quaestiones disputatae de pumpkinitate: g. k. chesterton on the rationality of this happening after...

7/29/2019 Quaestiones disputatae de pumpkinitate: G. K. Chesterton on the Rationality of This Happening After That

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QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE DE PUMPKINITATE:

G. K. Chesterton on the Rationality of This Happening After That

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

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1. Chesterton on what is rational and irrational in any sequences of events.

Cf. G. K. Chesterton, The Dragons Grandmother, in Tremendous Trifles (1913), pp.

119-121:

I met a man the other day who did not believe in fairy tales. I do not mean that he did notbelieve in the incidents narrated in themthat he did not believe that a pumpkin could turn

into a coach. He did, indeed, entertain this curious disbelief. And, like all the other people I

have ever met who entertained it, he was wholly unable to give me an intelligent reason for

it. He tried the laws of nature but soon dropped that. Then he said that pumpkins were unal-

terable in ordinary experience, and that we all reckoned on their infinitely protracted

pumpkinity. But I pointed out to him that this was not an attitude we adopt specially towards

impossible marvels, but simply the attitude we adopt towards all unusual occurrences. If we

were certain of miracles [119-120] we should not count on them. Things that happen very

seldom we all leave out of our calculations, whether they are miraculous or not. I do not

expect a glass of water to be turned into wine; but neither do I expect a glass of water to be

poisoned with prussic acid. I do not in ordinary business relations act on the assumption that

the editor is a fairy; but neither do I act on the assumption that he is a Russian spy, or the lostheir of the Holy Roman Empire. What we assume in action is not that the natural order

is unalterable, but simply that it is much safer to bet on uncommon incidents than on

common ones. This does not touch the credibility of any attested tale about a Russian spy or

a pumpkin turned into a coach. If I had seen a pumpkin turned into a Panhard motor-car with

my own eyes that would not make me any more inclined to assume that the same thing

would happen again. I should not invest largely in pumpkins with an eye to the motor trade.

Cinderella got a ball dress from the fairy; but I do not supposed that [120-121] she looked

after her own clothes any the less after it. (emphasis added)

Cf. G. K. Chesterton, The Blatchford Controversies (1904), ch. 3, Miracles and Modern

Civilization, in The Collected Works of G. K. Chesterton, Vol. 1, pp. 386-389:

Mr. Blatchford has summed up all that is important in his whole position in three sen-

tences. They are perfectly honest and clear. Nor are they any the less honest and clear be-cause the first two of them are falsehoods and the third is a fallacy. He says The Christian

denies the miracles of the Mahommedan. The Mahommedan denies the miracles of the

Christian. The Rationalist denies all miracles alike.

The historical error in the first two remarks I will deal with shortly. I confine myself for

the moment to the courageous admission of Mr. Blatchford that the Rationalist denies all

miracles alike. He does not question them. He does not pretend to be agnostic about them.

He does not suspend his judgment until they shall be proved. He denies them.

Faced with this astounding dogma I asked Mr. Blatchford why he thought miracles would

not occur. He replied that the Universe was governed by laws. Obviously this answer is of

no use whatever. For we cannot call a thing impossible because the world is governed by

laws, unless we know what laws. Does Mr. Blatchford know all about all the laws in the

Universe? And if he does not know about the laws how can he possibly know anything aboutthe exceptions?

For, obviously, the mere fact that a thing happens seldom, under odd circumstances

and with no explanation within our knowledge, is no proof that it is against natural

law. That would apply to the Siamese twins, or to a new comet, or to radium three

years ago.

The philosophical case against miracles is somewhat easily dealt with. There is nophilosophical case against miracles. There are no such things as the laws of Nature

rationally speaking. What everybody knows is this only. That there is repetition in

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nature. What everybody knows is that pumpkins produce pumpkins. What nobody

knows is why they should not produce elephants and giraffes.

There is one philosophical question about miracles and only one. Many able modern

Rationalists cannot apparently even get it into their heads. The poorest lad at Oxford in the

Middle Ages would have understood it. (Note. As the last sentence will seem strange in our

enlightened age I may explain that under the cruel reign of mediaeval superstition, poor

lads were educated at Oxford to a most reckless extent. Thank God, we live in better days.)

The question of miracles is merely this. Do you know why a pumpkin goes on being a

pumpkin? If you do not, you cannot possibly tell whether a pumpkin could turn into a coachor couldnt. That is all.

All the other scientific expressions you are in the habit of using at breakfast are words andwinds. You say It is a law of nature that pumpkins should remain pumpkins. That only

means that pumpkins generally do remain pumpkins, which is obvious; it does not say why.

You say Experience is against it. That only means, I have known many pumpkins

intimately and none of them turned into coaches.There was a great Irish Rationalist of this school (possibly related to Mr. Lecky), who

when he was told that a witness had seen him commit murder said that he could bring a

hundred witnesses who had not seen him commit it.

You say The modern world is against it. That means that a mob of men in London and

Birmingham, and Chicago, in a thoroughly pumpkiny state of mind, cannot work miracles

by faith.You say Science is against it. That means that so long as pumpkins are pumpkins their

conduct is pumpkiny, and bears no resemblance to the conduct of a coach. That is fairly

obvious.

What Christianity says is merely this. That this repetition in Nature has its origin not

in a thing resembling a law but a thing resembling a will .1 Of course its phase of a

Heavenly Father is drawn from an earthly father. Quite equally Mr. Blatchfords phase of a

universal law is a metaphor from an Act of Parliament. But Christianity holds that the

world and its repetition came by will or Love as children are begotten by a father, and

therefore that other and different things might come by it. Briefly, it believes that a

God who could do anything so extraordinary as making pumpkins go on being pump-

kins, is like the prophet, Habbakuk, Capable de tout. If you do not think it extraordinary

that a pumpkin is always a pumpkin, think again. You have not yet even begun philosophy.You have not even seen a pumpkin.

The historic case against miracles is also rather simple. It consists of calling miracles

impossible, then saying that no one but a fool believes impossibilities: then declaring that

there is no wise evidence on behalf of the miraculous. The whole trick is done by means of

leaning alternately on the philosophical and historical objection. If we say miracles are

theoretically possible, they say, Yes, but there is no evidence for them. When we take all

the records of the human race and say, Here is your evidence, they say, But these people

were superstitious, they believed in impossible things. (emphasis added)

Cf. G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (1909), ch. 4, The Ethics of Elfland, pp. 89-98:

But I am not concerned with any of the separate statutes of elfland, but with the wholespirit of its law, which I learnt before I could speak, and shall retain when I cannot write. I

am concerned with a certain way of looking at life, which was created in me by the fairy

tales, but has since been meekly ratified by the mere facts.

It might be stated this way. There are certain sequences or developments (cases of one

thing following another), which are, in the true sense of the word, reasonable. They are,

in the true sense of the word, necessary. Such are mathematical and merely logical

1 On this point, see the excerpt from Robert R. Reilly below.

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sequences. We in fairyland (who are the most reasonable of all creatures) admit that

reason and that necessity. For instance, if the Ugly Sisters are older than Cinderella, it

is (in an iron and awful sense) necessary that Cinderella is younger than the Ugly

Sisters. There is no getting out of it. Haeckel may talk as much fatalism about that fact

as he pleases: it really must be. If Jack is the son of a miller, a miller is the father of

Jack. Cold reason decrees it from her awful throne: and we in fairyland submit. If the

three brothers all ride horses, there are six animals and eighteen legs involved: that is

true rationalism, and fairyland is full of it. But as I put my head over the hedge of the

elves and began to take notice of the natural world, I observed an extraordinary thing. Iobserved that learned men in spectacles were talking of the actual things that happened

dawn and death and so onas ifthey were rational and inevitable. They talked as if the factthat trees bear fruit were just as necessary as the fact that two and one trees make three. But

it is not. There is an enormous difference by the test of fairyland; which is the test of the

imagination. You cannot imagine two and one not making three. But you can easily imagine

trees not growing fruit; you can imagine them growing golden candlesticks or tigers hangingon by the tail. These men in spectacles spoke much of a man named Newton, who was hit by

an apple, and who discovered a law. But they could not be got to see the distinction between

a true law, a law of reason, and the mere fact of apples falling. If the apple hit Newtons

nose, Newtons nose hit the apple. That is a true necessity: because we cannot conceive the

one occurring without the other. But we can quite well conceive the apple not falling on his

nose; we can fancy it flying ardently through the air to hit some other nose, of which it had amore definite dislike. We have always in our fairy tales kept this sharp distinction between

the science of mental relations, in which there really are laws, and the science of physical

facts, in which there are no laws, but only weird repetitions. We believe in bodily miracles,

but not in mental impossibilities. We believe that a Bean-stalk climbed up to Heaven; but

that does not at all confuse our convictions on the philosophical question of how many beans

make five.

Here is the peculiar perfection of tone and truth in the nursery tales. The man of science

says, Cut the stalk, and the apple will fall; but he says it calmly, as if the one idea reallyled up to the other. The witch in the fairy tale says, Blow the horn, and the ogres castle will

fall; but she does not say it as if it were something in which the effect obviously arose out

of the cause. Doubtless she has given the advice to many champions, and has seen many

castles fall, but she does not lose either her wonder or her reason. She does not muddle herhead until it imagines a necessary mental connection between a horn and a falling tower. But

the scientific men do muddle their heads, until they imagine a necessary mental

connection between an apple leaving the tree and an apple reaching the ground. They

do really talk as if they had found not only a set of marvellous facts, but a truth con-

necting those facts. They do talk as if the connection of two strange things physically

connected them philosophically.They feel that because one incomprehensible thing con-

stantly follows another incomprehensible thing the two together somehow make up a com-

prehensible thing. Two black riddles make a white answer.

In fairyland we avoid the word law; but in the land of science they are singularly fond of

it. Thus they will call some interesting conjecture about how forgotten folks pronounced the

alphabet, Grimms Law. But Grimms Law is far less intellectual than Grimms Fairy Tales.

The tales are, at any rate, certainly tales; while the law is not a law. A law implies that weknow the nature of the generalisation and enactment; not merely that we have noticed

some of the effects. If there is a law that pick-pockets shall go to prison, it implies that thereis an imaginable mental connection between the idea of prison and the idea of picking

pockets. And we know what the idea is. We can say why we take liberty from a man who

takes liberties. But we cannot say why an egg can turn into a chicken any more than we can

say why a bear could turn into a fairy prince. As ideas, the egg and the chicken are furtheroff from each other than the bear and the prince; for no egg in itself suggests a chicken,

whereas some princes do suggest bears.

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Granted, then, that certain transformations do happen, it is essential that we should

regard them in the philosophic manner of fairy tales, not in the unphilosophic manner of

science and the Laws of Nature. When we are asked why eggs turn to birds or fruits fall in

autumn, we must answer exactly as the fairy godmother would answer if Cinderella asked

her why mice turned to horses or her clothes fell from her at twelve oclock. We must

answer that it is magic. It is not a law, for we do not understand its general formula. It

is not a necessity, for though we can count on it happening practically, we have no right

to say that it must always happen. It is no argument for unalterable law (as Huxley

fancied) that we count on the ordinary course of things. We do not count on it; we bet on it.We risk the remote possibility of a miracle as we do that of a poisoned pancake or a world-

destroying comet. We leave it out of account, not because it is a miracle, and therefore animpossibility, but because it is a miracle, and therefore an exception. All the terms used in

the science books, law, necessity, order, tendency, and so on, are really unintellec-

tual, because they assume an inner synthesis, which we do not possess. The only words that

ever satisfied me as describing Nature are the terms used in the fairy books, charm,spell, enchant-ment. They express the arbitrariness of the fact and its mystery. A tree

grows fruit because it is a magic tree. Water runs downhill because it is bewitched. The sun

shines because it is bewitched.

I deny altogether that this is fantastic or even mystical. We may have some mysticism later

on; but this fairy-tale language about things is simply rational and agnostic. It is the only

way I can express in words my clear and definite perception that one thing is quite distinctfrom another; that there is no logical connection between flying and laying eggs. It is the

man who talks about a law that he has never seen who is the mystic. Nay, the ordinary

scientific man is strictly a sentimentalist. He is a sentimentalist in this essential sense, that he

is soaked and swept away by mere associations. He has so often seen birds fly and lay eggs

that he feels as if there must be some dreamy, tender connection between the two ideas,

whereas there is none. A forlorn lover might be unable to dissociate the moon from lost love;

so the materialist is unable to dissociate the moon from the tide. In both cases there is no

connection, except that one has seen them together. A sentimentalist might shed tears at thesmell of apple-blossom, because, by a dark association of his own, it reminded him of his

boyhood. So the materialist professor (though he conceals his tears) is yet a sentimentalist,

because, by a dark association of his own, apple-blossoms remind him of apples. But the

cool rationalist from fairyland does not see why, in the abstract, the apple tree should notgrow crimson tulips; it sometimes does in his country.

This elementary wonder, however, is not a mere fancy derived from the fairy tales; on the

contrary, all the fire of the fairy tales is derived from this. Just as we all like love tales

because there is an instinct of sex, we all like astonishing tales because they touch the nerve

of the ancient instinct of astonishment. This is proved by the fact that when we are very

young children we do not need fairy tales: we only need tales. Mere life is interesting

enough. A child of seven is excited by being told that Tommy opened a door and saw a

dragon. But a child of three is excited by being told that Tommy opened a door. Boys like

romantic tales; but babies like realistic talesbecause they find them romantic. In fact, a

baby is about the only person, I should think, to whom a modern realistic novel could be

read without boring him. This proves that even nursery tales only echo an almost pre-natal

leap of interest and amazement. These tales say that apples were golden only to refresh theforgotten moment when we found that they were green. They make rivers run with wine

only to make us remember, for one wild moment, that they run with water. I have said thatthis is wholly reasonable and even agnostic. And, indeed, on this point I am all for the higher

agnosticism; its better name is Ignorance. We have all read in scientific books, and, indeed,

in all romances, the story of the man who has forgotten his name. This man walks about the

streets and can see and appreciate everything; only he cannot remember who he is. Well,every man is that man in the story. Every man has forgotten who he is. One may understand

the cosmos, but never the ego; the self more distant than any star. Thou shalt love the Lord

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thy God; but thou shalt not know thyself. We are all under the same mental calamity; we

have all forgotten our names. We have all forgotten what we really are. All that we call

common sense and rationality and practicality and positivism only means that for certain

dead levels of our life we forget that we have forgotten. All that we call spirit and art and

ecstacy only means that for one awful instant we remember that we forget.

But though (like the man without memory in the novel) we walk the streets with a sort of

half-witted admiration, still it is admiration. It is admiration in English and not only

admiration in Latin. The wonder has a positive element of praise. This is the next milestone

to be definitely marked on our road through fairyland. I shall speak in the next chapter aboutoptimists and pessimists in their intellectual aspect, so far as they have one. Here am only

trying to describe the enormous emotions which cannot be described. And the strongestemotion was that life was as precious as it was puzzling. It was an ecstacy because it was an

adventure; it was an adventure because it was an opportunity. The goodness of the fairy tale

was not affected by the fact that there might be more dragons than princesses; it was good to

be in a fairy tale. The test of all happiness is gratitude; and I felt grateful, though I hardlyknew to whom. Children are grateful when Santa Claus puts in their stockings gifts of toys

or sweets. Could I not be grateful to Santa Claus when he put in my stockings the gift of two

miraculous legs? We thank people for birthday presents of cigars and slippers. Can I thank

no one for the birthday present of birth?

There were, then, these two first feelings, indefensible and indisputable. The world was a

shock, but it was not merely shocking; existence was a surprise, but it was a pleasantsurprise. In fact, all my first views were exactly uttered in a riddle that stuck in my brain

from boyhood. The question was, "What did the first frog say?" And the answer was, "Lord,

how you made me jump!" That says succinctly all that I am saying. God made the frog jump;

but the frog prefers jumping. But when these things are settled there enters the second great

principle of the fairy philosophy. (emphasis added)

2. Chestertons argument in sum:

The Dragons Grandmother,

Tremendous Trifles

(1913), pp. 119-121

I met a man the other day who did not believe in

fairy tales.

I do not mean that he did not believe in the

incidents narrated in themthat he did not

believe that a pumpkin could turn into a coach.

He did, indeed, entertain this curious disbelief.

And, like all the other people I have ever metwho entertained it, he was wholly unable to give

me an intelligent reason for it.

The Blatchford Controversies (1904), ch. 3,

Miracles and Modern Civilization,

pp. 386-389

Mr. Blatchford has summed up all that is im-

portant in his whole position in three sentences.

They are perfectly honest and clear.

Nor are they any the less honest and clear

because the first two of them are falsehoods and

the third is a fallacy.

He says The Christian denies the miracles of

the Mahommedan.

The Mahommedan denies the miracles of theChristian.

The Rationalist denies all miracles alike.

Faced with this astounding dogma I asked Mr.

Blatchford why he thought miracles would not

occur.

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He tried the laws of nature but soon dropped

that.

Orthodoxy (1909), ch. 4, The Ethics

of Elfland, p.

In fairyland we avoid the word law; but in the

land of science they are singularly fond of it.

Thus they will call some interesting conjectureabout how forgotten folks pronounced the

alphabet, Grimms Law. But Grimms Law is

far less intellectual than Grimms Fairy Tales.

The tales are, at any rate, certainly tales; while

the law is not a law.

A law implies that we know the nature of the

generalisation and enactment; not merely that

we have noticed some of the effects.

If there is a law that pick-pockets shall go to

prison, it implies that there is an imaginable

mental connection between the idea of prison

and the idea of picking pockets. And we know

what the idea is. We can say why we take liber-

ty from a man who takes liberties.

But we cannot say why an egg can turn into a

chicken any more than we can say why a bear

could turn into a fairy prince.

As ideas, the egg and the chicken are further off

from each other than the bear and the prince; for

no egg in itself suggests a chicken, whereas

some princes do suggest bears.

Granted, then, that certain transformations do

happen, it is essential that we should regard

them in the philosophic manner of fairy tales,

not in the unphilosophic manner of science and

the Laws of Nature.

He replied that the Universe was governed by

laws. Obviously this answer is of no use what-

ever.

For we cannot call a thing impossible because

the world is governed by laws, unless we know

what laws. Does Mr. Blatchford know all aboutall the laws in the Universe?

And if he does not know about the laws how

can he possibly know anything about the ex-

ceptions?

|We have always in our fairy tales kept thissharp distinction between the science of mental

relations, in which there really are laws,

and the science of physical facts, in which thereare no laws, but only weird repetitions.

|The philosophical case against miracles issomewhat easily dealt with. There is no philo-

sophical case against miracles. There are nosuch things as the laws of Nature rationally

speaking.

What everybody knows is this only. That thereis repetition in nature.

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We believe in bodily miracles, but not in mental

impossibilities.

We believe that a Bean-stalk climbed up to

Heaven;

but that does not at all confuse our convictions

on the philosophical question of how many

beans make five.|

Then he said that pumpkins were unalterable inordinary experience, and that we all reckoned

on their infinitely protracted pumpkinity.

What everybody knows is that pumpkins pro-

duce pumpkins.

What nobody knows is why they should not

produce elephants and giraffes.

There is one philosophical question about mira-

cles and only one.

The question of miracles is merely this. Do you

know why a pumpkin goes on being a pumpkin?

If you do not, you cannot possibly tell whether a

pumpkin could turn into a coach or couldnt.

That is all.

All the other scientific expressions you are in

the habit of using at breakfast are words and

winds.

You say It is a law of nature that pumpkinsshould remain pumpkins. That only means that

pumpkins generally do remain pumpkins, which

is obvious; it does not say why.

You say Experience is against it. That only

means, I have known many pumpkins inti-

mately and none of them turned into coaches.

You say The modern world is against it.

That means that a mob of men in London and

Birmingham, and Chicago, in a thoroughly

pumpkiny state of mind, cannot work miraclesby faith.

You say Science is against it. That means that

so long as pumpkins are pumpkins their conduct

is pumpkiny, and bears no resemblance to the

conduct of a coach. That is fairly obvious.|

But I pointed out to him that this was not an

attitude we adopt specially towards impossible

marvels, but simply the attitude we adopt

towards all unusual occurrences.

If we were certain of miracles we should not

count on them.

Things that happen very seldom we all leave out

of our calculations, whether they are miraculous

or not.

For, obviously, the mere fact that a thing

happens seldom, under odd circumstances and

with no explanation within our knowledge, is noproof that it is against natural law.

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That would apply to the Siamese twins, or to a

new comet, or to radium three years ago.

I do not expect a glass of water to be turned into

wine; but neither do I expect a glass of water to

be poisoned with prussic acid.

I do not in ordinary business relations act on the

assumption that the editor is a fairy; but neither

do I act on the assumption that he is a Russian

spy, or the lost heir of the Holy Roman Empire.

What we assume in action is not that the natural

order is unalterable,

but simply that it is much safer to bet on

uncommon incidents than on common ones.

This does not touch the credibility of anyattested tale about a Russian spy or a pumpkin

turned into a coach.

If I had seen a pumpkin turned into a Panhard

motor-car with my own eyes that would not

make me any more inclined to assume that the

same thing would happen again.

I should not invest largely in pumpkins with an

eye to the motor trade.

Cinderella got a ball dress from the fairy; but I

do not supposed that / she looked after her own

clothes any the less after it.

Orthodoxy (1909), ch. 4, The Ethicsof Elfland

We risk the remote possibility of a miracle as

we do that of a poisoned pancake or a world-de-

stroying comet.

We leave it out of account, not because it is a

miracle, and therefore an impossibility, but be-

cause it is a miracle, and therefore an exception.

|It is no argument for unalterable law (as Huxley

fancied) that we count on the ordinary course of

things.

We do not count on it; we bet on it.|

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N.B. In order to understand the radical nature of Chestertons position, it will be helpful to

review the understanding of cause and effect furnished by traditional philosophy, especi-ally as found in the teaching of Aristotle.

3. Aristotles understanding of what is irrational: That the irrational is that which is un-natural as having no order.

Cf. Aristotle,Phys., VIII. 1 (252a 10-23) (tr. R. Glen Coughlin):

[10] But indeed nothing is disordered among things which are by nature and are according

to nature. For nature is in all things a cause of order. The infinite, however, has no ratio to

the infinite, and every ratio is an order. It is no longer a work of nature for things to be

resting an infinite time, then at some time to have been moved, when there is no difference

of this [time] due to which [it has been moved] now rather than before, nor even some order[15] between these [times]. For either what is by nature is disposed simply, and not thus at

one time, otherwise at another, as fire moves up by nature, and not at one time but not at

another; or else, in the case of what is not simple, what is by nature has a ratio. Whence it is

better [to speak] as Empedocles [252a 20] [spoke], and anyone else who said things are so

disposed, [saying] that the whole rests in turn and [then] is moving again. For such a whole

already has a certain order.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas,In VIII Physic., lect. 3, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

Then when he says, But nothing is disordered, etc., he shows that this argument used by

Anaxagoras is more unsuitable than the one used by Empedocles. For it is obvious that when

something is put down as a principle, one must take what this is in accordance with the

nature of the thingthat is, that the nature of the thing be such that it agree with it. For in

this way we take as a principle that every whole is greater than its part, because this belongs

to the nature of a whole, which exceeds the amount of a part. And so Empedocles used to

say that in this way it was naturally apt to be, giving us to understand that this is to be taken

as a principle. And Anaxagoras spoke similarly, although he did not say so expressly. But it

is obvious that no natural thing, nor something of the things which belong to things bynature, can exist without order, since nature is a cause of ordering. For we observe nature in

her works to proceed in an orderly fashion from one thing to another: therefore, what does

not possess some order is not in accordance with nature, nor can it be taken as a principle.

But two infinites do not have an order to each other, since there is no proportion of one

infinite to another; but every order is a certain proportion.

Thus, then, it is clear that to rest for an infinite time and afterward to begin to move

through an infinite time without there being any difference between this time and that onaccount of which a motion resulted now more than beforenor again to assign any other

ordering between the two of which when the one is lacking, the other begins and a motion

results, as Anaxagoras heldthis is not a work of nature. The reason is that whatever exists

in nature is always disposed simplythat is, in the same wayand not at times thus, but at

other times otherwise, just as fire is always borne upward; or there is some reason why it isnot always disposed in the same way, as animals do not always grow, but sometimes they

get smaller, and this has some reason.

Thus, then, it does not appear to proceed in accordance with nature that things rest for an

infinite time and afterward begin to move, as Anaxagoras held. And so it is better that it be

said, as Empedocles said, or anyone else who held a similar opinion, that the whole universe

rests in a certain part, and moves again in another part of time, since this right away involves

some ordering: for there can be a proportion to the finite.

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But it must be borne in mind that the pronouncement of our faith is not similar to the

position of Anaxagoras. For we do not hold an infinite space of time before the world, of

which it is necessary to take a proportion to the following time: but before the world began

there was only the simple eternity of God, as has been said, which is entirely outside the

genus of time.

Cf. also Aristotle,Phys., IV. 4 (255a 9) (tr. R. Glen Coughlin):

Whence, if it is in its own power for fire to be borne up, it is clear that to be borne down isalso in its own power. It is unreasonable, however, [for them] to be moved from themselves

according to one motion alone, if in fact they move themselves.

4. Two reasons why Aristotle calls something alogos, or irrational.

One may note two general reasons why Aristotle calls something irrational. First,

because nature is in all things a cause of order; second, because the thing so called bearson something improbable that is not, simply speaking, impossible. With regard to the first,

Aristotle says:

But the infinite has no ratio (= alogos, irrational or without a reason) to the infinite, andevery ratio is an order. It is no longer a work of nature for things to be resting an infinitetime, then at some time to have been moved, when there is no difference of this [time] due to

which [it has been moved] now rather than before, nor even some order between these

[times]. For either what is by nature is disposed simply, and not thus at one time, otherwise

at another, as fire moves up by nature, and not at one time but not at another; or else, in the

case of what is not simple, what is by nature has a ratio. (Physics VIII, 1, 252a 10 ff., tr. R.

Glen Coughlin, additions in ( ) by B.A.M.)

Since nature is a cause of order, nothing disordered is natural, and hence, sinceevery ratio (logos) is an order, that which is unnatural by having no order has no ratio

(logos)that is, it is alogos or irrational. The same notion is expressed in the following

passages:

As for those who say that mathematical number is first and go on to generate one kind of

substance after another with distinct principles for each kind, they make the substance of the

universe a mere series of episodes [= unrelated parts] (for substances of one kind contribute

nothing to those of another kind, whether it exist or not [i.e. by its existence or non-

existence]) and they make many principles; but things do not wish to be governed badly.

The rule of the many is not good; let one the ruler be. (Iliad, ii. 204).1

Again, without taking it lightly, we may press this difficulty regarding all number and

mathematicals: those of them which come before contribute nothing to those which come

after; for if number did not exist, magnitudes nonetheless would exist according to those

who say that only mathematicals exist, and if these did not exist, soul and sensible bodieswould still exist. But the observed facts show that nature is not a series of episodes, like a

bad tragedy.2

1Metaphys. XII. 10 (1075b 371076a 8) (tr. H. G. Apostle; rev. B.A.M.)2Ibid., XIV. 3 (1090b 14-20) ( tr. H. G. Apostle, rev. B.A.M.)

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If one part contribute nothing to another part by its existence or non-existence, says

Aristotle, then the universe would be a series of episodes, like a bad tragedy, such a uni-verse, like that composed of successive infinite times, being alogosthat is, without

reason or irrational.

St. Thomas Aquinas explains Aristotles second reason for calling something

irrational as follows:

But it must be understood that these two arguments are probable in accordance with what

appears with respect to things moving themselves which are among us, which are sometimes

found to be moved by this motion, sometimes also to rest. And so he did not say it is

impossible, but irrational, by that manner of speaking he is accustomed to use in probable

matters. (In VIII Physic., lect. 7, n. 7)

Aristotle, by the manner of speaking he is accustomed to use in probable matters, callscertain physical theories of Empedocles and Anaxagoras irrational rather than impossible

(cf.Physics VIII, 4, 255a 9).

5. Notes.

The alogos is found where there is noproportio orratio of one thing to another, as

there is no ratio of one infinite to another; that is, where there is no comparison orrelationship of the one to the other.

To lack a reason or ratiothis constitutes the alogos.

In the phrase, without reason, what does reason mean? As meaning ratio: the

habitude or relationship of one thing to another, or that in virtue of which they admit of acomparison to one another. (St. Thomas Aquinas)

Clearly, then, a position such as Chestertons does away with nature in its entirety.

6. Primary divisions of the ways in which things come to be.

Cf. Aristotle,Phys., II. 5 (196b 10-23) (tr. R. Glen Coughlin):

138. [196b 10] First, therefore, since we see that some things always come to be in the sameway, but some do so for the most part, it is apparent that luck is called the cause of neither of

these; nor are these by luck, either what is by necessity and always, or what is for the most

part. But since there are things which [15] come to be besides these and everyone says these

are by luck, it is apparent that luck and chance are something. For we know that such things

are by luck and that what are by luck are such things.

139. Of things which come to be, some come to be for the sake of something and some donot.

140. Of the former, some [come to be] according to choice, and some not according to

choice; but both sorts are among those which are for the sake of [20] something. Whence it

is clear that, even in those which are beyond the necessary and what is for the most part,

there are some about which that for the sake of which can be present. Whatever could be

done by thought or by nature is for the sake of something.

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The correct way of understanding this happening after that in nature is well-expressed by

the following passage:

Cf. Michael A. Augros, Scrapbook 1.

[n 463] Because luck and chance are accidental causes, therefore they are not the causes

of all things, because they come after nature and reason, and what is by nature or reason is

not by luck or chance, because the cause is before the effect. The way we come to see the

existence of chance.

It is known to us through our very first experiences that there are substances in motion.

After some more experience, we see certain regularities in certain motions of certain things,

always or usually ending in something good for those things. We see that motion in general

has a cause (we always and naturally wonder why a thing moved and why it moved in the

way that it did: What makes an ocean wave wave? What causes the tides?). But we see

further that motions in a thing which happen regularly must have a per se cause, that some-

thing must be causing that motion by being what it is. Moreover, we see that regular motions

in things have a per se cause within those things. We then give a name to such causes,

nature, and, distinguishing natural motions from violent and artificial ones, we see thatnature is a cause of being moved, belonging to the thing moved as part of what it is.

Because natural things come and cease to be, and because they do not always move as

their natures incline them (e.g. men with six fingers to a hand or born without eyes), we seethey have in them a nature which is able to be other than it is. If a natural motion is one in

accord with the ability to be moved in a thing, how can there be violent motion? It would

have to be a motion in a thing for which it had no ability, which is impossible. But remem-

ber, every violent motion is natural to something, and one nature can be composed of many

natures. Hence, in burning an animal, this is violent to the animal nature, but not necessarily

to the natures of which it is composed (e.g. carbon, which is freed from its composition in

the animal by burning and comes into its own complete existence). Burning an animal is a

motion in accord with some nature in it, but obviously violent to its complete animal nature.

Cf. also Alfred J. Freddoso, Outline of the Treatise on Happiness:

1,2: Acting for an end is not peculiar to human beings, since all substances are agents,

rational or non-rational, that act for an end. (This is a fundamental thesis that St. Thomas

takes over from Aristotle and that he would not relinquish even if he were around today.) If

an agent were not ordered toward some determinate effect, it wouldnt do this rather than

that. What is peculiar to voluntary actions is that this ordering is accomplished through a

rationalappetite rather than through naturalappetiteso that rational agents qua rational

move themselves toward deliberated ends, whereas non-rational agents are moved byanother toward either an apprehended but undeliberated end (brute animals) or a non-

apprehended end (agents that lack cognition).

7. On things by nature and by other causes.

Cf. Aristotle,Phys., I. 1 (198b832) (tr. R. Glen Coughlin):

[192b 8] 92-93. Of things which are, some are by nature and some through other causes. The

animals and their parts and the plant and the simple bodies, such as [10] earth, fire, air, and

water, are by nature. For we say these and such things are by nature. But all these things

appear to differ from things not constituted by [15] nature. For each of these has in itself a

principle of motion and standing, some according to place, some according to growth and

diminution, and some according to alteration.

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A bed and a cloak, however, and anything else of this kind, insofar as they are subject to

each predicated [mentioned] and to the degree that they are from art, do not have any inborn

impulse for change [20] at all. But insofar as they happen to be rock or earth or a mixture of

these, the do have one, and just to that extent, (93) as though nature is some principle and

cause of moving and of resting in that in which it is, primarily, in virtue of itself, and not

accidentally.

8. An argument showing that things have natures: That like begets like.

Cf.Herbals: Their Origin and Evolution: A Chapter in the History of Botany 1470-1670,

by Agnes Arber, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1912:

2. ARISTOTELIAN BOTANY.

Aristotle, Platos pupil, concerned himself with the whole field of science, and his influ-

ence, especially during the Middle Ages, had a most profound effect on European thought.

The greater part of his botanical writings, which belong to the fourth century before Christ,

are unfortunately lost, but, from such fragments as remain, it is clear that his interest in

plants was of an abstract nature. He held that all living bodies, those of plants as well as of

animals, are organs of the soul, through which they exist. It was broad, general speculations,

such as these, which chiefly attracted him. He asks why a grain of corn gives rise in its turn

to a grain of corn and not to an olive, thus raising a plexus of problems, which, despite the

progress of modern science, still baffle the acutest thinkers of the present day.

Cf. Aristotle,Phys. II, 4, 196a 31-32, tr. H. G. Apostle):

(for it is not any chance thing that is generated from a given seed, but an olive tree from

this kind and a man from that kind).

9. The three ways in which things happen.

Cf. Aristotle Metaphys., XI. 8 (1064b 361065a 2) (tr. W. D. Ross):

We say that everything either is always and of necessity (necessity not in the sense of vio-

lence, but that which we appeal to in demonstrations), or is for the most part, or is neither forthe most part, nor always and of necessity, but merely as it chances; e.g. there might be cold

in the dogdays, but this occurs [1065a] neither always and of necessity, nor for the most part,

though it might happen sometimes. The accidental, then, is what occurs, but not always nor

of necessity, nor for the most part.

10. The three ways in which the causes of future things are disposed.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 95, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

I reply that it must be said that in the name of divination is understood a certainforetelling of things that are to come [orfuture things].

But future things can be foreknown in two ways: in one way in their causes; in another

way in themselves. Now the causes of future things are disposed in three ways. For certain

ones produce their effects by necessity and always. And future effects of this sort can be

foreknown and foretold with certitude by a consideration of their causes, just as astronomers

foretell future eclipses.

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But certain causes produce their effects not of necessity and always, but for the most part,

yet they rarely fail. And by causes of this sort future effects can be foreknown not indeed

with certitude, but by a certain conjecture, just as astronomers by a certain consideration of

the stars can foreknow and foretell about rains and dry spells, and doctors about health and

death.

But there are some causes which, if they be considered in themselves, are disposed indif-

ferently, which is chiefly observed in rational powers which are disposed to opposites,

according to the Philosopher (Meta. viii, 2, 5, 8). And such effects, as well as those effects

which occur from natural causes for the least part by chance, cannot be foreknown by aconsideration of causes since their causes do not have a determinate inclination to effects of

this sort. And so effects of this sort cannot be foreknown unless they be considered inthemselves. But effects of this sort can be considered in themselves only while they are

present, just as when a man sees Socrates run or walk. But to consider such things in them-

selves before they take place is proper to God, who alone in eternity sees those things which

are to come as though they were present, as has been determined in the first part (I, 14, 13; I,57, 3; I, 86, 4), and so it is said (Is. 41:23): Show the things that are to come hereafter, and

we shall know that ye are gods.

Cf. The Catholic Encyclopedia, Divination:

To put the question directly: can man know future events? Let St. Thomas answer insubstance: Future things can be known eitherin their causes orin themselves.

Some causes always and necessarily produce their effects, and these effects can be

foretold with certainty, as astronomers announce eclipses.

Other causes bring forth their effects not always and necessarily, but they generally do

so, and these can be foretold as well-founded conjectures or sound inferences, like a

physicians diagnosis or a weather observers prediction about rain.

Finally there is a third class of causes whose effects depend upon what we call chance

or upon mans free will, and these cannot be foretold from their causes. We can only see

them in themselves when they are actually present to our eyes. Only God alone, to whom all

things are present in His eternity, can see them before they occur. Hence we read in Isaias

(41:23), Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that you are gods.

Spirits can know better than men the effects to come from the second class of causes

because their knowledge is broader, deeper, and more universal, and many occult powers of

nature are known to them. Consequently they can foretell more events and more precisely,

just as a physician who sees the causes clearer can better prognosticate about the restoration

of health. The difference, in fact, between the first and second classes of causes is due to the

limitations of our knowledge. The multiplicity and complexity of causes prevent us from

following their effects.Future contingent things, the effects of the third class, spirits cannot know for certain,

except God reveal them, though they may wisely conjecture about them because of their

wide knowledge of human nature, their long experience, and their judgments based upon our

thoughts as revealed to them by our words, countenances, or acts.

In sum, there are causes which produce their effects:

(1) of necessity and always, and so such effects can be foretold with certainty(2) not of necessity and always but for the most part, and so such effects can be foretold as

well-founded conjectures or sound inferences

(3) neither of necessity and always or for the most part but by free will or by chance and

for the least part, and so such effects cannot be foretold from their causes

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11. Alternatives pertaining to the ways in which things happen.

things may come to be by nature or not by nature

things may come to be for the sake of something or not for the sake of something

things may come to be by nature or by thought (or mind)

things may come to be by nature or by chance or luck

things may come to be according to nature or contrary to nature

of things coming to be for the sake of something, some may come to be according to

choice or not

of things coming to be for the sake of something, some may be done by thought, some by

nature

we must be careful to distinguish what has happened from:

what is happening now (in Aristotles two senses of now)

what will happen in the future, andwhat might have happened but didnt

what has happened: in 1948 Harry S. Truman was elected President of the United States

what is happening now: George W. Bush is Presidentwhat will happen in the future: someone now living will be elected President after Bush

what might have happened but didnt: Thomas Dewey being elected President in 1948

As Aristotle makes clear in thePoetics, a sequence or a case of one thing following

another is reasonable when this happens because of that, not merely after thatthat is,

when an action, being possible, consists of this happening after that in accordance withnecessity or probability (cf. Poet. ch. 9). Moreover, as I have shown elsewhere (cf. my

paper On the Four Things Producing an Effect of Wonder According to Aristotle [Papers

In Poetics 2]), what is represented as happening is either rational or explicable or irrationalor inexplicable: it is rational or explicable if the antecedent is possible and the consequent

follows necessarily or with likelihood; it is irrational or inexplicable (a) if the antecedent is

possible, but the consequent does not follow necessarily or with likelihood, or (b) if the

antecedent is possible but unlikely and the consequent follows, but does so unexpectedly,or (c) if the antecedent is impossible but likely, and the consequent follows as if the ante-

cedent were true; the irrational or inexplicable being what is unnatural as having no order,

such that one part by its existence or non-existence has no bearing on another part.

11. Philosophical roots of the irrationalist view.

Cf. Robert R. Reilly, The Pope and the Prophet (Crisis Magazine Oct 8 2009):1

1 (http://www.crisismagazine.com/2009/the-pope-and-the-prophet [10/10/2009])

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The victorious view developed a theological basis for the primacy of power by claiming

that the revelation of Mohammed emphasizes most particularly one attribute of GodHis

omnipotence. Although all monotheistic religions hold that, in order to be one, God must be

omnipotent, this argument reduced God to His omnipotence by concentrating exclusively on

His unlimited power, as against His reason. Gods reasons are unknowable by man. God is

not shackled by reason; He rules as He pleases. He is pure will. There is no rational order

invested in the universe upon which one can rely, only the second-to-second manifestation

of Gods will.

God is so powerful that every instant is the equivalent of a miracle. Nothing inter-venes or has an independent or even semi-autonomous existence. In philosophical lan-

guage, this view holds that God is the primary cause of everything, and there are no

secondary causes. Therefore, what may seem to be natural laws, such as the laws of

physics, gravity, etc., are really nothing more than Gods customs, which He is at com-

plete liberty to break or change at any moment. As Benedict points out, this is called

volunteerism.

The consequences of this view are momentous. If creation exists simply as a succession of

miraculous moments, it cannot be apprehended by reason. Other religions, including Chris-

tianity, recognize miracles. But they recognize them precisely as temporary and extra-

ordinary suspensions of the natural law. In fact, that is what defines them as miracles. One

admits to the possibility of a miracle only after discounting every possible explanation of its

occurrence by natural causes. In this school of Islamic thought, there are no natural causes todiscount. As a result, reality becomes incomprehensible. If unlimited will is the exclusive

constituent of reality, there is really nothing left to reason about, and the uncreated Quran is

not open to interpretation.

The earlytenth-century thinker Abu al-Hasan al-Ashari elaborated a metaphysics for the

anti-rational view by using early Greek atomistic philosophy to assert that reality is com-

posed of atoms. The configuration of these atoms at any given moment makes things what

they are. In Islam in the World, British analyst Malise Ruthven explains: The Asharis ra-

tionalised Gods omnipotence within an atomistic theory of creation, according to which theworld was made up of the discrete points in space and time whose only connection was the

will of God, which created them anew at every moment.

For example, there is a collection of atoms that is a plant. Does the plant remain a plant

because it has the nature of a plant, or because Allah wishes it to be a plant from thismoment to the next? The Asharites said it is only a plant for the moment. For the plant to

remain a plant depends on the will of Allah, and if you say it has to remain a plant because it

has the nature of plant, this isshirkblasphemy.

The catastrophic result of this view is the denial of the relationship between cause and

effect. In The Incoherence of the Philosophers, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (10581111), perhaps

the single most influential Muslim thinker after Mohammed, vehemently rejected Greek

thought: The source of their infidelity was their hearing terrible names such as Socrates and

Hippocrates, Plato and Aristotle. Al-Ghazali insisted that God is not bound by any

order, and that there is, therefore, no natural sequence of cause and effect, as in fire

burning cotton or, more colorfully, as in the purging of the bowels and the using of a

purgative. Things do not act according to their own natures but only according to

Gods will at the moment. There are only juxtapositions of discrete events that make itappear that the fire is burning the cotton, but God could just as well do otherwise. (This

doctrine is known as occasionalism.) In other words, there is no continuous narrative of

cause and effect tying these moments together in a comprehensible way. In attacking the

Mutazilites, the Asharites, in the words of Mohammed Khair, wished to free Gods saving

power from the shackles of causality. (emphasis added)

Cf. R. Glen Coughlin, Some Considerations on Aristotelian Place and Newtonian Space,The Aquinas Review (Vol. 1, No. 1, 1994):

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Causes also fall away. If there is no imaginative component to causality, as Hume shows

there is not, we must bid it good-bye. If we are to consider things mathematically and

formally, we cannot consider the passivity of an object as such, and so we cannot consider

new effects as being the actualizations of previously dormant potencies. Since causes are

causes only in relation to effects, we can no longer consider causes as producing. We

can only know of a miraculous constant conjunction and succession in time. (emphasis

added)

Cf. David Hume,A Treatise on Human Nature (1739-40), vol. I, part 1:

Moral philosophy, or the study of human nature, may be treated in two ways. The simple,

popular, philosophy of Man born for action, taste and sentiment; which by appeal to

feelings, moulds the heart. Or the Abstruse philosophy of reasoning and speculation-

unpopular & tricky but able to diffuse through to the lawyer, soldier and politician. All our

Ideas come from sensory Impressions (well, perhaps except the missing shade of blue). You

cant dispute this give me an idea which hasnt come from an impression? The Idea of a

golden mountain comes from impressions of gold and mountain and of God from

extensions of ourselves. We associate ideas because of their Resemblance (we see a painting,think of the original), their Contiguity (closeness in time/place) or their perceived cause-and-

effect (think of a wound we cannot avoid thinking of pain). But there is a distinction

between relations of ideas and matters of fact Adam wouldnt have known that waterdrowns. Stones might go up, or billiard-balls not rebound. We believe things when we hold avivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady, more intense conception, which may not sound very

philosophical but we agree about the thing. Resemblance livens ideas powerfully, as with

the Catholic mummeries. We assume one thing is caused by another just by the habitual

assumption that things are often found together it is not a reliable assumption. My sceptical

friend argues that religion has no part in politics, and therefore the two ought not to be

mixed. He misses the point that people do mix the two, no amount of ought is equal to is.

Animals as well as men learn from experience, as when the dog fears the whip. Our Laws

are based on punishment that same effect will have same cause. But Cause is mere

constant conjunction, we never really discover anything but one event following another.

There is no such thing as chance in the world, yet nothing is more free than the imagi-

nation of man. There are always causes, even if the Power behind them is hidden fromus, as with medicines or clouds. Miracles shouldnt be believed, unless it would be even

more miraculous not to believe. All religions with miracles say that miracles prove other

religions wrong (which is impossible). If God knows all, then he is the author of all cri-minality. There need be no fear that philosophy should undermine our reasonings in

common life, but we can be sceptical as to moral or religious results. (emphasis added)

Cf. David Hume,An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sec. X. Of Miracles:

It being a general maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connection together,

and that all the inferences, which we can draw from one to another, are founded

merely on our experience of their constant and regular conjunction; it is evident that we

ought not to make an exception to this maxim in favor of human testimony.... This species ofreasoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. I shall

not dispute about a word. (emphasis added)

Cf. Mortimer J. Adler, The Great Ideas: A Syntopicon of Great Books of the Western

World(Chicago, 1952), Vol. I, Chapter 39, Induction (Introduction), pp. 810-811:

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Hume offers two reasons for the inconclusiveness and uncertainty which he thinks qualify

all our generalizations or inductions from experience. The first calls attention to the fact that,

unlike mathematical reasoning, inferences from experience in the realm of physical matters

depend on the number of cases observed. The conclusions which [reason] draws from

considering one circle, he says, are the same it would form upon surveying all the circles in

the universe. But no man, having seen only one body move, after being impelled by another,

could infer that every other body will move after a like impulse.

The principle which determines him to form such a conclusion is, according to Hume,

Custom or Habit; and precisely because inductive generalization is an effect of customrather than of reasoning in the strict sense, the strength of the induction or the force of

custom varies with the number of cases from which it arises. After the constant conjunction

of two objects heat and flame, for instance, weight and soliditywe are determined by cus-

tom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other. This hypothesis, Hume main-

tains, seems . . . the only one which explains the difficulty, why we draw, from a thousand

instances, an inference which we are not able to draw from one instance, that is in no respect

different from them. Reason is incapable of any such variation.

Since all the relevant cases can never be exhaustively observed, the inference from a customary

conjunction must always remain uncertain, no matter how high a probability it derives from the

multiplication of like instances. To this first point, concerning the dependence of the probability of

generalizations from experience upon the frequency of the observed instances, Hume adds a second

point about the similarity of the cases under obser- [810-811] vation. Analogy, he says, leads us toexpect from any cause the same events, which we have observed to result from similar causes.

Where the causes are entirely similar, the analogy is perfect, and the inference drawn from it is

regarded as certain and conclusive. . . . But where the objects have not so exact a similarity, the

analogy is less perfect, and the inference is less conclusive; though still it has some force, in

proportion to the degree of similarity and resemblance. The absence of perfect similarity is

Humes second reason for the inconclusiveness or uncertainty of inductive generalizations.

The contrary supposition that one case can be perfectly representative of an infinite number of

similar cases may explain why Aristotle seems to think that induction is able to produce theprimary truths or principles of science with a certitude which gives certainty to all the demon-

strations founded on these axioms. Another explanation of Aristotles view may be found in his

distinction between scientific and dialectical induction. He regards the former as based on the kind

of common experience which, unlike even the best experiment, admits of no exceptions. In con-trast, dialectical induction, or the still weaker form of induction which he calls rhetorical, is

based on an enumeration of cases (which may not be complete) or upon a single example (which

provides no safeguard against possible exceptions).

In its dialectical form, the inductive argument proceeds from a number of particulars taken for

granted. Aristotle offers this example of dialectical induction: Supposing the skilled pilot is the

most effective, and likewise the skilled charioteer, then, in general, the skilled man is the best at his

particular task. In its rhetorical form, no more than a single example may be used, as when the

orator generalizes that honesty is the best policy from the story of a particular individual who was

finally rewarded for his virtue.

In both forms, the inductive generalization is at best probable; and it is more or less probable

according to the soundness of the suppositions or the examples from which it originates to be tested

only by extending the enumeration of particulars. But if an induction is merely probable in the firstplace, it can only be made more probable, it can never be made certain, by multiplying cases or by

increasing their variety.Aristotles theory of dialectical induction thus seems to have a bearing on the probability of

induction from limited experiments (or from a single experiment whose perfection is not assured)

and of induction from the frequency or variety of observed instances. The other point to be noted is

that Bacons basic rule of gradual ascent from particular cases through less general to more generalpropositions seems to be relevant to dialectical induction, but not, on Aristotles view, to that kind

of induction which produces the axioms or principles of science. (emphasis added)

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Cf. C. S. Lewis, Miracles: A Preliminary Study (New York: Macmillan Publishing Com-

pany, 1978, 1st ed. 1947), pp. 55-56:

Three conceptions of the Laws of Nature have been held.

(1) That they are mere brute facts, known only by observation, with no discoverable rhyme

or reason about them. We know thatNature behaves thus and thus; we do not know why she

does and can see no reason why she should not do the opposite.

(2) That they are applications of the law of averages. The foundations of Nature are in the

random and lawless. But the number of units we are [55-56] dealing with are so enormous

that the behaviour of these crowds (like the behaviour of very large masses of men) can be

calculated with practical accuracy. What we call impossible events are events so over-

whelmingly improbableby actuarial standardsthat we do not need to take them into

account.

(3) That the fundamental laws of Physics are really what we call necessary truths like the

truths of mathematicsin other words, that if we clearly understand what we are saying weshall see that the opposite would be meaningless nonsense.

It will at once be clear that the first of these three theories gives no assurance against

Miraclesindeed no assurance that, even apart from Miracles, the laws which we have

hitherto observed will be obeyed to-morrow. If we have no idea why a thing happens, then

of course we know no reason why it should be otherwise.

12. C. S. Lewis on miracles: The answer to Chesterton:

Cf. Miracles from God in the Dock by C. S. Lewis, editor Walter Hooper, (GrandRapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1970) pp. 25-35:

Nothing is wonderful except the abnormal and nothing is abnormal until we have

grasped the norm. Complete ignorance of the laws of Nature would preclude the

perception of the miraculous just as rigidly as complete disbelief in the supernatural

precludes it, perhaps even more so. For while the materialist would have at least to explain

miracles away, the man wholly ignorant of Nature would simply not notice them.

The experience of a miracle in fact requires two conditions. First we must believe in a

normal stability of nature, which means we must recognize that the data offered by our

senses recur in regular patterns. Secondly, we must believe in some reality beyond

Nature. When both beliefs are held, and not till then, we can approach with an open mind the

various reports which claim that this super- or extra-natural reality has sometimes invaded

and disturbed the sensuous content of space and time which makes our natural world.

The belief in such a supernatural reality itself can neither be proved nor disproved by ex-

perience. The arguments for its existence are metaphysical, and to me conclusive. They turn

on the fact that even to think and act in the natural world we have to assume something

beyond it and even assume that we partly belong to that something.

In order to think we must claim for our own reasoning a validity which is not credible if

our own thought is merely a function of our brain, and our brains a by-product of irrational

physical processes. In order to act above the level of mere impulse we must claim a similarvalidity for our judgments of good and evil. In both cases we get the same disquieting result.

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The concept of nature itself is one we have reached only tacitly by claiming a sort of super-

natural status for ourselves.

If we frankly accept this position and then turn to the evidence we find, of course, that

accounts of the supernatural meet us on every side. History is full of them, often in the same

documents which we accept wherever they do not report miracles. Respectable missionaries

report them not infrequently. The whole Church of Rome claims their continued occurrence.

Intimate conversation elicits from almost every acquaintance at least one episode in his life

which is what he would call queer or rum.

No doubt most stories of miracles are unreliable; but then, as anyone can see by readingthe papers, so are most stories of all events. Each story must be taken on its merits. What one

must not do is to rule out the supernatural as the one impossible explanation. Thus you maydisbelieve in the Mons Angels [Lewis is referring to the story that angels appeared,

protecting British troops in their retreat from Mons, France, on the 26th August 1914, ed.]

because you cannot find a sufficient number of sensible people who say they saw them. But

if you found a sufficient number, it would, in my view, be unreasonable to explain this bycollective hallucination.

For we know enough of psychology to know that spontaneous unanimity in hallucination

is very improbable, and we do not know enough of the supernatural to know that a

manifestation of angels is equally improbable. The supernatural theory is the less improbable

of the two.

When the Old Testament says that Sennacheribs invasion was stopped by angels (2 Kings19.35), and Herodotus says it was stopped by a lot of mice who came and ate up all the

bowstrings of his army (Herodotus, Bk. 2, Sec. 14), an open-minded man will be on the side

of the angels. Unless you start by begging the question, there is nothing intrinsically unlikely

in the existence of angels or in the action ascribed to them. But mice just dont do these

things.

A great deal of skepticism now current about the miracles of our Lord does not, however,

come from disbelief of all reality beyond nature. It comes from two ideas which are

respectable but I think mistaken. In the first place, modern people have an almost aestheticdislike of miracles. Admitting that God can, they doubt if He would. To violate the laws He

Himself has imposed on His creation seems to them arbitrary, clumsy, a theatrical

device only fit to impress savages a solecism against the grammar of the universe. In

the second place, many people confuse the laws of nature with the laws of thought andimagine that their reversal or suspension would be a contradiction in terms as if the

resurrection of the dead were the same sort of thing as two and two making five.1

I have only recently found the answer to the first objection. I found it first in George

MacDonald and then later in St. Athanasius. This is what St. Athanasius says in his little

bookOn the Incarnation: Our Lord took a body like to ours and lived as a man in order that

those who had refused to recognize Him in His superintendence and captaincy of the whole

universe might come to recognize from the works He did here below in the body that what

dwelled in this body was the Word of God. This accords exactly with Christs own account

of His miracles: The Son can do nothing of Himself, but what He seeth the Father do. (Jn

5.19)

The doctrine, as I understand it, is something like this: There is an activity of God dis-

played throughout creation, a wholesale activity let us say which men refuse to recognize.The miracles done by God incarnate, living as a man in Palestine, perform the very same

things as this wholesale activity, but at a different speed and on a smaller scale.One of their chief purposes is that men, having seen a thing done by personal power on the

small scale, may recognize, when they see the same thing done on the large scale, that the

power behind it is also personal is indeed the very same person who lived among us 2000

years ago.

1N.B. Here Lewis puts his finger on the nub of Chestertons position.

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The miracles in fact are a retelling in small letters of the very same story which is written

across the whole world in letters too large for some of us to see. Of that larger script part is

already visible, part is still unsolved. In other words, some of the miracles do locally what

God has already done universally: others do locally what He has not yet done, but will do. In

that sense, and from our human point of view, some are reminders and others prophecies.

God creates the vine and teaches it to draw up water by its roots and, with the aid of the

sun, to turn that water into a juice which will ferment and take on certain qualities. Thus

every year, from Noahs time till ours, God turns water into wine. That, men fail to see.

Either like the Pagans they refer the process to some finite spirit, Bacchus or Dionysus: orelse, like the moderns, they attribute real and ultimate causality to the chemical and other

material phenomena which are all that our senses can discover in it.But when Christ at Cana makes water into wine, the mask is off. (Jn 2.1-11) The miracle

has only half its effect if it only convinces us that Christ is God: it will have its full effect if

whenever we see a vineyard or drink a glass of wine we remember that here works He who

sat at the wedding party in Cana.Every year God makes a little corn into much corn: the seed is sown and there is an

increase, and men, according to the fashion of their age, say It is Ceres, it is Adonis, it is the

Corn-King, or else It is the laws of Nature. The close-up, the translation, of this annual

wonder is the feeding of the 5000. (Mat 14.15-21) Bread is not made there of nothing. Bread

is not made of stones, as the Devil once suggested to Our Lord in vain (Matt 4.3). A little

bread is made into much bread. The Son will do nothing but what he sees the Father do.There is, so to speak, a family style.

The miracles of healing fall into the same pattern. This is sometimes obscured for us by the

somewhat magical view we tend to take of ordinary medicine. The doctors themselves do

not take this view. The magic is not in the medicine but in the patients body. What the

doctor does is to stimulate Natures functions in the body, or to remove hindrances. In a

sense, though we speak for convenience of healing a cut, every cut heals itself; no dressing

will make skin grow over a cut on a corpse.

That same mysterious energy which we call gravitational when it steers the planets andbiochemical when it heals a body is the efficient cause of all recoveries, and if God exists,

that energy, directly or indirectly, is His. All who are cured are cured by Him, the healer

within. But once He did it visibly, a Man meeting a man. Where He does not work within in

this mode, the organism dies.Hence Christs one miracle of destruction is also in harmony with Gods wholesale ac-

tivity. His bodily hand, held out in symbolic wrath, blasted a single fig tree (Matt 21.19); but

no tree died that year in Palestine, or any year, or in any land, or even ever will, save because

He has done something, or (more likely) ceased to do something, to it.

When He fed the thousands he multiplied fish as well as bread. Look in every bay and

almost every river. This swarming, pulsating fecundity shows He is still at work. The

ancients had a god called Genius the god of animal and human fertility, the presiding spirit

of gynecology, embryology, or the marriage bed the genial bed as they called it after its

god Genius. As the miracles of wine and bread and healing showed who Bacchus really was,

who Ceres, who Apollo, and that all were one, so this miraculous multiplication of fish

reveals the real Genius.

And with that we stand at the threshold of the miracle which for some reason most offendsmodern ears. I can understand the man who denies the miraculous altogether; but what is one

to make of the people who admit some miracles but deny the Virgin Birth? Is it that for alltheir lip service to the laws of Nature there is only one law of Nature that they really

believe? Or is it that they see in this miracle a slur upon sexual intercourse which is rapidly

becoming the one thing venerated in a world without veneration?

No miracle is in fact more significant. What happens in ordinary generation? What is afathers function in the act of begetting? A microscopic particle of matter from his body

fertilizes the female: and with that microscopic particle passes, it may be, the colour of his

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hair and his great grandfathers hanging lip, and the human form in all its complexity of

bones, liver, sinews, heart, and limbs, and pre-human form which the embryo will recap-

itulate in the womb. Behind every spermatozoon lies the whole history of the universe:

locked within it is no small part of the worlds future.

That is Gods normal way of making a man a process that takes centuries, beginning

with the creation of matter itself, and narrowing to one second and one particle at the

moment of begetting. And once again men will mistake the sense impressions which this

creative act throws off for the act itself or else refer it to some infinite being such as Genius.

Once, therefore, God does it directly, instantaneously; without a spermatozoon, without themillenniums of organic history behind the spermatozoon. There was of course another

reason. This time He was creating not simply a man, but the man who was to be Himself: theonly true Man. The process which leads to the spermatozoon has carried down with it

through the centuries much undesirable silt; the life which reaches us by that normal route is

tainted. To avoid that taint, to give humanity a fresh start, He once short-circuited the pro-

cess.There is a vulgar anti-God paper which some anonymous donor sends me every week. In it

recently I saw the taunt that we Christians believe in a God who committed adultery with the

wife of a Jewish carpenter. The answer to that is that if you describe the action of God in

fertilizing Mary as adultery then, in that sense, God would have committed adultery with

every woman who ever had a baby.

For what He did once without a human father, He does always even when He uses ahuman father as His instrument. For the human father in ordinary generation is only a

carrier, sometimes an unwilling carrier, always the last in a long line of carriers, of life that

comes from the supreme life. Thus the filth that our poor, muddled, sincere, resentful

enemies fling at the Holy One, either does not stick, or, sticking, turns into glory.

So much for the miracles which do small and quick what we have already seen in the large

letters of Gods universal activity. But before I go on to the second class, those which

foreshadow parts of the universal activity we have not yet seen, I must guard against a

misunderstanding. Do not imagine I am trying to make the miracle less miraculous. I am notarguing that they are more probable because they are less unlike natural events: I am trying

to answer those who think them arbitrary, theatrical, unworthy of God, meaningless

interruptions of universal order. They remain in my view wholly miraculous. To do instantly

with dead and baked corn what ordinarily happens slowly with live seed is just as great amiracle as to make bread of stones. Just as great, but a different kind of miracle. That is the

point.

When I open Ovid or Grimm I find the sort of miracles which really would be arbi-

trary. Trees talk, houses turn into trees, magic rings raise tables richly spread with

food in lonely places, ships become goddesses, and men are changed into snakes or

birds or bears. It is fun to read about: the least suspicion that it had really happened

would turn that fun into nightmare.

You find no miracles of that kind in the Gospels. Such things, if they could be, would

prove that some alien power was invading Nature; they would not in the least prove that it

was the same power which had made Nature and rules her every day. But the true miracles

express not simply a god, but God: that which is outside Nature, not as a foreigner, but as her

Sovereign. They announce not merely that a King has visited our town, but that it is theKing, our King.

The second class of miracles, on this view, foretell what God has not yet done, but will do,universally. He raised one man (the man who was Himself) from the dead because He will

one day raise all men from the dead. Perhaps not only men, for there are hints in the New

Testament that all creation will eventually be rescued from decay, restored to shape and

subserve the splendour of re-made humanity (see Rom 8.22). The Transfiguration (Matt16.1-9) and the walking on the water (Matt 14.26) are glimpses of the beauty and the

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effortless power over all matter which will belong to men when they are really waked by

God.

Now resurrection certainly involves reversal of natural process in the sense that it

involves a series of changes moving in the opposite direction to those we see. At death,

matter which has been organic, falls back gradually into the inorganic, to be finally scattered

and used perhaps in other organisms. Resurrection would be the reverse process. It would

not of course mean the restoration to each personality of those very atoms, numerically the

same, which had made its first or natural body. There would not be enough to go round, for

one thing; and for another, the unity of the body even in this life was consistent with a slowbut perplexed change of its actual ingredients.

But it certainly does mean matter of some kind rushing towards organism as now we see itrushing away. It means, in fact, playing backwards a film we have already seen played

forwards. In that sense it is a reversal of Nature. But, of course, it is a further question

whether reversal in this sense is necessarily contradiction. Do we know that the film cannot

be played backwards?Well, in one sense, it is precisely the teaching of modern physics that the film never works

backwards. For modern physics, as you have heard before, the universe is running down.

Disorganization and chance is continually increasing. There will come a time, not infinitely

remote, when it will be wholly run down or wholly disorganized, and science knows of no

possible return from that state.

There must have been a time, not infinitely remote, in the past when it was wound up,though science knows of no winding-up process. The point is that for our ancestors the

universe was a picture: for modern physics it is a story. If the universe is a picture these

things either appear in that picture or not; and if they dont, since it is an infinite picture, one

may suspect that they are contrary to the nature of things.

But a story is a different matter; specially if it is an incomplete story. And the story told by

modern physics might be told briefly in the words Humpty Dumpty was falling. That is, it

proclaims itself an incomplete story. There must have been a time before he fell, when he

was sitting on the wall; there must be a time after he had reached the ground. It is quite truethat science knows of no horses and men who can put him together again once he has

reached the ground and broken. But then she also knows of no means by which he could

originally have been put on the wall. You wouldnt expect her to. All science rests on ob-

servation: all our observations are taken during Humpty Dumptys fall, because we wereborn after he lost his seat on the wall and shall be extinct long b

quaestiones disputatae de pumpkinitate: g. k. chesterton on the rationality of this happening after...

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