role of initia in project management

7/29/2019 Role of Initia in Project Management

1/10

The role of inertia in explanations of project performance: A framework and

evidence from project-based organizations

Audley Genus , Pushkar Jha

Newcastle University Business School, UK

Received 8 February 2010; received in revised form 26 November 2010; accepted 7 December 2010

Abstract

The paper argues that inertia governs the search for explanations of project performance in ways that potentially could impair the quality of

feedback obtained about past performance, and thus jeopardise ongoing strategy-making. Based on a critique of relevant literature, the paper

presents a novel three-stage framework for analysing connections among inertia and the search for explanations of performance in project-based

organizations. This framework helps to show the significance of inertia for the adoption of alternative routes for such search. The framework is

illustrated using case study vignettes. These are based on in-depth interviews with senior project management practitioners at two global

organizations, about the explanation of project performance (i.e. the attainment or failure to achieve related objectives). Conjectures based on the

framework and the vignettes are presented to stimulate further research on how organizations search for explanations of project performance, and

on the implications of inertia for organizational and project level learning and strategy.

2010 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Ascription; Causality; Inertia; Learning; Project performance; Strategy

1. Introduction

Inertia is defined as a continued commitment to question-

able strategy (Schwenk and Tang, 1989). It manifests at

individual, team, project and organizational levels. Inertia

accumulates over time as a cognitive and behavioural

orientation, and confines explanations of performance so that

these compromise the quality of strategic decision making

(Bielby, 2000). It is a function of rigidities that limit the search

for possible explanations of performance, where

performance

refers to the attainment or failure to achieve strategic, project or

operational objectives and goals (Gibson and Birkinshaw,

2004).

Managing inertia successfully is a hallmark ofambidextrous

organizations that do well at balancing continuity and change

(Duncan, 1976; Miller and Chen, 1994; Tushman and O'Reilly,

1996; Genus, 2004). Arguably, these organizations counter

rigidities effectively by creating an exploratory space conducive

to searching in a more open-minded way for explanations of

performance. How this occurs is a key theme of this paper.

Further, the paper is concerned to examine how inertia governs

the search for explanationsof performance in ways that impair the

quality of feedback obtained and jeopardise ongoing strategy

making.

The examples chosen to illustrate this phenomenon are ones

featuring organizations which focus on projects as vehicles forrealising business or corporate strategy. Projects are widely

considered to moderate inertial tendencies (e.g. Lindkvist, 2008).

However learning relevant to strategy is often impaired by

rigidities about how to understand and explain project perfor-

mance. A convergent organizational- or project-level mindset is

typical of a lack of variety, which over time constrains

exploration of different routes that could help explain project

performance to the benefit of wider strategy (Miller, 1994).

Past studies have looked at project failures and successes to

identify explanatory factors. Such studies investigate the nature

of organizational mindsets in relation to the exploration of

Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

International Journal of Project Management 30 (2012) 117 126www.elsevier.com/locate/ijproman

Corresponding author. Newcastle University Business School, Room 23,

2nd floor, Armstrong Building, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne

NE1 7RU, UK. Tel.: +44 191 222 5179.

E-mail address: [email protected](A. Genus).

0263-7863/$36.00 - see front matter 2010 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2010.12.002
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2010.12.002http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2010.12.002http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2010.12.002mailto:[email protected]://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2010.12.002http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2010.12.002mailto:[email protected]://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2010.12.002http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2010.12.002http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2010.12.002


2/10

different ways in which to understand performance (e.g. Shore,

2008; Nguyen et al., 2004). However, none of these studies

discuss the more fundamental question of why organizations are

unable to search more deeply or extensively to explain and, by

extension, to learn more effectively from past project perfor-

mance. This paper is oriented towards the strategic management

implications of projects (i.e. with the organization as the unit ofanalysis) rather than more narrowly to project management

(where projects per se are the unit of analysis). It focuses on

project performance by positing that there are different search

routes that are taken to explore and to explain project

performance. It presents a framework that can help practitioners

to moderate myopic convergence towards particular search

routes. Further, the framework contributes to a theoretical

understanding of the implications of inertia for making sense of

strategy and project performance.

The paper has the following structure. First, the next section

presents a review and critique of relevant literature, linking the

effects of inertia with the construction, interpretation andrationalization of project performance. This underpins the novel

three-stage framework outlined in the third section, which may

facilitate analysis of connections among inertia and the search

for explanations of project performance. The fourth section

presents two case study vignettes concerning project perfor-

mance in project-based organizations to illustrate this frame-

work and the different search routes taken to explain such

performance. The fifth and concluding section highlights

implications of the paper for research and practice in the

much-debated area of how to enable strategic learning about

past organizational success or failure, particularly from projects.

It focuses on the search process that underpins the acquisition

of feedback necessary to facilitate such learning and the natureof blockages to more open-minded explanation of performance.

2. Inertia and the explanation of past performance

What makes inertia of interest to researchers, students and

practitioners of management? Well, one response from the

mainstream strategy literature is that organizations operating in

dynamic environments need to be adaptable if they are to

remain competitive. On this view, successful firms will have

been able to maintain a strategic fit through adaptive change.

Easterby-Smith (1997) identifies several perspectives of

learning from experience that can orient the search forexplanations of resulting performance. In addition, managerial

commitment and self-justification (Lant and Hurley, 1999)

may lead to persistence with a certain strategy despite inferior

performance. Furthermore, some elements tend to be ingrained

as central to the functioning of businesses, for instance, best

practices for project management, or even product attributes.

This directs efforts at learning from past performance towards

honing these aspects, whilst their centrality to business

functioning is rarely put under the microscope.

The point of departure for this paper is Kaplan and Norton's

observation that underperformance of organizations' strategic

and operational plans is caused by the breakdown of a firm's

management system. They suggest a closed loop management

system to avoid such difficulty, Stage 4 of which is a tightening

of the link between strategy and operations connected with the

need for managers to monitor and learn from internal results

and external datato see if the strategy is succeeding (Kaplan

and Norton, 2008, p. 65). This manner of breakdown is

explored below by invoking concepts related to inertia, and

highlighting connections among inertia, strategy and opera-tions, assessments of internal and external environments, past

performance and required future actions.

The role of inertia in the search for explanations of past

performance is connected with characteristics of the top

management team and strategic decision-making processes;

initial and prevailing product-market strategy and performance;

resource dependencies and ways in which managers enact and

configure their environment (Bobocel and Meyer, 1994).

Previous work also refers to the importance of causality for

search (e.g. Haunschildand Sullivan, 2002). Characteristics of the

top management team have been associated with the phenomenon

of creeping rationality (e.g. Frederickson and Iaquinto, 1989).Here, planning and information systems become increasingly

specialized as the firm evolves and grows. Such continuity belies

a stability that serves to shield the executive team from critical

sources of information (in both senses of the word critical),

making them rather insensitive to the need for change (Keck and

Tushman, 1993). Another explanation of the phenomenon is in

the idea of defensive avoidance (Janis and Mann, 1977). This

includes a tendency to pass the buck rather than take

responsibility for finding solutions to organizational difficulties,

as well as continuing with failing strategy (bolstering) and

procrastination (Hodgkinson and Wright, 2002).

A number of studies have investigated connections between

past and current strategy, organizational performance andinertia (e.g. Miller and Chen, 1994; c.f. Boeker, 1989). Past

research has also examined how project organizations are

affected by inertial processes (Keegan and Turner, 2001). Such

manifestations of inertia are characterized by ill attention to

intelligence gathering and processing, and failure to recognize

or to adapt strategies to changed competitive conditions, for

example (Miller, 1994). Contributions in the literature have

drawn attention to, and are indeed distinguished between,

knowledge inertia, learning inertia and experience inertia

(Liao et al., 2008), to highlight the tendency to employ prior

knowledge and experience to solve current problems, or to be

unable or willing to learn new approaches (Staw and Ross,1987).

The resource dependency theory, as conceived by con-

tributors such as Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), asserts that most

organizations need to develop stable links with others in order

to provide the resources required to realize production of goods

and services. Inertia in this context is the build up of routines

around prevailing legacy arrangements (Nelson and Winter,

1982). It also directs attention to ways in which organizations

search (or not) for improvements that may be made to inter- and

intra-organizational repertoires of knowledge and experience, to

attain a better alignment with the market environment or project

requirements (Cyert and March, 1992; Holmqvist, 2009;

Sauser, et al., 2008).

118 A. Genus, P. Jha / International Journal of Project Management 30 (2012) 117126


3/10

One other branch of literature of relevance to the work of this

paper is that connected to cognitive inertia. The notion of

sensemaking developed by Karl Weick (1979, 1995), refers to a

process that includes the construction and bracketing of cues

that are interpreted, as well as the revision of those interpreta-

tions based on action and its consequences (Weick, 1995, p. 8).

Sensemaking includes but is not limited to interpretation (Poracet al, 1989). Its significance for inertia lies in its attention to the

processes by which managers enact or socially construct their

environment and share interpretations of environmental cues

and implications for performance and actions required.

2.1. Causality

Interpretations of organizational-level performance have

been researched previously with reference to the concept of

causality. One of two dimensions of causality is complexity;

the other is ascription. The complexity dimension refers to themultiplicity of factors to which performance may be attributed.

Prior research suggests that given its greater comprehensiveness

high complexity is better for informing change than low

complexity (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982). While heterogeneity

of causal factors provides a rich pool of interlinked causes with

which to inform explanations of performance, the complex

inter-linkages sometimes make it difficult to make sense of the

reasons underlying performance. On the other hand, low

complexity or homogeneity of factors provides an apparently

more straightforward basis for the diagnosis of causality.

However, from a learning perspective this does not necessarily

mean that homogeneity of causal factors makes for simpler or

more effective diagnosis of causality than heterogeneity(Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002). The assertion of effective-

ness is open to challenge when the risk to managers is less

contingent on finding the right reasons with which to explain

performance and more contingent on being able to assign

acceptable reasons quickly.

The second dimension of causality connected with explain-

ing performance is ascription, wherein external or internal

factors are considered to have affected performance. Ascription

has been examined in the context of downturns in organiza-

tional performance and strategic events in organizational life

(e.g. Hedberg et al, 1976; Goncalo, 2003). It is contingent on

perceptions about control, legitimacy concerns, and the natureof performance all closely associated with institutional and

business characteristics (Dearborn and Simon, 1958; Bobbitt

and Ford, 1980). The importance of causality is magnified in the

case of project organizations. This is because resources compete

for alternative projects within the organization, putting manage-

rial performance under close scrutiny, for example in relation to

the managers' ability to meet often ambitious targets and

expectations associated with the unique and transient ventures

that projects are (Cheng et al., 2005; Olsson, 2006). Recent

work on multi-project organization(s) suggests that resource

allocation issues should be seen as an expression of deeper

problems connected with the management of a portfolio of

inter-dependent projects, relations among different tiers of

managers, or dysfunction management control systems (Eng-

wall and Jerbrant, 2003).

Counteracting inertia requires institutionalization of a

cognitive infrastructure (Lindkvist, 2008) that, in treating

projects and project organization(s) as opportunities for

experiment, could create new mindsets, for example with

regard to the explanation of performance, or to new rules of thegame for managing projects. How this may be achieved and the

problems involved in doing so are just two examples of the type

of work proposed by those who wish to broaden the scope of

research on projects. Such literature suggests to take into the

analysis wider organizational and managerial factors, and to

engage with mainstream management research to move

beyond a narrowoften technicalfocus on the individual

project (Dahlgren and Soderlund, 2010; Soderlund, 2004a,b).

3. Research framework: the search process

The literature discussed above may be synthesized toconnect inertia with explanations of project performance in

organizations, understood as the overall extent to which projects

in an organization's portfolio meet their stipulated objectives. In

so doing, it provides the foundations for the analytic framework

proposed here. The framework comprises three elements: risks

associated with the search for explanations of performance;

scoping of search; and ascription for project performance. Fig. 1

shows this as a three-stage search framework that delineates eight

possible routes, which might be employed to seek explanations

of performance. Whether organizations stick to one route for

searching, or explore more than one possible route is indicative of

the strength or weakness of inertia on influencing search.

The first stage of this framework relates to the nature of risksassociated with search. This entails a trade-off between search

for the right reasons to control for the risk of downturn in

project performance, and the risk that is associated with not

being able to assign an acceptable reason to project

Fig. 1. Search routes for explaining project performance.

119A. Genus, P. Jha / International Journal of Project Management 30 (2012) 117126


4/10

performance. This acceptability refers to what is conventionally

associated with performance on the type of projects that an

organization undertakes, is convincing or recognizable cogni-

tively, or works best to allay legitimacy issues. The next stage

concerns the scoping of the search process. This could be very

narrow, limiting search to a few factors that are routinely

associated with project performance. In other cases, anorganization could break free from this ingrained behaviour of

looking for the usual suspects to examine a broader spectrum

of potential reasons to explain project performance. The final

stage is that of ascription. This could be either internal or

external to the organization. In the case of the former,

organizations search for factors inside the organization to

explain project performance, and for the latter, they look at

external factors to rationalize project performance. The extent to

which the orientation of the search is influenced by inertia is

indicated by the extent to which organizations confine

themselves to a search trajectory across the three stages, oralternatively, explore more than one route to seek explanations

of project performance. Fig. 1 presents such potential search

routes. This is complemented by Table 1, which describes these

search routes in the context of different organizational

Table 1

Conjectures about potential routes for explanations of project performance. (References to search routes are based on those identified in Fig. 1).

Route 1: RR-LS-IA There is a perception of high risk in not finding the right reasons for project performance. These reasons are perceived to be located in a

narrow set of possibilities that point to internal, and by extension, relatively more controllable factors. Typically, such organizations have

considerable experience in doing long term projects, and believe that they can pin down reasons underlying project performance based on their

traditional understanding of what is crucial for such performance. This sense of control makes internal ascription a more favoured approach.

Route 2: RR-LS-EA There is a perception of high risk in not finding the right reasons for project performance. These reasons are perceived to be located in a narrow

set of possibilities that are external to the organization, andhence are not as controllable as internal factors. Organizations following this searchroute are likely to have an emphasis on short term projects for external clients. Giventhat securing successive assignments with the same client

and with others in the industry is contingent on prompt rationalizations about project performance, managers tend to assign reasons to external

factors in the event of poor project performance. Alternatively, in the case of superior project performance, the organization is likely to share

credit with the client for relationship building reasons.

Route 3: RR-ES-IA There is a perception of high risk in not finding the right reasons for project performance. This sees the organization engage in an exploratory

search inside the organization. This is somewhat typical of organizations that are engaged in critical internal change projects like ERP

implementation or post merger integration. Such projects are unique not only by the standard definition of a project, but also because they are

fine grained in the unique settings of change that the organization is experiencing. Internal ascription is thus usually a favoured route for

weeding out issues in designing and executing change, and for acceptability of change.

Route 4: RR-ES-EA There is a perception of high risk in not finding the right reasons for project performance. Such organizations are typically involved in projects

where external factors are important. One example is a product launch in an overseas market. Arguably, the high investment in such a project

and its high visibility within a firm's portfolio of projects may make it important to search for scapegoats, or alternatively, stars inside the

organization. However, more often than not, the existence of significant external contingencies will focus attention on the unknowns that

affect performance. In such cases external ascription is a natural consequence of the combination of organizational and project characteristics.

Route 5: RA-LS-IA There is a perception of high risk about not being able to assign an acceptable reason to performance. This can be due to legitimacy issues as itis for many organizations in the public sector. The scope of search is limited due to a need to establish clear accountability. This is most likely

to be the chosen search route in the case of highly politicised organizations in the public sector, and where project performance has

traditionally been sub-optimal. A scapegoating phenomenon may also take hold because when resourcing of failed projects needs to be

accounted for, factions in the organization tend to use this need for accountability to justify their actions. Limited search and internal

ascription constitute the search process under such a scenario.

Route 6: RA-LS-EA There is a perception of high risk about not being able to assign an acceptable reason for project performance usually due to legitimacy

issues. The search for explanations of project performance in this case is limited to a few factors external to the organization. More often than

not such factors would have helped to explain performance in the past, and thus appear to be convincing. The case is typical of an organization

with a mutual protection environment a close knit project organization. Organizations in the public and not for profit sector that use public

money to resource projects are likely to be favourably disposed towards this route. However, other public sector organizations may not

typically fall in this category given their tendency to be highly politicised, in which case internal ascription is favoured.

Route 7: RA-ES-IA There is a perception of high risk about not being able to assign an acceptable reason for project performance. This leads to an exploration of

potential internal reasons, or those within the control of a focal organization. This route could be manifested in nascent organizations where

roles and responsibilities across hierarchical levels are not clearly delineated. In these organizations structures and systems are in a state of

flux, and project leadership and organizational leadership roles are also not well delineated. Assigning reasons to internal factors is crucial forconfidence in, and development of, nascent systems and processes.

This disposition may also be found in more mature organizations, for instance if middle-level project managers have relatively low control

over how projects are managed, whilst also being held accountable for project performance. A perspective of what can we do to improve

future performance is likely to appeal to top management. This could also be leveraged by project practitioners to pitch for increasing the

commitment of organizational resources for projects in case of superior project performance.

Route 8: RA-ES-EA There is a perception of highrisk about notbeingable to assignan acceptable reason for project performance. This results in scoping the search

as widely as possible, but at the same time, externally to the organization. This is typical of organizations that engage in prestige projects.

Being able to justify performance and adopting an exploratory search approach are both necessary given that such projects are under close

public scrutiny. However, the search is likely to point to reasons beyond the control of the organization. This is because in such cases it

becomes crucial for organizational reputation that downturns in performance be explained by events and situations outside of their control.

Furthermore, such projects are usually delivered by more than one organization i.e. a consortium or alliance, and in case of successful

delivery, external ascription allows sharing of credit for superior performance. In essence, external ascription is usually customised in relation

to how it is defined to suit project failure and project success respectively. In the case of the former, ascription points to factors that are external

not only to the organization but also to the consortium/alliance. In the case of the latter, it works to allow sharing of credit as mutual back

slapping by partners.



5/10

characteristics. These assertions in Table 1 are conjectures that

provide the conceptual moorings of the framework by

highlighting structural and contextual rigidities having the

potential to orient search towards one route rather than to others.

The paper now presents two case study vignettes to illustrate

search routes for explaining project performance in two project-

based organizations. The first case study illustrates how inertiamay confine such search to a single route. The second case study

concerns a more ambidextrous organization, which moderates the

influence of inertia and is able to pursue multiple search routes,

seeking non-routine explanations of project performance.

4. Development of project-based vignettes

Organizations vary in how they choose to support and

control strategically significant projects. This denotes the

project orientation of organizations, and is a function of

both the busi ness area and type of projects in which

organizations are involved (Lampel and Jha, 2004a). Themanagement of major projects is also shaped by more subtle

issues to do with experience of such ventures. The two case

study vignettes are related to how two global organizations seek

explanations of project performance. These vignettes have been

constructed from in-depth interviews with senior project

managers at the two firms conducted as part of an Engineering

and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) research

projectProject Based Learning in Organizations, involving the

participation of a total of seven organizations. The aim of this

research project was to examine organizational approaches to

modifying the way that projects are managed based on what

they learned from past projects. Table 1 is informed by the

interviews and discussions with senior project managers at theseseven firms at four workshops, held in 20022003.

5. Case study vignettes

5.1. Justifying performance: the business of poverty alleviation

To maintain anonymity the focal organization central to the

first case study is labelled Rapid. This organization has classified

its area of business as poverty alleviation. Project narratives at

this organization are an interesting expression of how feedback

about project performance translates into rich yet often ignored

narratives of performance. The need to account for public fundingreceived by Rapidis a concern, and traditionally the business of

poverty alleviation has been a tough domain in which to operate.

A frequently cited reason for this, in policy and sector circles, is

the influence of an immense range of cultural and social factors

impinging on various activities. The challenge for Rapid to

structure projects to suit conditions across diverse regions is

considerable; equally pressing however is the need to satisfy

policy makers and justify public spending to ensure continued

funding in this not-for-profit sector. Ascription is often directed at

governments, local authorities and community leaders

particularly when performance is poor. Furthermore, whilst in

the business of poverty alleviation performance is less than that

aimed for, there is a need to share credit with others even when

performance exceeds targets, due to the political benefits such

ascription brings.

Rapid has an ambitious organizational goal to alleviate

poverty by 2050. There, narratives emerge at the project

implementation level about what did not go well? There is

also a belief on the part of those who have had field level

implementation experience that exploration of alternatives to theexisting way in which things are done happens in discussions in

the back of Land Rovers and stays there (i.e. remains at field

level). Because of this, explanations of project performance at

field level fail to influence wider project and organizational

strategy. In addition, there is atRapida tendency towards external

ascription since this mode of rationalization deflects attention

from the failings of senior management. This tendency also has

the effect of maintaining the credibility of senior management,

which is crucial for retaining public funding.

As mentioned above, the explanation of project performance at

Rapid tends towards external ascription. The scope of search is

narrow and is informed by experience of how well justificationsfor spending public money appear to have worked before. This

may be in terms of the acceptability of explanations within the

organization and their external legitimacy vis-a-vis public

funders. Conventional explanations, such as lack of community

involvement, poor support from local authorities, and so on, tend

to dominate. Such rationalizations are reinforced by the relatively

favourable image ofRapid's management they convey rather than

being based on relevant and available internal information for

more critical feedback. Thus the need to look for the right

reasons underlying project performance to inform design and

delivery of future projects tends to be frustrated. This is largely

due to perceived risks in questioning the fundamental assump-

tions underpinning the existing project strategy. The value of andmerit in those discussions that happen in the back of Land

Rovers are thus ignored, save for the making of tactical

adjustments. Within Rapid the perception seems to be that any

kind of critique of fundamentals is likely to conflict with the

dominant organizational sense of what is good for credibility and

associated funds flow necessary for the organization's continued

functioning. In case of a few outlier successes the need to

highlight the contribution of stakeholders external to Rapid

dominates. The figure that follows summarizes the search routes

adopted to explain project performance atRapid (Fig. 2).

The mental models of project practitioners at the implemen-

tation level and those at higher levels of strategy making remaininconsistent at Rapid. The former seeks to improve project

performance and provide feedback that could help project

strategy. However, the latter appears to have one dominating

premise, that of continuity (aside from minor tactical adjust-

ments). Here change in project strategy is likely to upset the

resource cart (i.e. public funding), and has consequences for

how the capability of strategy makers is viewed.

5.2. Integration of project practices as post-merger activity

The second case study vignette is grounded in observations

made during post-merger integration of project management

practices in an organization labeled here as Pharmaplus a



6/10

pseudonym for a large global pharmaceutical company. An aim

of the merger was to create an enriched, integrated and widely

applied set of project practices and position it as an agreed,

common, consistent way of working (Lampel and Jha, 2004b).

The project was initiated by constituting a top management

team comprising of members from both of the pre-existing

legacy systems. This team was called the Reds to indicate the

significance of the change project and was constituted primarily

for the purpose of countering biases in the top management

team about how projects were done in the past. The task was toselect and distil from available legacy and industry practices.

This was based on this team's understanding of the link between

practices and project performance, and the need to find the

right reasons for project performance that could be associated

with erstwhile legacy practices. Given the platform to create a

new, refined set of practices, there was also an opportunity to

explore beyond the scope of the two legacy systems, and so

examine projects in the industry that were marked as path-

breaking success stories. Another dimension of this project

management standards integration project was the diffusion of

such best practices. The study found that more experienced

senior managers (not all of these were part of the Reds team)

were more resistant to the adoption of new practices than middle

level managers, being influenced by biases and preferences

from experience.

Workshops for interaction and experience sharing were

conducted at Pharmaplus, partly because practitioners were

coming from two different legacy systems neither of which

concurred completely with the new set of project practices.

Aligning the designers' mental models with the users' mentalmodels was a felt need of the integration process. Despite

constituting a team specifically for the purpose, top manage-

ment's sensitivity to strategic redirection and biases from

project experiences were inevitable influences on the integra-

tion measures.

The study ofPharmaplus reveals a negotiated compliance

model (Lampel and Jha, 2004b). A key factor shaping this

negotiation is the need to allow for an iterative implementa-

tion-feedback process, as different project sites implement

elements from within the generic standards at an incremental

rate over time. This is contingent on feedback about how

conducive the proposed practices to the requirement of projectsare, and how much change can be absorbed at the field level

without compromising project performance. Such iterative

feedback and the incremental nature of the process moderate

risks associated with change.

As mentioned, the scoping of search is based largely on

erstwhile legacy practices. It is partly focused on examining the

association of practices in use with performance, and at the

same time, it is exploratory by looking at practices from the

wider pool that the two legacy systems offer. As captured in a

comment from a senior project manager atPharmaplus: we do

not believe in best practices but in good practicesyou never

know what other people [meaning improved practices] may

get to the table (Lampel and Jha, 2004b). Hence, the mandateand opportunity to create or adopt new project practices allows

for some exploration outside the ambit of the two legacies i.e.

for drawing from industry wide practices.

Finally, ascription is both internal and external helped by the

negotiated compliance approach, and the range of sources

from which the practices were derived. This not only

encourages seeking good practices from outside the legacy

systems, and evaluates the in use configuration of practices,

but also motivates project practitioners to engage in iterative

feedback about project performance. Such feedback is crucial

for consistency in mental models across the project organiza-

tion. The figure that follows summarizes the search routes forexplaining project performance at Pharmaplus (Fig. 3).

6. Discussion

It is suggested here that a high level of complexity

concerning factors affecting performance is associated with

projects at Rapid. In addition, the need to legitimize public

spending has situated sense making about project performance

in what can be termed as a defensive avoidance mode

(Hodgkinson and Wright, 2002). Examining and presenting

performance differently is seen as high risk and especially so if

ascription is not externalized. In a scenario where performance

has traditionally been sub-optimal, this is likely to be

Fig. 2. Explaining project performance at Rapid.

http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_1/image%20of%20Fig.%E0%B2%80


7/10

detrimental to the credibility accorded to the strategy making

capabilities of senior management at Rapid. This approach

embeds a narrow view or a creeping rationality perspective of

how performance should be examined a simplicity trap of

sorts referring to inflexibility in the way an organization seeks

explanations of project performance (Frederickson and

Iaquinto, 1989; Miller and Chen, 1994).In contrast, Pharmaplus seeks the right reasons for project

performance explicitly connected to future performance,

since subsequent projects would deploy the reshaped and

integrated project management standards. This in turn leads to a

detailed and focused exploration of erstwhile legacy and

industry practices, and their association with performance.

Similarly, the negotiated compliance model at Pharmaplus

entails shared ascription, drawing on practices that are brought

in from outside, erstwhile legacies, and linkages between the

strategic apex that guides distillation of the wider body of

knowledge on practice and middle level managers that organize

iterative feedback about project performance and their link with

project practices (Fig. 3).

Getting different managerial levels and legacy groups to

subscribe to the new set of project practices, and the need for

understanding the extent of applicability of the new practices,

are central to the post-merger integration project atPharmaplus.

The role of the strategic apex in facilitating such contextual

ambidexterity (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1994) through the

negotiated compliance model is visible at Pharmaplus(Lampel and Jha, 2004b). The use of different management

levels in dual structures, i.e. in iterative feedback based design

and shaping of practices, and in deployment of new project

practices, also indicates structural ambidexterity (Duncan,

1976; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004) in sharp contrast to the

case of Rapid.

Deliberate efforts to guide a shared dominant logic at

Pharmaplus differentiate it from Rapid(c.f. Prahalad and Bettis,

1986; Lampel and Shamsie, 2000). Pharmaplus pursues

multiple routes to inform the search for explanations of project

performance. This occurs on the basis of the need to avoid risks

associated with not finding the right reasons e.g. the likelihood

of generating an inferior pool of project practices compared

Fig. 3. Explaining project performance at Pharmaplus.

http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_1/image%20of%20Fig.%E0%B3%80


8/10

with what can be acquired from both internal and external

sources (Route 1 to Route 4 of Fig. 1). In contrast, legitimacy

concerns lead the sense making that conditions search at Rapid.

Here, defensive avoidance to protect the status-quo, reputation,

and to sustain funding levels narrows focus to just one route

(Route 6 of Fig. 1). In the case of Rapid the opportunity to

incorporate field level insights to improve project strategy couldhave allowed for both options to be invoked inducing a

search for right reasons, while keeping a tab on explanations

that also satisfy legitimacy concerns. However, an overt

perception of high risk, and reluctance to break the mould of

how explanations of project performance are sought and

presented, appear to prevent this.

Some caveats need to be made about comparing the two

vignettes. For instance, the need to implement a merger

successfully was a rather important factor in setting the scene

at Pharmaplus, with the need for strategic redirection being a

crucial catalyst. On the other hand, the prevalence of sub-

optimal project performance in Rapid, together with itsdependence on public funding seem to feed the perception

that change in project strategy is risky arguably a self-created

paradox stemming from divergent notions about the nature of

project performance itself. Thus the discussion has presented

two very different settings in which the two case study

organizations seek explanations of project performance. This,

in conjunction with recognition of the organization-specific

nuances presented in the vignettes, needs to shape the authors

reflections on the analytic framework at the core of the paper,

and on the state and future of research in the fields reviewed.

7. Conclusions

Performance is probably the most popular dependent variable

in management and contemporary strategy research. The

construction of performance determinants and their effects is

flawed, however, in that it omits analysis of structures,

experience, beliefs and perceptions (March and Sutton, 1977)

which condition definitions, assessments and explanations of

performance.

In examining the role of inertia in shaping the search for

explanations of project performance, the paper has provided a

framework for understanding what might be called the

architecture of search employed in organizations to explain

project performance. This framework goes some way to addressthe aforementioned flaws, based on a critical reading of relevant

literature on ecological, organizational process, and cognition

research. This points to the influence of inertia not due to

management's lack of capacity to evaluate performance, but to

the tendency to underrate the potential value of searching

beyond routine explanations of performance (c.f. Kaplan and

Norton, 2008). This myopic orientation also stems from an

interpretative bias which rationalizes performance comfortably

and/or safely, in a manner that does not serve well the strategic

remit of performance explanations (Fromm, 1995; Keck and

Tushman, 1993; Menzies, 1975).

The paper presented two case study vignettes to illustrate the

aforementioned framework of potential search routes for

explanations of project performance. In addition, reflection on

the case studies allowed the paper to provide conjectures

regarding the favoured search routes of organizations in

different contexts (Table 1). These conjectures could inform

future research aiming to understand the implications of inertia

for explanation of project performance and thence to strategy

making.Analysis of the architecture of search entails identification of

predispositions, which culminate in adherence to one search

route rather than the others defined in Fig. 1. Such analysis

could provide valuable leads for improving organizational

strategy making informed by this insight about potentially

inertial tendencies implicated in cognitive infrastructures, for

example (Lindkvist, 2008). It could help strategists reflect on

potential connections between inertia and impairments to the

search for and reception of relevant feedback about project

performance. It is also important as it deals with the impact of

inertia in performance of projects, the reason being that projects

are typically oriented to counter rigidities that constrainorganizational foresight about how resource configurations

and processes can be improved to meet changing environments.

It is useful to note that in contrast with Rapid, the context of

change at Pharmaplus offers an opportunity to explore factors

underpinning project performance beyond the constraints of

such rigidities (Burnes, 2004). To the extent that the organization

is able to do so, it will moderate the tendency to focus on bad

operations at the expense ofgood strategy.

Arguably, a more effective and efficient disposition may

favour refining, narrowing and fine-tuning the search process

for faster, acceptable and more stable outputs representing the

reasons underlying project performance. However, such an

approach may fall prey to the simplicity trap the nemesis ofspecialized and narrow business rationalities (Miller and Chen,

1994). Different organizational, project, and contextual busi-

ness environment-related factors tend to predispose an organi-

zation towards one of the routes that comprise the framework

presented in Fig. 1 and explicated in Table 1. However, if an

organization can coherently pursue more than one route at one

or more stages of the framework, this could loosen constraints

on the search for explanations of project performance, thus

opening up a process by which strategy making is otherwise

unduly influenced by inertial tendencies.

With regard to the specification of future research agenda the

paper agrees with contributions suggesting the need to furtherinvestigate how organizations might encourage systematic

learning and reflection about underlying assumptions affecting

inferences and cause and effect explanations of (project)

performance (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 2000). It also concurs

with the view that greater attention needs to be paid to non-

financial factors and wider organizational and managerial

factors affecting the conduct and explanation of project

performance (Kaplan and Norton, 2007). Such work may be

informed better by correspondence with research lying beyond

the conventional boundaries of project management research

and extension of the project management research agenda

(Dahlgren and Soderlund, 2010; Soderlund, 2004a,b). Finally, it

is important to recognize and to examine the paradoxical nature



9/10

of projects as instruments for enabling organizational change.

As the case study ofRapid presented above attests such efforts

do not occur in a vacuum and are partly structured by prevailing

practice and characterized by heterogeneity regarding the nature

and purpose of projects and the firm, and concerning the

explanation of project performance. This paradox, which may

affect interpretation of the success of projects as change andwhether and how they should be modified, presents a promising

avenue for future research.

Acknowledgements

This paper draws on workshop discussions and in-depth

interviews with senior project practitioners in two global

organizations. They were undertaken as part of an EPSRC-

funded project: Project based Organizational Learning

(PROBOL 2003, project reference number GR/R12473/02).

The authors wish to thank the participants for their contribution

to the study and the EPSRC for supporting it. The authors alsowish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments on

earlier drafts of the manuscript. Any remaining errors or

omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors.

References

Bielby, K.W., 2000. Minimizing workplace bias.Contemp. Sociol. 29 (1),120129.

Bobbitt, H., Ford, J., 1980. Decision maker choice as a determinant of

organisational structure. Acad. Manage. Rev. 5, 1323.

Bobocel, D.R., Meyer, J.P., 1994. Individual vs. group use of base-rate and

individual information. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. 38, 65 75.

Boeker, W., 1989. Strategic change: the effects of founding and history. Acad.

Manage. J. 32, 489515.Burnes, B., 2004. Managing Change: A Strategic Approach to Organisational

Dynamics, 4th edn. Prentice Hall, Harlow.

Cheng, Mei-I, Andrew, R.J.D., Moore, D.R., 2005. Towards a multidimensional

competency-based managerial performance framework: a hybrid approach.

J. Managerial Psychol. 20 (5), 380396.

Cyert, R.M., March, J.G., 1992. A Behavioural Theory of the Firm, 2nd edition.

Blackwell, Oxford.

Dahlgren, J., Soderlund, J., 2010. Modes and mechanisms of control in multi-

project organizations. Int. J . Technol. Manage. 50 (1), 122.

Dearborn, D., Simon, H., 1958. Selective perception: the identification of

executives. Sociometry 21, 140144.

Duncan, R.B., 1976. The ambidextrous organization: designing dual structures for

innovation. In: Kilmann, R.H., Pondy, L.R.,Slevin, D. (Eds.), TheManagement

of Organization, 1. Elsevier, North- Holland, New York, pp. 167 188.

Easterby-Smith, M., 1997. Disciplines of organizational learning: contributionsand critiques. Hum. Relat. 50, 10851113.

Engwall, M., Jerbrant, A., 2003. The resource allocation syndrome: the prime

challenge of multi-project management? Int.J. ProjectManage. 21 (6), 403409.

Frederickson, J.W., Iaquinto, A.L., 1989. Inertia and creeping rationality in

strategic decision processes. Acad. Manage. J. 32, 516542.

Fromm, E., 1995. The Fear of Freedom. Routledge, London.

Genus, A., 2004. Understanding inertia: developing a multi-disciplinary

perspective. In: Ghobadian, A., O'Regan, D., Gallear, A., Viney, H.

(Eds.), Strategy and Performance: Achieving Competitive Advantage in the

Global Market Place. Palgrave, London, pp. 203220.

Ghoshal, S., Bartlett, C.A., 1994. Linking organizational context and managerial

action: the dimensions of quality of management. Strateg.Manage. J. 14, 5973.

Gibson, C.B., Birkinshaw, J., 2004. The antecedents, consequences, and

mediating role of organizational ambidexterity. Acad. Manage. J. 47 (2),

209226.

Goncalo, J.A., 2003. The Vanishing Employee: The Influence of Perceived

Culture Strength on Attributions for Organizational Performance. Paper

presented at the Academy of Management Meeting Seattle, WA, 610

August.

Haunschild, P., Sullivan, B.N., 2002. Learning from complexity: effects of prior

accidents and incidents on airlines' learning. Admin. Sci. Quart. 47, 609643.

Hedberg, B., Nystrom, P., Starbuck, W., 1976. Camping on seesaws:

prescriptions for a self-designing organisation. Admin. Sci. Quart. 21,4165.

Hodgkinson, G.P., Wright, G., 2002. Confronting strategic inertia in a top

management team: learning from failure. Organ. Stud. 23, 949 977.

Holmqvist, M., 2009. Complicating the organisation: a new Prescription for the

Learning Organisation. Manage. Learn. 40 (3), 275287.

Janis, I.L., Mann, L., 1977. Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of

Conflict, Choice and Commitment. Free Press, New York.

Kaplan, R.S., Norton, D.P., 1992. The balanced scorecard measures that

drive performance. Harv. Bus. Rev. 70 (1), 7179.

Kaplan, R.S., Norton, D.P., 2000. The balanced scorecard: a strategic

management system for multi-sector collaboration and strategy implemen-

tation. Qual. Manage. Health Care 8 (4), 21 39.

Kaplan, R.S., Norton, D.P., 2007. Using the balanced scorecard as a strategic

management system. Harv. Bus. Rev. 85 (7/8), 150161.

Kaplan, R.S., Norton, D.P., 2008. Mastering the management system. Harv.Bus. Rev. 86, 6377.

Keck, S.L., Tushman, M.L., 1993. Environmental and organizational context

and executive team structure. Acad. Manage. J. 36, 13141344.

Keegan, A., Turner, J.R., 2001. Quantity versus quality in project-based learning

practices. Manage. Learn. 32 (1), 7798.

Lampel, J., Jha, P.P., 2004a. Models of project orientation. In: Morris, P.W.G.,

Pinto, J.K. (Eds.), The Handbook of Managing Projects. Wiley, New-Jersey,

pp. 223236.

Lampel, J., Jha, P.P., 2004b. To talk the talk you must walk the walk

linguistic communities in post merger integration. Presented at conference

on Organizational Knowledge, Learning, and Capabilities, Austria, 23

April.

Lampel, J., Shamsie, J., 2000. Probing the unobtrusive link: dominant logic and

the design of joint ventures at General Electric. Strateg. Manage. J. 21,

593602.Lant, T.K., Hurley, A.E., 1999. A contingency model of response to

performance feedback. Group Org. Manage. 24 (4), 421427.

Liao, S., Fei, W.-C., Liu, C.-T., 2008. Relationships between knowledge inertia,

organizational learning and organization innovation. Technovation 28,

183195.

Lindkvist, L., 2008. Project organization: exploring its adaptation properties.

Int. J. Project Manage. 26 (1), 1320.

Lippman, S.A., Rumelt, R.P., 1982. Uncertain imitability: an analysis of inter-

firm differences in efficiency under competition. Bell J. Econ. 13, 418 438.

March, J., Sutton, R.I., 1977. Organizational performance as a dependent

variable. Organ. Sci. 8 (6), 698706.

Menzies, L.I., 1975. A case study in the functioning of social systems as a defence

against anxiety. In: Coleman, A., Bexton, H. (Eds.), Group Relations Reader.

GREX Calif.

Miller, D., 1994. What happens after success: the perils of excellence. J. Manage.Stud. 31, 325358.

Miller, D., Chen, M., 1994. Sources and consequences of competitive inertia: a

study of the US airline industry. Admin. Sci. Quart. 39, 123.

Nelson, R.R., Winter, S.G., 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic

Change. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

Nguyen, L.D., Ogunlana, S.O., Lan, D.T.X., 2004. A study on project success

factors in large construction projects in Vietnam. Eng. Constr. Archit.

Manage. 11 (6), 404413.

Olsson, N.O.E., 2006. Management of flexibility in projects. Int. J. Project

Manage. 24, 6674.

Pfeffer, J., Salancik, G., 1978. The External Control of Organizations: A

Resource Dependence Perspective. Harper and Row, New York.

Porac, J.F., Thomas, H., Baden-Fuller, C., 1989. Competitive groups as

cognitive communities: the case of Scottish knitwear manufacturers.

J. Manage. Stud. 26, 397416.



10/10

Prahalad, C., Bettis, R., 1986. The dominant logic: a new linkage between

diversity and performance. Strateg. Manage. J. 7, 485501.

Sauser, B.J., Reilly, R.R., Shenhar, A.J., 2008. Why projects fail? How

contingency theory can provide new insights a comparative analysis of

NASA's Mars Climate Orbiter loss. Int. J. Project Manage. 27 (7), 665679.

Schwenk, C., Tang, M.-J.E., 1989. Economic and psychological explanations

for strategic persistence. Omega Int. J. Manage. S. 17, 559 570.

Shore, B., 2008. Systematic biases and culture in project failures. Proj. Manage.J. 39 (4), 516.

Soderlund, J., 2004a. Building theories of project management: past research,

questions for the future. Int. J. Project Manage. 22 (3), 183 191.

Soderlund, J., 2004b. On the broadening scope of the research on projects: a

review and a model for analysis. Int. J. Project Manage. 22 (8), 655 667.

Staw, B.M., Ross, J., 1987. Behaviour in escalation situations: antecedents,

prototypes and solutions. In: Cummings, L.L., Staw, B.M. (Eds.), Research

in Organization Behaviour. JAI Press, London, pp. 39 78.

Tushman, M.L., O'Reilly, C.A., 1996. Ambidextrous organizations: managing

evolutionary and revolutionary change. Calif. Manage. Rev. 11, 7187.

Weick, K.E., 1979. The Social Psychology of Organizing, second ed. RandomHouse, New York.

Weick, K.E., 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations. Sage, London.


role of initia in project management

Documents