www.micorps.org

THE VANGUARDJournal of the Military Intelligence Corps Association

Fall 2006

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THE VANGUARD

Volume 11 Number 4Fall 2006

PublisherCOL Larry D. Bruns, USA, Retired

Managing EditorSFC Michael C. Taylor, USA, Retired

Design DirectorMr. Les Siemens

Layout AssistantMs. Robbin Myers

Subscription AdministratorMs. Tara Glaus

Editorial OfficeP.O. Box 13020, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85670-3020Fax: (520) 459-5022Email: vanguard@micorps.orgWebsite: http://www.micorps.org/vanguard.htm

Purpose: THE VANGUARD is the official journal of the Military Intelligence Corps Association (MICA) for its members and sponsors. The quarterly journal serves as a professional forum for sharing knowledge, preserving history, and honoring civilian and military members of the Military Intelligence Corps.

Disclaimer: All rights reserved. The opinions expressed in the THE VANGUARD are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the position of the MICA. The content does not necessarily reflect the official position of the U.S. Department of the Army or other U.S. Government organizations.

Submissions: Submit articles, photographs, and other material to the Editor, THE VANGUARD, at vanguard@micorps.org. Please provide contact information, a description of the material, and a short biography with each submission. THE VANGUARD reserves the right to accept, reject, or edit any submissions at its discretion. Articles, photographs, and other material from THE VANGUARD may be reproduced, if they are not restricted by law or military regulations, provided proper credit is given and the Editor has given specific prior permission for each reproduced item.

Change of Address: Please send your new address along with your old address to administrator@micorps.org or by mail to MICA, P.O. Box 13020, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85670-3020.Postmaster: Send address changes to MICA, P.O. Box 13020, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85670-3020.

I am dedicating my final issue as editor of THE VANGUARD to my late father, SFC Clay R. Taylor (US Army, Retired) and veterans like him.

Not all intelligence personnel wear MI brass. My father exemplifies those non-MI soldiers who have been or are respon-sible for intelligence operations within their units. A medic and operating room spe-cialist, my father served as the Intelligence Sergeant for the 67th Medical Group in Vietnam from September 1967 to October 1968. His worked focused on what today we would call situational awareness and

force protection. Years later, his knowledge of intelligence operations and the Army Security Agency led him to encourage me to join the Army as a signals intelligence analyst.

Whether by design or personnel constraints, non-MI soldiers are filling positions and conducting intelligence activities in not only non-maneuver battalions and brigades but infantry companies and state-level operations centers. These Active Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard person-nel perform these duties with the skills and knowledge they have acquired through varying degrees of on-the-job training, military courses, and civilian education. Given the size of just the Army’s sustainment operations, these non-MI soldiers fill a significant number of positions and play an important role in ensuring intelligence reaches all decision makers.

In this issue of the MICA’s quarterly journal, we have four articles by first time contributors that we hope the readership will find of interest. The MI NCO Academy “Writer of the Cycle,” SFC Ryan Brassard, discusses the future of violence in Nigeria in his article entitle, “Crisis in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.” In “76th Infantry Brigade Leverages ASAS-Light,” 1LT Hembree and SPC Huffman discuss techniques and procedures for employing the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS)-Light. Mr. Gawthrop describes the underly-ing ideology of Islamic terrorism in his article, “The Sources and Patterns of Terrorism in Islamic Law.” Last but not least, MAJ Grubbs gives us a short but hopeful article about Afghan intelligence officer training in, “Afghan National Army Intelligence School.”

The suspense dates for the next issues are -

• 21 December Winter 2006/2007

• 21 March Spring 2007 (This issue includes items for Memorial Day.)

• 21 June Summer 2007 (This issue covers US, US Army, and MI Corps birthdays.)

I have enjoyed my time as editor for THE VANGUARD. I hope that, during my tenure, THE VANGUARD has contributed to the achievement of MICA’s goals and purposes expressed in the MICA Constitution. Thank you for your support of the MI Corps, MICA, and THE VANGUARD.

— Michael C. Taylor

From the Editor

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MICA National Executive Committee

PresidentCOL Larry D. Bruns, USA, Retiredpresident@micorps.org

Vice President1SG Dennis C. Schmidt, USA, Retiredvicepresident@micorps.org

SecretaryMr. Christopher L. Friendsecretary@micorps.org

Treasurer1SG Timothy P. Carroll, Jr., USA, Retiredtreasurer@micorps.org

Other MICA National Executive Committee Points of Contact

AdministratorMs. Tara Glaus administrator@micorps.org

AwardsMs. Tara Glaus knowlton@micorps.org

Chapter CoordinatorCOL Calvin E. Boyles, USA, Retiredchapters@micorps.org

Corporate Membership Coordinator1SG Dennis C. Schmidt, USA, Retiredcorporate@micorps.org

Managing Editor, THE VANGUARD

SFC Michael C. Taylor, USA, Retiredvanguard@micorps.org

Gift Shop Manager1SG Timothy P. Carroll, Jr., USA, Retiredgifts@micorps.org

Individual Membership Coordinator1SG Dennis C. Schmidt, USA, Retiredmembership@micorps.org

Mentor Program CoordinatorCOL Robert C. White, Jr. USA, Retiredmentor6@micorps.org

Scholarship Program CoordinatorSGM John L. Corley, USAscholarship@micorps.org

Chapter Points of Contact

See Chapter News for individual chapter points of contact or visit http://www.micorps.org/chapters.htm.

ContentsFEATURESCrisis in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria 2Afghan National Army Intelligence School 576th Infantry Brigade Leverages ASAS-Light 5The Sources and Patterns of Terrorism in Islamic Law 9650th MI Group Pioneers Multinational Counterintelligence in NATO 15DEPARTMENTSArmy Publishes New Intelligence Manual 18Military Intelligence Hall of Fame 18Chapter News 20US Army Field Station Augsburg Reunion 20328d Communications Reconnaissance Company Reunion 20Knowlton and Golden Rose Award Receipients for 3rd Quarter 2006 21Constitution of The Military Intelligence Corps Association 22Submissions Guidelines 25

President’s MessageTHE VANGUARD, under the direction of Michael Taylor,

has risen with each issue to a new level of professional-ism. The articles in this issue underscore the transfor-mation of THE VANGUARD over the past eighteen months. The word is getting out and writers are submitting well thought out and focused articles on diverse topic of in-terest to the members of MICA and the MI Corps. These articles serve to expand the dialogue on our profession and cause debate that strengthens our Corps.

Sadly, Michael is departing as the editor of THE VAN-GUARD. We are looking for someone to step up and continue the transformation of THE VANGUARD. If anyone has an interest in being the new editor, please contact myself or another member of the MICA National Execu-tive Committee by 1 December 2006.

The Executive Committee has spent much of the past two-months reviewing and revising the MICA Constitu-tion and By-Laws. The Constitution appears in this issue for the membership to review. We will publish the By-Laws in a subsequent issue of THE VANGUARD.

Please continue the use of the on-line Gift Shop. Based on your use, Tim Carroll continues to expand its selection and inventory. The Gift Shop remains a good place to find unique MI Corps related mementos for de-partures, arrivals, or special Corps functions.

Our thoughts remain with all those intelligence pro-fessionals going in harms way each and every day. We are proud of what you are doing for Corps and Nation. We pray for and await your safe return.

— Larry D. Bruns, President

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FEATURE

Crisis in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria

By SFC Ryan D. Brassard

Editor’s Note – The author developed the following strategic intelligence paper during the Advanced NCO Course at the MI NCO Academy, US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. In recognition of the paper’s quality, the Academy selected SFC Brassard as the “MI NCO Academy Writer of the Cycle.”

According to the US National Energy Strategy1, West Africa will produce 25% of the world’s oil by the year 2020, up from its current 10%. With this large increase in oil production, the stability of West Africa’s largest oil producer, Nigeria, will be criti-cal to the success of this growing energy market. The US currently imports 1.15 million barrels of oil per day from Nigeria, accounting virtually half of Nigeria’s produc-tion, making the country the 5th largest importer to the US. In-creased violence in Nigeria’s oil producing Niger Delta region raises questions as to whether the government can address the needs of its people while increasing its economic viability.

So how will the Nigerian government address the continued violence in the Niger Delta? After careful

analysis of three separate hypotheses, overwhelming evidence points to the Nigerian government’s continued use of military force to quell violence and stabilize oil production. Economic benefits will almost certainly stay in the hands of the powerful and politically connected, with a lack of historical action in changing policy or act-ing on proposed agendas to improve the Niger Delta region. Violence will continue to be the primary tool of the people to voice their dissent. If the Nigerian gov-ernment continues to fail in stabilizing the Niger Delta, international intervention is almost inevitable. There is also a lack of evidence pointing to the Nigerian govern-ment requesting international assistance, which means US and Coalition intervention will be required when the government no longer controls the Niger Delta region.

Violence – A Problem-Solving TechniqueViolence as a problem-solving technique in Nigeria

is not a new phenomenon. Looking back to Nigeria’s independence from Great Britain in 1960, several large-scale conflicts have plagued the country’s ability to progress as a united nation. In 1966, Nigeria’s central government was violently overthrown twice, ultimately changing the federal government system to a military regime. These changes sparked a Civil War in 1967 between the Eastern region of Biafra and the remainder of Nigeria. After three years of fighting and over one million Nigerian deaths, the war ended with Biafra sur-rendering to Nigeria proper. These conflicts resulted in Nigeria dedicating much of its income to reconstructing

battle-damaged areas of the coun-try. The ethnic animosity fueled by the violence in the late 1960’s surely contributes to the violence in present day Nigeria.

The start of Nigeria’s oil boom is rooted in their 1971 membership in the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). For a country struggling to develop an economy, this development provided hope for Nigeria’s future. Unfortunately, the 1970’s also saw significant droughts result-ing in the death of thousands of livestock and a large migration of people from the outlying farms to the larger cities. With increased

oil revenue, the Nigerian government had the ability to allocate money to its people to alleviate some of these pains but instead hoarded the vast majority of newly acquired oil revenues. The lack of desire to distribute money to the people in their time of need is key evi-dence to the hesitation of the Nigerian government in

SFC Brassard and a friend during the author’s de-ployment to Afghanistan.

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changing economic policy – they simply chose to reap the benefits of the oil industry without compensating the regional population where the oil resources reside. This is an underlying issue with today’s violence in the Niger Delta, and hinders other national interests such as education and civil engineering projects to improve the nation’s infrastructure. Instead, the influence of the for-eign oil companies operating in the region dictate much of Nigeria’s domestic policy.

Another key event that contributes to the violence plaguing the Niger Delta is the formation of the Move-ment for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 1993. MOSOP formed to give the Ogoni people, indig-enous to an oil-rich area of the Niger Delta, a platform to protest the perceived abuses by foreign oil companies such as Shell in Ogoni territory. The Ogoni charged Shell with environmental abuses of their land and a lack of oil revenue placed back into Ogoniland. Events escalated when then President Abacha took over the government in November 1993 and dispatched the Nigerian military to Ogoniland to pacify MOSOP initiatives. The military commenced to lootings, burnings, rape, executions and other acts of terror, including the murder of four Ogoni leaders. Many Ogoni suspected an alliance between Shell and the Nigerian government resulting in this retali-ation against the Ogoni. In May 1994, MOSOP leader Saro-Wiwa and eight other leaders were fraudulently charged with the murder of the four Ogoni leaders and imprisoned. In October 1995, all nine MOSOP leaders were tried and found guilty, causing several international organizations including the United Nations to pressure Abacha to spare their lives. Despite these pressures, Abacha executed the nine men resulting in several nations placing immediate sanctions on Nigeria2. The perceived use of the Nigerian military as an action arm of foreign oil companies when opposition is raised to the government is perhaps the greatest evidence supporting military use to solve instability issues. The lack of at-tention paid to international pressures shows a lack of evidence for future requests by the Nigerian government for international assistance in domestic issues.

Violence – The Role of OilViolence has replaced the aforementioned peaceful

opposition in the Niger Delta region, as the communi-ties living in the area see more benefit with hindering the flow of money to the government. Several incidents of sabotage targeting oil pipelines and foreign oil com-pany infrastructure occur frequently in the region. Since 1999, violence in the region has claimed over 15,000 lives, an average of 1,000 per year. The annual death toll is comparable to conflicts in both Chechnya and Co-lombia. Multinational oil giants Shell and Chevron con-tinue to be blamed for fueling much of the Niger Delta

violence, intentionally or otherwise, through a pattern of environmental neglect and financial arrangements with the Nigerian government3. As a result, the people of the region have lost the ability to work due to environmental disasters and loss of land, and have seen little by way of financial compensation from the Nigerian government. This lack of economic benefit to the Niger Delta region has created rampant criminal activity, to include selling siphoned oil to purchase weapons and kidnapping for-eigners for ransom.

Although this paper discusses the vast ethnic divides in Nigeria and the related violence these divides have caused, it is important to understand much of ethnic violence is a result of the stagnant economy. The lack of money, jobs and governmental attention has pushed the people of the Niger Delta into a state of desperation and anger, resulting in violence directed against rival ethnic groups. Although rivals, Nigerian ethnic groups would have a better chance of living in relative peace if provid-ed with financial incentives and civil engineering projects from the government. On several occasions, Nigerian government representatives have proposed various plans to reinvigorate the economy and the Niger Delta region, the majority of which remain empty promises4. The oil companies also claim to be actively assisting the commu-nities of the Niger Delta, although independent reports show quite the contrary. Many projects sponsored by oil companies in the region are unfinished, or even worse, actually support oil production rather than help the local population5. The Nigerian government must become more assertive over the oil companies and transition to a non-corrupt authority over the oil companies operating in their country. This alone will facilitate an environment where proper measures can be taken to ensure the Niger Delta’s populace receives proper compensation and oil companies are regulated in their actions. Unfortunately, there is no evidence to support this change, therefore reverting to military action to stabilize oil production.

Violence – The Military ContributionHistorically, the Nigerian government has maximized

use of the country’s military to halt violence and militant activity in the Niger Delta. Although effective in some ways, the military contribute equally to the cycle of vio-lence in the region. In the past 10 years, the Niger Delta people have attempted non-violent opposition actions but as a 2000 US NGO report notes, “organized protest and activism by affected communities regularly meet with military repression, sometimes ending in the loss of life. In some cases military forces have been summoned and assisted by oil companies5.” As a result, criminal violence has escalated beyond control of the country’s military. Specifically, the umbrella guerrilla group Move-ment for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)

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has increased the use of kidnapping for ransom to fund their resistance. Although many militant groups operate in the Niger Delta, MEND normally facilitates activity and attempts to consolidate resources and efforts for the opposition. Estimates state security-related issues accounted for a 25% reduction in oil production by this year. Although this figure is staggering, no evidence points to the Nigerian government making any changes in policy to improve the Niger Delta situation, instead opting to continue use of the military to quell violence. Other government organizations, such as the Special Security Service (SSS), participate in covert raids on kid-napping rings, which has had isolated success in the past year6. Overall, the results have not changed the overall violent and dangerous environment in the Niger Delta.

The upcoming Nigerian national elections, set to be-gin in early 2007, is yet another key evidence pointing away from any real political or economic change in the next few years. As with the majority of national elec-tions, the transition time between administrations can be long, and for the fledgling Nigerian democracy, it will likely take even longer. The real concern among several international observers is whether voter turnout will be high or will violent incidents intimidate Nigerians from going to the polls7. Recently, a series of politically-moti-vated assassinations have sparked accusations of police involvement in attempting to curve the elections to meet their political agenda In an already tenuous trust-rela-tionship between Nigerians and their government, these accusations can only hurt the prospects of a successful national election next year.

ConclusionTo conclude, collected and analyzed evidence over-

whelmingly points to Nigeria’s continued use of their military to stabilize oil production and maintain the na-tion’s primary source of income. Violence in the Niger Delta has not significantly improved over the last seven years, and there is no reason to believe it will in the fu-ture without significant economic and political change. The influence and power that foreign oil companies have within the Nigerian government will continue to drive domestic agenda, and as long as the oil companies can pay for their own protection, the real victims in this crisis are the common populace in the Niger Delta. As in other stabilization operations conducted throughout the world, Nigeria faces international intervention once the central Nigerian government cannot control the oil-rich Niger Delta. Without the aforementioned policy changes, Nigeria will face certain failure in realizing their full oil-producing potential.

SFC Brassard currently serves as the NCOIC of the G2, US Army Southern European Task Force (Airborne). Previous assignments include 1-67 Armor Battalion S2, 4th Infantry Division; Combating Terrorism NCOIC for US Army Europe; and Regional Threat Section NCOIC for 66th MI Group. He has deployed to Afghanistan, serving as the CJTF-76 J2 JISE/Operations NCOIC and the Senior Targeting Analyst.

Endnotes1. The US National Energy Policy: http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/US Government website providing the official US Energy Policy detailing trends in worldwide energy resources.2. Motherland Nigeria: http://www.motherlandnigeria.com/An independent website providing a history of significant events that shaped present day Nigeria. Created by Nigerian national Mr. Olubunmi Boomi, who has first-hand knowledge of many issues facing the Niger Delta.3. Conflicts in Africa: http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Africa/Nigeria.asp/Provides great incite into the oil company’s involvement in Nigerian politics, specifically recent violence plaguing the Niger Delta.4. All Africa: http://www.allafrica.com/stories/200609038.html/Daily news resource discussing strictly African issues. Great independent news resource for Africa-specific topics.5. Essential Action: http://www.essentialaction.org/shell/report/Provides an independent report from nine reporters and activists who visited the Niger Delta and documente oil company abuses and environmental neglect. 6. Library of Congress Nigeria Country Report: http://www.lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Nigeria.pdf#searcg=%22history%20MEND%20nigeria%22/US Government website providing the most comprehensive and updated information on Nigeria, including demographics, economy, government and internal/external threats.7. VOA News: http://www.voanews.com/english/2006-08-25-voa24.cfm/Provides daily world information, with this particular article focused on the 2007 Nigerian National Elections.

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FEATURE

Afghan National Army Intelligence School

by MAJ Lee GrubbsThe Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-76 graduated

the first Basic Intelligence Officer class of the Afghan National Army Intelligence School in Kabul, Afghani-stan, on 25 July 2006. CPT Shawnda Johnson and SFC Gerald Thompson served as Director and Commandant, respectively, for this class of the Afghan National Army Intelligence School. Mr. Brad Wade, Mr. Ron Richards, and CPL Gucker provided skilled instruction to the 37 students of this first class. All the soldiers were members of the 10th Mountain Division component of CJTF-76.

The four week course introduced Afghan Officers to the intelligence process, map reading, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, military decision mak-ing process, collection management, and reporting. Throughout the course, officers of the Afghan National Army learned the duties and responsibilities of Intelli-gence officers.

Building Afghan capability and capacity to secure their people and defeat the insurgency is a key task for the 10th Mountain Division. This Intelligence School

FEATURE

76th Infantry Brigade Leverages ASAS-Light

By 1LT Gregory T. Hembree and SPC Angela Huffman

When the BG David L. Harris, Commander, 76th In-fantry Brigade, distributed his guidance and asserted that automation was invaluable to the Warfighter in today’s fast-paced dynamic battlefield, the leadership of the brigade’s Intelligence Warfighting Function answered the call. In April 2006, the brigade S2 hosted an Intel-ligence Workshop at Stout Field, Indianapolis, Indiana, home to the Indiana National Guard Joint Forces Head-quarters. The purpose of this workshop was to conduct All Source Analysis System-Light (ASAS-Light) instruction and training. The ASAS-Light is the Army’s primary in-telligence workstation in units deploying in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. The cur-rent version of ASAS-Light is the first system that deliv-ers both conventional and unconventional asymmetric, multidiscipline analysis capabilities, including graphics

will help provide the Afghan National Army personnel with the intelligence skills they require in order to shape their country and make it a strong Afghanistan.

The next Intelligence Officer course will take place in November 2006 with guest instructors from the CJTF -76’s Joint Intelligence Operations Capability–Afghani-stan.

MAJ Grubb is the Chief, Joint Intelligence Support Element, of CJTF-76. Readers can contact MAJ Grubbs at lee.gurbbs@cjtf76.centcom.mil.

MAJ Lee Grubbs and CPT Shawnda Johnson present Distinguished Honor Graduates with 10th Mountain

Division G2 Coins.

for insurgency operations and customized theater-spe-cific symbology.

The WorkshopAttendees consisted of members of the Brigade S2

section and the S2 sections of the subordinate battalions, as well as personnel from the 38th Infantry Division’s Analysis and Control Element (ACE) and Joint Forces Headquarters-Indiana. All attendees were greeted by BG Harris, who provided his guidance for the training and took time out of his busy schedule to specifically emphasize the importance of automation to the entire Warfighter community and to continually challenge the 76th Brigade intelligence community to keep raising the bar on ASAS-Light proficiency. The brigade’s intent and focus was to provide a productive venue for intelligence professionals to receive developmental instruction while transitioning the Brigade’s focus to future training and operations of a modular infantry brigade combat team.

76th Infantry Brigade had just returned from a deploy-ment in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. As the Headquarters for Coalition Joint Task Force Phoe-nix III, the brigade deployed Army Battlefield Command Systems (ABCS) to include ASAS-Light in Afghanistan. In

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Afghanistan, the brigade leveraged successfully its ABCS capabilities to maintain situational awareness and track trends in the tactics of insurgents in the task force area of operations. Lessons from the deployment developed from operating with multinational coalition partners who do not share the same security access or security clear-ance requirements as does the US Army. These chal-lenges forced adjustments to standard operating proce-dures (SOP) for information exchange and processing. Throughout these adjustments, the brigade leveraged ASAS-Light capabilities to increase the S2’s efficiency in receiving, storing, and disseminating information to produce timely and relevant intelligence.

“The main goal is to familiarize the whole Brigade with the ASAS-Light,” said MAJ Andy Minton, the 76th Infantry Brigade S2. “We want them to maintain the basics and see what the system can do for them.”

1LT Gregory Hembree, Assistant S2, began the work-shop by briefing the soldiers on a Warfighter scenario overview and provided information on operations and terrain graphics. While 1LT Hembree briefed the en-emy situation as part of the common operational picture (COP) to the audience, CW2 James Graham dynami-cally manipulated the ASAS-Light map display. CW2 Graham also executed live queries of data to support the presentation of specific intelligence preparation of the battlefield results.

“Gone are the days of 3x5 cards and canned slide shows depicting hours-old information. Today’s In-telligence Professional must be acutely aware of the battlefield environment so that he or she can convey the most timely and relevant assessment to the battlefield commander. Time is not on our side, and we can now leverage the power of computer databases and informa-tion dominance to develop and display it in a graphic that is easy to understand” preached 1LT Hembree as he briefed the brigade and battalion staffs.

The TechnologyInformation dominance provides better synchroniza-

tion, ensures all units and weapon systems participate in the fight, resulting in a faster tempo that overwhelms the enemy. The Army must leverage enabling technologies to meet these requirements. As with battle command, the principles of command and control do not change with the development and fielding of the ABCS. The more a commander knows about his enemy, the better he is able to exercise command and control and make appropriate decisions. A good commander understands the environment of combat, the dynamics of battle, and the enemy’s uncooperative nature.

The ASAS-Light allows the Intelligence Professional to convey intelligence estimates to the commander to assist

in the military decision making process. The S2 section at any echelon is responsible for establishing a correlated enemy graphic, an intelligence product, based on the organic reporting and intelligence feeds from higher and adjacent headquarters. As the 76th Infantry Brigade also learned in Afghanistan, battlefield information comes from many other sources outside the normal reporting channels. In a multinational environment, information and all-source intelligence may enter the S2’s reporting channels via briefing notes, telephonic “Intel Cross-talk,” or informal verbal reporting at synchronization meetings. Headquarters may also share intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) via courier, especially in an austere environ-ment where communication is extremely difficult due to terrain limitations.

ASAS, as a tool, allows the intelligence analyst to compile massive amounts of information from all these reports, collectors, sources and database as well as cata-log this data in order to sort it, retrieve it, digest it and then make valid and relevant assessments. Once shared with other S2 sections, the enemy situation is correlated or synchronized with the assessments of others. This sharing provides a dynamic and computerized version of Intel Cross-talk which institutions like the US Army Intel-ligence Center has preached for years.

The TechniquesIn order to effectively operate the ASAS, analysts must

pay more attention to the technical skills of computer database technology and software applications than ever before. S2s must also pay attention to “managing the enemy” in a dynamic battlefield. Managing the enemy is not an easy task. The enemy situation displayed on the ASAS is created through the use of size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) and contact reports

“We live and die by automation, and ASAS is your tool to keep me informed on the enemy situation” says BG David Harris with an ASAS depiction in the background. “We have already achieved proficiency with ASAS; now we must maintain it.”

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as well as via shared INTSUMs (some adjacent units, es-pecially in a multinational environment, may not have access to ASAS workstations to link to the network).

Analysts create the enemy icons based on what they see or what is reported to them about the enemy. Once an analyst creates an enemy icon, he must manage (maintain) it to ensure the enemy picture is kept cur-rent and as accurate as possible. The element that first receives a SALUTE or contact report and generates an enemy icon is responsible for managing that icon until they can no longer observe the enemy unit or it has been destroyed. This includes updating the enemy position, adjusting the number and types of vehicles if necessary, changes in the enemy’s activity, and delete the icon when it is no longer a valid representation of the enemy’s composition and location.

When the enemy formation or element moves be-yond the icon manager’s view he should pass the icon on to the analyst in the adjacent or higher unit. The use of “transition” named areas of interest or intelligence hand-off lines are both good techniques to facilitate the passing of the enemy along with its representative icon to the next observer or friendly echelon’s S2. These, by the way, are age-old techniques that Intelligence Profession-als have been using for years and have been preached at the school house in courses like Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course and Captains’ Career Course.

Once the analyst has de-veloped and correlated the enemy picture, he can broad-cast or synchronize the new or updated situation graphic via ASAS to higher, lower, and adjacent echelons in a matter of minutes. MI leaders will want to establish, as part of their tac-tical SOP, just how often or un-der what circumstances the S2 should send an updated enemy situation graphic. Every time the S2 does this, he should no-tify the higher, adjacent, or sub-ordinate commands by voice or text message. There are several methods of real-time digital communication organic to the intelligence architecture (embedded Instant Messag-ing and email), and there are countless other digital messag-ing applications that the analyst can load into the ASAS-Light. This makes the ASAS-Light even more flexible to the analyst or

unit because this capability allows the unit to adapt the workstation to the organization’s tactics, techniques, and procedures.

This digital flexibility, while important to maintain au-tomation connectivity, also adds to the emphasis of intel-ligence analysts maintaining their technical skills. These are new challenges for trainers and leaders in the MI Community as we all attempt to aggressively teach and maintain valuable skill sets in our analysts with precious little time in the training plans and schedules. Time is an issue especially for Army National Guard and other Reserve Component units that train one weekend per month and two weeks during the summer. This is what makes a separate workshop, such as the one conducted annually by 76th Infantry Brigade, so critical to maintain-ing the skills of automation and familiarity with ASAS-Light, the weapon system of today’s digital analyst.

“Once our analyst teams compile and digest all of the information that hits the S2 shop, they can run queries in the ASAS that depict patterns and trends.” conveyed 1LT Hembree. “This automation doesn’t replace the analyst or the analysis that is performed; ASAS as a tool assists in predictive analysis by allowing analysts to spot trends that they may otherwise have missed without the power of a digital database.”

Entity Editor is the graphic user interface by which analyst input data in order to maintain and query the database. The Unit Summary provides many fields in

order to sectionalize information for database searches.

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The TrainingFollowing 1LT Hembree’s Mission Brief, CW2 Gra-

ham gave technical instruction on the functionality of the ASAS-Light and how it helps analysts manage the en-emy and share intelligence. Soldiers learned about the digital connectivity that enables ASAS to synchronize at multiple echelons. They also learned about the architec-tural backbones on which ASAS can operate as well as the functionality of the automated tool sets like ArcGIS (geospatial information service software) and Entity Edi-tor (the database interface) as well as Analyst Notebook, an application used to depict enemy relationships. By the end of CW2 Graham’s instruction, soldiers under-stood how to input battlefield information, insert their own analysis, and rapidly share that intelligence to up-date the COP at all echelons.

“This really takes Intel Cross-talk to a new level,” said CW2 Graham, who has dedicated several man-hours to enhancing the system while working directly with the Program Director for Intelligence Fusion as well as the system engineers.

After the technical instruction, soldiers broke off into groups by battalion S2 sections, a brigade S2 section, and a division ACE in order to replicate functional tac-tical operations center intelligence operations and to show that digital synchronization can provide an up-dated COP to all elements, dynamically updated to give accuracy as the situation develops. Novice soldiers who weren’t familiar with the ASAS-Light were able to work with experienced soldiers who had already deployed with the system and had developed expertise in using it in the field.

“It was easy talking to a deployed soldier,” says SPC Joe Dodson. “I was able to ask practical questions like, ‘Did you actually use this method? Which worked best for you?’”

SGT Amanda Brezina was one of the soldiers at the workshop who had deployed with the system. During the practical exercises she was able to refresh her memo-ry on the capabilities of the system as well as assist other soldiers who were experiencing difficulties.

“I think having people from all different units learn-ing at a company level and not relying on upper level units really helped,” Sergeant Brezina said. “We ac-complished our goal. The computers are talking and the soldiers are able to understand the message process.”

MAJ Anthony Sanchez, the Product Director of Intel-ligence Fusion at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, visited the work-shop and brought his team to observe the training and evaluate the ASAS-Light in action.

“Chief Graham is doing things with the system that we haven’t tried before,” remarked MAJ Sanchez. “He

really dove into the system. It’s apparent that the lead-ership has refined the process of operating the system and is focusing on things to become successful. Part of being successful is figuring out the best way to get your job done and focusing on that. Chief Graham is doing a good job of that.”

System engineers like Marvin Miller attended the conference to oversee different units operating the ASAS-Light and make note of how they were using the system and what changes need to be made. Mr. Miller has been with the program for over a decade and has been an integral part of the system’s evolution. Because different units operate the ASAS-Light in different ways according to SOP as well as their tactics, techniques and procedures, the system engineers are able to incorporate those lessons learned into their training and provide up-grades or “tweaks” to the ASAS-Light so that it can be as useful as possible on the battlefield.

“We’ll still continue to make little refinements,” says MAJ Sanchez. “Once you stabilize a baseline product, you’re able to take what is there and make little refine-ments. I think the 76th Brigade is most likely to be a large contributor to this process.”

Conclusion“This really fit the bill” according to 1LT Jacob Weis.

“It is exactly what we needed!”

The workshop was a success. With the relevant in-structions from 1LT Hembree as well as the assistance of CW2 Graham and the support of system engineers, the soldiers were able to train to standard. All walked away from the training very pleased with the opportunity to apply their intelligence skills, knowledge and abilities in a nonintrusive environment that allowed for mistakes, corrections, and development.

1LT Hembree is the Assistant S2, 76th Infantry Brigade, and SPC Huffman is the Unit Public Affairs Representative, 276th MI Company, Indiana National Guard. Readers can contact 1LT Hembree at gregory.t.hembree@us.army.mil and SPC Huffman at angela.huffman@us.army.mil

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FEATURE — Writer of the Quarter

The Sources and Patterns of Terrorism in Islamic Law

By William GawthropThe views expressed in this paper for those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect those of any entity of the US Government.

“There was a nearly incomprehensible misconcep-tion about the nature of the military problem. Lacking a criteria for judgment, officials often misunderstood, and therefore often misstated, the issues.” -- Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy

This paper identifies the sources and patterns of ter-rorism in Islam and proposes a framework for a response. The United States is confronted with an ideological threat requiring a response using a lever of national power that has no tradition of success in American Foreign Policy. Of the four levers of national power (diplomatic, ideo-logical, military and economic) the United States has tra-ditionally used three (diplomatic, military and economic) to defeat its adversaries.

The Ideological lever has largely been neglected. The two primarily ideological wars in American history are the Revolutionary War and the Cold War and in each the United States successfully responded with a combi-nation of diplomatic, military and economic power. An argument can be made that the Revolutionary War and Cold Wars were characterized by Ideological exchanges but in neither case were American ideological tools orga-nized, synchronized and focused against enemy centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities or exploitable seams.

Today, the United States, and an increas-ing number of other governments, are be-leaguered by an expanding array of states, groups, and individuals whose goals, actions and norms are animated by Islamic values. This places the defenders in the unenviable position of having to fight, at the strategic level, against an idea.

A FRAMEWORK Currently, the United States is engaged

in two countries (Afghanistan and Iraq) and is experiencing a groundswell of insurgent activity in each. Elsewhere across the globe, an increasing number of Governments are addressing the rising levels of “criminal” ac-tivity animated by Islamic values (Belgium, England, Germany, France, India, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Russian, So-malia, Sudan, The Netherlands, and

others). The insurgent environment is characterized by a wide variety of groups (Al-Qaida, Hamas, Hezbollah, or any number of “pop-up” organizations), state spon-sors (Iran, formerly Afghanistan, and others), as well as “homegrown” and “freelance” individuals whose opera-tions range from centralized planning and execution to instances of autonomous, decentralized, self actualiza-tion.

The analytical challenge is to create a framework that portrays the threat in understandable terms and gives insight to a solution. As depicted in Figure 1, one such framework consists of organizing the analytic picture into the three traditional levels of war: tactical, opera-tional, and strategic.

Tactical – The tactical level is the insurgent environ-ment, whether it be in a specific country or region, and the primary response force is law enforcement or the military.

Operational – The operational level (hostile or fa-cilitating groups, nongovernmental organizations and charities, and nation-states) is addressed primarily by the military; diplomacy and economic initiatives having failed in the case of Afghanistan, Iraq, Al-Qaeda, and other pop-up organizations.

Strategic – The strategic level hosts the forces that animate the tactical and operational elements. Those forces are the strategic themes in Islam which consists of: The Example of the Prophet; the Koran; the Haddiths; Islamic Law; the Pillars of Faith; Jihad; World View; and, Just War Traditions. Within each of these themes are drivers that constitute the sources of terrorism in Islam.

SOURCES OF TERRORISM IN ISLAMThe drivers or sources of terrorism in Islam reside in a

Figure 1. Threat Description – Traditional Levels of War.

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number of key, and closely interwoven, Islamic themes. Each of these themes is central to the core values of Islam and its orthodoxy and adherence to these themes is obligatory for the pious and devout.

Mohammad’s influence is manifested three fold as the author of the Koran, the subject of the Haddiths, and by his personal example. These three elements (Mohammad, the Koran, and the Haddiths) form the basis of Islamic Law.

MohammadMohammad, both in his capacity as a military and religious

leader, established a strategic objective of political (as well as religious) imperium and he left behind a rudimentary warf-ighting doctrine articulated in the Koran, elaborated on in the Haddiths1, codified in Islamic Law and reinforced by cur-rent interpretations in the modern era. As late as early 2006, the senior Service colleges of the Department of Defense had not incorporated into their curriculum a systematic study of Mohammad as a military or politi-cal leader. As a consequence, we still do not have an in-depth understanding of the war fighting doctrine laid down by Mohammad, how it might be applied today by an increasing number of Islamic groups, or how it might be countered.

The KoranMohammad’s Koranic verse commanding Jihad with a

view toward a strategic endstate is Sura 8:39.2

Sura 008.039: Yusufali: And fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah altogether and ev-erywhere; but if they cease, verily Allah doth see all that they do. Pickthal: And fight them until persecution is no more, and religion is all for Allah. But if they cease, then lo! Allah is Seer of what they do. Shakir: And fight with them until there is no more persecution and religion should be only for Allah; but if they desist, then surely Allah sees what they do.

Mohammad’s views are elaborated on in Surah 8, Al-Anfal, of the Koran. Yousuf Ali, the translator for the principle version of the Koran that the US Military uses, comments, “In this chapter (Sura 8) we have the lessons of the Battle of Badr enforced in their larger aspects; (1) the question of war booty; (2) the true virtues necessary for fighting the good fight; (3) victory against odds; (4) clemency and consideration for one’s own and for oth-ers in the hour of victory.3

The HaddithsMohammad’s mindset is further revealed from the

Haddith recorded by Sahih Al-Bukhari, and narrated by

Ibn Umar. “Allah’s Apostle said, ‘I have been ordered (by Allah) to fight against the people until they testify that none has the right to be worshipped but Allah and that Muhammad is Allah’s Apostle, and offer the prayers per-fectly and give obligatory charity, so if they perform that, then they save their lives and property from me except for Islamic Laws and then their reckoning (accounts) will be done by Allah.’ ”4

This utterance by Mohammad has neither been coun-termanded nor abrogated leaving it a mandate into the 21st Century. For Non-Muslims, Mohammad’s mindset is a source for terrorism.5

Islamic LawIslamic Law is based on The Example of Mohammad,

the Koran, and the Haddiths and is refracted through the lenses of four major Sunni Schools6 and a lesser number of Schools within the Shia Tradition.7

The Jurists, using the rules of war embedded in the Ko-ran, the Haddiths and the Example of Mohammad, give clear guidance on combat, combat support and combat service support obligations to the fighter, and those who can directly and indirectly support him. The Sunni views are contained and discussed, but not limited to, the fol-lowing legal texts: The Distinguished Jurists Primer,8 The Riyad-us-Saliheen,9 and Reliance of the Traveller.10

Each text discusses Jihad in detail citing a number of Koranic verses as the basis in Law for attacking Non-Mus-lims. For example, The Distinguished Jurists Primer rests its analysis on the laws justifying Jihad on the following Koranic Suras: 2:190, 2:216, 4:95, 8.1, 8:39, 8:41, 8:61, 8:67, 9:5, 9:29, 9:122, 17:17, 40:25, 47:4, 48:17, 59:6, and 59:10. Reliance of the Traveller cites Sura 2:216, 4:89, 4:95, 9:29, 9:36, 9:41, 9:111, and 61:10-13. The Riyad-us-Saliheen cites Sura 2:216, 4:95-96, 9:36, 9:41, 9:111, and 61:10-13. Common to all three of the legal texts are 2:16 and 4:95. Sura 2:216 obliges the fighter and Sura 4:95 motivates the non-fighter.

Sura 002.216:11 Yusufali: Fighting is prescribed for you, and ye dislike it. But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you, and that ye love a thing which is bad for you. But Allah knoweth, and ye know not. Pickthal: Warfare is ordained for you, though it is hateful unto you; but it may happen that ye hate a thing which is good for you, and it may happen that ye love a thing which is bad for you. Allah knoweth, ye know not. Shakir: Fighting is enjoined on you, and it is an object of dislike to you; and it may be that you dislike a thing while it is good for you, and it

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may be that you love a thing while it is evil for you, and Allah knows, while you do not know.

Sura 004.095:12 Yusufali: Not equal are those believers who sit (at home) and receive no hurt, and those who strive and fight in the cause of Allah with their goods and their persons. Allah hath granted a grade higher to those who strive and fight with their goods and persons than to those who sit (at home). Unto all (in Faith) Hath Allah prom-ised good: But those who strive and fight Hath He distinguished above those who sit (at home) by a special reward. Pickthal: Those of the believers who sit still, other than those who have a (disabling) hurt, are not on an equality with those who strive in the way of Allah with their wealth and lives. Allah hath conferred on those who strive with their wealth and lives a rank above the seden-tary. Unto each Allah hath promised good, but He hath bestowed on those who strive a great reward above the sedentary.Shakir: The holders back from among the believers, not having any injury, and those who strive hard in Allah’s way with their property and their persons are not equal; Allah has made the strivers with their property and their persons to excel the holders back a (high) degree, and to each (class) Allah has promised good; and Al-lah shall grant to the strivers above the holders back a mighty reward.

The Distinguished Jurists Primer,13 Riyad-us-Salihee,14 and Reliance of the Traveller,15 clearly identify combat, combat support and combat service support roles for the Muslim community when one initiates Jihad. There is unambiguous legal guidance upon whom support to Jihad is obligatory; conditions affecting the obligation; identification of the persons to be fought; the scale of harm that may be inflicted on the enemy; conditions for the declaration of war; the identification of the number from whom retreat is not permissible; permissions for truce; and, the two reasons for waging war (to force the conversion to Islam and to secure the payment of the “jizya”).

Pillars of FaithOf the five Pillars of Faith,16 one directly facilitates

warfighting: zakat, or alms giving. There are eight oblig-atory disbursements for zakat: The Poor, Those Short of Money; Zakat Workers; Those Whose Hearts are to be Reconciled; Those Purchasing their Freedom; Those in Debt; Those Fighting for Allah; and, Travelers Needing Money. Three of these categories support insurgency –

• The obligatory disbursements for those whose hearts are to be reconciled constitute a funding mecha-nism facilitating the establishment of Islamic footholds in non-Muslim areas and the consolidating of those foot-holds to increase Islamic influence.17

• The obligatory disbursements for those fighting for Allah constitute a funding mechanism for combat, combat support and combat service support operations. The precise characteristics of the funding process and the amount of money involved is presently unknown, but the enabling doctrine is in place and ideally suited for supporting autonomous, decentralized, asymmetrical military operations.18

• The obligatory disbursements for travelers need-ing money defrays personal expenses and transportation costs associated with individual movement to and from conflict zones.19

Jihad20 Jihad is considered among an increasing number of

Muslims to constitute a Sixth Pillar of Faith and this en-joys considerable theological inertia. Mohammad com-manded Jihad (Sura 8:39) proclaiming a divine mandate, personally led 27 attacks and sent his armies out 47 more times against non-Islamic communities averaging about seven operations per year.21 Quoting directly from the Encyclopaedia (sic) of Jihad:

“The Scholars of Fiqh (jurisprudence) have agreed that jihad in Shara’ee terms means ‘to fight in the Path of Allah or anything aiding this course’ A more detailed understanding of the term Jihad has been explained by the four major schools of Fiqh as follows.

Maliki Fiqh: “The Muslims are to fight with the Kuffar to advance Allah’s religion.”

Shafi’ee Fiqh: “The meaning of Jihad in Shara’ee terms is to make utmost effort in fighting in the Path of Allah.

Hanbali Figh: “Jihad means to fight against the unbelievers.” (Fadhail-e-Jihad).

Hanafi Fiqh: “Jihad means to be involved in fighting in the Path of Allah by one’s life, wealth and speech.” It is further explained “to call the unbelievers towards the true religion of Islam and to fight against them, if they are unwilling to accept this true religion.”22

Islam’s World ViewIslam divides the world into two spheres variously called

the Abode of Islam, House of Islam or dar al-Islam and the Abode of War, House of War or dar al-harb. There can be no peace between the two until dar al-Islam conquers and as-

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similates its adversary. Accommodation and compromise are impermissible and fighting is obligatory.

Islam’s Just War TraditionsThere are four commonly discussed Just War Traditions: Ju-

daic, Christian (or Catholic), Realist and Islamic. The Just War Theory is comprised of three elements: Jus ad bellum which addresses the justice of resorting to war; jus in bello which ad-dresses conduct in war; and, jus post bellum, which addresses the justice of post war peace.

Assessing the justification for resorting to war requires an understanding of the elements of jus ad bellum; Just Cause, Right Intention, Proper Authority and Public Declaration, Last Resort, Probability of Success, and Proportionality. A compari-son of the four traditions supports an argument that the Judaic, Christian and Realist Traditions of War are passive defensive while Islam is Offensive Aggressive.23 Invariably, the ques-tion is raised about the nature of the Crusades and the answer is that the Crusades were a delayed response to Jihad

Recommendations for a Response“McNamara’s Defense Department and Bundy’s

White House were gluttons for analysis. Both men were of extraordinary intelligence. What they lacked was a criteria to assess a challenge so at variance with the American experience and American Ideology.” – Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy

Based on the above abbreviated overview, there is evidence to support the contention that sources of ter-rorism in Islam may reside within the strategic themes of Islam: The Example of the Mohammad; the Koran; the Haddiths; Islamic Law; the Pillars of Faith; Jihad; World View, and Just War Traditions. The issue now is assessing how to counter “an idea.”

Developing a policy response is prob-lematic because the analytical community does not have a commonly accepted or understood framework for quantifying the threat. Islam is an idea; an ideology, and it is not readily or easily susceptible to diplomatic, military, or economic leverage. As an idea, however, it is more susceptible to the information or ideological lever of power and this requires insight to where the lever should be applied. Figure 2 portrays the sources of power animating Islam.

Islam’s political trinity consists of its Holy Texts, the Clerics (who interpret the Texts and serve as community leaders and “spiritual” advisors for fighters and fighting

groups), and the People. Each of the three elements is tightly interwoven with Islam’s strategic themes. Within each element are centers of gravities, critical vulnerabili-ties and exploitable seams that, when fully identified, become potential themes for a defensive information campaign.

Centers of Gravity – These constitute sources of strength that may or may not present themselves as suitable informa-tion targets.24 The centers of gravity for Islam itself are Mohammad, the Koran, and to a lesser degree, the Haddiths. Fracturing a center of gravity is a shorter (but sometimes more difficult) route to success but an indi-rect method for attacking a center of gravity is approach-ing it through its critical vulnerabilities.

Critical Vulnerabilities – These are “soft spots” that, if exploited, may induce a deteriorating cascade effect upon the target. Critical vulnerabilities of the Koran, for example, are that it was uttered by a mortal; por-tions were ghostwritten by others; portions were lost or redacted, and it was revised and re-issued by another mortal. Similar vulnerabilities may be found in Moham-mad’s character as a political and military leader, the character of other Clerics in the Modern Era, as well as the topics addressed in the Haddiths.

Exploitable Seams – Exploitable Seams are elements of Strategic Culture which can be thought of as “Love-Hate” relationships that bind the three elements (Holy Texts, Clerics, and the People) together. For example, within the American experience, there is the love-hate relationship between the People and the Government. Americans love the Constitution but hate big govern-ment. Another love-hate relationship, successfully ex-ploited by North Vietnam, was the dichotomy between an anti-military bias and the tradition of the citizen sol-dier. By exploiting the seams binding the People to the Government and the Military, North Vietnam was able

Figure 2. Power Assessment – Sources and Patterns.

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to fracture the Political Trinity of the United States. The same process may be applicable in the “Global War on Terrorism”.

The identification of information or ideological cen-ters of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, and exploitable seams produces Information Themes which become the fodder for a yet to be realized Information Lever of National Power. Presently, the adversary has the upper hand in using a global network of information outlets ca-pable of delivering Islamic themes penetrating otherwise inaccessible recesses of the Islamic Community.

If the United States, Moderate Muslim governments, and the Non-Muslim world seek to engage ideological adversaries on their own ground, they will have to de-velop, use and maintain the full range of capabilities in the Ideological component of National Power, and ad-dress Islam’s strategic themes directly.

Endnotes1. From the Haddith, recorded by Sahih Al-Bukhari, Muhammad is quoted as saying: “I am commanded by Allah to go and fight all the people of the world until they confess there is no God but allah, and I am his messenger, and to pray five times a day and to give alms. And if they do that, their blood will be spared from me.” This command has not been revoked, abrogated, or modified. See Mark A. Gabriel, Islam and Terrorism: What the Quran Really Teaches About Christianity, Violence, and the Goals of Islamic Jihad, (Charisma House, Lake Mary, FL. 2002); 79.2. http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/quran/008.qmt.html#008.039, accessed 30 June 20063. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Quran (Amana Publications, Baltimore, 2002): 4134. University of Southern California-Muslim Student Association Compendium for Muslim Texts http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/002.sbt.html#001.002.024, accessed 29 June 2006 5. “Will you listen to me, O Quraysh? By Him who holds my life in His hands I bring you a slaughter.” Muhammad to his detractors while circumambulating the Kaba on the third circuit. Reported by Amr ibn al-As in Karen Armstrong, Muhammad: A Biography of the Prophet (Harper Collins: San Francisco, 1992); 124.6. The four schools are Hanifi, Maliki, Shafie, and Hanbali.7. The remainder of this assessment will address the Sunni Law Traditions.8. Ibn Rushd, The Distinguished Jurists Primer (Vol I and II), Garnet Publishing, Reading, UK:(1994)9. Yahya, al-Imam Abu Zakariya, Riyad-us-Saliheen, Darussalam, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia:(1998)10. al-Misri, Ahmed ibn Naqib, Reliance of the Traveller: A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law, Amana Publications, Beltsville, MD, 1994.11. University of Southern California-Muslim Student Association Compendium for Muslim Texts http://

www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/quran/002.qmt.html#002.216, accessed 29 June 2006.12. University of Southern California-Muslim Student Association Compendium for Muslim Texts http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/quran/004.qmt.html#004.095, accessed 29 June 2006 13. Ibn Rushd: 454-48714. Yahya: 976-101615. al-Misri: 599-60516. The Five Pillars of Faith are: Testimony of Faith (Kalima), Prayer (Salat), Fasting (Sawm), Almsgiving (Zakat), and Pilgrimage (Hajj).17. Those Whose Hearts Are To Be Reconciled: Must be Muslim. Given to ensure propagation of the faith in initial stages. If recent converts and are alienated from their kin. Those to be reconciled include: Chief personages of a people (with weak or fledgling institutions needing economic support to improve or whose peers may be expected to enter Islam); Heads of a people who collect zakat for Islam from Muslims living near them who refuse to pay it; Heads of a people who fight an enemy for Islam at considerable expense and trouble to themselves. See al-Misri: 270-271.18. Those Fighting for Allah: Those engaged in Islamic military operations for whom no salary has been allotted in the army roster. Given enough to suffice them for the operation even if affluent of: weapons; mounts; clothing; expenses; and, for the duration of the journey, round trip, and the time they spend there. Current interpretation and practice has been to provide expenses in supporting such person’s family during this period. See al-Misri: 272.19. Travelers Needing Money. One who is passing through a town in Muslim lands where zakat is collected or whose journey was not taken for the purpose of disobeying Allah, if such a person is in need, he is given enough to cover his personal expenses and transportation, even if he possesses money back home. See al-Misri: 27220. For a more detailed discussion of Jihad, see Stephen P. Lambert, Y: The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct, Joint Military Intelligence College, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 2005, and Islam: The Peaceful Religion in Perpetual War, Joint Military Intelligence College, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington DC, 2003.21. Gabriel, 78.22. R.K. Pruth, editor, Encyclodaedia of Jihad, Anmol Publications PVT, LTD, New Delhi, 2002, Vol 1, page 57-5823. See first, Ibn Rushd, The Distinguished Jurists Primer (Vol I and II), Garnet Publishing, Reading, UK: (1994), 464. “The Muslim jurists agreed that the purpose of fighting the People of the Book, excluding the (Qurayshite) People of the Book and the Christian Arabs, is one of two things: it is either for their conversion to Islam or the payment of the jizya.” See also: Fred M. Donner, “The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War”, in Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions, John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, eds, Greenwood Press, New York (1991), 51. “Against states of the dar al-harb the legitimate ruler of the Islamic empire, in juristic theory, was justified in making war at any time; indeed to wage jihad in an effort to subdue the dar al-harb and to incorporate it into the dar

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al-islam was seen as a religious duty of the imam/caliph.” See also: A. J. Coates, The Ethics of War. Manchester University Press, New York (1997), 46. “Legitimate domination has one true foundation – Islam - and the recognition of non-Islamic states on anything other than a temporary and pragmatic basis is impermissible. This fundamentalist approach yields a starkly adversarial and conflictual view of the present state of humanity. The use of force to bring about the triumph of Islam is unambiguously and enthusiastically proclaimed. War is not a necessary evil, but a fundamental obligation or ‘neglected duty”. Far from war posing a threat to religious observance, ‘ religion without war is a crippled religion’ (Ayatollah Khomeini), and jihad or holy war is the essence of Islam, as the fundamentalists understands it.” 24. See, Izzo, Lawrence L. LTC. “The Center of Gravity is Not an Achilles Heel.” Military Review (January 1988): 76-77. See also Mendel, Wm W., and Lamar Tooke. “Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity.” Military Review (June 1993): 2-11; Vego, Milan. Enter of Gravity.” Military Review (April-March 2000): 23-29

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in Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions, John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, eds, Greenwood Press, New York: (1991)Gleave, Robert and Eugenia Kermeli, eds, Islamic Law: Theory and Practice, I.B. Tauris, London:(1997)Goldziher, Ignaz, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, Princeton University Press, Princeton: (1981)Hallaq, Wael B, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunnie usul al-fiqh , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK: (1997).Hallaq, Wael B., The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK: (2005)Ibn Kathir, The Life of the Prophet Muhammad, Garnet Publishing, Reading, UK: (1994)Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge, UK: (2003)Ibn Rushd, The Distinquished Jurists Primer (Vol I and II), Garnet Publishing, Reading, UK: (1994)Ibn Sallam, The Book of Revenue, Garnet Publishing, Reading, UK: (2003)Islam: The Peaceful Religion in Perpetual War, Joint Military Intelligence College, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 2003. (U)Izzo, Lawrence L. LTC. The Center of Gravity is Not An Achilles Heel.´Military Review (January 1998).Keller, Nuh Ha Mim. Al-Masqasid: Nawawi’s Manual of Islam, Amana Publications, Beltsville, MD: (1994)Lambert, Stephen P. Y: The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct, Joint Military Intelligence College, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 2005Mendel, Wm., and Lamar Tooke. Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity.” Military Review (June 1993)Narden, Terry. Ther Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Pespectives, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996Ostrogorsky, George History of the Byzantine State, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey: (1969)Pruth, R.K. editor. Encyclopaedia of Jihad, Anmol Publications PVT, LTD, New Delhi, 2002.Sarloff, Robert B. Ed, The Politics of Change in the Middle East, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado: (1993)Schacht, Joseph . An Introduction to Islamic Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford: (1982)Warraq, Ibn, Leaving Islam: Apostates Speak Out, Prometheus Books, Amherst, New York: (2003)Warraq, Ibn, What the Koran Really Says: Language, Text, & Commentary, Prometheus Books, Amherst, New York: (2002)Vego, Milan. “Center of Gravity.” Military Review (April-March 2000): 23-29.Zacharias, Ravi, Light in the Shadow of Jihad: The Struggle for Truth, Multnomah Publishers, Inc, Orlando, Florida: (2002)Zarabozo, Jamaal al-Din M., How to Approach and Understand the Quran, Al-Basheer Company for Publications and Translations, Boulder, Colorado: (1999)

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INTELLIGENCE UNIT PROFILE

650th MI Group Pioneers Multinational Counterintelligence in NATOby Lieutenant Colonel Chris A. Pilecki

Editor’s Note – This profile is reprinted with the per-mission of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin. This article from the January-March 2006 issue and other Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin articles are available online at http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/mipb.

Introduction “Who could imagine, less than two years ago, that a

French Counterintelligence (CI) officer would receive his new stripes from an American Colonel, in the presence of 15 nations? This international unit is an opportunity for us to share information, individual experiences, and to reinforce dialogue among our national agencies. More than that, it will protect our countries from terrorist at-tacks in Europe, the Balkans, and of course Iraq.”

With these words, Major Luc Rollet of the French Army accepted promotion to Lieutenant Colonel on 16 December 2005 in the Headquarters of the 650th Mili-tary Intelligence (MI) Group at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium. Colonel John Z. Dillon II, 650th Military Intelligence (MI) Group Com-mander, presided at the ceremony, and placed the new rank on Rollet’s shoulders.

No one in attendance could say for certain, but all suspected that it had been a very long time since an American officer had been invited to promote a French officer. Yet such activities may soon be the norm rather than the exception for the 650th MI Group. Lieutenant Colonel Rollet is one of 17 Allied officers currently as-signed to the 650th MI Group, with more on the way.

First Steps Toward TransformationFrom its creation as the CI agency supporting the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) military command structure in Europe until early 2004, the 650th MI Group had consisted exclusively of U.S. Army military and civilian personnel. Directly subordinate to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the 650th MI Group, known within NATO as the Al-lied Command CI Activity, was trusted within the alli-ance as an “honest broker” in CI, working on behalf of NATO rather than any individual member nation. Still, the solely U.S. composition of the unit came to appear increasingly anachronistic as NATO, and the U.S. moved increasingly toward coalition warfare.

In the Spring of 2002, Colonel Richard T. Ellis, then serving as the 650th’s commander, took the podium at SHAPE’s annual CI and Security Conference to offer a bold vision for the Group’s future. Colonel Ellis proposed opening the unit to all NATO member nations, with each of the Allied nations invited to assign personnel to the 650th. The Initial response was enthusiastic, and the 650th’s leadership shortly thereafter launched formal staffing of the idea.

The proposal stipulated that the 650th MI Group provide workspace, all operational funding, and all computer and communications equipment. In return, each NATO member nation was invited to provide one trained CI agent, of any rank and capable of working in the English language, to serve as a fully integrated mem-ber of the unit. Rather than work primarily as liaison of-ficers for their respective nations, Allied personnel would perform the same operational and investigative tasks as the Group’s U.S. personnel. Since the U.S. would pro-vide most of the 650th MI Group’s funding, the U.S. would continue to fill all key command and staff posi-tions in the unit.

As expected, formal staffing of the proposal was time-consuming, but the goal was reached in January 2004, when SACEUR General James Jones endorsed the initia-tive and forwarded it to NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) for final approval. The NAC agreed in April 2004, and the first Allied agent—from SHAPE’s host nation Belgium—arrived at the 650th MI Group the following month. Others quickly followed, with representatives from Iceland, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia, Greece, the United Kingdom, France and Italy joining the unit over the following two years.

Initially, all Allied personnel were assigned to Region V, 650th MI Group, co-located with the Group’s head-quarters at SHAPE, Belgium. This allowed the Group’s multinational experiment to unfold in a controlled envi-ronment, in close proximity to the Group Commander

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as well as each participant nation’s National Military Representative lo-cated at SHAPE Headquarters.

Conversion to a Multinational Unit

Once the formal staffing of the mul-tinational proposal was underway, the 650th MI Group began building a new home for Region V, directly adjacent to the Group headquarters. The new Region V building was designed from the ground up as a multinational facil-ity, with most workstations located in a single large room thus minimizing physical obstacles to internal commu-nication and information sharing.

All workstations are wired for both the NATO Secret-level Automated Command and Control Information System (ACCIS) network and an inter-nal Local Area Network (LAN) on which all operational reports are written and stored. Separate offices for the Region’s Command Group, as well as an interview room, provide privacy for smaller meetings.

Even after the NAC’s approval of Allied participation in the 650th MI Group, some NATO members remained suspicious that the Group’s multinational Region V would be largely for show, with the 650th’s “real” work being conducted elsewhere. To alleviate those concerns and to emphasize that a dramatically new chapter in NATO CI had begun, Region V held an open house a few months after welcoming the first Allied agents into the unit. The invitees—members of the NATO CI community and the National Military Representatives from SHAPE—saw the Allied personnel working alongside their American counterparts with access to the same computer networks and the same operational files. The result was as hoped, within a year more than half of the NATO nations had assigned an agent to Region V or had made a firm com-mitment to participate in the near future.

At the same time, the 650th’s new Commander, Colo-nel Dillon, recognized that the time had already come to build upon Region V’s initial success in converting to a multinational unit. Shortly after assuming command in July 2004, Colonel Dillon announced that the 650th welcomed Allied participation in its two other subordi-nate headquarters—Region I, supporting NATO’s Joint Forces Command South in Naples, Italy and Region IV, supporting Joint Forces Command North in Brunssum, The Netherlands—as well as in the Group’s detachments supporting NATO’s out-of-area missions in Afghanistan and the Balkans. Poland and Hungary have recently assigned their second agents to the 650th in Brunssum

and Naples, respectively, while Romania and The Neth-erlands have deployed personnel to serve with the 650th in Afghanistan. In the near future, we expect to welcome an Allied agent to the Group’s Kosovo Detachment as well.

Unlike in the U.S. Army, many NATO nations have no enlisted CI agents, and some restrict CI work to field grade officers. Given these structural differences and the importance each nation would certainly place upon ensuring the success of their initial contributions to the multinational unit, the 650th expected from the outset that the structure would be rank heavy.

In fact, most nations have assigned Lieutenant Colo-nels to the 650th, with a few nations providing even more senior personnel. Region V’s plan to deal with the influx of senior personnel was to de-emphasize rank and treat all assigned personnel on a first name basis and work in civilian business attire. The result has been bet-ter than we had dared to hope, with every participant thus far firmly committed to the success of the multina-tional endeavor.

While rank has proven to be much less a problem than it might have been, two other issues have required careful attention: experience in the NATO environment and written English language skills. While some of the Allied personnel assigned to the 650th MI Group have lengthy experience in NATO assignments, even those individuals have required training in the 650th’s opera-tional procedures. To help us meet that challenge, we designed our internal LAN to be as much a training tool as our operational backbone.

We created templates for all our standardized reports, so personnel unfamiliar with the formats do not have to

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start from a blank sheet of paper. We created self–paced training versions of our most commonly used security awareness briefings. With these, unit personnel can sit at their own workstations and not only review the briefings, but also learn the background information that will help them answer questions about the presentations. We also designed the network to maximize use of shared directo-ries so that less experienced personnel can benefit from the work done by more experienced agents.

Since almost everything the unit does must ultimately be documented in some form of a written report, the widely differing English writing skills of the Allied person-nel created new editing and proofreading requirements for the native English speakers. It was impractical to send someone to an intensive English course for the first sev-eral months of his assignment, so we recognized that we must accept gradual and incremental improvements in written English.

At the same time, we needed to be careful when editing reports written by non-native English speakers, so that we did not discourage their efforts. No one likes to see a final product that bears no resemblance to their first draft. To meet this challenge, we encouraged our native English speakers to work one-on-one as a “desk buddy” with a non-native speaker, talking through a re-port before the Allied agent tackles an initial draft. Even so, timely publication of a clearly-written report must sometimes take precedence over an English language training opportunity.

The FutureAs the 650th MI Group expands the placement of

Allied personnel throughout its three regional headquar-ters, and ultimately to the smaller detachments as well, a distinctly new picture of CI in NATO is beginning to emerge. While the Allied presence still constitutes only ten percent of the 650th’s strength, the additional com-mitment from the 25 Allied nations will greatly increase the 650th’s ability to support NATO personnel, facilities and activities. As NATO becomes more heavily engaged in out-of-area operations, the need for effective CI cov-erage—both in garrison and deployed locations—will only increase.

The 650th’s experience suggests that the major ob-stacles to greater Allied contributions to out-of-area mis-sions are the start-up and overhead costs, particularly for facilities and automated data processing (ADP) support. Over the nearly three years that 650th MI Group per-sonnel have deployed to Afghanistan in support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul and the ten years that 650th MI Group personnel have deployed to the Balkans in support of NATO missions in Bosnia, Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-donia, and Kosovo, we have consistently seen that most

nations can support such missions with personnel far more readily than with infrastructure. The 650th’s ability to provide office space and ADP support removes that major obstacle and has been instrumental in our ability to attract Allied contributions to these missions.

As more NATO nations provide personnel to the 650th MI Group, and ideally come to see an assignment with the 650th as an essential element in the career pro-gression of their CI personnel, we hope those nations will also see the value in adopting more common CI policies and procedures. Developing shared standards for the basics, such as report formats, may open the door for greater commonality among NATO nations on more important subjects such as the scope of an individual agent’s routine investigative authority.

The conversion of the 650th MI Group to a multina-tional unit offers a new model for the CI community. Even though the fundamental principle governing CI in NATO is that it is a national responsibility, the 650th MI Group is creating an environment where sharing CI information and working hand-in-hand with personnel from across the Alliance are simply accepted as routine business.

No nation stands alone against the threats we face today, and we are at our most vulnerable when we can-not bring ourselves to trust and work with our Allies. CI personnel are accustomed to asking themselves if the information they gain can be shared with Allied nations. The 650th MI Group wants to ask instead, “Why can’t we share this information if it will help our collective ef-forts?”

The 650th MI Group seeks senior, experienced per-sonnel to be part of its team. The 650th’s agents routinely work with national-level CI and security personnel from 26 NATO member nations and have the opportunity to conduct multinational or combined CI operations, inves-tigations, and collection in support of the SACEUR and the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation.

LTC Chris A. Pilecki is Deputy Chief of the Army HUMINT Operations Center on the Army G2 staff. From July 2005 to June 2006, he was Deputy Commander of the 650th MI Group, following three years as Commander, Region V, 650th MI Group, at SHAPE, Belgium. He holds an MS from the London School of Economics, London, England and a BS in Foreign Service from Georgetown University. He can be contacted at chris.pilecki@us.army.mil or (703) 695-3053.

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Military Intelligence Hall of Fame

The 19th Annual Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame Ceremony took place at Fort Huachuca on 23 June 2006. During the ceremony, the Corps inducted five new members: LTG James C. King (US Army, Re-tired), MG Robert L. Halverson (US Army, Retired), COL Jon M. Jones (US Army, Deceased), LTC James A. Cham-bers (US Army, Retired), and LTC Thomas Dillon (US Army, Retired). Cynthia (spouse), Nickolas (son), and Marlena (daughter) Jones accepted the honor on behalf of COL Jones.

The Corps also welcomed COL Richard E. Allenbaugh (US Army, Retired) as the new Honorary Colonel of the Corps and CSM Robert T. Hall (US Army, Retired) as the new Honorary Sergeant Major of the Corps. Other Hall of Fame activities included a trail ride, a reception, and the MICA Huachuca Chapter-sponsored Hall of Fame Golf Tournament.

Hall of Fame Inductees (left to right): LTG King, MG Halver-ston, Mr. Dillon, Ms. Jones, Mr. Jones, Mrs. Jones, and LTC Chambers.

Army Publishes New Intelligence ManualUS Army Public Affairs News Release dated 6 September 2006

The US Army announced today the publication of Field Manual (FM) 2-22.3, “Human Intelligence Collec-tor Operations.” It replaces FM 34-52, published in 1992. The new Army FM 2-22.3 is broader in scope than the old field manual but covers inter-rogation in detail. Other activities covered by the

new FM include screening, debriefing, liaison, and mili-tary source operations.

The Army is committed to the humane treatment of detainees. The new field manual complies with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and incorporates provi-sions of the Geneva Conventions -- to include Common Article Three. It establishes a single humane standard for detainee treatment, regardless of detainee status.

The Army did not wait for the formal publication of this field manual to incorporate lessons learned into Soldier training. Specifically, the field manual clarifies the roles and responsibilities of military intelligence and military police Soldiers conducting detention and interrogation operations. It specifies the role of medi-cal personnel and access to detainees by non-DOD personnel. The manual makes clear that commanders are responsible and accountable for conducting humane interrogation operations.

FM 2-22.3 establishes DOD/Joint interroga-tion standards to be followed by all services and DOD personnel — including contractors conduct-ing interrogation operations in DOD facilities.

The US Army has published this FM in the interest of full trans-parency. The “FOUO” markings are no longer operative. For additional information the media may contact LTC Carl Ey, Office of the Chief Army Public Affairs, via email at carl.ey@hqda.army.mil or call 703-614-2487. Visit the US Army website at www.army.mil. ((The link to FM 2-22.3 is http://www.army.mil/references/FM2-22.3.pdf))

LTG John Kimmons, US Army, holds up a copy of Army FM 2-22.3, “Hu-man Intelligence Collector Opera-tions” as he briefs reporters on the details of the manual in the Penta-gon on 6 September 2006. Photo by Robert D. Ward.

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CSM Hall and COL Allenbaugh

CSM Jackie Moore (Commandant, MI NCO Academy), CSM Frank Saunders (CSM, USAIC&FH), and an unidentified rider.

MG Barbara Fast (center - Commander, USAIC&FH) and other participants in the MICA-sponsored Hall of Fame Golf Tourna-ment.

Members and guests attend the Hall of Fame Reception.

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DEPARTMENT

Chapter NewsThe Chapter News provides information (activities,

elections, awards, upcoming events, etc) about the ac-tivities of active MICA chapters. We update the News using input from the Chapters and the MICA National Executive Committee’s Chapter Coordinator. A list of active MICA chapters is available on the MICA website at www.micorps.org.

PennsylvaniaChapter: DELMARPA (Delaware-Maryland-

Pennsylvania) Headquarters: Carlisle, PA

Founded: 1 October 2003Chairman Pro Temp: Dr. R. Don Green

Presidents Pro Temp –Delaware: Mr. William JohnsonMaryland: Last call for nominationsPA-East: Mr. John Donaldson, Jr.PA-West: CPT Marcel C. MinutoloSecretary/Treasurer: Last call for nominationsPoint of Contact: Dr. R. Don Green, drdg@prodigy.net

DELMARPA News:

• The Tri-state Honored Military Intelligence Scholar is Mr. John F. Murphy, Jr., Associate Professor, American Military University.

• Washington, DC: Representatives of DELMARPA Chapter attended the Joint Military Intelligence College’s conference, “Science + Technology = Intelligence on Target” at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, Bolling AFB, on 26 September. This conference convened experts from the academe, government and the private sector to discuss the critical partnership between developing scientific and technological solutions to address national security threats. Sessions addressed innovation and application of science and technology(S&T) tools to bioterrorism and hard-targets, developing an effective technology warning system, and strategies for countering terrorism. A panel of intelligence operators, analysts, and technologists discussed integrated S&T solutions to intelligence challenges. The conference closed with a strategic perspective on S&T priorities from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. For more information, visit http://www.fbcinc.com/jmic/ and http://www.dia.mil/college/index.htm.

• Annapolis, MD: The President of the Joint Military Intelligence College Alumni Association invited DELMARPA Chapter Pro Temp Dr. Green to the Association’s brunch of at the US Naval

Academy Officers’ and Faculty Club on 1 October. The event’s keynote speaker was Mr. Elliot Jardines, the Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Open Source and Class of ‘00 Alumni. Mr. Jardines’ entitled his speech, “A Day in the Life on the Senior Staff of the Director of National Intelligence.” For more information, visit http://www.jmicfoundation.org/default.asp.

• Suggested Resources & Directions: “INKognito,” the chapter’s newsletter for Summer 2006 discusses Enigma cipher machines of both WWII and present-day, and highlights of the above mentioned activities! To get a copy via email, send an email to drdg@prodigy.net with “INKognito” in the subject. The DELMARPA Chapter is again accepting nominations for the prestigious Military Intelligence Corps Association’s Knowlton Award! Congratulations to Knowlton Award recipients, whoooaaahhh! MI, Always Out Front!

US Army Field Station Augsburg

Reunion28 October

Jessup, MarylandThe Field Station Augsburg reunion dinner will be at

“Blobs Park” in Jessup, Maryland, from noon to 4pm on 28 October 2006. For more information, contact Bill Doyle at bdoyle3@cox.net or visit the US Army Field Station Augsburg website at www.usafsa.org.

328d Communications Reconnaissance

Company Reunion5-7 November 2006

Charleston, South CarolinaThe 328d Communication Reconnaissance Company

(1950s at Bad Aibling, Germany) will hold a reunion in Charleston, South Carolina, from 5 to 7 November 2006. For more information, contact Jerry Fortenberry at gritsd@telepak.net or visit the ASA Alpiners Reunion Group webpage at http://ww.asa-alpiners.com.

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Knowlton AwardsCW3 Abe Kader

MAJ Adam J. Boyd

SFC Alphonso S. Phillips

SGT Amanda Nicole Pinson

CPT (P) Amos R. Bennett

CPT Ashley Brian Miller

SFC Bernard M. Linhart

CW2 Brian Dickenson

CW2 Brian A. Stearmer

CPT Carmen Lugo-Martinez

Chad M. Keuser

Charles W. Gill, Jr.

CPT Christina M. Girotti

SGM David A. Tyler

COL David E. Servinsky

SFC David F. Nelson

SFC David Lee Clubb

1LT David P. Price

1SG David R. Oxford

CW3 Dennis L. Lindberg

SGT Edward T. Summerell

Special Agent Emiliano F. Sedillo

SFC Eric R. Dean

SFC Eric W. Anderson

CPT Galen R. Kane

Dr. Jacob W. Kipp

SGT Jason R. Thomas

CW4 Joel Giefer

MAJ John Ganino

CW2 Joseph E. Pickerd

CPT Joshua Comstock

SPC Justin Knight

SFC Kenneth Logan Green

CW2 Kevin Gallop

1SG Kevin Theismann

CW3 Kevin G. Boughton

CPT Kristin M. Arney

SSG Laurita A. Vanzant

CPT Lonnie L. Moore

SSG Lynne Snyder

CW2 Mario LaMaestra

LTC Mark J. Mabry

SSG Markus Morrison

CW3 Michael S. Sparks

SFC Patrick A. Lahti

Mr. Randy McMahon

1SG Robert Hall

SPC Robert A. Rosado

MSG Ronald Earl Lauscher

MAJ Shahram Afshar Takmili

Ms. Stephanie Samergedes

Stephen C. Wong

MAJ Steve Stevens

SFC Stuart A. Kreutzer

CW3 Timothy Puccetti

MAJ Timothy J. Parker

MSG Tony W. Dawson

SGT Victor M. Conde

LTC William Spendley, Jr.

DEPARTMENT

Knowlton and Golden Rose Award Receipients for 3rd Quarter 2006

Commander and staff of the 205th MI Brigade with Task Force Vanguard recipients of the Knowlton at Camp Victory, Iraq, in July 2006.

COL Mark Quantock, Commander, 205th MI Brigade, presents the Knowlton to soldiers of Task Force Vanguard during a ceremony at Camp Victory, Iraq, in July 2006.

Golden Rose AwardsMrs. Celeste N. Raymond

Mrs. Crystal Stelle

Mrs. Jennifer A. MacDonald

Mrs. Michelle Jurnak

Mrs. Sabine Phillips

The Knowlton Award recognizes individuals who have contributed significantly to the promotion of Army Mili-tary Intelligence (MI) in ways that stand out in the eyes of the recipients’ superiors, subordinates, and peers. These individuals must also demonstrate the highest standards of integrity and moral character, display an outstanding degree of professional competence, and serve the MI Corps with distinction.

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Constitution of The Military Intelligence Corps Association

States Government. In addition, the Association will not engage in activities which compete with those of any Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) instrument, Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) services, or any other United States Government function using Appropriated Funds (AF).

ARTICLE III – OFFICERS AND EXECUTIVE COUNCILSection 1. Officers

a. The elected officers of the Association shall consist of a President, Vice President, Secretary, and Treasurer, which comprise the Executive Council. If a vacancy oc-curs in the Office of the President, the unexpired term shall be filled by the Vice President. The Executive Council may appoint such other officers as they shall deem necessary, whom along with the Executive Council shall comprise the Executive Committee. Appointed of-ficers shall perform duties as prescribed by the Executive Council. One person may concurrently hold more than one appointed office.

b. All officers shall be subject to removal at any time by the affirmative vote of a majority of the Executive Council.

Section 2. Duties of the Elected Officers of the Association

a. President. The President shall preside at all meet-ings of the Association, call and preside at Executive Council and Executive Committee meetings. The Presi-dent shall sign checks and withdrawal authorizations on behalf of the Association, and the same shall be honored on his signature alone. As the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Association, the President shall have gen-eral and active management of the business affairs and property of the Association, and shall be responsible that all orders and resolutions of the Association and the Ex-ecutive Council are carried into effect.

b. Vice President. The Vice President shall, in the absence or incapacity of the President, perform the duties of the President. The Vice President shall also serve as the Association lead for membership activities, and perform such other duties as may be directed by the President. The Vice President shall sign checks and withdrawal authorizations on behalf of the Association, and the same shall be honored on his signature alone.

c. Secretary. The Secretary shall keep and maintain such records and files as may be required in the conduct of the Association business. He shall act as the official custodian of the Association Bylaws, Charter, and all current and past records. The Secretary shall record

ARTICLE I – NAME AND PURPOSESection 1. Name

The name of this organization is the Military Intelli-gence Corps Association (MICA).

Section 2. Purpose Said Association is a national professional association

organized for fraternal purposes to promote Military In-telligence and support the United States Army Military Intelligence Corps, including, for such purposes, the making of distributions to organizations that qualify as exempt organizations under section 501(c)(3) of the In-ternal Revenue Code, or corresponding section of any future federal tax code.

ARTICLE II – GENERAL PROVISIONSa. The headquarters of the Military Intelligence Corps

Association, hereafter referred to as the Association, is located at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, or such place as the Executive Council shall determine.

b. The Association operates and exists on a military installation only with the consent of the Installation Commander. The consent is contingent on compliance within the requirements and conditions of all Army regu-lations, specifically AR 210-22.

c. Neither the United States Army nor its various agencies shall be obligated, financially or otherwise, by any action of the Association; and the Association will not represent itself as an instrument of the United States Government.

d. The Association will be self-sustaining financially through member contributions and income derived from fund raising events dedicated to promote Military Intelligence and support the United States Army Military Intelligence Corps.

e. All members will understand fully that they are personally liable if the assets of the Association are insuf-ficient to discharge all liabilities. All members will read the Constitution and Bylaws as a condition of member-ship.

f. There shall be no capital stock, and no distribution of profits to any officer, member, or other person; the entire income of the Association, from all sources, shall be applied and used in the conduct of its activities in furtherance of its purpose as set forth in Article I, Sec-tion 2.

g. The Association activities will be directed toward achieving the purpose as set forth in Article I. These activities will not in any way prejudice or discredit the United States Army or other agencies of the United

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1. Individual Members: Anyone who subscribes to the purpose for which the Association is formed.

2. Corporate Members: Any corporation, business, or limited partnership that subscribes to the purpose for which the Association is formed.

Section 2. ApplicationApplication for membership can be made to the As-

sociation Headquarters. The application shall set forth the facts establishing membership, be accompanied by payment of the membership fee, and be submitted to the President for approval. Eligibility being met, the President may grant membership.

Section 3. TerminationMembership in the Association shall remain in force

so long as the member does not violate the provisions of section 5 of this Article and has submitted the appropri-ate membership fee. Membership in this Association may be terminated for cause at any regular or special meeting of the Executive Council upon concurrence of a majority of the members attending said meeting; but only after the member concerned has been advised by written notice of said proposed action at least twenty (20) days prior to such meeting, which written notice shall have been mailed to his address of record retained in the office of the Association, and only after said mem-ber has been given opportunity to be heard at said meet-ing, if member indicated his desire to the President prior to said meeting.

Section 4. RightsAll members of the Association have the privilege of

attending meetings and engaging in discussions at meet-ings and receive the benefits specified in the Bylaws. Only members shall be entitled to hold office and vote. Each member shall have one (1) proxy vote which may be cast either personally or by duly elected proxy.

Section 5. ConductWhen acting on behalf of the Association, members

will conduct themselves in a manner that will not in any way prejudice or discredit the United States Army or other agencies of the United States Government. Any member whose conduct is prejudicial or discredits the Association will have action taken as outlined in section 3, this article.

ARTICLE V – EXPENDITURES AND ACCOUNTING

a. Officers are authorized to expend funds for autho-rized purposes as approved by the Executive Council. The Treasurer may maintain a petty cash fund in an amount approved by the Executive Council.

b. Accounting records of all funds shall be maintained

the minutes of all business meetings of the Associa-tion including actions taken by vote or direction of the President. He shall assist with correspondence of the Association. He shall give notice of all Executive Coun-cil, Executive Committee and membership meetings as requested by the President.

d. Treasurer. The Treasurer shall have charge and custody of all receipts, funds, and securities of the As-sociation, and shall secure them in the name of the Association in such depositories as may be designated by the Executive Council. The Treasurer shall prepare checks and withdrawals for authorization on behalf of the Association. He shall keep accurate and current accounts in books belonging to the Association; collect Association fees as required, and shall render to the Ex-ecutive Council, as required, an account of all his trans-actions as bonded in accordance with policy established by the Executive Council. The Association books shall be reviewed annually and audited as directed by the President.

Section 3. Executive Councila. Elections. The Executive Council is comprised of

the President, Vice President, Treasurer, and Secretary. The officers shall be alternately elected by an annual vote of the Association’s general membership. A plural-ity of votes cast shall be requisite for election. The terms of elected officers shall begin immediately after election and shall continue until their successors have been duly elected. The President shall appoint Executive Council members if vacancies occur.

b. Responsibility and Authority. The Executive Coun-cil shall manage the business and property of the As-sociation consistent with law and this Constitution; shall have power to make and amend the Constitution and Bylaws for its own government, which Bylaws shall not be inconsistent with this Constitution; and shall have the power to provide in the Bylaws for the appointment of such officers and/or employees as it shall deem neces-sary and proper, and to prescribe their duties and com-pensation.

ARTICLE IV – MEMBERSHIPSection 1. Eligibility

a. General. Membership is open to all persons who meet the eligibility criteria specified in paragraph b. of this section. Membership fee shall be determined by the Executive Council. There will be no membership dis-crimination on the basis of race, sex, or national origin. The categories of membership are as follows:

1. Individual Members

2. Corporate Members

b. Qualifications for membership are as follows:

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in accordance with general accounting practices (GAP) and in accordance with AR 210-22.

c. The officers and employees of the Association may receive reimbursement for expenses incurred while performing Association business as prescribed in the Constitution and Bylaws or approved by the Executive Council.

ARTICLE VI – ACTIVITIESa. The Association’s goals and purposes are to:

1. Promote Military Intelligence.

2. Support the United States Army Military Intel-ligence Corps

3. Honor and recognize individuals for their contri-bution to Military Intelligence.

4. Support the Association members and their families.

5. Assist in preserving Military Intelligence history.

6. Educate and provide a forum for sharing Military Intelligence knowledge.

b. The Association shall also have the following pow-ers:

1. To accept, from present and former Military Intelligence personnel, their estates, from other persons and organizations, gifts of pictures, flags, relics, libraries, personal papers, books, manuscripts, files and personal effects. Any such gifts will be donated to the United States Army Military Intelligence Museum in the public interest for sharing knowledge and increasing esprit de corps and pride in the Military Intelligence Corps.

2. The Association is authorized to do all and every-thing necessary, suitable, and proper for the accomplish-ment of any of the goals and purposes or the attainment of any of the objects, or the furtherance of any of the powers hereinbefore set forth, either alone, or in asso-ciation with other corporations, firms, or individuals, and to do every other act or acts, thing or things, incidental or appurtenant to, or growing out of, or connected with the aforesaid objects or purposes, or any part or parts thereof, provided, the same not be inconsistent with the laws under which this Association is organized.

3. The purpose of this Association being purely fraternal, charitable, benevolent, historical, educational, and not for profit or financial gain, no financial gain shall accrue to any Incorporator or Trustee of the Association in the conduct of same; any receipts of the Corpora-tion on excess of authorized expenses shall be held and disposed of by the Association in the furtherance of the goals and purposes herein stated.

Limitations of Powers. No part of the net earnings of the Association shall inure to the benefit of, or be distrib-uted to its members, trustees, officers, or other private

persons, except that the corporation shall be authorized and empowered to pay reasonable compensation for services rendered and to make payments and distribu-tions in furtherance of the purposes set forth in Article I, Section 2 thereof. No substantial part of the activities of the Association shall be carrying on of propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, and the corporation shall not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distribution of statements) any political campaign on behalf of any candidates for public office. Notwithstanding any other provisions of these articles, the Association shall not carry on any other activities not permitted to be carried on (a) by a corporation exempt from federal income tax under sec-tions 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, or cor-responding section of any future federal tax code, or (b) by a corporation, contributions to which are deductible under section 170 (c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, or corresponding section of any future federal tax code.

ARTICLE VII – AMENDMENTS Section 1. Adoption

This Constitution shall become effective when ap-proved by a majority of the Association members, sub-ject to review in accordance with AR 210-22.

Section 2. AmendmentsThis Constitution may be amended or repealed by a

vote of the members of the Association present personal-ly or by proxy at a duly called meeting of the Association, provided that the notice of intent to amend or repeal, contains, (as well as) a copy of the proposed amend-ment or repeal. Following membership vote, changes/amendments to the Constitution will be submitted in accordance with AR 210-22. Recommendations for amendment or repeal can be presented to the President, in writing, signed by not less than ten (10) members of the Association, at least two (2) months before the date of the meeting at which the proposed amendment or repeal is to be considered. Bylaws may be established, amended, or repealed by a majority vote of the Execu-tive Council.

ARTICLE VIII – DISSOLUTIONIn case of dissolution of the Association, whatever

funds are contained in the treasury at the time will be used to satisfy any outstanding debts, liabilities, or ob-ligations. Upon the dissolution of the Association, the residual balance of these assets shall be donated to a charitable organization which is exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Any other as-sets of the Association not converted to cash upon dis-solution shall be sold to the highest bidder at public or private sale, and the proceeds of the sale, after expenses donated to a charitable organization which is exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.

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MICA is the national professional fraternal associa-tion of the US Army Military Intelligence Corps.

The objectives of MICA are to:n Preserve history

n Educate leaders

n Honor professionals

n Share knowledge

n Provide support programs

Awards ProgramThe Knowlton Award recognizes select individu-

als who have contributed significantly to Military Intelligence

The Golden Rose Award recognizes a spouse whose volunteer service contributes to mission ac-complishment

Scholarship ProgramMICA provides scholarships for members and

their families

Museum ProgramMICA supports the Military Intelligence Museum

MICA is a non-profit organizationJoin online at www.micorps.org/join

Submissions GuidelinesWhen writing an article, select a topic relevant to the MICA

membership. The goal is to spark discussion and add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps. Propose changes, describe a new theory or dispute an existing one. Explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or discuss how a new piece of technology will change the way we operate.

When writing for THE VANGUARD, please consider the follow-ing:

• Feature articles, in most cases, should be under 3000 words, double-spaced pages with normal margins, not count-ing graphics without embedded graphics. Maximum length is 5,000 words.

• Be concise and maintain the active voice as much as possible.

• We cannot guarantee we will publish all submitted articles and it may take more than a year to publish some articles.

• Be aware that submissions become property of THE VAN-GUARD and may be released to other government agencies or non-profit organizations for republication upon request.

What we need from you:

• Cover Letter – A cover letter with your work and home email addresses, work telephone number, and a comment stating your desire to have your article published. We accept electronic or hardcopy cover letters.

• Security Release – A security release signed by your local security officer stating that your article and any accompany-ing graphics and pictures are unclassified, non-sensitive, and releasable in the public domain.

• Publication Release - A publication release if your or-ganization requires it. Please include that release with your submission.

• Graphics – Any pictures, graphics, crests, or logos which are relevant to your topic and enliven the article. We need complete captions (who, what, where, when, why and how), the photographer’s credits, and the author’s name on the pho-tos. Please note where they should appear in the text.

• Biography – The full name of each author in the byline and a short biography for each. The biography should include the author’s current duty assignment, related assignments, relevant civilian education and degrees, and any other spe-cial qualifications. Please indicate whether we can print your contact information, email address and phone numbers with the biography.

In what format:

• Text - Your article in Microsoft Word. Do not use special document templates.

• Graphics - Please do not embed graphics or images within the text, attach them separately. Images should be sent to us in .tif or .jpg formats.

THE VANGUARD staff will edit the articles and put them in a style and format appropriate for the journal. From time to time, we will contact you during the edit process to ensure a quality product. Please inform us of any changes in contact information.

Submit articles and graphics to vanguard@micorps.org or mail (on disk or CD) to:

MICA VanguardP.O. Box 13020Fort Huachuca, AZ 85670-3020If you have any questions, please email us at

vanguard@micorps.org.

THE VANGUARDMilitrary Intelligence Corps AssociationP.O. Box 13020Fort Huachuca, AZ 85670-3020

NONPROFIT ORGUS POSTAGE PAIDSIERRA VISTA, AZPERMIT NO. 154