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The Journal for Interdisciplinary Middle Eastern StudiesVolume 6, No. 2, Fall 2020, pp. 165-187DOI: https://doi.org/10.26351/JIMES/6-2/3ISSN: 2522-347X (print); 2522-6959 (online)

Rethinking Islamic State’s Violence: Primordial-Instrumentalism Mixture for Explaining Its

Terror against Sunni EnemiesGadi Hitman and Dina Lisnyansky

Abstract

This study suggests a new and different perspective on terror attacks executed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-affiliated organizations. Based on nearly 4,000 attacks between June 2014 and 2016, the study argues that the terror policy of this organization is an outcome of primordial and instrumental calculations for striking their Sunni enemies. A thorough mapping of the Sunni targets that were attacked leads to the conclusion that these attacks were an instrumental tool for achieving political goals, mainly to recruit better-trained personnel to Salafi or Takfiri organizations and deterring incumbent governments from hitting ISIS’s caliphate. Among these targets: (1) heads of state, as occurred in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia; (2) government ministers and ministries in Saudi Arabia and Iraq; (3) military camps, and economic facilities. This research shows that primordialism alone does not provide a full explanation for these attacks. Instead, we suggest a combination of primordialism and instrumentalism for analyzing global jihad organizations’ terrorism.

Keywords: primordialism, instrumentalism, terror, al-Qaeda, Islamic State

Dr. Gadi Hitman – Department of Middle Eastern Studies, Ariel University; gh791966@gmail.com;

Dr. Dina Lisnyansky – Department of Middle Eastern Studies, Ariel University, and Department of Middle Eastern Studies, Tel Aviv University; dina.lis@gmail.com

Gadi Hitman and Dina Lisnyansky166

Literature Overview

Researchers from different schools use various theories for analyzing social, political,

and cultural phenomena, including terror, which is one type of political violence. The rise

of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (June 29, 2014) provides a typical case study of

using terror and violence for achieving political goals. In fact, the research literature on the

Islamic State deals with diverse topics that aim to teach readers about the new phenomenon

of an Islamic caliphate in modern times. Among the topics in discussion between scholars

are: the propaganda of ISIS; the media jihad; psychological effects on recruiters and the

international community; threats against Western countries; and possible impacts of the

ISIS Caliphate on the stability of the nation-state in the Middle East.

Winter explored the Islamic State’s propaganda strategy. His study focused on the

taxonomy of this propaganda by classifying it as political; sociological; tactical and

strategic; rational and irrational. He also mapped six different themes, which are relating

to ISIS as follows: brutality; mercy; victimhood; war; belonging (us versus them); and

utopianism.1 In his following study, he examined the media jihad, emphasizing the

doctrine of information warfare.2 Marwan Kraidy used three ISIS publications in Arabic

in his study, which is titled “The projectilic image: Islamic State’s digital visual warfare

and global networked effect.”3 Ingram analyzed ISIS’s magazine, Dabiq, and concluded

that the Caliphate’s strategy is to design an in-group identity and to reshape the readers’

perspective on the global jihad idea.4

Following 14 terrorist incidents carried out from 2014 to 2017 by Islamic State recruits

or individuals influenced by its messages, Meleagrou-Hitchens and Hughes sought to study

1 Charlie Winter, The Virtual “Caliphate”: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy (London: Quilliam, 2015), https://www.stratcomcoe.org/charlie-winter-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy (Accessed on December 15, 2020).

2 Charlie Winter, Media Jihad: Islamic State’s Doctrine for Information Warfare (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, 2017).

3 Marwan Kraidy, “The Projectilic Image: Islamic State’s Digital Visual Warfare and Global Networked Affect,” Media, Culture and Society, Vol. 39, No. 8 (2017), pp. 1194–1209.

4 Haroro J. Ingram, “An Analysis of Islamic State’s Dabiq Magazine,” Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51, No. 3 (2016), pp. 458–477.

Primordial-Instrumentalism Mixture for Explaining ISIS’s Terror against Sunni Enemies 167

the ISIS threat map. They did this by monitoring ISIS’s network of public information

and its content’s effects on young people in the West.5 Avriel’s research suggests a new

term – civilitary − coined from the words civil and military, which aims to capture the

state of play imposed on the international community by ISIL and other radical forces of

violence in the 21st century that have placed civilians at the heart of military conflict.6 In

another study he tries to predict the map of the global jihad in years to come. That study

predicts that the Salafi idea was not going to go away and that a series of unresolved

conflicts (the Palestinian question, the situation in Afghanistan, the Somali instability and

more) could be an incentive for terrorist jihadist leaders to carry out terrorist attacks.

Nolen tested women’s involvement in the ranks of jihad organizations and found that they

were just as imbued with faith as men. Some were ready to die for Allah, and others had a

real impact on terrorist acts carried out by men: they supported the couple who carried out

terror attacks, educated the younger generation on jihad’s knees, and took an active part

in assisting terrorist acts.7

This study seeks to understand the rationale of ISIS in choosing the targets they chose

to hit. According to our database, based on publications in Arabic and English media,

including responsibility claims, Islamic State activists have perpetrated nearly 4,000

terror attacks across the Middle East, between July 2014 and December 2016. Nearly one

third of them (1,200 attacks) were committed against: Sunnis; heads of state; officials,

military and police; and vital civilian facilities such as power stations, oil fields, bridges

and government ministries serving the public. The basic premise usually used in Islamic

Studies research – that ISIS perceives the struggle as primordial, that is, between Islam

and the West, or between true believers and heretics (either within Islam, or in reference

to Christians, Jews or other non-Muslims) – is insufficient for explaining why ISIS

fighters hit so many Sunni targets. This study suggests a combination of two fundamental

5 Seamus Hughes and Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, “The Threat to the United States from the Islamic State’s Virtual Entrepreneurs,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2017), pp. 1–8.

6 Gil Avriel, “Terrorism 2.0: The Rise of the Civilitary Battlefield,” Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 7 (2015), p. 200.

7 Elizabeth Nolen, “Female Suicide Bombers: Coerced or Committed?” Global Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2016), pp. 30–40.

Gadi Hitman and Dina Lisnyansky168

approaches for analyzing political violence, including terrorism – primordialism and

instrumentalism – to explain goals that serve ISIS’s political interests.

The Primordial-Instrumentalism Amalgamation

People, including scholars, use the term “theory” to convey at least two dissimilar

meanings, when the subject in question is global jihad (holy war):

1. The actual realization of the idea of establishing an Islamic caliphate (Islamic

State in Iraq and Syria, ISIS). Abu Bakr al-Baghdai’s announcement in June 2014

made the theory (dream or vision) come true. The creation of ISIS was one of

the major outcomes of the regional turmoil in the Middle East since December

2010. The seizure of large-scale territories in Iraq and Syria, along with using

brutal violence against opponents, was perceived then as the first step towards

implementation of the vision that is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in

the Middle East region from Spain to China’s borders. In accordance with that,

al-Qaeda senior activists declared that their leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, would

seriously consider dismantling al-Qaeda after ISIS became the dominant power

within the global jihad community.8

2. The use of an abstract idea, created in inductive or deductive form, to explain various

phenomena, trends, and processes in human society. It can be a military escalation,

financial crisis, ethnic conflict, or use of terror. When political violence is being

discussed, the existing literature offers eight different theories for analyzing it.9

This study uses the concept of theory in terms of its latest meaning; its primary goal is

to understand what lies behind the terror acts, meaning the political violence of ISIS.

8 Kamal Kamal and Ahmad Arfa, “Surprise: Al-Zawahri is Heading to Dismantle al-Qaeda,” Al-Yawm al-Usbua’, April 3, 2015, https://bit.ly/2KrFyJu (Accessed on July 10, 2020).

9 Earl Conteh-Morgan, Collective Political Violence: An Introduction to the Theories and Cases of Violent Conflicts (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 16.

Primordial-Instrumentalism Mixture for Explaining ISIS’s Terror against Sunni Enemies 169

Focusing on ISIS’s terror deeds against Sunnis, this study argues that the primordialism

approach for analyzing political violence is insufficient to address al-Qaeda’s and ISIS’s

brutality against their opponents. Moreover, primordialism in itself cannot explain Ayman

al-Zawahri’s call in May 2018 to attack Sunni regimes in the Middle East.

This first part of the study will explain the foundations of the primordial and instrumental

approaches as theoretical bases for an empirical discussion. This section will also discuss

Islamic religious rulings (fatwa) of religious scholars who share the Salafist-jihadist idea

and allow the infidels, including Sunnis, to be attacked.

The second part will analyze salient terror attacks, carried out by al-Qaeda and

ISIS against Sunnis, since al-Qaeda was founded back in 1988, emphasizing leaders’

public statements that justify their policies, including hitting Sunni targets and enhance

our argument.

Primordialism

Primordialism, in short, means being part of a certain group from the moment a human

being is born. The family, ethnic, religious, linguistic, territorial, and national linkages

form the foundation for creating a joint communal life. Some scholars of sociobiology

argue that ethnic groups and nations should be seen as forms of extended kin groups, and

that both nations and ethnic groups, along with “races,” must ultimately be derived from

individual genetic reproductive drives. Smith wrote, based on van den Berghe, that the

main exponent of a sociobiological approach to ethnicity and nationalism, the modernity

of nations, is purely formal, a matter of supplementing underlying structures of “inclusive

fitness” with political forms. As he puts it, “the very concept of the nation is an extension

of kin selection, and so nations are to be treated as descent groups in the same manner as

ethnic groups.”10 This theoretical frame may be useful for the purpose of this study, since

Salafi’s creed relies, inter alia, on Prophet Mohammad’s idea that all believers in Islam are

10 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 147; see also: Sohaib Sultan, The Koran for Dummies (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2004).

Gadi Hitman and Dina Lisnyansky170

one large family that replaces the nuclear family. The founders of the global jihad used

primordialism to form the believer’s community that is no different from a family.

Primordialism, in any case, is a term used not only when the subject in question is

ethnicity or nationalism. When conflict between two sides occurs, primordialism can

explain the background of the conflict, whether national, ethnic, or religious, and why

people – as individuals or a collective – use violence to achieve political influence and

goals. Primordial scholars see conflicts as clashes of civilizations, for example, between

Islam and the West, and perceive cultural and religious differences as unsolvable unless

the winning side takes all.11 Disputes also involve the character of society when religion

plays a major role. A compromise with the enemy is not an option, since according to the

divine order, the enemy excluded himself from the “right community.”12 This theory is

relevant for collective political violence between enemies, whether they belong to two

different religions or have faith in the same religion.

This is also the case when analyzing terror attacks where the rivalry is between

Muslims and Christians, or even when the two parties belong to the same religion, as in

case studies within Islam, whenever Sunnis and Shi’ites clash. We suggest that this kind of

situation is sub-primordial, since only Muslims are involved in brutal acts, namely terror.

This also can be justified by an Islamic religious ruling (fatwa), as we will demonstrate

below. But what if the conflict is only within Sunni communities? Or Shi’ites? Or Jews?

Can primordialism itself explain terror? If all the parties involved in the story – whether

as perpetrators or victims – belong to the same (religious) group or community, then

primordialism as the sole explanation is not enough.

11 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Vol. 4 (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).

12 Andreas Hasenclever and Volker Rittberger, “Does Religion Make a Difference? Theoretical Approaches to the Impact of Faith on Political Conflict,” Millennium, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2000), pp. 641–674.

Primordial-Instrumentalism Mixture for Explaining ISIS’s Terror against Sunni Enemies 171

Instrumentalism

Instrumentalism, like the primordial approach, is related to nationalism or politics.

The core of instrumentalism is that ethnicity is neither inherent in human nature nor

intrinsically valuable. Ethnicity is useful for garnering political power or for drawing

resources from the state. The idea of creating a distinctive community based on ethnicity

has been exploited by the elite to garner political power and resources.13

Like primordialists, instrumentalists agree that people form deep emotional

attachments that persist into adult life and that may provide a basis for social and political

groupings. But, unlike primordialists, instrumentalists doubt the primordial ties of people.

They attest that many people are bilingual; others change or shift their language, or do not

think about their language at all. Even where religion is concerned, there are cases when

religion was changed by reformers. Even places of birth, instrumentalists argue, may lose

their emotional significance for many people. Massive migration has severed a sense of

attachment to their place of birth for many people. While focusing on interests of elite

groups, which try to manipulate members of the community, some scholars, such as Brass

and Ericksen, accept that members of the elite are influenced by cultural aspects of the

people. Their argument is that these cultural components are being used to serve the elite’s

political purposes or to mobilize the masses.14

Instrumentalism, as a theoretical framework, is relevant for analyzing political violence

and terror acts based on ethnic differences as well as religious ones. A combination of

primordialism and instrumentalism provides a solid setup for understanding global jihad

terror, particularly against Sunnis. Instrumentalism, in the context of this paper, will be

examined twice:

13 Ashutosh Varshney, “Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict,” The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 282.

14 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 125; Paul Brass, “Elite Groups, Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity among the Muslims of South Asia,” in David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp (eds.), Political Identity in South Asia (London: Curzon Press, 1979), pp. 35–77.

Gadi Hitman and Dina Lisnyansky172

1. The struggle for internal hegemony within the Salafi community between al-Qaeda

and ISIS.

2. The use of terror as murderous and documented, in order to enhance political

power and to deter the infidel rivals, even Sunnis.

Drawing the theoretical frame of this study, we now turn to examine if our hypothesis

has validity through case studies on fatwa and terror carried out by al-Qaeda or ISIS.

Analyzing terror attacks against other Sunnis, who are considered part of a primordial

group, and Salafi senior’s statements, is also part of the methodology we choose for this

case study.

Religious Ground for al-Qaeda and ISIS’S Terror Attacks against Sunnis

In most cases, the concept of a battle between groups of Muslims is considered to be

a fitna – a civil war between otherwise friendly factions, which is highly discouraged

according to Islamic theological laws.15 However, under different circumstances, when

such a war takes place, there is a need for a grounded legal justification in order to

legitimize fighting between Sunni Muslims and other Muslims, especially other Sunni

Muslims. Traditionally, such justifications are obtained by legal rulings of expert Islamic

theologians and muftis, who are authorized to issue fatwas on various subjects. Both

al-Qaeda and ISIS leaders make sure they have a team of Salafi religious legal experts,

who could periodically issue the necessary permission for fighting Sunni Muslims within

the framework of rules of engagement in jihad.

The criteria for rules of engagement are very clear according to sharia law: Jihad is

proclaimed only if needed and is conducted only against the defined targets of fighting: the

infidels (kuffar). This term can be given to various groups of enemies, or “enemies of Allah,”

15 Louis Gardet, “Fitna,” in P. Bearman et al. (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition (2018), http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/fitna-SIM_2389 (Accessed on November 29, 2020).

Primordial-Instrumentalism Mixture for Explaining ISIS’s Terror against Sunni Enemies 173

as they are referred to, in accordance with the principles described in the following Qur’anic

verses, dealing with the fate of infidels: “Such is the requital of the enemies of Allah – the

Fire: therein will be for them the Eternal Home: a (fit) requital, for that they were wont to

reject Our Sings.”16 The instructions regarding what needs to be done with “enemies of

Allah” or “enemies of God” are also clear, according to the Qur’anic commandment:

Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power including

steeds of war to strike terror into (the hearts) of the enemies of Allah and your

enemies and others besides whom ye may not know but whom Allah doth know.

Whatever ye shall spend in the cause of Allah shall be repaid unto you and ye shall

not be treated unjustly.17

These groups of “enemies” are usually defined as non-Muslim groups, some of them

monotheists (mostly adepts of Christianity, Judaism and Zoroastrianism); others are

polytheists. War against these groups has a wide theological and juridical justification.

However, killing Muslims is generally forbidden by the Islamic laws.18 During periods

of fitna, wars against other Muslims, a reasonable solution was needed in order to grant

legitimacy to fighting and killing other Muslims. This solution relies on a casus-belli –

acknowledging these other Muslims as “wrong” Muslims, or munafiqun (hypocrites).

Being a munafiq is considered a mortal sin by Islamic law and is equivalent to kufr –

heresy. Hence, the munafiqun are also considered to be enemies of Allah and are subjected

to fighting and killing.19 The munafiqun narrative has been used in recent decades by some

of the more extremist Salafi-jihadi groups to justify fighting against Muslims who do not

identify with them and who do not proselytize extremist views.

16 M. A. S. Abdel Haleem, The Qur’an, Oxford World’s Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 41:28.

17 Ibid, 8:60.18 The Prophet said: “Abusing a Muslim is Fusuq (evil doing) and killing him is Kufr (heresy)”

(Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 9, Book 88, nu. 197). 19 Jeffry Halverson, Steven Corman and H. Lloyd Goodall, Master Narratives of Islamist

Extremism (New York: Springer, 2011), p. 62.

Gadi Hitman and Dina Lisnyansky174

Rules of Engagement in Jihad: ISIS and al-Qaeda

While ISIS, as an ideological organization, relies on a variety of sources of different

authority levels, including extremely untraditional sources such as “The Koran for

Dummies,”20 according to some ISIS fighters’ testimonies, al-Qaeda’s ideological baseline

rests on a much broader, well-established foundation of legal rulings by highly authorized

and well-known Islamic Salafi leaders and muftis.

However, both movements state that the duty of waging jihad against certain Muslim

groups relies on one of the most prominent and significant Islamic principles, Hisbah –

accountability or responsibility of every Muslim for all other Muslims’ behavior in the

eyes of Allah. This principle is based on the following Qur’anic verse: “Enjoining what

is right and forbidding what is wrong” (al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-n-nahy ʿani-l-munkar),

which is stipulated as every Muslim’s duty.21 Thus, when according to Islamic law a group

of people is deemed to be “enemies of Allah,” all Muslims should be committed to their

eradication.22 For this reason, prior to engaging in jihad, the group of fighters is obligated

to identify the right people who fit the definition of “enemies of Allah” – or in other

words, they need to determine which Muslims are considered infidels and can be treated

like heretics.

Al-Qaeda’s proto-ideologists, such as Abdallah Azzam, pronounced a set of rules that

justifies engagement in jihad against certain Muslims in the 1980–1990s. According to

one of these ideologists, Abu Jandal al-Azdi, there is a special significance in fighting

against those whom he refers to as “apostate regimes and apostate Muslims.”23 Apostate

Muslims are defined as Muslims who abandoned Islamic faith and community, whereas

apostate regimes include all secular Muslim, non-Islamic regimes in the Lands of Islam.

Al-Azdi states that it is extremely important to fight against murtaddin, perhaps even

20 Sohaib, The Koran for Dummies.21 Abdel-Haleem, The Qur’an, 3:422 Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2001).23 Abu Jandal al-Azdi, Al-Bahth ’an Hukm Qatl Afrad wa-Dhubbat al-Mabahith [Law regarding

the Killing of Secret Police Officers and Men] (Minbar al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad, 2004).

Primordial-Instrumentalism Mixture for Explaining ISIS’s Terror against Sunni Enemies 175

more important than to fight against infidels who have never been Muslims, unlike the

first group.

Two factors make up the reasoning behind the importance of battling murtaddin.

The first is Sharia law’s position that enables one to make truces and peace agreements

with the infidels but forbids it in the case of murtaddin. Moreover, in case the righteous

Muslim side wins the battle and gains control over the defeated Muslims who are defined

as murtaddin, according to Sharia law, there is no possibility of granting protection to the

defeated aman. Hence, unlike the defeated infidels, if murtaddin are defeated in battle,

their only fate can be execution or immediate death. Whereas, if the defeated are plain

infidels, they can be granted protection and even conciliation.24 Al-Azdi also uses a legal

ruling by a unanimously accepted authority in Islamic law, Ibn Taimiyya, to clarify that

the punishment of the murtadd is much more severe than that of any infidel. His writings

on this subject state that a murtadd cannot buy his life and stay under the rule of Islam

in the status of Dhimmi, while paying jizya, as according to the laws of Islam he must

be killed.25

Abu Jandal al-Azdi applies these rules not only to individuals, but also to Muslim but

non-Islamic (non-religious) regimes, as he defines the Muslim but non-religious rulers as

apostates – murtaddin. Subsequently, even if jihadi groups might benefit from collaborating

with Muslim leaders who are considered murtaddin according to the definition above,

they are forbidden to do so in order not to harm the greater good (maslaha) of the

Salafiya-jihadiya ideology. Hence, no settlement with former Egyptian president, Husni

Mubarak, who was considered a murtadd by al-Qaeda ideologists, was allowed; and today

no collaboration with the murtadd Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi, the incumbent president of Egypt,

is allowed for local Egyptian/Sinai branches of al-Qaeda and other Salafi-jihadi groups,

such as the ISIS-affiliated Sinai province (Wilayat Sina), most of which was formed by

former operatives of al-Qaeda- affiliated Ansar Bait al-Maqdis.

24 Yair Minzili, “Strategic Thinking of the Salafi-Jihadi Movement” (Herzliya: IDC, 2007), pp. 21–23, https://www.idc.ac.il/he/research/ips/documents/publication/5/minzili-salafi-jihadi2007.pdf (Accessed on December 15, 2020).

25 Daniel Clement Dennett, Conversion and the Poll Tax in Early Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950).

Gadi Hitman and Dina Lisnyansky176

The second reason for the importance of battling murtaddin specifically lies in the

realm of the Qur’an. According to the Qur’anic verse:

They wish that you reject Faith, as they have rejected (Faith), and thus that you all

become equal (like one another). So, take not Auliya’ (protectors or friends) from

them, till they emigrate in the Way of Allah (to Muhammad). But if they turn back

(from Islam), take (hold) of them and kill them wherever you find them, and take

neither Auliya’ (protectors or friends) nor helpers from them.26

Apostasy is much worse than just infidelity – mostly due to the fact that infidels have not

seen the light yet and might repent someday, whereas apostates were already Muslims and

rejected Islam, becoming enemies of Allah.

The case of the Saudi regime is exceptional even considering the definition of

apostates, mostly because Wahhabis are not secular, nor they are anti-religious. Thus, the

rationale behind the consideration of the Wahhabi regime as an apostate authority is based

on different reasoning, some of it instrumental.27

The Salafi-jihadi perception of the Saudi regime as a regime of renegades and apostates

is based on the fact that Saudi Arabia does not avoid pacts and agreements with regimes

that “attack Islam,” according to many jihadi ideologists, including “Father of Jihad,”

Abdallah Azzam.28 The Saudi regime is perceived as a regime of collaborators with the

enemies of Allah, and hence positioned as an enemy regime itself that is a target for jihad.

Moreover, the aid delivered by Saudi authorities to the U.S. army during the war in Iraq

in 2003 and during the current war in Syria and Iraq against The Islamic State and ISIS as

a military organization, is also perceived as a breach of contract and apostasy. According

to the Qur’anic model of apostates that classifies those who aid “the enemies” against

fighters of jihad, as renegades, all Muslims as “allies of disbelievers” will be “punished

forever in the afterlife,” as stated in the Qur’an: “You see many of them becoming allies of

26 Abdel-Haleem, The Qur’an, 4:89.27 Minzili, “Strategic Thinking of the Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” p. 24.28 ’Abdallah Azzam, Fi Jihad: Fiqh wa-l’ Ijtihad (Maktabat al-video wa-l-cassette wa-l-atur al-

islamiyya, 1992), pp. 89–90.

Primordial-Instrumentalism Mixture for Explaining ISIS’s Terror against Sunni Enemies 177

those who disbelieved. How wretched is that which they have put forth for themselves in

that Allah has become angry with them, and in the punishment they will abide eternally.”29

This model is applicable to any other Muslim regime that maintains well-established

connections with regimes that are involved in wars in the Middle East or any other

realms of Islam, such as the U.S. or the United Kingdom, Russian Federation, and

others. This perception of Muslim non-Islamist regimes and individuals is the baseline

for all Salafi-jihadi groups, and ISIS ideologists rely on it in defining their own limits of

acceptance when identifying certain regimes and individuals as apostates – which makes

battling against these solid and legitimate.

Al-Qaeda’s and ISIS’S Terror Attacks against Sunnis

Between 1992 and 2016, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State carried out 6,437 terror attacks

against various targets. These included attacks on heads of state (Sunni) in Pakistan, Saudi

Arabia, Somalia, and Yemen; military and police installations; civilians; diplomats; and

tourists. A total of 406 attacks targeted government offices; 2,466 terror attacks were

against military, security, and policemen; 66 against diplomats; 103 against utilities (energy

facilities); 86 were focused on aviation (airports and aircraft); and 63 against journalists

and media.30 ISIS alone carried out nearly 4,400 terror attacks against its opponents in

the Middle East and North Africa regions, almost one third of it against Sunni or officials

within Arab states.

29 Abdel-Haleem, The Qur’an, 5:81.30 “National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (start),”

Global Terrorism Database (2016), https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=2016&sa.x=0&sa.y=0 (Accessed on August 3, 2018).

Gadi Hitman and Dina Lisnyansky178

Table 1: ISIS’s terror attacks against Sunni/state targets, July 2014–December 2016

Month/Year Politician Military Police Civil Total

7/2014 1 35 20 7 63

8/2014 1 9 20 1 31

9/2014 8 30 0 5 43

10/2014 3 18 10 10 41

11/2014 5 26 2 1 33

12/2014 2 19 9 2 32

1/2015 2 42 19 3 66

2/2015 1 15 6 4 26

3/2015 0 30 4 2 36

4/2015 3 26 16 5 50

5/2015 0 31 5 3 39

6/2015 0 27 12 4 43

7/2015 0 31 15 2 46

8/2015 1 33 13 7 54

9/2015 2 17 6 5 30

10/2015 1 19 5 2 27

11/2015 1 30 11 2 44

12/2015 2 26 4 1 33

1/2016 1 22 9 6 38

2/2016 0 16 10 4 30

3/2016 1 30 21 7 59

4/2016 0 18 16 2 36

5/2016 2 26 14 2 44

6/2016 0 21 9 9 39

7/2016 1 11 6 5 23

8/2016 0 20 2 0 24

9/2016 1 24 8 7 40

10/2016 1 14 6 3 24

11/2016 5 26 6 1 38

12/2016 0 46 9 2 57

Primordial-Instrumentalism Mixture for Explaining ISIS’s Terror against Sunni Enemies 179

An analysis of the targets of the attacks – in fact, even before 2014 (see below) – indicates a

strong instrumental component in the choice of objectives, in order to maximize the interests

of the global jihad organizations: spreading the Salafist idea, advancing the vision of the

caliphate, reducing the number of infidels – especially among security personnel – taking

control of resources, and reducing Western or other foreign interference in the Islamic

world. For the purpose of this study we focused on acts against Sunni people, targets, and

institutions, in order to enhance or refute our basic hypothesis that primordialism was not

the only basis for this violent activity. Methodologically, we analyzed about 30 terror attacks

carried out by al-Qaeda or Islamic state operatives from 2000 onward. Special emphasis was

given to accepting responsibility for the attacks and the reasons that led to their execution.

First, a look at the geographic distribution of the map of attacks carried out by the two

organizations shows that these acts took place all over the Middle East and North Africa

region. This is not only a question of the operational feasibility of hitting civil or military

targets. From al-Qaeda’s foundation, that, it was the primordial and historical perception

of the Salafist organizations that the entire area was an Islamic holy land that must be

liberated from heretics. Therefore, terror acts were carried out in Algeria and Tunisia in

West Africa; in Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq (Middle East); and in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and

Kuwait (Gulf region).

Second, it is important to map the targets chosen to attack in a way that will enable

organizations to justify the damage from primordial and instrumental perspectives. At least

six different targets were selected: governmental offices, military compounds and police

headquarters, security checkpoints, embassies of Arab Sunni states, Sunnis celebrating

holidays, and tourists.

A closer look at some of the salient terror attacks by both al-Qaeda and ISIS all over

the region may be useful to enhance our arguments. Jordan, Iraq, Algeria, Egypt, Saudi

Arabia, and other Arab countries that are dominated by Sunnis or have a large Sunni

population, all experienced primordial-instrumental terror by al-Qaeda and ISIS. Outside

the Middle East region, Bangladesh, for instance, of which 90% of its population are

Sunnis, experienced more than 30 attacks in 2015 and 2016.

Jordan’s capitol city of Amman was shocked on November 10, 2005 as a result of a series

of explosions in three hotels. 57 people were killed, hundreds were injured. The al-Qaeda

Gadi Hitman and Dina Lisnyansky180

organization claimed responsibility, emphasizing that “after the study of the targets, the

execution places were chosen for some hotels [...] Despite the security measures provided

by the traitor, the son of the traitor, al-Qaeda soldiers managed to reach their targets and

implement them.”31 11 years later, ISIS’s terror cell of four people opened fire on security

recruits in Karak, south of Amman, killing ten people, seven of whom were armed forces

personnel, two citizens, and a Canadian tourist.32 Again, the responsibility announcement

made it clear that the attack was carried out against the soldiers of the heretics.

On March 29, 2006, a Saudi citizen was able to enter the base of volunteers and

candidates for enlisting in the Iraqi police in the city of Tel Afar, some 420 kilometers

from Baghdad. He blew himself up and caused the death and injury of hundreds of

people. Mujahedeen Shura Council (majlis shura al-mujahedeen), representing al-Qaeda

in Mesopotamia (bilad al-rafidin), claimed responsibility for the deadly attack. In its

statement, this organization stressed that “the attack in Tel Afar targeted the apostate pagan

guard, and our brother grew up and blew up.”33 Three years later, on October 25, 2009, the

Islamic State in Iraq, which later became ISIS, announced that “its heroes committed the

attack against governmental compound in Baghdad.” More than 500 people were injured

and 160 people were killed. The statement described the Iraqi Ministry of Justice as the

Ministry of injustice, a hint for the Iraqi population that real justice exists only under the

law of the Divine Sharia.34

Al-Qaeda in Iraq did not hesitate to hit Sunni politicians whenever the organization

speculated that the removal of these figures would promote al-Qaeda’s goals. This was

the instrumental motive and justification for killing Sheikh Abd el-Satar Abu Risha on

31 Hassan M. Fatteh and Michael Slackman, “3 Hotels Bombed in Jordan; At Least 57 Die,” New York Times, November 10, 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/10/world/middleeast/3-hotels-bombed-in-jordan-at-least-57-die.html (Accessed on December 9, 2020).

32 Rana F. Sweis, “Deadly Attack in Jordan,” New York Times, December 20, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/20/world/middleeast/jordan-attack-isis-karak.html (Accessed on December 9, 2020).

33 George Packer, “The Lesson of Tel Afar,” New Yorker, April 3, 2006, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/04/10/the-lesson-of-tal-afar (Accessed on December 9, 2020).

34 “Baghdad Bomb Fatalities Pass 150,” BBC News, October 25, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8325600.stm (Accessed on December 9, 2020).

Primordial-Instrumentalism Mixture for Explaining ISIS’s Terror against Sunni Enemies 181

September 13, 2007. Abu Risha was the head of a tribal alliance in the Iraqi city Ramadi,

which supported cooperation with the U.S. and opposed al-Qaeda. After his death,

al-Qaeda’s statement called the killing of Abu Risha a “heroic operation,” and vowed

to assassinate more tribal leaders who cooperated with the U.S. and government forces.35

Compared to other countries, Iraq was a convenient arena for carrying out attacks in

the first decade of the 21st century. This was the result of an unstable political and security

system in the first years following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Besides,

as long as the Iraqi government was a joint political project of Sunnis and Shi’ites, it

was considered a heretic regime. Al-Qaeda operatives, then those of the Islamic State,

exploited this situation to harm the embassies of Sunni countries, in order to convey a

message to the infidels and to enlist support in those countries for the Salafi ideology.

One of these terror attacks took place against the Egyptian embassy in April 2010, when a

track full of explosives blew up near the embassy building, killing 30 people. The Islamic

Emirate of Iraq warned all embassies to stop assisting and cooperating with the infidel

Iraqi government.

On February 13, 2007, al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (hereinafter AQIM) claimed

responsibility for a terror attack against a tribal region in eastern Algeria. Six people were

killed, another ten were injured. AQIM’s statement explained that “the Mujahideen (holy

fighters) heroes managed to carry out a blessed invasion by detonating six car bombs,

targeting simultaneously several centers of the apostate police and gendarmerie in the

tribal area.”36 The explosion left a large hole and damaged the front of the building and

a number of shops, cafes, and grocery stores on the main street in the Algerian town Si

Mustafa, which hundreds pass on their way to the tribal area. AQIM’s message was signed

by the al-Qaeda organization in the Islamic Maghreb. Six years later, trying to resend

the message and deter candidates from joining the Algerian army, AQIM operatives

attacked the military Academy in Cherchell, Algeria, killing 18 people, one of whom was

a Tunisian officer. This objective was carefully chosen because officers from Tunisia,

35 “Top Sunni Sheik Killed in IED Attack,” ABC News, February 13, 2007, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=3596631 (Accessed on December 9, 2020).

36 Jean-Pierre Filiu, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Algerian Challenge or Global Threat? (Washington, DC: Carnegie Papers, 2009).

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Syria, and Mauritania were trained at the military academy. The purpose of the attack

was to convey a message to all officers serving Arab and non-religious Muslim regimes,

including Sunnis, that they should give up this service because it helps the infidels.37

Tunisia, like Algeria, suffered from terrorist attacks by the Salafi organizations, which

focused on harming security personnel in order to deter them from serving infidel regimes.

On June 15, 2015, activists of the Islamic State attacked two centers of the National Guard

in the town of Sidi Bouzayed and killed three security personnel. Five months later a

suicide perpetrator blew himself up in front of the Presidential Guard convoy in the city

of Tunis, killing 12 security personnel. These attacks occurred after ISIS operatives killed

22 people (21 of whom were tourists) in a terror attack at the Bardo museum in the city of

Tunis earlier in 2015. This attack was aimed at hitting Tunisian revenues from tourism.38

The Ansar Beit al-Maqdas (supporters of Jerusalem) organization, which was an

operational and ideological extension of al-Qaeda in Egypt, attacked the directorate of

the security compound in Dakahlia, Egypt on December 25, 2013. A short time after the

attack ended, the organization announced that al-Qaeda activists were responsible for

the attack, calling on Egyptian security forces to stop working for the heretic regime of

Egypt. Candidates for Egyptian forces were called upon not to join the ranks of Satan and

instead to join the army of the merciful God, which was in fact the Salafi group.39 Four

months later, on January 24, 2014, six people were killed in a terror attack by the Ansar

Beit al-Maqdas against a police station in Cairo. The organization called on Muslims to

distance themselves from police stations and centers of security companies in Egypt.40

Security institutions in Egypt continued to be preferred targets for terrorist attacks by

37 Carlos Echeverria, “Al-Qaeda Terrorism in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM): An Example of Survival and Adaptibility,” Journal of the Higher School of National Defence Studies, Vol. 1 (2012), p. 17.

38 “Tunisia: ISIS Claims Responsibility for the Attack on the Elements of the National Guard,” Al-Hurra, June 16, 2015, https://www.alhurra.com/a/tunisia-isis-blast/273336.html (Accessed on September 10, 2020).

39 “A Group Affiliated with al-Qaeda Adopts the Mansoura Bombing,” Arabi21 (2013), https://desktop.arabi21.com/story/714164/ (Accessed on September 11, 2020).

40 “Al-Qaeda Adopts Bombings in Cairo,” Ammonnews, January 25, 2014, http://www.ammonnews.net/index.php?page=article&id=180807 (Accessed on June 28, 2020).

Primordial-Instrumentalism Mixture for Explaining ISIS’s Terror against Sunni Enemies 183

global jihad organizations. On March 24, 2018, an Egyptian security guard was killed in a

car bomb attack near a police station in one of the neighborhoods of Alexandria.41

Saudi Arabia was traditionally a preferred target for al-Qaeda and the Islamic State

because of historical-religious rivalry as detailed above. The Al-Saud family, which

controls the kingdom, is considered among the Salafi organizations to be infidels.

Therefore, al-Qaeda has regularly tried to strike the Saudi infrastructure, economy, and

security personnel in order to undermine internal political stability within the kingdom

and to decrease incomes from the petrol industry. On May 29, 2004, four men armed with

guns and bombs attacked two oil industry installations and a residential compound in

al-Khobar, an Eastern province in Saudi Arabia, which is the hub of the Saudi oil industry.

Over approximately 25 hours, the gunmen, describing themselves as members of “The

Jerusalem Squadron” or “Jerusalem Brigade,” killed 22 and injured 25.

After the Khobar operation, two significant documents were released on the jihadi

forums. One of the documents was authored by a well-known jihadist who used the

pseudonym Oweis Bradley. Bradley’s document is titled, “Al-Qaeda and the Shaking

of the Oil Nets.” The second document provides a more in-depth account of the

attack, provided by the leader of the group that performed the operation, Turki bin

Fahd al-Moteiri (known as Fawwaz al-Nashami). Bradley’s document focused on the

economic impact of the attack on the oil industry, pointing out the advantages of the

attack for al-Qaeda: (1) the negative economic effect on the Saudi government and

the West; (2) the media coverage enjoyed by al-Qaeda during and after the attack;

(3) the pursuant interview with the group’s cell leader, Turki bin Fahd al-Moteiri, which

was considered a big morale boost for other al-Qaeda operatives. All of the above

were instrumental goals of the attack in Khobar. Al-Qaeda continued to strike Saudi

Arabia regularly after 2004. The organization’s attacks inside the kingdom included an

attempt to assassinate Prince Na’if, the Saudi Deputy Interior Minister, in 2009. The

Islamic State also viewed Saudi Arabia as having met its criteria for being a preferred

country to attack, since it had taken over the holy sites of Islam. In April 2016, ISIS

41 “Photo of Policeman Killed in Alexandria Bombing Released by Egyptian Media,” Arabnews, March 24, 2018, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1272901/middle-east March 24 (Accessed on December 9, 2020).

Gadi Hitman and Dina Lisnyansky184

operatives hit a police center in al-Dilam, south of the capital city of Riyadh. One

person was killed.42

The targets that have been analyzed above were not chosen randomly. This was not only

a question of feasibility for carrying out attacks against them. The motive to hurt specific

targets was an instrumental one. These attacks served a wide range of interests that the

global jihad organizations sought to promote: (1) to reduce the motivation of candidates

to recruit to security forces of the Sunni infidel regimes; (2) to call for those candidates to

join them and be part of the “Peace House” (Dar el-Salam), which God (Allah) prefers;

(3) to sabotage economies and energy infrastructures of the Sunni countries in order to

decrease their revenues from oil and gas; (4) to cut the number of tourists for the purpose,

again, of causing damage to the local economy of the Sunni states; and finally, (5) to

encourage the local population to act against the heretics and to persuade as many as

possible to join Salafism as a step toward establishing a caliphate in order to return Islam

to its glory days.

In the case of Jordan, hotels were targeted, in order to deter tourists from visiting

the Hashemite Kingdom and to harm the Kingdom’s income from tourism. In the cases

of Algeria and Egypt, the attacks were carried out in order to hurt the morale of security

men and candidates for recruitment, and to try to enlist them in the combat organization

of al-Qaeda affiliates.

This pattern of activity can be found even within the global jihad community. As early

as in 2012, two years before al-Baghdadi declared the new caliphate, an internal conflict

broke out between the Islamic State in Iraq and in Jabhat al-Nusra (the al-Nusra front),

when the latter’s members were asked to move from Iraq to Syria to build the infrastructure

for the Islamic State.43 This conflict had several dimensions: First, the al-Nusra leadership

disagreed with al-Qaeda, believing that it was too early to declare the caliphate that

was on al-Qaeda’s agenda. Second, while the Islamic State focused on fighting against

42 Sarmad Khan, “One Killed in Saudi Blast Claimed by Isis,” MEED, April 4, 2016, https://www.meed.com/one-killed-in-saudi-blast-claimed-by-isis/ (Accessed on December 9, 2020).

43 Hamza al-Mustapha, The al-Nusra Front: From Formation to Dissension (Qatar: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2014), pp. 1–26.

Primordial-Instrumentalism Mixture for Explaining ISIS’s Terror against Sunni Enemies 185

enemies within the Syrian (and Iraqi) arena, refusing to accept any kind of assistance

from non-jihadist organizations, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, the al-Nusra Front leader,

thought that cooperation with non-jihadist organizations should be permitted if it helped

his people achieve their goals. Finally, there was a personal rivalry between al-Julani

and al-Baghdadi, as the former refused to accept the latter’s dominance. He preferred to

swear allegiance to the leader of al-Qaeda, thereby setting up a personal competition that

prevented cooperation between two organizations whose basic ideology was identical.

The bitter rivalry between the two jihadist groups continued in the Golan Heights.

In 2015, the Shuhada’ al-Yarmook Brigade, an organization of 600 activists who settled

in southern Syria and pledged allegiance to the self-proclaimed caliph al-Baghdadi, was

caught in a confrontation with al-Nusra activists. In December 2015, Shuhada’ al-Yarmook

Brigade activists blew up a car within the al-Nusra Front headquarters in al-Madariyya, a

Syrian village.44

From that moment on, violent confrontations between the two jihadist groups in southern

Syria became routine. The primordial-instrumental explanation is applicable in this case

for the following reasons: (1) each side saw the opponent as heretical in accordance with

the primordial perspective; (2) each side believed that weakening the opponent would

serve it in several ways: establishing the right religious ideology, controlling wider areas,

and taking control of resources such as weapons, money, and logistical infrastructure.

Conclusions

The combination of the primordial and instrumental theories, in connection with the

religious rulings by senior clerics in the Sunni world, provides a comprehensive theoretical

platform for analyzing global jihad-related Sunni political violence against other Sunnis.

According to case studies examined in this study, it was found that targets chosen for the

terrorist attacks were not accidental. They were meant to achieve political ends through:

44 Yoav Zeitoon, “600 Armed Men on the Syrian Golan: This is the Da’ash Branch in the Southern Golan Heights,” ynet, December 30, 2015, https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4746427,00.html (Accessed on September 9, 2018).

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(1) hurting the heretics; (2) deterring security forces of non-religious regimes in the Middle

East; (3) taking control of resources that help in combat – including weapons, ammunition,

and logistical equipment; and (4) recruiting volunteers to the Global jihad community.

This violence has been explained by al-Qaeda’s and ISIS’s spokesmen as justified

because it was targeted against the kuffar and the murtaddin (renegades). Any act,

including violent action, is allowed, in the name of Allah, to cause military, political,

or economic damage to the adversaries. But this primordial angle was only half an

explanation, because the global jihad organization was hoping to use this terror to garner

resources that would serve them in longstanding combat against their enemies. Since the

establishment of al-Qaeda, these enemies have also been other Sunni actors in the Middle

East region. Since June 2014, the basket of enemies has included elements within the

Salafist jihad world as well, because al-Qaeda and the Islamic State were fighting for

global jihad leadership. This jihadist rivalry pushed the two organizations to intensify

attacks against enemies, including Sunnis, in order to gain control over resources and to

demonstrate through the propaganda system (mainly of the Islamic State) the advantages

of joining the jihad community. The military campaign by Russia, the U.S., and their

various allies to diminish ISIS’s power has in recent years led to a decrease in the number

of attacks by the organization against its rivals, including Sunni rivals. But this halt is

temporary, because the Salafi jihadist idea still serves as an ideology for many believers in

the Middle East and beyond. When ISIS rebuilds its power, it will attack previous targets,

including Sunni regimes, in order to maximize its power.

Primordial-Instrumentalism Mixture for Explaining ISIS’s Terror against Sunni Enemies 187

About the Authors

Dr. Gadi Hitman is a lecturer in the Department of Middle Eastern studies at Ariel

University. His main fields of research are the development of theoretical knowledge,

nationality, ethnicity, protest and political violence, and majority-minority relationships,

with a specialization in Palestinian and Israeli Arab issues. He has so far published two

books on the Israeli Arab minority (2016, 2018).

Dr. Dina Lisnyansky is a lecturer and research scholar in the Department of Middle

Eastern Studies at Ariel University, and in the Department of Middle Eastern Studies

at Tel Aviv University. She holds a PhD on “Da’wa in Europe: The Case Studies of France

and Italy” from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, which is the basis for her upcoming

book “Crescents and Croissants: Preaching Islam in Europe.”