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IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Assessment Programme
Cornelia Spitzer
Section Head, Safety Assessment Section
Division of Nuclear Installation Safety
Department of Safety and Security
IAEA
Contents
• Safety Assessment Section (SAS)
• IAEA Safety Standards
• Review Services
• Competency Building
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IAEA
Who we are
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Programme Objectives
• to provide Member States (MSs) with up to date
safety assessment and design safety standards
based on current technology and best practices
• to support MSs with advice and review services in
the implementation of safety assessment and
design safety standards
• to develop safety assessment knowledge
requirements and provide support to MSs in safety
assessment competency and capacity building
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Mission
SAS’s mission is to
support Member States in
achieving a high level of
safety in nuclear power
plant design and
excellence in safety
assessment.
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Areas of Responsibility
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Design Safety
Analysis and Assessment
Implementation and Training
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Design Safety
Defence in depth in NPPs including aspects such as design provisions for design basis accidents, design extension conditions and demonstration of practical elimination of large or early releases
Safety approach and requirements for advanced reactor designs
Safety engineering of NPPs, including aspects such as fluid – structure interaction, safety classification and qualification of structures, systems and components, fuel safety, and design of plant systems
Fire safety in NPP design and safety assessments
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Analysis and Assessment
Deterministic safety assessment methods, techniques and applications related to design basis accident analysis, design extension conditions, severe accidents, and accident management
Probabilistic safety assessment methods, techniques and applications, reliability analysis, and risk management
Integration of deterministic, probabilistic and performance based approaches and applications, including integrated risk-informed decision-making processes; safety goals and performance indicators
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Implementation and Training
Verification, validation and application of codes/methods related to thermal hydraulics, neutron physics, core design and management, fuel design, PSA codes
Principle of backfitting of NPP designs
Periodic Safety Reviews particularly regarding the factors of plant design, equipment qualification as well as deterministic and probabilistic safety reassessment
Conducting studies relating to incident and accident analysis
Project and programme management
Providing education and training in the areas of safety assessment
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IAEA Safety Standards
Global Reference
Point for a High Level
of Nuclear Safety
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Safety Guides
Safety Requirements
Safety Fundamentals
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Involvement of Stakeholders
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Participation by the different stakeholders (for example, regulators, users and co-sponsors) during the drafting and review phase is a long established practice
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Safety Standards Related to SAS
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Requirements for Safety Assessment
GSR Part 4
Revised after the Fukushima
Daiichi accident. The
changes relate mainly to
• Margins to withstand
external events
• Margins to avoid cliff-edge
effects
• Multiple facilities / activities
at one site
• Cases where resources
are shared
• Human factors in accident
conditions
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Safety Guides
Safety Requirements
Safety Fundamentals Safety objectives and
safety principles
Functional conditions
required for safety
Guidance on how to fulfil
the requirements
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Relevant Safety Guides for Safety
Assessment
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Safety Guides
Safety Requirements
Safety Fundamentals Safety objectives and
safety principles
Functional conditions
required for safety
Guidance on how to fulfil
the requirements
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Requirements for Design of NPPs
(SSR 2/1)
• to be implemented by
the designer to fulfill the
fundamental safety
functions with the
appropriate level of
defence in depth
• to be used by the
reviewer of the design
(e.g. Safety Authority) to
assess the safety of the
design
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Safety Guides
Safety Requirements
Safety Fundamentals Safety objectives and
Safety principles
Functional conditions
required for safety
Guidance on how to fulfil
the requirements
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Revision of Design SR (SSR 2/1) after
the Fukushima Daiichi Accident (1/3)
Defence in Depth (DiD)
• Reinforcement of the independence of DiD
provisions, in particular between levels 3 and 4
Margins
• Stressing the need for margins to avoid cliff
edge effects. For items that ultimately prevent
large or early releases, margins are required
also for hazards more severe than those
selected for the design basis
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Revision of Design SR (SSR 2/1) after
the Fukushima Daiichi Accident (2/3)
Multi-unit site
• In a multi-unit site, each plant unit is required to have
its own safety systems and safety features for DEC
Heat transfer to the UHS
• Reinforced capabilities for heat transfer to the UHS.
Alternative heat sink or different access is required if
heat transfer cannot be ensured in conditions
generated by hazards more severe than those
selected for the design basis
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Revision of Design SR (SSR 2/1) after
the Fukushima Daiichi Accident (3/3)
Non permanent equipment
• Implementation of features (design, procedures,
etc.) to enable the use of non permanent equipment
Power supply
• Reinforced capabilities for power supply in DECs
Spent fuel pool
• Additional measures for spent fuel pool
instrumentation, cooling and maintaining inventory
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Safety Standards for Design of NPPs
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Safety Guides
Safety Requirements
Safety Fundamentals Safety objectives and
Safety principles
Functional conditions
required for safety
Guidance on how to fulfil
the requirements
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Technical Safety Review (TSR)
The TSR incorporates
IAEA design safety and
safety assessment
technical review
services to address the
needs of Member
States at all stages of
development and
implementation of the
nuclear power
programme.
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TSR
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OBJECTIVES
TSR provides a tailored, independent
evaluation of the plant design safety
and safety assessment documentation
and makes recommendations for
enhancements and improvements to
safety.
The TSR services assist Member States in relation
to the following topics:
• Safety of operating and new nuclear plant
designs
• Specific sections of the safety analysis report
• Safety Requirements developed by regulatory
authorities
• Safety assessments, also related to plant
modifications
• Action taken to address emerging safety
issues
• Countries’ Periodic Safety Review programme
SCOPE
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General Process
3. MISSION:
Staff conducts mission
at the site to discuss
observations with
support of int’l experts
2. PREPARATION:
Staff plans review in
consultation with MS, prepares
and conducts evaluation with
support of int’l experts
1. REQUEST:
Member State (MS)
sends a formal request
to the IAEA Staff
5. FOLLOW-UP:
MS considers implementing recommendations and inviting a
follow-up mission
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4. REPORT:
Staff finalizes the review report
at its headquarter & sends the
report to the MS
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Competency Building
• Safety Assessment Education and
Training (SAET) Programme
• Assistance in building competency within
Member States
BY PROVIDING
• Training on the design safety and safety
assessment of nuclear power plants
BASED ON
• The IAEA Safety Standards
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SAET Programme
• Basic knowledge of safety assessment
• Essential safety assessment education and training
• Specialized knowledge in technical areas
• Detailed practical training
• Target audience
• Staff of regulatory authorities
• Technical and scientific support organizations (TSOs)
• Owner/operators of nuclear power plants
• Organizations embarking on nuclear power programmes
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Annex
Listing of
Technical Safety Review (TSR) Services
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Generic Reactor Safety (GRS) Review
• DESCRIPTION • Review service conducted by the IAEA staff and international experts to review the safety case
of new reactor design against the requirements of IAEA Safety Standards on Safety Assessment
for Facilities and Activities (GSR Part 4) and Safety of NPPs: Design
(SSR-2/1)
• OBJECTIVE • To enable the requesting party to understand to which extent the safety case is complete and
comprehensive in addressing the requirements of the safety standards
• PROCESS
• The process takes between 6-8 months to complete. Funded by the requesting party
• OUTPUT • A report summarizing the extent to which the safety case addresses the requirements and, if
needed, recommendations for improvement of completeness and comprehensiveness are
provided.
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Examples of GRS Reviews
Russia AES 2006/Rosenergoatom Concern OJSC
Completed
January 2013
China ACPR 1000+ (Conceptual Design)/China
Guangdong Nuclear Power Holding Co., LTD
Completed
May 2013
Russia VVER-TOI/Rosenergoatom Concern OJSC Completed
December 2014
China ACP1000/China National Nuclear Corporation Completed
January 2015
China ACP100/China National Nuclear Corporation
Ongoing since
July 2015
China CAP1400/China Shanghai Nuclear Engineering
Research and Design Institute (SNERDI)
Ongoing since
July 2015
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Design Safety (DS) Review
• DESCRIPTION • Review service conducted by the IAEA staff and international experts to review the safety of
designs of nuclear power plants against the IAEA Safety Standards. The review can be limited on
specific technical areas
• OBJECTIVE
• To assist the requesting Member State to review the preliminary safety analysis report for nuclear
power plants and to make recommendations in order to enhance safety
• PROCESS
• The process includes preparatory work by the review team and review missions that usually last
two weeks. Funded by the requesting party or through technical cooperation projects
• OUTPUT • A report summarizing the findings of the review and, if needed, includes a set of
recommendations to improve the compliance with the IAEA Safety Standards.
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Examples of DS Reviews
Ukraine Design safety reviews of 15 NPPs Completed
January 2010
Bulgaria Follow up of design safety review of units 5
and 6 of Kozloduy NPP
Completed
May 2013
Armenia Follow up of design safety review of
Metzamor NPP
Completed
November 2009
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Safety Requirements (SR) Review
• DESCRIPTION • Review service conducted by the IAEA staff and international experts to review the national
safety requirements for the design or safety assessment of nuclear power plants against the IAEA
Safety Standards. The review can be limited to specific requirements of interest.
• OBJECTIVE
• To assist the requesting Member State in the process of issuing or revising national safety
requirements for the design or safety assessment of nuclear power plants to enhance safety
• PROCESS
• The process includes preparatory work by the review team and review missions that usually last
two weeks. Funded by the requesting party or through technical cooperation projects
• OUTPUT
• A report summarizing the findings of the review and, if needed, includes a set of
recommendations or suggestions to improve the compliance with the IAEA Safety Standards
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Examples of SR Reviews
The Netherlands Review of the safety requirements for
nuclear reactors
Completed
June 2013
Lithuania Review of the new regulatory documents for
nuclear power plant design and PSA
Completed
May 2014
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Probabilistic Safety Assessment
(PSA) Review
• DESCRIPTION • Review conducted by the IAEA staff and international experts of Probabilistic Safety
Assessments (PSAs) on the basis of Safety Guides SSG-3* and SSG-4** and TECDOC-832***
• OBJECTIVE
• To assist for the assessment of the adequacy of the treatment of technological and
methodological issues in the PSA
• To assist for the assessment whether the PSA applications and conclusions are adequately
supported by the provided analysis
• PROCESS
• The process includes preparatory work by the review team and review missions that usually last
two weeks. Funded by the requesting party or through technical cooperation projects
• OUTPUT • A report summarizing the findings of the review and, if needed, includes a set of
recommendations to improve the PSA quality and applicability * Development and Application of Level 1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment For Nuclear Power Plants
** Development and Application of Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment For Nuclear Power Plants
*** IPERS guidelines for the international peer review service
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Examples of PSA Reviews
The Netherlands
PSA Review for Level-1 through Level-3 PSA
for internal IEs, internal and external hazards
(excluding seismic) for Borssele NPP (power
operation and shutdown modes)
Completed
June 2010
Follow-up PSA Review Completed
April 2013
Bulgaria PSA Review for Level-1 through Level-2 PSA
for internal IEs, internal and external hazards
for Kozloduy NPP (power operation and
shutdown modes)
Completed
June 2013
Armenia PSA Review for Level-1 full power PSA for
internal IEs, internal and external hazards for
Medzamor NPP
Completed
October 2014
Switzerland PSA Review for Level-1 and Level-2 for
internal IEs, internal and external hazards for
Leibstadt NPP (power operation and shutdown
modes)
Completed
November 2014
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Accident Management (AM) Review
• DESCRIPTION
• Review service conducted by the IAEA staff and international experts of accident
management (AM) programme in Member States on the basis of Safety Standards
GSR Part 4* and NS-G-2.15** and guideline SVS-9***
• OBJECTIVE
• To advise and assist the regulatory body, utility or technical support organization in
the development and implementation of accident management programme
• PROCESS
• The process includes preparatory work and the review of the AM and associated
documentation. The review usually lasts two weeks. Funded by the requesting party
or through technical cooperation projects
• OUTPUT
• A report describing the review performed, the review findings and, if needed,
recommendations in developing the plant specific AM *Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities
**Safety Guides Severe Accident Management Programmes for Nuclear Power Plants
***Guidelines for the review of accident management programmes in nuclear power plants
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Examples of AM Reviews
Slovenia AM review of the quality and completeness of the
accident management programme (AMP) for Krisko
NPP
Completed
2001
Lithuania AM review of the quality and completeness of the
accident management programme (AMP) for
Ignalina NPP
Completed
2007
Pakistan Pre-AM review of emergency control centre and
post accident monitoring instrumentation to improve
the AMP for KANUPP
Completed
2007
Mexico Pre-AM review workshop on severe accident
analysis and accident management programme for
Laguna Verde NPP
Completed
2014
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Review of Periodic Safety Review
(PSR)
• DESCRIPTION
• Service conducted by IAEA staff and international experts to review the PSR programme against
the IAEA Safety Standards on Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities (GSR Part 4) and
the Safety Guide SSG-25 Periodic Safety Review of Nuclear Power Plants
• OBJECTIVE
• To assist the requesting party in establishing and implementing PSR programmes according to
the IAEA Safety Standards, to assure high level of safety throughout the nuclear power plant’s
operating lifetime
• PROCESS
• The process includes preparatory work by the review team and review missions that usually last
two weeks. It is funded by the requesting party or through technical cooperation projects
• OUTPUT
• A report summarizing findings and, if needed, recommendations to improve the compliance with
the IAEA Safety Standards.
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Examples of Reviews of PSRs
Slovenia PSR review mission Completed
2001
Ukraine PSR requirements review mission
Completed
2008
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Advisory Programmes
• Advisory Programmes support the IAEA statute in
providing advice to MS in the application of the
IAEA Safety Standards
• Within the Safety Assessment Section, this
advisory programme supports particularly
embarking countries with an understanding of how
to ensure successful application of standards for
safety assessment, including capacity and
competence building
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Safety Assessment Advisory
Programme (SAAP)
• DESCRIPTION
• Systematic identification of nuclear safety assessment competency and capacity needs for a
Member State (MS) establishing a new nuclear power plant (NPP) programme
• OBJECTIVE
• To assist the requesting MS to identify gaps and develop an action plan for competency and
capacity building based on the IAEA Safety Assessment Education and Training (SAET)
Programme
• PROCESS
• The process may include a phase 1 workshop for senior managers of all stakeholders of the new
NPP Programme and a two weeks mission in the MS to develop the action plan for safety
assessment competency and capacity building within the MS. Funded by the requesting party or
through technical cooperation projects
• OUTPUT
• A report summarizing the findings and an action plan based on SAET and the IAEA Safety
Standards.
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Examples of SAAPs
Malaysia SAAP Phase 2 Completed
October 2013
Jordan SAAP Phase 1 Completed
November 2013
Jordan SAAP Phase 1 Follow-up Completed
November 2014
Bangladesh SAAP Phase 1 Completed
November 2014
Malaysia SAAP Phase 2 Follow-up
Completed
April 2015
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