richard lennane head, bwc implementation support unit

Regional Workshop on National Implementation of the BWC for Eastern Europe

Kyiv, Ukraine27-29 May 2013

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

The Biological Weapons Convention Obligations and agreements, other international

instruments, and building confidence

Richard Lennane

Head, BWC Implementation Support Unit

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs(Geneva Branch)

BWCIMPLEMENT

ATIONSUPPORT UNIT

UNITED NATIONS

OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS




Disease as a weapon?

“Repugnant to the conscience of mankind”




International response to the BW threat

• 1925 Geneva Protocol

– Prohibits use of CW and BW in warfare

• 1972 Biological Weapons Convention

– Prohibits development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention or transfer of BW

• 2004 UN Security Council Resolution 1540

– Requires all states to take measures to prevent WMD (including BW) terrorism




BWC facts and figures

• Opened for signature in 1972; entered intoforce in 1975

• Current membership:– 170 States Parties

– 10 signatories

– 16 states neither signed nor ratified

• Main provisions:– completely prohibits any acquisition or retention of biological or

toxin weapons; no exceptions

– prohibits assisting or encouraging others to acquire BW

– requires national implementation measures

– peaceful uses of biological science and technology to be protected and encouraged




And just what is a biological weapon?

“(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;

(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.”

- from Article I of the BWC




BWC strengths and weaknesses• Strengths:

– Clear, comprehensive ban: no exceptions, few loopholes– Strong international norm, never publicly challenged– Futureproof (so far...)

• Weaknesses: – No organisation or implementing body– No systematic monitoring of implementation or compliance– No systematic assessment of needs or provision of assistance– Uneven national implementation– No mechanism for investigating alleged violations – Conceived to deal with state-based BW programs: covers

bioterrorism only indirectly




Direction of the BWC since 2002

• Focus on improving and coordinating nationalimplementation

• Annual work programme dealswith specific topics; exchangeof technical expertise

• Range of different actors and organisations involved

• Implementation Support Unit coordinates activity




Why this direction?• Failure in 2001 of effort to negotiate a protocol to strengthen the BWC

• Bioterrorism becomes major concern after September 11, 2001

• Rapidly growing biotech capabilities, shrinking costs, and widely expanding interest, participation, availability and access

– Unintended consequences, experiments gone wrong

– Accidents, leaks, mistakes – or deliberate misuse or sabotage (bio-terror vs. bio-error)

– Awareness and management of risks lagging far behind

• Concern about naturally-occurring, emerging and re-emerging disease

• Recognition of interconnection of BW with other biological risks




Weapons of Mass Destruction

NuclearWeapons

Nuclear Non-proliferation

Treaty

InternationalAtomic Energy

Agency

ChemicalWeapons

ChemicalWeapons

Convention

Organization forthe Prohibition ofChemical Weapons

BiologicalWeapons

BiologicalWeapons

Convention

?




The Spectrum of Biological Risk

Natural disease outbreak

Deliberate use of BW

Unintended consequences Accidents

Vandalism, sabotageNegligence

WHO BWC

“We must look at [the BWC] as part of an interlinked array of tools, designed to deal with an interlinked array of problems” – Kofi Annan, 2006




WMD regime: traditional model

Treaty

Organisation

State State State State State




BWC approach: a network model

BWC

State State

WHO

FAO

OIE

SCR 1540

INTERPOL

Professionalassociations

IndustryScientific

organisations

WorkProgram

ISU




Components – WHO, OIE and FAO• WHO, OIE and FAO set standards and guidelines on

biosafety and biosecurity, and offer:

– manuals, reference materials and online resources

– advice, training and capacity-building




Components – INTERPOL

• INTERPOL Bioterrorism Program started in 2004 to:

– raise awareness of the threat – develop police training

programs – strengthen efforts to enforce

existing legislation – promote the development of

new legislation – encourage inter-agency co-

operation on bioterrorism




Components - UNSCR Resolution 1540

• Adopted 2004, renewed 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008) and 1977 (2011)– imposes binding obligations on all States to establish domestic controls – prevents proliferation of NCB weapons by establishing controls over

related materials – encourages enhanced international cooperation – promotes universal adherence to WMD treaties

• Committee under UN Security Council

• Supported by group of experts

• Committee maintains database on implementation

• Committee acts as a clearing house for assistance




A shared responsibility

“Governments alone cannot confront the risks posed by biological weapons ... to manage the full spectrum of biological risks, you need a cohesive, coordinated network of activities and resources. Such a network will help to ensure that biological science and technology can be safely and securely developed for the benefit of all.”

- Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, 2008




Seventh Review Conference: outcomes• Final Declaration, including guidance

on implementation

• New, re-structured intersessionalprogramme (2012-2015):

– Three “standing agenda items”

– also considers CBMs (2012-13)and Article VII (2014-15)

– vice-chairs

• Revised CBM forms

• Database for assistance requestsand offers

• Sponsorship programme

• ISU mandate renewed until 2016




New intersessional programme• Mandate remains to “discuss, and promote common understanding and

effective action on” specific topics related to better implementation of the BWC

• Runs from 2012 to 2015 (8th RevCon in 2016)

• Two meetings each year: Meeting of Experts mid-year (12-16 August 2013); Meeting of States Parties in December (9-13 December 2013)

• Wide range of participants: objective is sharing information and experience, identifying best practices, improving effectiveness of the BWC

• Cost is shared by all States Parties, regardless of participation




New intersessional programme• Three standing agenda items (considered every year):

– Cooperation and assistance, with a particular focus on strengthening cooperation and assistance under Article X

– Review of developments in the field of science and technology related to the Convention

– Strengthening national implementation

• Other topics:– How to enable fuller participation in the CBMs (2012 and 2013)

– How to strengthen implementation of Article VII, including consideration of detailed procedures and mechanisms for the provision of assistance and cooperation by States Parties (2014 and 2015)

– Universalization, ISU report (every year)




Confidence-building Measures (CBMs)

• Annual exchange of information “in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions and in order to improve international cooperation in the field of peaceful biological activities”

• Agreed by review conference: States Parties “are to implement” the measures

• Set of six forms to be completed and submitted to the ISU by 15 April each year

• Seventh RevCon revised the forms

• Submitted CBMs published on restricted area of ISU website

• Guide available to help (now updated to match revised forms)




Implementation Support Unit (ISU)

• Small, 3-person unit in UNODA, funded entirely by BWC States Parties

• Mandate:

– “Help States Parties help themselves”

– Provide administrative support for BWC meetings

– Facilitate communication among States Parties and with relevant organizations

– Support national implementation efforts

– Act as “clearing house” for offers of and requests for assistance, administer database

– Administer confidence-building measures (CBMs)

– Support universalization activities

– Support implementation of decisions and recommendations of 6th and 7th Review Conferences




The future: challenges and questions• Evolving BW threat: technological advances (e.g. synthetic biology),

capability spreading fast

• Can the “network approach” assure compliance? What about verification, investigation?

• Coordination (e.g. with SCR 1540, CWC and WHO IHR implementation) remains uneven

• Universalization of BWC: 170 members, still lags behind NPT and CWC

• Disparities in national implementation; low CBM participation

• Effective provision of assistance: ISU helps, but demand greater than supply, coordination lacking




For more information…

www.unog.ch/bwc

Or contact:

BWC Implementation Support UnitUnited Nations Office for Disarmament AffairsRoom 61, Palais des NationsGenevatel: +41 (0)22 917 2230fax: +41 (0)22 917 0483e-mail: [email protected]

richard lennane head, bwc implementation support unit

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