Part I
Between the IX and XII century C.E. a comparative examination of the Islamic world
and central Europe would have revealed a Muslim Golden Age with enormous achievements in
philosophy, science, technology and culture contrasted with a relatively backward Europe which
was largely indebted to Islam for supplying it with the most important documents of its own
Greco-Roman heritage. However, because of this Greco-Roman heritage, Europe began to
advance until by the end of the XVII century C.E. it had successfully defeated the last Muslim
attempts to conquer Europe at Vienna in 1683 C.E. In addition, two movements – the
Enlightenment and its concomitant, the Industrial Revolution – have their roots in this time
which marked the beginning of the dominance of Europe over the Islamic world. That led to two
challenges. The first was to recognize and admit that a decline had taken place, to admit that
A universal consensus has evolved, however, to the effect that Islamic civilization has
been in decline since the seventeenth century and that the community of the world of
Islam – the huge hemispheric ‘Islamicate’* space – has been under serious assault both
from within and from without.”2
Abu Ismail al-Beirawi sums up the situation succinctly, saying, “Today, the Muslim Ummah is
living in decline, whether in the area of economics, politics, social order, government, morals
etc.”3
It comes as no surprise to find that this situation has sparked serious responses to remedy
what many find is an unacceptable state of affairs. Two questions naturally arise: “How do we
1 1 With thanks to Sam Bhattacharjee for help with some of the research.
2 Ali S. Allawi,The Crisis of Islamic Civilization, p.23. *Allawi notes that the term “Islamicate’ space was invented by Marshall Hodgson. 3 Abu Ismael al-Beirawi, “Ijtihad and the Application of Islam in the 21st Century” in Future Islam, http://www.futureislam.com/20060111/insight/abu_ismael/Ijtihad_the_Application_of_Is lam_in_the_21st_Century.asp
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regain the greatness of our civilization? How do we resuscitate our tradition?”4 The answers to
these questions determine two different approaches to the challenge facing the Islamic world –
Revivalism and Modernization. One way to “regain the greatness of our civilization” to purify a
civilization of foreign influences and all sorts of deviancies that have accrued over time in the
hopes that purity will lead to an Islamic Enlightenment capable of defeating modernist
challenges. According to al-Jabri, this strategy is
characterized by a lack of historical perspective and objectivity and . . . treats the past as
transcendental and sacral while seeking to extract from it ready-made solutions to the
problems of the present and future . . . All the schools of Arab thought seem to borrow
their prospect for renewal from a past-related or (past-based) model . . . 5
Al-Jabri believes this mode of thinking must be subjected to rigorous analysis and critique before
it is accepted as an appropriate answer to the challenge of modernity. Otherwise it can easily
degenerate into simplistic reaction that eventually undermines itself by engaging in too many
conflicts in an effort to ‘save everything.’ This is not an uncommon fate for revivalist
movements such as we have observed among some Christian groups in the West.
On the other hand, it is possible to identify what is the best and strongest in a culture
along with what is weakest and remedy or even in some cases abandon the latter. This is the
Modernist approach such was begun by al-Afghani (1838 – 1897) and Mohammed Abduh (1849
– 1905) in the late XIX and early XX century. Both believed that Islam was in harmony with
rationality and that the powers of rationality latent within all people should be freed by opening
the gates of ijtihad and allowing free debate on all matters to everyone. By limiting ijtihad to
themselves the Ulama
bore the responsibility of the decline of Islamic civilization. In their self-appointed role as
the guardians of Islam, the Ulama had so stifled independent thought and scientific
progress that even as Europe awakened to the Enlightenment, the Muslim world was still
floundering in the Middle ages.6
Both men considered themselves rationalists and Abduh even labelled himself a ‘neo-
Mu’tazalite,’ i.e. an advocate of reason, and, thereby, in conflict with the Ash’arite Ulama and
4 Mohammed ‘Abed al-Jabri,, Arab-Islamic Philosophy, A Contemporary Critique.” p. 9. 5 Mohammed ‘Abed al-Jabri,, Arab-Islamic Philosophy, A Contemporary Critique.” p. 21. 6 Reza Aslan, No god but God, p. 235.
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their traditional understanding of Islam in the Islamic world. He called for a re-opening of the
gates of ijtihad or independent reasoning.”7 In his view, the “only path to Muslim empowerment
. . . was to liberate Islam from the iron grip of the Ulama and their traditionalist interpretation.”8
In the XX century, perhaps the most outstanding advocate of reason and a self-described
neo-Mu’tazalite was the Indonesian scholar Harun Nasution. His goal was to establish an Islamic
and rationalist philosophy and theology suitable for the modern world. His ambition was to base
his advocacy for Islamic rationalism in the Qur’an itself and thereby to demonstrate that there
was no necessary, inherent conflict between reason and revelation. Even more, Nasution was
convinced that rationalism was one of the “central themes”9 of the Qur’an and that “the prophet
Mohammad and his early Companions were rationalist in nature.”10 Once this a rational – and
more accurate – understanding of the Qur’an and Islam was achieved, it would be possible to
bring Islam into the modern world on its own terms.
For al-Afghani, Mohammed Abduh and Harun Nasution the modernization of Islam did
not, of course, simply mean a wholesale – and thereby, an irrational, mindless – imposition of
Western ideas on the Islamic world. As Reza Aslan points out, al-Afghani was quite disgusted
with his experience of the West in the form of the British occupation of India. The intellectual
resources for modernization are within Islam itself. This is exactly what this paper seeks to
support.
Part II
It is difficult to see any essential differences between God’s requirements in the Qur’an
and Kant’s answer to the question “What is Enlightenment?”
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the
inability to use one’s own understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity
is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in a lack of resolve
7 Reza Aslan, No god but God, p. 237. 8 Reza Aslan, No god but God, p. 237. 9 Martin,Woodward, Atymaja, Defenders of Reason in Islam, p. 165. 10 Martin,Woodward, Atymaja, Defenders of Reason in Islam, p. 165.
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and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude! “Have courage to use
your own understanding!”- that is the motto of enlightenment.11
Kant’s wording is, of course vastly different from the Qur’an’s but the spirit and overt or tacit
admonitions to use reason and to use it properly in each are remarkably alike. Kant’s claim that
the failure to use reason is an “immaturity” that keeps us from fully being our human selves is
not far removed from the Qur’an’s statement that “Indeed, the worst of living creatures in the
sight of Allah are the deaf and dumb who do not use reason”12 which the Pickthall translation
gives as “Lo! the worst of beasts in Allah's sight are the deaf, the dumb, who have no sense.”13
The significance here is that when we live like animals, we are not living as humans and we are
not thinking for ourselves but letting others think for us. Kant calls this “immaturity” but the
Qur’an goes further and suggests it is a sin against God. Just as Kant sees something shameful –
“a lack of resolve and courage” – in the failure to reason, so the Qur’an calls on us to avoid the
shame of sinning against reason:
Say: the things that my Lord hath indeed forbidden are: shameful deeds, whether open or
secret; sins and trespasses against truth or reason; assigning partners to Allah for which
He hath given no authority; and saying things about Allah of which ye have no
knowledge.14
The sins against reason and truth are “shameful” for at least two reasons. First, they are
“shameful” because they are not fit, i.e. not appropriate to our rationally endowed human nature.
Second, they hinder man from overcoming his “immaturity” deepen his deficiency in being the
kind of creature God created him to be. While Kant’s statement does not reflect the Qur’an’s
teaching that trespassing against truth and reason are an ontological sin, this idea is not
incompatible with Kant’s definition of Enlightenment because in both cases we have not attained
our proper state of being. Kant’s statement and the Qur’an’s teaching are compatible because
11 Immanuel Kant, What is Enlightenment? in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays. Trans. By Ted Humphrey. Indianapolis IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983. Al-Anfal, Chp. #8, Verse #22) Saheeh translation , 12 http://www.searchtruth.com/search.php?keyword=reason&chapter=&translator=5&searc h=1&start=0&refquran=1 13The Qur’an, Al-Anfal, Chapter #8, Verse #22) Pickthall translation. 14The Qur’an, Al-Araf, Chp 7, Verse # 33. Yusuf Ali translation.
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they both assume that rationality is an essential aspect of human nature that we are obligated to
develop. Perhaps the most poignant advocacy of reason is found in the words “And they will say,
"If only we had been listening or reasoning, we would not be among the companions of the
Blaze.”15 The speakers recognize that their failure to listen and/or to use reason has exacted a
tremendous spiritual price from them. This is because God “He lays abomination upon those
who do not reason.”16 Allowing others to ‘guide’ or distort one’s reasoning process is not, in
fact, reasoning but a parody of reasoning which is clearly not what the Qur’an intends.
It might be objected that Kant wants reason to do its work without external “guidance”
constraining the quest for truth whereas, in contrast, the Qur’an wants us to reason with God’s
guidance through his revelation. However, this contradiction is more apparent than real. Kant’s
rejection of guidance refers to guidance from individuals, institutions and social customs, i.e.
from fallible humans. Nothing in the Qur’an states that we should let inherently fallible human
beings, institutions or social customs control our reasoning processes. Indeed, clearly God
expects us to reason for ourselves and to reason accurately on the basis of His signs. This is
overtly re-enforced by God’s frequent demands that we “reflect” on His signs and on His
revelation: “Thus Allah maketh plain to you (His) revelations, that haply ye may reflect.”17 He
even overtly chides people for not reflecting: “And verily ye know the first creation. Why, then,
do ye not reflect?”18 Reflecting is something that must begin with us, although later, we can
bring the fruits of our reflection for consideration by others. If these reflections are to be
genuinely our own, which is to say, genuine reflection and not the mere appearance of reflection,
it cannot be imitation of others or distorted by others. We may come to the same conclusion as
others, but, in genuine reflection we have come to them by ourselves in the spirit of the Quran’s
injunction, “Let there be no compulsion in religion.”19
15 The Qur’an, Al-Mulk, Chapter #67, Verse #10) Saheeh Translation.
16 The Qur’an, 10:10 quoted on “Conception of Reason in the Qur’an” http://www.al- islam.org/al-tawhid/vol1-n1-3/understanding-uniqueness-quran-ayatullah-murtadha- mutahhari/conception-reason 17 The Qur’an, Al-Baqara, Chp. 2, Verse #219. Pickthall translation 18 The Qur’an, Al-Waqia, Chp. 56, Verse #62. Pickthall translation 19 The Qur’an, Al-Baqara, Chp. 2, Verse # 256. Yusuf Ali translation.
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Two implicit but essential aspects of reasoning we must recognize are criticism and self-
criticism, i.e. the willingness and ability to analyze and evaluate the work of others as well as
one’s own work. Both are vital for an active intellectual scientific, technological and artistic
culture especially in the modern world; where a culture of criticism and self-criticism is stifled,
stagnation is inevitably the result. No one’s thoughts should be exempt i.e. ideas and not persons
are what matters and a falsehood is a falsehood whether expressed by a novice or an expert.
Moreover, without criticism and self-criticism our thinking inevitably becomes careless as we
privilege our own work by exempting it from critical analysis. We start to believe everything we
think. Of course, criticism and self-criticism play an important role in Kant’s view of the
Enlightenment for the obvious reason that especially self-criticism is integral to independent
thought which requires self-reliance. If we are overly dependent on others for examination and
critique of our work, we are not independent at all and if we avoid self-critique we are simply
getting careless – or too proud to give our own ideas a rigorous analysis. Such disinclination is a
sign of pride which is the archetypal sin committed by Iblis when he refused to bow before
Adam as commanded by God.20 This refusal may also have been a conscious desire or will not to
know, i.e. a will-to-ignorance. What Iblis did not want to know was the special nature of Adam.
While the application in the Qur’an is to a theological and moral matter, there is nothing to
prevent us from applying it to our intellectual lives as well. Willful ignorance to save our pride is
a sin we commit when we avoid self-criticism because we are willing not to know the nature of
our thoughts.
There is, of course, an analogous concept in Islam – muhasabah – which is the self-
inventory we each should take to bring ourselves to account at the end of each day. Self-criticism
or self-critique is simply a wider application of this well-established principle to intellectual,
scientific, technological and cultural matters. This extension is natural insofar as muhasabah is
an inventory of one’s actions, i.e. of what we do, and reasoning about things is something we all
do whether or not we are scholars. This also would include collective reasoning as when a group
of people decide that something is true or something is to be done. This self-criticism or self-
20 The Qur’an, Al-Baqara, Chp. 2, Verse # 34.
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inventorying is not optional, as suggested by the Qur’an: “Do they not think that they will be
called to account?”21
It must be noted that ‘critique’ or ‘self-criticism’ is really ‘analysis’ for proper logic, for
correct information, pre-assumptions and pre-suppositions, rational or irrational biases, hidden or
overt agendas and the use of language, rhetoric and metaphors. It also implies taking
responsibility for the strengths and weaknesses of one’s ideas and/or work. In criticism,
judgments about these factors may be positive or negative but in each case, reason must prevail.
One particular Muslim thinker, Mohammed Arkoun paid special attention to the issue of self-
criticism importance of self-criticism in the culture of a new Islamic Enlightenment:
Like Muhammed ‘Abduh, Fazlur Rahman and other modernists, Mohammed Arkoun
encouraged self-criticism and the reappropriation of theological rationalism.22
Arkoun understood that “theological rationalism” could not be “reappropriated” unless Muslims
first admitted to themselves that it had been lost and that developments within the Islam world
itself had done the damage. Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd writes,
Critique of Islamic reason is a key concept in Arkoun’s project. Its starting point is the
need to leave the practice of classical ijtihad, which is limited and confined to the
epistemological framework established by jurists in the 8th to 9th centuries and to move
forwards to a modern critical analysis of Islamic reason . . . With this critique of Islamic
reason Arkoun aims to establish an ‘applied Islamology’ that deals seriously with the
modern issues from a genuinely engaged Islamic perspective . . .23
From this it is clear that Arkoun realized that thinking in the Muslim world must be reformed or
modernized but also that the reforms must be based on – though not limited to - the intellectual
resources of a ‘re-thought’ Islam. The problem that must be overcome is that “the development
of Islamic thought since the 13th Century has led to an inflation in the number of things it is
impossible to think about. The result today is rigid thinking and intransigent convictions which
21 The Qur’an, Al-Mutaffifin, Chp. 83, Verse # 4. Yusuf Ali Translation. 22 Martin, Woodward, Atmaja, Defenders of Reason in Islam, p/ 204. 23 Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Reformation of Islamic Thought: A Critical Historical Analysis, p. 84.
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call for criticism.”24 Arkoun’s obituary in The Guardian eloquently explicates the basis of his
thought:
He saw, and readily acknowledged, that the Enlightenment was a European phenomenon
produced by a particular European history, but he also argued that the history of Islamic
thought testified to an aborted humanist project that could have led to the rise of an
Islamic Enlightenment.
Islamic humanism flourished during the "golden age" of classical Islam, a period from
the eighth to the 12th centuries that witnessed the rise and flowering of religious sciences,
natural sciences, literature, the humanities and the arts. Arkoun argued that the elevation
of reason by this humanism not only led to the advancement of natural sciences, but had
an impact on religious sciences, furnishing them with tools of reasoning that enabled
them to develop into highly sophisticated systems of thought. This humanism was
suppressed and all but wiped out of the subsequent pages of the history of Islamic
thought.25
Arkoun’s goal was to help kindle an” Islamic Enlightenment” based on Islam’s own intellectual
and cultural resources. We shall examine one of these resources next.
When we examine Kant’s definition of enlightenment as entailing independent reasoning,
it is clear that Islam has – or had – a similar concept, namely ijtihad. However, in its historical
development, ijtihad has come to exist in two seemingly contradictory versions.26 In the first
sense, ijtihad is understood as a strict process of juristic reasoning to see whether an action is
allowable when the Qur’an and the Sunnah are silent or when previous mujtahid has made no
ruling on this subject. Ijtihad may only be practiced by mujtahids who possess the necessary
educational qualifications and understand all foregoing legal complications on this subject. This
24 Burhan Schawi, “A Modern Critic of Islamic Reason,” in Quantar de. http://en.qantara.de/content/mohammed-arkoun-a-modern-critic-of-islamic-reason 25 Mohammed Arkoun Obituary, Mohammed Mahmoud, The Guardian, Tuesday, 19 October 2010. 26 M.A. Muqtedar, “Two Theories of Ijtihad.” http://www.commongroundnews.org/article.php?id=2581&lan=en&sp=1
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is ijtihad as it developed in Muslim history. However, a second concept of ijtihad arose in the
nineteenth century with Al-Afghani and Mohammed Abduh among others.27 This concept views
ijtihad as the independent reasoning or as the independent investigation of truth and it is not
limited to mujtahids. The purpose of this much broader concept of ijtihad was to overcome what
its originators saw as the intellectual and scientific stagnation of the Islamic world prompted by
culture in which taqlid and not independent reasoning was the rule. This could not help but
engender a culture in which questioning of any kind or about anything was discouraged.
The Islamic Modernizers rejected the traditional teaching that “The doors of ijtihad are
closed,” a teaching which among other things limited legal interpretation of any action to four
schools. They asserted the right to independent investigation of truth, the right to critique and
questioning and the right to declare one’s findings as part of one the ongoing search for
consensus. In essence, they wanted ijtihad – the independent investigation of truth – to become a
major part of modern Islamic culture; in effect, they wanted to launch an Islamic Enlightenment.
Abdokarim Soroush throws an interesting sidelight on ijtihad – differentiating “reason as
a destination and reason as a path.”28 In his view, we should balance “reason as a path” or reason
as a process with reason as a definitive truth. He states,
Viewing reason as a truth-seeking, sifting and appraising agent entails as much respect to
the method of achieving the truth as it does to the truth itself.29
Soroush’s point is well taken: if we put too much stress on the results of reasoning, we do
not let the process unfold as it should and lead us to the truth ‘naturally.’ We may distort
the process to get the kind of result we feel we should get. On the other hand, if there is no
concern for the truth then reason itself can go astray because reason requires a goal – we
reason to discover or establish something. Soroush believes that both concepts of ijtihad
must be played against each other in a dialectical process. They must be evenly balanced.
27 Voices of a New Ijtihad, Center for Dialogue, New York University, http://islamuswest.org/publications_islam_and_the_West/Who_Speaks_For_Islam/Who- Speaks-For-Islam_21.html 28 Abdokarim Sooroush, Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam, p. 89. 29 Abdokarim Soroush, Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam, p. 89.
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This leads us to other difficulties associated with the traditional sense of ijtihad. One of
these is that it discourages almost all of the faithful from investigating Islam in a rational manner
and, thereby, discourages the habit of reflection even though the Qur’an seems to command that
we do so: “Do they not reflect in their own minds?”30 Rhetorically speaking, this question is
clearly a demand that we do reflect. Moreover, such discouragement of reflection, reasoning and
the independent investigation of truth if carried on over centuries and is even enforced by law
cannot help but have a strong detrimental effect on the prevailing culture. In fact, it encourages a
kind of fideism – of which more later – that at its worst reduces every intellectual problem to a
problem of faith to which taqlid or blind belief is the answer. This, as we shall see later, had a
devastating effect on the development of science in the Islamic world. While fideism may have
been a rational strategy in times when the clear majority were uneducated, this strategy will self-
evidently not be successful with an educated population – or a population that has access to the
internet. Technology makes ijtihad in its tradition, narrow sense impossible because once people
have access to knowledge and to questions and to the ability to communicate with others, the
traditional limitations are overcome. It would be like the Roman Catholic Church’s unsuccessful
attempt to impose the traditional limitations of knowledge and thought after the invention of
printing and the widespread distribution of books. In other words, the new technological
situation cannot help but loosen the hold the traditional understanding of ijtihad.
The second difficulty with the traditional concept of ijtihad is that it seems difficult to
reconcile with the Qur’an’s positive emphasis on reason, understanding and reflection. It is hard
to avoid the conclusion that there is a logical contradiction between the Qur’an which requires
reasoning, reflection and evidence-based thought from everyone and the official practice of
limiting ijtihad to a small class of men. Especially in today’s world in which some degree of
universal education is the norm and with wide-spread availability of the internet it is difficult to
make a case for limiting ijtihad to jurisprudential problems or a small number of exceptionally
educated ‘ulamma. Moreover, it appears that growing number of Islamic scholars beginning with
Al-Afghani and Mohammed Abduh see the need for a new much broader concept of ijtihad if the
Islamic world is to be revived. An Islamic Enlightenment requires all the intellectual resources
we can muster. Furthermore, if we ask how such a revival might be achieved, Abu Ismael al-
30 The Qur’an, Ar—Chp. 30, Verse #8. Room,
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Beirawi believes that ijtihad is the answer because it allows us to deal with some of the problems
of the Islamic world by using the intellectual resources within Islam itself.
The keyword for Islam’s applicability in the twenty first century is not reform (islah)
but the Islamic concept of Itjihad . While reform implicitly discounts the validity of
an idea through suggesting that it is in need of alteration, Ijtihad tackles
contemporary problems using Islam’s original principles and rules; it does not
demand their alteration but their application.31
In other words, once ijtihad becomes part of the everyday culture of the Islamic world, the
intellectual, cultural, scientific and technological stagnation will end and a specifically
Muslim way can be found into modernity. In the words of Mirza A Beg,
Islamic polity should not ape the West, but it should regain the spirit of search and
research that made it great long centuries ago, It should rise above the ill-placed
fear that intellectual dissension creates weakness.32
At this point it is appropriate to remind readers that the purpose of this paper is to locate
those places where the ideals of the European Enlightenment overlap with the Qur’an and
the thoughts of the Muslim Modernists. Overlap does not suggest the superiority or
inferiority of one side or another but rather a common ground where both can work
together and learn from each other.
A brief comment is in order at this point. It seems clear that the concept of ijtihad –
at least in its wider sense – is shared by Kant and the Enlightenment as well as the Islamic
modernizers such as al-Afghani, Mohammad Abduh and Harun Nasution, Moreover, if we
recall our explication of Kant’s definition of Enlightenment, it is clear that ijtihad is a
31 Abu Ismael al-Beirawi, “Ijtihad & the Application of Islam in the 12st Century.” www.futureislam.com/20060111/insight/abu_ismael/Ijtihad_t 32 Mirza A Beg, “Decline of Islamic Civilizations – Causes – Time for a New Paradigm.” Counterpoints.Org. http://www.countercurrents.org/beg-250706.htm
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concept that can be shared with Islamic philosophy. They share the same basic concept and
this forms a bridge between the two that can be used for the advantage of both in providing
constructive criticism as well new ideas to work with.
However, there is a seemingly uncrossable divide between the Western Enlightenment
and any concepts of a possible Islamic Enlightenment, namely, secularism. While there are
various aspects to secularism, the one that is germane to our focus on reason is Kant’s definition
of ‘enlightenment,’ i.e. the individual’s capacity and willingness to reason independently.
Secularism in this sense refers to the individual’s freedom to think and express him or herself
according to their own reasoning. In Kant’s terms, they have achieved ‘maturity.’ Consequently,
there is no rationale for the state, a religion or society to interfere with this intellectual freedom
or to place strictures on it.
While this open intellectual culture of Enlightenment secularism is unacceptable to
traditionalist Muslim thinkers, it is certainly in harmony with the broader concept if ijtihad in
which individuals are allowed to investigate the truth for themselves without interference by
others. Whether one wants to call this ‘secularism’ is of little consequence in regards to the
right of ijtihad since the important thing is not the name but that intellectual freedom is practiced
in society. If ijtihad – either in its Kantian sense or in the broader sense advocated by Muslim
Modernizers – is universally practiced, then the Enlightenment’s main goal of thought unfettered
by shackles of any kind has been achieved. The argument if such a state is or is not really
‘secular’ is moot.
It is essential to note that secularism does not necessarily require us to adopt a purely
materialistic understanding of science from which we might develop a materialistic
understanding of reality in general. This would be wholly incompatible with a Muslim world-
view of any kind. When a materialistic understanding of reality in general arises, it is not
difficult to show that a scientist and/or philosopher is speculating beyond the data and has left
science behind and entered the realm of ‘scientism.’ Science insists that evidence must be among
other things (1) physical; (2) measurable; (3) objective; (4) observable; (5) refutable.
Consequently, science cannot find any evidence for or against the existence of God, the soul or
spiritual realities for the simple reason that none of these three are proper objects of scientific
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study; they are incompatible with the scientific method because God and the soul do not fit the
criteria listed above. Materialist methodologies are inherently incapable of knowing anything
about spirit. No future inventions can overcome this intrinsic limitation. Therefore, science has
nothing to say about spiritual issues – although, of course, individual scientists may offer
personal opinions. However, these cannot be regarded as genuinely scientific statements.
Therefore, we must conclude that turning science into the foundation for a materialistic world
world-view is to turn science into an ideology, i.e. to change its purpose from discovery to
persuasion. Neither of the two purposes are wrong – both discovery and persuasion have their
proper places – but we must not confuse one with the other. From this perspective, at least, the
argument that secularism necessarily leads to materialism and an unspiritual world view turns
out to be a pseudo-argument. As John Haught says, “Some of the most prominent scientists are
literally unable to separate science from their materialist metaphysics.”33 One thinks of biologists
like Richard Dawkins, physicists like Stephen Hawking and Victor Stenger and neuroscientists
like Sam Harris.
Part III
The re-appropriation of rationalism in Islam is the major goal of numerous Muslim
thinkers wishing to revive the fortunes of the Islamic world in the face of modern challenges.
However, they wish to find the basis for such changes in Islam itself without having to depend
on ideas imported from, among other things, the European Enlightenment. Indeed, no matter
how valuable imported ideas may be, without an Islamic foundation, they have no natural place
to grow in an Islamic intellectual and cultural environment. This does not mean Enlightenment
ideas, such as Kant’s, are not welcome but that they must be grafted onto an Islamic tree to be
fully effective thereby allowing Muslims to work with modernity and to keep their faith. This
helps lead to a modernism which has been appropriately connected to the Islamic world-view.
33 33 John Haught, in Abdelhaq M. Hamza, “Faith and Reason: The Re-Emergence of Neo- Mu’tazilite Thought in the Discourse of Modern Muslim Scientists” http://social- epistemology.com/2014/09/26/faith-and-reason-the-re-emergence-of-neo-mutazilite- thought-in-the-discourse-of-modern-muslim-scientists-abdelhaq-m-hamza/
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Reason is an essential aspect of revitalizing the Muslim world. In seeking an Islamic
foundation for a re-vitalized rationalism, it is necessary to look back to the IX century and the
rise – and fall – of the Mu’tazalites. Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd notes that the “epistemological
framework”34 that introduced the narrow traditional concept of ijtihad (discussed previously) led
to a conflict with the Mu’tazalites who advocated reason in understanding the Qur’an and the
Hadith. According to Defenders of Reason in Islam,
The Mu’tazila also accepted the authority of the two scared texts but made human reason
(‘aql) the warrant for determining what the text of the Qur’an and Hadith meant in
particular circumstances . . . The problem has been that the starting point for Hanbali
traditionalists, as for most Muslims, is revelation and for the Mu’tazila it is reason.35
Despite the eclipse of Mu’tazailism since the IX century, i.e. for almost a thousand years, today
[t]here are some extraordinarily intelligent Muslim scholars who would like to see
something like a neo-Mu’tazalite movement within Islam, a restoration of the primacy of
reason so that they can reopen the doors of ijtihad and develop some kind of natural-law
foundation for humane, political, constitutional rule. In fact, Indonesian scholar Harun
Nasution (1919 – 1998) was willing to wear the neo-Mu’tazalite label openly despite the
implication of heresy it carried.36
Other important Muslim thinkers have joined Nasution. Abdolkarin Soroush has even published
an interview, “I’m a Neo-Mu’tazalite,”37 saying, “I respect the Mu’tazilite school of thought and
I esteem them highly, because they were the first group to raise the banner of rationality in
Islamic culture.”38 A Tunisian philosopher Latif Lakhdar expresses similar beliefs.39
34 Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Reformation of Islamic Thought: A Critical Historical Analysis, p. 84. 35 Martin, Woodward and Atmaja, Defenders of Reason in Islam, p.15 – 16. 36 Robert R Reilly, The Closing of the Muslim Mind, p. 193. 37 Abdolkarim Sorouish, “I’m a Neo-Mu’tazalite” http://www.drsoroush.com/English/Interviews/E-INT-Neo-Mutazilite_July2008.html 38 Abdolkarim Sorouish, “I’m a Neo-Mu’tazalite” http://www.drsoroush.com/English/Interviews/E-INT-Neo-Mutazilite_July2008.html 39 Robert R Reilly, The Closing of the Muslim Mind, p. 193.
15
Let us examine in more detail what attracts modern Islamic thinkers to Mu’tazailism in
one form or another. The quintessential belief is that God has given man reason i.e. a rational
soul and that God expects us to use reason in knowing the world, knowing moral truths and in
knowing God so we can worship Him. It is primarily this general program for the application of
reason to all things that draws modern Islamic thinkers to the Mu’tazalite outlook and not so
much the specific philo-theological doctrines regarding such issues as the createdness or
uncreatedness of the Qur’an. Moreover, there is no intention of ignoring the Revelation. Rather,
in contrast to the Traditionalists, the basis of their understanding is reason and not a literalistic
understanding of Revelation.
The traditionalists located the warrants [for understanding the Qur’an] in the plain sense
of the texts (Qur’an and Hadith) and in the community that faithfully transmitted them.
The Mu’tazila argued . . . that [r]eason is the means for knowing that what Qur’an and
Sunna require of humans (taklif) is good.40
According to the Mu’tazalites, a rational approach to the Revelation is necessary not only to
know God’s will and to obey it, but also to understand the literal and metaphorical passages in
the Qur’an (3:7). The Mu’tzalites, for example, could not literally accept that God has physical
hands and other physical attributes. Consequently, the Revelation must be understood through
the application of reason since reason is intrinsically natural to man and the Qur’an often
requires it:
He is the one who sent upon you the book: some of its verses are clear (muhkamât)—
these are the basis of the Book, while others are allegorical (mutashâbihât).
As for those in whose hearts is perversity, they follow the allegorical verses, seeking to
mislead and seeking to give (their own) interpretation. None know their (i.e., allegorical
verses') interpretation except Allah and those who are firmly rooted in knowledge…”41
40 Martin, Woodward and Atmaja, Defenders of Reason in Islam, p.17. 41 The Qur’an, Aal-e-Imran, Chp 3, Verse #7. Translation in Sayyid Muhammad Rizvi ,“The Allegorical Verses of the Qur’an,” http://www.al-islam.org/ismat-infallibiity-of-prophets-in- the-quran-sayyid-muhammad-rizvi/allegorical-verses-qur%E2%80%99
16
While for the traditionalists – Hanbali’s and Ash’ari’s for example – inconsistencies in the
Qur’an must simply be accepted, and lived with, for the Mu’tazalites, the notion that we should
passively accept inconsistencies is nothing less than a violation of the rational nature God has
given us. Such blind acceptance is not a viable option in light of the obligations placed on us by
God: “And He lays abomination upon those who do not reason.”42 The clear passages in the
Qur’an do not require any reasoning to be understood, but the allegorical passages do. This
makes reasoning imperative in our religious lives because this brings reasoning into harmony
with Revelation and short circuits any notion of an inherent and necessary conflict between faith
and reason. Reason is also a way to understand God – at least insofar as God has revealed
Himself to us in His creation. In Himself, of course, God is beyond all human comprehension.
To sum up, the Mu’tazalites’ positive attitude to reason and the autonomy of reason is a
common foundation between them and the European Enlightenment as characterized by Kant. It
opens the possibility for creative mutual influence and mutual endeavors without either side
losing its inherent nature.
Another important point of connection between the Mu’tazalites and modern thinkers and
scientists is the problem of causality. Causality is the necessary connection between two events
in which one inevitably follows the other. For thinkers like the Ash’ari’s, who believed that
reality was made up of discrete atomic events that were continuously renewed by God, an
Aristotelian or ‘Western’ concept of causality denies the omnipotence of God Whose absolute
will is the only connection between events. Nothing actually ‘in’ interacting particles or events
actually creates the new effects of the interaction rather; it is God Who recreates the new effects.
To sum up, there is no real cause-and-effect in nature and looking for it is a misunderstanding of
the nature of reality. The underlying reason is straight forward: assigning innate power to
anything except God in effect diminishes God’s omnipotence. Since God’s omnipotence is
absolute or infinite, nothing else can have any intrinsic power. Unfortunately, two possibilities
do not seem to have occurred to the Ash’arites. First, if God’s power is infinite, no ‘gift’ of
power to anything else could diminish what is infinite. God’s power is always infinite or absolute
42 The Qur’an, 10:10 quoted on “Conception of Reason in the Qur’an” http://www.al- islam.org/al-tawhid/vol1-n1-3/understanding-uniqueness-quran-ayatullah-murtadha- mutahhari/conception-reason
17
no matter how much of it He gives away. Second, it is possible that God ‘lends’ or shares His
power to His creation and, in the case of man, generously chooses to restrain His power to
provide man with free will.
This situation has important consequences for the issue of free will. For the Ash’arites,
there is no causal connection between a doer and his deed. In short, as with nature, God is the
only actual agent either in human deeds.43 The Ash’arites “consecrated the formula according to
which each person is not the author of his or her acts, which constitutes a denial of the principle
of causality. Otherwise limits were placed on divine omnipotence and the miracles.”44 In sharp
contrast, the Mu’tzalites, saw free will i.e. the individual’s ability to cause events to happen as
the necessary basis of God’s justice; people cannot be justly held responsible for acts they did
not commit.
Furthermore, it is clear that the Ash’arite view makes modern science impossible – and
helps to explain the rise of the West due to scientific and technological progress. Simply put, the
consequences of the Ash’arite views on cause and effect are devastating for science since the
development of science depends entirely on the study of cause-and-effect. Without cause-and-
effect all we have is a juxtaposition of things or events or a mere sequence of events without any
possibility of understanding the connection between them in a scientifically useful way. There is
no possibility of developing a rational explanation of their interactions and, thereby, no way of
controlling these interactions. Our studies of these of merely juxtaposed or sequential events
yields no useful information. In short, the lack of a cause-and-effect explanation makes modern
science impossible.
43 Eugene F Bales, Philosophy in the West, p. 139.
44 Abdelmadjid Charfi, David Bond, Abdou Filali-AnsarySikeena, Karmali Ahmed, Islam: Between Message and History, p. 150.
18
[T]he Mu'tazilites, could only see their way to securing human freedom by considering
free human actions as utterly autonomous, and so as the creations of human agents, not of
God45
In their preference for the autonomy of human action, the Mu’tazalites were in harmony with the
European Enlightenment’s insistence on human freedom and inherent autonomy. There was a
necessary connection between the doer and the deed, i.e. the doer caused the deed and could
therefore justly be held responsible for it. We are agents. If we are not, it would be impossible to
uphold the Mu’tazalite’s emphasis on God’s justice. However, they also included nature in their
understanding of causality which they adopted from Aristotle:
The notion of the power to act came generally to be understood by the Mu’tazalites a
distinct accident which made the owner of such a power a potential agent . . . The Mu’tazalites
clearly appealed to the Aristotelian theory of causation for which all things that exist have, by
nature, within themselves the principle of motion and rest. Nature was identified with a principle
and a cause of change in those things in which it inheres primarily.46 In other words, everything
contains the possibility of rest or motion in itself, which is to say in Aristotelian terms, it has the
potential to stay the same or to change. For Aristotle ‘motion’ includes all types of change –
augmentative, diminishing, growing and, of course, change in location but in all cases change
requires the actualization of potentiality. This is what happens in natural change. The concept of
potentiality also entails that all beings are purposive, i.e. have a goal or telos that is unique to
them both as a member of a species and as an individual being.
At this point it is important to mention that basing a revival of rationalism on
Mu’tazalism does not require the adoption of every item in Mu’tazalite theology. For example,
the debate over the ‘created’ and ‘uncreated’ nature of the Qur’an can be distinguished from the
debates about reason, causality and personal responsibility. Of course, the Mu’tazaltes “maintain
there is no conflict between reason and the true meaning of the Qur’an”47 which is why they felt
45 Maria de Cillis, Free Will and Predestination in Islamic Thought, p. 13. 46 Maria de Cillis, Free Will and Predestination in Islamic Thought, p. 13.However, in the early XI century 47 Martin, Woodward, Atmaja, Defenders of Reason in Islam, p.18.
19
– in contradistinction from other schools of thought – that it was legitimate, indeed, necessary, to
use reason in our religious understanding. They did, however, feel it was necessary to lay aside
the literal readings of the Qur’an in order to resolve the conflict between reason and Revelation.
Unfortunately, the decline of Mu’tazailism and its emphasis on rationality fell onto hard
times after the rule of Abbasid Caliph Al-Ma’mun but, as we shall see, a greater set-back was to
come. In the meantime, one of the greatest philosophers of the Islamic world – Ibn Sina (950 –
1037 C.E.) – would add new strength to the project of Islamic rationalism. Ibn Sina was a
follower of Aristotle and adopted his method of analyzing and understanding reality in terms of
matter and form; actuality and potentiality; motion and change; accident and essence; he also
adopted Aristotle’s four-fold causality. Moreover, he accepted Aristotle’s logic of deductive
reasoning and his philosophy of man in which “reason marks the crowning of the psychic
process”48 Man is endowed with a rational soul49 which provides the ontological and
psychological basis for Ibn Sina’s rationalist outlook. However, he was not uncritical of Aristotle
and
criticizes, selects and refines this material, but above all, informs it with his own insights
to construct a world-view that has a character all its own. He also injects into it a pattern
of deductive reasoning that anticipates the kind of thinking encountered in seventeenth-
century European rationalist philosophies. At the same time, it should be remembered
that his metaphysics is part of medieval Islam’s intellectual history. It represents a
climactic development of medieval Islamic Aristotelian and Neoplatonic thought.50
Furthermore, it is important to recall that “The affinity of [Ibn Sina’s] rationalism to seventeenth-
century continental European modes of philosophizing has often been noted.” 51 Indeed, Ibn Sina
had a major influence on medieval European philosophers and above all, on the work of St.
Thomas Aquinas. This shows that there is a convergence between certain developments in
rationalist philosophy in Islam – the Mu’tazalites, Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd – and philosophical
48 Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, third edition, p.143. 49 Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, third edition, p.144. 50 M.E. Marmura, Avicenna iv. Metaphysics in Encyclopedia Iranica, Nov. 11, 2014; emphasis added. 51 M.E. Marmura, Avicenna iv. Metaphysics in Encyclopedia Iranica, Nov. 11, 2014.
20
developments unfolding much later in Europe. Moreover, we must bear in mind that the
Euroepean XVII century developments in rationalism were the beginnings of a philosophic
movement that would culminate in Kant whose concept of ‘enlightenment’ has significant
similarities to Mu’tazalite thought. The fact that one can establish an ‘intellectual bridge’
between rationalism in Islam and rationalism in Europe shows us that we are not necessarily
dealing with ‘two solitudes’ which cannot learn from each other or undertake mutual projects for
the good of all people.
It may, of course, be objected that Ibn Sina was not purely a Peripetatic philosopher, that
later in his life turned against discursive reasoning as the sole emphasis of his thought.
According to this view,
in his latter phase, Avicenna was inclined towards illuminative thoughts and mysticism.
In this phase, he tried to found, with the help of neo-Platonic, mystical, and Islamic
thoughts, a new philosophical system.52
However, according to Majid Fakhrty, “the departure from Peripatetism is often purely verbal”53
and “even his sharpest critics such as al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd whose fairness in reporting his
view cannot be questioned, betray no acquaintance with his alleged bipolarity.”54 In other
words, Ibn Sina’s peripatetism took on a new and unfamiliar form that caused some critics to
believe he had abandoned his original quest. If al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd were unable to perceive
such a bifurcation in Ibn Sina’s philosophy, there are, in our view, good reasons for questioning
its existence.
Between Ibn Sina and the second of the great peripetatic philosophers, Ibn Rushd,
another major challenge to rationalism in Islam arose: the philosophy of al-Ghazali (1058 – 1111
C.E.). According to Seyyed Hossein Nasr, al-Ghazali “broke the back of rationalistic philosophy
and in fact brought the career of philosophy . . . to an end in the Arabic part of the Islamic
52 Mohammad Mehdi, Gorjian, Masumeh Esma’eeli, “Discursive Rationalism in the Methodology of Avicenna [sic] Philosophy,” Hekmat Journal Quarterly, Fifth Issue, Winter 2012. 53 Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, third edition, p.137. 54 Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, third edition, p.137.
21
world.”55 He achieved this largely through the overwhelming influence of his book, The
Incoherence of the Philosophers which was instrumental in establishing Ash’aritism as the
primary theology of the Muslim world to this time. In The Incoherence, al-Ghazali revealed what
he claimed was the impotence of reason to solve any of the important theological and
philosophical questions of his time. In the process of doing so, he rejected Plato and Aristotle
and, thereby the Mu’tazilites as well as Ibn Sina and the neo-platonic influences in Muslim
philosophy. One of the ways he showed the impotence of reason was to demonstrate that
philosophy could not prove even the most basic elements of faith such as the existence of God;
all such ‘proofs’ had logical errors. (It is interesting to note that Al-Ghazal used logic to show the
limits of reason.) He also showed why reason was incapable of proving that there could not be
two Gods. The inability to prove such a basic theological point by rational means, constitutes an
opening through which polytheistic beliefs may slip in by allowing speculation about such a
possibility. Al-Ghazali had numerous other targets in Ibn Sina’s philosophy, but there is one that
stands out for modern readers: the denial of causality. According to al-Ghazali, only God has
efficient causality; fire does not burn cotton – God does because that is His will. Al-Ghazali says,
We say that it is God who — through the intermediacy of angels, or directly — is the
agent of the creation of blackness in cotton; of the disintegration of its parts, and of their
transformation into a smouldering heap or ashes. Fire, which is an inanimate thing, has
no action. How can one prove that it is an agent? The only argument is from the
observation of the fact of burning at the time of contact with fire.56
Later, in Europe in the XVII century, this view was called “occasionalism” whose chief
proponent was Malbranche. As we have already demonstrated previously, the denial of causality
– in a manner much like Hume in the XVIII century – makes science impossible. Perhaps even
worse, it provides a fertile ground for the existential attitude of fatalism57: if I can do nothing,
why should I do anything? Let God do it.
55 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, in Robert R. Reilly, The Closing of the Muslim Mind, p. 119. 56 Al-Ghazali, Incoherence of the Philosophers, trans by Sabih Ahmad Kamali, Problem XVII, http://www.ghazali.org/books/tf/Problem_XVII.htm 57 See also Ali S Allawi, The Crisis of Islamic Civilization, p. 98.
22
If the Mu’tazali tradition had continued until the present time the position of the Muslim
community in history would have been far different from what it is. Fatalism weakened
the Islamic community and drained its energy while tawakkul [trust only in God] led to a
static condition.58
The matter could not be stated more concisely.
Ibn Rushd (1126-1198 C.E.) is the final great philosopher in the Muslim peripatetic
tradition and champion of Aristotle, reason, causality and free will. Like his predecessor, Ibn
Sina, Ibn Rushd had enormous influence on the development of European philosophy throughout
the Middle Ages and later. However, unlike Ibn Sina, he was a strict Aristotelian and rejected
much of Plato and neo-platonism. Indeed, he thought that Ibn Sina had distorted Aristotle’s
philosophy which meant that al-Ghazali had chosen the wrong target and had not really refuted
Aristotle’s philosophy at all. Not only was al-Ghazali off target, he was also mistaken in his
critiques of Aristotle. Like the Mu’tazalites, Ibn Rushd rejected the Ash’arite teaching that God
had all power and that humans had none in effecting all of creation to impotence.59 He also
rejected the Ash’arites’ denial of cause and effect and the implicit denial of essences. For Ibn
Rushd it is self-evident
that existing things possess certain natures or properties which determine the kinds of
actions associated with them and even the definitions appropriate to them. ‘Hence, if an
existing entity did not have a nature proper to it, it would not have a name to it, it would
not have a name of definition proper to it; then all things would be reducible to one thing
and not one thing at the same time.’60
A brick is a brick and not a house cat and cannot behave like one. This common-sense
observation is the basis of causality. Furthermore, if things lack a particular inherent essence,
then we would not be able to tell one thing from another; all would be the same. We should also
note that Ibn Rushd developed his own logical proofs for the existence of God.
58 Ahmad Amin in Robert R Reilly, The Closing of the Muslim Mind, p, 127 – 128. 59 Majid Fakhry, Averroes, p.17. 60 Majid Fakhry, Averroes, p. 26.
23
Given the eventual Ash’arite victory over the rationalism of Ibn Rushd and its acceptance
of causality, what we might call the ‘Mu’tazalite project’ was finished as a major force in Islamic
philosophy and culture. With the severe demotion of reason and the denial of causality, Islamic
thought took a turn that would eventually disadvantage it vis-s-vis its European rivals who took
exactly the opposite direction in its intellectual, scientific and technological thinking. It would
take until the XIX century modernists like al-Afghani and Mohammad Abduh to begin the
process of reversing this course.
Conclusion
This paper leads to three major conclusions.
First, the Islamic world has its own philosophical resources on which to build an Islamic
Enlightenment and, thereby, respond positively to the challenges of modernity in general and the
modern West in particular.
Second, there is considerable common ground between the Kantian understanding of
‘enlightenment’ and what we find primarily in the Qur’an, and, secondarily, what is offered by
Mu’tazalism.
Third, this common ground offers a basis for a mutual rapprochement and enrichment of
Western and Muslim philosophies and world-views for the benefit of both.
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