state-funded healthinsurance programs. Because states have more authority to restrict immigrants access and immigrants have fewer federal benefits to fall

back on, devolution has led to even greatervariation across state safety nets for immigrants than citizens.Feds model the states on immigration policy


Finally, in the spirit of devolutionand in line with its approach toward welfare reform generallythe federalgovernment has left it to the states to decipher the complex set of decisions embedded in the law. Infact, federal action has at times fol- lowed state responses. For example, Washington stateapproached the federal government about the possibility of purchasing federal food stamps to

distribute to newly ineligible immigrants before the federal government made it possible for allstates to do so. In addition, the federal government has been slow to define key terms in the federal welfare law, such as what isconsidered a federal public benefit. The result has been substantial variation in the pace of implementation across states and a lack ofguidance that leaves some state policymakers confused about their new roles and responsibilities.

Specifically the states are responsible for impoverished immigrants


The clearest immigration-related mandate that PRWORA creates for the states is, of course, thatthey pay a greater share of the costs of providing services to their low-income immigrantpopulations. When immigrants are cut from various federal benefit programs, states face thechoice of providing benefits on their own dollar or excluding immigrants from state-fundedprograms. Even if they choose to limit immigrant eligibility for state assistance, states stillbear the consequences of havinga needy population without access to a safety net, potentially increasing homeless-

states counterplan

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