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R v GlennonLegislation:

s. 568(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vict.):

"The Full Court on any such appeal against conviction shall allow the appeal if it thinks ... that

on any ground there was a miscarriage of justice ..."

Cases:

Jago v. D istrict Court (1989) 168C.L.R.:'a permanent stay should be ordered only in an extreme case'

R. v. Lee (12) and Reg. v. Benz:Special leave to appeal should be granted to the Crown only in very exceptional circumstances

R. v. Weaver:"The verdict of acquittal entered by the Supreme Court as a Court of Criminal Appealdiffers

greatly in substance from an original verdict of a jurywho have acquitted. The jury's verdict of

not guilty has a special constitutional finality and sanctity which are always regarded as an

essential feature of British criminal jurisprudence."

Hinch v. Attorney-General (Viet.) (1987),164 C.L.R. 15.extremely prejudicial and improper and unfair considerations to put before witnesses and

potential jurors.

"the very real possibility that the publications would adversely interfere with the due

administration of justice"

Tuckiar v. The King:accused's conviction being quashed and a verdict of acquittal then entered on account of the

potential prejudicial effect of pretrial publicity

Barton v. The Queen:"To justify a permanent stay of criminal proceeding, there must be a fundamental defect which

goes to the root of the trial 'of such a nature that nothing that a trial judge can do in the conduct

of the trial can relieve against its unfair consequences

Reg. v. Murdoch(1987) 37 A. Crim. R. 118, at p. 126.:"There must be a sound basis made out on a prima facie footing to anticipate the probability

[of] prejudice on the part of an individual juror."

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Murphy v. The Queen:misleading to think that, because a juror has heard something of the circumstances giving rise

to the trial, the accused has lost the opportunity of an indifferent jury

Reg. v. Thomson N ewspapers Ltd, [1968] 1 W.L.R. I; [1968] 1 AllE.R. 268 and Reg. v. Malik, [1968]1 W.L.R. 353; [196811 All E.R. 582.:

Appeals against conviction on the ground of an unfair trial have failed despite a prior finding of

contempt arising from pre-trial publication (35). These decisions have been criticized on the

ground of inconsistency.

Reg. v. Hubbert:Prior information about a case, and even the holding of a tentative opinion about it, doesnot

make partial a juror sworn to render a true verdict according to the evidence.'

Munday v. The Queen (1989) 167 C.L.R:"'...it is relevant to note that.the system of jury trial is geared to enable juries to be assisted in

every possible way to 'put out of mind statements made outside the court, whether in the media

or elsewhere. There is every reason to have confidence in the capacity of juries to do this.

Judges do not have a monopoly on the ability to adjudicate fairly and impartially.

Other:

McGarvie J acknowledged:

"[t]here is not an absolute insistence by the law that a jury have no knowledge of a prior

conviction of an accused on trial"

Toohey J and Mason J:

That time span made a vital difference, particularly in relation to something as ephemeral or

transient as radio broadcasts

Mason C.J. held: the boundary to be crossed when the publication created a substantial risk of

serious interference with a fair trial (45).

Wilson J. adopted the formulation of a real and definite tendency

to prejudice or embarrass pending proceedings (46);

a similar formulation was adopted by Deane J. (47) and by Toohey J. (48).

Gaudron J. held that, to constitute contempt, there must be proof beyond reasonable doubt

that the impugned conduct "poses a real risk to the administration of justice" though the court

must decide as a matter of law whether any competing public interest "outweighs the degree of

risk established" (49)