reliability report 2016 - rte-france.com · power system and which has a bearing on the role played...

Risk audit department Tour Initiale 1 terrasse Bellini-TSA 41000 92919 La défense CEDEX TEL: +33 (0)1 02 26 48 FAX: +33 (0)1 41 02 24 04

www.rte-france.com

RTE Réseau de transport d’électricité French société anonyme with a management board and supervisory board, and capital of €2,132,285,690 – listed on the Nanterre register of trades and companies

under number 444 619 258

Reliability report 2016

R-JEC-DAR-MAS-2017-00024 Version: 1


Page: 2/30

Copyright RTE. This document is the property of RTE. No communication, reproduction, publication of all or part of this document without express written

authorisation granted by the Electricity Transmission Grid Operator (RTE)

Contents

Summary

1. Significant System Events

Page 4

2. Operational conditions encountered

Page 5

3. Equipment components reliability

Page 12

4. Tools, telecoms and IT

Page 14

5. Other operational levers

Page 16

6. Developments and changes to the network

Page 18

7. Contribution of human resources and

organisations to reliability

Page 19

8. Changes to the reference frameworks and

contractual rules

0

9. Reliability beyond RTE in Europe

Page 22

10. Reliability audits

Page 24

Conclusion and outlook

Glossaries



Page: 3/30



Summary

Every year, RTE produces a reliability report for the past year. This document lays

out the main factors that affected the electrical power system's operational

reliability in 2016 and the initiatives currently under way intended to ensure its

reliability in the future.

Withing a context of the energy transition, changes to the European interconnected

network mean that RTE has to adapt on an on-going basis. These changes include

the increase in the share of renewables injecting an intermittent power supply into

networks, resulting in a need for flexibility, and a diversification in the numbers of

stakeholders operating in the energy sector and changes in the ways in which they

behave.

These changes are dramatically changing the structure of the power system of

tomorrow and the way in which it will operate – particularly the way in which

voltage and frequency are controlled, as well as the distribution of flows, the power

system's stability, the level of reserves needed to ensure supply-demand balance,

network studies, assets' operating and control rules, the tools used and the

expertise of operators.

The results obtained in 2016 are evidence of a globally satisfactory level of

reliability for RTE's operations in somewhat demanding circumstances: more

complex supply-demand balance management, cross-border schedules at

interconnections indicating operation that is closer to its limits and – most

noteworthy – having to manage a cold spell just as several nuclear power plants

had been shut down.

In a drive to keep pace with the changes expected to occur in these circumstances,

RTE implemented numerous initiatives to ensure high levels of reliability:

- maintaining investment levels of €1.5 billion per year; - increasing cross-zonal capacity at borders with our neighbouring countries,

thus bolstering the security of our electricity supply;

- implementing new mechanisms (demand response, capacity mechanism, interruptibility, etc.);

- involvement in tests or projects (AMELIE, Ampacité, iTesla, APOGEE, etc.) designed to predict constraints on the future power system and develop new tools to tackle them.

And the Winter Packet, unveiled by the European Commission at the end of 2016,

which features numerous provisions designed to increase the reliability of the

power system and which has a bearing on the role played by transmission system

operators. RTE will ensure that it sheds light on the political issues which underlie

the technical provisions put forward and that appropriate measures are adopted

for reaching the objectives associated with the energy transition.



Page: 4/30



1. Significant System Events Every year, RTE measures the reliability of the power system by adding up the

number of Significant System Events (SSE). These are classified according to a

scale of severity that ranges from 0 to F. These events correspond to incidents

that can result from a broad range of factors. RTE’s scale is more differentiated

and is compatible with the ICS (Incident Classification Scale) severity scale which

includes four levels defined by ENTSO-E.

Tracking the SSEs over several years flags up any weak signals which deserve to

be analysed in more detail. And the effectiveness of any initiative implemented to

increase operating reliability can be measured over time.

With 35 level A incidents and 2 level B incidents, 2016 was in line with the last

few years (see graph above). Worth noting in 2016 was the incident at the

Vigy substation, which was classified as a level C SSE. The last level C SSE

occurred in 2009.

The level C SSE deals with an incident

which occurred during a maintenance

operation at Vigy’s 400 kV substation.

The service provider tasked with doing

the work knocked a powered-down

busbar onto a powered-up busbar below

it with its handling equipment, resulting

in a busbar fault and the loss of eight

400 kV outgoing feeders, including a

nuclear power plant which islanded itself

in accordance with standard procedure

and an interconnection resulting in an

overload on the network, but without

any effect on consumption. A detailed analysis of this event highlighted the fact

that the operating and maintenance technicians had appropriately addressed these

consequences in real time, meaning that there are no significant recommendations

to be made in relation to the way in which the network was managed. (An analysis

of the human factor conducted resulted in recommendations for the company

tasked with doing the work).

45 41 37

57 55

2632

3830 29

35

4 2 1

85 3 3 2 1 2 21 1 1

4943

39

6660

2935

40

31 31

38

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Increase in SSEs more severe than A

SSE A SSE B SSE C Total SSE > A



Page: 5/30



2. Operational conditions encountered

Regarding the weather conditions, 2016 was another warm year: average

temperatures in France were 0.5°C higher than normal. However, it was not

particularly exceptional, and ranks as the 10th hottest year behind 2014 (+1.2°C),

2011 (+1.1°C) and 2015 (+1°C).

From a very general perspective, the following are noteworthy in terms of system

operation:

Storm Suzana which passed over part of France on 9 February (leading to

violent storms and winds of more than 115 km/h), but which did not result in

any power outages,

increased hydraulic operation compared with 2015 thanks to high springtime

rainfall and high levels of sunshine, good for photovoltaic electricity generation,

a summer heatwave which led RTE to monitor the forecast temperature

changes in its substations in order to prevent any consequences for the

measuring transformers following the incidents of 2015, in addition to the

earlier-than-expected campaign to replace them,

a new maximum of 8632 MW set for wind power generation on 20 November,

covering nearly 18% of France’s total power requirements, despite a fall in the

quantity of wind power generated owing to low wind speeds at the end of the

year,

a cold period coinciding with many nuclear power plant shutdowns during the

2016/2017 winter, mobilising RTE's resources so as to effectively predict

balance between supply and demand, widely involving neighbouring TSOs and

CORESO.

Continued growth in the share of renewable energies

The capacity of power generation facilities in mainland France increased by 1699

MW (+1.3%) compared with 2015 to reach 130 GW in 2016. This increase was

mainly driven by the growing share of renewable energies (+2188 MW),

which went a long way towards compensating for the reduction in fossil-fuel

thermal generation facilities (-488 MW), and the reduction in fuel oil facilities owing

to the two Aramon-based power plants closing (each one generating 685 MW).

Given its increasing share in the power mix, renewable energy production

– despite being decentralised – is playing an increasingly important role

in ensuring the stability and reliability of the power system (frequency,

voltage, margin, etc.). It requires increasingly flexible resources.

Total electricity generation in France was 531.3 TWh – a decrease of nearly 3%

compared with 2015. The fall in power generation in 2016 was mainly due to

reduced production at nuclear and coal-fired power plants.



Page: 6/30



The development of renewable energies is a major component in the energy

transition. For RTE, the main challenge involves forming a sound

understanding of their variability and predicting it, so that supply-demand

balance can be properly managed, and the impact that they have on the network's

reliability can be forecast (flows, voltage, etc.). The demand response mechanisms

need to be adapted on a continuous basis so as to harness any potential for

flexibility among the various stakeholders and tackle the uncertainties associated

with renewables.

Record cross-border schedule capacities to improve system reliability,

despite particularly low cross-border schedules in 2016.

France's balance of trade for 2016 was

positive, with 39.1 TWh of sales. It can be

split into 71.7 TWh of exports and 32.6

TWh of imports. This is the lowest balance

since 2010. December even saw a very

slightly negative average balance of trade

– something which had not been seen

since February 2012. However, a new

positive record was set of 15.9 GW

between 5 PM and 6 PM on 31 January

2016.

Such high positive levels have been made

possible through the introduction of the France-Spain line which was brought into

service at the end of 2015, by flow-based market coupling across the Central

Western European zone and by competitive market prices.

The power system must be able to adapt to highly uncertain and extreme

weather conditions – particularly future cold spells

Power consumption peaked at 7 PM on Monday, 18 January 2016 at 88.6 GW. The

mild start to the year meant that this peak was relatively low.

Sensitivity to consumption currently shows a winter gradient estimated at

2400 MW per °C.

The last few relatively mild winters have had a tendency to hide the variability of

consumption levels – both in terms of annual energy consumption and peak

demand. However, even if the underlying trend is most likely heading towards an

average increase in temperatures, the power system must be able to cope with

any cold spells – the frequency and severity of which are difficult to predict. This

is why emergency training sessions for dealing with severe cold periods are held

on a regular basis so that operators can prepare themselves.

In the summer, the lowest power consumption was on Sunday 7 August 2016 –

30.6 GW.

Gross consumption stood at nearly 483 TWh in 2016 – that's 1.5% more than in

2015 owing to lower average temperatures.



Page: 7/30



The significant variability in consumption shows that the power system

needs to be able to adapt to highly uncertain and extreme weather

conditions – particularly future cold snaps.

A management of the balance between power supply and demand under

surveillance

2016 saw 22 rising margin deficits and 4 that fell. The number of discrepancies

between forecast and actual power consumption was greater than in 2015. There

was also an increase in the number of alerts sent – mainly as a result of industrial

disputes among power generation companies.

Shortfalls in margins can – depending on how long they last and the time of day

at which they occur – impact reliability. The various initiatives that RTE has

implemented with the stakeholders involved should therefore be maintained in

order to strengthen contractual requirements and perform monitoring and

checking, making sure that power generation companies declare the technical

limitations affecting generation and actual availability via the Balance Mechanism.

Equivalent outage time not due to exceptional events was 2 minutes 54 seconds.

Although this result is still higher than the target of 2 minutes and 24 seconds that

was set by the French Energy Regulatory Commission as an incentive regulation,

it confirms the efficiency of the various initiatives put in place by RTE to improve

the quality of the power that it supplies to its clients. In particular, the accelerated

replacement of its measuring transformers and the operating provisions applied in

the event of temperature warnings limited the impact of this damage to 16 seconds

in 2016 (as opposed to 5 minutes and 44 seconds in 2015). This is almost

equivalent to pre-2011 levels – before damage to the measuring devices and

capacitor coupled voltage transformers during periods of very hot weather. It

should be noted that power outages resulting from various industrial disputes in

2016 added 32 seconds to total equivalent outage time.

Otherwise, equivalent outage time resulting from exceptional events rose to 3

minutes and 15 seconds as a result of two events that were classified as

exceptional, which together added 21 seconds. They involved infrastructure being

powered down during fires near Fos-sur-Mer and Vitrolles in France’s Bouches-du-

Rhône region at the request of the local authorities, as well as an act of vandalism

targeting the Salaise 63 kV substation in the Isère, resulting in a number of

customers experiencing outages.

The quality of the system's power-frequency control improved in 2016

across France, helping to manage frequency deviations in Europe.

The trend which got under way in 2013 which has seen an increase in the frequency

stability of the Interconnected European power system continued, with a fall in the

number of deviations greater than 100 MHz.



Page: 8/30



Although falling frequency deviations (stable in 2016) are currently seen as the

most critical for the European system, in early 2016, RTE implemented

instrumentation and means for monitoring a high-frequency indicator. These

situations are now being tracked because of how potentially critical they are during

troughs in consumption, and more particularly at night when decreasing margins

are constrained. They can also be used to monitor the risk of massive photovoltaic

generation being tripped at 50.2 Hz during the day.

The IGCC (International Grid Control Cooperation) has been operational since early

2016 and is used to optimise secondary reserve procurement in France, helping to

improve the way in which frequency deviations is controlled in Europe.

A new project – "aFRR Assitance” – was launched in March 2017 designed to

enable the sharing of secondary reserve in the event of exceptional situations.

Through this system, a TSO could procure secondary reserve from its neighbour

in accordance with fixed and shared conditions.

Load shedding considered this winter during the cold spell.

Following the announcement regarding the reduced availability of a number of

nuclear power plants, seasonal studies conducted and published at the end of the

year by RTE within the framework of its public service remit highlighted the

operating risks to the system in the event of a cold spell. Measures were therefore

taken in order to prepare RTE for a possible supply-demand balance crisis and

inform stakeholders operating on the power system and the general public of the

exceptional and progressive means that might be put in place in order to ensure

system security.

A warning system was developed in close cooperation with the public authorities

and the Distribution System Operators as part of preparations to manage a

possible crisis. Otherwise, significant work was done on the market operating rules

(the capacity mechanism was introduced, a number of provisions to do with

demand response were reviewed) in order to secure the involvement of all

stakeholders in the power system and to remind each one of the responsibilities

incumbent upon them. In concrete terms, this work resulted in the stakeholders

mobilising at the start of 2017. A successful balance between consumption and

generation was attributed to all possible power generation means being used in

France (particularly ones involving renewable energies), to imports, to demand

response mechanisms and to people behaving more responsibly in relation to their

energy use. Cooperation with CORESO once again proved effective in preparing

the system for operation in real time. Furthermore, within the framework of this

unusual situation, RTE’s neighbouring TSOs worked together exceptionally in order

to maximise cross-border schedules (resulting in a departure from a number of

operating rules in order to maintain the power supply). For example, planned

works were postponed by a number of TSOs and RTE implemented exceptional

and temporary measures to increase cross-border schedule capacities by departing

from standard operating procedures, particularly those relative to service quality.

An inter-zone frequency oscillation phenomenon observed



Page: 9/30



On December 1st 2017, the unexpected opening of a 400 kV breaker in south-

western France triggered a

frequency oscillation

phenomenon right across

European network. When

this happened, the rotor

shafts of generating units

in Turkey and the Iberian

Peninsula started

oscillating out of phase

relative to generating units

in Central Europe.

The phenomenon lasted for several minutes until the Spanish system operator REE

started reducing cross-border schedules between Spain and France (for its own

reasons). This led to the oscillatory phenomenon being reabsorbed.

Detailed studies were initiated by specialists in this field at RTE, as well as at REE

and ENTSOE. This is a major system security issue and it is important to determine

whether this phenomenon was the manifestation of a set of structural

circumstances, or simply the unfortunate convergence of several factors. We need

to determine the importance of the way in which the "Baixas-Santa Llogaia” direct

current line was operated.

2.2 Voltage management

The last few winters have not led to any particular difficulties in terms of

low voltage management. The two defence automata (in the west and in the

north) which are part of the voltage collapse defence plan were only armed once

in 2016. But the thresholds below which the west and north defence automata are

triggered were not reached. No safeguard order for low voltages (-5%, One,

adjuster lock) were issued during the year.

In 2016, the number of upper normal voltage range threshold overruns – together

with the total duration of these overruns – was more than halved. But there are

still too many of them. Around thirty 400 kV substations are still affected by

voltage ranges being exceeded. For the 225 kV network, normal voltage range

threshold are exceeded at 574 substations, with significant disparity from region

to region. As far as reliability is concerned, high voltages are less dangerous than

low voltages (risk of network collapse). But they can affect the service life of

equipment, as well as contractual voltage ranges for customers.

Despite the same number of substations experiencing overruns as in

2015, a reduction in the number of overruns and their total duration is

evidence of these phenomena being more effectively managed by RTE.

Tests in collaboration with Enedis were conducted in order to assess the utility of

using the reactive power capacity of generating facilities connected up via MV

power lines, and more specifically wind power facilities in order to address voltage



Page: 10/30



overruns on the transmission grid: one was conducted in France’s Picardy region

in August 2016, and two others were initiated at the end of 2016 (Vendée and

Hauts de France), with a view to their being carried out in summer 2017.

To control voltages on its

network nodes, RTE has

installed considerable

compensation means over the

past 12 years. In 2016, 700

Mvar of capacitors were

connected up (low voltages in

the action zones of the Paris,

Toulouse, Marseille and Nancy

regional control centres) and

nearly 500 Mvar of inductors

(high voltages in the Marseille, Nantes, Nancy and Lille regions).

New investments in inductor-type compensation means are scheduled for the

years ahead, but installing capacitors beyond 2017 can no longer be justified.

2-3 Interconnections and international flows

Overall, flows across the French network were well managed in 2016. This can be

attributed to a number of cyclical factors, as well as structural and organisational

factors, including improvements in the efficiency with which the regional

grids are managed through CORESO (coordination of electrical system

operators). This has enabled effective coordinated initiatives to be implemented

among TSOs – as was the case during this winter's cold snap.

There were six 20-minute overload start-ups on the 400 kV network and

interconnection links in 2016. Although such occurrences are relatively rare and

so should not be used as the basis for any statistical interpretations, it would still

seem that some of them are evidence of an underlying trend that involves

maximising cross-zonal capacity. This situation also illustrates the utility of

performing calculations as closely as possible to capacity allocation limits with

assumptions that change more and more between D-1 and real time, as well as

on an intradaily basis.



Page: 11/30



The France-Spain HVDC interconnection that came into operation in October 2015

made commercial cross-border schedules between France and Spain of up to 3500

MW (export) and 2983 MW (import) possible in November 2016. Average available

capacity in 2016 was 2425 MW for exports and 1950 MW for imports – which is

more than double what was available the year before this new line was brought

into service.

France has never exported or imported energy across the Spanish border

so much as it did in 2016. France exports power to Spain (72% of the time)

much more frequently than it imports it.

This balance of trade reached a new export record for the Iberian Peninsula: 7.8

TWh, as opposed to 7.3 TWh in 2015.

This winter, at peak evening times of the week from 16 to 20 January 2017 during

the cold snap, Spain exported more power to France than any other country (an

average of 1352 MW; behind Belgium (1015 MW) and Germany (772 MW)).

Flow-based market coupling across the Central Western European zone

can be used to operate interconnections as close to their limits as

possible, while at the same time maintaining the required operational

security margins. Convergence rates between French prices and those of

neighbouring countries are on the increase across all market coupled borders.

In 2016, price convergence in the Central Western European zone rose to

35%, as opposed to 19% in 2015. Average spreads between French, Italian and

Spanish prices are decreasing, partly thanks to the increase in cross-border

schedule capacities at these borders. Unusual convergent situations are regularly

recorded – as was the case between 1 PM and 2 PM on 19 January 2016: prices

were identical from Portugal to Finland. In terms of reliability, a price

convergence between two countries also indicates that there is no

network congestion forecast at these borders.

After consultation with market parties and in line with the principles set by

European network codes, RTE has implemented mechanisms designed to open up

the French electricity market and facilitate its integration in Europe. As a result,

several exchanges will be competing in France by mid-2017 at the earliest.

This will bolster the French market's liquidity.



Page: 12/30



2.4 Short-circuits affecting transmission structures

The number of short-circuits (7912) affecting transmission structures fell

for the second year in a

row (8352 in 2015 and

9818 in 2014). This fall

can be explained by a

lower number of lightning

strikes. Across France as

a whole, the main causes

of short-circuits are

naturally atmospheric in

nature: 29.7% were due

to storms, and 5% were

due to wind and floods.

Sticking snow was

responsible for 0.9% of

short-circuits this year,

and damage to equipment accounted for 2.2% of all recorded causes. There were

encouraging results in 2016 (0.6% of short-circuits) for controlling vegetation,

evidence of just how useful long-term initiatives and the resources allocated have

been.

The share of permanent faults accounted for 3.7% of the overall total – slightly

lower than in 2015. And the situation improved with only 4 double 400 kV faults,

of which 1 involved a definitive tripping.

In 2016, work began on testing AMELIE (a weather warning system for overhead

power lines), alerting RTE in the event of any weather events likely to result in

short-circuits on the network. These warnings tell RTE when to deploy technical

and human resources for tackling these incidents and help ensure that nominal

operation is restored as quickly as possible on the network.

In 2016, work began on deploying the LAD service (automatic fault location),

designed to power undamaged infrastructure back up as quickly as possible during

storms. Deployment is scheduled to be completed by 2020.

3. Equipment components reliability

3.1 Generating units

Twice a year, electricity generators and RTE hold discussions about the multi-year

program to bring down the limitations of the reactive capacity of nuclear power

plants, in terms of both supply and absorption. These limitations can be

disadvantageous for managing low voltages (risk of collapse) or high voltages

(risks for equipment). There were more imbalances in 2016 than in 2015 and

Répartition des causes de courts-circuits sur le réseau de RTE en 2016



Page: 13/30



resorption times could prove constraining depending on the adjustments needed

between now and winter 2018/2019 in northern France.

Individualised per-unit Secondary Voltage Control for finer voltage

management:

This option to individualise the level was introduced in 2016 in the secondary

voltage control and can be used to more finely manage voltage without affecting

the interface with the generating unit.

The first renewable energy facilities subscribed to secondary voltage control

appeared in 2015 and 2016 following the introduction of a specific command. This

relates to the Justice wind turbine facility (74 MW on the 225 kV Nantes network)

and the Constantin photovoltaic facility (230 MW on the 225 kV Toulouse network),

certified in 2016.

In 2016, the combined cycle power plant in Bouchain and the biomass facility in

Guerache were the first thermal power plants to be certified for performing this

type of control.

This change will be rolled out to hydraulic power units in 2017.

92% of trials to island nuclear power plants in compliance with

objectives:

The successful islanding of nuclear power plants in the event of a widespread

incident is important for nuclear safety and is vital for recreating the network and

restoring power supplies to customers. In 2016, 14 islanding trials (from full

power) were carried out on the nuclear power plants (including 2 accidental ones):

13 island operations were successful – the equivalent of a 92.3% success rate (as

opposed to 77% in 2015), and an 85% success rate over a four-year rolling period

to be compared with a 60% multi-year ceiling target.

3.2 Network equipment

On the 400 kV network, 383 short-circuits were eliminated in 2016 (385 in 2015),

340 of which were single-phase faults. The response rate in compliance with the

soliciting of protection devices and automata in the event of electrical faults on

400 kV networks is in compliance with regulations: a 96% compliance rate on

400 kV networks. Furthermore, the good results on the "225 kV HDP (high-density

production area and close) network" is evidence of the specific protection plan for

these networks being effectively deployed following a reliability audit conducted in

2011.

The 400 kV differential busbar protection devices play a major role in the fast and

selective elimination of busbar faults, which although very rare present a high risk

in terms of reliability and were behind 9 SSEs (10 in 2015). Their 99.5% availability

rate has remained stable.

Protection devices involving ring opening upon loss of synchronism are part of the

Defence Plan and play an essential role in isolating those network zones which

have lost synchronism from other zones which are still healthy in the event of a

major incident. This prevents the incident from spreading. Although they are only



Page: 14/30



very rarely used, they need to be able to respond reliably if required. In 2016,

there were no operating anomalies and the ring opening upon loss of synchronism

plan was reliability-audited, indicating that the whole system is properly managed

overall.

The Ampacité project sets out to test a more flexible type of operation,

determining cable transmission capacities in real time depending on external

conditions measured (temperature, perpendicular wind, sunshine levels, etc.) so

as to generate additional margin and optimise available remedial actions. These

measures, which ensure that the way in which infrastructure is used is optimised

for its particular physical characteristics, help facilitate the incorporation of

electricity generated by wind turbines and improve the quality of the power supply

to customers, reducing the number of operating constraints and the associated

power outage risk.

Within the framework of this project, the 400 kV Tavel-Réaltor line was fitted with

sensors at the start of 2017, and three other 63 kV and 90 kV lines are set to be

fitted with them later on this year in Lille, Nantes and Nancy. These projects will

serve to validate the valuation assumptions and test their implementation. The

Ampacité project is set to be made available in full operational conditions

in 2018.

4. Tools, telecoms and IT

4.1 Tool

In 2016, two incidents involving accidental unavailability with shut-down of

transmission at secondary load-frequency control level for 3 minutes and 1 minute

respectively affected the National Control System (SNC). The main focus in 2017

will be on improving the National Control System so it can address the demands

of the "aFRR Assistance" project, the purpose of which is to implement an inter-

TSO support function for secondary reserves.

In 2016, 5 “0” level SSEs were recorded (as opposed to 11 “0” level SSEs and 3

“A” level SSEs in 2015) on the Regional Control Systems (SRC). All the accidental

events taken together in 2016 resulted in a total loss of observability of 1 hour

and 2 minutes – significantly lower than in previous years (16 hours and 15

minutes in 2015).

During the course of 2016, the regional inter-dispatching support centre (SIDRE)

– which has been operational since June 2015 across the three inter-regional units

– was only activated once in order to tackle a real need. The year was used to test

two usage modes (short mode with activity resumption over a few hours and long

mode with activity resumption over several days) with 42 short activations and

one long activation.

In order to deal with the ageing of the control systems currently in use and to

provide operators with a unique control system built around the market's SCADA

supervision system, RTE has launched the STANWAY project. This new tool is



Page: 15/30



scheduled to be brought into service for the first time in 2019/2020 for the National

System Operating Centre, then for the 7 Regional Operating Centres.

The average monthly number of remote commands issued per Operations Centre

is around 8600, with amplitude varying from centre to centre. The annual average

unavailability rates for the remote measurement and remote signalling systems at

the 7 regional operating centres are 1.33% (1.42% in 2015) and 0.17% (1.14%

in 2015), respectively.

The Safeguard Alarm System (SAS) is a vital tool for managing high-risk (alert

orders) or downgraded (safeguard orders) situations, during which availability and

reliability need to be excellent.

In 2016, 38 "0" level SSEs and 1 “A” level SSE were logged. The high number of

SSEs can mainly be explained by messages not being acknowledged by generators

and distributors during periodic tests conducted by RTE. A reminder was issued to

ensure that people respond in compliance with expectations in high-risk or

downgraded situations requiring the use of the Safeguard Alarm System.

The Convergence test platform is the reference tool used to conduct

electrotechnical tests to prepare for operation in real time. It is used by RTE and

CORESO. The theoretical availability rate of the Convergence servers was excellent

– 100% in terms of real-time activities on D+2.

The system for including the production of intermittent renewable energies into

the power system (IPES) is used for short-term tests and during operation in real

time; it supplies estimates about the actual quantities of electricity generated by

wind farms and photovoltaic cells, as well as forecasts for these renewable sources

locally, regionally and nationally. It can do this for adjustable periods ranging from

D-4 to D+2, at frequencies selected by the user.

At the end of 2016, the total observable power generated by renewables either

directly by the producer’s remote operation, or via means put in place following

agreements entered into with partners (producer associations, Distribution System

Operators, etc.) was 17.7 GW for 18.4 GW of installed capacity. In order to tackle

the growing volume of data about renewable energies, in 2016 RTE continued

thinking about ways of ensuring the long life of the system to include the reduction

of intermittent renewable energies in the power system, and results are expected

by the end of 2017.

The Voltage Map application was declared

operational following a prototyping phase.

This enables users to visually monitor the

voltage plan at national or local level and

issues warnings in the event of voltage

overruns.

Within the same framework, the LUCA

project began in 2016. The purpose is to

conduct automatic system security

analyses on projected network situations.



Page: 16/30



4.2 Telecommunications and IT system security

The operational reliability of the power system is closely linked to the sound

operation of the security telecommunications networks on the one hand, and the

IT system on the other with its capability to face threats such as cyber-attacks.

The "ROSE" Optical Security Network, an infrastructure owned and operated by

RTE, is distributed over approximately 20,000 km of optical cable and provides

telecommunication services which contribute to system security: "high-level"

remote operation (observability, manoeuvrability, control), exchange of

information with protection against electrical faults, safety telephone.

2016 saw two level “B” SSEs affecting the optical infrastructure used by ROSE in

the Toulouse zone and a level "0” SSE in the Nancy zone following one or several

optical fibres being cut.

One level “A” SSE affected operation of the Safety Telephone System in 2016

(malfunctioning of an automatic switch reset manually), together with nine level

“0” SSEs. Actions scheduled to be implemented in 2017 mainly involve testing

STS2 architecture (implementing a Disaster Recovery Plan exercise, redundancy

operation).

The security of RTE's IT system is key to ensuring the reliability of the power

system's operation. This applies in particular to the command control system and

remote management activities, as well as to the way in which information is shared

with customers, market parties and partners.

RTE’s Operational Security Centre (COrS’R) thwarted several IT warning situations

in 2016 (outsmarting around 4300 attacks every month, preventing 1000 spam

emails from getting through and eradicating 200 viruses across RTE's IT system).

RTE was involved in the 2016 PIRANET cyber-attack government plan organised

by France's public authorities. It served as an opportunity to apply RTE's internal

IT security expertise and to form links with government departments.

5. Other operational levers

Greater collaboration between the transmission grid and the distribution

grid

With a network that is both more limited and more difficult to manage as a result

of decentralised production and smart grid projects, exchanging information

between the distribution grid and the transmission grid and having a sound

reciprocal understanding of the difficulties encountered are now vital for controlling

the future operation of both networks and managing relations with interfaces.

In 2016, RTE and several Distribution System Operators undertook projects in a

number of areas. They involved managing automata, sharing operations data and

managing voltages at the transmission grid/distribution grid interface.



Page: 17/30



Three shared roadmaps have been drawn up for these projects, clearly defining

their targets and timescales. They will be extended to include other French

Distribution System Operators.

Consumption moderation and demand response schemes

Demand response is a source of flexibility that involves consumers waiving or

postponing some or all of their power consumption in response to a signal. Demand

response can be used by market parties to optimise their own portfolios or to sell

energy directly to other stakeholders or to RTE.

Demand response is now a source of power and flexibility for managing

supply-demand balance and frequency in the same way as it is for

managing production. It is an additional lever for ensuring operational

security.

In 2016, 1875 MW of demand-response capacity was certified as part of the

capacity mechanism for 2017.

Furthermore since November 1st 2014, RTE has been managing the Tempo signal

project and has been featuring it on éCO2mix so that all suppliers can offer their

demand-response electricity supply packages.

For the third year, companies have been able to use the new NEBEF mechanism

(Notification of the Exchange of Curtailment Blocks) to adjust demand response

valorisation rules directly on the market. By the end of 2016, 24 companies (6

more than in 2015) had entered into contracts with RTE to be part of this

mechanism. Although the demand response volume on the NEBEF demand-

response mechanism (that rewards demand-reduction efforts) is still relatively

modest regarding the potential that some stakeholders give to it, it is enjoying

healthy growth and reached 11 GWh in 2016.

In December 2016, RTE formalised the use of its educational éCO2mix

application as a new means for issuing alerts within the framework of its crisis

communication system. So when exceptional resources are mobilised during the

power system's high voltage periods, the éCO2mix application sends out national

and/or regional warning messages, suggesting that consumers reduce their energy

consumption by adopting more environmentally-friendly behaviour.

The environment-responsible EcoWatt initiative, deployed in Brittany and in

the Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur region as a means of addressing weaknesses in

the electricity supply, has also been designed to encourage people to moderate

their power consumption, particularly in the winter and at peak times.

EcoWatt has a total of 58,200 EcoWatt players in Brittany and 32,000 in France's

Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur region, where the warning system now kicks in during

peak power demand at regional level.

The capacity mechanism is designed to secure power supply in the long term in

France, particularly during peak demand periods. By remunerating the availability



Page: 18/30



of generation and demand response means, the capacity mechanism encourages

stakeholders operating on the power system to maintain and develop – at the

lowest possible cost – the demand response and generation means needed to

secure power supply in the long term. By December 31st 2016, total capacity

of 92,148 MW had been certified by RTE, nearly 2 GW more than the

criteria for securing power supply.

6. Developments and changes to the network

In 2016, RTE invested a total of €1519 billion across the perimeter

regulated by the French Energy Regulatory Commission. Among the main

investments were the bringing into service of the 400 kV line between Charleville

and Reims, the continuation of construction work (on the French side) on the direct

current interconnection between France and Italy that passes through the security

duct of the Fréjus tunnel, reconstruction of the Haute Durance 225 kV network and

the 2 Loires project to rebuild the 225 kV line interconnecting the Auvergne region,

the Rhône Valley and the Massif Central, as well as the Brittany safety net. Around

60% of investments was for existing infrastructure.

Future changes and adaptations to the network are underpinned by a

forward-looking approach which involves the following projects:

The 2016 provisional long term forecast plan on power supply-demand

balance in France is the first link in the reliability chain – it is the starting point for

developing a set of potential supply-demand balance scenarios which will then be

broken down into "network hypotheses" for use with all national and regional

network development studies up until 2030. For the first time, it points to an 8

TWh reduction in France’s annual electric power consumption by 2021,

mainly as a result of energy efficiency measures. The security of the power supply

level from 2016 until 2021 will be influenced by the conditions under which the

French capacity mechanism is implemented, which itself will be influenced by the

debate on the price per tonne of emitted CO2.

RTE published a new edition of its ten-year grid development plan on

completion of the public consultation which ended in January 2017. This ten-year

plan is a break from previous editions and lists all the adaptations which will need

to be made over the next three years and the main infrastructure that should be

considered over the next ten years. The actions which have been chosen are

detailed in the "Impulsion & Vision" project. In this particular corporate project,

the "digital revolution" and "technological breakthrough" challenges will result in

the creation of five "New Generation" substations between now and 2020 and the

deployment of digital control systems at all RTE substations by 2030, as well as in

50% of the network being equipped with monitoring solutions by 2030 in order to

adjust maximum network capacities based on weather conditions or in response

to multiple equipment measurements.

In line with and as a continuation of the Ten-Year Network Development Plan and

the provisional forecast plan, more than 400 projects are discussed in this plan –



Page: 19/30



many of which are in response to the challenges associated with the energy

transition. These projects are designed to facilitate the incorporation of the new

production mix both in France and abroad, and support localised changes to

consumption, as well as ensuring solidarity in terms of access to electricity among

regions.

In addition to inter-regional cross-border schedules, RTE is also developing

interconnections between France and its European partners. Taking all borders

together, an increase of up to 10 GW in interconnection capacity is being

investigated or has been proposed with a view to being brought into service within

the next decade.

7. Contribution of human resources and organisations to reliability

An approach based on Human Security Organisational Factors at RTE

At the end of 2015, RTE launched an ambitious program designed to develop the

security culture across the company with the help of the ICSI (France's industrial

safety culture institute). An assessment was conducted targeting 1500 employees

from eight pilot entities focusing in particular on jobs in operations, maintenance

and development.

This assessment highlighted a high degree of shared involvement among all

stakeholders, but for some of them, it also pointed to the opportunity to adopt a

more systematic approach to security-related behaviour.

The improvement initiative is based on the fact that implementing a safety culture

development program across the company will ultimately improve the operational

security of the way in which the system works. It will also generate benefits in

terms of production quality and improving health and safety in the workplace.

Improved Performance through Professionalism

An inter-profession seminar on Human Factors was held in March 2016, the aim

being to share information about progress made with the Human Factor initiative

at RTE. This seminar served as an opportunity to present the first results of the

assessment conducted by the industrial safety culture institute, as well as details

of the benefits provided by the Improved Performance through Professionalism

initiative. This initiative involves capitalising on and sharing Human Factor type

differences, regardless of whether or not they have consequences on industrial

safety in the broadest sense, the aim being to collectively improve performance.

In 2016, 634 “Improved Performance through Professionalism” events were

declared in the field of operations, and served as opportunities to analyse weak

signals in this field.

Training and skills maintenance initiatives which are being continuously

adapted

In addition to the annual training program available for maintaining operatives'

expertise – including days during which exceptional circumstances are simulated

– many projects and changes in doctrine have required special training in

operations-related areas.



Page: 20/30



The centralised training program is regularly modified in order to ensure that they

are in line with changes on the network, kept up-to-date with the fast and

numerous changes to the methods and tools used for conducting assessments and

managing the network and for preparing and carrying out work on the transmission

grid's infrastructure. In 2016, two crisis management courses for technical on-duty

staff and on-call management staff were created in order to expand the range of

training courses available for this activity. Also in 2016, the first inter-centre

distance training test was conducted in circumstances in which distance learning

methods play an increasingly important role in training.

Local training program play an additional role in helping operatives to acquire and

maintain their skills. The important role that coordinators, intake mentors and

managers play in enhancing people's professionalism out in the field also needs to

be emphasised.

There were very few visits from outside parties in 2016 because of the

antiterrorism measures that have been put in place in the wake of the attacks in

France. However, there were a number of meetings with generators and

distributors' management centres in all regions of France, and a number of "Let's

guarantee reliability together" courses were held for Generators and Distributors

in partnership with the Performance Testing unit.

Regarding preparing stakeholders, 2016 also saw a significant number of

national and regional crisis management exercises.

In addition to the numerous exercises conducted by all Operations Centres, two

major national exercises were carried out:

the "Measuring Transformer" exercise, conducted in May 2016 to prepare

operatives for the risks involved in operating measuring transformers in

extremely warm periods before summer 2016;

the "Managing Electricity Supply/Demand Balance" crisis exercise in early

December 2016, in partnership with government departments (zonal

operational centre, regional department for environment and housing, etc.) and

ENEDIS.

These exercises were opportunities to consolidate all the operational documents

managed by ORTEC (RTE's crisis structure) for these situations and to maintain

numerous employees' skills at local level.

8. Changes to the reference frameworks and contractual rules

Focus on the new European "Clean Energy for All Europeans" raft of

legislative proposals.

On 30 November 2016, the European Commission unveiled a package of

measures, collectively known as the "Clean Energy for All Europeans" legislative

proposals. Its aim is to make changes to the European framework, implement the

aims of the energy-climate packet and continue putting together the Energy Union.

This package of legislative proposals focuses in particular on the market design,

the aim being to adapt it for use with renewable energies and the incorporation of



Page: 21/30



new flexible means into the system (demand reduction, storage, etc.). It also

contains an important section on regional cooperation between TSOs and

structural measures regarding the tools which can be used to secure the energy

supply (definition of criteria, capacity mechanism, etc.). The proposals also

concern adapting the way in which all energy issues are governed at regional and

European level.

These proposals are therefore important issues for France, for RTE and for all

stakeholders involved in the power system, including future responsibilities for

ensuring the power system's reliability. Discussions about these documents are

already under way with the European Council and European Parliament; the

Commission would like them to be definitively adopted by 2019. In particular, RTE

will clarify the underlying political issues associated with these technical provisions

and will proactively ensure that this new energy packet is appropriate for the task

of creating a fully-fledged, sustainable Energy Union. It will ensure that it meets

the power system's needs in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, creating

an environment in which innovation can develop at a time when the sector is

having to address wide-ranging changes.

The main changes to the Technical Reference Document in 2016 pertain to:

the introduction of the Operating and Management Agreement template, and of

the Connection Agreement template for New Exceptional Interconnections used

within the framework of the Eleclink project (designed to connect up a private

interconnection via the Channel Tunnel).

Work has been undertaken or will continue into 2017 together with clients in order

to make changes to other articles. This work relates to the sharing of information

and the remote management system for power generation facilities, consumers

and distributors, together with the voltage ancillary service rules.

Towards management of the risk of a massive triggering of renewable

generation

In 2016, in order to address the risk of a massive tripping of photovoltaic

generation when the 50.2 Hz in 200 ms threshold is exceeded, RTE and ADEEF

adopted a joint position designed to maintain reliability. It mainly involves the

thresholds being gradually raised for new connections (50.4 Hz, then 50.6 Hz) and

alternative production means being qualified for new connections.

In 2016, situations whereby generation is tripped based on frequency criteria of

less than 49.5 Hz were also addressed, with alternative protection being qualified

for new connections, as well as by devising a technical solution the deployment of

which is in the process of being finalised with the regulatory authorities.

System Services

The work that RTE carried out in 2016 on Voltage System Services has resulted

in changes to terms of payment designed to make the system both more

transparent and easier to understand. These provisions came into force on April

1st, 2017.

As far as frequency ancillary services are concerned, since January 16th, 2017

RTE has been meeting its frequency containment reserve requirements via a



Page: 22/30



weekly invitation to tender issued jointly with TSOs in Belgium, Germany,

Switzerland, Austria and the Netherlands.

In 2016, industrial site contracts for frequency containment reserve were

formalised and primary industrial sites for secondary reserve were certified. At the

end of 2016, certified power for the frequency control of consumption sites stood

at 92 MW (of which 25 MW of secondary reserve). This potentially equates to 16%

of France's required frequency containment reserve. It should be noted that

this reserve includes the first RTE certified battery for voltage control (1

MW, on the distribution grid).

Balancing mechanism

In 2016, RTE entered into FRR and RR capacity contracts with nine suppliers in

order to ensure a 1000 MW volume of rapid reserves that can be activated in less

than 15 minutes, and 500 MW of complementary reserves that can be activated in

less than 30 minutes. The contractually-agreed volumes of FRR now stand at 1278

MW, 47% of which is supplied by demand response (against 20% for the previous

period) and 53% by generation. Regarding RR, demand response covers 4% of

the subscribed volume, and the remaining 96% is covered by generation.

Changes in contracts over the last few years highlight the growing contribution

of industrial demand response on the one hand, and the increased vigilance

with which RTE manages supply-demand balance in real-time on the other. This

vigilance is manifested by strict checks on the performance of insuring parties

and the processes involved in renewing approvals.

9. Reliability beyond RTE in Europe

In 2016, the Requirements for Generators code setting out a set of connection

conditions for all generators was discussed in France with a view to applying some

of the thresholds, and the DCC and HVDC codes were published in the European

Union’s Official Journal.

In 2017, the European System Operations Guidelines and Emergency and

Restoration network codes will be prepared and will then come into force.

The fourth edition of the TYNDP (Ten-Year Network Development Plan) was

published in 2016.



Page: 23/30



It sets out the ways in which Europe's transmission network will develop between

now and 2013 in order to complete the energy transition and create the European

single energy market. The important

role that direct-current technology

plays in this plan should be noted.

The following issues in particular will

have a major impact on the way in

which the system is managed over

the next few years:

Europe's future energy mix which

will ensure that between 45% and

60% of power consumption needs

are met by renewable energies,

with specific initiatives designed

to reduce the limitations of

electricity generated by wind power,

interconnection capacity which is set to double in Europe by 2030, particularly

so as to enable a more effective incorporation of peninsulas into the European

electricity market (Portugal/Spain, Italy, the Baltic states, Ireland, the UK).

Cooperation between TSOs

On October 28th, 2016, RED Electrica, the

Spanish transmission system operator, became

a new member of CORESO.

CORESO is one of 6 RSCs (Regional Security

Cooperations) in Europe located in Brussels

which supplies cooperation services to 7 TSOs.

This ensures the power system's security at

European level.

CORESO is taking on increasing numbers of

coordination tasks across increasingly large

regions.

Irish TSOs (Eirgrid and SONI) are in the process

of becoming members. This should be finalised

in 2017.

As far as R&D and major European projects connected with reliability are

concerned, the following key developments should be noted for 2016:

APOGEE project: In 2016, this decision-support system aimed at developing a

hypervision environment underwent an initial off-line test phase so that operators

could test the "periodic manoeuvres" module. Online testing started in May 2017

at the control centre of RTE’s operations centre in Nancy.

iTesla project: iTesla foreshadows the next generation of network security

analysis platforms which use a probabilistic approach to analysing the risks

incurred during operation, factoring in possibilities for curative workarounds and

dynamic phenomena.



Page: 24/30



Migrate project: This project involves preparing for the power system's operation

by incorporating significant quantities of power electronics equipment (HVDC links

and connecting up renewable energies).

Substation of the future: The purpose of this project is to use demonstrators to

redesign the functional architecture of substations in response to the new

requirements of the power system. It incorporates environmental targets into its

design and technological solutions that will likely be implemented in the decades

to come. In 2017, the functional components of BLOCAUX’s "Smart Substation”

were brought into service and will be used in observation mode in 2017. "Action"

mode is being considered for 2018.

Direct current networks: In 2016, the second year of work using the project's

demonstrator operated by RTE helped create all of the study scenarios using the

numerical models supplied by the constructors. At the same time, the European

"PROMOTION" project (PROgress on Meshed HVDC Offshore TransmissIOn

Networks) was launched in early 2016 for studying the interoperability of

protection schemes in use on direct current networks. The results are expected in

2020.

GARPUR project: In 2016, work focused on developing a new probabilistic

method for isolation procedures, as well as for assessing a maintenance policy.

10. Reliability audits

The issues on which audits are focussed, are designed to ensure that all the major

aspects of reliability are covered over periods of 2 to 3 years. In particular, risks

flagged up by feedback from the year just passed are monitored. Audit conclusions

are presented to RTE's Executive Committee. Recommendations are then

formulated so as to improve the way in which identified risks are managed. The

initiatives undertaken based on these recommendations are detailed in an action

plan, the progress of which is monitored by the Reliability Audit all Department. A

report is submitted annually to RTE's Executive Committee and to the CSEA.

Three reliability audits were conducted in 2016 focusing on the following areas:

The way in which downgraded modes are handled on equipment,

The ring opening plan in the event of synchronism being lost,

The impact of renewable energies on the system's reliable operation.

Their conclusions indicate globally satisfactory operation of the power system in

terms of its reliability and formulate recommendations for improving its operation.



Page: 25/30



Conclusion and outlook

The results obtained in 2016 indicate a globally satisfactory level of

operation by RTE in terms of reliability against a backdrop of increased – even

decentralised – renewable generation that is playing an increasingly important role

in the power system's reliability and stability (frequency, voltage, margin, etc.).

This requires increasingly flexible means.

However, 2016 saw two weather-related episodes – the period of summer heat in

mid-July which required closer surveillance of temperatures at RTE's substations

and the winter cold snap which coincided with a historically low availability of

nuclear generation means. These situations, which placed particular stress on the

system, were contained and even served as opportunities to put in place additional

management means (warning systems, load shedding, etc.) which should not hide

the risk of less favourable conditions being encountered over the next few years,

particularly in the event of periods of intense cold in future winters.

Tracking the SSEs over several years flags up any weak signals. These can be

analysed in more detail. And the effectiveness of any initiatives implemented to

increase operating reliability can be measured over time. Since 2013, the number

of SSEs has been stable (904 events in 2016 as opposed to 919 in 2013). Although

most of the SSEs recorded were equal to or less than A, we encountered and

analysed two level B SSEs and one level C SSE (based on a severity scale ranging

from 0 to F).

These satisfactory results are the fruit of work that has been done both internally

and externally with our partners over a number of years. They emphasise the fact

that ensuring system reliability is an ongoing task that is underpinned by corrective

actions, as well as scheduled initiatives implemented over time across an

extremely wide scope and involving expertise from a number of different areas.

All of these actions together address the major risk of there being a

blackout. They will help ensure the system's operational reliability in the

long term. This is RTE's fundamental task and assuming responsibility for

it benefits everyone in France and in Europe more widely.

The key issues that have been highlighted in this report involve the need to

continue with and bolster initiatives that have already been implemented at

various different levels over the next few years.

Ongoing vigilance to ensure reliability in the future.

In particular, this includes:

Internally at RTE:



Page: 26/30



bolstering the implementation of support systems for operators,

continuing to improve the performance of tools for conducting analysis and

preparing for management,

consolidating the reliability of the IT system and the effectiveness of the

disaster recovery plans,

innovating by conducting experiments out in the field (substation of the

future), by making use of the new possibilities provided by digital

technologies, or by looking into new system management means (batteries,

etc.),

ensuring the effectiveness of companies' maintenance and renewal

initiatives in order to reduce faults on reliability-sensitive equipment

(switching devices, differential busbar protection devices, measuring

transformers, etc.).

In collaboration with our partners:

consolidating and adapting tools used to manage demand-supply balance

to ensure that they meet future requirements,

improving the quality of data shared at the interfaces, together with the

feedback loop,

expanding the assortment of market parties involved in order to increase

economic efficiency and flexibility in managing short-term demand-supply

balance (curtailment, asymmetrical frequency ancillary services, etc.),

consolidating mechanisms for systematically checking the commitments

and performance of stakeholders in order to ensure that reliability is

properly managed in new and changing configurations,

continuing discussions and tests with our partners who play a significant

role in ensuring the system's reliability (sharing data, reactive power of

generating units, controlling voltages at the interface between the

Transmission Grid and the Public Distribution Network, etc.).

And more specifically in Europe:

finalising technical analyses working alongside REE following the

oscillations encountered at the end of 2016,

making progress at French and European level in understanding and

controlling frequency biases, working on predicting them,

anticipating the coming into force of European grid codes in our tools and

methods,

ensuring the ability to share data between real-time platforms for all

stakeholders involved in reliability,

stepping up cooperation with system operators and the European

coordination centre during the cold snap at the start of 2017.

actively taking part in an analysis of the "winter packet".



Page: 27/30



APPENDIX 1: Specialist glossary

Identifier Concept

Power system reliability

System reliability is defined as its ability to: - ensure the normal operation of the power system; - limit the number of incidents and prevent major incidents; - limit the consequences of major incidents when they do occur. Ensuring reliability is one of the key responsibilities entrusted to RTE by the law of 10 February in its capacity as owner of France’s transmission system.

Operating margins and security regulations

Security regulations prescribe: - a minimum margin of more than 1500 MW that can be mobilised in under 15

minutes; this figure is arrived at so that the loss of the largest coupled generating unit can be compensated for at any time;

- a minimum margin at the furthest deadline, the required volume of which

increases from a 15-minute timescale to one of several hours.

When these conditions are not met, depending on the circumstances, RTE issues a warning message on the Balance Mechanism or a "critical situation” S order.

Balancing Mechanism According to French law, generators must provide RTE with the powers that are technically available in order to ensure supply-demand balance. This is done via the Balancing Mechanism, which enables RTE to pool all the resources managed by the various stakeholders as a permanent and open system. At the same time,

stakeholders can maximise their demand response capacities and the flexibility of their generation. Based on price-volume bids, RTE performs the balancing required, inter-classifying proposals based on their price until the balance for which they are responsible is satisfied. There are provisions in place for power levels being too low: - for timescales of more than eight hours, RTE requests additional bids by sending

out a warning message; - for timescales of less than eight hours, a "downgraded mode" message enables

RTE to mobilise exceptional bids and resources not offered for balancing as well as any additional bids.

Primary and secondary frequency

control

Primary control is for automatically ensuring that balance is restored practically immediately after any contingencies affecting balance between generation and

consumption, and by all of the partners involved in the synchronous interconnection working together as one. Rules have been set by the ENTSO-E’s regional "continental Europe" group so that this action then maintains the frequency within defined limitations. Then, secondary control of the partner behind the disruption automatically cancels the frequency's residual discrepancy relative to the reference frequency, as well as discrepancies in relation to the scheduled cross-border schedules between the

various control zones.

ENTSO-E ENTSO-E (European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity), created at the end of 2008, has been the sole association of European TSOs since 1 July 2009. The ENTSO-E's role is to step up cooperation between TSOs in key areas, such as

in developing network codes about the technical aspects of the market and in the way in which it operates, coordination of the operation and development of the

European transport network, and research activity. In accordance with its statutes, the association's main decisions are taken by the General Assembly. An executive board is tasked with overall management and with preparing its strategic aims. Four main committees and their various sub-structures – the Market Committee, the System Development Committee, the

System Operations Committee, the Research and Development Committee and a legal analysis group – are responsible for the association's operational work. In order to technically coordinate the TSOs that are synchronously interconnected in Western Europe and assess their commitments to reliability (as defined in the 8 policies and agreed within the framework of the Multilateral Agreement signed by members of the former UCTE association), the System Operations Committee has

created an ad hoc regional subgroup – the Regional Group Continental Europe (RGCE). Consult: www.entsoe.eu

http://www.entsoe.eu/



Page: 28/30



Identifier Concept

Safety Telecommunications

This safety network is made up of a dedicated telecommunications infrastructure, most of which is owned and operated by RTE. It is used to convey all information (voice, data) needed for remote management.

Significant System Events (SSEs)

Pre-established criteria are used for detecting events from which lessons can be learned for the power system's reliability. These are grouped together in a "Significant System Event classification grid". The grid is used for classifying events based on their actual level of importance in terms of reliability. They are located on a seven-level severity scale. Level 0 is assigned to events which have the lowest consequences for reliability, but which should still be recorded nonetheless; levels A to F are for incidents of growing

severity up to a wide-ranging nationwide incident.

The method used to classify incidents involves assessing their severity based on two input types: - an input records the occurrence of concrete elementary events which affect the

way operation is carried out in a certain number of areas (distribution network, generation, system operation, management means, distribution);

- an input marks the extent to which the event has a damaging impact on the system.

Checking the performance of

generating facilities

Given the critical nature of the services provided by generating facilities, they may be subject to performance checks when they are connected up to the transmission grid. These checks are conducted such that they do not lead to significant increases in

work or in high costs for users or for RTE. Their purpose is to maintain the transmission grid's operating conditions so that everyone can benefit and the system's reliability is ensured. The idea is for performance to be checked at the facility's delivery point whenever such checks are enough for ensuring that performance levels are in compliance.

Checks are carried out to verify the way in which the generation units behave in relation to primary and secondary frequency control – power (statistical gain or

"droop", scheduled reserves, response times, etc.), as well as in relation to primary and secondary voltage control (provision of the contractual area in the Q/U diagrams, dynamic response, etc.).

Crisis organisation The ORTEC system (RTE’s crisis organisation plan) was introduced in the wake of the storms at the end of December 1999. It lays out the measures to take and

the organisational structure to be implemented at both national and regional levels when RTE declares a serious crisis. In addition to sourcing the necessary human resources and technical expertise, it provides for the implementation of communications initiatives for crisis management. Essentially, crisis units can be quickly mobilised across all of RTE's Units and at its Headquarters. In addition, grid incident response plans have been created for each of the regional

units. Their main aim is to ensure that cables which have sustained serious damage – and which are particularly important for the power system's reliability – can be restored in under five days.



Page: 29/30



APPENDIX 2: Abbreviations used

ACR Agence de Conduite Régionale (Regional Management Agency)

ADN Automate de Défense Nord (northern defence automaton)

AMPRION German TSO

APGP Amélioration de la Performance par le Geste Professionnel (Improved Performance through

Professionalism)

CACM Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management

CCG Cycle Combiné Gaz (gas combined cycle)

CE Centre d’Exploitation (Operations Centre)

CNES Centre National d’Exploitation Système (National System Operating Centre)

CORESO CO-oRdination of Electricity System Operators

COrS’R Centre Opérationnel de Sécurité de RTE (RTE’s Operational Security Centre)

CSEA Comité de Surveillance Economique et des Audits (Economic Surveillance and Auditing

Committee)

CWE Central Western Europe

DCC Demand Connection Code

DTR Documentation Technique de Référence (Technical Reference Documentation)

ECCT Etudes Coordonnées Court Terme (Short-Term Coordinated Studies)

EH Electronic Highway

ELD Entreprise Locale de Distribution (Local Distribution Company)

END Energie Non Distribuée (Non-Distributed Power)

ENTSO-E European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity

ELIA Belgian TSO

EOD Equilibre Offre Demande (Supply/Demand Balance)

ESS Evénément Système Significatif (Significant System Event)

GdP Groupement de Postes (Group of Substations)

GIP Groupe d’Intervention Prioritaire (grid incident response plan)

GRD Gestionnaire de Réseau de Distribution (Distribution System Operator)

GRT Gestionnaire de Réseau de Transport (Transmission System Operator)

HDP Haute Densité de Production (High-Density Production)

HVDC High Voltage Direct Current link

ICS Incident Classification Scale

ICSI Institut pour une Culture de Sécurité Industrielle (France's industrial safety culture institute)

IDCF Intra-Day Congestion Forecast

IFA Interconnexion France-Angleterre (France-UK interconnection)

IGCC International Grid Control Cooperation

IMAP Intensité Maximale Admissible en Permanence (Maximum Permissible Permanent Current)

IPES Insertion des Productions Energies renouvelables intermittentes dans le Système électrique

(incorporation of intermittent renewable energy production into the power system)

IST Intensité de Surcharge Transitoire (Transient Overload Intensity)

LAD Localisation Automatique de Défaut (Automatic Fault Location)

LFCR Load Frequency Control and Regulation

LPM Loi de Programmation Militaire (Military Planning Act)

MA Mécanisme d’Ajustement (Balancing Mechanism)



Page: 30/30



NEBEF Notification d’Echange de Blocs d’Effacement (Rules for participation of demand response in

energy markets)

NEMO Nominated Electricity Market Operator

NG National Grid, UK TSO

ORTEC Organisation de RTE en crise (RTE's crisis organisational structure)

RC Réserve complémentaire (Complementary reserve)

REE Spanish TSO

RfG Requirements for Generators

RGCE Regional Group for Continental Europe

ROC Regional Operation Centre

ROSE Réseau Optique de SEcurité (Optical Security Network)

RR Réserve Rapide (Quick Reserve) – Balancing Mechanism

RSFP Réglage Secondaire Fréquence Puissance (Secondary Load Frequency Control)

RST Réglage Secondaire de Tension (Secondary Voltage Control)

RSTN Réglage Secondaire de Tension réNové (Secondary Renovated Voltage Control)

RPD Réseau Public de Distribution (Distribution Grid)

RPT Réseau Public de Transport (Public Transmission Network)

RSCI Regional Security Cooperation Initiative

SAS Système d’Alerte et Sauvegarde (Safeguard Alarm System)

SIDRE Support Inter-Dipatchings Régionaux (Regional Inter-Control Centre Support)

SNC Système National de Conduite (National Management System)

SOGL System Operation GuideLine

SRC Système Régional de Conduite (Regional Management System)

STANWAY Project to replace the SRC

STATNETT Norwegian TSO

STS Système de Téléphonie de Sécurité (Safety Telephone System)

SWISSGRID Swiss TSO

S3REnR Schéma Régional de Raccordement au Réseau des Energies Renouvelables (Regional

Connection Program for Renewable Energies)

TCD Téléconduite (Remote Management)

TCE Temps de Coupure Equivalent (Equivalent Outage Time)

TCM Telecommunication

TCT Transformateur Condensateur de Tension (capacitor coupled voltage transformer)

TENNET-NL Dutch TSO

TERNA Italian TSO

Transnet BW German TSO

TSC TSO Security Cooperation

TSO Transmission System Operator

TURPE Tarif Utilisation Réseau Public d’Electricité (Public Transmission Network Usage Tariff)

TYNDP Ten-Year Network Development Plan

reliability report 2016 - rte-france.com · power system and which has a bearing on the role played...

Documents