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REPORT NO. 95-28

STATE OF FLORIDA

OFFICE OFPROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS ANDGOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

POLICY REVIEWOF THE

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS’

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER STAFFING

January 10, 1996

The Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountabilitywas established by the 1994 Florida Legislature to play a major role inreviewing the performance of state agencies under performance-basedbudgeting and to increase the visibility and usefulness of performance audits.The Office was staffed by transferring the Program Audit Division staff of theAuditor General’s Office to the Office of Program Policy Analysis andGovernment Accountability. The Office is a unit of the Office of the AuditorGeneral but operates independently and reports to the Legislature.

This Office conducts studies and issues a variety of reports, such aspolicy analyses, justification reviews, program evaluations, and performanceaudits. These reports provide in-depth analyses of individual state programsand functions. Reports may focus on a wide variety of issues, such as:

Whether a program is effectively serving its intended purpose;

Whether a program is operating within current revenue resources;

Goals, objectives, and performance measures used to monitor andreport program accomplishments;

Structure and design of a program to accomplish its goals andobjectives; and

Alternative methods of providing program services or products.

The objective of these reports is to provide accurate, reliableinformation that the Legislature or an agency can use to improve publicprograms.

Copies of this report in print or alternate accessible format may be obtained bycontacting Report Production by voice at (904) 488-0021 or (800) 531-2477 or(904) 487-3804/FAX.

Permission is granted to reproduce this report.

OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS ANDGOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

JAMES L. CARPENTERINTERIM DIRECTOR

January 10, 1996

The President of the Senate,the Speaker of the House of Representatives,and the Legislative Auditing Committee

I have directed that a policy review be made of theDepartment of Corrections’ Correctional Officer Staffing. The results of thereview are presented to you in this report. This review was made at therequest of the Joint Legislative Auditing Committee. This review wasconducted by Charles Barrett and Sabrina Hartley under the supervision ofD. Byron Brown.

We wish to express our appreciation to the staff of theDepartment of Corrections for their assistance.

Respectfully yours,

James L. CarpenterInterim Director

111 WEST MADISON STREET ROOM 312 POST OFFICE BOX 1735 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32302904/488-0021 SUNCOM 278-0021 FAX 904/487-3804

OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS ANDGOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

JAMES L. CARPENTERINTERIM DIRECTOR

January 10, 1996

The President of the Senate,the Speaker of the House of Representatives,and the Legislative Auditing Committee

I have directed that a policy review be made of theDepartment of Corrections’ Correctional Officer Staffing. The results of thereview are presented to you in this report. This review was made at therequest of the Joint Legislative Auditing Committee.

We wish to express our appreciation to the staff of theDepartment of Corrections for their assistance.

Respectfully yours,

James L. CarpenterInterim Director

Review supervised by:

D. Byron Brown

Review made by: Review reviewed by:

Charles F. Barrett Gloria I. Berry

111 WEST MADISON STREET ROOM 312 POST OFFICE BOX 1735 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32302904/488-0021 SUNCOM 278-0021 FAX 904/487-3804

ContentsContents

Summary i

CHAPTER I BACKGROUND 1

CHAPTER II CURRENT STAFFING LEVELS 4

Finding 1Although maintaining an adequate level of staffing isone way the Department of Corrections protects thepublic from incarcerated felons, the Departmentoperated its prisons during the 1994-95 fiscal yearwith about 80% of its officer posts filled. Theprisons were frequently staffed with the minimumnumber of officers needed to ensure public safety. 4

Finding 2When the institutions operate at or near their criticalcomplement, the Department’s ability to ensure thatinmates follow institution rules and the safety of thepublic, officers, and inmates is diminished. TheDepartment also must rely on inexperienced orfatigued staff. Furthermore, recent policy changesplace additional demands on correctional officers’efforts to manage inmates. 9

Finding 3The primary cause for operating at lower staffinglevels appears to be the Department’s inability toretain correctional officers. When officers must bereplaced, the Department often hires non-certifiedcandidates who are not available to staff theinstitutions for 13 or more weeks during training.Other factors that cause low staffing are anunderfunded relief factor and the practice ofintentionally maintaining position vacancies. 15

Contents (Continued)

CHAPTER IIIDETERMINING THE NEED FOR CORRECTIONAL

OFFICERS 25

The Department relies on an informal process todetermine its officer staffing requirements and has notdeveloped written criteria specifying the factors usedin determining its staffing needs. Without a moresystematic process for assessing the need forcorrectional officers, the Legislature and otherdecision makers cannot determine the reasonablenessof staffing levels or evaluate the Department’srequests for additional staff positions. 25

APPENDICES 27

A. General Information on Major CorrectionalInstitutions 28

B. Response From the Department of Corrections 30

No. 95-28

Summary

Policy Review of theDepartment of Corrections’Correctional Officer Staffing

Purpose Our review addressed four primary questions:

What is the current correctional officer staffing levelat the state’s correctional institutions?

What are the consequences of current Departmentcorrectional officer staffing levels?

What are the causes of current Departmentcorrectional officer staffing levels?

Does the Department have a process for determiningthe number of correctional officers needed at itscorrectional institutions?

Conclusions

Institutions OperateBelow Their AuthorizedStaffing Levels

Florida’s prisons are operating with a level of officerstaffing significantly below the number of staff authorizedby the Legislature. The institutions frequently operate at ornear their critical complement level of staffing which isintended for short-term situations, when there is a staffingshortage. When an institution has only a criticalcomplement of staff on duty, there are a limited number ofofficers available to resolve problems or emergencies thatarise.

As a result of operating at low staffing levels, theConsequences ofLow Staffing Levels Department does not always have enough staff to ensure

that inmates are following institution rules, which canincrease the danger for staff, other inmates, and the public.We also found that the Department is managing itsinstitutions with a high number of inexperienced officers,who can potentially be manipulated by inmates to breakrules; and officers are often asked to work double shifts, apractice that can result in fatigue and diminished alertness.Furthermore, as Florida implements policies designed toincrease the punitive effect of incarceration, the burden on

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officers to maintain control is increased. AlthoughFlorida’s prison system has been relatively free of majordisturbances and escapes, we observed that current staffinglevels create numerous situations which could be potentiallydangerous for staff, for inmates, and ultimately for thepublic.

Department officials that we interviewed were aware of thepotential risks associated with operating institutions at ornear their critical complements and were making attemptsto increase the security of the institutions. State levelofficials were monitoring the frequency of escapes andassaults, and, in the statewide security assessmentconducted in early 1995, had attempted to identify securityneeds. The Department has made efforts over the past twoyears to enhance the perimeter security of its institutionsthrough the installation of additional physical barriers, suchas layers of razor wire, at many institutions.

The Department’s inability to retain the correctional officersMajor Causes ofLow Officer StaffingLevels

it hires is the primary cause for the low staffing levels ofcorrectional officers in Florida’s prisons. A second cause isthe use of an outdated relief factor that does not provideenough staff to cover officer absences from work. Whencombined with these two causes, the practice of someinstitutions to intentionally maintain vacancies in order tobalance institutional budgets creates an ongoing problem oflow staffing levels.

Although we identified several potential adverseDepartment Does NotHave Written Criteriato Determine OfficerStaffing Needs

consequences that result from the current level of staffing,we cannot determine whether increasing staff beyondpresently authorized levels is necessary to allow theDepartment to achieve its mission. It is possible thathaving all authorized positions filled may adequatelyaddress the current security needs of the Department.

Recommendations

Funding the Relief Factor

The Department must maintain an adequate level of staffingto ensure the security and safety of its correctionalinstitutions. Therefore, we believe that the Legislatureshould address those factors that have contributed to thecurrent low levels of staffing. We recommend that the

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Legislature establish as a high priority the funding of therelief factor to reflect changes in correctional officerabsences since 1968 so that enough authorized positionswill be provided to adequately staff all 7-day posts.

To reduce the rate of officer turnover, the Legislature andReduce Officer Turnoverthe Department should focus efforts on improving theretention of correctional officers. We believe this could beaddressed through three primary efforts:

Revising policies to discourage newly certifiedofficers from leaving the Department for localgovernment positions after the state has paidsalaries and benefits during their certificationtraining period. The Legislature and the Departmentshould consider options that would increase theincentive for trained officers to stay with theDepartment and reduce the up front costs incurred bythe Department to train new officers;

Addressing correctional officer working conditions.We recommend the Department increase its efforts toidentify and address the working conditions thatcontribute to officer turnover, in order to increase theretention of correctional officers; and

As resources are available, providing funds for thestep pay plan. To provide increased incentive forexperienced officers to stay with the Department, werecommend that the Legislature consider providingfunds to allow the Department to compensateexperienced correctional officers in accordance withthe step pay plan negotiated by the Department ofManagement Services and the correctional officers’union.

For the Department to efficiently accomplish its mission itDevelop Written Criteriato Define OfficerStaffing Needs

must have sufficient staff to provide a safe environment andprotect the public, institution staff, and inmates. Writtencriteria will enable the Department to define its staffingneeds and allow decision makers to evaluate thereasonableness of staffing requests. To ensure consistencyand to provide a measure for evaluation, we recommend the

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Department develop written criteria to determine thenumber of correctional staff needed. In addition, asconditions, inmates, and institutions change, we recommendthe Department conduct assessments of its staffingrequirements on a routine basis in order to ensure thatsecurity staffing needs are accurately identified.

Response tothis Review

The Secretary of the Department of Corrections agreed withthe issues raised in our preliminary and tentative report anddescribed actions the Department is taking to address ourconcerns.

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Policy Review of theDepartment of Corrections’Correctional Officer Staffing

CHAPTER I Background

The Department of Corrections is responsible for thesupervision, protective care, and control of inmates who aresentenced to the Florida prison system. The Department’smission includes the protection of public safety and theprovision of a safe and humane environment for staff andinmates. To meet this mission the Department hasdeveloped several objectives that include establishingsecurity components commensurate with standards, physicalsecurity, and mission requirements; reducing the rate offelony crimes committed by offenders while incarcerated;compensating correctional officers equitably whencompared to other state law enforcement officers; andreducing correctional officer turnover. Correctional officersserve as the security force for the institutions and assumecharge of inmates.

During the 1994-95 fiscal year, the Department operated orhad under construction a total of 53 major correctionalinstitutions supervising an average inmate population of45,303 inmates.1 The institutions are assigned to one offive regions whose staff serve as advisors and provideoversight to the institutions. The Department operated infiscal year 1994-95 with an annual budget of $652 millionappropriated to its major institutions. The majorcorrectional institutions have approximately 17,000authorized positions, of which approximately 15,000 arecorrectional officers. These officers include the ranks ofcorrectional officer, sergeant, lieutenant, captain, major, andcolonel.

1 Florida’s prison system also includes other correctional facilities such as workcamps, community correctional centers, and drug treatment centers.

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The primary responsibility of correctional officers is tomaintain the security and safety of the correctionalinstitution and its staff and inmates. These officers areresponsible for the supervision, custody, care, control, andphysical restraint of inmates. Depending on their particularduty assignment they are required to supervise inmates inhousing units and instruct them in housekeeping andsanitation; supervise inmates performing unskilled andsemi-skilled work; counsel inmates regarding institutional,domestic, and emotional adjustment problems; assist inmaintaining security by participating in searches to preventthe introduction of contraband; and maintain proficiency infirearms, emergency measures, communication equipment,and other security equipment. To meet the requirements ofa correctional officer an individual must be at least 19 yearsof age, have a high school diploma or its equivalent, be ofgood moral character, complete training in a certifiedtraining program, and pass the state’s standardizedcertification exam.2

The Department’s 53 institutions differ in their inmatepopulation, custody level, and housing design. Thesedifferences affect the requirements for resources toefficiently and effectively operate the institution. Inreviewing correctional officer staffing, we visited 12 majorcorrectional institutions to observe operations, interviewstaff, and obtain data relating to correctional officerstaffing. 3 A description of the 12 institutions is includedin Exhibit 1 and a description of all 53 correctionalinstitutions in included in Appendix A.

2 The requirement to pass a certification exam became effective for officers certifiedon or after May 15, 1993. Other training requirements were established in 1984.

3 We also visited Franklin Work Camp and Brooksville Drug Treatment Center butconfined our analysis to the major correctional institutions.

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Exhibit 1: General Information on Major Correctional Institutions 1

CorrectionalInstitution

LawfulCapacity

Number ofAuthorized

Security OfficersJune 30, 1995

Ratio ofInmates Per

Security Officer

HighestCustodyLevel 2 Housing3

Apalachee 1,564 355 4.41 Close Dorms

Brevard 768 186 4.13 Close Mixed

Broward 540 167 3.23 Close Mixed

Cross City 812 175 4.64 Close Mixed

Glades 1,181 219 5.39 Close Open Bay

Gulf 1,095 211 5.19 Close Mixed

Jackson 1,128 208 5.42 Close Mixed

Martin 1,077 232 4.64 Close Cells

Polk 995 182 5.47 Close Mixed

South FloridaReception Center 1,968 416 4.73 Close Mixed

Tomoka 993 210 4.73 Close Mixed

Union 1,432 422 3.39 Close Mixed

1The figures presented here do not include work camps, road prisons, or forestry camps.

2Close custody is the most secure of the Department’s three primary custody classifications (minimum, medium, and close). Allbut four of the state’s major correctional institutions house all three classifications of inmates.

3The Department uses a variety of housing designs within its institutions, which can be labeled either dormitories or cells. Mostof the Department’s inmates are housed in open bay dormitories, where 75 or more inmates sleep in bunks lined up in a largeroom. Some institutions have dormitories with smaller rooms. Cell housing units typically place inmates in one or two personcells which can be locked to restrict inmate movement. Most of the state’s major institutions in Florida have dormitories with alimited number of cell units.

Source: Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability analysis of data provided by the Department of Corrections.

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CHAPTER II Current Staffing Levels

Our review addressed four primary questions:

What is the current correctional officer staffing levelat the state’s correctional institutions?

What are the consequences of current Departmentcorrectional officer staffing levels?

What are the causes of current Departmentcorrectional officer staffing levels?

Does the Department have a process for determiningthe number of correctional officers needed at itscorrectional institutions? (See Chapter III.)

Finding 1

Although maintaining an adequate level of staffing isone way the Department of Corrections protects thepublic from incarcerated felons, the Departmentoperated its prisons during the 1994-95 fiscal yearwith about 80% of its officer posts filled. Theprisons were frequently staffed with the minimumnumber of officers needed to ensure public safety.

Maintaining an adequate level of officer staffing to manageStaffing Levelsviolent offenders is essential to protecting the safety of thepublic, as well as the safety of staff and other inmates.When a sufficient number of officers are not available tosupervise offenders and to manage prison operations,violence or other criminal activity can occur, and inmateswill try to escape. We found that the institutions rarelyoperate at their authorized security staffing levels. Ouranalysis of staffing levels showed that, during fiscal year1994-95, institutions operated with an average of 80% oftheir authorized officer posts filled. Furthermore,approximately 31% of the shifts in our sample were staffedwith the minimum number of officers needed.

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The Department uses two terms to describe levels ofcorrectional officer staffing at its institutions: "post pattern"and "critical complement." Post pattern refers to theauthorized level of officer staffing assigned to eachinstitution by the Department. The post pattern for eachinstitution is developed by Department central office staffbased upon such factors as the design and mission of theinstitution. The post pattern includes the listing of officerassignments for each shift at an institution. Officers areassigned to posts, such as the institution’s control room,inmate dormitories, vehicle gates, and perimeter towers.The number of officers assigned to various posts isdetermined by informal criteria such as staffing plans forspecific types of housing units, maintaining equitablestaffing among institutions, experience, and the professionaljudgment of Department officials. Officers are dividedamong three 7-day shifts and one 5-day administrative shift.(See Exhibit 2 for an example of a post pattern.)

Each institution has set a critical complement, or minimumnumber of officer posts that are to be filled on each shift.Each institution determines its critical complement withapproval from the Department. The critical complement isintended for short-term situations in which there is astaffing shortage due to vacancies, leave, training, or otherstaffing obligations. The critical complement varies foreach institution by shift and is based on determining theposts that must be staffed on each shift. For example,instead of three officers in each dorm as called for by thepost chart, the critical complement may call for one officerin each dorm with another officer roving between twodorms. Generally, about 75% of the positions in the postpattern are designated critical. In Section 2 we discuss theconsequences that result from institutions operating at theircritical complement.

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Exhibit 2: Sample Post Staffing Pattern

Tomoka Correctional InstitutionPost Staffing Pattern

June 1995 — 1,131 Inmates — 210 Authorized Staff[Critical Complement is indicated in parenthesis - (#)]

7-Day Posts1st Shift

12 AM -- 8 AM2nd Shift

8 AM -- 4 PM3rd Shift

4 PM -- 12 AM

Shift Captain 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1)

Control Room 2 (2) 2 (2) 2 (2)

Internal Security 2 (2) 3 (1) 2 (1)

Perimeter Security 6 (6) 6 (6) 6 (6)

Housing (7 dorms) 21 (13) 21 (12) 22 (19)

Confinement Unit 2 (2) 2 (2) 2 (2)

Protective Management Unit 1 (1) 4 (2) 4 (1)

Services Building 0 1 (1) 1 (1)

Utility 0 1 0

Vehicle Gate 0 1 (1) 0

Escorts 0 4 (2) 0

Total Official 7-Day Posts35 (27) 46 (30) 40 (33)

121 = 7-Day posts for all three shifts

Total Authorized Officer Positions(1.573 positions for each 7-Day post)

55 73 63

191 = Authorized positions to cover 7-Day posts

5-Day Administrative Posts - (19 total):Colonel (Chief Correctional Officer); Administrative Lieutenant; Environmental/Safety Sergeant;Property/Orientation Sergeant; Protective Management Sergeant; Key and Lock Sergeant; Canine Sergeant;Arsenal Sergeant; Headquarters Security Officer; Utility Officer; Mail Room Officer; Security Officer forIndustries Area; and Work Squad Sergeant and 6 Work Squad Officers.

Source: Daily duty rosters and security post chart from Tomoka Correctional Institution.

To review the actual staffing levels at Florida’s institutions,we obtained data from the Department and all of theinstitutions, visited 12 institutions to interviewadministrators and officers, and interviewed regional andcentral office staff. We compiled data provided by theDepartment on the post patterns and the criticalcomplements for all of the institutions operating in fiscal

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year 1994-95. In addition, we compiled data on a selectivesample of staffing daily rosters for 14 days at 44correctional institutions (50 facilities) for the sameperiod.4 We then compared the actual staffing patterns tothe post patterns and critical complements for each of theinstitutions to identify to what extent the institutionsoperated below their authorized staffing levels (postpatterns) and at or close to their critical complements.

Florida’s prisons rarely operate at the authorized level ofstaffing for the institution. We found that the averagenumber of authorized positions (post pattern) for each shiftfor the 50 correctional facilities was about 34 officers, butthe average number of staff on post duty was less than 28officers, or about 80% of the authorized posts. Of the2,055 shifts in our sample, all authorized posts were filledon only 58 shifts, or 2.8%.5 Twenty-nine facilities werenot fully staffed for any of the shifts in our sample.

Institutions frequently operate with the minimum number ofofficers that can safely staff the institution. In our sample,the institutions operated at or below their criticalcomplement on 31% of the shifts.6 Forty-five of the 50facilities had at least one shift in our sample that operatedat or below the critical complement. (See Exhibit 3 forcomparison of post pattern, critical complement and actualstaffing at selected institutions.) When an institution is ator near its critical complement, most officers are assignedto posts that they should not leave, and thus are notavailable to resolve problems or emergencies, such asbreaking up fights or escorting inmates to the clinic. Sucha situation creates a risk for officers who may not receiveprompt assistance from other officers in attempting tosubdue an inmate. In addition, because of the temptation

4 Some institutions have two major units that operate somewhat independently fromeach other. For example, Apalachee Correctional Institution consists of East and Westunits, and the South Florida Reception Center consists of Main and South units. For thepurposes of our analysis, we considered these units separately, and therefore refer to 50facilities.

5 We did not include 5-day administrative shifts in our review.

6 An institution may operate below the official critical complement in specialsituations where a position designated as critical may not have been needed. Examplesinclude: closed confinement areas, closed dormitories, or medical escorts not needed.

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for officers to leave assigned posts to provide assistance toa fellow officer, there is a potential breach of security.

Exhibit 3: Comparison of Post Pattern, Critical Complement, and Actual Staffing atSelected Institutions, 1994-95 Fiscal Year

CorrectionalInstitution

AveragePost Positions

Per Shift

AverageCritical

ComplementPer Shift

AverageActual Staff

Per Shift

Percent of Shifts

Staffed atPost Pattern

Staffed at orBelow CriticalComplement

Statewide 34.4 25.4 27.6 2.8% 30.7%

Glades 26.7 20.3 20.9 0.0% 58.3%

Tomoka 40.3 29.5 30.9 0.0% 52.4%

Broward 30.3 22.7 23.0 0.0% 47.6%

Apalachee East 34.0 24.7 26.4 0.0% 28.6%

Cross City 32.7 27.6 29.5 9.5% 26.2%

Brevard 33.7 25.7 27.8 2.4% 21.4%

Martin 39.3 27.3 31.3 0.0% 14.3%

Apalachee West 32.7 23.1 25.6 0.0% 9.5%

Polk 35.0 22.3 26.0 0.0% 7.1%

Gulf 39.7 27.3 33.5 2.4% 0.0%

South FloridaReception Center(Main) 46.7 35.5 41.4 4.8% 0.0%

Jackson 38.3 26.4 31.3 0.0% 0.0%

Union 70.0 48.0 55.5 0.0% 0.0%


Florida’s prisons are operating with a level of officerConclusionstaffing significantly below the number of staff authorizedby the Legislature. The institutions frequently operate at ornear their critical complement level of staffing which isintended for short-term situations, when there is a staffingshortage. When an institution has only a criticalcomplement of staff on duty, there are a limited number ofofficers available to resolve problems or emergencies thatarise. We discuss the consequences of current staffinglevels in Section 2, and the primary reasons why the

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institutions are frequently operating at their criticalcomplement in Section 3.

Finding 2

When the institutions operate at or near their criticalcomplement, the Department’s ability to ensure thatinmates follow institution rules and the safety of thepublic, officers, and inmates is diminished. TheDepartment also must rely on inexperienced orfatigued staff. Furthermore, recent policy changesplace additional demands on correctional officers’efforts to manage inmates.

To determine the consequences of Department staffingConsequences ofCurrent Staffing Levels levels, we visited 12 correctional institutions to interview

all levels of security staff and conduct focus groupdiscussions with correctional officers and sergeants. Weconducted visits during weekend and evening hours as wellas during the weekdays in order to observe and obtaincomments from staff on multiple shifts. Based on theseinterviews and our observations we identified three majorproblems associated with the institutions continuouslyoperating at or close to their critical complement:

The Department’s ability to ensure that inmatesfollow institution rules, and the safety of officers,inmates and the public is diminished;

At some institutions, the Department provides staffcoverage that is inexperienced and includes someofficers working 16-hour days; and

Recent correctional policy changes by the Legislatureplace additional demands on correctional officers’efforts to manage inmates.

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Requiring inmates to follow institution rules is integral toOperating at CriticalComplement Diminishes theDepartment’s Ability toEnsure That Inmates FollowInstitution Rules and ThatStaff, Inmates, and thePublic Are Protected

maintaining discipline and ensuring the safety of staff, otherinmates, and the public. Examples of incidents that couldthreaten safety include escape attempts, assaults on staff,and assaults on other inmates. Officers try to prevent suchincidents by following standard correctional practicesdesigned to minimize the opportunity for their occurrence.The Department has increased the safety to the public byreducing inmate escapes with the addition of securityenhancements to the institutions. However, staff andinmates continue to be at risk as indicated by the increasesin the number of reported assaults over the past two years.(See Exhibit 4.)

Exhibit 4: Reported Incidents at Correctional Facilities

CalendarYear

Escapes(Major Institutions Only)1

Inmate Assaults(At All Correctional Facilities)2

Staff Inmates

1992 38 281 773

1993 56 293 941

1994 48 436 853

1995 22 597 1,002

1Escapes in 1992 were annualized based on July-December 1992 data and 1995escapes were annualized based on January-October 1995 data.

2Assaults in 1995 were annualized based on January-September 1995 data.

Source: Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability analysis ofdata provided by the Department of Corrections.

At current Department staffing levels, we noted severalfactors that restrict the ability of officers to effectivelyenforce Department rules and to protect staff and inmates,and ultimately the public, from danger. For example:

At 6 of the 12 institutions we visited, one correctionalofficer supervised 100 or more inmates in an inmatehousing unit. In such a setting, officers havedifficulty effectively enforcing discipline amonginmates, regulating inmate movements and activities

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within dormitories, and ensuring that inmates followrules;

Correctional officers are required to conduct frequentsearches of buildings, inmates, and inmate property todetect the presence of contraband such as drugs,alcohol, and weapons within the prison. At 7 of the12 institutions we visited, officers told us that suchsearches are done less frequently when staffed at orclose to critical complement;

When an institution is staffed at or near its criticalcomplement, there are a limited number of officerswho are available to respond to emergencies. Ifofficers respond to a disturbance in one part of theinstitution, then that typically leaves other parts of theinstitution vulnerable. As a result, there may not beenough correctional officers to promptly respond toinmate fights, disturbances, or attacks upon staff. Asshown in Exhibit 4, the number of assaults by inmateson staff and other inmates has been increasing.Department officials indicated that an individualofficer should not attempt to break up fights betweeninmates until additional officers arrive; and

Officers working alone at a post rely on equipmentsuch as radios and telephones to maintain contact withother officers. At 9 of the 12 institutions we visited,we observed or were told of equipment that did notwork, such as radios that could not communicate withthe control room, or fence motion sensors that did notdetect movements.

During our interviews with institution officials and focusInexperienced Officersand Officers WorkingDouble Shifts May Affectthe Institution’s Abilityto Carry Out Its SecurityResponsibilities, EspeciallyWhen Operating atCritical Complement

groups with officers, officer inexperience and the practiceof working double shifts were two issues raised that mayaffect the security of the institution. Institution officialsstated that these factors can diminish the effectiveness ofcorrectional officers in performing their duties.

Inexperience can create a problem because many inmateshave been in the institution much longer than the officers.The inmates are often more familiar with an officer’s

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responsibilities than are new and inexperienced officers.This gives the inmates the opportunity to manipulate newand inexperienced staff to violate or ignore institution rules.We identified shifts at critical complement in which asmany as 8 of the 24 officers on duty were trainees. Wewere also told by officers that trainees are occasionallyasked to perform duties that should be performed bycertified officers, such as working the dorm alone, oraccompanying inmates as a medical escort. Correctionalofficers and sergeants cited the number of inexperiencedstaff as a problem. Personnel data as of June 30, 1995,shows that of the 13,369 correctional officers and sergeants,22.4% have less than one year experience and 43.7% havefive or more years experience. (See Exhibit 5.) Incontrast, the state’s Annual Workforce Report for calendaryear 1994 shows 61% of career service personnel withmore than five years of continuous service.7

Exhibit 5: Experience Levels of Correctional Officersand Sergeants, as of June 30, 1995

Length of Servicewith the Department Number Percent

Less than 1 year 2,996 22.4%

At least 1 year but less than 2 1,569 11.7%

At least 2 years but less than 3 1,264 9.5%

At least 3 years but less than 4 633 4.7%

At least 4 years but less than 5 1,064 8.0%

5 years or more 5,843 43.7%

Totals 13,369 100.0%

Source: Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability analysis ofCOPES data.

7 State of Florida Annual Workforce Report. Calendar Year 1994. Department ofManagement Services.

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Fatigue may cause officers to perform their jobs lessdiligently. The alertness of officers working double shiftsmay be diminished, and officers may become indifferent toinmate actions. In order to meet the critical complement,the Department sometimes requires officers to work doubleshifts (16 straight hours). Although the frequency of suchdouble shifts could not be determined from most of thedaily rosters in our sample, we did note at least teninstitutions in which officers were working double shifts.At one institution, we noted one 4 p.m. to 12 midnight shiftin which 12 of the 21 officers on duty were on their secondshift of the day.

One of the primary concerns of corrections officials is theRecent Legislative Changesin Correctional PoliciesPlace Additional Demands onCorrectional Officers’Efforts to Manage Inmates

potential for violence that exists within the institutions.Florida’s institutions have largely avoided incidents such asgroup violence, hostage taking, or arson, that endanger staffand the public. However, recent legislative changes haveplaced additional burdens on the Department. Legislativepolicy changes in the last few years have:

Increased the legal capacity of correctional institutionsto 150% of design capacity, potentially placing largernumbers of inmates in areas supervised by eachcorrectional officer;

Required offenders to serve a minimum of 85% oftheir imposed sentences, limiting the amount of gain-time that the Department can use to encourage goodbehavior; and

Restricted the use of Inmate Welfare Trust Fundmonies to purchase recreational equipment, potentiallylimiting the use of recreation as an inmatemanagement activity.

Based upon the concerns that we identified at Florida’sprisons at current staffing levels, our review suggests thatthe combined effect of these changes may make it moredifficult for the Department to safely and effectivelymanage institutions with low staffing levels. (SeeExhibit 6.)

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Exhibit 6: Potential Effects of Legislative Policy Changes

Policy Change Desired EffectPotential Adverse Effects on

Safe Management of Institutions

150% ofDesign Capacity

Enable state to house moreprisoners in existing space withouthaving to release inmates fromprison early to avoid prisonovercrowding.

Increases the number of inmatesthat officers must supervise.

Serve 85% of Sentence Require offenders to serve bulk ofsentence without early release.

Awarding and rescinding gain-timeearnings is one of the primarytools for managing behavior;reduced awards may diminish theeffects of gain-time.

Cannot Use InmateWelfare Trust Fund toPurchase RecreationalEquipment

Direct the use of those fundsobtained from profits of canteensand inmate phone calls to morebeneficial activities such aseducation and substance abusetreatment.

It is easier for officers to superviselarge numbers of inmates when theinmates a re engaged inrecreational activities.

Source: Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability.

Department officials that we interviewed were aware of theConclusionspotential risks associated with operating institutions at ornear their critical complements and were making attemptsto increase the security of the institutions. State levelofficials were monitoring the frequency of escapes andassaults, and, in the statewide security assessmentconducted in early 1995, had attempted to identify securityneeds. The Department has made efforts over the past twoyears to enhance the perimeter security of its institutionsthrough the installation of additional physical barriers, suchas layers of razor wire, at many institutions.

Despite these efforts, institutions continuing to operate withcorrectional officer staffing at or near the criticalcomplement creates several potentially adverseconsequences for the institutions. The Department does notalways have enough staff to ensure that inmates arefollowing institution rules, which can increase the dangerfor staff, other inmates, and the public; the Department ismanaging its institutions with a high number ofinexperienced officers, who can potentially be manipulated

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by inmates to break rules; and officers are often asked towork double shifts, a practice that can result in fatigue anddiminished alertness. Furthermore, as Florida implementspolicies designed to increase the punitive effect ofincarceration, the burden on officers to maintain control isincreased. Although Florida’s prison system has beenrelatively free of major disturbances and escapes, weobserved that current staffing levels create numeroussituations which could be potentially dangerous for staff,for other inmates, and ultimately for the public. In the nextsection, we discuss why staffing levels are below authorizedlevels.

Finding 3

The primary cause for operating at lower staffinglevels appears to be the Department’s inability toretain correctional officers. When officers must bereplaced, the Department often hires non-certifiedcandidates who are not available to staff theinstitutions for 13 or more weeks during training.Other factors that cause low staffing are anunderfunded relief factor and the practice ofintentionally maintaining position vacancies.

To determine why actual staffing patterns were soCauses of CurrentStaffing Levels consistently below the authorized levels, we interviewed

institution administrators, officers, and personnel directorsat the 12 institutions we visited, and the fiscal and securitystaff at each of the five regional offices. We identifiedthree major factors that contribute to the operation of mostshifts at or close to their critical complements: the inabilityto retain correctional officers, an underfunded relief factor,and correctional officer vacancies.

The primary cause of low officer staffing levels is theInability to RetainCorrectional Officers Department’s inability to effectively retain the correctional

officers it hires. The turnover rate for correctional officersis among the highest turnover rates for employment classesin Florida. The Department of Management Servicesreported that the annual turnover for correctional officers in1994 was 22%; the state average for all positions was13.4%. Furthermore, of 5,087 officers hired in fiscal years

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1992-93 and 1993-94, only 56% (2,861) were stillemployed by the Department of Corrections as of June 30,1995. Additionally, 35% of the 5,087 officers had left theDepartment within one year of being hired. (SeeExhibit 7.)

Exhibit 7: Separations of Officers HiredFrom July 1992 Through June 1994(n = 5,087 Officers Hired)

Months Until Separation

Officers Separated

Number PercentCumulative

Percent

Separated within 6 monthsafter hiring 1,086 21.3% 21.3%

Separated from 6 to 12months after hiring 679 13.3% 34.7%

Separated after 12 months,but before June 30, 1995 461 9.1% 43.8%

Total Separations byJune 30, 1995 2,226 43.8% 43.8%

Source: Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability analysis ofCOPES data.

This inability to retain officers affects staffing levels bycreating short-term vacancies. These vacancies lead toextended absences from post assignments if non-certifiedofficers are hired and sent through the 13-week statecorrectional officer training program. Because of the lackof available certified officers many of the state’s institutionshire non-certified trainees and send them to the trainingprogram. During this time, trainees occupy authorizedofficer positions, but are not usually available to performshift work. The daily rosters of some institutions indicatedthat up to 19 positions were occupied by non-certifiedtrainees that were attending certification training.According to the Department, the cost for training a newcorrectional officer averages approximately $9,600,

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including tuition, salary and benefits.8 Currently,s. 943.16, F.S., requires that persons hired as officertrainees who leave the employment of the Department ontheir own initiative within 12 months are required to repaythe Department for the cost of tuition.9 The Departmenthired over 2,200 trainees in the 1994-95 fiscal year, andthus expended approximately $21 million, or 5% of itssalary budget, to train these officers. (See Exhibit 8.)

Exhibit 8: Training for Correctional Officers

Fiscal Year

Number ofCorrectional

Officers Hiredfor Training

Number of Trainees Who Left the Department EstimatedTotal Cost of

TrainingCorrectional Officers

Prior to 6 Months Prior to 12 Months

Number Percent Number Percent

1992-93 793 152 19.2% 262 33.1% $ 7,600,905

1993-94 1,218 409 33.6% 606 49.8% 11,674,530

1994-95 2,214 N/A N/A N/A N/A 21,221,190


Furthermore, beginning in 1994, individuals seekingcorrectional officer certification are required to pass acertification examination upon completion of training.Failure of this examination results in immediate terminationby the Department. The Department reported that, of the1,684 candidates taking the exam from October 1994 toMarch 1995, 312 candidates (18.5%) failed the exam. Weestimate that the Department expended at least $3 millionon these trainees who were terminated after failing theexamination. We identified two factors that appear to

8 Tuition for correctional officer training is set by the community colleges andschools, and can cost up to $800 per officer. Officers in trainee status receive salary(10% below entry level salary) and benefits.

9 The Legislature has made a special appropriation to the Department for use inpaying the tuition for officer trainees, and for the purchase of ammunition needed byofficers to maintain their certifications. In fiscal year 1994-95, institutions requestedreimbursement for payments of $478,187 for tuition and ammunition, of which $355,360was reimbursed from this special appropriation. The Department’s central office reportedthat $1,706 was returned to this account from officers who left the employment of theDepartment prior to serving one year. Institutions may have received additionalrepayments that were not forwarded to central office.

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impair the Department’s ability to retain officers andcontribute to high turnover rates: the competition by localgovernment agencies for correctional officers and certainadverse working conditions within the Department ofCorrections.

Due to the rapidly growing correctional agencies within thestate, local governments compete with the Department ofCorrections for the correctional officer labor pool. Tocompete with salaries offered by local governments, thestate provides a competitive area differential (CAD) inthose geographical areas where starting salaries for localcorrectional facilities are high. (See Exhibit 9.) Althoughstate starting salaries appear competitive with most localcorrectional agencies, those agencies with funded step payplans for its officers may have a competitive advantageover the Department of Corrections. The Department’s steppay plan for correctional officers has never been funded, sothat officers with multiple years of experience receivesimilar pay as newly hired officers. Furthermore, asincarcerated populations grow, there are additionalcompetitive opportunities for correctional officers with thefederal government and with private prisons.

Correctional officers cited several aspects of the workingconditions within the Department as a factor in the highrate of turnover among correctional officers. Based ondiscussion groups with correctional officers at each of theinstitutions we visited, we identified the following areas ofconcern:

Apprehension regarding personal safety that isenhanced by the problems associated with lowstaffing and inexperienced correctional officers;

A perceived lack of respect for state correctionalofficers in comparison with certified law enforcementofficers and local correctional officers;

The requirement that officers work double shifts tomeet critical complement decreases their effectivenesswith inmates;

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The practice of flexing-out overtime hours within thepay period rather than paying overtime disruptspersonal schedules without providing compensationfor the officers; and

Institutional equipment such as radios, vehicles,phones, locks, and alarms is inadequate and in a stateof disrepair.

Exhibit 9: Comparison of Department of Corrections and County CertifiedCorrectional Officer Minimum Salaries (as of March 1995)

RegionNumber ofInstitutions

DepartmentMinimum

Starting Salary

CountyStarting

Salary Ranges

IInstitutions Without CAD1 16 $18,109

$11,500 - $18,920Institutions With CAD 0 ---

IIInstitutions Without CAD 15 18,109

$14,500 - $21,283Institutions With CAD 0 ---

IIIInstitutions Without CAD 4 18,109

$16,000 - $22,526Institutions With CAD 2 21,909

IV

Institutions Without CAD 2 18,109

$17,917 - $26,556Institutions With CAD

33

23,10924,409

VInstitutions Without CAD 6 18,109

$16,500 - $24,002Institutions With CAD 2 20,909

1Competitive Area Differential (CAD) - a pay incentive applied to specific employment classes at select institutions aimed atimproving the Department’s competitiveness with local law enforcement agencies.


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A second major cause of low officer staffing at theUnderfunded Relief Factorinstitutions is an underfunded relief factor. The relief factoris a mathematical calculation used to determine the numberof full-time officers that are required to fill each 7-day post.During the 1994-95 fiscal year, institutions were staffedusing a relief factor that was calculated in 1968 and did notallow for absences due to administrative leave, disabilityleave, leave without pay, and training. The 1968 relieffactor had determined that 1.573 positions were required tofill each 7-day post, based on a 40-hour work weekadjusted for officer absences due to holidays, annual leave,and sick leave. (See Exhibit 10.)

Exhibit 10: Calculation of the Relief Factor1968 and 1994

Year

Days Not Working 1968 1994

Days Off (2 per week) 104.00 104.00

Holidays 10.00 10.00

Annual Leave 13.00 13.47

Sick Leave 6.00 9.43

Other Leave (administrative,disability, leave without pay)

NotIncluded 3.95

TrainingNot

Included 5.00

Total number of days per yearnot working 133.00 145.85

Total number of days per year working 232.00 219.15

Relief Factor(365/Total number of Days Working) 1.573 1.666

Source: Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability analysis ofdata provided by the Department of Corrections.

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For the 1994-95 fiscal year, the Department calculated arelief factor of 1.666 that included an allowance for allcorrectional officer normal leave time. This relief factorrepresents an average increase of nine positions perinstitution when compared to the 1.573 relief factor. In1995, the Legislature provided funds and authorizedpositions to increase the relief factor from 1.573 to 1.60, ata cost of $6.2 million. While this adjustment will providean average of three additional officer per institutions,institutions will still be short by an average of six officersper institution.

The third major cause of low officer staffing is that someVacanciesinstitutions intentionally maintain vacancies for long periodsof time. Personnel directors and superintendents at 6 of the12 institutions we visited stated that their institutionsintentionally maintain vacancies in order to balance theirbudgets. These administrators stated that two fundingissues create the need to maintain vacancies: the lapsefactor reduces the amount of salary dollars available, andthe need to reserve salary dollars to pay overtime.

The lapse factor represents an adjustment for staff attritionin annual legislative appropriations for state agencies. For1994-95, the Department’s appropriation for authorizedpositions was subject to a lapse factor, reducing the salarydollars available to fill officer positions by 2.7%.

Salary dollars available to fill officer positions are alsoreduced by the overtime payments to officers who arerequired to work in excess of 80 hours per pay period.Overtime is necessary to meet the critical complement or torespond to crises such as inmate disturbances or escapes.In fiscal year 1994-95, the Department expendedapproximately $10 million for overtime, or 2.2% of thetotal salary amount for 52 facilities. (See Exhibit 11.) Thecombined effect of the lapse factor and overtime is thatinstitutions have approximately 95% of the total dollarsneeded to maintain all authorized positions, which equatesto approximately nine officer positions per institution.

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Exhibit 11: Fiscal Year 1994-95 Regional Overtime Expenditures

Region

Number ofVacancies as ofJune 30, 1995

Number ofCorrectionalOfficers as ofJune 30, 1995

Total SalaryDollars

OvertimeExpenditures

OvertimeDollars as

Percentage ofSalary Dollars

I 258 3,694 $101,851,657 $1,829,947 1.80%

II 254 5,137 150,985,469 2,894,609 1.91%

III 58 1,936 68,135,590 1,295,152 1.90%

IV 109 2,152 71,048,039 2,411,896 3.39%

V 103 2,048 65,248,577 1,462,978 2.24%

Total 782 14,967 $457,269,332 $9,894,582 2.16%


Conclusions andRecommendations

The Department’s inability to retain the correctional officersit hires is the primary cause for the low staffing levels ofcorrectional officers in Florida’s prisons. A second cause isthe use of an outdated relief factor that does not provideenough staff to cover officer absences from work. Whencombined with these two causes, the practice of someinstitutions to intentionally maintain vacancies in order tobalance institutional budgets creates an ongoing problem oflow staffing levels.

The Department must maintain an adequate level of staffingto ensure the security and safety of its correctionalinstitutions. Therefore, we believe that the Legislatureshould address those factors that have contributed to thecurrent low levels of staffing. We recommendthat theLegislature establish as a high priority the funding of therelief factor to reflect changes in correctional officerabsences since 1968 so that enough authorized positionswill be provided to adequately staff all 7-day posts.

To reduce the rate of officer turnover, the Legislature andthe Department should focus efforts on improving theretention of correctional officers. We believe that thiscould be addressed through three primary efforts:

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Revising policies to discourage newly certifiedofficers from leaving the Department for localgovernment positions after the state has paidsalaries and benefits during their certificationtraining period . The Department currently pays thesalary and benefits for officer candidates to gothrough the state’s 13-week correctional officertraining program. Officers who leave the Departmenton their own initiative are required to repay the statefor the cost of tuition. Options that should beconsidered for these policies include: (1) Expandingthe obligation incurred to the state by officers who aretrained while on the state payroll, by increasing thelength of service required and by requiring repaymentfor more than just tuition; (2) Rather than payingsalary and benefits to trainees, develop an incentiveloan program to finance correctional officer trainingby providing the trainee with tuition and a stipend inthe form of a loan that could be forgiven as theofficer remains with the Department for three-to-fiveyears. In addition to increasing the incentive for thetrained officer to stay with the Department for at leastthree years, paying only a stipend would reduce theup front costs incurred by the Department to trainnew officers;

Address correctional officer working conditions.In addition to the inherent security risks associatedwith working with violent inmates, correctionalofficers identified several factors that discourage themfrom staying with the Department. Therefore, werecommend the Department increase its efforts toidentify and address the working conditions thatcontribute to officer turnover, in order to increase theretention of correctional officers; and

As resources are available, provide funds for thestep pay plan. Experienced officers do not makesubstantially more than beginning officers. A steppay plan has been established through negotiationsbetween the Department of Management Services andthe correctional officers’ union, but funds have notbeen provided to enable the Department of

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Corrections to use the plan to provide pay increasesbased upon merit or experience. To provide increasedincentive for experienced officers to stay with theDepartment, we recommendthat the Legislatureconsider providing funds to allow the Department tocompensate experienced correctional officers inaccordance with the step pay plan negotiated by theDepartment of Management Services and thecorrectional officers’ union. With the continuingexpansion of the state prison system, an investment inthe retention of experienced staff should enable thestate to properly manage the challenges of that largersystem.

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CHAPTER III Determining the Need forCorrectional Officers

The Department relies on an informal process todetermine its officer staffing requirements and hasnot developed written criteria specifying the factorsused in determining its staffing needs. Without amore systematic process for assessing the need forcorrectional officers, the Legislature and otherdecision makers cannot determine the reasonablenessof staffing levels or evaluate the Department’srequests for additional staff positions.

The Department relies on an informal process to determineits officer staffing requirements and has not developedwritten criteria specifying what factors should be used todetermine staffing needs. Department officials indicatedthey use their experience and professional judgment todetermine the number of security staff needed. Theseofficials indicated they consider such factors as the specificfunctions and activities staff must perform at each post,facility size, housing unit design, number of housing units,and facility mission.

As a part of its annual budget process, the Departmentidentifies staffing needs based upon changes in facilityconditions and other factors and makes requests foradditional correctional officer positions. For example, theDepartment may request additional correctional officerpositions to staff new housing units that have beenconstructed, to add perimeter security posts based uponflaws that have been detected in that security, or to performresponsibilities that take officers away from other posts,such as conducting medical escorts. The Department’sannual requests do not represent a systematic review ofcorrectional officer staffing needs.

In March 1995, the Department published the results of aone-time assessment to identify statewide security needs.

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This assessment was conducted after six inmates escapedfrom Glades Correctional Institution in January 1995. Inaddition to identifying the need for 852 positions to addressthe underfunded relief factor, this assessment also identifiedthe need for 427 additional security staff positions.Although this assessment involved a review of the staffingneeds of each institution, the lack of written criteria make itdifficult to evaluate the considerations that went into theirdetermination of the need for additional security staff andthe validity of those considerations.

Conclusions andRecommendations

Although we identified several potential adverseconsequences that result from the current level of staffing,we cannot determine whether increasing staff beyondpresently authorized levels is necessary to allow theDepartment to achieve its mission. It is possible thathaving all authorized positions filled may adequatelyaddress the current security needs of the Department.

For the Department to efficiently accomplish its mission itmust have sufficient staff to provide a safe environment andprotect the public, institution staff, and inmates. Writtencriteria will enable the Department to define its staffingneeds and allow decision makers to evaluate thereasonableness of staffing requests. To ensure consistencyand to provide a measure for evaluation, we recommendtheDepartment develop written criteria to determine thenumber of correctional staff needed. In addition, asconditions, inmates, and institutions change, we recommendthe Department conduct assessments of its staffingrequirements on a routine basis in order to ensure thatsecurity staffing needs are accurately identified.

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List of Appendices

A. General Information on Major CorrectionalAppendicesInstitutions 28

B. Response From the Department of Corrections 30

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Appendix AGeneral Information on Major Correctional Institutions 1

No. Correctional InstitutionsLawful

Capacity 2

Number ofAuthorized

Security Officers

Ratio ofInmates Per

Security Officer

HighestCustody

LevelHousing

Type

Region I - Marianna

1 Apalachee East and West 1,564 355 4.41 Close Dorms

2 Calhoun 1,072 191 5.61 Close Open Bay

3 Century 1,128 207 5.45 Close Mixed

4 Correctional Mental Health 175 126 1.39 Close Mixed

5 Gulf 1,095 211 5.19 Close Mixed

6 Holmes 1,075 192 5.60 Close Dorms

7 Jackson 1,128 208 5.42 Close Mixed

8 Jefferson 915 182 5.03 Close Dorms

9 Liberty 1,085 191 5.68 Close Dorms

10 Okaloosa 747 166 4.50 Close Mixed

11 Quincy ----- 3 ----- 3 ----- 3 ----- 3 ----- 3

12 River Junction 533 113 4.72 Medium Dorms

13 Santa Rosa ----- 3 ----- 3 ----- 3 ----- 3 ----- 3

14 Wakulla ----- 3 ----- 3 ----- 3 ----- 3 ----- 3

15 Walton 1,091 196 5.57 Close Dorms

16 Washington ----- 3 ----- 3 ----- 3 ----- 3 ----- 3

Region II - Gainesville

17 Baker 835 198 4.22 Close Mixed

18 Columbia 1,095 201 5.45 Close Mixed

19 Cross City 812 175 4.64 Close Mixed

20 Florida State Prison 1,176 335 3.51 Close Cells

21 Hamilton 969 172 5.63 Close Open Bay

22 Lancaster 556 161 3.45 Medium Mixed

23 Lawtey 740 162 4.57 Medium Mixed

24 Madison 1,083 197 5.50 Close Open Bay

25 Mayo 1,061 185 5.74 Close Mixed

26 New River 1,687 304 5.55 Close Mixed

27 North Florida Reception Center4 2,143 362 5.92 Close Mixed

28 Putnam 399 121 3.30 Close Mixed

29 Taylor ----- 3 ----- 3 ----- 3 ----- 3 ----- 3

30 Tomoka 993 210 4.73 Close Mixed

31 Union 1,432 422 3.39 Close Mixed

(Continued)

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No. Correctional InstitutionsLawful

Capacity 2

Number ofAuthorized

Security Officers

Ratio ofInmates Per

Security Officer

HighestCustody

LevelHousing

Type

Region III - Orlando

32 Brevard 768 186 4.13 Close Mixed

33 Central Florida Reception Center5 2,251 432 5.21 Close Mixed

34 Florida 1,027 178 5.77 Close Mixed

35 Lake 877 168 5.22 Close Cells

36 Marion 984 209 4.71 Close Open Bay

37 Sumter 1,251 217 5.77 Medium Mixed

Region IV - Lauderhill

38 Broward 540 167 3.23 Close Mixed

39 Dade 536 153 3.50 Close Mixed

40 Everglades ----- 3 ----- 3 ----- 3 ----- 3 ----- 3

41 Glades 1,181 219 5.39 Close Open Bay

42 Indian River 207 76 2.72 Medium Dorms

43 Martin 1,077 232 4.64 Close Cells

44 Okeechobee ----- 3 ----- 3 ----- 3 ----- 3 ----- 3

45 South Florida Reception Center6 1,968 416 4.73 Close Mixed

Region V - Tampa

46 Avon Park 796 172 4.63 Close Mixed

47 Charlotte 1,004 233 4.31 Close Mixed

48 Desoto 960 177 5.42 Close Mixed

49 Hardee 1,155 224 5.16 Close Mixed

50 Hendry 997 195 5.11 Close Mixed

51 Hillsborough 280 105 2.67 Close Mixed

52 Polk 995 182 5.47 Close Mixed

53 Zephyrhills 741 158 4.69 Close Mixed

1The figures represented here do not include work camps, road prisons, and forestry camps.

2Lawful capacity is 133% of design capacity for most types of housing.

3Facilities under construction or planned to open after June 30, 1995.

4Includes Main Unit and West Unit.

5Includes Main Unit, East Unit, and South Unit.

6Includes Main Unit and South Unit.


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Appendix BResponse From the Department of Corrections

In accordance with the provisions of s. 11.45(7)(d), F.S., alist of preliminary and tentative findings was submitted tothe Secretary of the Department of Corrections for hisreview and response.

The Secretary’s written response is reprinted hereinbeginning on page 31.

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January 5, 1996

Mr. James L. CarpenterInterim DirectorOffice of Program Policy Analysis and

Government AccountabilityPost Office Box 1735Pepper BuildingTallahassee, Florida 32302

Dear Mr. Carpenter:

The Department of Corrections is very appreciative of the time andeffort your staff put into the development of a balanced review ofthe Correctional Officer staffing challenges facing thedepartment. The attention your staff gave to learning about thedepartment in advance of their visits to the correctionalinstitutions made a difference in their reception by staff and thequality of information. We are grateful for your willingness towork with us to ensure this important information is accurate aswell as useful.

The first section of your report deals with the currentcorrectional officer staffing at the institutions. Your studyindicates that several institutions operated at or below criticalcomplement during certain time periods covered by this study. Weconcur that this is a serious area of concern and one that we mustaddress daily. It must be noted however, that an institutionoperates below the critical complement only under very extreme orunavoidable circumstances.

The second section of your report deals with the consequences ofcurrent staffing levels. During your visits to twelveinstitutions, you heard first hand from correctional officers, thechallenges they must face everyday in an institutional setting.One of the concerns which the department is addressing is non-working equipment and fences that do not detect movement. This isbeing addressed with the addition of new radios and microphonicsfence alarm systems that are being installed statewide. The issueof radios not working may be more related totransmission/receiving problems that we experience in our singlecell housing units. Typically, the low-band frequencies that wehave used for many years is not well-suited for use within andbetween concrete and steel structures. In the past when we builtprimarily open-bay inmate housing, low band radios could meet ourcommunication needs. With the construction of more secure singlecells, this radio system is no longer adequate. The department iscurrently part of a multi-law enforcement agency task forcecharged with developing and planning a statewide 800 MHz radio

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system that will be more suitable to our needs. Itsimplementation will take several years to accomplish due to cost.

It was also noted that correctional officers indicated thattrainees are occasionally asked to perform duties that should beperformed by certified officers. Recently the department hasissued guidelines regarding the use of non-certified officers toall institutions.

We agree that institutions operating at critical complement forextended periods of time, pose serious safety and security issues.Without question, staffing shortages force officers to take shortcuts, cause fatigue and can lead to less readiness in preventing,detecting and reacting to emergencies. That the department hasnot had a major disturbance at one of our institutions is a creditto the dedication of staff and the quality of institutionalleadership.

Section three of the report deals with the causes of the currentstaffing levels. We concur that hiring and retention of qualifiedstaff for the department is a challenge. As the chart displays onpage 20, in no region are the department’s starting salaries at orabove the top end of county salary ranges. In those areas wherewe may be marginally competitive with starting salaries, we loseout because local agencies are able to move employees along thestep at will. The state however, is bound by funding constraintsand collective bargaining agreements. We concur that the state’sstep pay plan should be funded and that we need to increase therelief factor to provide more relief for officers.

Equally important in any discussion of hiring and retention issome mention of working conditions. In more recent years, mostinmates were content to serve their sentence since their period ofincarceration may be relatively short. However, as we move towardinmates serving a greater percentage of their service and a moreharsh prison environment, we can expect more well organized inmategangs. We can expect our prisons of the future to have morehostile inmates increasing the imperative to keep our correctionalofficer positions filled with well-trained and experienced staff.

Section four deals with determining the need for correctionalofficers. Each year in the budget cycle, we develop post chartswhich is our written justification for additional staff. Postcharts are actual listings by title of security posts that arenecessary to operate an institution. A recapitulation of eachpost chart indicates by correctional officer rank, the number of5-day posts, the number of 7-day posts, the number of reliefpositions required for the 7-day posts, and the totals ofpositions required. Post titles are standardized statewide. Thenumbers and types of posts that are authorized for each prisontake into account institutional differences such as size, custody

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grades, special programs, protective management, close managementcapabilities, etc. It may well be that we need to develop a moreeasily understood format and we would be pleased to work. withOPPAGA to develop an additional format for legislative use.

We thank you for working with us and for giving us thisopportunity to comment on your report.

Sincerely,

Harry K. Singletary, Jr.Secretary

HKSJr/NKW/cjm

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state of f - oppaga · as layers of razor wire, at many institutions. major causes of the...

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