reporting of i&c status (ukraine)

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY Technical Committee Meeting of

Technical Working Group on Nuclear Power Plant Control and Instrumentation 20 - 22 May 2009, Vienna, Austria

REPORTING OF I&C STATUS (UKRAINE)

Prof. Mikhail YastrebenetskyUkrainian State Scientific Technical Center on Nuclear and Radiation Safety


Mikhail Yastrebenetsky

Contents

1. Common news2. Modernization during 2007-20093. Operating experience4. Regulatory activity5. Recommendation to IAEA



RIVNE NPP

ZAPORIZHA NPP

KHMELNITSKY NPP

WWR 2×1000

WWR 6×1000

WWR 2×1000 WWR 2×440

SOUTH-UKRAINE NPPWWR 3×1000



1 Common news

•There are in Ukraine:-4 NPP’s;

- 13 units WWER-1000;- 2 units WWER-440.

•The youngest units – Rovno 4 and Khmelnitskiy 2 – started in 2004.The age of the oldest units (Rovno 1, Rovno 2, South Ukraine 1) –

28-29 years. Design life of these units – 30 years. The set of actions (including I&C) for life extension are fulfilling now.

Decreasing of electricity production during January-March 2009 compared with January-March 2008:

-Common – 13,7%-NPP – 13,6%



1 Common news

•According government plans, 2 units will be intended for commissioning to 2015. The site was determined - Khmelnitskiy 3 and 4.

Type of units – WWER-1000, project B392B (analog – Balakovskaja NPP-5 – Russia). Manufacturer of reactor – Russia. Manufacturer of turbine and generator – Ukraine.

Designers and manufacturers of I&C systems – Ukrainian companies.

Main designer of I&C – KHIKA and “LvovOrgres”.The main problem – the assurance of unity of different systems

because designers of different systems inside of Ukraine had different element base, difference of software, etc.

Conception of I&C systems for these units will be ended in 2009.



2 New systems for Ukrainian NPP

– 2007–2009

Name of system Developer RNPP SUNPP KhNPP ZNPP

1 2 3 4 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 3 4 5 6Reactor protection system RADIY

Reactor power regulation and limitation system

RADIY KHARTRON-ARKOS

Control rod actuation system

ŠKODA IMPULS

Neutron flux monitoring system IMPULS

Engineering safety features actuation system

RADIY

SPDS WESTINGHOUSE, WESTRON

Refueling machine control system

GANZ, EWIG DIAKONT, RADIY



2 Implementation of Ukrainian I&C systems for foreign NPP

Ukrainian company

Name of system Name of NPP Country

Radiy Engineering safety feature actuation system

Kozloduy NPP2008 – unit 6 system 22009- unit 5 system2,unit 6 systems1,32010-unit 5 systems 1,3

Bulgaria

Westron System of diesel-generator control

Armenian NPPUnit 2

Armenia

Feedwater control system

Kharkov Shevchenko plant

Automatic turbine regulators Balakovo NPP-3, 4Kalinin NPP-1, 2

Russia

ASUT-240 Control systems for turbine (regulators, technological protection, monitoring and diagnostic) and generator

Kaiga 3, 4 India

RAPP 5, 6



3 Operating experience

Operating reliability of I&C systems, designed by “Radiy” company

Name of system Reactor protection systemsReactor power and limitation control

systems

Engineering safety features actuation

systemssystems sets channels systems channels systems channels

Number 10 20 60 6 18 7 22Operating time, h 318000 492000 1476000 124000 372000 85000 236000

Number of failures 0 0 9 0 2 0 3

Estimation of failures intensity,

Е‑06

low confidence

bound– – 10,6 – 19,2 – 32,8

point 0 0 6,1 0 5,37 0 12,7high

confidence bound

– – 3,17 – 1,08 – 3,45

There weren’t any failures of systems or sets as a whole. Comparison of all operating measures with design measures and requirements measures

in specification was fulfilled for channels. Operating measures are close to design measures (e.g. design failure intensity for channel of reactor protection system is 11.6E-06, point estimation is 6.1E-06). All measures for systems satisfy the specification requirements.




Reliability of FPGA• Different types of FPGA – manufacturer “Altera”

(USA)• Common number of FPGA in reactor protection

systems, reactor power control systems and ESFAS is 11000

• FPGA had not failures for operating time during the observation.



Analysis of violations due to I&C

• Level of violations according INES- 1, 0, out of scale• Intensity of violation decreased in function of time ( for

violations due to I&C and due to technological equipment too)

• Important reason of violations- events outside of I&C (ventilation system, EMC, etc)

• Measures how modernization improved safety• Influence of SW




Reactor power control and

limitation systems (designer – Radiy)

Reactor protection systems

(designer – Radiy)

Control rod systems(designer –

Skoda-Controls)

Before moder-nization

After moder-nization





Operating time, years 140 32 135 37 105 67

Number of violations 2 – 4 – 16 5

Violations intensity, 1/year 0,014 0 0,029 0 0,15 0,074

Unit downtime, h 0 – 55,39 0 38,15 0Underproduction

of energy, 106 kWh

3,5 – 55,3 0 47,907 16

Influence of I&C systems modernization to NPP safety



3. Analysis of operating data about NPP violations due to the I&C systems

Comparison of software influence to NPP violations because digital systems

Ukraine USA B.Geddes and R.Torok

2 out of 13 (1st generation),0 out of 20 (2nd generation) 4 out of 49 (1E systems)

Agreement with B.Geddes, R.TorokProtection against the software failures is already at a “reasonable assurance level”



4 Regulatory activity

Common Principles of NPP

Safety

Regulations of NPP Reactors Nuclear Safety

Safety Requirements to NPP Digital I&C Systems

(Revision 1)

IEC

IEC 1226

IEC 62340

IEC 60880

IEC 62138

IEC 60987

IAEA

NS-R-1

NS-G-1.3

NS-G-1.1NP 306.5.02/ХХХ-2009

NP 306.2.141 NP 306.2.145

Ukrainian Regulations

Regulations with Requirements to NPP I&C



4 Regulatory activity (2)Requirements on Nuclear and Radiation Safety to digital safety important Instrumentation and

Control SystemsNP 306.5.02/XXX-20091. Common positions2. Main terms and definitions3. Classification4. Functional requirements-common positions-safety control systems-safety related systems-control rooms5. Requirements to dependability of functions-protections after CCF-single failure criteria-redundancy-diversity-reliability measures-diagnostic-protection after unauthorized access-protection after personnel error



4 Regulatory activity (3)

6. Requirements to resistance of functions-environment-mechanical influence-electrical supply-EMC7. Requirements to quality of functions-accuracy-MMI-response speed8. Requirements to independence of functions9. Requirements to software and hardware10. Requirements to design11. Requirements to confirmation of compliance



4 Regulatory activity (4)

Methods of Assessment of NPP I&C Compliance with

Safety Requirements

Requirements of Order and State of the Actions for

Safety Important NPP I&C Life Extension

Methods of Expert Review of NPP I&C, based on FPGA

(Revision 0)

NP 306.2.141 NP 306.5.02/2-068

Regulations with methods related to NPP I&C



Knowledge base for expert activity

• -International (IAEA, IEC,ISO) and Ukrainian standards

• Requirements to I&C (Comparison)• Expert reviews • Documentations of new systems• Methodics• Text (or list) of books and articles



5 Recommendation to IAEA (1)

I) TECDOC. Review (comparison and analysis) of WWER I&C systems (Russia, Ukraine, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, etc.)(similar IAEA Technical Report N387, part 5 “Modern I&C for NPP: Guidebook”)The base of this chapter from Ukrainian side may be the new book “NPP Safety: Reactor Control Systems” (in Russian – “SUZ”), Kiev, 2009 (in publisher house now)




The content of this book:1. NPP with WWER2. Common information about reactor control systems (RCS)3. Type project and modernization of RCS4. Standard base5. Classification6. Common requirements7. Peripheral equipment8. Neutron flux monitoring systems9. Protection systems10. Power control and limitation regulators11. Control rod actuation systems12. Some results of operationAttachments1. Classified list of standards2. FPGA




II) Updating of NS-G-1.3, NS-G-1.1

III) I&C Roadmap in Support of Reactors III+IV generations

IV) Collection, summarizing and analysis of information about NPP safety violations because I&C failures (independent of COMPSIS, not only digital systems) - TECDOC or coordinated research program

Y) Knowledge base related to I&C



• Thanks for attention

reporting of i&c status (ukraine)

Documents

conception of ic systems

control systems

failures of systems

designers of different

main designer of ic

design measures

ukrainian npp

operating measures