Shaftesbury, Stoicism, and Philosophy as a Way of Life

JOHN SELLARS

ABSTRACT: This paper examines Shaftesburys reflections on the nature of philosophy in his Askmata notebooks, which draw heavily on the Roman Stoics Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. In what follows I introduce the notebooks, outline Shaftesburys account of philosophy therein, compare it with his discussions of the nature of philosophy in his published works, and conclude by suggesting that Pierre Hadots conception of philosophy as a way of life offers a helpful framework for thinking about Shaftesburys account of philosophy.

1. Reading the Askmata

Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, is best known for his

three volume work Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times published

in 1711.1 That work was in fact a compilation of previously published works,

supplemented with further reflections on those works, and was no doubt

intended to stand as the final, complete statement of his philosophy.2 After its

publication Shaftesbury made some further revisions to the text and these were

incorporated into the second edition that was published in 1714, the year after

Shaftesburys death.3 In the second edition of the Characteristicks, then, we have

1 Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. In Three Volumes [] Anno 1711. 2 The first edition contained A Letter concerning Enthusiasm, Sensus Communis, and Soliloquy in volume 1, An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit and The Moralists in volume 2, and the hitherto unpublished Miscellaneous Reflections in volume 3. Later editions added other texts to volume 3 (e.g. Judgment of Hercules and Letter concerning Design), but these additions were not part of Shaftesburys original plan. 3 Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. In Three Volumes. The Second Edition Corrected. By the the Right Honourable Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, MDCCXIV. For a fuller account of the publishing history of the Characteristicks see W. E. Alderman, English Editions of Shaftesburys Characteristics, The Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America 61 (1967), 315-34, although this contains a number of errors and should be used with caution.

2 Shaftesburys collected works, edited and revised by the author himself. This is

an extremely fortunate state of affairs, and not one that is replicated very often.

It might lead one to assume that Shaftesbury is one of the few authors in the

history of philosophy where there is little to be gained from rummaging through

manuscripts and archives, for he has already done the necessary editorial and

textual work for us himself and given us an authoritative edition of his collected

works.

Even so people have rummaged through the archives and there they have

found a number of other texts by Shaftesbury. The most famous of these

consists of a pair of notebooks with the title Askmata, now in the Public

Records Office at Kew, and first edited and published by Benjamin Rand in

1900.4 Recently these have been re-edited for the Standard Edition of

Shaftesburys works being published in Germany.5 A more recent discovery

worth mentioning, also in the Public Records Office, is a short work in Latin

under the title Pathologia.6 Both of these literary remains deal primarily with

Stoicism: the Askmata takes inspiration from, and is packed full of quotations

from, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius; the Pathologia offers an account and

defence of the Stoic theory of emotions, drawing on Cicero and Diogenes

Laertius. By contrast Shaftesburys published works, conveniently gathered

4 B. Rand, The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1900). For a discussion of the notebooks see L. E. Klein, Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 81-90. 5 Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, ed. W. Benda, C. Jackson-Holzberg, P. Mller, and F. A. Uehlein (Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 2011). 6 See L. Jaffro, C. Maurer, and A. Petit, Pathologia, A Theory of Passions, History of European Ideas 39/2 (2013), 221-30, with, immediately preceding in the same volume, C. Maurer and L. Jaffro, Reading Shaftesburys Pathologia: An Illustration and Defence of the Stoic Account of the Emotions, History of European Ideas 39/2 (2013), 207-20.

3 together for us in the Characteristicks, contain relatively few references to

Stoicism or Stoic authors.

In the light of what we have already seen regarding Shaftesburys

preparation of his own collected works, what, if any, weight ought we to place

on these manuscript texts? If Shaftesbury thought they were important parts of

his philosophical work then presumably he would have included them in the

Characteristicks. His decision not to publish them, even in some revised form,

might seem to indicate that he did not think them worthy of a place within what

he took to be the final record of his philosophical work.7 It looks, then, as if these

manuscript remains might simply be discounted.

But before we dismiss these texts too quickly we might perhaps bear in

mind something that Shaftesbury says in one of his published works, his

Soliliquy, or Advice to an Author.8 In this work Shaftesbury advocates a form of

Socratic care of the self that requires the individual to split himself in two so

that he can be both patient and doctor to himself at once. One of the best ways

to do this, he suggests, is to enter into self-dialogue or soliloquy, and one of the

most effective ways to carry that out is via writing. It is through writing, through

trying to grasp our thoughts with language, that we gain self-knowledge. He

writes, our Thoughts have generally such an obscure implicit Language, that tis

the hardest thing in the world to make em speak out distinctly.9 However he

also says that this sort of writing, this sort of dialogue with oneself, ought to be

kept private: 7 As we shall see later Shaftesbury did extract some short passages from the notebooks and incorporate them into some of his published works. 8 First published in 1710, and cited here from the fourth edition of the Characteristicks, 3 vols (London, 1727), supplemented with the pagination of L. E. Kleins modernized edition, Charcateristics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 9 Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 171 (Klein, 78).

4

I hold it very indecent for any one to publish his Meditations,

Occasional Reflections, Solitary Thoughts, or other such Exercises as

come under the notion of this self-discoursing Practice.10

This sort of writing is an opportunity for an author to think in private, for their

own particular benefit and ought to be kept quite distinct from other forms of

writing that address a public audience.11

It looks, then, as if Shaftesbury had quite specific ideas about different

forms of philosophical writing, some appropriate for publication, others not.

The briefest of glances at the Askmata shows that this text clearly falls under

the heading of private reflections not designed for publication. Perhaps, on

Shaftesburys own terms, that gives us a new reason not to pay these texts too

much attention. Yet, as his remarks in the Soliloquy make clear, it is in this sort

of private writing that the real philosophical work gets done, namely the

agonizing attempt to articulate ones innermost thoughts away from public gaze

in pursuit of the self-knowledge that Shaftesbury calls the proper Object of

Philosophy.12

I have already noted that the Askmata engage at length with Epictetus

and Marcus Aurelius, comprising a patchwork of quotations from both,

sometimes with no comment at all, sometimes with a brief gloss, and sometimes

with extended essays on a particular topic inspired by his reading of these two

Stoics. Both Epictetus and Marcus explicitly advocate precisely the sort of 10 Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 164 (Klein, 74). 11 Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 164 (Klein, 75). 12 Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 285 (Klein, 128). As Klein puts it, The essence of philosophy [for Shaftesbury] was self-making and self-transformation (Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness, 90).

5 writing that Shaftesbury describes in the Soliloquy and practises in the

Askmata. Marcuss own notebook, known to English readers since the

seventeenth century as the Meditations, has the title To Himself in the Greek

textual tradition.13 Epictetus describes the practice in his Discourses:

Have thoughts like these ready to hand by night and by day; write

them, read them, make your conversation about them, communing

with yourself.14

This gives us a further reason to pay attention to the Askmata, for not only does

this work give us an example of Shaftesbury doing what he recommends in the

Soliloquy but it also points us to the inspiration behind the idea, namely Stoic

practices of self-fashioning. These practices clearly form part of a wider

conception of the role and purpose of philosophy and it is this conception of

philosophy that I want to examine in what follows. In the next section (2) I

shall look at what Shaftesbury says about the nature of philosophy in the

Askmata itself, bearing in mind that this is a text in which Shaftesbury is

privately trying to articulate his innermost thoughts. Then (3) I shall

contextualize those private reflections by comparing what he says there with

13 The title in the editio princeps of 1559, based on a now lost MS, is tn eis heauton. The English title Meditations dates back to Meric Casaubons translation of 1634. There is an irony in the fact that Shaftesbury was inspired to write privately by a book that was not intended for public circulation. Shaftesbury is likely to have known this. In the preface to his translation of the Meditations, Casaubon wrote that what Antoninus wrote, he wrote it not for the publick, but for his owne private use (Marcus Aurelius Antoninus The Roman Emperor, His Meditations Concerning Himselfe, Translated out of the Originall Greeke; with Notes: by Meric Casaubon [London, 1634], 24). Casaubons version circulated widely and was reprinted in 1635, 1663, 1673, and 1693. 14 Epictetus, Dissertationes 3.24.103 (trans. W. A. Oldfather, in Epictetus, The Discourses , 2 vols [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925-28]).

6 comments on the nature of philosophy that we find in the Characteristicks.

Finally (4) I shall say something about the image of philosophy that

Shaftesbury presents us with and how it differs from traditional accounts of

early modern philosophy. I shall conclude by suggesting that Pierre Hadots

account of philosophy as a way of life might offer a productive framework

within which to think about Shaftesburys image of philosophy.

2. Shaftesburys Notebook Reflections on Philosophy

In Benjamin Rands 1900 edition of the Askmata, a title he translated as

Philosophical Regimen, there is a chapter entitled Philosophy.15 The new edition

shows us that the bulk of this was written during Shaftesburys stay in

Rotterdam in 1698-9, with a couple of shorter additions in 1703-4 and after 1704.16

These were, for Shaftesbury, periods of retreat, time away from his duties as a

Member of Parliament at Westminster and an opportunity, through his reading,

to converse with the ancients rather than his contemporaries.17 With pressures

of work and family life taking their toll on his health, the periods of seclusion

during which Shaftesbury filled his notebooks were conceived as a vital

opportunity for him to take care of himself.18 Although there is mention of him

suffering asthma, exacerbated by the tobacco smoke filling the crowded rooms

at Westminster,19 Shaftesburys own comments suggest that the care he needed

15 See Rand, The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen, 267-72; cf. Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 282-9. 16 See Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 55. 17 See Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 22, citing Shaftesburys letter to Locke (9 April 1698). 18 See further Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 22-8. 19 Ibid.

7 to give himself was primarily psychological rather than physical, and this

psychological project of taking care of himself very much shapes his reflections

on the nature of philosophy in the Askmata.20

Those reflections open with a somewhat blunt rejection of Lockes

philosophical project of analysing the formation and composition of ideas as a

mere specious exercise.21 Locke was of course quite explicit in claiming that

the task of the philosopher was to be an Under-Labourer to the sciences,

clearing Ground a little, and removing some of the Rubbish, that lies in the way

to Knowledge.22 By contrast Shaftesburys point of departure is personal and

introspective: let me look a while within my self. Let me observe there,

Whether or no there be Connection, & Consistency.23 What he finds within

himself is very little in the way of consistency: one day all goes well and the

world is delightful, the next is marked by disappointment and despair. In the

ups and downs of ones inner emotional life there is little sign of the Truth,

Certainty, [and] Evidence championed by the philosophers of his day.24

Shaftesbury complains that their abstract speculations bear little relation to

either inner emotional turmoil or the pressing issues of everyday life, and his

retreat, during which he was writing these comments, was his attempt to

confront problems of both sorts in his own life. In one striking passage he 20 Indeed, his extended reflections from his first retreat end with the words School of Philos: Surgeons Shop (Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 287), which is a translation of a line from Epictetus (Diss. 3.23.30), omitted in Rands edition. 21 Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 282 (Rand, 267). Compare with Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 299 (Klein, 134). 22 J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding [first published 1690], ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 10. 23 Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 282-3 (Rand, 267). Again compare with Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 299 (Klein, 134). 24 Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 283 (Rand, 267).

8 suggests that philosophy is only of value when it grapples with the question of

the value of human life:

If I have a right Idea of Life now at this moment, that I think slightly

of it & resolve with my Self that it may easily by layd down; teach

me how I shall remain in this opinion; what it is yet changes it; and

how this Disturbance happens: by what Innovation, what

Composition, what Intervention of other Ideas. If This be the

Subject of the Philosophical Art; I readily apply to It, & studdy It. If

there be nothing of this in the Case, I have no occasion for the sort

of Learning, & am no more desirouse of knowing how I form or

compound those Ideas which are distinguished by Words than I am

of knowing how, & by what motions of my Mouth I form those

articulate Sounds, which I can full as well pronounce & use, without

any such Science or Speculation.25

This reference to a Philosophical Art brings to mind Epictetuss definition of

philosophy as an art of living and in the notes added in his subsequent retreats

Shaftesbury turns explicitly to Epictetus.26 The art with which Shaftesbury is

concerned, devoted to wisdom, happiness, and character rather than scientific

knowledge, appears simplistic at first glance but is he suggests far harder to

master.27 To grasp fully the nature of ones desire and aversion, of what is and is 25 Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 284 (Rand, 268), with contractions expanded. Compare this with Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 302-3 (Klein, 135), which follows this passage very closely. 26 See Epictetus, Diss. 1.15.2. Shaftesbury worked closely on the text of Epictetus and some of his textual emendations are recorded in John Uptons Epicteti quae supersunt Dissertationes ab Arriano collectae , 2 vols (London: Thomas Woodward, 1741). 27 See Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 288 (Rand, 269).

9 not within ones control, and then to transform oneself in the light of that

understanding this is the truly difficult task.28 Quoting Epictetuss statement

that we ought to train ourselves to distinguish between our impressions and

things themselves (in order to avoid mistaken value judgements and unwanted

emotions), Shaftesbury comments Let this be thy Philosophy, & leave the other

Phaenomena for others.29

Shaftesbury goes on to offer a slightly more formal distinction between

these competing ways of conceiving philosophy. Either philosophy is an activity

marked by the subtlety and niceness of the speculation, in which case it

includes all the natural sciences, or it teaches happiness and gives the rule of

life, in which case it stands above all other subjects. If it is the latter, as we have

already seen him affirm, then if happiness is dependent on external things it

ought to concern itself with such things, but if instead it is dependent on the

mind then the Work of Philosophy is to fortify a Mind against avarice,

ambition, restlessness, and anxiety.30

1. marked by subtlety and niceness of speculation Philosophy either 2. teaches happiness 2a. the study of outward things and gives the rule of life in which happiness consists 2b. to correct and amend our opinions of outward things 28 See Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 289 (Rand, 269), where Shaftesbury uses a series of Epictetan technical terms, such as orexis, ekklisis, ta eph hmin, ouk eph hmin, proaireta, and aproaireta. 29 Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 288 (Rand, 269), following a quotation from Epictetus, Ench. 1.5. 30 Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 284 (Rand, 269).

10

For Shaftesbury philosophy is at one neither with the natural sciences and

mathematics (i.e. 1) nor with political and economic sciences (i.e. 2a), but rather

is a psychotherapeutic project devoted to the contents of ones own mind (2b).

If philosophy is anything, Shaftesbury comments, then it is this, and this is a

matter of Practice, an activity ultimately aimed at securing tranquillity of

mind.31

The claim that philosophy ought primarily to be concerned with the

analysis of ones opinions and judgements again brings to mind Epictetus, while

the reference to tranquillity as the criterion for assessing the relevance of

philosophical speculation reminds us of Senecas De tranquillitate animae.

Shaftesburys next move brings to mind ancient debates about Stoic ethics.

Having distinguished between happiness dependent on externals and happiness

dependent on the mind, Shaftesbury adds a third option, namely that happiness

might require both a sound frame of mind and certain external goods:

For, either [1] Happiness is in outward things; or [2] from Self &

outward things together; or [3] from Self alone & not from outward

things.32

Of these three options the first can be quickly dismissed, for if it were true then

people would consistently be happy in proportion to their possession of

external goods, which is not the case. Shaftesbury resists choosing between the

second and third options, instead arguing that in either case it will be necessary

31 See Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 285 (Rand, 270). 32 Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 285 (Rand, 270), numbers added.

11 to pay attention to ones Self and so this is a task that we cannot ignore. At this

point, then, Shaftesbury refuses to choose between Stoicism and

Aristotelianism.33 He goes on to list some of the things that he takes this to

involve: how to free my Self from those [] Passions which make me

inconsistent with my Self, how to calm my Anger, how to quell Resentment

& Reveng, how to keep out Luxury, how to stand out against Ambition, and

how to bear with Accidents & support the common Chances of the World.34

This project of taking care of ones Self looks as if it might involve turning

ones back on the world and ones worldly affairs. As a man of the world himself,

albeit one struggling in that role, Shaftesbury was all too aware of the tension

between managing his practical affairs and turning to devote himself fully to a

philosophical life. This brings us back to the choice between the second and

third options outlined earlier: are outward things necessary for a happy life?

Again Shaftesbury resists answering this question directly but instead suggests

that this question is at the very heart of philosophy. He writes that this still is

Philosophy: this is the Thing it Self: to enquire where & in what we are Loosers:

which are the greatest Gains.35 In the attempt to become secure against

Fortune is it a matter of acquiring further external goods or settling matters

within? The task of philosophy is to examine the extent to which we ought to

moderate our desires, control our passions, check our ambition, and place value

on external goods such as wealth and property. Central to this will be assessing

the contribution, if any, such things make to our happiness.

33 It is worth noting that the points noted above that resonate with Stoicism (a concern with opinions, the role of tranquillity) are equally compatible with Aristotelian ethics. 34 Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 286 (Rand, 270-1). 35 Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 286 (Rand, 271).

12 It is, Shaftesbury concludes, part of the human condition to reflect on the

nature of ones own happiness but of course people vary considerably in their

ability to think rationally about these sorts of issues. This is where philosophy

can help. Philosophy is the art of reasoning about the nature of human

happiness.36 It is also, as we have already seen, the art of training ones Self in

the light of that reasoning so that one becomes happy. That at least appears to

have been Shaftesburys goal during his therapeutic retreat during which he

reflected on these issues and wrote these notes.

3. Shaftesburys Published Metaphilosophy

The discussion of philosophy in the Askmata notebooks was never intended for

publication. These were Shaftesburys private reflections, his attempt to think

through on paper issues of personal concern, such as trying to articulate his own

understanding of philosophy and differentiate it from that of his tutor Locke. As

such it would be unwise to take these notes as a definitive statement of

Shaftesburys considered view on the subject. For that we ought to return to his

published works that he revised and edited to form the Characteristicks.

We have already noted that Shaftesbury advocated a form of Socratic care

of the self in his Soliloquy, and in the light of the Askmata we now have a much

clearer sense of what he took this to involve. We can also see the relevance of

the line from the Stoic poet Persius printed on the title page of the Soliloquy, no

need to inquire outside yourself.37 The internal inquiry that Shaftesbury

outlines in the Soliloquy involves examining ones passions and the opinions on 36 See Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 287 (Rand, 272). 37 Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 151 (Klein, 70), quoting Persius, Saturae 1.7: nec te quaesiveris extra.

13 which they are based, implicitly assuming a Stoic view of the relationship

between the two. This in turn leads to the study of human nature.38 Shaftesbury

goes on to say that philosophy conceived thus by Nature, has the Pre-eminence

above all other Science or Knowledg,39 echoing the claim he made in the

Askmata. Here, however, he goes on to give us a reason why, namely that it and

it alone assigns value to things in life. But a more powerful reason for preferring

this conception of philosophy for Shaftesbury is its existential relevance, just as

we saw in the opening sections of the discussion in the Askmata. Indeed, at this

point in the Soliloquy Shaftesbury takes over half a dozen lines from the

Askmata almost word-for-word,40 adding afterwards that whatever the virtues

of Lockean philosophy might be it relates not to Me myself, it concerns not the

Man, nor any otherwise affects the Mind than by the conceit of Knowledg, and

the false Assurance raisd from a supposd Improvement.41

We can see, then, that in the Soliloquy, first published in 1710, Shaftesbury

asserts in public the central ideas that he first developed in private in the

Askmata around a decade earlier, in places taking over sections of text from the

notebooks and reworking them.42 Alongside the Soliloquy we might also note

Shaftesburys work entitled The Moralists, first printed a year earlier, in 1709, in

which he also addresses the topic of the nature of philosophy. Although this

work is harder to interpret insofar as it takes the form of a dialogue, the view of

philosophy that emerges by the end is very much in tune with what we have

38 See Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 297 (Klein, 133). 39 Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 297 (Klein, 133). 40 Compare Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 283, lines 4-11 (Rand, 267) with Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 300 (Klein, 134). 41 Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 301 (Klein, 134). 42 See in particular the parallel passages mentioned in notes 24 and 38 above.

14 already seen in both the Askmata and the Soliloquy. Philosophy is defined as

the Study of Happiness and happiness is asserted to come from within, not

from without, so philosophys primary object of study is ones Self.43 But to be a

philosopher is not merely to inquire into the nature of happiness; instead it

involves a process of self-transformation. Thus Theocles, one of the characters in

the dialogue, says Experience shews us every day, That for talking or writing

Philosophy, People are not at all the nearer being PHILOSOPHERS.44 If that seems

to imply an excessively narrow account of who does and does not count as a

proper philosopher, the discussion continues by suggesting that more or less all

reflective human beings are philosophers to varying degrees, to the extent that

they reflect on what might contribute to a happy life. The defining feature of the

philosopher seems to be practical orientation rather than intellectual discourse.

4. Philosophy as a Way of Life

What are we to make of Shaftesburys reflections on the nature of philosophy?

At first glance these look somewhat anomalous when compared with the

predominant models of philosophy current in the early modern period. As we

have seen, they are explicitly at odds with Lockes conception of philosophy,

which has gone on to be so influential in the English-speaking world. They are

also at odds with Kants account of the philosophy of his immediate

predecessors, a narrative that shaped the somewhat simplistic rationalists

versus empiricists story of early modern philosophy in so many textbooks.45

Shaftesbury simply looks out of place. 43 Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 2: 437-8 (Klein, 336). 44 Ibid. 45 See e.g. I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Riga, 1781/1787), A854/B882.

15 I do not think he is in fact as out of place as he might at first appear to be.

A number of other philosophers of the period adopt a similar view. We might

mention Spinozas metaphilosophical ideal of psychotherapeutic self-

transformation, outlined in his Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione.46 We could

also note Bacons interest in medicine of the mind and of course Montaigne.

Others have commented on the contingent character of traditional narratives of

the history early modern philosophy, and the shift from a biographical model to

a systematic paradigm in the eighteenth century, so I do not intend to cover that

ground here.47 Instead what I want to do in this final section is to point to

another model for thinking about what philosophy is that might offer a useful

framework within which to think about Shaftesburys approach.

The model I have in mind was developed by the French scholar of ancient

philosophy Pierre Hadot.48 Hadot argued in a series of works that in antiquity

philosophy was conceived not as an abstract theoretical system but rather as a

way of life.49 A philosopher in antiquity was not someone who examined a series 46 In the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione Spinoza suggests that unhappiness is the product of misconceiving what is good or bad, that this requires a remedy just as a physically sick person requires a remedy and that this remedy begins by studying philosophy, and in particular the philosophy of nature. See B. Spinoza, Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, esp. 7 and 14 (ed. C. Gebhardt [Heidelberg: Carl Winters, n.d.], 7-8; trans. E. Curley in The Collected Works of Spinoza I [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985], 9-11). 47 See e.g. Leo Catana, The Historiographical Concept System of Philosophy: Its Origin, Nature, Influence and Legitimacy (Leiden: Brill, 2008). 48 C. Brooke, Philosophic Pride: Stoicism and Political Thought from Lipsius to Rousseau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 122-23, has also suggested that Shaftesbury might be read productively through the lens of Hadots work. I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to my attention. 49 See P. Hadot, Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique (Paris: tudes Augustiniennes, 1981; 2nd edn 1987; rev. edn 2002), parts of which are translated into English in Philosophy as a Way of Life (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). Note also his Quest-ce que la philosophie antique? (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), translated as What is Ancient Philosophy? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). I should note that Hadot himself mentioned Shaftesbury as a reviver of this ancient conception of philosophy; see What is Ancient Philosophy?, 270.

16 of theoretical questions in isolation while continuing to live just as he had done

before. Instead to become a philosopher meant to choose a certain way of life: a

life devoted to virtue or to pleasure or to contemplation, for instance. It also

often meant joining a community of like-minded people following the same way

of life, whether that be in the Academy, the Lyceum, the Garden, or at the Stoa.

On this account an ancient philosopher shares more in common with what we

would now associate with a follower of a religious life than it does with what we

would associate with the life of a scientist.

This shift in focus, stressing the connections between philosophy and

religion over the connections between philosophy and science, is reflected in

the narrative history of ancient philosophy that Hadot developed. In the

English-speaking world the most common narrative history of ancient

philosophy opens with the Presocratics, whose proto-scientific, epistemological,

and metaphysical concerns are then developed and systematized by Plato and

especially Aristotle.50 According to this narrative, various other schools of

philosophy developed after Aristotle but on the whole they merely repeat and

rework the insights of their predecessors in less attractive ways. This narrative

for the history of ancient philosophy probably has its origins in Hegels Lectures

on the History of Philosophy.51 Dismissive of Socrates contribution to philosophy

as insufficiently systematic,52 Hegel summed up the view just described when he

wrote: 50 See e.g. W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 6 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962-81). 51 G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson, 3 vols (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963). These lectures (Vorlesungen ber die Geschichte der Philosophie) were reconstructed by Michelet from lecture notes and first published 1833-36. Michelet also produced a shortened second edition in 1840-44 upon which Haldane and Simsons translation is based. 52 See e.g. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 1: 396.

17

The development of philosophic science as science, and, further,

the progress from the Socratic point of view to the scientific, begins

with Plato and is completed by Aristotle. They of all others deserve

to be called teachers of the human race.53

In contrast to this, Hadot opens his narrative of the history of philosophy with

Socrates, who is the defining figure.54 For Socrates the task of philosophy is to

live well, to live a life marked by sophia, aret, and eudaimonia, and it is to this

end that his cross-examining and questioning is directed. In the wake of

Socrates almost single-handed invention of philosophy as we know it a whole

series of philosophical schools develop, each one continuing the Socratic project

in different ways. According to Hadots narrative, the four central philosophical

traditions are Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, and Epicurean. Plato and Aristotle are

no longer monumental giants, but rather founders of schools on a par with Zeno

and Epicurus. If they seem to tower above all other ancient philosophers that is

simply due to the contingency of textual transmission and the fact their works

happened to survive in greater quantity. On this account of ancient philosophy

the Stoics, Epicureans, and Neoplatonists take centre-stage as proponents of

philosophical ways of life that flourished and attracted numerous adherents.

Hadots view has been criticized in various ways. Martha Nussbuam has

suggested that the focus on the similarities between philosophical and religious

movements runs the risk of undervaluing the role of rational argument in

53 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 2: 1. 54 See the history outlined in his Quest-ce que la philosophie antique?

18 ancient philosophy.55 More recently John Cooper has argued that to claim that

all ancient philosophers conformed to this model goes too far. While accepting

the central role of Socrates and the Socratic ways of life he inspired in

subsequent schools, Cooper suggests that other ancient philosophers who dont

conform to this model, such as the Presocratics, still deserve to be called

philosophers and to find a place in our histories of ancient philosophy.56

In the present context we shall have to put these criticisms to one side.

What is important to note for our purposes is the striking way in which Hadots

way of thinking about the history of ancient philosophy resonates with

Shaftesburys own. In the Soliloquy Shaftesbury offers a brief genealogy of

ancient philosophy in which Socrates stands as the philosophical PATRIARCH

who contained within himself the several Geniuss of Philosophy and who

gave rise to all those several Manners in which that Science was deliverd.57

Elsewhere, in his manuscript examining the Stoic theory of the passions,

Shaftesbury opens by calling this Doctrinam Socraticorum, and there he

describes Stoics, Cynics, and ancient Academics all as Socratics.58 The

importance of Socrates for Shaftesbury is further supported by his plan to write

a work devoted to reconstructing the views of the historical Socrates from the

evidence of Xenophon, Plato, Aristophanes, Diogenes Laertius, and others. This

was to be called the Chartae Socraticae, and a notebook of preliminary material

55 See M. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 5, primarily taking aim at Foucaults use of some of Hadots ideas. 56 See J. Cooper, Pursuits of Wisdom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 57 Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 254 (Klein, 114). 58 See Jaffro, Maurer, and Petit, Pathologia, A Theory of the Passions, 221.

19 survives, also at Kew.59 In contrast to the emphasis placed on Socrates as the key

figure in ancient philosophy, Aristotles contribution is devalued to the extent

that he fails to be a good Socratic. Again in the Soliloquy Shaftesbury writes:

As the Talent of this great Man [i.e. Aristotle] was more towards

polite Learning, and the Arts, than towards the deep and solid parts

of Philosophy, it happend that in his School there was more care

taken of other Sciences, than of Ethicks, Dialect, or Logick; which

Provinces were chiefly cultivated by the Successors of the Academy

and Porch.60

Aristotle holds a lesser interest for Shaftesbury, then, for he fails to conform to

the Socratic ideal of philosophy as an ethical project of self-transformation.

Shaftesburys prioritization of Socrates and the presentation of various

subsequent schools of philosophy as Socratic highlights one similarity between

his approach to philosophy and Hadots. There are no doubt various differences

too, though, and we might note that Shaftesburys claims about Socratic

philosophy do not appear to be intended to apply to all ancient philosophers,

and to that extent his position shares something with Coopers revised version

of Hadots history of ancient philosophy.61 59 See Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Standard Edition II,5 Chartae Socraticae: Design of a Socratick History, ed. W. Benda, C. Jackson-Holzberg, F. A. Uehlein, and E. Wolff (Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 2008). 60 Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 256 (Klein, 115). Shaftesbury is not claiming here that Aristotle was uninterested in logic, which would be absurd, but rather that his school, the Lyceum, paid little attention to it. This is not unreasonable as an assessment of the Hellenistic Lyceum. 61 See Shaftesburys letter to Pierre Coste, 1 October 1706 (Rand, 355-66, esp. 359), where he suggests there are two schools of philosophy, one Socratic embracing Academics, Peripatetics, and Stoics, and one Democritean, inckuding Cyrenaics and Epicureans.

20 There are other, more substantive, points of contact too. Most important

here is Hadots account of what he calls spiritual exercises (exercices spirituels).

Hadot borrows this phrase from Ignatius of Loyola and some, such as Cooper,

have been wary of applying this later Christian notion to ancient pagan

philosophy. However, putting the phrase to one side, the idea of some kind of

psychological or mental training being part of philosophy is widespread in

ancient philosophy, or at least in the traditions that come to the fore in Hadots

narrative, namely the Stoics, Epicureans, and Neoplatonists. The Stoic Musonius

Rufus uses the Greek phrase asksis ts psuchs, or exercise of the soul, and

borrowing the Ignatian phrase spiritual exercises (exercitia spiritualia) to

translate this neednt involve anachronism.62

We have already seen Shaftesbury advocate spiritual exercises of the sort

that Hadot had in mind in his account of philosophy as a way of life, namely the

practice of writing down ones thoughts in an effort to gain self-knowledge.

Earlier we saw this practice advocated by Epictetus and others in antiquity

recommended it too, famously Seneca, who suggested that we ought to combine

the activities of reading and writing in order to help us to digest what we have

read, with the ultimate goal being the transformation of our behaviour.63

Writing may have also played a role in Senecas nightly exercise of calling

himself to account. Inspired by his own teacher Sextius, who was drawing on

Pythagorean practices outlined in the Golden Verses, Seneca writes:

Sextius had this habit, and when the day was over and he had

retired to his nightly rest, he would put these questions to his soul: 62 See J. Sellars, The Art of Living (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 110-15. For Coopers concerns see Pursuits of Wisdom, 402-3. 63 See Seneca, Epistulae 84.5-8.

21 what bad habit have you cured today? What fault have you

resisted? In what respect are you better? Anger will cease and

become more controllable if it finds that it must appear before a

judge each day. Can anything be more excellent than this practice

of thoroughly sifting the whole day? And how delightful the sleep

that follows this self-examination.64

This is of course precisely the sort of dialogue with oneself that Shaftesbury

advocates in the Soliloquy. In Michel Foucaults account of ancient practices of

writing the self (lcriture de soi), inspired by the work of Hadot, he points to

different types of writing that were thought to play a role in spiritual exercises,

such as personal notebooks and correspondence, involving respectively

dialogue with oneself or with another.65 This offers a helpful framework within

which to think about what Shaftesbury was doing when he was writing in his

Askmata notebooks. For anyone more accustomed to reading canonical early

modern philosophical texts, these private notebook reflections must look

deeply anomalous, if not worthless and irrelevant, even for an understanding of

Shaftesburys own philosophy as it is presented in his more formal works like An

Inquiry concerning Virtue, or Merit. Yet in the light of Hadots conception of

philosophy as a way of life, further elaborated by Cooper, Foucault, and others,

we can see the way in which these notes might be read as substantial

philosophical texts in their own right. Indeed, on Shaftesburys own account it is

in these private texts that the real philosophical work gets done.

64 Seneca, De Ira 3.36.1-2 (trans. J. W. Basore, in Seneca, Moral Essays, 3 vols [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1928-35]). 65 See M. Foucault, Writing the Self, in A. Davidson, ed., Foucault and his Interlocutors (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 234-47.

22 I have mentioned the work of Hadot and Foucault together and their

approaches to ancient philosophy share much in common. Indeed, Foucault

was quite open about his debt to Hadot.66 But there are also differences, and one

of these is significant for anyone thinking about the nature of Shaftesburys

philosophical project. In an essay entitled Reflections on the Idea of the

Cultivation of the Self, Hadot diplomatically tried to correct Foucaults use of

his work.67 His main concern was what he took to be an excessive focus on the

self in Foucaults account of ancient practices. For Hadot many ancient

practices of what we might call self-cultivation were actually aimed at

overcoming the boundaries between self and non-self. It was not about

sculpting oneself into a unique work of art but rather transforming oneself so

that one reconnected with, say, Nature (for a Stoic) or the One (for a

Neoplatonist). This involved a transformation of ones way of life, but perhaps

not Foucaults notion of taking care of the self. Closely connected to this is

Hadots concern with Foucaults phrase aesthetic of existence (lesthtique de

lexistence).68 As Hadot puts it:

What I am afraid of is that, by focusing his interpretation too

exclusively on the culture of the self, the care of the self, and

conversion toward the self more generally, by defining his ethical

model as an aesthetics of existence M. Foucault is propounding a

66 Foucault refers to Hadots work on spiritual exercises in both The Use of Pleasure ([Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986], 8) and The Care of the Self ([Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1988], 243), volumes 2 and 3 of his A History of Sexuality. 67 In Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 206-13. 68 See e.g. Writing the Self, 234. See also Foucaults essay On the Genealogy of Ethics, in P. Rabinow, ed., The Foucault Reader (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), 340-72, at 350-1.

23 culture of the self which is too aesthetic. In other words, this may be

a new form of Dandyism, late twentieth-century style.69

As Hadot himself commented, it is a great shame that he and Foucault did not

have an opportunity to discuss these issues further, due to Foucaults untimely

death.70 The relevance of this difference between Hadot and Foucault in the

present context is that Shaftesbury often expresses himself in ways quite similar

to Foucault. The focus of the discussion throughout the Soliloquy, for instance, is

very much on the Self, as it is in Foucault, and Shaftesbury often makes use of

aesthetic language when trying to define what a transformed self might be like.

For instance he refers to the Beauty of Sentiments, the Sublime of Characters;

and [] the Model or Exemplar of that natural Grace, which gives to every

Action its attractive Charm.71 In the light of these sorts of comments it looks as

if Shaftesbury might stand closer to Foucault than he does to Hadot.72 Indeed,

Shaftesbury himself uses the phrase Care of Self at one point.73

However if we turn back to the Askmata we find material that

complicates matters. In a section entitled The End Shaftesbury considers the

telos or goal of human life and makes the claim that The End & Design of

Nature in Man is Society.74 Human beings are born with natural affections

towards other humans, felt most strongly with close family but ultimately 69 Reflections, in Philosophy as a Way of Life, 211. 70 Ibid., 206. 71 Characteristicks, 4th edn (1727), 1: 336 (Klein, 149-50). Here Shaftesbury is referring to the aesthetic sensibility required by anyone who proposes to write about Men and Manners. 72 See e.g. S. Ylivuori, A Polite Foucault? Eighteenth-Century Politeness as a Disciplinary System and Practice of the Self, Cultural History 3 (2014), 170-89, at 178-80, who aligns Shaftesbury with Foucault. 73 Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 195 (Rand, 231). 74 Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 127 (Rand, 49).

24 extending to humankind as a whole. Nature has formed humankind,

Shaftesbury suggests, that he be framd & fitted for Society.75 A good human

being is one who is socially inclind & affected, for that is the fundamental

characteristic of human nature.76 Here Shaftesbury is drawing on the Stoic

theory of oikeisis, which posits a natural instinct of affection between

humans.77 By defining sociability as a natural instinct, Shaftesbury, like the

Stoics, can exhort us to follow Nature, which will itself involve becoming an

active and congenial member of society.78

Within this discussion of the goal of human life, Shaftesbury insists that

Whatever is a Mans End is that which he cannot quit or depart from, on the

account of any other thing.79 He goes on say that the Whole Creature has his

End in Nature, & serves to something beyond himself.80 That thing beyond

himself will be society, an end set down by a power beyond himself, namely

Nature. If that sounds somewhat austere, we might restate it by saying that a

good human being will be one who doesnt struggle against his own natural

instincts of affection towards others. Our natural instincts and what is good for

us are in complete harmony, for this is how Nature has arranged it.

The important point for present purposes is that there is no question of

there being any choice in how an individual conceives a good life. What counts

as a good human being has been set down by Nature. The Socratic project 75 Ibid. 76 Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 128 (Rand, 49). 77 The theory is reported in Cicero, De Finibus 3.16 and Diogenes Laertius 7.85. 78 On Shaftesburys relationship with Stoicism see e.g. L. Jaffro, Les Exercices de Shaftesbury: un stocisme crpusculaire, in P.-F. Moreau, ed., Le stocisme au XVIe et au XVIIe sicle (Paris: Albin Michel, 1999), 340-54, with further references listed in Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 52-4. 79 Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 128 (Rand, 50). 80 Standard Edition II,6 Askmata, 130 (Rand, 52).

25 outlined in the Soliloquy of uncovering self-knowledge and then taking care of

ones self is here fleshed out as a Stoic project of uncovering our true human

nature, itself an expression of something beyond itself, namely cosmic Nature,

and then living in harmony with it. The project involves a reconnection between

self and Nature similar to the sort outlined by Hadot in his criticisms of

Foucault.81 Although Shaftesbury thinks the result will be beautiful as well as

moral, reflecting the scope of the Greek to kalon, there seems to be little room

here for a dandyish aesthetics of existence in which one self-fashions oneself

however one might see fit. There is no doubt a lot more that one could say about

the relationship between Shaftesburys aestheticized ethics and his Stoic

commitment to living in accordance with Nature. In the present context this is, I

suggest, a further example where thinking about what Shaftesbury is doing in

the light of Hadots discussions of ancient philosophy has the potential to be

illuminating.

81 Thomas Bnatoul has commented that although Hadots criticisms of Foucault, first published in 1989, are understandable given the texts he could read, if we take into account Foucaults 1981-82 lecture course, first published in 2001, a different picture emerges. There Foucault highlights the the tight connection between the Stoic care of the self and knowledge of nature (Bnatoul, referring to M. Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject [New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005], 289-96). As Bnatoul notes, Hadots view perhaps goes too far when dealing with the Roman Stoics, reflecting his somewhat Neoplatonic perspective. See T. Bnatoul, Stoicism and Twentieth Century French Philosophy, in J. Sellars, ed., The Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition (forthcoming).