rebellion and taxation: evidence from early modern japanprivateksg/esrcjsps/tanaka.pdf · key...

Rebellion and Taxation:

Evidence from Early Modern Japan∗

Christopher Paik† Abbey Steele‡ Seiki Tanaka§

12 March 2012

Abstract

This paper explores the legacy of rebellions within autocracies for state-building.Do rebellions lead rulers to tax at lower rates, in order to avoid future threats toorder? Or do rebellions provide an incentive to tax at higher rates in order to keeporder? The former scenario would suggest a bargaining mechanism, in which localelites (in this case, warlords) concede to the masses’ demands. The latter wouldindicate an punitive mechanism, in which the warlord seeks to undercut the abilityof the masses to revolt again. We test these questions with fine-grained data ontaxation and rebellion from Japan at the domain level (N=267) during the Toku-gawa era (1603-1868). This paper makes two central contributions. First, while theearly modern period of Japanese history has been intensely studied, exploiting itssub-national variation has been largely overlooked. Second, we reverse the typicalquestion relating to war and rebellion: rather than explain rebellion as a functionof state action, we study how the state formed at the local level, in areas thatexperienced rebellion.

Key words: Taxation, rebellion, Japan

∗Paper prepared for the Advancing the Scientific Study of Conflict and Cooperation: AlternativePerspectives from the UK and Japan, Essex, 20-21 March 2012, and the 2012 Annual Midwest PoliticalScience Association National Conference, Chicago, March 31-April 3. We thank the participants inthe Empirical Studies of Conflict Workshop at Princeton for their comments. The authors are listedin alphabetical order, equal authorship implied. All are affiliated with the Woodrow Wilson School,Princeton University.

†[email protected]‡[email protected]§[email protected]

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1 Introduction

The relationship between taxation and compliance is a fundamental aspect of gover-

nance, and transcends states, regimes, and eras. All states, regardless of their form,

need revenue, and extracting revenue from a population is a central challenge. While

rulers aim to collect the maximum amount possible, they also have to “prevent flight

and fight” of the population (Levi, 1988, 19). In this paper, we use novel data from

early modern Japan to assess the extent to which unruly populations succeed in winning

lower tax rates than their more compliant neighbors.

Tokugawa-era Japan (ca. 1603-1868) is an apt environment to assess the effect of

unruly populations on the tax rate. Before 1871, Japan was divided among 267 feudal

domains (han).1 A daimyo, or ruler, ran each domain. Yet despite the authority

imposed by the shogun, the daimyo were left to rule their domains as they saw fit.

This included setting the tax rate and collecting taxes. Using data from 1603 to 1868

on rebellions across the 267 domains, we find that domains that organized widespread

protests secured larger decreases in their tax rate than more pacific neighbors.

While early modern Japan has been intensely studied, few have analyzed sub-national

variation.2 Second, this paper is the first that we know of to test the relationship be-

tween organized resistance and taxation in a systematic way in early modern Japan, and

generally. Drawing on the historical literature, the paper also suggests the conditions

under which such resistance is not just possible, but effective.

This paper has three remaining sections. First, we provide background on the gover-

nance structure of Tokugawa-era Japan, focusing on taxation. Second, drawing on the

literature, we develop hypotheses. In section three, we describe our empirical strategy

and present the analyses. Section four concludes.

1This number fluctuated earlier in the period, but settled at 267 (Bolitho, 1995a, 205).2See Sugimoto (1975) and White (1989) for important exceptions.

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2 Taxation and Rebellion

Though the literature on taxation is vast, we still do not understand well variation

in levels or forms of taxation across and within states (Cheibub, 1998). Economists

have focused on optimal tax rates, or tax systems, given individuals’ incentives not

to comply, and in some cases, the costs required for coercion (e.g., Slemrod, 1990).

While Levi (1988) does not focus on the optimal rate, she proposes a framework to

explore how rulers generate revenue. For Levi, rulers’ taxation depends on four factors:

transaction costs (often overlooked in the economics literature (Besley and Persson,

2010)); the discount rate of the government; the government’s bargaining power vis-a-

vis the population; and the overall fiscal situation of the government. How do these

factors figure into the situation in early modern Japan? Here we focus primarily on the

third factor: relative bargaining power, defined primarily as the government’s access to

resources. Levi suggests that rebellion is possible, but infrequent, and that substantial

resources are required - making it unlikely that peasants would be able to rebel (Levi,

1988, 53).3. Indeed, Ferejohn and Rosenbluth McCall (2010) suggest that in Japan,

peasants had little recourse.

But peasants were able to rebel. Between the start of the Tokugawa period (ca.

1603) and the beginning of the Meiji Restoration (1868), peasants rebelled 5,420 times

between 1590 and 1878 across Japan. According to Aoki (1971), 1,052 of those times

were specifically protesting the taxation rate. Figure 1 shows the variation over time.

In the next section, we describe these rebellions and how villagers were able to organize

in more detail. How were they able to rebel? In his Marxist analysis, Vlastos (1986,

11) argues that three factors enabled them to do so: 1) peasants identified as a class;

2) they shared communal tasks; and 3) there was little differentiation within class. In

addition, samurai lived far from the villages themselves. Finally, Vlastos also cites

ethnic homogeneity as helpful.

Of course, Japan is not the only setting where tax-related rebellions occurred. For

3Elsewhere, she refines the expectation: rebellions should happen where there are significant eco-nomic and political resources but not where a monopoly exists on which the monarch depends for hisrule (Brustein and Levi, 1987, 451)

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Long-Term Trend in Rebellion in Tokugawa Japan

Long-Term Trend in Rebellion in Tokugawa Japan

Figure 1: Tax and Non-Tax Rebellions in Tokugawa Japan

example, Michael Bush documents rebellions in early Tudor England. However, each

one was prompted by changes in the form of taxation. The Tudors court attempted

to modernize its financial system in two ways: by assessing privately held assets, and

by making the tax a regular one (White, 1995, 41). Between 1450 and 1550, such

adjustments prompted 6 revolts (Bush, 1991). In contrast, in Tokugawa Japan, rebel-

lions were primarily linked to the rate of taxation, rather than its form. Closer to the

Japanese experience, Rapoport (2004) describes the tax system for villages during the

first century of Mamluk rule in Egypt (ca 1300). They were levied on entire villages,

and were paid in-kind for grains. Large-scale revolts lead by Arab tribesmen against the

Mamluk rulers were at least partly linked to taxation resistance. However, in Japan,

many revolts were limited to han - rather than large-scale.

In other words, in the case of Japan, rulers faced a variation of the typical taxation

problem. They faced collective non-compliance. Therefore, the challenge was to set the

optimal tax rate (and form), given incentives for groups not to comply, and their ability

to organize. Based on the frequency of rebellions and protests, we could infer that the

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optimal tax rate was not reached. Yet the question is: did the rebellions work? Were

villagers able to win tax concessions from their rulers? We take advantage of the spatial

variation in rebellion and data on taxes collected to test a straightforward hypothesis:

did more rebellions domains secure lower tax rates? The variation across Japan and

fine-grained data allow us to explore this question.

An alternative is presented by Bolitho (1995b) and Saxonhouse (1995): the changing

economy, rather than rebellions, lead to lower taxes. As people shifted from agrar-

ian labor to “proto-markets,” the argument goes, the daimyo left the land tax alone

while seeking new ways to extract resources. But these changes cannot account for the

variation in taxation that we observe.

3 Governance and Unrest in Early Modern Japan

Before testing the long-term impact of rebellions on taxation, we describe the gover-

nance structures in place during the Edo period (ca 1603-1867), focusing on taxation in

particular. The Edo period began when Ieyasu Tokugawa, himself a powerful daimyo,

defeated his main rival and unified the country under his rule as shogun. The Toku-

gawa shogunate, based in Edo, was a dynasty that co-existed with the Emperor, based

in Kyoto. In practice, though, the Tokugawa house stripped the Emperor and royal

court of their authority and even their wealth. In effect, the shogun was similar to 14th

and 15th-century European rulers, in which “The difference between the overlord and

the others was at first only one of degree; he was primus inter pares” (Schumpeter, 1991

(1918, 102).

Nevertheless, semi-formal rules were outlined in the buke-sho-hatto, first in 1615 and

again in 1635, which established the hierarchy between the bakufu and the han. The

bakufu settled disputes among daimyo, reducing the costs associated with going to

war. The daimyo were the lords of the land, but served at the shogun’s pleasure -

and they could be removed at any time.4 Further, daimyo were required to submit

4However, this practice declined over time. “Between 1616 and 1651, there had been a total of 95attainders, an average of just under 3 cases per year. The remainder of the Tokugawa period, from

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to inspections and reviews of their justice-related decisions. They also had to submit

maps of their territories - but only twice, in 1644 and 1697 (Bolitho, 1995a, 226).

They were also prohibited from preventing travel through their han, or from erecting

barriers or collecting tolls. Daimyo were forced to spend money on troops. But more

importantly, they were also required to maintain a residence in Edo and engage in

“alternate attendance” (sankinkotai) - periods when they were required to be present

in Edo. When they were not living in Edo, they had to leave wives and children in

the capital. When emergencies occurred in other han, daimyo were required to send

assistance (Bolitho, 1995b, 231).5 The Bakufu also mandated that daimyo maintain one

castle, and that all vassals live near the castle - removing samurai from the villages, and

making them more easily monitored by the Bakufu.

Finally, the han did not pay any taxes to the shogun directly (Whitney Hall, 1995,

178). Rather, they were required to maintain sufficient armed forces, and to occasion-

ally send their forces into action against recalcitrant daimyo. However, daimyo were

compelled to spend massive sums to maintain their estates - including numerous samu-

rai - in Edo. Further, when the shogun traveled, he could request costly accompaniment

by daimyos’ samurai, and lavish accommodations.

Interestingly, the bakufu did not attempt to centralize power (White, 1988b, 11).

Indeed, the regime even seems to have withdrawn oversight after the 17th century.6 This

includes the land surveys - which did not change for the last 100 years (Whitney Hall,

1995, 191). The shogunate did not collect taxes from the daimyo; it maintained its

own 47 domains that it taxed directly (Jansen, 1995a, 147). Revenue was collected

from among the shogunate’s granary lands, which were distributed among 47 of the 68

provinces. By 1734, there were only 47 intendants, charged with collecting the bakufu’s

taxes; these in turn also relied on 26 han for assistance in collecting the bakufu tax

(Whitney Hall, 1995, 189). As with the daimyo, the mura system of levying taxes on

1652 to 1867, presents a marked contrast, only 118 instances over more than 200 years, or fewer than1 a year” (Bolitho, 1995a, 227).

5In turn, this requirement lead to the creation of a sophisticated highway system (Saxonhouse, 1995,744).

6However, White (1988b) argues that even as capacity declined, centralization increased.

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an entire village was used. Village leaders were responsible for collecting the tax. They

also taxed commercial activities in the urban centers that it gradually usurped from the

daimyo (Whitney Hall, 1995, 171). In a sense, the difference between daimyo and the

shogun was the size of their holdings.

3.1 Han Rule

Han covered three quarters of Japan’s territory, and “They presided over most of Japan’s

wealth and garnered most of its taxes” (Bolitho, 1995a, 202).7 Bolitho goes on to say

that the only governance the majority of Japanese knew was the han. The comparability

of the han to the bakufu in terms of their governing structures is uncontroversial among

historians (Bolitho, 1995a, 203). Han were mostly autonomous, though required to

be “well-governed” (Bolitho, 1995a, 213). In practice, after the death of the third

Tokugawa shogun Iemitsu in 1650, enforcement even of those guidelines waned. At the

same time, because of the rule stipulating that samurai live in castle towns, “villages

became self-governing to a degree that had previously been unknown” (Saxonhouse,

1995, 744).8

Domain productivity was measured in terms of koku - bundles of rice. No domain

was “smaller” than 10,000 koku (Whitney Hall, 1995, 172). In turn, the relationship

between villages and daimyo was primarily fiscal (Saxonhouse, 1995, 744). Daimyo and

village leaders were hereditary. Land taxes, or nengu, were paid in kind - most often

in rice - and villages were assessed as a whole. Eighty percent of the han income came

from taxes - ranging from 40-50 and up to 70%. Rice tax was paid in rice directly;

cereals (“dry crops,” as opposed to rice) and taxes related to housing was typically paid

7There were initially 3 important categories of han: the fudai, the tozama, and the kamon. Thefudai were the “inner” daimyo - those that supported the Tokugawa clan from the beginning. Fudaidaimyo were situated in less agriculturally advantageous lands (Saxonhouse, 1995, 744).

8Samurais’ lost authority over their fiefs was restricted to “new” han. In older han (those establishedbefore the end of the 16th century, samurai remained in the villages, where villagers were not allowedto engage in any economic activity beyond subsistence farming. In these older han, Bolitho argues,villages more backward, and for some reason, less likely to rebel (Bolitho, 1995a, 208). In addition, oldhans like Satsuma and Choshu, in the meantime, were able to restructure their han finances. Satsumabecame the monopoly producer and distributor of sugar, while Choshu had a similar tobacco monopoly.Saxonhouse (1995) attributes Satsuma’s ability to maintain samurai in the countryside to its relativelyperipheral location. As a result, its land surveys were also more accurate.

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in cash (Bolitho, 1995a, 232). Komononari were taxes on everything else, which were

considerably less.

The main purpose of taxation was to pay the samurais’ stipends - in rice. Within the

domains, the main public good that taxes funded was security in the form of samurai

stipends. Services and additional public goods were provided within communities, if at

all. In addition, given the extended period of stability within Japan for roughly two

and a half centuries, it was not clear that samurai were providing security more than

living off of peasants’ provisions. (At the same time, given production shortages and

a growing population of samurai, the warriors were unsatisfied with the size of their

stipends (Bolitho, 1995b; Jansen, 1995b).) Bolitho (1995b, 16) affirms that the daimyo

were de facto independent, but without military strength. For peasants, tax obligations

were “pre-modern,” or direct, rather than related to the greater good per se; they were

pre-social contract theory (Levi, 1988, 102).

If the Bakufu lacked mechanisms for assessing territories’ wealth, so did the daimyo

in their own han, according to Saxonhouse (1995). After the early 17th century, no

cadastral records were even attempted (Saxonhouse, 1995, 745). When more revenue

was needed, the tax rate changed or a piecemeal adjustment was made. “Given that

these adjustments were made irregularly on imperfect information and in the face of

local opposition, it is hardly surprising that the marginal rate of taxation on agricultural

production converged to zero over the two and one half centuries of Tokugawa rule”

(Saxonhouse, 1995, 745).

There was wide variation in how daimyos managed the challenges of revenue shortages.

Many cut samurai stipends, others created monopoly ventures (Bolitho, 1995b, 18).

Taxes, however, were not adjusted in the late 1830s (Bolitho, 1995b, 20) [The other

chapter claims that they were realigned in Mito]. At the same time, farmers started

moving into non-taxable sectors, such as trade (Bolitho, 1995b, 32). Many han were

tobichi, or fragmented, to diversify their economic bases. Another favored tactic to

increase revenue was land reclamation. In fact, land under production doubled during

the Tokugawa period - though the majority of these reclamations went unreported to

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the bakufu. However, while this tactic increased revenues through about 1710, revenues

declined after that. Expenditures in the growing cities and samurai stipends were highly

costly (Bolitho, 1995a, 236).

3.2 Rebellions

Between 1603 and 1867, the span of the Edo period, peasants rebelled 3,534.9 We focus

on this period, because with the creation of the Tokugawa regime, many daimyo were

relocated and at least 94 new han created (Whitney Hall, 1995), marking a break with

the previous period. The number of rebellions is surprising. Resistance is difficult to

mount in general (Levi, 1988). In addition, Japanese society in the 19th century featured

strongly enforced social hierarchies. For example, peasants were barred from owning

weapons in a strictly enforced distinction between them and the samurai. However,

there were clear mechanisms within this structure to manage discontent - which dated

to before the Tokugawa period. Keirstead (1990, 357) writes that the “repertoire” of

peasant protest during the Shoen period (ca 8-15th centuries) encompassed 3 stages:

petition, oath, and flight.

Peasants’ rights were formalized by the bakufu in 1603: they could either lodge formal

complaints or abandon their han altogether in protest (Bolitho, 1995a, 235). Village

leaders were responsible for ensuring that the village amassed the necessary quantity

of rice, and if not, to organize a petition (the formal complaint) to the daimyo for tax

forgiveness. They could also issue a complaint for poor governance or abuse of power

by the daimyo. All peasants were forced to be members of goningumi - public service

committees - in which they were responsible for enforcing rules among their neighbors,

and denouncing those who violated them.

Aoki (1971) documents different types of rebellion and resistance, referred to collec-

tively as ikki. The most intense is hoki, a widespread insurrection, sometimes armed,

of a large number of commoners. Its urban analogue is the uchikowashi, a destructive

9We collected information on a total of 4,604 rebellions between 1590 and 1878 across Japan, butin this paper we focus on the Edo period.

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Figure 2: Distribution of Types of Rebellions during the Edo Period

riot, most often sparked by the price of rice. Fuon were less drastic, and ranged from a

disorderly rally to minor violence. The goso is a “coercive appeal,” meaning a petition

backed up with some sort of threat, to protest, or to abandon the village. In contrast,

the osso was a deferential overture - typically not to the daimyo, but rather to the

bakufu. The shuso was also a petition but most commonly addressed to the closest

governmental office. Finally, there was also the possibility of lodging a secret appeal to

a governmental leader, seen as the least aggressive approach. Figure 2 illustrates the

variation in type of rebellion.

The daimyo reaction was usually twofold: pacify the protesters, and punish the leaders

(White, 1988a). In addition, the bakufu could intervene and did so increasingly in the

18th century - mostly to refuse concessions (White, 1988b). White (1988a, 63) writes

that beginning in the 18th century, “there followed a never-ending contest between the

extractive efforts of the government and the resistance of the people” - and it became

clear land tax couldn’t be increased. In the next section, we test this proposition with

fine-grained, cross-sectional data.

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4 Empirics

In order to assess the overall effect of rebellions on tax, we look at the variation in local

tax rates across domains in Japan in 1868, before the end of the Edo Period in Japan in

1869-1871. This marks an era after which the Western influence dramatically changed

Japan’s governance structure; what remained as a collection of domains deeply rooted in

neo-Confucianism and autocratic institutions became exposed to the foreign concepts of

democracy and communism, constitutions and modern nation-states. The years between

1869 and 1871 saw the last remains of Japan’s feudal system consisting of independent,

sovereign domains before the Meiji Restoration. By focusing on the Tokugawa (Edo)

period between 1603 and 1868, we take advantage of the country’s unique micro-state

setting in history. We consider each domain as essentially an independent state with its

own fiscal policy and army.

Furthermore during the Tokugawa regime, Japan witnessed few violent incidents in-

volving multiple daimyos against the shogunate or themselves. Inter-domain conflicts

were rare and involved samurais and daimyos rather than peasants. Therefore we take

the number and intensity of peasant rebellions that occurred within each domain as the

main variable of interest. Given that rice cultivation constituted the main livelihood

for the people and the main source of revenue for the rulers, we also take the change in

rice tax rate as the dependent variable.

It is important to note that collection of tax for the provision of public goods rarely

characterized feudal states’s policy in Japan. On the contrary, historians cite incidents

of tax imposed on commoners primarily as means to accumulate wealth for the elite

during this period. In Japan daimyos who controlled their own domains exerted power

through samurais; retainer stipends and personal expenses of the daimyo consumed most

of the local government revenues (Ravina, 1999). In the following empirical results we

discuss the relationship between tax in general and rebellions, but also how greater

expenses on the samurai income and heavier tax rates may have been associated with

rebellions, controlling for the productivity and population as well as past records of

natural disasters in the region.

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4.1 Data

Dependent Variable: Taxation

Our dependent variable is tax rate. The data are derived from Hanshi Soran (1977).

It is originally constructed by two variables: Rice Revenue (Shunodaka) and Estimated

Rice Output (Uchidaka). We construct a tax change variable based on two variables:

the actual tax rate (Shunodaka/Uchidaka) and the estimated tax rate in the past (Shun-

odaka/Omotedaka). This is a counterfactual measure in the sense that the estimated

tax rate is based on the actual collection divided by the official estimated output by the

Bakufu in the past. We use the Nengu variable derived from Kodama and Masamoto

(1977) for the tax rate in 1868. The Tax Change variable is estimated by the actual tax

variable subtracted by the estimated tax rate variable.

We also test an alternative measure, the salary for samurai as a proportion of the tax

rate, and its change over time. Because taxes on peasants were essentially redistributed

to the samurai, their salary is a reasonable proxy. The dependent variable is calculated

by two variables: the estimated present tax rate and the estimated tax rate in the past.

The former variable is estimated by this formula: (S-C)/Ux100 in which S denotes

the actual tax collection (Shunodaka); C denotes the total amount of samurai salary

(Chigyo); and U denotes the assessed rice output (Uchidaka). The latter variable is

calculated by multiplying the estimated yearly allowance, or stipend, for samurai by the

number of samurai recorded in the domain, based on Ishikawa (2010) and Murakoshi

(2010). Then we subtract that amount from the Shunodaka, or overall tax, and calculate

the proportion that this figure represents for the overall estimated output of a domain.10

The Samurai Tax Change is the simple difference between the estimated present tax

rate and the estimated tax rate in the past. We calculate the alternative measure

of the dependent variable based on two variables: the actual proportion of samurai

salary of the total present output and the estimated proportion of samurai salary of

10The formula is: (S-0.005x365xH)/Ox100 in which H denotes the total number of samurai and Odenotes the official estimated output by the Bakufu in the past. 0.005 represents the portion of onekoku that each samurai received for a daily allowance (Ishikawa, 2010; Murakoshi, 2010).

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the official output assessed by the Bakufu in the past. The latter variable is calculated

by multiplying the yearly stipend by the number of samurai in the domain, divided

by the original recorded output of the domain.The Samurai Salary Change is thus the

difference between these two variables.

Independent Variables

Our main independent variable - rebellions and unrest - come from from Aoki (1971). We

collected information of a total of 5,420 rebellions between 1590 and 1878 across Japan.

The variable codes the total number of rebellions within each domain at a given time

period. We code two variables - Violent Rebellion and Rebellion Intensity - depending

on the intensity of violence. Violent Rebellion is constructed based on four violent

incident types: Hoki; Uchikoashi; Goso; and Fuon. For intensity, we assign a value to

four types of rebellion that peasants mobilized, depending on the level of violence. Hoki

is coded as the most violent rebellion type and has a value of 4. Uchikowashi is the

second most violent, and has a value of 3. Goso has a value of 2,ab and Fuon has a

value of 1. We expect that whatever the type of protest, the more numerous they are,

the lower the tax rate will be.

We also code the motivation of the rebellion, based on Aoki (1971), who recorded it

for each rebellion based on first and secondary sources. We construct a dummy variable:

1 if Aoki reports that the motivation for the rebellion was tax-related and 0 otherwise.

We expect tax-related rebellions to have a stronger effect on depressing the tax rate

than non-tax-related rebellions.

We also include a number of controls. While we do not have domain-level socioe-

conomic indicators during this time period, we do have the estimated rice price in

Osaka annually from 1701 and 1868, derived from Iwahashi (1981). We also include

mean province population from 12 different years spanning from 1720 to 1846 (Hayami,

1992).11 Domains with larger populations paradoxically may have generated less rev-

enue, because urban residents were not taxed; but we don’t have an expectation about

11There are on average 4.2 domains contained within a province, and 6.4 domains in a prefecture.

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the tax rate.

Data on natural disasters are derived from Saito (1966). We code the total number of

each natural disasters within a prefecture between 1840 and 1868. The variables range

from Famine to Storm. Since the unit of analysis is the prefecture, some domains have

the same value if they belong to the same prefecture. Floods and storms are the most

frequent natural disasters recorded at the prefecture level, followed by draughts and

earthquakes. The rarest disaster type is tsunami, which usually “skips a generation”

but nonetheless the most damaging in many cases. Data on earthquakes are originally

from http://iisee.kenken.go.jp/utsu/index eng.html. We first calculate the intensity of

earthquake surrounding the epicenter, and then code the number of earthquakes affected

within each domain during a given time period. Natural disasters could affect taxes

collected in two ways. First, the affected domains could receive tax forgiveness if crops

were destroyed. Second, non-affected domains could see taxes increase because daimyo

were required by the bakufu to provide assistance to other han after disasters (Bolitho,

1995b).

4.2 Analyses

Table 1 provides the summary statistics for variables used in our empirical results.

The mean tax change across domains is around -9 percent, suggesting that between

the official record of rice output in the beginning of the Tokugawa regime and 1868,

there had been a significant drop in the tax rate imposed on the peasants. The daimyo

revenue as part of the total rice tax also decreased significantly. The mean of –19

percent shows that on average a typical daimyo had to spend more tax revenue on

retaining samurais over time. Similarly, the 10 percent increase in tax spent on the

samurai income suggests that, assuming no change in the total number of samurais,

more tax revenue per total rice output was spent on samurais. Between 1603 and 1868,

the typical domain experienced eight rebellions, and the average highest intensity was

2, indicating a Goso, or a coercive appeal White (1988a) categorizes all rebellions into

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one of three types: fiscal, administrative, and economic. Less than 30 percent of these

rebellions were motivated by tax reasons, as coded by Aoki (1971).

In order to explain the variation in tax rates in 1868, we first show that rebellions

of high intensities, and more rebellions during the Tokugawa regime, explain a lower

tax rate in general. In Table 2a, Columns 2 to 4 show that the highest mob intensity

recorded has a significant negative impact on the tax change dependent variable. The

coefficient value of 1.7 under Column 4 for example suggests that controlling for the

number of rebellions, rice price, population and natural disasters, a higher intensity level

leads to a 1.7 unit drop in tax percentage. The results suggest that rebellions are more

effective in reducing tax rates when they involve actual casualties and intense in scale.

The insignificance of the total number of rebellions also suggests that more rebellions

do not necessarily mean less tax; in fact, small and insignificant peasant uprisings, even

if numerous, may have failed to influence the daimyo.12

In order to address different implications of daimyo expenses on the personal vs.

samurais, we separate the tax revenue into daimyo revenue and samurai income. We

find that the tax rate, when the samurai income portion is excluded, is lower in domains

that experienced high intensity rebellions. In Table 3a, Columns 2 to 4 show that the

highest mob intensity level has a statistically significant impact on the subsequent tax

rate. The coefficient value of 1.9 under Column 4 for example suggests that a unit

increase in the intensity scale of recorded rebellions leads to a 1.9 drop in the percent

change in tax rate. This effect is robust and strengthened as both socioeconomic controls

(rice price and population) and natural disaster indicators are added. The number of

rebellions in the past also seems to have a negative impact on the daimyo revenue

excluding expenses on samurais, although its statistical significance disappears under

Columns 3 and 4.

Next we only consider the change in tax allocated for the samurai income. Table

4a has the same specifications as in Table 2a and 3a, and presents results in which

domains with more rebellions throughout the time period appear to spend more on

12Add case studies.

16

samurai income as part of the tax revenue. Under Column 4, the coefficient of the

rebellion variable is positive and statistically significant. The value of 0.065 suggests

that a one unit increase in the number of rebellions during the Tokugawa regime leads

to about a 0.07 increase in the percent change in tax rate, as indicated by the samurai

income. The highest mob intensity level does not appear to affect changes in tax for

samurai income. The insignificance of the intensity variable and the small magnitude

of the rebellion coefficient value together suggest that while intense peasant rebellions

in the past affected a daimyo’s ability to collect taxes for his own benefit, they did

not substantially alter the social structure of the daimyo system. The samurai class

remained relatively unscathed by any domestic rebellions, and while the total tax rev-

enue may have decreased over the years, the payment towards the retainers stayed more

or less constant as a percentage of the tax revenue. The fact that the number of past

rebellions has a small but statistically significant and positive impact on the samurai

income is understandable; for a daimyo who experience peasant rebellions in the past,

a more substantial amount of his revenue must have been invested into the retainers

as he sought to control his subjects. As a result however, the daimyo appears to have

suffered more revenue strain. These results, taken in conjunction with our findings in

the original specification, suggest an interesting dynamic at play. While daimyo appear

to be granting rebellious han concessions in the tax rate, they also appear to increase

their repressive capacity. Take together, the results suggest that high-intensity rebel-

lions lead to a lower tax rate, while the frequency of rebellions leads to more repressive

capacity.

One concern we have is that tax-induced rebellions may have had different impact

on the subsequent tax rate. After all, if rebellions were motivated by factors related

specifically to the daimyo’s tax decision, these rebellions may have had more direct

effect than others. Appendix 1 presents a set of results (Tables 2b and 2c, 3b and

3c, 4b and 4c) in which the specifications in Tables 2a, 3a, and 4a are replicated, but

rebellions types are divided into tax-induced vs. others. In all of these cases, we find

that past rebellions induced by tax rates (due to unjust tax reforms, draconian tax

17

measures etc.) either give similar results as those rebellions in general (Table 4b), or do

not appear to have much significance in explaining the tax rate in 1868 (Tables 2b and

3b). Furthermore, rebellions that are not tax motivated give similar results as rebellion

types combined. These findings lead us to believe that rebellions in general, whether tax

induced or not, have negative influence on fiscal policies in 1868, while the cumulative

effect of tax-induced rebellions on subsequent tax rate is weak.13

5 Conclusion

Despite the numerous peasant revolts, Saxonhouse (1995) points out how politically

stable the Tokugawa regime was. It endured for nearly three centuries. After a period

of severe crop failure and famine in 1833-1836, peasants engaged in popular revolts which

led the shogunate to implement realm-wide Tempo reforms in 1841 (Bolitho, 1995b).

However, these efforts failed - in fact, they provoked further resistance. Eventually, the

combination of foreign encroachment, revenue shortages, and the inability of the regime

to adapt, created the opportunity for reform-minded samurai and daimyo to challenge

the shogunate. Though they advocated reform, they followed a deeply conservative

ideology of loyalism to the emperor (Jansen, 1995a, 149). They were incensed that the

shogunate would allow the country to appear weak in the face of outside interference;

they wanted to maintain isolation. The final affront came when the shogunate agreed

to a treaty with England without securing approval from the emperor in Kyoto. Four

powerful domains set aside their differences to challenge the shogunate in the name

of the crown (Jansen, 1995b). It seems that peasants did not actively participate in

the rebellion, and were only recruited into a national army after the Meiji Restoration

was underway (Vlastos, 1995). The loyalists won, the shogun resigned, and a gradual

transition to a modern, centralized state began. In 1869, however, domains remained

the same - as did their taxes within them. Domains were abolished in 1871, when they

were replaced by prefectures. In addition, the taxation system radically changed. For

13Because of our inability to review Aoki’s judgment, we cannot be sure that we agree with hisassertion. White (1988b, 39), for example, claims that 80% of protests were related to tax reasons.

18

the first time, a common currency was introduced throughout Japan, and taxes were to

be collected in monetary form (Vlastos, 1995). Individuals became owners of the land

they worked - though local elites benefitted from an absence of records in many cases.

Further, individuals’ property were newly assessed and a tax rate levied.

Sugimoto (1975) finds that this rebellion, which led to the Boshio War (1868) and

ultimately to Meiji Restoration, was independent of internal peasant rebellions. How-

ever, it does seem clear that peasants were able to mobilize, and to effect changes in

their relationship with their immediate ruler: the daimyo. In fact, there is evidence

that peasants mounted protests after the han system was dismantled: they wanted the

return of their daimyo (Vlastos, 1995). One reason that this paper points to is that

they had mechanisms to influence policies, and were able to mobilize to use them.

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Table 1: Summary Statistics

Obs Mean Std. Dev.

Tax Variables, 1868

tax change 231 -8.85 12.22

tax change (excluding total Samurai income) 230 -19.18 12.09

tax change (only including total samurai income) 230 10.36 5.03

Rebellions 1603-1868

total number of rebellions 267 8.43 14.52

corresponding maximum mob intensity 238 2.00 1.47

number of rebellions that are tax induced 267 2.48 4.97


number of rebellions that are not tax induced 267 5.94 10.64


Provincial Controls

estimated rice price (Osaka-based), 1701-1868 257 77.53 6.44

mean cencus population (1000's), 1720-1846 239 512.91 314.17

Prefectural Controls

number of earthquakes, 1840-1868 267 1.54 1.43

number of tsunamis, 1840-1868 267 0.12 0.34

number of draughts, 1840-1868 267 1.98 1.85

number of famines, 1840-1868 267 0.15 0.35

number of poor harvests, 1840-1868 267 1.15 1.95

number of pests, 1840-1868 267 0.07 0.26

number of fires, 1840-1868 267 1.04 1.55

number of floods, 1840-1868 267 5.78 4.04

number of heavy snows, 1840-1868 267 0.34 0.65

number of heavy rains, 1840-1868 267 0.64 0.98

number of storms, 1840-1868 267 7.26 5.05

number of epidemics, 1840-1868 267 0.46 1.21

Table 2a: Rice Tax Change and Rebellions, 1603-1868

(1) (2) (3) (4)

VARIABLES

Total Sum of Rebellions, 1603-1868 -0.132** -0.091 -0.058 -0.006

(0.061) (0.065) (0.092) (0.095)

Highest Mob Intensity Level Recorded -0.939 -1.266* -1.655**

(0.605) (0.755) (0.811)

Estimated Provincial Rice Price, 1701-1868 0.144 -0.120

(0.147) (0.241)

Mean Provincial Population (1000's), 1720-1846 -0.007 -0.005

(0.005) (0.004)

Number of earthquakes in Prefecture, 1840-1868 2.087

(1.500)

Number of tsunamis in Prefecture, 1840-1868 0.456

(4.951)

Number of draughts in Prefecture, 1840-1868 -0.876

(0.921)

Number of poor harvests in Prefecture, 1840-1868 -3.159

(2.563)

Number of pests in Prefecture, 1840-1868 6.549

(8.446)

Number of fires in Prefecture, 1840-1868 0.784

(0.761)

Number of floods in Prefecture, 1840-1868 0.181

(0.271)

Number of heavy snows in Prefecture, 1840-1868 -1.751

(2.892)

Number of heavy rains in Prefecture, 1840-1868 -0.095

(2.207)

Number of storms in Prefecture, 1840-1868 0.611*

(0.335)

Number of epidemics in Prefecture, 1840-1868 -0.830

(0.907)

Constant -7.676*** -6.067*** -13.576 1.405

(0.870) (1.141) (11.355) (17.814)

Observations 231 203 179 179

R-squared 0.027 0.038 0.071 0.167

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3a: Tax Change (Excluding Samurai Stipends) and Rebellions, 1603-1868

(1) (2) (3) (4)

VARIABLES

Total Sum of Rebellions, 1603-1868 -0.201*** -0.150** -0.104 -0.070

(0.068) (0.073) (0.094) (0.100)

Highest Mob Intensity Level Recorded -1.152* -1.551** -1.891**

(0.606) (0.738) (0.740)

Estimated Provincial Rice Price, 1701-1868 0.254* 0.055

(0.146) (0.244)


(0.005) (0.005)


(1.482)


(5.156)

Number of draughts in Prefecture, 1840-1868 -1.526*

(0.866)


(2.483)

Number of pests in Prefecture, 1840-1868 -1.073

(7.934)


(0.768)


(0.266)


(2.875)


(2.259)

Number of storms in Prefecture, 1840-1868 0.461

(0.322)


(0.843)

Constant -17.391*** -15.469*** -32.063*** -18.598

(0.869) (1.127) (11.317) (17.961)


R-squared 0.064 0.081 0.106 0.195


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4a: Tax Change (Only Based on Samurai-Stipends) and Rebellions, 1603-1868

(1) (2) (3) (4)

VARIABLES

Total Sum of Rebellions, 1603-1868 0.068*** 0.059** 0.048 0.065*

(0.025) (0.026) (0.031) (0.034)

Highest Mob Intensity Level Recorded 0.166 0.217 0.237

(0.228) (0.236) (0.243)

Estimated Provincial Rice Price, 1701-1868 -0.105*** -0.140**

(0.037) (0.063)

Mean Provincial Population (1000's), 1720-1846 -0.001 0.001

(0.001) (0.001)


(0.364)

Number of tsunamis in Prefecture, 1840-1868 -2.424**

(1.080)

Number of draughts in Prefecture, 1840-1868 0.657*

(0.339)

Number of poor harvests in Prefecture, 1840-1868 -2.791***

(0.833)

Number of pests in Prefecture, 1840-1868 8.341***

(3.004)

Number of fires in Prefecture, 1840-1868 0.617***

(0.212)

Number of floods in Prefecture, 1840-1868 -0.216***

(0.082)

Number of heavy snows in Prefecture, 1840-1868 1.073

(0.879)

Number of heavy rains in Prefecture, 1840-1868 1.162**

(0.488)


(0.102)

Number of epidemics in Prefecture, 1840-1868 -0.563*

(0.286)

Constant 9.757*** 9.543*** 18.436*** 17.875***

(0.324) (0.504) (2.891) (4.828)


R-squared 0.042 0.043 0.062 0.241


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix 1

Table 2b: Rice Tax Change and Tax-Induced Rebellions, 1603-1868

(1) (2) (3) (4)

VARIABLES

Total Sum of Tax-Induced Rebellions -0.306 -0.309 -0.322 -0.373

(0.186) (0.229) (0.411) (0.434)

Highest Mob Intensity Level Recorded 0.131 -0.061 0.089

(0.775) (0.964) (0.968)


(0.146) (0.230)


(0.005) (0.005)


(1.438)


(4.869)


(0.857)


(2.424)


(8.194)


(0.742)


(0.263)


(2.863)

Number of heavy rains in Prefecture, 1840-1868 0.222

(2.266)

Number of storms in Prefecture, 1840-1868 0.628**

(0.315)


(0.900)

Constant -8.065*** -8.543*** -17.275 -2.294

(0.928) (1.100) (11.409) (16.746)


R-squared 0.016 0.015 0.044 0.145


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2c: Rice Tax Change and Non Tax-Induced Rebellions, 1603-1868

(1) (2) (3) (4)

VARIABLES

Total Sum of Non Tax-Induced Rebellions -0.180** -0.126 -0.077 0.009

(0.088) (0.093) (0.111) (0.103)

Highest Mob Intensity Level Recorded -0.895 -1.262* -1.695***

(0.622) (0.698) (0.632)


(0.145) (0.234)


(0.005) (0.004)


(1.417)


(4.916)


(0.895)


(2.336)


(7.331)


(0.659)


(0.264)


(2.735)


(2.230)

Number of storms in Prefecture, 1840-1868 0.616*

(0.329)


(0.924)

Constant -7.713*** -6.428*** -15.353 -2.879

(0.850) (1.156) (11.272) (17.787)


R-squared 0.027 0.039 0.078 0.174


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3b: Tax Change (Excluding Samurai Stipends) and Tax-Induced Rebellions, 1603-1868

(1) (2) (3) (4)

VARIABLES

Total Sum of Tax-Induced Rebellions -0.485** -0.484* -0.530 -0.557

(0.217) (0.270) (0.397) (0.411)

Highest Mob Intensity Level Recorded 0.081 0.003 -0.043

(0.768) (0.899) (0.830)


(0.142) (0.234)


(0.005) (0.005)


(1.431)


(5.131)

Number of draughts in Prefecture, 1840-1868 -1.800**

(0.830)


(2.393)


(7.949)


(0.786)


(0.260)


(2.901)


(2.312)


(0.304)


(0.864)

Constant -17.937*** -18.327*** -35.565*** -22.740

(0.926) (1.083) (10.998) (16.761)


R-squared 0.042 0.040 0.066 0.159


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3c: Tax Change (Excluding Samurai Stipends) and Non Tax-Induced Rebellions, 1603-1868

(1) (2) (3) (4)

VARIABLES

Total Sum of Non Tax-Induced Rebellions -0.270*** -0.211** -0.131 -0.066

(0.097) (0.103) (0.110) (0.110)

Highest Mob Intensity Level Recorded -0.918 -1.469** -1.913***

(0.622) (0.677) (0.596)


(0.141) (0.238)


(0.005) (0.005)


(1.416)


(5.148)

Number of draughts in Prefecture, 1840-1868 -1.435*

(0.847)


(2.266)


(6.773)


(0.686)


(0.262)


(2.732)


(2.349)


(0.318)


(0.867)

Constant -17.475*** -16.293*** -33.910*** -22.860

(0.845) (1.125) (11.018) (17.956)


R-squared 0.062 0.075 0.109 0.195


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4b: Tax Change (Only Based on Samurai-Stipends) and Tax-Induced Rebellions, 1603-1868

(1) (2) (3) (4)

VARIABLES

Total Sum of Tax-Induced Rebellions 0.177** 0.174** 0.212* 0.183

(0.071) (0.086) (0.117) (0.117)

Highest Mob Intensity Level Recorded 0.032 -0.097 0.145

(0.270) (0.296) (0.256)

Estimated Provincial Rice Price, 1701-1868 -0.097** -0.137**

(0.038) (0.061)

Mean Provincial Population (1000's), 1720-1846 -0.001 0.001

(0.001) (0.001)


(0.348)


(1.083)

Number of draughts in Prefecture, 1840-1868 0.691**

(0.313)


(0.723)


(2.613)


(0.193)


(0.077)


(0.848)


(0.490)


(0.097)

Number of epidemics in Prefecture, 1840-1868 -0.586**

(0.277)

Constant 9.909*** 9.835*** 18.257*** 18.227***

(0.335) (0.366) (3.036) (4.469)


R-squared 0.032 0.034 0.052 0.223


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4c: Tax Change (Only Based on Samurai-Stipends) and Non Tax-Induced Rebellions, 1603-1868

(1) (2) (3) (4)

VARIABLES

Total Sum of Non Tax-Induced Rebellions 0.088** 0.085** 0.055 0.080**

(0.035) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039)

Highest Mob Intensity Level Recorded -0.011 0.162 0.196

(0.241) (0.232) (0.244)

Estimated Provincial Rice Price, 1701-1868 -0.100*** -0.133**

(0.036) (0.061)

Mean Provincial Population (1000's), 1720-1846 -0.001* 0.001

(0.001) (0.001)


(0.345)


(1.030)

Number of draughts in Prefecture, 1840-1868 0.664**

(0.322)


(0.797)


(2.889)


(0.201)


(0.082)


(0.854)


(0.435)


(0.099)

Number of epidemics in Prefecture, 1840-1868 -0.632**

(0.275)

Constant 9.802*** 9.960*** 18.479*** 17.786***

(0.319) (0.450) (2.809) (4.563)


R-squared 0.039 0.035 0.055 0.243


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0 250,000 500,000125,000Meters

4

Number of Rebellions, 1603-1968

0 - 56 - 1617 - 3839 - 6566 - 112

0 250,000 500,000125,000Meters

4

Maximum Rebellion Intensity, 1603-1868

NoneFuonGosoUchikoshiHoki

0 250,000 500,000125,000Meters

4

Domain-Level Tax Change in Japan (%)

-90 - -74-73 - -26-25 - -12-11 - -3-2 - 11

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