silicon valley blue ribbon task force on aviation security and technology

8/17/2019 Silicon Valley Blue Ribbon Task Force on Aviation Security and Technology

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REPORTOF THE

2002 SILICON VALLEY BLUE RIBBONON

TASK FORCE

AVIATION SECURITY AND TECH N OLOGY

JUNE 17, 2002

CONVENED BY

U.S. CONGRESSMAN MIKE HONDAAND

SAN JOSE MAYOR RON GONZALES

CHAIRED BY

JOHN W. THOMPSON

CEO CHAIRMAN, SYMANTEC CORPORATION

CITYOF

SANJOSECAPFrALOF SILICONVALLEY


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CONTENTS

TransmittalLetter i

List of Participants ii

Task Force Recommendations

Executive Summary 2

Background 3

Creation of the Blue Ribbon Task Force 10

Objectives, Problems and Recommended Solutions 16

Toward the Future: Unresolved Issues 27

Appendix A: Blue Ribbon Task Force Members A-i

Appendix B: Committee Chairs, Members and Staff B-i

Appendix C: Task Force Meeting Summaries C-i

Appendix D: Public Hearing Comments—May10, 2002 D-i

Appendix E. Responses to the Request for Information E- i

Appendix E Technology Demonstration CommitteePresentersand Exhibitors—May 3i, 2002 F-i

Appendix G. Technology Demonstration CommitteeFindings G-i

Appendix H. Press Releases and Outreach H-i

AV I AT I O N S E C U R I T Y AN D T E C H N O L O G Y


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June 17, 2002

The Honorable Mike HondaMember of Congress, 15th District3500 Stevens Creek Blvd.SanJoséCA 95117

The Honorable Ro n GonzalesMayor, City of San Jose801 N. First Street, Suite 600SanJoséCA 95110

Dear Congressman Honda and Mayor Gonzales,

On February 4, 2002, you announced formation of Blue Ribbon Task Force consisting of 20technology, security; business and aviation experts to “identify and evaluate technology-drivensolutions to improve the security and efficiencyof national and local aviation.” You asked the

Task Force to complete its mission and report its findings within 100 days of its organization.Today, we are pleased to provide you the results of our work.

This report represents the contributionsof some of the finest minds and forward-thinkingcompanies in Silicon Valley. It contains a series of recommended technologies that can beimplemented to enhance security and safety in the airport workplace, workforceand infrastructurecommunications network without jeopardizing the civil rights and civil liberties of the flyingpublic. Most important the technology proposals put forth by the Task Force can be put intoplace now.

The Task Force worked hard to develop its recommendations. During its brief 100-day periodof existence, the Task Force and/or its two committees on Technology Demonstration and ReportWriting met on more than a dozen occasions. The Task Force also held a public hearing andorganized a meeting of vendors representing various technologies.

We believe tha t our proposals represent an important step toward infusing21st Century technologyinto 21st Century air travel security, safety and comfort. We look forward to working with you inthe future on any ne xt steps required to transform these recommendations into reality.

Sincerely,

~ ~

CEO and Chairman, SymantecChair, BlueRibbon Task Force

V . Infante MichaelE. Fox, Sr.

Chairman, President CEO Aspect Com munications Chairm an, M.E. Fox Co.Chair, Technology Demonstration Committee Chair, ReportWriting Committee

Av I AT I O N S E C U R I T Y AN D T E C I I N 0 L 0 G Y


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LiST OF PARTICIPANTS

H ON OR ARY C O -C H AIR SMike Honda, Member, U.S. CongressRon Gonzales, Mayor, City of San José

WORKING CHAIRJohn W Thompson, CE O and Chairman, Symantec

Task Force Committee ChairsMichael E. Fox, Sr., Chairman, M.E. Fox and Company, Proposal DevelopmentBeatriz V. Infante, CEO, Aspect Communications, TechnologyRecommendations

Committee MembersSam Araki Chairman, SecurityTechnologyVenturesCaptain Dan B. Ashby, Chair, CaliforniaAirline Pilots AssociationBill Coleman, Chairman, BEA Systems, Inc.Bill Crowell, President and CEO Cylink CorporationMariano-Florentino Cuélar, Assistant Professor, Stanford Law SchoolSandra England, Executive Vice President, NetworkAssociatesDon Harris, Director of Special Projects, Southwest AirlinesGen. Richard Hearney (Ret.), CEO, BENSBill Lansdowne, Chief, San José PoliceDr. Sergio Magistri , CEO,InVision Technologies, Inc.Bob McCashin, CEO, IdentixDr . Ko Nishimura, CEO,Solectron CorporationRichard W. Palmer, Jr., Vice President, Cisco SystemsKrish Panu, CEO, @Road

Larry A. Wansley, Managing Director of Corporate Security, American AirlinesTom Weidemeyer, COO, United Parcel ServicePeggy Weigle, CEO Sanctum

STAFF TO TH E TASK FORCEOffice of Congressman Mike HondaMen Maben, District DirectorMatt Bostick, Field Representative

Office of Mayor Ron GonzalesJim Webb, Senior Policy Advisor

David Vossbrink, Communications DirectorOffice of City Manager, San JoséDarrell Dearborn, Senior Deputy City Manager

Norman Y. Mineta San José International AirportRalph G. Tonseth, Director of AviationJim Peterson, Deputy Director

ConsultantsLarry N. Gerston, Ph.D., Gerston Associates, Principal WriterSunny Claggett, Shilling Kenyon, Task Force Facilitator

Callie Gregory Grant, ProjectCoordination

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TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

NE W TECHNOLOGIES CA N IMPROVETH E NATION’S AIRPORTS BY CREATING

• A Validated Workforce through Biometricauthentication Workforcemanagement

• A Validated Facility through Video monitoring Driver/vehicleauthentication GPS devices to monitor vehicle traffic Access control within aircraft, including the cockpit

• A Validated CommunicationsInfrastructure through Integrated communications infrastructure Migration to a secure networked, digital technology

• Greater Protection and Respect fo r Passengers through Implementationof the Above Recommendations

A IR TRAVELERS MUST HAVE RELIEFWITH RESPECT TO

• Th e Travel Environment Threatened by Inadequate Security

• Cumbersome Airport Internal Communications Systems

• Discomfort Resulting From Poorly Trained Personnel

• Lengthy Check-in Processes Due to Poorly FunctioningDetection Technologies

M I N E TA SA N JOSE INTERNATIONALAIRPORT IS IDEALLY SUITED FORTESTING NEW TECHNOLOGIES

• Mid-sized• Heavy Business Use

• Major Cargo Center

• Positioned for Redesign

NE W T E C H NO L O G Y A P PL IC ATIO N S MUSTNOT INTERFERE W I T H CIVIL LIBERTIES

• Th e Right to Privacy• Freedom from Racial/Ethnic Profiling

AvIATIoN SEcuRITY AND T E c H N o L o G Y


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EXECUTIVESUMMARY

uch like the rest of American society, the commercial air travel industry is in the midst ofprofound change. The unprecedented airplane-launched attacks of September 11, 2001

by adversaries of democracy culminated a series of international incidentsthat tragically

brought the horrors of terror and devastation to American soil. Clearly, our traditionallyopen ways of life will never be the same.

Fundamental questions emerged in the wake of the September 11 tragedy. Among them:What can we learn from the catastrophic events to make America and air travel safe again?What existing technologies utilized by Silicon Valleycompanies can be applied to thenational air transportation system in general and to Mineta San José InternationalAirport(SJC) in particular? Ho w can we make ou r airports safer, yet preserve the individualliberties that distinguish the United States from many other countries? The Sil iconValleyBlue Ribbon Task Force on Aviation Security and Technology Report responds to those

questions with pro-active prescriptions based on novel, yet available applications oftechnology to the air transportation and airport environments.

The Blue Ribbon Task Force Report is the result of a 100-day intensive effort organizedby United States Congressman Mike Honda and San José Mayor Ron Gonzales, led byChairman John W. Thompson, and carried out by committed leaders in the Silicon Valley.

2 It began with Congressman Honda and Mayor Gonzales calling upon technologists,entrepreneurs, civil rights experts and community leaders to examine various technologieswhich, if applied in the airport setting, would improve airport efficiencyand passengersafety, while protecting constitutionallyguaranteed individualrights. Th e report ends

with a series of carefully tailored and targeted technology applications that offer workableimprovements to the complete airport environment.

The report’s recommendationsfocus neither upon specific “brand” names no r the use ofany single technology. Rather, the Task Force has concentrated upon utilization of severaltechnologies that, eitheralone or in combination, can make various aspects of the air travelexperience safe once again, while preserving precious constitutionalguarantees. In fact,every technology recommended by the Task Force ha s been done via the objectivesof addressing the needs of passenger comfort and convenience, fo r without satisfiedpassengers, airport and air transportation simply can not th rive. Given the concentration

of technology knowledge inSilicon Valley, the report recommends SJC as a testingground for these problem-solvingmethods and applications. Further, the proximity oflocal expertise will allow adjustments and refinements to these applications as necessary,thereby facilitating replication elsewhere.

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BACKGROUND

n many respects, America lost its innocence about any invulnerability to terrorismon September 11, 2001. Even more than the human death toll and physical property

devastation, the terrorist attacks graphically illustrated a national security crisis of

immense proportions. Never before had commercial airplanes been hijacked and used asweapons of mass destruction. Indeed, in the wake of September 11, the nation emergedwith unprecedented concern for its collective safety as well as a pronounced anxiety aboutits future. Th e President urged the public to go about its “business as usual,” yet thetragedies of that late summer day seemed to preclude anyone from doing anything closeto normal.

Government agencies responded quicklyto the September 11 terrorist events. Theyconducted exhaustive safety assessments of oil pipelines, nuclear power plants,waterfacilities andother sensitive installations. But few flash points distressed the nation’s leaders

and general public more than air travel, a transportation means through which nearly 700million passenger enplanements occurred in calendar year 2000. Suddenly, travelers feltunsafe in airplanes; pilots worried about their ability to control their planes; airlinessuffered deep financial losses; and airports seemed ill-equipped to protect their facilities,workforceand the traveling publicfrom assaults on their lives and personal freedoms.

A PERVASIVE CLIMATE OF FEARThe terrorist attacks rocked the long-standing assumption that somehow America wasremoved from the problems of the rest of the world. Collectively, the four airplaneassaults claimed more than 3,000 lives and inflicted billions of dollars worth of property

damage. Th e violent and well-orchestrated offensives ripped the psychological fabric ofAmerican society within hours of reaching their targets. When asked in a national surveydays after the events about the extent to which the attacks had shaken their personal senseof safety and security, 63 percent replied a “great deal” or “a good amount,” compared with26 percent who answered “not too much.” At the same time, most of the respondentsexpected that their lives would not return to normal in the near term. Accordingto thesame national survey, 57 percent believed that the attacks would precipitate fundamentalchanges in the ways that Americans live their dailylives, compared with 39 percent wh ocontended that the country would soon return to “business as usual.”2

National leaders continued to caution the nation that the terrorist attacks uponAmericans are likely to occur again. On February 6, 2002, Central Intelligence AgencyDirector George J Tenet testified before Congress that Al Qaeda, the international terroristorganization suspected of the attacks on the U.S., had every capability to strike the U.S.again.3 Director Tenet’s remarks were repeated in an even more direct manner on May20, 2002 by Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Robert Mueller. In a candidmoment before Congress, Mueller stated, “There will be another terrorist attack [in theUnited States]. We will no t be able to stop it.”4 Thus, more than e ight months after theattacks, Americans and their leaders remain worried about further damage and loss of life.

“U.S. Keen to Avenge Attacks,” LosAngeles Times September 16, 2001, PP. Al, A13.2 Ibid.‘“Qaeda Still Ableto Strike the U.S., Head of C.I.A. Says,” The New York TimesFebruary 7, 2002, pp. Al, AlO.

“FBISays U.S. Suicide Bomb Attack Likely, Los AngelesTimes, May 21, 2002, p. Al.

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A R AVA G E D E C O N O M Y

Th e terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 cu t deeply into a national economy alreadyfaltering from recession. Accordingto one financial report, the declines in economicactivity reeling from the terrorist attacks subtracted an additional one percent from theannualized third-quarter gross domestic product growth beyond any reductions associatedwith the already slowing U.S. economy.5 Another assessment projected a 16 percent

decline in the value of the broad-based Standard Poor’s 500 stocks.6 Ne w York Cityalone suffered 83 billion in economic losses, includingmore than 130,000 jobs.7

Th e airlines and their support industries were hit especially hard. Air travel was shutdown for four days after the attacks, costing the airlines 340 million per day in lostrevenues.8 ~When air service resumed, shattered passenger confidence left airplanes so emptythat the airlines were forced to lay off nearly 150,000 employees.9 Industry analystspredicted that the airlines would lose 6.5 billion in the twelve-month period followingthe terrorist attacks,’° three t imes the losses previously expected in the recession-drivenyear, and a sharp reversal from the 2 .6 billion profit earned during the previous twelve-

month period.” Meanwhile, airline stocks tumbled by between 10 and 75 percent,with the average stock value reduced by 41 percent,’2 cutting a wide swath through theeconomic underpinningsof the American economy.

Th e ripple effects throughout the travel sector were even more serious. Boeing Corporationfurloughed more than 30,000 workers in response to the decisions by airlines to reduce

4 their flying schedules by 20 percent or more, and to delay deliveries of new aircraft.’3Th e Travel Industry Association projectednationwide losses of 453,000 travel/visitor-related jobs amounting to 43 billion.’4

Airports, seen as benign way stations prior to September 11, were suddenly viewed astargets fo r weapons of mass destruction. Nowhereelse in the country were the previousways of doing business altered more dramaticallyand rapidly for more people than inair travel and airports. An d now, with new minivan-sized explosive detection machinesand massive conveyor beltsystems required at airports, experts predict new unbudgetedairport retrofitting costs of more than 40 billion.’5

Evan F. Koenig, “DownBut Not Out: The U.S. Economy AfterSeptember 11,” a presentation to the Board of Directors of theFederal Reserve Bank of Dallas, November 2001, p. 1.David M. Blitzer, “September2001 Trends and Projections_AfterSeptember 11,” Standard Poor’s, September 2001, p. 1.“They’lltake Manhattan,” US. News WorldReport, p. 34.“Pork Barrel or Kick-Start?,”Newsweek October 15, 201, p. 66.

~‘“Crisis Grows for Airlines Worldwide,”Los Angeles Times September 23, 2001, pp. Al, A16.“Continental’s Blunt Leader Faces Crisis, Again,” The New York Times September 23, 2001, p. Cl.‘~Aidfor industry tankinganyway,” San Francisco Chronick September 20, 2001, pp. Bi, B3.

“Faith in flying key to airlines’survival,”San Jose MercuryNews, October 16 2001, pp. 1C, 4C. “What Kind of Rescue,” Business Week October 1 2001, p. 36. “AirTransport and the BayArea Economy,” Bay Area Economic Forum, January 2002, p. 4.

“Security upgrades strain airports’space budgets,” USA Thday May 29, 2002, p. 1.

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Airline finances were already sufferingprior to the September 11 events,’6 but the attacksripped away any hope of normal cyclical economic recovery: Said U.S. Department ofTransportation Secretary Norman Mineta, “Weare [now] talkingabout the safety andsecurity and the stabilityof an entire industry: Not of one or two or three or four companies,bu t an entire industry:”7 As a result of this seismic economic collapse, and fearingbankruptcy from the nation’s airlines, Congress approved an emergency airline economicpackage with 5 billion in direct aid and another 10 billion loans within nine days ofthe attacks.

Within the Bay Area, airplane passenger and cargo traffic fel l bym ore th an 2 0 percent asa consequence of the terrorist activities and subsequent reactions. Hotel occupancy rates,hav ing p lunged to well below50 percent immediatelyafter September 11, remained at 60to 65 percent of capacity as recently as January 2002.18

At SJC, major and normally lucrative long haul routes to Toronto, Taipei and Paris weredropped, costing not only the affected airlines dearly, but the local economy between 100 million and 20 0 million each on an annual basis. Additionally,airport concessionrevenues fell sharplyfrom 9 .3 million in October 2000 to 7 .6 million in October2001.19 Parking revenue, which historicallyaccounted fo r 46 percent of the airport’sbudget, plummeted from 38.7 million to 28.7 million between Ma y 2001 and Ma y2002; at the same time, new security costs for the airport parking areas increased by 500,000.20 Thus, SJC found itselfwith the unenviable combination of lower revenuesand higher operating costs.

Whatever the direction of the U.S. economy prior to September 11, economic activityafter that date declined at a much more precipitous rate than beforehand. And in touristdestination regions such as the Bay Area, the impact was more severe than elsewhere.

MAJOR ELEMENTS OF CONCERN RELATED TO AVIATIONThe terrorist attacks rocked virtually all sectors of American security—governmental,corporate and individual. Within days of the horror-filled events, experts discussed U.S.vulnerability to biologicalwarfare, chemical warfare and nuclear weapons. Each area ofpotential devastation presented its own unique se t of troubling circumstances pointing toa serious absence of adequate public protection.2’ Nevertheless, the September 11 assaultswere orchestrated via the seizure of commercial airplanes for use as lethal weapons. Giventhis method of aggression, several airport-relatedsecurity issues emanated from the terror

ist attacks and have remained worrisome to the general public. Chief concerns havefocused upon aircraft/airport vulnerability, protectingcivil liberties, implementing on-siteairport security: and reductions in airport traffic.

“Suddenly, Carriers Can’t Getoff the Ground,” BusinessWeek September 3 2001, PP. 36-37.“What Kind of Rescue,” BusinessWeek October 1,2001, p. 38.“AirTransport and the Bay Area Economy,” op. Cit., p.

‘° ibid. P. 10.20 “S.J. Airport to Raise Hourly Parking Rate,” Sa n Jose MercuryNews, May 30, 2002, pp. 1B, 6B.

See “TerrorWeapons: The NextThreat,?” Time,October 1 2001, PP. 70-71, “Treating Terrorism “ San Jose Mercury News,October 21, 2001, pp. 1C, 4C, and “U.S. Nuclear Plan Sees NewTargets and New Weapons,” The New York 7~mesMarch 10, 2002, pp. 1A, GA .

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VulnerabilityThe terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 presented travelers and non-travelers alikewith a new sense of vulnerabiIity~ No longer did travelers automatically assume a safetravel environment, whether in the airport or in the air. In addition, for the first time,collective apprehension spilledover into other transportation modes. Suddenly highways,rai l and bus networks, inland waterways and ocean harbors became sites of great concern.Additional anxiety focused on sources of weapons materiel as well as targets; nuclearpower plants and dams became part of a long l is tof facilitiesviewed by public authoritiesas focal points of possible attack, with the EnvironmentalProtection Administration estimating as many as 15,000 chemical, water and waste treatment plants vulnerable to terrorist activities.22 Governments invested precious scarce resources to protect the publicand sensitive facilities.23

Yet, public anxiety remains. Six months after September 11th, 54 percent of therespondents in a nationwide poii agreed that the airlines needed to take additional stepsto assure better security, compared with 38 percent w ho fe lt th at the airlines had doneenough. Sentiment toward the federal government’s management of the anti-terrorismeffort was a bit more favorable: 48 percent viewed the federal government as having doneenough to promote airport security, with 45 percent stating otherwise.24 Nevertheless, anational poll conducted by the Washington Post on Ma y 18-19, 2002, found that only46 percent of those interviewed believed that the government can stop future attacks,down from 55 percent who answered favorably inMarch 2002.25 Clearly, these events

6 have brought about widespread and long-lasting concern.

Civil LibertiesIn the post-September 11 environment, the Department of Transportation has embarkedupon a comprehensive security program of stricter scrutiny of passengers and theirbelongings. Th e additional security requirements at passenger checkpoints and morevigilant airline passenger assessments have produced long airportlines and bottlenecksfor pedestrian trafficmoving through the facilities. Along with the worsened airportphysical conditions, security screeners have been criticized for poortraining and inconsistentapplications of mandated procedures.26 Some passengers have been singled ou t and/orsearched because of their physical appearances alone; others have been questioned byunnecessarily aggressive and poorly trained screening personnel.

22 “Bush wants terror risk evaluation for 15,000 plants,” San Francisco Chronic1e~ June 8 2002, p. A6.‘~Additional BudgetCuts As States and Cities Address Safety Issues,” The New York Times November 15, 2001, p. B9.“Skies Not Safe,” CBS News Poll, March 14, 2002.

“President Retains Strong Support,” Washington Post, May 21, 2002, p. A4.2~ Gerald L. Dillingham,“Aviation Security: Vulnerabilitiesin, and Alternatives for, Preboard Screening Security Operations,”

United States General Accounting Office,Testimony before the Committee on Governmental Affairs and Its Subcommittee onOversight of Governmental Management, Restructuringand the Districtof Columbia, U.S. Senate, September 25, 2001, p. 5.

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Questionable treatment of individuals going through the ticketingand/or screeningprocess has raised its own distinctlayer of serious constitutional issues. Civil libertiesexperts have focused upon the questions of privacy as protected by the FourthAmendment, freedoms of speech and association as protected by the First Amendment,and due process as protected through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Indeed, forsome travelers, the post-September 11 “war on terrorism” environmenthas elements eerilyreminiscent of the hardships suffered by Japanese-American citizens at the onset ofWorld Wa r JJ27

On-site Facilities ManagementCommercial airportshave been proven to be porous environments ripe for securityintrusions. In one Department of Transportation study between December 1998 andApril 1999, investigators breached airport security 117 out of 173 efforts, or a 68 percentsuccess rate.28 Between 1996 and 2000, federal undercoveragents were able to sneakbomb-like devices beyond airline security personnel at SJC on nine separate occasions.29No doubt, such breakdowns contributed to the decision of Congress to direct replacementof virtually all airport passenger screeners with federal employees as part of the Aviationand Transportation Security Act.

These concerns became more pointed after September 11, when hijackers avoideddetection at three airports prior to takeoff. Accordingto the Federal Aviation Agency,between October 30, 2001 and April 6, 2002 alone, security lapses and breachesproduced no fewer than 180 evacuations of air terminals, resultingin 540 flightcancellations and 1,923 flight delays.3°

Because of new cumbersome airport security requirements, airtravel has no w become atime-consuming ordeal. Depending upon the airline and the airport, domestic passengersare now directed to arrive anywhere between 60 minutes and two and one-half hoursbefore their flights,many of which do not last as long as the time required for airportprocessing. International passengers are required to arrive at least two to three hoursbefore their flights. In addition, with new security measures allowingonly ticketedpassengers into the gate areas people meeting arriving travelers are often inconveniencedby inadequate numbers of concession stands, restaurants and restrooms in non-securesectors of the airports.

Reduced Air TrafficAir traffic has been slow to recover from the September 11 attacks. As of February 2002,traffic at the nation’s 31 largest airports was down more than 12 percent from thecorresponding period in 2001.~’

27 “War on Terrorism Stirs Memoryof Internment,” The New York Thnes September 24, 2001, p. Al 8.V “How Safe CanWe Get,?” lime, September 24, 2001, p. 87.

“Hidden weapons slip by California security,”Scripps-McClatchyWestern Service, September 27, 2001. During the sameperiod, agents penetrated security at San Francisco International Airport eight times and Los Angeles International Airporton six occasions.

“Summer Fliers Likelyto Face Endurance Test at the Airport,” The New YorkTimes May 11 2002, pp. Al, B2.“AirTraffic Is Off Almost Everywhere, but the Dip Is Uneven,” The New York limes, March 12, 2002, p. A18.

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Reduced passenger traffic has produced financiallosses exceeding 7 billion in 2002for the major airlines, about 4 billion more than they expected from the effects of thenational recession.32 Within a month of the terrorist attacks, airlines had furloughed morethan 100,000 employees. Ripple effects were felt down stream from airportconcessionstands to airplane manufacturers, and beyond. At San José airlines reduced the numberof scheduled flights by 20 percent. Such losses have had deleterious impacts on tens ofthousands of people in the iocal economyas well as the national economy.

Combined, these developments show little sign of abating in the near term. To that end,the Federal AviationAdministration predicts that air traffic by September 30, 2002 willremain 12 percent below the trafficof September 200 ~ Such projections augur forcontinued airline losses and long-term layoffs fo r air industry and industry-relatedworkers throughout the nation.

PASSAGE OF TH E AV I AT I O N A N DT R A N S P O RTAT I O N S EC UR IT Y A CT

On November 19, 2001, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act(ATSA) Enacted only ten weeks after the terrorist attacks, this legislation representedboth a response of the United States government to international terrorism and ablueprint fo r national action to protect itself.

Comprehensive in scope, the ATSA contained several landmark provisions. Th e major

8 components of the 51-page legislativeact emphasized aviation security and passengersafety, with the underlying objective of restoring passenger confidence in the U.S. airtravel industry. Key elements of the legislation included:

• Creation of a new Transportation Security Administration within the U.S.Department of Transportation;

• Establishm ent of an improved and redesigned security system throughout the nation’scommercial airports;

• Authority for the new Transportation Security Undersecretary to issue and overseeimplementation of security-related rules and directives;

• One hundred percent baggage screening airport capabilities, with advanced explosivedetection systems in place by the end of 2002;

• New airplane safety features such as fortified cockpit doors and other measures;

• A dramaticallyincreased presence of sky marshals on many commercial aircraft;

• Development of new screening technologies;

• Replacement of 28,000 private sector-employed screening personnel with trainedfederal employees by the fall of 2002;

32 State of the US. AirlineIndusoy: A Report on Recent Trendsfor US. carriers 2002, op. cit., p. 3.“FAAExpects Fares to DeclineThis Year But Forecasts a Sharp Increase for 2003,” Wall Street Journal, March 12, 2002, p. A2.

~ Public Law 107-71.

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• Full authority for the Transportation Security Undersecretary to hire and f irescreeners as well as determining the conditions for their employment;

• Organization of a Transportation Security Board toreview the actions of theTransportation Undersecretary

An important piece of the legislation provided opportunities to test “best practices”at

no fewer than twenty pilot or beta site airport facilities,with successful programs to bereplicated and adopted elsewhere in the air transportation system. This amendment,originally co-authored by Congressman Honda and Congressman James Matheson inHR 310 1 was folded into the ATSA.

Multifaceted in approach, the Aviation and Transportation Security Ac t covers a vastamount of public policy making territory. At its root, however, the new law seeks toimprove aviation security and passenger safety, while restoring the confidence of thetraveling public.

CRITICAL Qj~JESTIONSFor all of its intentions and comprehensiveness, the ATSA left many criticalquestionswithout answers. Among the most important unanswered questions are:

1. What are the most vulnerable areas of airports with respect to the ability to effectivelyscreen, identif~rand/or authenticate entry?

2. How can airports safely promote movement of materials and people within the 9physical facilities?

3. What new technologies might be utilized to make airport environments safe?

4. How can the Department of Transportation determine the highest return ontechnology investments, and what criteria would be necessary for such considerations?

5. How can the fundamental civil libertiesof travelers be protected as the governmentmoves to employ new methods to interdict weapons and agents of terror?

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CREATION OF THE BLUE RIBBON TASK FORCE

ith inadequate public resources to answer so many questions about air transportationsafety and passenger security, Silicon Valley public officialssearched for entrepreneurialand innovative solut ions. One novel approach emerged with the creation of the BlueRibbon Task Force on Aviation Security and Technology~ Constructed out of apartnership between United States Congressman Mike Honda and San José MayorRon Gonzales, the Task Force was organized as a private sector/public sector collaborativeeffort to address the thorny issues of airport safety; security and convenience raised bythe Aviation and Transportation Security Act.

Appreciatingthe reservoir of innovative technologies in the Silicon Valley, and sensitiveto the trade-offbetween security and convenience, Honda and Gonzales sought ou t theknowledge and advice of technology experts. Thus, they designed a Task Force comprisedof leading authorities with experience in technology, security, business, aviation andpublic policy;

At the first meeting of the Blue Ribbon Task Force, Congressman Honda and MayorGonzales challenged the members to search out and recommend the best technologiesfo r responding to the issues of security; safety and comfort, while maintainingsensitivityto critical matters of passenger privacy. They appointed John W. Thompson, Chairman

10 and CEO of Symantec to serve as Chair. Recognizing the many ongoing concerns of ananxious public, Honda and Gonzales asked the Task Force to complete its work within100 days.

TASK FORCE G OA LS

Th e Blue Ribbon Task Force on Aviation Security and Technology dedicated its efforts tomeeting four major goals:

1. To identify existing technologies that can be utilized to improve the security of thenational air transportation system, with immediate deploymentat SJC;

2. To identify and recommend how existing technologiescan be combined intointeroperable systems to improve airlineefficiencies and customer convenience atairports;

3. To identify and recommend emerging security technologies andsystems fo rdevelopment by both the federal government and private sectors at airportsthroughout the nation;

4. To design technology-drivenrecommendations in such a manner that they vigorouslyprotect personal liberties of the passenger and workforcewhile promoting publicsafety.

Guided by these objectives, the Task Force set ou t to examine air transportation-relatedproblems with the goal of finding appropriate technology-designed responses created bycompanies in the Silicon Valley.

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Governed by the 00—daymandate, the group limited its work to the followingfour generalareas: improvingsecurity (includingpassenger and the cockpit), protecting individualcivilliberties, strengthening workplace integrity;and improvingcustomer service. Cargo wasomitted from discussion because of pending TS A considerations. With this framework, theBlue Ribbon Task Force defined specific transportation—related problems and potential hightechnology solutions, bearing mind that technology is only as valuable as the judgment ofthose wh o us e it. Ralph G. Tonseth, Director of Aviation forSJC, was asked to providestaff and any support services requested by the group.

A P P LY I N G HIGH TECHNOLOGY TO SJCCongressman Honda and Mayor Gonzales recommended SJC as an excellent locationfor technologyapplications. Located in the heart of Silicon Valley, the airport is close tomany technologycompanies and easily accessible as a beta test or pilot site.

Approximately 13.1 million passengers used SJC in 2001, virtually unchanged from theprior year. The terroristattacks severely curtailed travel in the final quarter of the year

nationwide, but particularlyat SJC. Through August 2001, passenger levels were 13percent above the prior year. That overall levels for 2001 remained constantwith theprior year shows the extent that SJC dipped in the fourth quarter.

SJC’s passenger volume makes it the fourth busiest in the state of CaliforniabehindLos Angeles (61.6 million as of 2001), San Francisco (34.6 million as of 2001), andSan Diego (15.2 million). Other recent facts about SJC include:

• Commercial flights—average of 398 per day (2001)

• Cargo—300.O million pounds (2001)

• Revenue— 106.0 million (est. FY 2001-02)

• Direct airport jobs—5,900 (2002)

• Number of local jobs generated—75,000 (2001)

• Business revenue generated from airportactivity— 4.2 billion (1998)

• State and local taxes generated from airportactivity— 471 million (1998)

SJC is a medium-size hub with a full range of services fo r both domestic and internationaltrave l. As such, the airport is an ideal beta site for experimentation. Th e location, sizeand complexity of the airport led Congressman Honda and Mayor Gonzales to v iew it aswell-suited for the application and potential replication of new technologies.

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THE PROCESS: SEARCHING OU T INDUSTRYAND PUBLIC PARTICIPATIONSilicon Valley has long operated with several unique axioms, one of which is that newcommercial ideas often spring from unusual combinations of people, values and concepts.With that in mind, the Blue Ribbon Task Force solicited broad—based input by constructingan open participation process. Accordingly, the Task Force set up several opportunitiesfor individualsand companies to communicate their recommendations so as to assureinclusion of the widest varietyof ideas and technology-based applications. This processprovided opportunities for continuous input from the earliest moments of the TaskForce’s organization to the point at which members considered and recommended varioustechnology solutions.

Use of CommitteesGiven the very brief time frame in which to carry ou t its mandate, the Blue Ribbon TaskForce created two committees to expedite the information gathering, member deliberationsand recommendations processes in an efficient, yet fully vetted manner. The task forcereceived progress

reports from thecommittees on a regular basis and refined its thinking

as necessary

Technology DemonstrationCommittee—The Blue Ribbon Task Force organized aTechnology Demonstration Committeeto study, consider and recommend “best practices”technology applications. Established under the leadership of Beatriz Infante, CEO of

12 Aspect Communications, the committee was divided into three subcommittees thatfocused upon technologies applicable topassenger safety and comfort, authenticating theairportworkforce, securing the immediate airport environmentand improvingthe flowof communications.

Proposal Development Committee—TheBlue Ribbon Task Force also elected to forma second committee forvetting potential recommendations. Accordingly,a ProposalDevelopment Committee was set up to consider and aggregate all materials andrecommendations into a final package. Chaired by Michael Fox, Sr., Chairman of M.E.Fox Company, the committee also assumed responsibility forweighing the varioustechnology recommendations against fundamental societal values ranging from civilliberties to implementation practicality

Each committee me t on several occasions to carry out its assigned responsibilities. This

execution of tasks via committees permitted the Blue Ribbon Task Force to pursue research,reviews and recommendations of new technologies quickly, while maintaininga “checksand balances” approach to protecting fundamental individual rights and civil liberties.

Public HearingsIn an effort to capture new ideas and applications from the widest varieties of sources, theBlue Ribbon Task Force announced a public hearing via a press release issued on April 52001. Held on May 10, 2002 at the Silicon Valley Conference Center, the public hearingwas designed to solicitinput from individuals, organizations and/or companies that wishedto comment on issues, problems and solutions relative to the charter of the task force.

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Interested parties were invited to present their ideas in advance via the Blue Ribbon TaskForce web site at www.sjcblueribbontaskforce.org,a listed telephone number or via mailto the San José Department of Aviation. Any participant who failed to sign up inadvance was provided an opportunity to speak the day of the public hearing, which wasopen to the press se e AppendixH).

Th e Blue Ribbon Task Force public hearing drew twenty-nine speakers. Their commentsranged from discussions of biometrics applications to inadequatewages for airportpassenger and baggage security screeners. A complete listing of public hearing speakercomments and materials is located in Appendix D.

Request fo r InformationRecognizing thatvarious technologies might be beyond the collective wisdomandknowledge base of the Blue Ribbon Task Force, the Technology DemonstrationCommittee announced a Request fo r Information (RFI) for applications potentiallysuitable for demonstration in areas under examination. Accordingto the proceduresmade public by the committee on April 5 2002, applicationswould be accepted no laterthan May 10, 2002, at which time committee members would consider proposals forpresentation and/or display.

A total of forty-one proposals were received by the Ma y 10, 2002 cut-off date seeAppendix E). After reviewingthe various proposals, the Technology DemonstrationCommittee recommended the demonstrations by six applicants with technologies 13addressing the needs as outlined by the committee at the scheduled Public DemonstrationMeeting on Ma y 31, 2002.

In addition to the RFI applications, the Technology Demonstration Committeeconsideredselected high technology areas that did not receive sufficientpublic or corporate responseto the RFI request. Based upon need in these essential areas, the committee membersinvited some “best practices” companies to present their technologies at the Ma y 31, 2002meeting, thereby filling a critical gap see Appendix E).

Public Demonstration MeetingOn May 31 , the Blue Ribbon Task Force sponsored the Public Demonstration Meetingat the SiliconValley Conference Center. The demonstrations were divided into threecategories:

Technology Demonstration Committee Selected Technologies

Technology Demonstration Committee Member Technologies

Technologies Solicited by the Technology Demonstration Committee

Th e full list of company names, spokespersons, addresses and technologies is included inAppendix F.

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THE BLUE RIBBON TA SK FOR CEOPERATIONAL FRAMEWORKBearing in mind the organizational mandate to consider technology applications forproblems related to airportworkers, the airport workplace, the airport infrastructure andair passenger safety; the Blue Ribbon Task Force focused its research and recommendationsupon those particular issue areas. As such, existing technology applicationsalready underconsideration or in various states of utilizationremained outside the purviewof the TaskForce. In addition, the Task Force stayed away from operational solutions already managedby existing technologies. Accordingly, the Task Force developed a set of guiding principles,criteria for technologyutilization,and a ranking formulafor determining the desirabilityand applicability of high technologyapplications to the stated areas of need. These arediscussed later in this report.

Guiding Princi~plesPrior to consideration of any specific technology or application, the Blue Ribbon TaskForce developed a set of guiding principles for the Technology DemonstrationCommittee. Collectively, these principles became the bases upon which the committeeextended recommendations for application to the Task Force.

1. Th e Blue Ribbon Task Force will examine technology applicationsdedicated toincreasing security for the nation’s commercial aviationsystem.

2. Th e Blue Ribbon Task Force will employ a proactive approach in considering14 solutions to the problems of commercial aviation security.

3. Th e Blue Ribbon Task Force will explore any technologies that will promote apredictable and satisfactory commercialaviation experience for all users.

4. The recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Task Force will span a security continuumthat encourages the applications of various technologies in manners that significantlyimprove commercial aviationsecurity, workplace safety and passenger comfort.

5. The Blue Ribbon Task Force recommendations will include appropriate sensitivity tocompelling civil liberties and constitutionalvalues, bearing in mind the importanceof balancing the imperatives of individualrights and guarantees with the needs ofcollective security.

These five principles became criticalguidelines fo r the activities of Blue Ribbon TaskForce. Any recommendations put forth b y th e Task Force were filtered through these

critical points before receiving task force approval.

Criteria for Technology UtilizationDetermining bases of technology applicationwas an essential objective of the BlueRibbon Task Force. This responsibilitywas assigned to the Technology DemonstrationCommittee. Without such criteria, almost any idea would fit into the solutions matrix.After considerable review and discussion, the committee crafted the following criteria fortechnology utilization:

1. The recommended technologies will be accessible on a consistent (24/7) basis to thosewh o use them.

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2. Th e recommended passenger screening technologies will be dedicated to a passengerscreening process that lasts no more than ten minutes.

3. Th e recommended technologies will be easily maintainable and user-friendly.

4. Th e recommended technologies will be networked and digital, rather thanstand-alone or analog, thereby enabling “real time” access and sharing of information.

5. Th e recommended technologies will be standards-based and interoperable, therebyenabling future extensions and operation over wireless and wired networks.

6. Th e recommended technologies will not jeopardize individual rights and liberties.

Ranking MatrixIn addition to developing criteriafo r the utilizationof various technologies, theTechnology Demonstration Committee established a list of factors used to determine thesuitability of those technologies. Th e five factors are as follows:

Security—the more the technology enhances security in the workplace amongemployees

or among passengers, the more desirable it is; the extent to which the new technologydoes not improve either workplace or passenger security makes it less desirable.

Cost of the technology application—The lower the cost, the more desirable theproposed technology application;the higher the cost, the less desirable the proposedtechnology application.

Maturity of the technology—The more mature the technology, the less the risk offailure; the less mature the technology, the greater the risk of failure.

Time to deployment—the more quicklythe technology can be deployed, the moredesirable; the less quickly the technology can be deployed, the less desirable. Th e extentto which the technology can stand alone without connecting to a national networkfurther enhances its value.

Intrusiveness—to the extent that the technology does not intrude upon civil rightsand/or civil liberties, it is more valuable; to the extent that the new technology intrudesupon civilrights and/or civil liberties, it is less valuable. Th e committee stronglybelievesthat applications of all technologies must be done in ways that are scalable and rules-based, assuring fairness to the greatest extent possible.

Few technologies considered by the committee are exclusively low cost, mature, immediatelydeployable, completely secure and totallynon-intrusive. Nevertheless, the closer atechnology comes to these ideal types, the more likelythat the technology would receivea strong committee recommendation.

Collectively, the guidingprinciples, the criteria for technologyutilization,and the rankingfactors became the bases upon which the Technology Demonstration Committeemade itsrecommendations to the Blue RibbonTask Force at a meeting on June 4, 2002.

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OBJECTIVES,PROBLEMSAND RECOMMENDEDTECHNOLOGYSOLUTIONS

he Blue Ribbon Task Force placed passenger security, comfort, protection,and integrityat the forefront of its work. These boilerplate values were critical to the full complementof efforts carried ou t by the group. From the earliest research statements to the pointof recommendations, the Task Force considered technologies that ultimatelywouldcontribute to a more efficientand safer air transportation environment without sacrificingany individual passenger liberties.

The structure and operations of commercial airports pose significant security and safetychallenges. Airports are composed of multiple functional areas including commercialaviation terminals, general aviation terminals, and cargo and freight operations. Each areaha s domains requiring different security levels. For example, in the commercial aviationarea, there is an unsecure terminal area, a secure terminal area, and an “air-side”areawhich includes the jetway and ramp areas. There are no t always “hard” boundaries orcontrolled access points between these domains and the functional areas where securityfunctions such as authentication and inspection can be reliably enforced. In additionpersonnel associated with several different commercialcompanies and governmentorganizations ma y require legitimate access to one or more of these areas. These individualsare usually involved with the movement of a wide variety of materials including baggage,

16 food , fuel, and other cargo and, as such, must be validated as they move into and aroundthe airport facility to carry out their tasks.

Compounding these challenges is that no one organization has responsibilityfor all

airport security functions. Federalagencies, including

the FAA,TS A and FBI, local lawenforcement, airport security operations and airline personnel all are involved withvarious aspects of airport and aviation security. Under these circumstances, there can bejurisdictional gaps, leading to security breakdownsand significantchallenges in real-timecoordination of activities during a crisis.

In examining the flow of people and materials through the entire airportvenue, the BlueRibbon Task Force determined that the entry point protection offers the best opportunityfor preserving safety and security throughout the process. Thus, the Task Force concluded:

1. It is vital to secure the workplace environment as employees enter sensitive facilities;

2. It is imperative to authenticate employees before they go into the workplace;

3. It is critical to maintain state-of-the-industryinformation exchange procedures at alllevels and conditions of communications;

4. It is essential to safeguard passenger rights from the earliest entry points on andthroughout the traveling experience.

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After reviewing several issues and approaches for solutions, the Blue Ribbon Task Forcenarrowed its activities to four areas: workforce security; facility integrity; the airportcommunications network,and preservation of passenger dignity; Each area of examinationcontains an objective, a problem and recommended high technology-based solutions.Lo w tech (e.g., more telephones or personnel), operational solutions (e.g., reducing thenumber of entry areas to control access or personnel training and airport governanceand general management were no t considered because airport administrations and variousother agencies are addressing these issues. in addition, the Task Force ha s refrainedfrom considering solutionsrelative to the movement of baggage because of existingTransportation Security Administration activities and the technology applications alreadyexist for validatingbaggage and are in various stages of implementation.35

The Task Force recognizes that the private sector and several government agencies havealready moved in the post-September 11 era to expand research and intelligence gatheringefforts. Such endeavors are valuable first steps toward a safer airport environment. Tothat end, the Task Force views its technology-driven proposals as the next step in whatmust be viewed as a long process of technology research, development and application.

The discussion below focuses upon recommended “best practices” for the four discussionareas. Recommendations are determined as a result of presenting an objective, identifyingthe problem, proposing solutionsand describing passenger benefits. In some cases the sametechnology is recommended for more than one area; in other instances, combinationsof technologies are recommended. The discussion assesses the viability of each proposal 17

~ . ~ “36in terms of the ranking factors discussed above as high, m edium , or low. Th ecomplete list and analyses of possible technologies presented at the May 31 meeting isfound in AppendixF.

VALIDATED WORKFORCE SECURITYTh e Blue Ribbon Task Force contends that a trustworthy workforce is the cornerstonefo r a safe air transportation environment. Congress has taken the first step of replacingprivate security screening personnel with government employees, thereby addressing oneaspect of a secure air transportation network workforce.Nevertheless, the totality of theworkforce in the airport setting extends well beyond screening employees to individualswho work behind the ticket counters, in concession venues, on the tarmac, in supplyvehicles and anywhere else with direct or indirect access to any elements of the airtransportation system.

ObjectiveTo assure that all elements of the extended airport workforce, especially thoseconnected with the Security Identification Display Area (SIDA), consistentlysatisfy the highest possible security standards.

“U.S. TransportationSecretary Mineta Announces Successful Test of New Technology to Secure Cargo Movement in U.S .Ports,” press re lease June 4, 2002.

~ With respect t o the deployment category, the assessments are“Easy,” “Medium,”and “Hard.”

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ProblemControl of the airport workforce,especially in the Security Identification DisplayArea(SIDA), is weak due to inconsistent standards, uneven oversight, poor enforcement andmultiple constituencies that range from local to national authorities. Accordingly,opportunities exist for unauthorized individualsto compromise the integrity of the workforcethrough the use of false identification,unauthorized presence in authorized areas and“piggybacking,”an entry process that allows for the possibilityof an unauthorizedemployee to quickly move behind an authorized employee through a doorway entry

Technology Solution 1 : Biometric AuthenticationBiometricauthentication mechanisms should be utilized for identif~iingall employees wh orequire access to airport functional areas, especially the SIDA. Reliable authentication isbased on combining at least two of the following identification factors: something anindividualknows (password, PIN etc.), something one has (an ID card), and an individual’sunique characteristic (fingerprint,iris scan, etc.). An identification card with biometricinformation combines the latter two factors and is an extraordinarilyreliable authenticationmechanism. A variety of biometric characteristics can be used to establish identity,including fingerprints, facial scans, iris scans and hand scans. In general, the costs ofstoring and scanning most biometric characteristics pale ne xt to the general costs ofperforming the initial identificationfor card issuance and the costs of administering theinfrastructure to manage and revoke cards once issued.

18 Any identification card should encode all information, including biometric data, so thatit is electronicallyscanable. Several technologies are available to carry ou t this activityincluding magnetic stripe, RE optical, and “smart card” which contains a smallmicrocircuit or chip. Irrespective of encoding technology all identification cards mustinclude a mechanism to authenticate the card itself and its information,preferablythrough the use of digitalcertificate techno1ogy~ This mechanism also enables one ofthe most important attributes of an effective authentication system—the means to revokeor cancel a validated card.

Biometric scanning devices should be networked at access control pointswhere biometricdata is collected from an individualand compared with biometric data on the card.This enables the scanning device to val idate the identification card, ensure currencyand determine that it ha s no t been flagged or revoked. It also enables individuals tobe located on a “real-time”basis, which is vital in many security-related scenarios.Biometric-basedaccess control mechanisms should be augmented with some form ofmonitoring either by co-located individuals (securitypersonnel) or by remote personnelusing video technology~

Ranking MatrixSecurity: HighCost: MediumMaturity: HighDeployment: EasyIntrusiveness: Lo w

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Technology Solution 2 : Workforce ManagementA critical aspect of workforce security lies with the ability to schedule, track and monitoremployees. Although the federal government is assuming responsibility for securitypersonnel, local airport employers will retain control of workforce activities and access.Such controls are necessary to ensure that the right person is at the right job at the righttime. In order to promote a secure workforce, the Blue Ribbon Task Force recommendsworkforcemanagement software to automate scheduling, skills managementand access

control. To the extent that an employee is detected in a wrong area based on schedule,skills and/or access control, the real-time alerts and notificationsengine will send amessage to th e appropriate security personnel. Additionally changes in schedules can becontrolled in real-time to a llo w fo rthe shifting airportenvironment.

Ranking MatrixSecurity: HighCost: MediumMaturity: HighDeployment: Easy

Intrusiveness: Low

Passenger BenefitsThe most important source of reassurance to the passenger lies with the firm belief thatauthorized personnel are where they belong and that supervisory authorities have fast,accurate methods to detect any situation contrary to that expectation. The knowledge 19that employees are not compromised by impostorswill go far toward restoring passengerconfidence in the airport environment and flying experience.

VA L I D AT E D FACI LITY

A validated facility is the backbone of the airport’s physicalenvironment. Within avalidated facility,movements of people and materials are monitored, therefore guaranteeingthat the materials within the area belong there and that unauthorized goods or individualswill not enter the area. Th e activitywithin the validated facility is “sterile”to the extentthat it is not compromised by materials or individuals enteringthe facility withoutapproval from an appropriate authority.

ObjectiveTo provide for a secure airport facility~ especiallythe Security Identification DisplayArea (SIDA) in which the movement of employees, vehicles and baggage take placewithout compromise from outside, tainted or unauthorized sources.

ProblemValidating or securing the airport facility is a daunting challenge for several reasons: First,the facility includes multiple functions and areas. Second, various personnel belongingto several different commercial companies and government organizations require accessto those areas. Third, a variety of materials including baggage, food, fuel, and othercargo must be moved into and around the airport facility. For the facility to be secure,individuals mustbe subject to authentication and access control as they move betweenareas; likewise, trusted authorities must be able to inspect and/or validate materialscoming and leaving the facility without tampering.

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Technology Solution 1 : Video MonitoringIt is recommended that airports significantlyexpand and migrate their use of videomonitoring technologies. Video monitoring both enables more effectivesecurityoperations and reduces security costs. Generally, remote video monitoring from a centrallocation is a more effective and less costly enterprise than on-location patrols by securitypersonnel. Video technology provides a “force multiplication” factor by enabling securitypersonnel to monitor many areas across a spread ou t site. Given the extensive perimeter,multiple access points, and multiple interior areas that require surveillance, videomonitoring can be instrumental in securing airport facilities. Along with airport securitymanagement, extensive video monitoring also protects general health and safety withinthe airport facility by watching for fire or accident.

Although most airport video monitoring is based on analog (CCTV) technology, the BlueRibbon Task Force recommends aggressive migration to digitalvideo technology becauseof its numerous benefits. For example, in m an y security scenarios, high-resolution digitalimaging can capture facial characteristics at a distance. Digital video also enables the us eof a common and standard networking infrastructurerather than requiring a dedicated,stand-alone set of cabling, making it more cost-effective and more extensible than analogvideo. In addition by coordinatingwith other forms of digital data, digitalvideo enables“real-time”correlation from an access control point with information from a biometricidentification card used for authentication. Digital video also enables more convenientand effective storage of images and enables rapid access of images based on a variety of

20 selection criteria. Finally, digitalvideo provides convenient “real-time”sharing of imagesto the various securitypersonnel and organizations involved with airport and aviationsecurity.

Ranking Matrix:

Security: HighCost: High/MediumMaturity: MediumDeployment: MediumIntrusiveness: Low/Medium

Technology Solution 2 : Driver/Vehicle AuthenticationTh e Blue Ribbon Task Force recommends three steps to authenticate a driver and thevehicle there prior to entering the airport faci1ity~ First, DriverAuthentication—Allemployees with access to vehicles seeking entry to the airport facility first must beauthenticated using the Biometrics process outline described in the Validated Worlcforce,Technology Solutions BiometricAuthentication. Second, Vehicle Inspection—Eachvehicle should undergo a visual inspection and manifest/load comparison. Third, LoadSeal—Where appropriate, vehicle loads should be sealed to prevent tampering. After thedriver and vehicle have been validated, the task force recommends placement of aninspection “certificate”in the vehicle. This certificate should contain a GPS transponderso that vehicle movementcan be tracked within the facilityand in nearby areas critical tosafe aviation operations such as freight forwarders, goods delivery companies and offsiteutilities and securities services. Se e Technology Solution 3, GPS Devices to MonitorVehicle Traffic).

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RankingMatrix


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RankingMatrixSecurity: HighCost: MediumMaturity: HighTime to Deployment: ModerateIntrusiveness: Low

Technology Solution 3 : GPS Devices to Monitor Vehicle TrafficGiven the movements of large numbers of vehicles at and near the SIDA, placementof global positioning devices in each vehicle authorized for airportaccess will allowauthorities and managers to monitorand track traffic as it takes place. In order tomaximize efficiency; the GPS could be associated with the authentication process at theentry and exit points, and other sensitive areas cited in Technology Solution 2 . This“real time” management will permit immediate interdiction of unauthorized vehicles orauthorized vehicles that travel to unauthorized locations.

RankingMatrix

Security: HighCost: MediumMaturity: HighDeployment: EasyIntrusiveness: Low

Technology Solution 4 : Access Control Within AircraftA biometric device system is recommended for pilots. This technology solution requiresa nationwide identification system previously recommended in the Workforce Facilitysection. Th e Task Force recommends access control points within aircraft that will utilize

the biometric authenticationmechanism. As a result, access to sensitive areas will belimited to validated aircraft personnel including pilots, flight attendants, maintenanceworkers and other authorized personnel.

Ranking MatrixSecurity: HighCost: MediumMaturity: HighDeployment: HighIntrusiveness: Low

Passenger BenefitsWith materials, employees, aircraft and vehicles closely monitored throughout the airtransportation process at and near the airport facility, the SIDA will be secure and safefrom unauthorized entry; Such an environment will assure passengers of a secure airportfacility,authorized personnel and airplanes free of any tampering.

A V IA TIO N S Ec uR IT Y AN D T E C H N O L O G Y

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Personnel representing the multiple organizations responsible fo r airport and aviationsecurity need to communicate in a seamless fashion at all times, but particularly duringcrisis. Whether within the airport, between the airport and the outside environment,or between the airport and non-airport authorities in other jurisdictions,exchanges ofinformation and data must be rapid, accurate, and secure to assure efficientoperation.Th e communications infrastructure must insure the integrity of information and mustalso prevent access or intercept by unauthorized personnel.

Use of a common network infrastructure across all organizations in the airport communityand integrating multiple applications would greatly reduce operational costs, enable rapidextensions, increase resiliency; and promote information sharing from multiple sourcesin “real-time.” In addition, all devices that perform vital security operations should benetworked; they include, but are not limited to, video cameras, biometric scanning stationsand baggage scanning systems. Networkingenables information collected by thesedevices to be accessible on a “real-time”basis and shared with appropriate securityorganizations and personnel. In addition, networking instantly avails information aboutthe status of devices. There have been many cases where significant disruptionsto localairport operations and the nationwide aviation grid couldhave been avoided, had securitypersonnel been instantly informedabout a dysfunctionalscanning system such as the lossof power.

22 ObjectiveTo provide a communications infrastructure within the airport and beyond thatguarantees secure, real time transmission of data and other information, therebyassuring interoperability between technologies, immediate response capabilitiesan d integration with legacy systems.

ProblemExisting airport communications infrastructures are generally composed of multipleapplication-specific networks. In some airports, over fiftydifferent, unconnected networksexist fo r various voice, video and data applications, with many duplicated fo r the multiplecommercial and government organizations in the airport community. Each network hasits own administrativecosts as well as scalabilityand extensibilitylimitations. Movingall applications fo r every involved organizationon to a common, standards-based andextensible network infrastructure would represent significantsavings of operations costs.Such a change would also simplify and speed enhancements and extensions, increaseresiliency; and most importantly, enable “real-time”information sharing.

Technology Solution 1: Integrated Communications InfrastructureTypical airport communications infrastructure consists of multiplestand-alone, proprietary;application-specificnetworks. These networks are high in cost and difficult to administer.Typically, theydo no t a llow for growth orchange. An integrated digital communicationsinfrastructure would provide real time communications, data sharing and enhancedsecurity. In addition, an integrated communications infrastructurewould allow multipleorganizations (both on and off the airport site) to share critical information in real-time.Th e communications infrastructurewould take advantage of open standards to ensure forfuture growth and flexibility; Thismassive infrastructure upgrade is the cornerstone to asecurity system. -

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Security: HighCost: MediumMaturity: HighDeployment: ModerateIntrusiveness: Lo w

Technology 2: Migration to Networked, Digital TechnologyAlldevices performing vital security operations should be networked, including videocameras, biometricscanning stations and baggage scanning systems. A standards-baseddigital communicationstechnology is fundamental to the ability of devices to utilize acommon network infrastructure, including both wired and wireless connectivity. Toaccommodate growth inhigh bandwidthapplications, including digital video, the airportcommunications infrastructure will need to leverage the high bandwidth capabilities ofwired network connectivitybased on optical and 10 Gigabit Ethernet technologies. Toaccommodate remote, untethered, and mobile applications, the airport communicationsinfrastructure will need to leverage wireless network connectivitybased on cellular and

802.11 technologies. Use of digital technology is also fundamental to enablingtheconvenient storage, access correlation, and sharing of the data collected by each device.Digital communications technologies compatible with standards-based Internetconnectivityarchitectures are essential to enabling a scalable, extensible, and interoperablecommunications infrastructure.

The airport information technology (IT) network infrastructure should conform to 23standard security best-practices and architectural principles to ensure cyber security.These include compartmentalizationof network domains to limit propagation of attacksand “virus infections.”The airport information systems security officer (ISSO) should

develop a defense in depth architecture to incorporate security technologies at all levelsof the network, including the gateways. This includes security devices such as firewalls,network and host-based intrusion detection, internet and email content filtering andanti-virus technologies allmanaged by a single central security management system. Allnetworked devices should provide device authentication, and all communicationsbetweennetworked devices should be encrypted using virtual private network (VPN) technology.Periodic evaluations of IT operating system vulnerabilities should be conducted viaautomated assessment tools and by running vulnerability scans to assure that systemsare properlyparched and operating at peak security efficiency~

Ranking MatrixSecurity: HighCost: High/MediumMaturity: HighTime to Deployment: High/MediumIntrusiveness: Lo w

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Th e ability of airport personnel to exchange information fully and in a secure manner willprovide a strong protective layer of passenger safety; With fast, integrated communicationsthroughout the airport facility;passengers will be safeguarded from unauthorized intrusionsor unanticipated disruptive events, thereby ensuring the security and integrity of passengerand employee databases and significantlyincreasing a collective sense of safety and overallcomfort. These databases should be monitored for evidence of tampering by conducting

automated periodic security posture assessments of the database.

VA L I D AT E D PASSENGER

Of all the elements associated with the airport environment, no one has suffered morethan the passenger—an irony, given that passengers are the lifebloodof the flyingexperience. Subjected to long security waits in line, inconsistent racial and ethnic profilingand/or repeated body searches and other forms of individual intrusion, passengers haveseen their dignity reduced to an after thought. The passenger can be protected by a safefacility, a well-trainedand screened workforce and an efficientcommunications network.Collectively, the technology-driven solutions will enable passengers to move peoplethrough the entry and boarding processes quicklyand within an environment that honorsconstitutionally guaranteed freedoms.

B A L A N C I N G T HE IN TE RE ST S OF TH E G O V E R N M E N TA N D TH E INTERESTS OF TH E I N D I V I D U A L

24 Th e recommendations above reflect the potential of technology for ensuringsecurity.Bu t in a free society, technology does not operate in a social vacuum; rather, it interactswith legal and ethical principles that underscore core values. Accordingly,the Task Forcerecognizes that recommended technology-based solutions must balance security needswith the values of privacy and other civil liberties.

Airports are quasi-public entities.37 Although they include private organizationssuch asairlines and concessionaires, airports operate under the ultimate controland supervisionof the government. Thus, both private sector operations and public sector guaranteesco-exist and in some cases overlap within the general airport boundaries. Airlineemployees, vendors and shopkeepers are hired and fired in accordance with the rules oftheir companies; however, the traveling public is protected by Constitutional guarantees.Because of the public constituency and the use of public police powers, governance atairports is comparable to the governance of bridges, roads or any other enterprise which,as their underlying bases of existence, serve the public good.

Technology, the Private Sector and Constitutional IssuesAlthough everyone is protected by the U.S. Constitution, people who work fo r the privatesector do so as part of a contractual relationshipbetween the company and the individual.Some rules affecting that relationship are legislatively established—theminimum wage,health and safety conditions, and anti-discriminationprovisions are examples. Nevertheless,in exchange for working in a secure environment, employees assume certain responsibilitiesthat may subject them t o more security and validation. Thus, the application of biometricsor other monitoring means to employees and their workplace strikes an appropriate

‘~ Cf United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973) (concluding that an airport ticket agent’s search of a passenger’s brief casewas “part of the overall, nationwide anti-hijackingeffort, and constituted ‘state actions’ for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment”).

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real time video streaming, GPS placement or other means of identifying location,authenticity or proprietyof activity are usually well beyondthe reach of right to privacyissues among employees.

Technology, the Public Good and Constitutional IssuesUsing technologyapplications to solve security problems as they relate to passengers creates

a set of issues distinctly different from those relating to employees or the workplace setting.Inasmuch as it is reasonable to view passengers as members of the public and the airportas a public place, the threshold forviolatingindividualrights takes on a higher standardaltogether. Yet, terrorists can pose as passengers, thereby creating a civil liberty versussecurity conundrum. Thistension ha s led the Transportation Security Administrationto consider new methods of passenger identificationand scrutiny that may redefinepassenger safety and civil rights.38

Recent public opinion data underscore anxieties about the passenger security issue. In anational poli conducted by the New York ]Jmes and CBS News in December 2001, 64

percent of the respondents agreed that it is a “good idea” to “make changes in the [civil]rights guaranteed by the Constitution.” Yet, in the same survey, 55 percent were “veryconcerned” or “somewhat” concerned about losing some of their civil rights.39 This is thehaystack through whichthe high technologyneedle must thread new security applicationswhile not intruding unnecessarily upon the rights of individuals.

Th e constitutional rights and values most at risk from high technology applications to 25airport-related security are those associated with the right to privacy (Fourth Amendment),freedom of expressions and association (First Amendment) and due process of the law(Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). Nevertheless, the Blue Ribbon Task Force believes

that its recommendations will no t adversely impact airport passengers.

The Fourth Amendment: the Right to PrivacyThe Four th Amendment regulates how and when authorities may engage in the searchor seizure of a person or property. Under ideal circumstances, police ask a judge for awarrant prior to undertaking a specified search or seizure activity. Warrants generally areno t required when a search or seizure is conducted in a regulated environment such as anairport.4° Nonetheless, because the long-reveredvalue of privacy enshrined in the FourthAmendment protects individualdignity and autonomy, technologies should be used in amanner that does no t impinge upon privacy or unreasonably singles ou t some individuals

over others. Much of the right to privacy debate now centers upon the extent to which theUnited States is on a wartime footing4~—acondition that could impact the way the courtsand other public institutions view the privacy issue in public settings such as airports.Th e recommendations of the Task Force are directed primarily toward safeguarding theworkplace, screening employees, and improving communications. Passengers are not thefocus of the Task Force’s proposals, although they are very much the beneficiaries. Moreover,none of the recommended technology applications have the potential as face recognition

“Plan Sharply Tightens Airport Screening,” The New York Times May 30, 2002.~ “Public isWa~ But Supportive On CivilRights Curbs,” The New York ~me~ December 12, 2001, pp. Al, B9.~° See U.S. v. Bulacan, 156 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 1998) (“searches conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme, done in

furtherance of administrative goals rather than to secure evidence of a crime, may be permissible under the Fourth Amendmentwithout a particularized showing of probable cause”).~‘ “Civil Libertyvs. Security: Finding a Wartime Balance,” The New York TimesOctober 18, 2001, pp. Al, B6.

Av I AT I O N SECURITY AN D T E C H N O L O G Y

software would, for example) to radicallychange the amount of private information thatairports airlines or th government g th about the public Th e T k F i confident


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airports, airlines, or the government gathers about the public. Th e Task Force is confidentabout safeguarding individualrights in a public setting.

The First Amendment: Freedom of Speech and AssociationFreedom of speech is a basic right protected by the First Amendment. The right ofassociation, while not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, also ha s been viewed by

the United States Supreme Court for nearly fifty years as a fundamental right related toadvancing one’s beliefs and ideas.42 The rights of both free speech and association couldbe threatened with the universal applicationsof some technologies in the airportenvironment. For example, a sensor system that singles out individualson the basis ofwhat they say while traveling throughthe screening area could have a chilling effect uponfree speech. Does this mean that such technologies should no t be used? Not necessarily,if they are applied to the voluntary setting of the workplace. But those law enforcementpersonnel who elect to utilize technologies that potentially impactspeech need to realizethat they are jeopardizing protection of a precious right if they extend us e beyondvoluntary relationships. As such, they need to apply electronicmonitoring only on an

ad hoc basis and to the extent it corroborates other information.

The Fifth and Four teenth Amendments : DueProcessModern due process doctrine focuses upon the procedures used by government entitiesto determine whether a person should be subject to a particular legal restriction or

26 requirement.43 Cased in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, the due process clauseattempts to balance the interests of government with those of the individual for examplethe individual’s right to travel.44 Due process remains a criticalconstitutional guaranteein the wake of September ~ 1. More than ever, the government must carefullyweighthe conditions under which it extracts information from individualsunder suspicion

especially when using seemingly removed, yet invasive means such as sensors or other datacollection technologies. Balancing the need fo r security against privacy of the individualtherefore, requires technology deploymentthat is reasonably effective and accurate, whileproviding for due process protections.

Preserving the BalanceMaintaining the balance between security and constitutionalvalues demands constantvigilance and attention to the details of how technology will be used and wh o will beaffected. Aviation security and safety presents one setting which is deserving of sucha tten tion . The debate over ho w and the extent to which the federal government should

increase passenger screening methods now sits at center stage in the this setting. Itma y well be that if the Transportation Security Administration adopts a computerizedpassengers profiling system (CAPPS), civillibertarians will challenge the new policy as aviolation of privacy, particularlyif such a system is mandatory. Equally unclear is whethersuch a plan will withstand judicial or legislative scrutiny. Whatever that outcome, nosuch proposal is forthcoming fromthe Blue Ribbon Task Force.

22

NAACPv. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc. 481 U.s. 252 (1987).

~‘ See United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 481 (1967).

REPORT OF THE 2002 SILIcoN VALLEY BLUE RIBBON TASK FORCE

TOWARD THE FUTURE:UNRESOLVEDIS SUES


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he technologies recommended by the Blue Ribbon Task Force represent only thefirst steps toward making airports trusted and secure 21st Century venues of commerceand travel. Nevertheless, as the Blue Ribbon Task Force conducted its research,

members happened across other issues and solutions which, if applied with technology

applications, would go far toward making the airport a safer, more secure, user-friendlyenvironment. Accordingly,the Task Force recommends that authorities investigate andrespond to the following:

Reengineering of Physical SpaceAirport authorities m ay w ish to consider different uses of physical space. With fewerpeople allowed past the passenger entry areas, space at and near the airline counter areasis at a premium. Individualsdropping off or pickingup passengers have literally noplace to go, contributing to highly congested outer lobbies. The accumulation of largenumbers of people in addition to travelers moving through the process leaves the outerareas anything bu t user-friendly, revealing considerable frustration and possibly presentingadditional security issues. In addition, limited space in the outer lobby area allows forvery few concessions and other facilities.

Customer Service TrainingMost airports tend to operate as an awkward, disjointed collaborativebetween public 27employees, the airport and other miscellaneous service personnel. In some cases tasksamong the various groups overlap; in other cases there are gaping holes and conflictingrules of conduct . The Blue Ribbon Task Force recommends that the airport embark upona training program for all employees regardless of employer or responsibility~ The programwould provide employees with basic information to pass on to inquiring travelers.

An Anti-Theft ProgramPassenger screening often leaves the individualseparated from his/her carry-on bags forseveral minutes, an anxiety-provokingsituation that only worsens if an individual issingled out for further screening. Regardless of how fast people move through thescreening process, th

silicon valley blue ribbon task force on aviation security and technology

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