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Bhutan’s democratic journey -

lessons from other young democracies

Renata Dessallien

www.bhutancmd.org.bt



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The democratic journey --

some thoughts for Bhutan

Introduction

Democracy’s lustre has dimmed in recent years, both in the south and the north.

The urry of democratization in the last part of the 20th Century evoked prospects

for a democratic golden age. But too often elected governments deviated from the

basic precepts of democratic rule. Sometimes they strayed so far that democracy

became unrecognisable. Recent books such as “Wars, Guns, and Votes”1 describesome of the brazen tactics employed in the name of democracy. In Kenya, for

example, large numbers of tribal people were forcibly displaced prior to the 1992

and 1997 elections to disenfranchise them.2 And in the lead up to the 2008 elections

in Nicaragua, the incumbent party tilted the playing eld to its advantage by

disqualifying two opposition parties, refusing accreditation to election observers,

and withholding voter identity cards for people supporting the opposition.3

Although democratic transition was supposed to usher in an era of good governanceand people’s emancipation, many societies got something very different.

What many (or most) citizens actually experienced was a mix of

distressed governance: abusive police forces, domineering local

oligarchies, incompetent and indifferent state bureaucracies, corrupt

and inaccessible judiciaries, and venal, ruling elites contemptuous

of the rule of law and accountable to no one but themselves. As a

result, people -- especially in the bottom strata of society, which inmany new democracies comprised the majority -- were citizens only

in name. There were few meaningful channels of participation and

voice open to them. There were elections, but they were contests

between corrupt, clientelistic parties that served popular interests

only in name. There were parliaments and local governments, but

they did not represent or respond to broad constituencies. There

was a constitution, but not constitutionalism -- a commitment to

the principles and restraints in that hallowed charter. There was

1 Collier, Paul (2009): Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, New York:

HarperCollins Publishers.

2 Ibid, pp. 33-34

3 “How to steal an election”, The Economist , 13 November 2008



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democracy in a formal sense, but people were still not politically

free … there is good reason to question whether such a shallow

rendition of democracy can legitimately be termed anything morethan a competitive authoritarian regime.4

Faced with such examples of democracy’s susceptibility to deformation, it is clear

how complex, vulnerable and fragile the system is. While democracy is undoubtedly

the least worst form of government, it is also the least easy. To work well it must

be well calibrated to specic country contexts. It must be steered by decision-

makers who place national interests above individual and group pursuits. It must

be carefully scrutinized by the society, who must actively engage with the systemto keep it true to purpose. Otherwise, democracy tends to veer off course and

malfunction. It becomes a front for other forms of governance. It becomes a

Trojan horse.

Unlike many developing countries, Bhutan’s democratic transition occurred during

a period of peace, prosperity and enlightened thinking. It was introduced against

a backdrop of good governance that had been established over years of careful

grooming by the 4th King. It was phased in gradually, grounded with the early

decentralisation decisions of 1981 and 1991,5 giving the country time to prepare

itself, to study the experiences of other nations, and to design a system tailored to its

specic context. Yet despite these favourable conditions and careful preparations,

the transition to full edged democracy represents a signicant adjustment for

Bhutanese society. The system is very young and fragile in many ways, and it has

introduced tensions and compulsions that must be carefully managed. Decisions

taken now will determine the path dependency of Bhutan’s democracy for decades

to come.

Bhutan is therefore at an important conjuncture in her history. She has a unique

opportunity to steer clear of the most costly mistakes made by others that could

save years of struggle and frustration. She can establish, right from the start, a well

functioning, high quality democracy that reaps good harvests for the Bhutanese

people, maintaining the country’s stable development path. Indeed, as a small

nation in a sensitive geopolitical zone, Bhutan may not have the same space to

repeat all the same mistakes of other young democracies. But to avoid democracy’s

4 Diamond, Larry (2008): The spirit of democracy: the struggle to build free societies throughout the

world , Times Books/Henry Holt and Company, p. 295

5 In 1981, important administrative functions were decentralised from the central level to the district

or Dzongkhag level, and in 1991 functions were further decentralised to the block or Geog level.



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common trappings will not be easy, nor will it occur without concerted effort and

creative thinking.

This paper reviews some frequent causes for democratic malfunction in developing

countries, probing the effects of traditional power structures and predatory elites,

the inuence of externally driven development paradigms, and the impact of

high levels of corruption on democratic politics. It highlights the importance of

strong democratic framework conditions, and constructive political engagement

by citizens, parties and inuential groups in the public space. And it offers some

thoughts on Bhutan’s democratic journey, including the importance of GNH

in crafting a quality democracy, of developing Constitutional trumping powersand inculcating a strong democratic culture. The paper concludes with that vital

ingredient of good governance -- leadership, and reects on the role of the King

in guiding Bhutan’s democratic process until it settles into an enduring positive

trajectory.



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PART ONE

1.0 Common causes of democratic malfunction

To understand how and why democracy deviates from its expected course requires

that we go behind the scenes. What you see is often not what you get. On the

surface, there may appear to be a ne democratic system design, complete with all

the laws, regulatory features and institutional set up for proper functioning. But

beneath the surface, there may lay an operative system that has little to do with

democracy beside elections.

For example, a country may possess a formal justice system ostensibly designed

to protect the constitutional order and ensure justice for all citizens. However, the

actual functioning of the system may differ substantially from what it purports

to be. It may be heavily inuenced by the ruling class. In extreme cases, it may

function primarily to ensure their impunity, while ignoring or impeding the majority

of citizens’ access to justice.

Let us take a specic example. In many edgling democracies, if a powerful

politician commits a grave crime and someone has the courage to blow the whistle

and lodge a case, it may be accepted in court. The politician, in addition to ensuring

that the whistleblower never forgets his grave mistake, will hire a high-powered

defence lawyer whose training and experience likely far exceeds that of state

prosecutors. Given the lawyer’s skills, possible legal ambiguities and loopholes,

and judges’ susceptibility to threats and coercion, it may not be difcult for the

accused to secure bail, upon which he can immediately begin interfering with witnesses and evidence. If the case is not quashed on grounds of being ‘politically

motivated’ (a favourite tactic), it may not be difcult to nd a politically biased

judicial bench to secure the desired verdict, for a fee or favour. Impunity is thus

effectively purchased, in the name of democracy and rule of law. Beneath the

formal judiciary, another system is at work with completely different aims.

This kind of subterranean, parallel governance can exist across all parts of the state

apparatus. The state anti-corruption bureau may effectively be a front for harassing those out of political favour. The public service commission and establishment

ministry may be fronts for ensuring that ruling party loyalists get hired, promoted

and transferred into coveted positions, while afliates of the opposition get



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sidelined or laid-off work. The state land registry ofce may be a thin disguise for

a system to allocate state land to the ruling elite. The elections authority may be a

front for keeping the ruling party in power.

Understanding how democracy is undermined is the rst step toward deepening

it. The following sections look at some channels through which democracy is

deformed and deled. They are by no means the only vectors of democratic

distortion, but they are relatively common in developing countries.

Common causes of democraticmalfunction

Traditional power structures

Predatory elites

Externally driven development paradigms

Corruption

1.1 Traditional power structures

When societies transition to democracy, they do not suddenly abandon their age

old practices; they take their social hierarchies, power structures and networks with

them, in some form or another. In countries where poverty is widespread and the

state is unable to provide basic services to many of its people, afliation with a

group is usually the most effective means of securing protection and acquiring

opportunities. Groups form around traditional leaders, religious personalities

and institutions, local patrons, people who are well established and know how to

work the system, etc. They provide protection and assistance to members, often in

return for services.

When democracy is superimposed on traditional societies, and leaders --

particularly those who function as patrons -- enter into public ofce, they remain

committed to their social networks and practices. For example, an elected ofcial

or civil servant may know full well that the recruitment of staff or the award of a

tendered government contract must follow a stipulated formal process to ensure

value for money, yet strong social obligations may exert untenable pressure to

favour a particular candidate or bidder. Over time, these social networks may shed

some of their traditional characteristics for political opportunism, but the sameties of dependency and reciprocal obligation often persist.

In a study of patron-client relationships in Ghana, it was found that politicians



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maintained their network of clients through favours such as “attending to

individuals’ schools fees, electricity and water bills, funeral and wedding expenses;

or distributing cutlasses and other tools for agriculture, or even handing out ‘chop-money’ (small cash sums) to constituents.”6 The patron-politician’s incentive to

guarantee his incumbency is the main incentive for this form of redistribution,

often relying on resources extracted through his political position. It was also

found that power structures of this kind tended to turn election campaigns into

“harvesting seasons” for voters, who saw in an election a chance, or even a right, to

“reap the fruits from the parliamentary tree.”7 While the particular expression of

such patron-client networks varies between cultures and places, similar examples

have been found in countries across the democratizing and developing world.8

Political parties are thus often the conduit for traditional, non-democratic social

traits that mutate into politically expedient practices. They mirror the basic

characteristics of their societies and improvise around them. This explains why

parties operating in societies marked by feudal, patron-client relations, or by ethnic

or religious cleavages, often exhibit these traits. Since kinship and traditional power

relations are so vital for survival in many societies, party politics often becomes

both highly intense and highly personalised. Deep dependency syndromes develop.

Personality cults emerge. Parties become dominated by families and run as efdoms.

Heredity becomes an acceptable form of leadership succession. Hybrid systems

emerge, based on competing logics -- formal and traditional. The bigger a society’s

unmet socioeconomic needs and the stronger its social ties and relationships, the

more difcult it seems to be to remain within the formal democratic framework.

It should not be surprising that when democracy is introduced to societies thatoperate along non-democratic lines, it takes on the characteristics of its host.

What is surprising, however, is that those who study and promote democratic

governance have taken so long to acknowledge the hybrid systems that emerge and

the extent of their deviation from basic democratic principles.

6 Lindberg, Staffan (2005): “‘It’s Our Time to ‘Chop’: Do Elections in Africa Feed Neo-Patrimonialism

rather than Counteract it?”. Democratization, vol 10/2, pp. 121-140

7 Ibid, p. 127

8 Khan, Mushtaq (2005): “Markets, States and Democracy: Patron-Client Networks and the Case for

Democracy in Developing Countries”, Democratization, vol. 12/5, pp. 704-724



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1.2 Predatory elites

Predatory elites in young democracies often trace their antecedents to traditionalpower structures. When a country produces a ruling class of predatory elite, they

often become the prime distorter of democratic governance. In some developing

countries, they operate virtually unrestrained. Once in power, they pass laws,

policies and decisions designed to enable their own relentless pursuit of rents and

their compulsions to maintain power. After spreading their inuence across all

branches of government, they feed on the state and exploit the weak. Corruption

becomes a way of life. In extreme cases, the entire government apparatus can be

distorted beyond recognition.

Politicians bribe electoral ofcials, beat up opposition campaigners,

and assassinate opposing candidates. Presidents silence criticism and

eliminate their opponents by legal manipulation, arrest, or murder.

Ministers worry rst about the monies they can collect and only

second about whether the contracts they are signing have any value

for the public. Legislators collect graft to vote for bills and to make

or break governing coalitions… Police extort rather than defend the

public, and the line between the police and the criminals is a thin one,

when it exists.9

In countries suffering from elite predation, political parties are usually the locus of

power and their organising force. They tend to be hierarchical and authoritarian.

Motivated by the thirst for power and resources, their behaviour can resemble

that of maa groups, complete with networks of armed thugs and threateners. The opposition is perceived as the arch enemy, along with anyone who dares

question their ways. The people are peons to be used to achieve their aims. Because

they operate in countries where the masses are generally poor, vulnerable and

uneducated, dependency syndromes develop. Constituents come to view their

parties and their representatives as agents for material and other benets, and

parties view public ofce as business ventures. Not all the fruits of rent seeking

disappear into party and party representative pockets; some is redistributed to

political dependents whose services are required. Come election time, there isoften generous redistribution, with the knowledge that public ofce will enable its

recuperation manifold.

9 Diamond, Larry (2008): The Spirit of Democracy and the Struggle to Build free Societies

throughout the World , New York: Times Books/Henry Holt and Company, p. 295



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“The predatory society is the inverse of the civic community. First,

there is no real community, no shared commitment to any common

vision of the public good, and no respect for law. Behavior iscynical and opportunistic. Those who capture political power seek

to monopolize it and the rents that ow from it. Thus, if there are

competitive elections, these become a bloody zero-sum struggle

where everything is at stake and no one can afford to loose. People

ally with one another in the quest for power and privilege, but not

as equals. Rather, relations are steeply hierarchical. Ordinary people

are not truly citizens but rather clients of powerful patrons, who

themselves serve as clients to more powerful patrons. Blatantinequalities in power and status cumulate into vertical chains of

dependency and exploitation, secured by patronage and coercion. In

a predatory society, ofcials feed on the state and the powerful prey

on the weak. The rich extract the wealth from the poor and deprive

them of public goods.”10

Political parties and their networks thus enable predatory elite to operate a complex

system of exploitation, underneath a façade of democracy. Democratic systems

are carefully rewired behind the scenes to meet their ends. They ensure their

people are in strategic decision-making positions to expedite their work. They are

adept at neutralising institutional oversight of their activities. The most efcient

way of accomplishing this is through appointments to oversight bodies. In some

countries, the president or prime minister is endowed with enormous discretionary

powers of appointment. In such cases, there is no need for excessive pretence --

political allies or compliant personalities are openly selected to head the judiciary,the anti-corruption body, the audit authority, the election commission, the national

human rights commission, etc. In other countries, selection procedures involve a

number of administrative and elected gures. This may require some ingenuity

to x, but arrangements can usually be found. In countries where term durations

were purposefully made lengthy or designed to straddle political governments

to avoid tampering, even this can be xed. In the event an independent-minded

leader accidentally emerges at the helm of such institutions, the ruling elite can

usually make life so difcult for him or her that they eventually have no optionbut to resign. And if the system proves to be truly fool proof, it can always be

suspended on some pretence.

10 Ibid, p. 298



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To prevent society from objecting to their behaviour, elite predators employ several

effective tactics. First, they make it difcult or costly to expose their illegal activities

through threats and harassment. Secondly, they hide their misdeeds behind thedemocratic façade, emitting thick smokescreens of democratic rhetoric to confuse

their ‘assailants’. Third, they inltrate the private sector and civil society to create

friends and foes of them, and drive wedges between groups that might otherwise

try to unite against them. Fourth, when they exaggerate beyond a society’s tolerance

level and people protest, they create diversions -- inciting ethnic tensions, conjuring

up national conspiracies, fabricating malicious and threatening foreign intent and

other forms of fear mongering that justies clampdowns on human liberties.

The above description may seem exaggerated, but it exists today to greater or lesser

degrees in many young, struggling democracies. In fact, these are not democracies

at all; they are predatory systems that subject themselves periodically, sometimes

even regularly, to elections (during which rigging and coercion abound). Extricating

societies from the grips of predatory elite is one of the greatest challenges for

rescuing democracy. When democracy reaches such desperate straights, it must be

rescued rst before it can be deepened.

1.3 Externally driven development paradigms

It is becoming increasingly evident that neo-liberal economic policies and

externally driven development paradigms of the last twenty years have not always

contributed to the consolidation of democracy and good governance in developing

countries. In fact, an increasing body of literature argues that they have often had

a negative impact by reducing the space for public policy debate and distorting, in

some cases completely undermining, domestic accountabilities.11 Countries trying to build or consolidate democracy should therefore pay attention to the impact of

development policies on democracy and good governance.

In this section we look at two ways in which dominant economic development

models have undermined democracy. First, we study how it can negatively inuence

society’s general frame of reference, shaping a peoples’ image of themselves and

the rest of the world, and therefore inuencing how they behave as citizens and

engage politically. Second, at the level of development policy packages, we look athow tough economic reform initiatives trigger reactions from the ruling elite that

can negatively affect political choices.

11 Lekvall, Anna: “Democracy and aid: the missing links”, Open Democracy, 13 May 2009



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Homo economicus and America’s model of progress

This section examines what can happen to countries that have made the transitionto multi-party democracy when liberal economic forces are taken to extremes. The

United States is used by way of example.

America’s predominant frame of reference today is economic. This was not

always the case. For two hundred years prior to the late 1980s, Western politics

including that of the US was marked by a social struggle between the political left

and the right. And economic strategies were driven largely by social issues and

convictions. This came to an abrupt halt with the demise of the Soviet Unionin 1989. Thereafter, both the left and the right lost some of their bearings and

a new dominant narrative emerged that was essentially economy-centric. Instead

of seeing the world through the lens of class struggle, revolutions and progress,

the new dominant discourse evoked an economic world view -- global capitalism,

market optimization, economic competition, growth, productivity.12

Many countries were part of this transformation, but the US came to epitomise the

new narrative. It has been termed “supercapitalism”13 and “superdevelopment”14

by some. In this new era, rms and nanciers, or “Wal-Marts and Wall Streets,”15

became the dominate players. Through professional lobby networks, they rolled

back regulatory mechanisms, pushed the privatisation of services long considered

government functions (health care, schools, airports, post, even prisons and army

functions), and at the same time secured extraordinary advantages for themselves

through tax breaks, subsidies, protectionist policies, etc.

The new American growth model resulted in immense opportunities for some

and enormous fortunes for a few. It succeeded in sustaining growth, expanding

consumer choice, it brought down prices and spurred remarkable technological

innovation that changed the way we live. But it also drove down wages, wiped

out jobs, bankrupted companies, devastated many communities and caused untold

environmental harm. While the economy expanded and investment values sky

12 Kotz, David (2003): “Neoliberalism and the U.S. Economic expansion in the ‘90s”, Monthly

Review, vol. 54/11 (April), pp. 15-33

13 Reich, Robert B (2007): Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy and

Everyday Life, New York: Vintage Books

14 Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1995): Democracy on Trial , New York: Basic Books, p. 13

15 Reich, Robert B (2007): Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy and

Everyday Life, New York: Vintage Books, pp.12-14



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rocketed (prior to the 2008 nancial meltdown), many vital social concerns and

social responses fell by the wayside.16 And as the society focused on trying to get

ahead economically, it seemed to loose interest in the public interest. Notions of the common good came to be viewed as almost old fashioned. The public space

contracted.17

By trumping private advantage over public interest, and by reducing and

discrediting the role of the state, America’s economic view of itself and the world

neglected that part of the human experience that represents the collectivity, the

shared purpose, interests bigger than the individual. According to Robert Reich,

Americans’ interests as “investors” and “consumers” triumphed over theircapacity to act as “citizens”. This led to a form of hyper-individualism at odds with

fundamental values of democracy. It threatened the quality of social engagement

and society’s ability to perform its democratic responsibilities. The consequences

of this were serious.18

The current chapter in American history teaches us that unless the basic elements

of a country’s self identity and purpose remain complementary to democratic

values, they can end up eroding the institutions that support and magnify those

values, undermining the quality of democracy. Developing countries should take

heed. Unfortunately, many have instead charged headlong in the same directions at

break neck speed. This created a peculiar situation: the emergence of a super-rich

developing country elite that may share more in common with their American and

other OECD country counterparts than with their own countrymen. Given their

relatively weak democratic culture to begin with, these countries are even more

vulnerable than the United States to the distorting effects of super-capitalism.

Political response to tough economic reform -- developing countries

America’s dominant economic narrative began to be promoted by the international

community in developing countries during the 1980s. A set of economic policy

16 The Gini index, the most commonly used measure of income inequality, increased from 39.7 in 1967

to 46.9 in 2001, and data from the US Census Bureau shows that the share of pre-tax household

income held by the top 1 percent in 2005 stood at its highest since the 1920s, an era of great income

disparities (US Census Bureau. (2005). “Historical Income Tables - Income Equality.” (http://www.

census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/p60no231_tablea3.pdf. Retrieved 2009-10-03; Johnston,

David, “Income Gap is Widening, Data Shows”. New York Times, 29 March 2007

17 Putnam, Robert D. (2000): Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community,

New York: Simon & Schuster

18 Ibid



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prescriptions, known as the “Washington Consensus,” took shape with two

main prongs (a) structural adjustment -- designed to divest the public sector of

productive activities, to maintain low savings rates and to nance investmentthrough foreign capital, and to promote export-led growth, and; (b) stabilization

-- to keep ination low, through containment of public spending and tax reform.

These packages were conceived to help developing countries tackle their very real

and nagging problems of low productivity, high ination, large trade imbalances

and high public decits.

Implicit in the policy package were three big assumptions. First, it was assumed

that most developing countries could be treated the same way -- they could becured of their various economic ailments with the same medicine. Secondly, it

assumed that developing countries had to pass through the same path or trajectory

as had developed countries -- they had to start with low-end exports and work their

way up. Trade liberalisation was therefore a central feature of the policy package.

Thirdly, it was assumed that market forces could handle most of what was needed

to achieve development and that the role of government was mainly regulatory,

plus the provision of some basic services. Governments were therefore put on

belt-tightening regimes. And the era of country-specic national development

strategies and planning was over.

By the late 1990s, when country after country failed to achieve the desired results

of stabilization and structural adjustment and when public protests and bad

press reached embarrassing levels, the international community had to pause

and think again. It abandoned the Washington Consensus nomenclature and

adopted ‘poverty reduction’ as its new clarion call. But it made this change withoutfundamentally rethinking many of its basic economic assumptions and policy

prescriptions. The packaging became softer, governments were asked to lead the

processes, but the policies remained largely the same. It is now nearly three decades

that many developing countries have operated within this policy framework. In

many cases, this corresponds with the period in which many of them transitioned

to democratic government. What inuence did the neo-liberal economic model

have on the shape and quality of democracy in these countries?

This is a difcult question to answer because of attribution problems. Furthermore,

the differences in initial circumstances and the disparate ways in which countries

assimilated both economic policy prescriptions and democracy led to a plurality



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of experience, some positive and some negative. In addition, country studies are

often hampered by narrow compartmentalism and ideological blinkers. There are

numerous reports on the economies of almost all countries, and many on politicalgovernance, but they are separate, parallel enquiries. Very little analysis exists on

how one impacts the other. Until such a body of work emerges, we can only hazard

general observations.19

Roberto Mangabeira Unger (1989) provides some insights in his book Democracy

Realized . He gives a vivid description of what happens to democracy when one

tries to force neo liberal policies onto a society marked by strong hierarchies

and divisions, high concentrations of wealth, power and income, and a businesscommunity dependent on collusive relationships with politicians and bureaucrats,

such as his native Brazil. First, he notes the policies threaten the interests of

the propertied class and business elite, through the withdrawal of subsidies, the

exposure to foreign competition, and the application of anti-trust norms. Under

these circumstances, the business elite is likely to “ercely resist the assault upon

their privileges even as they reafrm their devotion to liberal principles.”20 This

often results in selective interpretation of the neo-liberal project. It tends to

be implemented only partially and with numerous concessions to the elite. The

consequence of this is to turn the economic project from one designed to open

new avenues for growth into one designed to realign and reinvent the elite. An

elaborate bargaining between policy makers and the elite forms the backdrop for

this, in which policy measures are sweetened for elite consumption. For example,

greater foreign competition can be made more palatable by providing opportunities

for the elite to benet from subsidized privatization of state owned industries.21

The type of politics preferred by this type of selective neo-liberalism is “relative

democracy; democracy but not too much.”22 Too much democracy in these

circumstances can lead to mass movements. Popular leaders may incite the

excluded majority of people. “Not too much democracy is both the antidote and

the prophylactic that the defenders of selective neo-liberalism administer against

this danger.”23 The methods employed for this include changes to constitutional

rules, electoral arrangements and media ownership that keep people at low levels

19 Lekvall, Anna: “Democracy and aid: the missing links”, Open Democracy, 13 May 2009

20 Unger, Roberto Mangabeira (1998): Democracy Realized: The Progressive Alternative, London:

Verso, p. 68

21 Ibid, pp. 67-70

22 Ibid, p. 68

23 Ibid, p. 69



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of political engagement and activism. For example, private media licences can be

granted to selected persons in exchange for political backing, etc. When democracy

become subservient to a selective neo-liberal project and when the latter issuccessful at keeping down mass protest, it does so “at the cost of putting the neo-

liberal project at odds with the collective interest in the deepening of democracy.”24

In conclusion, although no one ever promised that structural adjustment and

stabilization policies would enhance democracy, there were expectations that these

economic and nancial sector reforms might open up development opportunities

to a broader array of stakeholders, beyond the ruling elite. This prospect raised

hopes for gradual development of a middle class in poor countries that would beable to demand better governance and their piece of the redistribution pie. But often

the policies employed were neither able to accomplish their economic objectives

(as they were either misplaced to begin with or got distorted in implementation, or

they were not implemented at all), nor were they able to meet vaguely associated

political expectations. Even when they were implemented reasonably well, and

when growth succeeded in creating new beneciaries, this generally did not alter

the political dynamics as the new comers were usually co-opted by ruling elite. The

elite class expanded in size, but this did not enable a middle class to consolidateor to emerge in the rst place, nor did it bring about signicant changes to the

majority of people. More often than not, neoliberal economic reforms caused

political backlash that led to democratic contraction.

This assault on democracy through the suppression of social mobilisation, in

some cases provoked wide electoral swings, often between economic orthodoxy

and populism (e.g. in many Latin American countries). People may have been

disempowered from expressing themselves in the face of unpopular policies, butthey were harder to control on election-day. Pent-up frustrations translated into

huge vote swings from one election to the next. While these dramatic electoral

swings provided a eeting outlet for people’s frustrations, they were largely self-

defeating, as the answers to society’s socioeconomic ailments often lay in some

policy middle ground.

1.4 Corruption

Another common factor that leads to democratic distortions and malfunction

emanates from the human frailty of those in public ofce. All human beings have

24 Ibid, p. 69



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personal and group interests, but public ofce requires that they be contained in the

broader interests of society and the nation. The higher the position, the greater the

responsibility to public and national interests. Even political party representatives, whose job it is to work for the interest of their party and their constituency, are

required to place the broader interests of society and the nation rst. Otherwise

politics degenerates into a battleground.

Public interests are subverted for private gain through misuse of public funds

and authority. This occurs in all governments and no level is immune, neither

lowest nor highest. In many developing countries, citizens are regularly pressured

for bribes to receive public services. This varies from paying low-level bureaucratsto speed up the processing of applications, to paying police ofcers to record

crimes, to paying doctors at public hospitals to receive care. In India, it is estimated

that citizens paid the equivalent of $4.8 billion in bribes in 2004 to receive public

services.25

At the other end of the power spectrum another scale of corruption is practiced.

Examples include the awarding of large government contracts to electoral

campaign contributors, paying judges in the higher judiciary to inuence rulings

in favour party afliates charged with serious crimes, and formulation of laws and

regulations to allow particular companies to monopolize certain markets.

Corruption comes with tremendous costs to society. Studies show that a one-

unit decrease in the Corruption Perception Index, an internationally recognised

measurement of corruption, leads to a decrease of annual GDP per capita growth

rate by between 0.9 and 1.7 percent.

26

The World Bank estimated in 2000 thatif Bangladesh could reduce its corruption level to those prevailing in countries

with the highest reputation for honest dealing, it could add between 2.1 and 2.9

percent to its annual per capita GDP growth.27 It has also been estimated that

about 15 percent of Pakistan’s development budget for infrastructure of 2007/08

was wasted through corruption, valued between USD 1.6 and 2.5 billion.28

25 Transparency International Bangladesh (2007): National Household Survey; Centre for Media

Studies (2005): India Corruption Study

26 Anoruo, Emmanuel & Habtu Braha (2005): “Corruption and Economic Growth: The African

Experience”. Retrieved 2009-09-15 from www.jsd-africa.com/.../Arc_Corruption%20and%20

Economic%20Growth.pdf; Podobnik, Boris et al (2008): “Inuence of corruption on economic

growth rate and foreign Investment”. Retrieved 2009-09-15 from arxiv.org/abs/0710.1995

27 The World Bank Bangladesh (2000): Corruption in Bangladesh: Costs and Cures

28 The World Bank (2007): Pakistan Infrastructure Implementation Capacity Assessment (PIICA)



19

Corruption not only weakens economic growth and retards human development, it

undermines public goods such as security and the environment. In many countries,

degradation of the environment is a direct result of the misuse of public authority,e.g. through the granting of logging permits that exceed quotas, tweaking pollution

controls or not enforcing standards for disposal of hazardous materials and

substances. Those most affected by such malpractice tend to be the poor whose

livelihoods depend on land and water, and who have no way of countering the

powerful interests of large companies, factory owners and landowners.

Finally, the misuse of public funds and authority is contagious. Once national

leaders indulge in it, they send the signal to society at large that it is alright foreveryone to follow suit. And once a critical mass indulge in it, it becomes harder

for individuals who want to resist. Ultimately it has a corrosive effect on the

public’s trust in institutions and in the rule of law. Through frequent exposure to

corruption by public ofcials and representatives, citizens grow disillusioned with

the commitment of the state to respond to their needs. Over time this can lead to

the evaporation of social capital and disillusionment with democracy itself.

PART TWO

2.0 Key factors for democratic consolidation

The preceding section looked briey at four factors that can breed democratic

malfunctions -- traditional power structures, predatory elite, certain economic

development paradigms and policy reform packages in particular circumstances,and susceptibility to misuse of public authority and resources. These are by no

means the only forces and factors that distort the democratic process, but they

are common to many developing countries. When faced with them, how can a

struggling democracy be strengthened and deepened? How can it be made more

responsive to, and meaningful for, average citizens?

A quick glance through the history of democratic thought reveals the recurrent

preoccupation with the possibility of an elected few who fail to check their ownexcesses. Indeed, many democracies have suffered from excess freedom at the top,

unleashing a plethora of democratic ailments. This concern led to the design of

robust democratic framework conditions that spell out the vision and character of



20

the state, how it should function, and the penalties for violating the rules of the

game. Collectively, these framework conditions constitute the embankments within

which the political process ows.

29

No system is foolproof, however, and even the most perfect democratic framework

is vulnerable to distorting forces and human frailty. To contain these forces, the

democratic system depends on vibrant, inuential actors in the public space

that hold their governments accountable. They are the ultimate referees of the

democratic process. They must ash the penalty cards when players breach the

rules. To perform this crucial role, they must be strong, organised, knowledgeable,

alert and engaged.

When either the framework conditions are awed or weak and/or the citizenry is

unable to play its vital role as referee, democracy can go array. The political ow

can seep over the embankments, spilling into adjacent elds and towns destroying

crops and homes. It can displace people and cause socioeconomic havoc. It can

provoke discord and violence. It can altogether change the course of the river’s

ow.

The following section looks at democracy’s embankments, the political ow, and

the referees of the political game.

Key factors for democratic

consolidation

Robust democratic framework conditions

The power of institutions

Constructive political party engagement

Vibrant public space

2.1 Robust democratic framework conditions

Democracy’s framework conditions are sometimes interpreted as both the

conditions set within the framework, as well as the broader conditions for the

framework to function well.30 This paper takes the former interpretation, focusing

on the constitution, laws, regulations and institutions that dene the state polity

and orient the political process. The latter view encompasses external factors such

as levels of education, interpersonal trust, social mobilisation, and even economic

well being, etc., all of which buttress the sustainability of the framework. These

29 de Souza, Peter (2008): “Framework Conditions of Democracy” [unpublished manuscript]

30 de Souza, Peter (2008): “Framework Conditions of Democracy” [unpublished manuscript]



21

external conditions are covered under section 2.3 below entitled “The Public

Space.”

The framework conditions for democracy begin with its vision and design. They

describe the values and norms to which the state subscribes, both in aspirational

and prescriptive terms. They also outline the system of governance, set the roles

and functions of state organs, frame the rules of the game and the punitive

measures for violation, and prescribe the relationships between institutions.

While all democratic systems share common basic features, framework conditions

must be crafted to specic country conditions and character. There are many roadsto democracy and each country must nd its own way. Underlying social structures

and practices must be taken into account. If they are synchronistic with democratic

practice, they can be nurtured and built upon. If they compete with central tenants

of democratic principle, incentives must be built to adapt them.

The national vision is derived from the constitution, from the political process,

from the administration and from the culture. Often, those parts of the framework

conditions that reect the national vision get overlooked or taken for granted, while

the more structural and systemic elements receive the lion’s share of attention.

But the vision is vitally important, especially for countries in transition and those

attempting a development strategy that departs from global conventional wisdoms.

It is the national vision that sustains the focus of the people and the government

on the aims to be achieved, on society’s desired outcomes and goals. It should be

the object of special focus and institutional support. If not, the special character

of a nation gradually succumbs to the gravitational eld of dominant regional orglobal narratives that may not be compatible with the national context.

The structure of the polity and character of the system -- unitary or federal,

presidential or prime ministerial, the composition and functioning of chambers

of representatives, the tiers of government and their respective functions, the role

of independent bodies, appointments to constitutional posts, the organisation

of elections, the administration of justice, the composition and functioning of

oversight bodies – all constitute the architecture of a nation’s framework conditions.

In addition to establishing the vision and structure of the polity, framework

conditions must also serve to guide the resolution of disputes and conict. This



23

of ‘spirit’ is embedded, in thinking about and debating constitutional morality.

There are two dimensions to this. The rst relates to imagining what the founding

persons meant with respect to that “spirit” -- what lay behind their vision of the new republic’s identity, norms, values and principles, what underlay their

conception of the future structure of the polity. The second dimension relates to

contemporary constitutional concerns and discussions drawing on good practice

from around the world. India’s invention of a “basic structure of the constitution,”

for example, illustrates an imaginative attempt to cordon off fundamental

elements, protecting them from tampering, to conserve the constitutional spirit.

Both aspects of “spirit” are important in determining constitutional morality. And

both the face value content and the essence or spirit of the framework conditionsare important in any effort to deepen democracy. “Spirit, as constitutional morality,

serves as a check on political behaviour as does ‘framework’ when seen as laws,

etc. So framework conditions are both structure and spirit.”33 Efforts to improve

the quality of democracy must occur at both levels, by tightening the laws and

introducing institutional innovation, and by generating robust public engagement

in measuring political behaviours by their constitutional morality.

Because the spirit of the constitution must be kept alive through vigorous,

continual public debate and because all laws, regulations and public policies have

direct bearing on the lives of citizens, it is vitally important that the population

engage with the process of their formulation and amendment. Creating the space

for this is fundamental for deepening democracy.

The power of institutions

Institutions are both part and parcel of the framework conditions and the main

conduit through which that framework is operationalised. They enshrine and

promote the values, principles and directives of the constitutional order and

ensure that laws, policies and decisions translate into action. Through institutions,

the multiple and varied claims and needs of the citizenry are channelled, vetted

and solutions found as to whether and how they can be met. They are both the

lubricating interface between the law makers and law enforcers, as well as between

the rulers and the ruled. They enable arbitration between conicting claims of society. They set the incentives for human interaction. They matter enormously.

33 de Souza, Peter, email to the author, 4 October 2009



24

How institutions of the state, the private productive and service sectors, and civil

society work together, and how citizens interface with them, determines to a large

extent the direction and effectiveness of the state. Each set of institutions has itsspecic roles and responsibilities and the democratic system reserves special status

and autonomy to some. This section looks at formal state institutions.

A primary function of the state institutional framework is to make the national

vision a palpable, living and breathing force. One of the big errors of many

developing countries in the last several decades has been to neglect this critical

function. As domestic economic policies became increasing inuenced by externally

driven policy packages and as Western models of democracy were replicated without adequate adaptation to national circumstances, many countries lost their

unique, individual paths and drifted into foreign orbits. This has weakened and

compromised them.

In addition to sustaining and pursuing the national vision, state institutions of a

democratic polity must ensure vertical and horizontal accountabilities designed to keep

the system in check. Vertical accountabilities are engendered through credible

electoral processes and sincere representation at national and subnational levels,

as well as through mechanisms that reach out to include the public such as public

hearings, citizens’ charters, citizens’ report cards, audits, etc. Such accountability can

also be enhanced by obligations imposed on the state, such as right to information

laws, public disclosure requirements, etc. Civil society, including media, can play a

vital role here.

Expanding the political space through political representation at sub-national tiersof government creates opportunities for greater vertical, as well as horizontal

institutional accountability. While some countries prefer to keep these elections

party-less, others contend that local politics is the best grooming for national

representation and therefore should be open to political parties. Even when parties

are barred from subnational elections, they are usually active informally. Beyond

the issue of parties, local elected governments provide many of the opportunities

of parliament at subnational levels. Because they broaden a nation’s political space

and spread the decision making base, elected local governments are often resistedby parliaments and the central administration. They are often not given either the

authority or the resources to perform meaningfully. The stiing of local democracy

can impede the ourishing of national democracy.



25

Horizontal accountability refers to checks and balances across the state institutional

apparatus. Keeping the judiciary independent is probably the single most important

institutional building block toward making democracy functional. Firstly, it is thenal authority and decision maker on legal matters and, secondly, by ring fencing it

from the inuence of the ruling class, it can enable other positive reforms to take

hold across state bodies. Beyond the judiciary, horizontal accountability networks

include institutions such as the public audit authority, the election commission,

the anti-corruption authority, parliamentary committees, national human rights

commissions, ombudsmen, police commissions, economic regulatory institutions,

etc. While each of these bodies has specialised functions, they also oversee other

government bodies. Together, they perform their oversight function best in anoverlapping, interlocking manner. That way, if one institution falters or fails,

another can step in to take up the slack. “Effective horizontal accountability is not

the produce of isolated agencies but of networks of agencies.”34

Oversight of political parties is a particularly important institutional function of

the state, usually entrusted to the elections authority, but also to some extent to the

judiciary, the audit authority, the police, the national board of revenue, the anti-

corruption commission, etc. As parties are the agents whose misbehaviour most

seriously affects the quality of democracy, ensuring they conform to accepted

norms and practices is critical. This can be done in a variety of ways. For example,

the electoral law on party registration can stipulate criteria to enhance political

accountability -- candidate qualication criteria (such as educational achievement,

servicing of debts, payment of utility bills, etc.), mandatory public disclosures

from candidates (including income, assets, criminal records, etc.), guidelines on

party constitutions (e.g. to be in line with the national constitution, regular electionof party committee leadership at all tiers, gender representation targets, etc.), limits

on campaign spending, submission of campaign spending reports, submission

of annual audited accounts, etc. Empowering the elections authority to disqualify

candidates for violation of electoral law during campaigns and placing tight time

limits on the courts for resolving cases of electoral misconduct can also help keep

parties accountable, provided the election commission is politically impartial.

Getting the institutional framework right, including its vertical and horizontalaccountabilities, is no easy feat. Independence may exist, but on paper alone.

Power may be effectively concentrated in one branch. Oversight institutions may

34 O’Donnell, Guillermo (1998): “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies”, Journal of

Democracy, vol. 9/3, p. 39.



26

collude with those they are supposed to police, or they may be rendered toothless.

A awed or suboptimal institutional framework creates networks of beneciaries

that resist change. “The choice of a conguration of institutions, in the early lifeof a nation, sets the polity along a certain path from which it is reluctant and costly

to exit. It gets set along a certain path dependency. This means that the polity

nds that it gets increasing returns by remaining along the chosen path. To get out

of this path entails a big effort and huge costs that, in normal times, the polity is

unwilling to pay.”35

Breaking free of this path dependency is not only about conceiving the right

technical xes. Every institutional conguration has stakeholders who benetfrom the status quo and jealously guard it. What is usually required is a broad-based

momentum for change. Fukuyama (2004) in his study of statebuilding notes that

“the majority of cases of successful state building and institutional reform have

occurred when a society has generated strong domestic demand for institutions and

then created them... Insufcient domestic demand for institutions or institutional

reform is the single most important obstacle to institutional development in poor

countries.”36

2.2 Constructive political engagement: the importance of political parties

Historically, political parties evolved as part and parcel of the landscape of civil

society organisations. As they play such a special role in democracy and because,

when elected, their reach extends beyond the public space into power centres of

the state, they deserve special consideration.

The classic functions of political parties are to forge coherent policy agendas from

a vast range of societal concerns and competing claims, to raise public political

awareness, to pass legislation, to oversee government, and to represent the

electorate. Behind these functions lies an elaborate system that enables a political

government, amidst multiple competing public expectations, needs and priorities,

to chart a way forward with public support.

Political governance is fundamentally different from administrative governance. Administrative governance is top-down, often expert-driven, and guided by

35 de Souza, Peter (2008): “Framework Conditions of Democracy” [unpublished manuscript], p. 14.

36 Fukuyama, Francis (2004): State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21 st Century,

Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 35.



27

rational planning and execution. Administrative governance assumes that most of

society’s collective endeavours can be analysed, planned and managed logically.

It can be autocratic or oligarchic or even polyarchic. The former Soviet Unionoperated under a system of polyarchic administrative governance. The strengths

of administrative governance lie in its orderliness, its predictability and, when

implemented well, its efciency and effectiveness. At some periods in a country’s

history, administrative governance may be benecial and necessary, such as in the

formative stages of state building or during periods of crisis or instability.

But administrative governance has its limits. Even if it is not usurped by powerful

elite, it usually decides priorities and makes plans for people, rather than with them.Its data gathering, problem analysis and strategy formulation may be awless, but

because people are less than fully involved, they may not feel ownership of the

resulting public decisions. This can lead to tensions, discontent and ash points.

This is where political governance has the upper hand and where political parties

play such a vital role. They generally have much greater reach and closer contacts

with people than do administrative systems, enabling their decisions to resonate

more broadly, thus producing wider results with greater sustainability.

Peter Ronald de Souza provides an eloquent description of the unique resources

that political parties can bring to society:

Plural societies have inherent to them multiple contestations. These

take place all the time and while some are minor, they have the

potential of growing in magnitude and at times of even spilling over.

These contestations may be over interests, beliefs and perceptions.Politics provides the site for these contesting positions to enter into

negotiation. In that way, politics often encourages accommodation.

Politics, in addition, provides multiple sites for accommodation.

These could be at the national level or at the local level, within

formal institutions of state and also within civil society. As a

result tensions within a polity get dispersed polity-wide and do not

accumulate to destabilize the polity. In a plural polity, which all large

polities are, such tensions get counter balanced, with demands in onearea having to nd space for articulation alongside demands from

another area. This blunts the sharp edges of the demands producing

a more pragmatic mindset. If we were for a moment to overlook



28

the pejorative inexion to the phrase ‘playing politics’, then playing

politics is a complex game and those who do so successfully have

acquired distinct skills of negotiation and compromise. Politics breedsentrepreneurs who can deal with such contestations. They serve as

intermediaries between citizen and state. Suspend politics and you

remove these intermediaries leaving a void that cannot be lled by

the administrative system. Tensions thus begin to accumulate. The

main home for such entrepreneurs is the political party. It enables

articulation and aggregation of interests, encourages the creation of

wider coalitions to achieve electoral success, is the main agent for

recruitment and training of leaders in governance and, most of all,helps the state build support for itself.37

Political parties engage with society and with other parties across multiple fora, but

they interact formally in parliament where they perform their legislative, oversight

and representative functions. The parliament or national assembly is the formal

locus of political deliberation in a democracy. Democratic deliberation entails

the exchange of views and the understanding of other political perspectives. It

involves the search for common ground, common interests as opposed to narrow party or ideological positions, and requires give and take. It is both educative and

creative. Through democratic deliberation, the various perspectives, claims and

needs surrounding important public issues are reviewed, explored and consensus

built around appropriate laws/policies to address them.

Because of the centrality of parliament in a democracy, the quality of its democratic

deliberations is not only important for law making, it also has multiplier effects

across society. A parliament whose political representatives engage constructively in informed debates, whose majority members accord due consideration for,

and accommodation of, the views of other members, who respect the accepted

procedures and adopt behaviours betting the decorum of the institution, sets a

good example for society to emulate across numerous other deliberative fora.

The role of the speaker is determinant in establishing a conducive environment

for constructive debate. Party whips and individual members can play a supportive

role behind the scenes in the search for common ground. The rules of procedure

and conventions vis-à-vis the opposition are also determining (e.g. allocated time

37 de Souza, Peter (2008): “Framework Conditions of Democracy” [unpublished manuscript], pp. 12-

13



29

for the opposition to question the PM, nomination of opposition members to a

deputy speaker position and to chair important committees, etc.). While political

competition is an essential part of the political process and parliamentary sessionsmay get rowdy at times, if raw competition can be subjugation to constructive,

high quality inter-party deliberation, in the pursuit of decisions that benet society

at large, democracy can deliver on people’s expectations.

Having appreciated the value of political parties in constitutional democracy

and the importance of inter-party deliberation, we must also probe why parties

sometimes misbehave. Parties are programmed to compete and to prevail in

the political game. They are in constant competition with other parties and arecontinually sizing up situations with reference to how the public perceives them,

the actions and reactions of rival parties and other groups, and the responses of

those parties with whom they enjoy alliances. If democratic framework conditions

are not strong, parties will be tempted to breach their parameters and indulge in

extra legal means of achieving their aims. Often this involves informal means.

Informal systems exist to some extent in all forms of government, in both

developed and developing countries. Some elements can be benecial. For

example, the practice of informal consultations prior to naming important

government appointments may not be required by law, but may be practiced in

order to ensure the decision is well founded, well accepted and therefore durable.

However, informal governance practices can also be harmful. As described in

Part One, when political parties are viewed as business opportunities and when

constituencies depend on their parties for direct socioeconomic benets, negative

forms of informal governance can undermine the democratic framework anderode state institutions.

If political parties are not kept in check, their indulgence in dubious informal

governance may spread across the length and breadth of the formal governance

system. Parties may coerce, bribe, or otherwise illegally inuence the decisions

of all three branches of government. In two-party systems where competition is

particularly erce, the parties’ compulsions to vie for political allegiance between

and across state and non-state institutions may end up politicising virtually allbranches of government, civil society and the private sector. The entire society

may end up divided, pitted one side against the other. In Bangladesh, it is well

known which major business conglomerates, public associations, media houses



30

and NGOs “belong” to which political alliance. Even national artists have been

divided into political camps.

Breaking free of these parallel, informal systems, driven by political parties’

misdirected compulsions, is exceedingly difcult. Elements of the problem that

could be remedied through changes to the framework conditions are usually not

an option, because political elites do not willingly submit themselves to limits on

their powers. When public opinion requires them to convey support for positive

change in their rhetoric, they may still tenaciously resist it in their actions. If public

opinion is strong enough, they may even agree to formal changes to protect their

public image. However, as soon as people are looking in the other direction, they are likely to pull out their informal governance toolbox to unwind or neutralise

the potential positive impact of such change. In countries where accountability

systems are weak and public access to information is limited, there are virtually no

limits to politically driven informal governance. This is where politics meets the

underworld.

When political parties misbehave, when the embankments are breached and the

ood waters inundate surrounding crops and communities, the solutions usually cannot come from within political parties. Vested interests are too entrenched.

Pro-reform elements within parties usually nd themselves sidelined, threatened,

expulsed, or in worst case scenarios assassinated. Even in those rare instances

when top party leadership tries to bring the behaviour of party cadres in line with

democratic framework norms, they can be stymied by those who benet from

the status quo. Reforming democracies with widespread, entrenched ailments can

usually only occur when a critical mass of civil society unites in protest.38

2.3 Vibrant, inuential actors in the public space

Democracies require a supportive, dynamic public space to function well. This

means informed and engaged citizens, and a vibrant and dense network of non-

state, civil society associations, including an independent and pluralistic media.

Citizens become informed and engaged by participating in political processes

(debates on legislative and public policy issues, voting, participating in political

awareness raising initiatives, etc.). Through these means, citizens become

38 While military interventions can effectively arrest the slide into political chaos, they are generally

not good at creating durable political solutions.



31

knowledgeable about political issues and processes, express their views and explore

other viewpoints, and hold public ofcials and institutions to account. Engaged

citizenry often emerges in response to perceived or real injustices by the state, butit can also be promoted through civic education, awareness raising, role models,

appeals to people’s responsibilities as citizens, etc.

In many developing countries, people are too poor or preoccupied with daily

subsistence struggles to be able to invest time in political affairs. Or they do not have

access to information and feel powerless to change things. This evokes a body of

literature that emerged in the 1990s arguing that minimum thresholds of personal

income and/or education were necessary in order for democracy to succeed. Whilethe preconditions arguments were compelling, conventional wisdom has moved

on, using examples such as India, Costa Rica, Ghana, etc., where average income

and education levels are low, yet democracy is consolidating. Many people resonate

with Amartya Sen’s observation that “A country does not have to be deemed t

for democracy; rather, it has to become t through democracy.”39 Be that as it may,

since the majority of countries in the world today have already transitioned to

democracy, a more germane issue may be the power of ideas that democracy

plants in the minds of the masses, regardless of their education or income.

One of democracy’s greatest assets lies in the seeds of possibilities it evokes in

citizens’ imaginations. Despite its foils and fumbles, democracy kindles hope in

people’s hearts and makes them believe in a better future. Change we can . Democracy

enables people to envision that their masters of today need not be their masters

of tomorrow. The idea of change in the minds of the masses may take decades

to reap democratic dividends, but when it does real change becomes inevitable.

Cultivating faith in those possibilities is therefore one of the keys for deepening and sustaining democracy. That is why the ndings of opinion polls on people’s

faith in democracy matter. When people’s faith in democracy dwindles, democracy

is in trouble.

Civil society includes individual citizens and the multitude of community and

associational life that citizens construct outside formal state structures. This

encompasses everything from village and neighbourhood groups, religious bodies,

trade unions, voluntary associations, non-prot organisations and charity services.

Parent-teacher associations, self-help groups, community policing, professional

39 Sen, Amartya (1999): “Democracy as a Universal Value”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 10/3 (July),

p. 4.



33

Larry Diamond’s analysis of why democracy in India has sustained

and developed for over six decades since the country’s independence

highlights the country’s vibrant civil society and its democraticdispositions. He notes rstly that Indians value and believe in democracy

-- opinion polls show that the majority of Indians are convinced that democracy

is the best form of governance and share a common commitment to it. Second,

they maintain a healthy suspicion of authority which makes them watchful of

their politicians and their government (the referee function). Thirdly, the diversity

of India has nurtured a culture of accommodation, tolerance, cooperation and

collective bargaining, necessary for the inclusion of diverse views and needs.

Fourthly, Indian society is generally pragmatic, so while they may strike a hardbargain, they also value the necessity for compromise and concession. And fthly,

rule of law has managed to take root and grow.44

The role of media within civil society plays a vital role for democratic governance.

It can apply accountability and transparency pressure on state institutions (and

non-state actors) by revealing information on their performance, their misdeeds or

lack of action, and the public’s opinion of them. It can raise awareness on public

issues, through articles and discussions, helping to forge informed public opinions.

And it can expand people’s perspectives on problems and alternative solutions,

broadening the common ground for political compromise and consensus building.

In nurturing the development of an independent, vibrant media, there are risks.

Inexperienced journalists can get carried away by their freedoms and confuse

personal slander for critique on performance. They may be a little “creative”,

approximative, or partial in the news they report. And they may be politically biased. In fact, as politicians realise the power of the media, they try to inuence

it. They purchase media houses, so as to shape the news to their liking.45 Because

of this, governments are often tempted to control or at least inuence the media.

This is a big mistake. Firstly, it usually backres against the government, which can

nd itself under erce media attack. Secondly, if it does manage to control the

media, it destroys a vital part of the democratic system. This not only has domestic

implications, it can also inuence the country’s foreign image and relations.

44 Diamond, pp. 155-156

45 In some South Asian countries, ownership of private media is overwhelmingly dominated by

political party members or their afliates.



34

When media manages to successfully perform a watchdog function, it is often

threatened and mistreated, sometimes directly by governments and political parties

and sometimes through proxies. The number of journalists subject to harassment, violence and incarceration is an indicator of a country’s democratic performance.

In 2009, 76 journalists worldwide were killed on the job, 573 were arrested and 33

were kidnapped.

Equally harmful to democracy is the gradual trivialization and marketization of

news media. Whereas two decades ago, a good section of news media outlets were

driven by a mission to nd and report the “truth”, this professional calling has

been eclipsed by media’s business preoccupations with entertainment and selling commercial products. The impact of this on the development of informed and

engaged citizenry and civil society, and their ability to resist and protest the misuse

of power, is serious.

This section has attempted to outline how citizens and civil society can inuence

their political governments in a democracy, but it does neither explain how a

country in democratic transition develops a conducive public space to begin with,

nor how a society’s demand for good politics can be enhanced or increased.

While there is much that is still unexplained, it is clear that demand for positive

change must come from within societies. Exogenously generated change is usually

distorted by self-interest, ill-conceived and unsuccessful. Draconian international

interventionism has a very bad track record. And the results of urgings by the

international community for improvements in the quality of governance in

developing countries are not encouraging, even when accompanied by carrots andsticks. Sometimes, exogenous shocks, such as international price spikes, regional

or global recession, severe natural disasters, war, etc., can have spill over effects

on a country, creating crises that in turn foster internal demand for change. But

even these externally provoked demands for reform from within are often only

temporary in nature.

Sometimes demand for functional institutions and good governance develops as

new groups, new class interests or business needs emerge. This can be triggered by overall socioeconomic development, by piercing into lucrative new export markets

(e.g. the ready made garment industry in Bangladesh and its transformation of

poor women into an organised workforce with a voice), by emerging business



35

interests, by initiatives to empower underprivileged groups -- women, lower castes,

ethnic minorities, and by raising education levels. These are, of course, mostly

long-term processes.

Sometimes the demand can emerge from an escalation of internal tensions or

conicts between groups. To avert a full blown crisis, the ruling class may agree

to modications of the status quo. Sometimes the demand can be triggered

by technological innovation. New media and information technology have

revolutionized politics and civil society around the world. And sometimes, the

pressure of good practice in a neighbouring country may have ripple effects at

home. The passage of the right to information act in India in 2005 gave impetus tothose promoting it in Bangladesh, where a similar act was passed in 2009.

As civil society increases its demand for functional democratic institutions, it

should be expected that the ruling elite will attempt to neutralise change. Building a

civil society capable of standing up to the powers that be and protecting the quality

of democracy is a long and arduous process. Democratic theory has no answer to

the question of who guarantees the guarantors of democracy when they cannot

yet perform their role adequately.



36

PART THREE

3.0 Bhutan’s democratic challenge

Bhutan -- last of the small Himalayan Buddhist Kingdoms, land of snow capped

peaks and pristine nature, of ancient culture and hidden spiritual treasures. How

relevant is the sorry state of democracy in many developing countries to the

world’s youngest democracy?

Bhutan started her democratic journey with several important advantages that

most other developing countries lacked: peace and stability, good governance, greatpublic leadership, and a carefully crafted constitution. The country’s transition to

democracy was gradual, beginning more than 20 years ago with the build-up of

local governance and culminating in multi-party elections in 2008. The introduction

of political parties was nevertheless a major structural change and has not come

without some stress and strain. While these can certainly be attributed to growing

pains, the Bhutanese must be careful as democratic growing pains have a bad habit

of becoming chronic pains.

Governance is not golf: that we are a democracy does not entitle

us to a handicap. The virtues and benets that come with being a

democracy are to be an additionality. They cannot be a substitute

for other ingredients of national strength. The world is not going to

slow down, our adversaries are not going to dilute the power they are

acquiring out of compassion for the fact that we are a democracy.46

If Bhutan does not make careful decisions at this early phase of her democratic

journey, she may succumb to the same unfortunate path dependencies that caused

other countries great frustration, unrest, and many decades of lost progress. Can

a small country in a sensitive geopolitical position afford making all the same

mistakes as others? Some errors are inevitable, of course. To err is human. But big

mistakes at this stage, during which the new system is taking shape and its trajectory

established, could have serious consequences if not quickly corrected. Bhutan’s

rst political governments thus have a twofold responsibility -- to govern wellduring their tenure and to establish healthy and constructive political conventions

46 Shourie, Arun (2004): “When spirit is willing, esh has a way”, Fourth M.N. Srinivas Memorial

Lecture delivered at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, retrieved 2009-11-18

from http://www.indianexpress.com/oldStory/40417/



37

that will set the standards for the political process in the decades to come.

This section draws on the lessons of democratic transition from other developing countries of relevance to Bhutan. It stresses the importance of a strong national

vision and development strategy, well grounded in the country’s specicity and

conducive to democratic values and processes. GNH is examined in this context.

The section goes on to explore Bhutan’s framework conditions and areas of

potential vulnerability, avenues for strengthening democratic culture, including

overcoming public scepticism toward democracy, establishing healthy inter-party

relations, and encouraging citizens and civil society to proactively engage. Finally,

the topic of democratic leadership is broached, including some thoughts on thespecial role of the King.

Bhutan’s democratic journey

The importance of democratic “ends”

National specicity, vision and strategy

Framework conditions

Strengthening democratic culture

Leadership -- the heart of the matter

3.1 The importance of democratic “ends”

In a country that quietly took the wide-spread notion of economic growth as the

principle object of human progress and turned it on its head,47 any discussion of

democracy must be preceded by clearing the air with respect to means and ends. As

Lyonchhen Jigmi Thinley has emphasised, it is when we confuse ends with means

that we end up pursuing the wrong goal.

Should we think of democracy as a “means” or an “end”, or both? To answer this

question, it may be helpful to break down democratic governance into component

parts. What is known as procedural democracy -- the casting of votes by citizens

to elect leadership, the practice of public consultation, debate and deliberation

of views, the function of representation, etc., these elements may be considered

means toward certain desired governance outcomes or ends. In its procedural

aspects, therefore, democracy may be viewed as a set of means to attain higher

47 In 1979, His Majesty the Forth King was asked by journalists about Bhutan’s development and he

told them that Gross National Happiness was more important than Gross National Product. This

simple turn of phrase has had profound impact not only on Bhutan and its development paradigm,

but on many other countries around the world.



38

level aims. This aspect of democracy, especially elections, currently receives most

of our attention.

But is that all there is to democracy? What is it about democracy that inspires so

many millions of peoples around the world to ght so passionately for democratic

rule, to the point that many are willing to place themselves at great personal risk for

its achievement? Why does democracy evoke such aspirational yearnings? Certainly

it is not democracy’s procedural elements alone. Above and beyond its systems and

processes, democracy seems to correspond to some intrinsic values that resonate

deep in the human spirit. It seems, at least conceptually, to full some fundamental

human needs -- the need for freedom from subjugation, the need to participate indecisions that impact oneself and one’s family/community, the need to be treated

fairly and equally be the state. Viewed from this perspective, democracy may also

be considered an “end” in itself.

And there are some who contend that democracy, at least some parts of it, are

at the same time both means and ends. People’s participation, for example, is

concurrently a means and an end in itself, argues Amartya Sen.48

We know quite a lot about democratic procedures or “means”, and indeed

spend inordinate time and energy on some of them. We also know a lot about

democratic “ends” -- philosophers have thought deeply about human freedoms

and the equality of man for centuries. But somehow the practice of democracy too

often brushes aside the latter or accords it secondary status. How can democratic

practice be adjusted to take greater heed of the intrinsic “ends” it is supposed to

achieve? How can democratic “ends” be repositioned to their rightful place at thetop of the hierarchy of preoccupations?

Few countries are better placed to do this than Bhutan. Just as Bhutan trail blazed a

new set of measures of human progress that place “ends” rst,49 so she can break

new ground for democratic governance, endowing it with deeper meaning. This

could contribute immensely to a much needed general shift in global perspective,

creating incentives for better democratic performance.

48 Sen, Amartya (1999): “Democracy as a Universal Value”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 10/3 (July),

p. 10

49 Gross National Happiness (GNH) Index, http://www.grossnationalhappiness.com/gnhIndex/

intruductionGNH.aspx



39

Such a democratic framework would require us to revisit our current crude

taxonomy of countries that legitimizes any government established through multi-

party elections as “democratic”, no matter if the winning party or coalition isfundamentally authoritarian or even predatory in nature, operating above the law,

using coercive and criminal tactics, etc. Clearly, we need a new classication, indeed

a new vocabulary, that allows us to go beyond the surface of multi-party elections

to describe the real forms of governance at work beneath the democratic façade.

Only by putting the intrinsic values of democracy at the apex of our conceptual

construct, can we hope to realize the deeper purpose of democracy to which we

aspire.

Bhutan owes it to itself and to the world to develop a deeper approach to democracy,

one that places democratic “ends” if not above, then at least on equal footing as

“means”; one that inspires a new, normative democratic discourse. The seeds of

such an approach are embedded in the GNH concept and its Index variables in the

form of measures of social and institutional trust, freedoms, community vitality,

human security, etc. They may need to be further rened, and they need careful

monitoring and analysis, particularly with respect to policy implications, so that

democracy develops depth and meaning for average Bhutanese. “Democracy’s real

product is trust”50 -- trust in one’s neighbours, in public institutions, in public

representatives. This dimension of the GNH Index is of paramount importance

to monitor as it will reect the general health of the country’s democracy. To

ascertain this and to create positive incentives for preserving and enhancing trust,

public opinion polls on people’s trust in various branches of government and

political parties could be considered, as well as general levels of trust in neighbours,

community organisations, and civil society groups, etc.

In concluding this section, it may be important to remember that many promoters

and practitioners of democracy do not have time for normative enquiry or

conceptual niceties. Some believe that democracy’s higher purpose is mere rhetoric;

that democracy’s real merits lie in its ability to contain the coercive powers of the

state and release pent up societal “steam” -- enabling multiple, competing claims

to work themselves out through a legitimized process. They are less bothered that

democratic processes are driven by the narrow strategic calculus of competing political parties, rather than by principles of the public good. This paper argues

50 Barber, Benjamin (2008): A Credit Defcit or a Democratic Defcit? The Hufngton Post blog

[internet], 27 October 2008 [cited 31 January 2010], available from http://www.hufngtonpost.com/

benjamin-r-barber/a-credit-decit-or-a-dem_b_138146.html



40

that while democracy certainly possesses pragmatic merits, it is ultimately not

sustainable unless it also delivers on people’s aspirations for better living conditions

and social justice, and for this to occur it must be guided by principles. It is thereforein the interest of both the demos and the democratic system itself, to focus more on

values and principles, and on what democracies actually deliver to people at large

-- on democratic “ends”.

Finally, even those who rmly believe in democratic ends have a hard time aligning

their words with their deeds. Western nations are strong in espousing the importance

of democratic freedoms and other “ends”, but nd themselves pouring the lion’s

share of their democracy building support to developing countries into “means”.51 All the more reason for a country like Bhutan to focus on what exactly it wants its

democracy to achieve.

3.2 National specifcity, vision and strategy

Part One of this paper argues that democratic transition and consolidation

cannot be understood in isolation from a country’s dening characteristics and

its vision of human progress. Bhutan’s basic characteristics include its physical

size and geopolitical location; its value systems including spiritual, cultural and

environmental heritage; the evolving system of governance, including the centrality

of the monarchy and the emergence of political governance; the structure of the

economy; the population including its size, age pyramid, educational levels, civic

awareness, ethnic composition and dynamics; the edgling civil society, etc.

From these characteristics, Bhutan developed its own vision of developmentthat gradually began orbiting around the concept of Gross National Happiness

(GNH). It emphasizes balance between individual and collective wellbeing,

between man and nature, between the temporal and the spiritual, between rights

and responsibilities. In this vision, for example, forest cover is valued not only for

its economic utility, but also for nature’s own intrinsic value.

It was within this context that Bhutan’s democratic framework conditions were

51 A recent study of EU support for democratic governance in developing countries found that while

people across all regions expected democratic systems to produce societal changes in the form of

social cohesion, equality, social stability/security, ability of governments to deliver, “the EU applies

a narrow understanding of democracy, failing to link procedural democracy to delivery aspects of

democracy.” Reference “Democracy in Development: Global consultations on the EU’s role in

democracy building”, IDEA (2009), pg. 23



41

conceived, and subsequently crowned by the national Constitution in 2004.

The Constitution evokes the basic elements of Bhutan’s national character and

aspirations, and outlines its democratic system. The articles on spiritual heritage,culture, environment, human rights and responsibilities, and principles of state

policy are both aspirational and normative, conveying the desired character of the

country. They have direct bearing on governance.

Vital elements of this national vision are at odds with dominant global currents

and are therefore vulnerable. As global forces entered the country, particularly

since the 1980s, tensions emerged that impacted the development trajectory and,

hence, governance. Today, there is a growing tension between GNH and thecountry’s susceptibility to (and in some quarters preference for) individualistic and

consumerist lifestyles advertised by free-market economies. There are those who

wish to resist the pressures to conform to the global market-based ethos so as to

preserve the country’s values and lifestyle, and there are those who want the country

to embrace the global models of development. As the latter view is buttressed by

international mass media and dominant global thinking, its proponents have an

advantage. This tension is evident in Bhutan’s WTO accession process. While the

forces behind GNH in Bhutan are strong and gaining international recognition,52

no national development strategy in the world offers a good model for balancing

GNH values with the forces that drive 21st Century modernity.

How the GNH vision unfolds in Bhutan and what direction the country’s

development path takes will have profound inuence on the character of the

country’s democracy. A more GNH focused development path, with its emphasis

on socio-economic equity and concern for all sentient beings, would denitely enhance the quality and depth of democracy. A more neo-liberal, free-market

development path would undoubtedly lead to the pursuit of a Western-centric

form of democracy. This would leave Bhutan open to the deceptions and struggles

witnessed by other countries that have abandoned their roots, described in Part

One of this paper. And it would almost certainly destroy certain natural, indigenous

traits within Bhutanese society that could otherwise reinforce meaningful

democratization.

52 The GNH Conferences since 2001 illustrate a growing resonance across countries, North and

South. For example, President Sarkozy’s recent Commission on the Measurement of Economic

Performance makes direct reference to Bhutan’s work on GNH, and its proposed index is very

similar to Bhutan’s.



42

A GNH anchored development strategy would not only promote smoother,

deeper democratisation by cultivating a conducive environment for civil liberties

and political equality, it would also inuence the choice of certain democraticprocedures. For example, it would help inform whether political parties should

be active during local elections -- whether this would enhance or undermine

community vitality (a component of the GNH Index). It would also, for example,

inform the choice of electoral systems. Bhutan selected the single constituency,

rst-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system because of its simplicity and the direct

representational link it establishes between the elected and his/her electoral

constituency. But FPTP also happens to be the most politically divisive electoral

system. Already political party rifts have emerged in Bhutan. This should be of concern because these social cleavages can grow and fester. They concurrently

detract from the goal of GNH and the consolidation of democracy.

Clearly, one of the best strategies for deepening democracy in Bhutan is to further

anchor GNH, enabling it to become the state’s social contract, inspiring the

overall development and political processes. In this way, its attributes can infuse

the character of Bhutan’s democratic governance. Some work toward this end

has been done at the conceptual and policy levels, mainly through the work of

the Centre for Bhutan Studies and the establishment of the GNH Commission,

but much more is required. The GNH Survey of 2007 ascertained people’s

perceptions of their happiness, leading to the GNH Index. And the GNH

Commission is charged with analysing state policies, plans and programmes for

their GNH implications. But this is an extremely difcult task since there is no

clear methodology for determining what policies are or are not GNH enhancing. It

is compounded by the fact that virtually all international development conceptualframeworks are singularly unhelpful and, in fact, inuence the decision making

process away from GNH. They lead toward excessive individualism, consumerism,

materialism, driven by the pursuit of prot maximization and economic growth,

often at virtually any cost -- most are socially and environmentally unsustainable.

The fact that despite the interesting spatial considerations of the country’s GNH

Strategy its central preoccupation is economic growth, illustrates just how hard it is

for analysts to break away from global conventional wisdom. The GNH Strategy is

in fact a growth strategy with a GNH label. Its analysis and conclusions may all beperfectly valid from an economic growth perspective, and it may actually outline a

sound, GNH-enhancing growth strategy. But then it should be labelled as such; it

should not be accorded the overarching title of GNH Strategy. Such mis-labelling



43

is misleading and dangerous for GNH.

Enhancing national capacity for GNH policy and programme analysis is important,but it is not enough. Social contracts are two-way streets. GNH policy making

needs to be complemented by public understanding of, and engagement with, the

GNH concept. Today, most Bhutanese have only a vague notion of GNH. Some

people feel that GNH is a nice idea, but relegate it to the intellectuals. Some people

think it is pie in the sky. Some fear it may become a means of state control and

a threat to individual freedoms. A recent opinion piece in the Kuensel 53 warned

that GNH could become an instrument for state authoritarianism. These voices

need to be heard and discussed. Bhutan’s current transition from administrative topolitical governance will take time and frictions between the two modus operandi will

inevitably emerge in which GNH may become entangled. The more the Bhutanese

public engages with the concept, making it their own, the less likely it is to be

misused or to smack of paternalism. A bottom-up GNH track is therefore vitally

important at this time. Fortunately, the Ministry of Education has begun a process

to weave GNH into the school curriculum, to raise general awareness. While an

excellent initiative, this needs to be complemented by a proliferation of public

GNH discussions and exchanges among different groups, particularly among

youth.

At a moment in history when the limits of the “invisible hand” have become so

painfully apparent and the crisis in global leadership so pervasive, it would be a

great pity if Bhutan were to dilute its identify and erode its inherent strengths by

going with the global ow. As Dasho Karma Ura aptly put it “the invisible hand

is invisible because it does not exist.”

54

GNH can help Bhutan remind itself of itsinherent values and beliefs, the absence of which have led so many other countries

astray. It can help maintain Bhutan’s distinct identity and qualities, so essential

for her continued strength as a nation. It would be a bitter irony if, just as the

world is poised to accept the folly of some of growth-centric illusions in favour of

more sustainable GNH-like pursuits, Bhutan were to dilute its own commitment

to GNH.

53 Kuensel editorial (2009): “Dissecting GNH”, Kuensel , 20 October.

54 In his concluding remarks to participants at the Conference on Deepening Democracy in Asia, Paro,

Bhutan 12-14 October 2009.



44

3.3 Framework conditions

In addition to a strong national vision and strategic abilities to chart the country’sdevelopment pathway on its own terms, conducive democratic framework

conditions also require robust legislative and institutional provisions of governance.

While many of the institutions that underpin Bhutan’s democracy are already in

place and have been for some time, the new political process has only recently been

introduced and therefore the whole system merits careful monitoring. While there

are many dimensions to this, I wish to highlight two areas of competing logic and

possible tension.

First, there is the balancing act between the need to test and adjust the new

systems, and the need to infuse the Constitution and its supporting structures with

trumping powers. Second, there is the need to keep a close eye on possible gaps

between the provisions of the law, the spirit of the law, and the application of the

law. Behind both these areas lies the paramount issue of rule of law.

At the heart of establishing rule of law lies the process of developing the

Constitution’s trumping powers. In Bhutan, the Constitution is young and asthe nation tests its provisions, it is inevitable that areas will emerge where some

modication may be desirable. The fundamental design of the Constitution should

not be touched, but some elements may need ne-tuning. However, amending

the Constitution at this early phase of its existence could undermine its ability to

consolidate trumping powers. Furthermore, differentiating between the genuine

need for ne-tuning and the impulses of political forces may not always be easy.

This challenge of knowing when and how much to amend the Constitution will

confront the country and clear principles and parameters will need to be set forit, with political and public consultation and endorsement forming an important

element to ensure broad support. Consideration of India’s “basic structure”55

doctrine may be helpful in this regard. For the time being, however, it would be

unwise to touch the Constitution, both in order to enable its gravitas to settle,

and because constitutional change under an overwhelmingly majoritarian National

Assembly is potentially dangerous.

When a Constitution lacks trumping powers, rule of law can easily be circumvented

by those in power, and serious gaps can form between the law, its spirit, and its

55 A.G. Noorani, Frontline, Chennai: Behind the “basic structure” doctrine: Volume 18-Issue 09,

Apri.28-May 11, 2001



45

application. In some instances disrespect for the law is so rampant that all pretence

is dispensed with, and impunity is aunted. In other instances, a façade of rule

of law is deemed necessary for public consumption, but the law is breachedsurreptitiously. Rule of law can only be established through institutions. In countries

that began their democratic adventure with weak public institutions, building

their capacities has been a focus of international assistance for many decades.

But experience shows that such endeavours can take an exceedingly long time to

reap meaningful results, and beyond a certain critical point when political forces

begin to see their inuence and benets curtailed by it, progress can be virtually

impossible. Countries that managed to develop reasonably strong institutions

before the introduction of democracy, like Bhutan, are clearly at an advantage.But they are not risk free. When political forces are driven by mal-intent, they can

usually nd ways of circumventing even the most robust institutional framework.

To be on the safe side, Bhutan should anticipate that at some point its political

forces may try altering and weakening the country’s legal/institutional framework

with ignoble purpose. A common method employed in other countries is to

gradually politicise the organs of the state -- the civil service, the judiciary, the

police, the armed forces, etc. Excessive politicisation leads to de-professionalisation

and de-capacitation of institutions, making it easier to divert them from their

fundamental purpose of public service. The main conduit for this is through

appointments, promotions and transfers. Bhutan would do well to ensure it is well

guarded against this risk. Appointments to key positions, such as Constitutional

bodies and independent institutions, should be carefully monitored for their

political neutrality, their professional calibre and their integrity. The appointment

commissions prescribed in the Constitution were designed to do this; however,similarly designed entities in other countries have not been able to hold up under

political pressures. Bhutan could heed their experiences. Civil society watchdog

groups could assist by keeping a close eye on these processes and advocating for

the substance and spirit of the Constitution to be upheld, assuming these groups

themselves are politically neutral. Ensuring the law species minimum professional

qualications for vitally important positions, such as judges, is advisable.

3.4 Strengthening democratic culture

Democracy works best when bolstered by a democratic culture. This is a broad

subject and can be interpreted in different ways. I wish to highlight three important



46

elements of relevance to Bhutan -- the interface between citizens and their

government, the role of civil society, and the relationship between political parties.

Interface between citizens and their government

Time and again we see the spectacle of elected leaders invoking “the people” when

in fact “the people” are the furthest thing from their mind. Apart from voting,

what are the means and ways through which people inuence their governments

that are supposed to be of them, by them and for them? The practice of public

consultation, public deliberation, public polling, public hearings, etc., are present

in most democracies in one form or another. But it is possible to have all these andstill have almost no responsiveness by the elected to the electorate. How can these

and other opportunities for citizens to inuence their government develop depth

and meaning in Bhutan?

One of the biggest constraints to building democratic culture in Bhutan is

the dearth of people who truly believe that democracy is the best system of

governance for them. People’s scepticism and apprehensions are understandable,

given the exceptional quality of governance under Bhutan’s recent monarchs to

which they became accustomed. But they will need to embrace the new system

whole heartedly in order for it to function well. A major effort is thus needed to

help the Bhutanese public appreciate the merits of democracy and shape it to

their aspirations, and the best people to do this are the politicians. Rhetoric alone,

however, will not sufce. Politicians will have to back up their words with hard

evidence of the merits of the new system. This will require not only delivering

on electoral promises, but also ensuring that the democratic process is collegial,peaceful, inclusive, responsive, effective, transparent and accountable. Practicing

intra-party democracy (e.g. regular and transparent elections at all tiers of the party

apparatus) would also help convince the public that politicians practice what they

preach. If successful democracy depends on people’s belief in it, then elected

leaders should feel a vested interest in building people’s faith in the system. If they

act accordingly with sincerity, people’s scepticism can be transformed from an

obstacle into an asset for deepening democracy.

In the quest for healthy interface between the electors and the elected, Bhutan

has an advantage that many other young democracies lack -- its size. Despite the

country’s rugged terrain, its small population makes direct democracy a feasible



47

proposition. While some quarters may wish to delay this practice in Bhutan until the

general public becomes more politically aware, this may be a mistake. What better

way to help expand the public’s political awareness than by starting the practiceof organised consultations with them, including referenda when necessary, at this

early phase? This may also be the best way of building the public’s condence in

democracy.

Importance of civil society

Civil society organisations (CSOs) have a vital role to play in building people’s

understanding of democracy, facilitating the exchange of ideas to enrich the

public decision-making process, and keeping government in check. In Bhutan, a

wealth of local level, indigenous civil society groups exist to manage collective

concerns -- water sharing, community infrastructure, social assistance, etc. At the

national level, CSOs are emerging very gradually around social, developmental or

environmental concerns. Apart from the media, the Centre for Bhutan Studies and

Media and Democracy, there are no CSOs that yet engage directly on issues of

democratic governance. This may be partly because the topic is so new, perhaps

partly because the CSO Authority is still being set-up and people may not be clearabout registration issues, and partly because the law stipulates that CSOs should

remain politically neutral and there may be some confusion between this and the

expression of personal opinions on the political process.

For Bhutan’s democratic culture to develop, it would be important to encourage the

development of CSOs that question and challenge decisions and directions taken

by the government, as well as to monitor the overall workings of the democratic

process. Media has a vital role to play here, as do think-thanks and democracy watchdog organisations. This web of institutions is what John Keane refers to in

his concept of ‘monitoring democracy’.56 How to promote this type of CSO in a

young democracy, while ensuring that they are not captured by political parties,

will be a challenge. Keeping the ownership of CSOs out of the hands of political

parties and their afliates is important, as stipulated in the CSO Act. But the Act

alone will not sufce to keep them politically neutral.

The independent media constitutes a special category of CSO. In some countries where the main opposition party is unable or unwilling to play its role, the media

actually ends up performing political opposition function -- holding government

56 Keane, John (2009): The Life and Death of Democracy, New York: W. W. Norton & Company



48

to account. The independent media in Bhutan has started trying to do this. But

to enhance its effectiveness it needs both greater access to public information,

and high reporting standards. The rst could be addressed through a Right toInformation Act, such as that of India which has proven catalytic. The second

could start with a code of conduct for reporters and reporting. Government should

resist the urge to regulate the reporting standards of the media as this will be

perceived as infringement on their freedom. Such a media code of conduct should

be developed and policed by the media itself. Finally, as one of the greatest modern

threats to independent, quality media reporting comes from the commercial

pursuits of media owners, safeguards need to be developed against this. Unless and

until the media of Bhutan can work out innovative funding mechanisms that allow it independence not only from government but also from big business and the

business bottom-line, it will loose its ability to serve the pubic interest. This would

have a very negative impact on the process of democratic consolidation. Several

thoughtful papers on this topic have been discussed at GNH Conferences57. Given

the small context of Bhutan, Government assistance in setting up such funding

is required. As it is this same media that often lashes out at public gures and

decision’s, Government’s willingness to help establish funding mechanisms for

independent public media is a good indicator of its commitment to that vital but

messy democratic ingredient -- freedom of speech.

The relationship between political parties

Another dening ingredient of democratic culture is the quality of relationships

between political parties. Design features of the democratic system inuence

these relationships and the rst-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system tends to

produce two major political parties with high degrees of competitiveness. In somedeveloping countries this electoral system has degenerated into a ‘winner takes

all’ zero-sum game that has made it almost impossible to develop any meaningful

form of political dialogue between opposing parties. In worst case scenarios this

has dragged the political process down into the realms of hatred and violence, as

described in Part One of this paper. This phenomenon is exacerbated manifold

in situations of landslide electoral victories, such as in Bhutan. Developing a

democratic culture of constructive inter-party dialogue and deliberation under

these circumstances is exceedingly difcult. Bhutan may wish to consider other

electoral systems that could produce less conictual political party relations. An

57 Kinley Dorji & Siok Sian Pek: The Bhutanese Media: In the Service of the Public, presented at the

Second International Conference on Gross National Happiness, 2007



49

interesting proposal to this effect -- the Majority Judgement system -- was made

at the Asian Conference on Deepening Democracy, held in Paro in 2009.58 In

the meantime, if Bhutan’s majority and opposition parties do not consciously guard themselves against the risk of confrontational politics, their relationship

will almost inevitably slide into acrimonious and conictual territory. This will

not inspire people’s condence in democracy. Given the majority party’s massive

advantage in the National Assembly, it is behoven on it to be generous toward,

and accommodating of, the opposition. Each big-hearted effort to constructively

engage with the opposition will be another step toward consolidating democratic

culture.

An instrument the Government may wish to explore in this context is the use of

political party codes of conduct. Such a code exists for election periods and there

is a general code of conduct within the National Assembly Act.59 However, it may

be necessary to add greater specicity to the latter to ensure adequate space for the

opposition party to engage. For example, the Speaker may be required to entertain

motions of a certain gravitas submitted to him by the opposition for plenary

discussion, or the PM’s question periods may be required to grant preference to the

opposition’s queries, or a certain proportion of the chairs of National Assembly sub-committees may be reserved for opposition members, etc.

Codes of conduct, monitored by the appropriate oversight bodies and by civil

society organisations, can help encourage constructive political party behaviour.

But such codes cannot fundamentally change the nature of inter-party relations.

Only statesman-like leadership from within the main parties can do that. Regular

consultations between the leaders of the majority and opposition parties, initiated

by either side but particularly by the former, on issues of national importance, area good gauge of constructive engagement.

Only when relations between the main political parties are collegial and constructive

can the full dividends of democratic deliberation emerge. And only when parties

engage in the negotiations, deliberations, give-and-take that dene deliberation,

can democracy be prevented from degenerating into a tyranny of the majority.

Without democratic deliberation there can be no meaningful democracy. And

without constructive inter-party dialogue there is no real democratic deliberation

58 Michel Balinski (2009): The Majority Judgement: A New Mechanism for Electing and Ranking ,

unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Deepening Democracy in Asia, 12-14 October

2009, Paro, Bhutan.

59 Article 124 of the National Assembly Act also accords preferential treatment to the opposition.



51

decisions and actions not only with respect to their immediate impact, but also in

light of the conventions, practices and standards of political governance they will

establish for the country, and in whose tracks future governments will follow. Andthey must pave they way for the next generation of leaders. While a few young

leaders have emerged or seem to be emerging, they need assistance. It is behoven

on the current leadership to groom the country’s future leaders in the same

enlightened spirit that they themselves were groomed. This is an important task

for Members of Parliament, leaders of other Constitutional bodies, government

institutions, and political parties.

What about the King? What is his role in protecting the quality of Bhutan’s leadershipand ensuring the emergence of the next generation of ne leaders, particularly

those who will pass through the electoral process? Apart from continuing to lead

by example, his most powerful instrument, the King is constitutionally endowed

with important functions as Head of State and is required to grant royal assent for

various aspects of governance that have direct bearing on the country’s leadership.

For example, he must endorse appointments like that of the Chief Justice and the

Drangpons . For some posts he makes the selection from the recommendations of

pre-dened selection commissions or the Prime Minister. But the mere fact of his

involvement imbibes the process with his moral authority. This is a great safeguard

for the country.

In addition, the King may award titles, decorations and other recognitions through

which he draws public attention to the desired calibre and quality of public

leadership. He may direct some of these recognitions to outstanding contributions

by youth, to inspire and encourage them for public service. In his speaking engagements, the King also emphasizes the qualities of great leadership, and

inspires the next generation to lead with the same seless and dedicated spirit that

guides him.

In addition to encouraging the emergence of great future leaders, the King also

inuences current public leaders. He is, for example, endowed by law with the

discretion to addresses or send messages to Parliament when he deems t, refer

questions of law to the Supreme Court, return Bills to Parliament, and he may command a National Referendum, etc. Naturally, with the recent introduction of

political party democracy and the need for the new system to take root, the King

is reticent to intervene unless absolutely necessary.



52

The King may also need to compensate for the lack of familiarisation of the people

with their new system of governance. As mentioned earlier, despite the check

and balances within the system, it is the people who are the nal guarantors of democracy. When they are unable to provide the required oversight and inuence,

the system can quickly mutate into devious impersonations of the real thing. So,

until the Bhutanese general public develops strong, organised groups and outspoken

eminent persons whose views hold sway over public opinion and government,

some of these responsibilities inevitably fall on the shoulders of the King, as nal

protector of the state and guardian of the people. Given this situation, the King

may wish to engage in activities to expand people’s understanding of their roles

and functions in the new system, and develop their capacities to perform them well.

Clearly, the King has vital contributions in shaping the country’s current and

future leadership and the quality of democracy. He is leading by example. He is

introducing and shaping the new role of the monarchy under a constitutional

democracy. He is working to infuse the new system with the ethos of public service

that characterised past governments in Bhutan. And while it will remain one of his

most fundamental responsibilities to represent his people’s collective aspirationsand needs, he is having to assume some of his people’s democratic responsibilities,

until they develop these capacities themselves. All these are in addition to the other

vital functions of the monarchy.

The role of the King in Bhutan’s young democracy will perhaps never be as

important as it is today. His legacy is noble, his inuence immense, and his reach

extensive as he must support parts of the democratic system that have yet to

nd their feet. Precisely because of this inuence, and because the system needsto avoid over reliance on the monarch to develop its own strength, the King is

treading very carefully. Those who advise the King must do so with equal care and,

like their King, remain totally and utterly above the political fray.

Concluding thoughts

Bhutan has crossed a major threshold on its democratic journey. Before it lies a

long road with many forks and hairpin turns that will require great presence of

mind and navigational skill for the ride to be smooth. The need for stability and

continuity must be balanced with the need for greater freedoms and inevitable

change. The logic and avour of democracy must be informed by the wisdom of



53

GNH. The introduction of political governance must be balanced with the legacy

of hierarchical, administrative governance.

Many other young democracies faced similar challenges in the past, and while

each situation is unique, broad trends can be drawn from their experience. This

paper outlines some of devastating impact of wrong decisions, highlighting how

easy it is for the democratic system to be overpowered by non-democratic power

structures and predatory elite, as well as by externally driven global forces. It

describes how democracy has been frequently drained of its soul and paraded

like the Emperor’s New Clothes, as in the well-known fairy tale. It examines some

of the building blocks for consolidating democracy that ultimately make it easierfor the right decisions to be made. And it stresses how very difcult it is to build

these blocks, as their construction inevitably requires the ruling class to submit to

curtailment of its power and authority. This requires leadership of a calibre that

most democracies are not wont to produce, and in the absence of which young,

struggling democracies often get caught in a Catch-22 situation. They can linger in

this democratic limbo for decades -- during which people are forced to swallow a

sorry substitute for meaningful democracy, while their leaders play the system for

personal gain.

Bhutan has a precious opportunity to avoid this dismal scenario. The country’s

legacy of great leadership and good governance gives it a distinct advantage. But

this window of opportunity is time-bound; it will not exist in a few years time,

at least not to the same degree. By then the pattern of political behaviours and

conventions of the new system will have been largely set into a path dependency that

will characterize the country’s future governments. Using the current opportunity

well is therefore the single most important task of the current government andpeople of Bhutan.

Many of Bhutan’s inherent characteristics and its legacy of good governance

could help guide and shape the country’s democracy positively. As the quality of

democracy is inextricably linked to the quality of a country’s values and vision,

an obvious starting place is GNH. The GNH concept is inherently democracy-

friendly -- it could help Bhutan deepen its democratic experience right from the

start. But while GNH is gathering some steam internationally, it nds itself at risk athome. The economic-centric forces that have blinded the international community

to other essential elements of human well-being have entered Bhutan and are hard

at work. The economic bias of the country’s mis-labled GNH strategy is but one



54

reection of this. If Bhutan is to leverage its strengths to deepen its democracy

right from the start, it needs to enable GNH to shape the country’s new system of

governance by rmly anchoring it both in government decision-making and in theminds and hearts of the general public.

The overriding lesson from other young democracies is that democratic “ends”

must be valued on the same footing, if not higher, than democratic “means.” The

sign of a good democracy is much more than a good election; it is what happens

in between elections. Four main areas emerge from this observation. First, strong

democratic framework conditions are required for democracy to deliver on

people’s expectations. Rule of law, constitutionalism and the trumping powersof the Constitution are key to this, both in their aspect as rules and as morality.

Second, keeping the appointments and promotions to high state ofces free from

political bias and of the highest standards of professionalism and integrity are

vital. In this way the process of state building can resist misguided forces that

sometimes inltrate the democratic process and try to drive it in unhealthy

directions. Third, developing the attributes of a conducive democratic culture is a

priority. This includes maintaining constructive and collegial inter-party relations,

raising citizens’ awareness of and condence in democracy, engaging citizens andcivil society with democratic processes, and strengthening the ability of the media

to play its vital democratic oversight functions.

Finally, although the literature on democracy has neglected the fundamental issue

of leadership, nothing is more important. While Bhutan currently has a signicant

leadership advantage over other countries, care must be taken to maintain the

standard and groom the country’s next generation of public leaders. In addition to

his many other vital functions, the King has an important role to play in inspiring and encouraging both Bhutan’s present and future leaders, political and non-

political, to maintain the high standards of public service to which the people have

became accustomed.

As political parties, state institutions and the people of Bhutan unpackage their

new system of governance and test it, the King’s role is key in many other areas as

well. How he decides to perform his vital functions, whether directly or indirectly,

quietly or more publicly, only he can decide. But there is no question that the shapeand quality of Bhutan’s democratic trajectory depends very much on his guidance.

-x-x-x-



55

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