sustainability assessment for lng industry at abbot point · multi cargo facility (mcf). in...

Suitability Assessment for LNG Industry at Abbot Point

May 2011

The following document was prepared by RLMS

On behalf of Department of Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation (Office of the Coordinator-General)

RLMS (Resource and Land Management Services) is an independent consultancy established in 1990, focusing on the energy, transport, communications and exploration sectors Australia wide. RLMS specialises in tenure management, land negotiation and acquisition, route corridor selection, environmental approvals, mapping, and gas market analysis.

RLMS | FINAL REPORT SUITABILITY ASSESSMENT FOR LNG AT ABBOT POINT MAY 2011

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The purpose of this study and assessment is to identify if Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facility/s would be appropriate at Abbot Point and to define critical LNG facility requirements. It is also a desk top analysis that identifies several potentially suitable sites for LNG and seeks to better understand the opportunities and constraints at Abbot Point. This assessment includes the identification of the land and infrastructure requirements for LNG facilities (including processing, transport, storage and export) and the implications of LNG industries for the future development of Abbot Point. This assessment was undertaken for the Abbot Point area, which includes the Abbot Point State Development Area (APDSA), the Port of Abbot Point and the proposed Multi Cargo Facility (MCF). In outlining the critical requirements for LNG, the report and assessment includes a summary of LNG production and facilities. The differences between coal seam gas and natural gas have been discussed and it has been concluded there is little difference between the two types of gas in planning for LNG facilities. It has also been determined that the source of gas has no material impact on the LNG plant requirements. LNG production and facilities were summarised and opportunities for synergies with other industries were considered. It was determined that the provision of gas provides an opportunity for many industries for use in power generation, chemical production and mineral processing. This assessment also provides a broad overview of the relevant guidelines, standards and policies applicable to the LNG industry. The requirements of LNG facilities have been identified within this report. For potential future LNG proponents, site selection will be strongly influenced by efforts to minimise transportation and storage costs of LNG and an ideal site would be close to a marine terminal. In most respects an LNG facility is typical of other industrial activities and as such, has similar siting requirements. Further, the LNG industry is subject to rigorous safety standards which have evolved over several decades and which relate to the safe operation of LNG facilities. Safety is the key driver in site selection, rather than infrastructure demands or amenity issues, such as odour and noise. Three sizes of LNG plants have been discussed including facilities delivering – 1.5 million tonnes per annum (Mtpa), 3 Mtpa and 10 Mtpa. The report discusses design in terms of safety and risk. Safety is a significant issue both at the plant and the berth. A series of site criteria have been tabulated and are included in Table 5.7. These criteria are generic and any LNG project would need to supplement this information by undertaking their own investigation and risk assessments. This assessment concludes that Abbot Point would be suitable for LNG shipping, provided the LNG berthing facilities are sited and designed appropriately. Further investigations will be required to understand requirements for specific plant sizes and operations in


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relation to the arrangement of berths and industries on the proposed Abbot Point Multi Cargo Facility (including operation restrictions and exclusion zones). This report notes that a LNG facility would be considered a suitable use of land in the Industry Precinct of the APSDA, however, it was beyond the scope of this project to review the suitability of all land within the Industry Precinct for a LNG facility. For the purpose of this desk top study and assessment, four potential sites for LNG were reviewed:

a site at the proposed MCF; a site at the base of Mt Luce; a site near the foreshore; and a site at the base of Mt Little.

Impact analysis of the selected potential sites were undertaken. The analysis found that there were opportunities and constraints related to each of the four sites. The review and analysis of these four sites were undertaken for the purpose of understanding the application of LNG facilities requirements. It was not intended to either limit or confirm the location of LNG facilities at Abbot Point but to use several potential sites to broadly canvas the opportunities and constraints. This report includes conclusions which are intended to guide the Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation (Office of the Cordinator-General) and potential proponents related to the planning and investigations for LNG facilities at Abbot Point.


TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................ i 1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................1

1.1 Background ..................................................................................................1 1.2 Purpose of the Study ..................................................................................2 1.3 Methodology.................................................................................................2 1.4 Limitations ....................................................................................................3

2. OVERVIEW OF ABBOT POINT.......................................................................4 2.1 Abbot Point State Development Area (APSDA) .....................................4 2.2 Land and Infrastructure Planning Study for the Central Portion of Abbot Point State Development Area ..................................................................5 2.3 Abbot Point State Development Area Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor Study ..........................................................................................................5 2.4 Port of Abbot Point ......................................................................................6 2.5 Bowen Abbot Point Flood Modelling Study .............................................9 2.6 Water for Bowen ....................................................................................... 10

3. SUMMARY OF LNG PRODUCTION AND FACILITIES ........................... 11 3.1 LNG Production Process......................................................................... 11 3.2 Natural Gas vs Coal Seam Gas ............................................................. 12 3.3 Synergies between LNG and Existing and Future Industries ........... 13

4. RELEVANT LNG FACILITY GUIDELINES, STANDARDS AND CODES OF PRACTICE.......................................................................................................... 14

4.1 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 59A ............. 14 4.2 SIGTTO Information Paper No 14 – Site Selection and Design for LNG Ports and Jetties ......................................................................................... 16 4.3 AS3961 The Storage And Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas .......... 16

5. LNG FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS ............................................................ 18 5.1 Proximity of Components of an LNG Facilities .................................... 18 5.2 Safety and Risk......................................................................................... 19 5.3 Land Area .................................................................................................. 24 5.4 Port Considerations ................................................................................. 26 5.5 Services ..................................................................................................... 31 5.6 Access........................................................................................................ 31 5.7 Topography ............................................................................................... 32 5.8 Geology/Stability....................................................................................... 32 5.9 Environment .............................................................................................. 33 5.10 Extreme Weather ..................................................................................... 33 5.11 Summary of Siting Requirements .......................................................... 34

6. POTENTIAL LNG FACILITY SITES............................................................. 37 7. IMPACT ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL LNG SITES ................................... 38

7.1 Multi Cargo Facility Site........................................................................... 38 7.2 Mt Luce Site .............................................................................................. 40 7.3 Foreshore Site .......................................................................................... 43 7.4 Mt Little Site............................................................................................... 46

8. KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS........................................................ 50 9. REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................... 53

9.1 References ................................................................................................ 53 9.2 Abbreviations ............................................................................................ 56


APPENDIX A - ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY GUIDELINES FOR LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS (LNG) FACILITIES APPENDIX B - LIST OF POLICIES AND STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO THE LNG INDUSTRY APPENDIX C –APPENDIX FROM SIGTTO INFORMATION PAPER 14 -SITE SELECTION AND DESIGN FOR LNG PORTS AND JETTIES APPENDIX D – RISK CONTOUR MAPPING GLADSTONE LNG PROJECTS

RLMS | FINAL REPORT SUITABILITY ASSESSMENT FOR LNG AT ABBOT POINT MAY 2011 Page 1

1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background Abbot Point is located approximately 20km north west of Bowen, north Queensland. It is a strategic location due to its remoteness from urban development, ready access to a deepwater port and major transport linkages. The area includes a range of environments and is surrounded by mountain ranges. There are a number of ecologically sensitive areas in and around Abbot Point including the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park and the Kaili Valley Wetlands. Figure 1 shows the location of Abbot Point. The Abbot Point State Development Area (APSDA) was declared by the Governor in Council on 19 June 2008. It comprises approximately 16,230 hectares, and provides for the establishment of large scale industrial development of regional, state and national significance, while protecting environmental, cultural and community values. The APSDA is a cornerstone of the Northern Economic Triangle Infrastructure Plan 2007-2012. The APSDA is adjacent to the Port of Abbot Point. This is a major deep water port facility operated by the North Queensland Bulk Ports Corporation Limited (NQBP). The Port of Abbot Point is one of a small number of major seaports on the eastern seaboard of Australia. The Port of Abbot Point has recently expanded and further expansions are proposed and being planned. The current growth in export capacity is being driven by coal development in the northern Bowen Basin and Galilee Basin. Expansion of the Port at Abbot Point will be supported by the development of the “Northern Missing Link” rail line which will connect the existing mines of North Goonyella and Newlands and allow coal trains originating in Central Queensland to be directed to Abbot Point. Development of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) plants and export facilities is regarded as a potential opportunity for Abbot Point because:

its distance from urban areas; of the availability of undeveloped land in proximity to the port which may be

suitable for an LNG plant; of its reasonable proximity to the reserves of Coal Seam Gas (CSG) in the

region to the south west of Abbot Point; and in the future the port may have the potential to handle large LNG vessels.

Opportunity exists for a range of export focussed industries within the APSDA. The State is seeking to maximise the amount of industrial development within proximity of the port, whilst achieving the objectives of the Development Scheme for the APSDA. LNG facilities would need to be planned and integrated with other development so they do not unduly constrain future industries within the APSDA.


1.2 Purpose of the Study The purpose of this study was to identify if LNG facility/s would be appropriate at Abbot Point, to define LNG facility requirements and to identify potentially suitable sites for LNG sites based on a desk top analysis. This study identifies the land and infrastructure requirements of LNG facilities (including processing, transport, storage and export) and the implications of an LNG industry for the future development of Abbot Point. For the purposes of this study and assessment, the Abbot Point area includes the Abbot Point State Development Area (APDSA), the Port of Abbot Point and the proposed Multi Cargo Facility (MCF) discussed in Section 2 of this report. It is acknowledged that advanced planning work is underway by NQBP regarding the MCF and this planning has not included detailed consideration of an LNG industry. This report considers LNG at a future point, it does not consider the current MCF planning being undertaken by NQBP. 1.3 Methodology The study involved five stages as outlined below.

1. Review of data including: reports prepared about Abbot Point ; known projects; information from LNG proponents; and interviews with the Office of the Coordinator-General, NQBP and the

Hazardous Industries and Chemical Branch (HICB), Department of Justice and Attorney General.

2. Identification of LNG plant site requirements. 3. Identification of suitable sites at a broad scale, based on the above site

requirements. 4. Assessment of LNG plants on the sites deemed suitable from previous

stages. 5. Identification of the development considerations for LNG facilities at Abbot

Point. To manage the potentially differing requirements of various sized LNG plants, the assessment of site requirements has been undertaken on three nominal LNG plant sizes: 1.5 million tonne per annum (Mtpa) capacity; 3 Mtpa capacity; and 10 Mtpa capacity. This size LNG plant would be a “shared facility” (ie hub). A

hub is considered to be two or more trains operated by separate entities but using a shared delivery gas pipeline, cryogenic LNG pipelines, storage tank(s) and/or loading arms at the berth.

These plant sizes are considered to reflect the possible scale of LNG plants that future proponents may be interested in locating at Abbot Point.

WKSP Z:\clients\DIP\10-0008_Abbott_Point_LNG_Land_Suitability_Study\Mapping\Workspaces\Final_Report_Maps\Figure_1.mxdCreated on 26/10/2010 by JE

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Brisbane

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Townsville

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Abbot Point

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KilometersDatum: GDA94

Projection: MGA94 Zone 55

In preparing this map, RLMS have endeavoured to ensurethat the data and information are as accurate and reliable aspossible. However RLMS cannot accept liability for anydecisions or actions of whatever kind or nature based on this study.RLMS expressly disclaims any loss or damage that mayarise therefrom.

NOTES

DISCLAIMER

Base data: Geodata V3

PROJECT

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FIGURE 1 - LOCALITY

SUITABILITY ASSESSMENT FOR LNG INDUSTRY AT ABBOT POINT

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT,ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT & INNOVATIONOFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR-GENERAL

Layout: A4 Portrait

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! City / Town

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1.4 Limitations In conducting this assessment and desktop study RLMS has relied on:

data provided by the Coordinator-General in relation to constraints and planning; and

other publicly available data. This study is a desktop assessment of existing information only. No field investigations or computer modelling have been conducted to support the conclusions presented in this report. However, a number of RLMS staff are familiar with the Abbot Point area and this knowledge has also been utilised.


2. OVERVIEW OF ABBOT POINT 2.1 Abbot Point State Development Area (APSDA) State Development Areas (SDAs) are established under the State Development and Public Works Organisation Act 1971. SDAs can be established by the State in the interest of economic development through the supply of industrial land. Powers granted to the Coordinator-General by this Act for SDA declared land include:

the power to compulsorily acquire land and dispose of it to third parties (subject to certain conditions); and

responsibility for regulating land use, which is effected through a Development Scheme for a SDA.

On 19 June 2008, the Abbot Point State Development Area (APSDA) was declared by the Governor in Council under section 77 of the State Development and Public Works Organisation Act 1971. The APSDA has been designated as an area to be used for development of large scale industries. The area has been identified as suitable for these uses because it is:

in close proximity to an existing and expandable deepwater port facility; close to transport links such as the Bruce Highway and rail infrastructure;

and not in close proximity to urban development.

The APSDA adjoins the Port of Abbot Point to the Port’s south and west. Figure 2 shows the APSDA. The APSDA comprises approximately 16,230ha. Planning for this area includes provision for infrastructure corridors and the identification of industrial development areas. The land within the APSDA is partly in private ownership and partly owned by the State. The current planning for the area is undertaken based on the Development Scheme for the Abbot Point State Development Area (Development Scheme), which regulates land use and sets out the broad land use precincts of the area. The Precinct Map from the Development Scheme is shown in Figure 2. To the north of the APSDA is Abbot Bay. Mt Luce is located on the coast in the north-west portion of the APSDA. The Kaili Valley Wetlands are located east and south of Mt Luce and are included within the Directory of Important Wetlands. The Kaili Valley Wetlands are also included as a protected wetland in the Great Barrier Reef catchment under the planning regulation and Temporary State Planning Policy: Protecting Wetlands of High Ecological Significance in Great Barrier Catchments. South of the Kaili Valley Wetlands is the central part of the APSDA. This area is considered to be suitable for industry and is the major area designated for future industrial development in the APSDA. The Bruce Highway and North Coast rail line run east west through this area of the APSDA. East of the Abbot Point Road (access to the Port) the area is dominated by steep land including Mt Little.

WKSP Z:\clients\DIP\10-0008_Abbott_Point_LNG_Land_Suitability_Study\Mapping\Workspaces\Final_Report_Maps\Figure_2.mxdCreated on 02/05/2011 by KR

In preparing this map, RLMS have endeavoured to ensure that the data and information are as accurateand reliable as possible. However RLMS cannot accept liability for any decisions or actions of whateverkind or nature based on this study. RLMS expressly disclaims any loss or damage that mayarise therefrom.

NOTES

DISCLAIMER

Base data: Geodata V3Image & data provided by DIP

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FIGURE 2 - ABBOT POINT STATE DEVELOPMENT AREA-DEVELOPMENT SCHEME PRECINCTS


DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT & INNOVATIONOFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR-GENERAL

Layout: A3 Landscape

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Abbot Point State Development Area Boundary

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South of the Bruce Highway the area is dominated by Mt Roundback. Flat grazing land, which is considered suitable for industry, exists to the east and west of Mt Roundback. 2.2 Land and Infrastructure Planning Study for the Central

Portion of Abbot Point State Development Area The Land and Infrastructure Planning Study for the Central Portion of Abbot Point State Development Area (Land and Infrastructure Planning Study) has been undertaken by the Coordinator-General, based on a number of background investigations. The study was completed in November 2010. The study documents an investigation of the central part of the APSDA. The central part of the APSDA is considered to comprise the land north of the Bruce Highway and south of the Kaili Valley Wetlands from the western boundary of the APSDA to Abbot Point Road. The study investigates the ecological, geotechnical and hydraulic constraints of the area, identifies indicative development parcels in this area and identifies the transportation connections to the Bruce Highway and proposed Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor (see section 2.3). The Land and Infrastructure Planning Study includes possible development scenarios. The development scenarios are based on an assumed 50 year industry mix, which includes the potential for LNG plants. The purpose of the development scenarios is to validate the configuration of the indicative industrial development parcels and demonstrate opportunities for synergies and collocation of industries within the study area. Figure 3 shows the proposed industrial development parcel configuration for the central Abbot Point area. Figure 4 shows the proposed port expansions in relation to the proposed Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor and the proposed development parcels for the APSDA (see Section 2.4). 2.3 Abbot Point State Development Area Multi-user

Infrastructure Corridor Study The Abbot Point State Development Area Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor Study has been undertaken by the Coordinator-General based on a number of background investigations. The study was completed in November 2010.

The study investigated the route and profile of a Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor as a means of transporting materials and services from the Industry Precinct in the APSDA to the proposed Multi Cargo Facility (MCF). The MCF is a proposal by the North Queensland Bulk Port Corporation Limited (NQBP) as an expansion of the existing Port of Abbot Point (see section 2.4.3). Also considered are the physical constraints within the area of interest and, based on a 50 year industrial mix, an assessment of the likely inputs and outputs of this mix of industry. This information was used to determine the transportation infrastructure required. The possible industries identified include LNG plants. Further, the study identifies the likely transportation requirements for an LNG plant to include:

cryogenic pipelines (with return) and or natural gas pipeline; seawater intake and return; port access road; and


pre-assembled modules infrastructure. The study assessed a range of corridor options and recommended a preferred corridor route shown in Figure 3. Figure 4 shows the proposed port expansions in relation to the proposed Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor and the proposed development parcels for the APSDA (see section 2.4). The report also proposes a long term width for the corridor of 247m and provides a cross section, depicting one possible configuration of the corridor as shown in Figure 5. In terms of LNG development, the report concludes the following pipeline requirements:

one natural gas (to an LNG plant); or one LNG cryogenic pipeline (with a possible return pipeline for LNG) from:

an LNG plant to storage tank; or storage tank to loading arms at berth.

The study includes an indicative cross section of the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor, which includes 20m wide easement for gas pipes. The study proposes that where the corridor would be inundated in a flood event (ie below RL 4.45m AHD) the corridor would be constructed on a fill platform with bridge culverts to maintain wetland connectivity across the Kaili Valley Wetlands. With the exception of seawater pipelines the report recommends all pipes (including gas and LNG) be located underground at RL 3.5m AHD (ie within the fill structure and above the groundwater table). 2.4 Port of Abbot Point The Port of Abbot Point is currently managed by the NQBP. The NQBP is owned by the Queensland Government. On 3 May 2011, the Queensland government announced the successful sale of the 99 year lease of the Abbot Point Coal Terminal. Under the deal the State retains ownership of the Port land and associated strategic infrastructure such as the jetty and wharves and will continue to facilitate future private sector funded expansion of export infrastructure within the broader port precinct. NQBP will remain the Port Authority for Abbot Point and the Queensland ports of:

Hay Point; Mackay; Weipa; and Maryborough.

The Port of Abbot Point is currently a dedicated coal export facility. It comprises a rail line and unloading facility, coal handling and stockpile areas and a conveyor located on a 2.75km long approach trestle to one berth and ship loader. The Port area also comprises a private road into the port from the Bruce Highway. The coal loading facilities are managed by a subsidiary company of Xstrata Coal Queensland Pty Ltd. Throughput of coal in financial year 2008-09 was approximately 14.5 million tonnes, handled in 169 ships.



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FIGURE 3 - INDICATIVE DEVELOPMENT PARCELS -CENTRAL ABBOT POINT STATE DEVELOPMENT AREA

SUITABILITY ASSESSMENTFOR LNG INDUSTRY AT ABBOT POINT



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Highway

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Proposed Road Network

Selected Multi-User Infrastructure Corridor

Indicative development parcels for central part of APSDA

WKSP Z:\clients\DIP\10-0008_Abbott_Point_LNG_Land_Suitability_Study\Mapping\Workspaces\Final_Report_Maps\Figure_4.mxdCreated on 04/05/2011 by kr


NOTES

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KAILI (CALEY) VALLEYWETLANDS

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FIGURE 4 - OVERVIEW OF POSSIBLEDEVELOPMENT AT ABBOT POINT




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Existing Port Facilities (Up to X50 Expansion) -NQBP

Proposed Port Facilities (X80 and X110 Expansion) -NQBP


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Proposed Multi Cargo Facility -NQBP

Proposed Maintenance Dredge Pond -NQBP

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NOTESBas data: Geodata V3Image provided by DIP


DISCLAIMER

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FIGURE 5 - SELECTED MULTI-USER INFRASTRUCTURE CORRIDOR CROSS-SECTION




Source: Abbot Point State Development Area Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor Study,November 2010 (cross section prepared by PB Australia)


The Port is wholly contained within the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area, and the Port limits overlap with the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park (GBRMP), however the physical infrastructure is outside of the marine park boundaries. The onshore components of the port are located on generally flat coastal land in the north east of the Abbot Point area. Figure 6 shows the current configuration of the port. 2.4.1 X50 Expansion As part of the approved X50 Expansion project, a new berth is presently under construction at the end of the existing approach trestle. A small service jetty is located to the east of the approach trestle, which is utilised for offshore construction activities for the X50 Expansion. The X50 Expansion increases the number of coal berths at Abbot Point from one to two and increases the terminal’s capacity to 50 Mtpa. It is anticipated that the X50 Expansion will be completed in 2011. 2.4.2 The Proposed X110 Expansion The proposed expansion of the port to handle 110 Mtpa of coal (X110 Expansion) requires the development of three main offshore components:

installation of a second approach trestle to the west of the existing approach trestle with two out-loading conveyors to take the product to the offshore berths;

installation of two new offshore berths serviced by two new ship-loaders; and extension of the service jetty structure.

Key onshore facilities for the proposed X110 Expansion include: y

the development of two rail dump stations and in-loading conveyors from each to the stockyards;

two rail loops; installation of new stockyard capacity involving up to 10 new bunds (10

stockpile rows); installation of up to 15 new stockyard machines, which will be stackers,

reclaimers or combined stacker/reclaimers, chosen to optimise efficiency of the stockyard operations;

installation of transfer towers, surge bins and sampling plant for the new stockyard; and

potential installation of additional fuel facilities for refuelling terminal vehicles and machinery.

Figure 6 shows the site layout for the proposed X110 Expansion. Figure 4 shows the layout of the proposed X110 Expansion in relation to the proposed Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor and the proposed development parcels for the APSDA. The X110 Expansion has been declared a controlled action under the Commonwealth Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act). The NQBP has prepared a draft Voluntary Environmental Assessment (VEA) for the project. The VEA was publicly notified in November – December 2009.


An Expression of Interest (EOI) process to seek interest from proponents for the right to be the Preferred Developer of the X110 (and X80) expansions (now known as T2 and T3) was conducted in late 2009. The Preferred Developers, are currently working with NQBP to enter into a Framework Agreement to progress the project and preliminary design and environmental studies are being finalised. 2.4.3 Multi Cargo Facility (MCF) NQBP is proposing the development of the MCF and is preparing the final Environmental Impact Statement under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. Strategically, advantages of the MCF include:

ability to support to the State’s long-term industrial and infrastructure development plans;

provision of deepwater channel access for the large bulk carriers (Cape-size); well located geographically to service trade from the Bowen Basin, Galilee

Basin and North West Mineral Province; ability to service vacant land suitable for large scale heavy industry; and ability to provide the opportunity for the port to import and export multiple

cargoes, thereby broadening the port from a coal export only to multi-product port.

Potential users of the MCF include:

broad range of large scale industry suitable for the APSDA; LNG facilities – the NQBP has recognised that the LNG industry is rapidly

emerging in Queensland and has identified the opportunity for LNG to be exported via the MCF;

expanded coal output from the Galilee Basin and North Bowen Basin (beyond X110); and

future minerals processing for raw product from the North West Mineral Province or other locations.

The proposed MCF involves the construction of a protected harbour at Abbot Point. The current concept comprises over 350ha of reclaimed land developed to accommodate 12 shipping berths, a tug harbour and a dredged access channel, swing basin and berth pockets. Material dredged to create the access channel, swing basin and berth pockets, being approximately 35Mm3, would be used for the reclamation. No dredged materials from the construction works are proposed to be disposed of in the port's established dredge spoil ground at sea. It is proposed to dredge the berth pockets to a depth of 21m below lowest astronomical tide (LAT) for Cape size vessels, while the berth pockets for Panamax vessels would be dredged to 17.4m below LAT. The access channel for the MCF would be dredged to a depth of 18m below LAT. The MCF will likely be developed in two stages, the first would comprise:

construction of a bunded reclamation; dredging of an access channel, swing basin and berths; development of up to six berths; development of a tug harbour; and



NOTES

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FIGURE 6 - EXISTING AND PROPOSED PORT FACILITIES


DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT,ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT & INNOVATIONOFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR-GENERAL


LEGEND



Railway

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Existing Port Facilities (up to X50 Expansion) -NQBP

Proposed Port Facilities (X80 and X110 Expansion) -NQBP

Proposed Dreding Channel and Berth -NQBP



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ABBOT POINT



development of the transport access corridor.

The second stage would extend the bunded area and include construction of the final six berths. The proposed MCF provides a protected harbour which may provide an opportunity for an LNG load out facility. The proposed MCF design contained in the Initial Advice Statement (IAS) is under review by NQBP. The latest design provided by NQBP is shown in Figure 6. 2.4.4 Expansion After the Proposed X110 ExpansionWork has commenced to plan for future export demands from the Galilee and Bowen Basins. The NQBP has lead a master planning process to investigate three potential coal stockpile location options with the objective of determining the arrangement for a single export coal stockpile location within the APSDA. The master planning was undertaken in consultation with the Coordinator-General and other relevant stakeholders. This master planning process built upon work commissioned by the Coordinator–General to identify and evaluate options for locating coal stockpiling and associated infrastructure within the APSDA. 2.5 Bowen Abbot Point Flood Modelling StudyA flood modelling study has been undertaken for the Coordinator-General on the Abbot Point area. The report was completed in March 2008 by Maunsell/AECOM. The study informed the declaration of the APSDA for heavy Industry. Two assessments of the impact on inundation from storm surge levels were undertaken:

100 Year Average Recurrence Interval (ARI) storm surge with no coincident flooding; and

10 year ARI storm surge with 100 Year ARI coincident flooding. This approach addressed the difference between larger catchments where flood and storm surge are generally independent events and the smaller coastal catchments where storm surge and flooding may be dependent events. These issues are discussed in more detail in Section 4.7.3 of the flood modelling study report. Figure 7 shows the resulting 100 year ARI inundation levels resulting from both flooding and storm surge, include an allowance for greenhouse effect within the APSDA. The report:

assessed the existing flooding constraints for the Abbot Point area and assessed the suitability of previously identified infrastructure and development areas;

revised the location of specific industry areas and access corridors to provide large areas for industrial sites above flooding in the 100 Year ARI event;

recommended access between the industrial sites and the port have higher flood immunity (1:500 Year ARI Event);

recommended reasonable flood immunity be required for industrial sites and


waste disposal areas; and identifies a 1% AEP flood immunity level of RL 4.45m AHD.

2.6 Water for Bowen The Water for Bowen Project is a proposed water transport system that will provide up to 60,000ML of water per annum from water allocations sourced from the Burdekin Falls Dam. The water would be transported from the Clair Weir on the Burdekin River as far south as Bowen. The water transport infrastructure would include approximately 93km of new open channel and approximately 63km of main pipeline, including a pipeline to Abbot Point. The Project supports the proposed expansion of the Port of Abbot Point and the establishment of the APSDA. Over half of the water transported is anticipated to be supplied to industrial and urban users in the Bowen and Abbot Point area while the remainder would go to agriculture. A business case is currently being prepared for this project.



DISCLAIMER

PROJECT

TITLE

DATE

CLIENT

MAY 2011

FIGURE 7 - 100 YEAR ARI LEVELS - FLOODING AND INNUNDATION WITHIN APSDA




Source: Figure 4.7 - Bowen Abbot Point Flood Modelling Study, Maunsell AECOM, March 2008.

°0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5

Kilometres




Proposed Dredging Channel and Berth -NQBP



3. SUMMARY OF LNG PRODUCTION AND FACILITIES

LNG is predominantly liquefied methane with 1-2% heavier hydrocarbons such as ethane and propane. It is a cryogenic liquid boiling at -162°C at atmospheric pressure. 3.1 LNG Production Process LNG is produced by pre-treating the feed gas to remove carbon dioxide, water and heavy hydrocarbons. The gas stream is then liquefied by cooling to -162°C (approximately) which reduces the volume to approximately 1/600th of its original volume. The LNG is then piped to an insulated storage tank prior to export via a purpose built LNG vessel. 3.1.1 Gas Delivery Gas will be delivered from the gas field by pipeline. The pipeline will be underground and its size will depend on the volume of gas to be delivered. The gas pipeline will access the proposed LNG site via a dedicated easement or similar right to use and occupy land. Typically the gas pipeline easement is 30m wide providing sufficient space to construct and maintain the pipeline. Larger easements may be required for larger pipes to allow for construction activity. Access to freehold and leased land will need to be negotiated with landowners and lessees. The use or development of land over the pipeline corridor will have some restrictions to protect the pipeline and allow access to the pipeline. Crossings of roads and the rail line will need to be negotiated with the road and rail managers. Typically major roads and rail lines will be under-bored so as they continue to operate during construction, and minor roads will be closed or their operation limited during construction to allow for trenching, laying of the pipeline and repair of the road. 3.1.2 Gas Pre-Treatment The purpose of the gas pre-treatment phase is to remove components contained within the gas stream that would otherwise freeze or have an adverse impact during the gas liquefaction process. Generally some treatment of the gas occurs at the gas field prior to transportation, with further “polishing” of the gas occurring at the plant. At the pre-treatment stage solids and liquids in the feed gas will be removed. Carbon dioxide (CO2) removal is usually achieved by an amine system using a Methyl diethanolamine (MDEA) solution. In the past the removed CO2 is typically vented to the atmosphere from the stripper. However it is usually in a form where it can be readily captured and subsequently sequestered. The amount of CO2 in the gas stream depends on the field where the gas is sourced. After CO2 removal the gas stream will pass to the dehydration process for removal of all moisture prior to liquefaction. 3.1.3 Liquefaction Following pre-treatment, feed gas is sent to the liquefaction process where gas is cooled. Initially the remaining heavy hydrocarbons are removed from the LNG stream, captured and stored in the condensate tank.


The resultant gas is then cooled further, liquefied and sent to LNG storage at approximately -162°C. The cooling of the gas in the liquefaction process is performed by a closed loop refrigerant circuit. The boil-off gas (BOG) system handles a combination of flash gas from the liquefaction process, gas displaced from the tanks during LNG production and BOG from the LNG tank due to heat leak. The vapour resulting from the loading of the LNG ship will also be returned to the BOG system. This gas is returned to the cooling loop or used as fuel in the LNG plant. 3.1.4 Product Storage LNG output from the liquefaction process is pumped to a storage tank. The system can collect and handle LNG vapour, which will be directed to the BOG system for reuse. The storage tanks are large volume and highly insulated to minimise BOG. 3.1.5 Flare System A flare system is incorporated into the plant design to provide overpressure protection for plant and equipment and for disposal of flammable gas releases that may occur under non-routine or emergency situations. 3.1.6 LNG Marine Terminal A marine terminal is required to facilitate loading of product into LNG vessels. The infrastructure includes cryogenic LNG marine loading arms, cryogenic LNG supply pipeline from the storage tank to the loading arms and return BOG pipeline. There will also be a requirement for a vapour capture and return system and monitoring and control systems to ensure the vessel movements at the loading arm are within the prescribed tolerance, usually between 1-2m vertically (heave) and horizontally (surge and sway). Appendix A includes the Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Facilities prepared by the International Finance Corporation and World Bank. Annex A of this document provides a valuable summary of LNG industry activities. 3.2 Natural Gas vs Coal Seam Gas Natural gas, which is essentially methane, is mostly recovered from sedimentary reservoirs ranging from buried sandstone, shale and carbonate formations (conventional gas) to that recovered from coal measures and carbonaceous shales. The latter is usually referred to as unconventional gas of which CSG is currently the most economically significant. Raw natural gas, as recovered from a well, contains a number of compounds other than methane which must be removed or reduced in concentration before the natural gas can be marketed. These compounds include heavy hydrocarbons (oil/condensates), LPG, oxygen, CO2, sulphur compounds, other gaseous inerts such as nitrogen and water. Normally CSG has a high methane content (usually greater than 96%) with other components being traces of ethane, nitrogen and CO2. Natural gas and CSG have to be dry so that water does not condense out at low points in the pipeline causing flow problems with water slugs as well as for internal pipe corrosion protection. Raw natural gas is processed to meet the pipeline’s specifications though the amount of processing varies from field to field and is governed by the level of


contaminants in the raw gas. After treatment of natural gas to pipeline standards, there is no basic difference in composition of gas from different reservoirs. Treatment of gas is usually done in the field. The gas delivered to the LNG plant, regardless of whether it is sourced from conventional natural gas or CSG is likely to have been treated in the gas field to bring it to pipeline quality standard. The difference between the CSG and natural gas delivered in the pipeline is only marginal and the difference between the LNG processes is in the pre-treatment of the gas. Whether the gas originates from conventional gas or CSG has minimal affect on the components of the LNG facility and no effect on the siting or land area requirements of the plant. 3.3 Synergies between LNG and Existing and Future

Industries LNG plants produce limited by-products and no industries have been identified which would locate near to an LNG plant to use its by-products, particularly those using CSG. A gas pipeline of significant capacity is required to supply an LNG plant. Natural gas in addition to that needed for LNG production may be used as a feedstock or energy source by many other industries. The quantities of gas demanded by neighbouring industries for feedstock or energy needs can be significant, but modest in comparison to an LNG plant’s demand. An LNG plant is therefore an important anchor tenant in a regional development model as it brings a significant supply of gas to the area. It would be desirable for third party access to be made available to the gas transported to the LNG plant, as this would be attractive to other industry considering locating in the APSDA. Potential uses of natural gas at Abbot Point include power generation, process heat, chemical production such as ammonia, urea and ammonium nitrate, methanol and large mineral processing industries such as alumina refineries. The mechanism for accessing gas would need to be negotiated by the potential users with the gas pipeline owner.


4. RELEVANT LNG FACILITY GUIDELINES, STANDARDS AND CODES OF PRACTICE

This section summarises key LNG guidelines, standards and codes of practice relevant to the siting of LNG facilities. A comprehensive list of reference documents is provided in Appendix B. These standards are generally not mandatory, however it would be prudent to have good reasons for ignoring recommendations in any of the reference documents including the Australian Standards. The Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO) for example, has a membership of over 100 companies, representing over 95% of the world’s owners and operators of LNG tankers and terminals. Like the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), a disclaimer against any liability for the information provided appears inside the cover of each publication. The requirements of the Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No. 10 (HIPAP) are the standards used in Queensland, although it is of New South Wales origin. 4.1 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard

59A The standard applies to the following:

facilities that liquefy natural gas; facilities that store, vaporize, transfer, and handle LNG; the training of all personnel involved with LNG; and the design, location, construction, maintenance, and operation of all LNG

facilities The purpose of the standard is to provide minimum fire protection, safety, and related requirements for the location, design, construction, security, operation, and maintenance of LNG plants. Chapter 5 Plant Siting and Layout, presents criteria for the siting of plant and equipment. NFPA 59A requires a written site evaluation addressing the following to be prepared and provided to the authority having jurisdiction:

Potential incidents and mitigation measures; Adjacent activities; Severe weather patterns over a 100 year period; Other natural hazards; and Security.

NFPA 59A also requires:

All weather access to the plant shall be provided for personnel safety and fire protection except where specific measures are taken in accordance with chapter 12 Fire Protection, Safety and Security.


Site preparation shall include provision for retention of spilled LNG within the limits of the property. Dykes or impounding walls are required to contain the spill. Double and full containment containers shall be designed and constructed such that in the case of a spill and secondary container fire, the secondary container wall will contain the LNG for the duration of the fire. In the case of a fire contained to the inner tank, the secondary container wall shall retain sufficient structural integrity to prevent collapse, which can cause damage to and leakage from the primary container.

The maximum radiant heat flux from a fire shall not exceed the limits stated in Table 5.3.3.2 Radiant Heat Flux Limits to Property Lines and Occupancies (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 – NFPA 59A Radiant Heat Flux Limits to Property Lines and Occupancies (Table 5.3.3.2)

Radiant Heat Flux W/m2

Exposure

5,000 A property line at ground level that can be built upon for ignition of a design spill

5,000 The nearest point located outside the owner’s property line at ground level that, at the time of plant siting, is used for outdoor assembly by groups of 50 or more persons for a fire in an impounding area

9,000 The nearest point on the building or structure outside the owner’s property line that is in existence at the time of the plant siting and used for assembly, educational, healthcare, detention and correction, or residential occupancies for a fire in an impounding area

30,000 A property line at ground level that can be built upon for a fire over an impounding area

The separation of an LNG tank impoundment from a property line that can be built upon, shall be such that for the design spill based on parameters in Table 5.3.3.7 of NFPA Standard 59A, an average concentration of methane in the air of 50% of the lower flammability limit (LFL) does not extend beyond the property line that can be built upon, as demonstrated by an approved vapour dispersion model.

Table 5.3.4.1 of NFPA Standard 59A provides minimum separation distances between storage tanks or impoundments and property lines that can be built upon. For storage capacity greater than 265m3 the minimum distance is 0.7 x tank diameter, but not less than 30m.

Clause 5.3.7 - Loading and Unloading Facility spacing, requires that the wharf be located such that the moored vessel is at least 30m from any bridge or crossing of a navigable waterway and the loading or unloading manifold is at least 61m from this point.


4.2 SIGTTO Information Paper No 14 – Site Selection and Design for LNG Ports and Jetties

The main focus areas of this information paper are: Risk Limitation; Port Navigation; and Cargo Operations.

The paper discusses risks and the historical record of the LNG industry in relation to those risks and action that can be taken at the planning stage to mitigate the risks identified. The following is a brief summary of Chapter 6 - Site Selection. The paper summarises the site selection process as being to limit marine risk while positioning the jetty within realistic limits. Jetties should be located to remove as many risks as possible by placing terminals in sheltered locations remote from other port users, in particular where other ships do not pose a collision risk and where gas leaks can not affect local populations. The Information Paper recommends that harbour protection is provided against low frequency waves either by choice of location or breakwater, or an enhanced mooring system design. The berth should not be on the outer bends of rivers or near channels used by large ships to minimise collision risk. The Appendix from Information Paper 14 titled LNG Ports – Risk Reduction is included at Appendix C. 4.3 AS3961 The Storage And Handling of Liquefied Natural

Gas AS 3961 ‘The Storage and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas’, concentrates on emergency and fire safety requirements associated with LNG marine terminals. AS 3961 describes the general principles for containment of LNG in both pressure and atmospheric tanks, however this summary focuses on atmospheric tanks. Pressure tanks are generally not associated with LNG marine terminals as their purpose is the transport of LNG by road. Standard fire fighting methods and equipment may not be appropriate for use on LNG fires as the fire characteristics of LNG are significantly different to solids and liquids. Unlike solids and liquids, the vapour from a gas leak is mobile and can drift towards an ignition source. The key objective is dissipation prior to reaching an ignition source which is achieved through the control, elimination and distance to possible ignition sources. The risk of there being an ignition source present during the transfer of LNG at a marine facility is controlled through the use of operational procedures which are intended to eliminate or control the risk. For example the Standard requires:

no general cargo, apart from ship’s stores shall be handled over the loading platform or wharf within 30m of the point of transfer connection, otherwise known as the manifold, whilst LNG is being transferred through the piping systems;


bunkering may be allowed, provided that it is completed via a pipeline and not via a barge;

vehicular traffic shall not be allowed within 30m of the manifold during loading and unloading; and

the marine control building shall be at least 15m from the manifold. Design of LNG facilities must incorporate sufficient isolating facilities as this is the only adequate means of stopping a gas fire. Isolation values for marine transfer facilities shall be provided at the manifold, with remote access from the marine control building. An onshore isolation valve shall also be provided for each liquid and vapour return line located at a readily accessible location onshore near the abutment of the marine facility. At the plant, catchment compounds shall be provided around the LNG tanks to contain any possible liquid spillages. Since the evaporation rate of LNG is high, the surface area of the compound shall be minimised to reduce the rate of vapour generation. In the event that the compound catches fire, attention should be given to protecting nearby property and plant from the high level of radiant heat. Fires which break-out at other locations on the plant site, i.e. non-LNG source fires, are generally not a threat to LNG tanks due to the separation distance required and the insulation of the tank, provided that the fire is not active for a prolonged period and its intensity is moderate. In summary, the fundamentals of dealing with an LNG fire emergency as set out in AS 3961 are as follows:

It is of utmost importance the nature of the fire is evaluated immediately. LNG tanks will not be affected by fires which are of normal intensity and

duration which are affecting adjacent buildings or materials, and the emphasis shall be on fighting that fire.

Where LNG or gas is escaping, the aim is to shut off the flow of the escaping gas to prevent escalation.

In the event that the gas has ignited and the situation is stable and it is safe to allow the gas to burn, the best course of action may be to allow the fire to burn until the entire storage of gas has burned off.

If the fire cannot be contained or controlled and the gas flow cannot be stopped, all personnel must be evacuated.


5. LNG FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS For LNG proponents, site selection is strongly influenced by the desire to minimise transportation and storage costs of LNG. The ideal site is close to the gas field and the plant can be located near to a marine terminal. In most respects an LNG facility is typical of other industrial activities and as such, has similar siting requirements. Additionally, the LNG industry is subject to rigorous safety standards which have evolved over several decades to ensure the safe operation of LNG facilities. Safety is the key driver in site selection, rather than infrastructure demands or amenity issues, such as odour and noise. Establishing site requirements for LNG facilities at Abbot Point has included a review of publicly available and private client information for several LNG plants proposed in the Port of Gladstone. In particular, the EIS documents for the following LNG projects have been reviewed as they are recent and many aspects of the LNG proposals for Port of Gladstone are relevant to Abbot Point:

the LNG Ltd plant at Fishermans Landing Wharf (3 Mtpa); the Queensland Curtis LNG plant at Curtis Island (12 Mtpa); the GLNG plant at Curtis Island (10 Mtpa); and the Australia Pacific LNG plant at Curtis Island (18 Mtpa).

5.1 Proximity of Components of an LNG Facilities LNG facilities consist of the following components:

Gas Pre-treatment; Liquefaction; LNG Storage; and LNG load out to ship.

Cryogenic pipelines transfer LNG from the liquefaction plant to a storage tank and from the storage tank to the loading arms at the marine terminal. The gas liquefaction process is designed to continue uninterrupted, requiring LNG vessels to call on a very rigid schedule, determined by the plant and storage capacities. Generally the gas pre-treatment and liquefaction facilities are an integrated facility and are regarded as one unit or train. The inter-relationship between these components is such that their separation is not desirable. The limited separation of processing train from the storage tank and the loading facilities does occur. While the objective in designing the plant layout is to minimise the distance between the plant and the storage tank to minimise cost and reduce safety risk, it is possible (although not practical) to separate the plant from the tank. A possible scenario at Abbot Point is to utilise one of the relatively large parcels of land at the Bruce Highway end of the APSDA for an LNG plant, with a storage tank located either at the plant or on the MCF, near to the abutment of the approach to the marine terminal. As discussed in section 5.4.2, the fundamental issue is the distance of cryogenic pipeline between plant and load-out facility.


5.2 Safety and Risk Determining appropriate safety parameters is a fundamental issue for LNG plants and one of the key drivers for determining land requirements and site suitability for LNG facilities. Also important is the safety of ships loading LNG and transiting ports, as the consequences of a LNG leak from a ship can be catastrophic due to the large volume of LNG involved. The safety of LNG facilities are established by undertaking a project specific Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). These risk assessments take into account the specifics of the plant, the prevailing local conditions, the surrounding land uses and the local legislative requirements. LNG plants of the size considered in this report are Major Hazard Facilities (MHF) under the Dangerous Goods and Safety Management Act 2001 and are likely to be the subject to an EIS either under the State Development and Public Works Organisation Act 1971 or the Environmental Protection Act 1994. A risk assessment will be required for each LNG project as part of the information submitted for regulatory assessment. 5.2.1 Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRA) A QRA “combines the known frequency or probability that something may go wrong with an assessment of the potential consequences for people if something goes wrong” (Quantitative Risk Assessment Explained, QGC, January 2010). The results of this assessment of risk are then compared against acceptable risk standards. This comparison will inform decision makers about whether the level of risk is acceptable. Diagram 5.1 provides an overview of the QRA methodology. Diagram 5.1 Quantitative Risk Assessment Processes

Source: Queensland Curtis LNG EIS, July 2009


The level of acceptable risk is expressed as a probability of an individual death occurring in a year. This chance of fatality can be mapped as “Risk Contours” which describes the risk at a particular location. From these maps it can be determined whether the development’s impact has an acceptable risk on surrounding land. 5.2.2 Queensland Requirements for Safety The Chemical Hazards and Emergency Management (CHEM) Unit of the Department of Emergency Services (DES) (now known as the Hazardous Industry and Chemical Branch (HICB) within the Department of Justice and Attorney-General) released Information Paper 10: Hazardous Industry Planning for Safety in 1998 and Interim Risk Objectives in 2002. These documents provide the policy guidance for Queensland’s approach to risk assessment. Through these documents Queensland has adopted the NSW Department of Urban Affairs and Planning, Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper (HIPAP) approach. The acceptable risk values are outlined in Risk Criteria for Land Use Safety Planning – Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No. 4 (1992), commonly known as HIPAP4. Individual Fatality Risk Table 5.1 outlines the criteria for individual fatality risk from the HIPAP Guideline. Table 5.1 – Individual Fatality Risk Criteria

Type of Land Use Tolerable Individual Fatality Risk Criteria

Hospitals, schools, child-care facilities, old-age housing developments

0.5 in a million chances of fatality per year (0.5 x 10-6 fatalities per year)

Residential developments, hotels, tourist resorts

1 in a million chances of fatality per year (1 x 10-6 fatalities per year)

Commercial developments including offices, retail centres, warehouses with showrooms, restaurants, entertainment complexes


Sporting complexes and active open space areas


Industrial 50 in a million chances of fatality per year (50 x 10-6 fatalities per year)

From the table above it can be stated that:

development should not occur on land within an area that has a greater chance than 50 in a million of fatality per year;

land between the risk contours greater than 1 in a million chances of fatality per year and 50 in a million chances of fatality per year would be acceptable for industrial but not residential use; and

land with lower than a 1 in a million chance of fatality per year, would be acceptable risk for residential development (and industry).


The lower the risk attached to an area of land, the greater the variety of suitable development scenarios. The CHEM Unit Interim Risk Objectives also state that for new facilities risk of fatality contours in excess of 50 in a million chances of fatality per year (50 x 10-6 fatalities per year) should exist within the boundary of the facility. Heat Radiation and Blast Overpressure The consideration of risk includes the consequences of heat radiation and blast overpressure (ie fire and explosion). These assessments take account of an accident causing damage to buildings or affecting a neighbouring industrial operation and creating a “domino effect”. NFPA 59A requires the calculation of exclusion distances for thermal radiation resulting from the release of LNG. The CHEM Unit Information Paper No 10 defines criteria to protect against property damage and accidental propagation caused by fire and explosions onto neighbouring industrial facilities. These CHEM unit criteria are:

heat radiation on neighbouring hazardous industries, or at land zoned to accommodate such facilities, should not exceed 23 kW/m2 at frequencies of more than 50 chances in a million per year (50 x 10-6 chances per year). This level of heat radiation can cause spontaneous ignition of wood after extended exposure and can result in structural failure of unprotected steel.

overblast pressure at neighbouring hazardous industries, or at land zoned to accommodate such facilities, should not exceed 14kPa at frequencies of more than 50 chances in a million per year (50 x 10-6 chances per year). This level of overblast pressure can cause damage to piping and equipment at neighbouring facilities, and also cause significant structural damage to buildings.

5.2.3 Proposed Criteria for Determining Separation Distances Based on the Queensland policy position and the view that the Abbot Point area is an industrial area, it was considered that the assessment of potential sites for LNG facilities at Abbot Point, from a safety and hazard perspective, should be based on the criteria below. LNG facilities should:

contain the 50 in a million per year chance of fatality per year risk contour (50 x 10-6) within the site boundaries;

heat radiation should not exceed 23kW/m2 at the site boundaries; and blast overpressure should not exceed 14kPa at the site boundaries.

5.2.4 Determining Appropriate Separation DistanceIt is beyond the scope of this report to undertake risk assessments to determine risk contours or heat radiation and blast overpressures for possible LNG plant sites at Abbot Point. However, some conclusions may be drawn about appropriate separation distances by reviewing risk assessment information undertaken for LNG developments proposed for Gladstone and deriving separation distances from those assessments. This approach provides useful guidelines for a high level site selection assessment, however it would be inappropriate to rely on this information to assess a specific proposal as individual specific risk assessments will be required.


The LNG facility risk assessments considered by this study are derived from information contained in:

LNG Ltd Fisherman’s Landing LNG EIS (3 Mtpa); Assessments for an undisclosed RLMS client (1 Mtpa); Queensland Curtis LNG EIS (12 Mtpa); and Australian Pacific LNG EIS (18 Mtpa)1

A summary of the risk assessment information contained within these studies is provided in Table 5.2. Appendix D provides the risk contour mapping for the Queensland Curtis LNG, Australia Pacific LNG plant and LNG Ltd Fisherman’s Landing Wharf LNG Plants as presented in their respective EISs. Table 5.2 - Summary of Risk Assessment (Safe Clearances) Outcomes from Other LNG Projects

Project 50 x 10-6 Risk Contour Distance from plant footprint

50 x 10-6 Risk Contour Distance from manifold

Heat Radiation 23 kW/m² Distance from plant footprint

Overpressure 14 kPa Distance from plant footprint

LNG Ltd (3 Mtpa)

< 50 m NIL 116 m 215 m (23 kPa)

RLMS Private Client (1 Mtpa)

75 m < 50 m 220 m 40 m

Queensland Curtis LNG (12 Mtpa)

161 m 357 m 4.7 kW/m2 contour is contained within the property boundary. Boundary separation to plant is approximately 350 m.

3.5 kPa contour is contained within the property boundary. Boundary separation to plant is approximately 350 m.

Australia Pacific LNG (18 Mtpa)

74 m 310 m 130 m 115 m

The last two columns of the table contain the information required to estimate a nominal boundary clearance to any LNG plant site. The third column, containing the distance from the manifold (ship loading) to the 50 x 10-6 risk contour, is irrelevant in terms of land boundary clearances and the remaining column further to the left has lower values than any of the columns to the right. The rows represent LNG plants of 1, 3, 12 and 18 Mtpa; however the information for the Queensland Curtis LNG project (12 Mtpa) is excluded because it is inconclusive for the purposes of estimating a nominal boundary clearance to any LNG plant site. The heat radiation contour and the overpressure contour contained within the

1 It is noted that Supplementary EISs have been prepared for these projects, w hich in some cases have resulted in modif ied risk assessment information primarily as a result of changes in design and specif ications.


property boundary 350m from the plant are much more conservative than necessary; however, there is insufficient information to determine the distance from the plant to the appropriate heat radiation and overpressure contours. On the basis that the remaining information (1 Mtpa - 18 Mtpa LNG plants) envelopes the 1.5, 3 and 10 Mtpa LNG plant sizes which are the focus of this report, the estimate will still be reliable. Of the data available for the boundary clearance estimate (shown in bold), 220m is the highest number, followed by 215m. On this basis allowing a safety buffer of 220m between the plant perimeter and the property boundary will produce a conservative estimate of land area required to contain the fatality risk, heat radiation and overpressure limiting contours within the property boundary. It is stressed that these distances are proposed for the purpose of strategic planning. Plant specific safety assessment needs to be undertaken on each LNG plant proposal. Pipelines The practice of locating pipelines and conveyors in a dedicated corridor is not uncommon. The alternative is an inefficient use of land and would result in a more haphazard and space consuming web of pipes and conveyors. In accordance with the HIPAP4 guidelines, vulnerability zones must be produced for radiant levels for the worst case events (e.g. a pipeline ruptures and ignites in this case) as follows: )

4.7 kW/m2 = cause pain in 15-20 seconds and injury after 30 seconds; 12.6 kW/m2 = significant chance of fatality and damage to thin steel; and 23 kW/m2 = likely fatality and unprotected steel may fail and pressure vessels

may need to be relieved. While the lower flux values generally apply to people, the higher values apply to equipment. In considering the issue of the LNG pipe causing damage to neighbouring pipes and conveyors, the following is noteworthy:

1. The frequency of failure of LNG pipes is extremely low, with a negligible probability.

2. The duration of such a pool fire would be very short, as the flow of LNG in the pipeline can be shut off.

3. The 23 kW/m2 radiant heat contour may cause damage to metal structures such as a conveyor or pipe, but in reality for such short term exposure, much higher heat flux levels would be necessary to produce significant damage.

The following codes recommend a separation distance of 30m between sources of LNG and potential sources of ignition:

NFPA Standard 59A for minimum separation of storage tanks; and AS3961 – no handling of cargo over the wharf or platform within 30m of the

loading point, no vehicular traffic within 30m of the manifold during loading. It would be a prudent starting point to assume a 30m separation between the LNG pipes and sources of ignition. It is expected that the LNG pipe would be located on the western edge of the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor to access a dedicated LNG berth on the western side of the MCF. A walled corridor system could be employed on the eastern side of the pipeline to contain LNG spills and limit the consequences to other infrastructure contained within the corridor. The need for any mitigating


action, including the wall may be proven unnecessary when studied in detail at a later stage. The overlap of the LNG pipe vulnerability zone with another pipeline or conveyor in the corridor does not mean that the concept is infeasible. There is a risk, although slight, that in the absence of any attempt to mitigate the consequences, economic loss requiring repair and/or replacement of damaged lengths of pipeline or conveyor may result. Ship Load Out It is noted in the Australia Pacific LNG Project EIS that an exclusion zone of 250m around the LNG vessel manifold has been agreed upon by Maritime Safety Queensland (MSQ), Gladstone Ports Corporation and other LNG proponents during loading out of LNG. It is a reasonable assumption for the purposes of strategic planning that a 250m exclusion zone around the manifold would also be applied at Abbot Point. The ramifications of a larger exclusion zone are relatively minor, requiring a revision to the marine terminal layout. 5.3 Land Area5.3.1 Plant Site Comparison From a review of proposed LNG plants proposed to be located at Gladstone and the safety and hazard distances derived from section 5.1, it is concluded that: y

each plant has been able to contain the risk contours and heat radiation and overpressure contours within or nearly within their site boundaries;

each site for LNG plants at Gladstone is to be used for the liquefaction process and gas storage; and

separating the storage tank and liquefaction plant is considered unlikely to warrant different separation distances to those discussed, although it will reduce the plant footprint and therefore the size of land needed to operate the plant.

A summary of the plant and site areas for current and proposed LNG projects are provided in Table 5.3: Table 5.3 - Proposed LNG Plant and Site Areas

Project Plant Footprint Site Area

LNG Ltd (3 Mtpa)

9 ha 25 ha

RLMS Private Client (1 Mtpa)

9 ha* 25 ha

GLNG (10 Mtpa)

Train 1= 40 ha (3-4 Mtpa) Train 1,2 & 3 = 100 ha (10 Mtpa)

190 ha

Queensland Curtis LNG (12 Mtpa)

75 ha 268 ha

Australia Pacific LNG (18 Mtpa)

140 ha 270 ha

* - site excludes storage tank


5.3.2 LNG Facility Area Requirements To verify the view that the site areas of the LNG plants at Gladstone are reasonable, RLMS has also determined the appropriate site area for LNG plants for the purpose of this study by:

calculating the footprint of land likely to be needed for the plant (with and without storage tank(s)) and adding a nominal 220 m safety buffer to the plant footprint. The extent of the safety buffer around the plant footprint then determines the plant area.

reviewing those calculations against the proposed LNG plants sizes at Gladstone and advice from Abbot Point LNG proponents.

Plant Footprint for 10Mtpa LNG Hub The 10Mtpa plant is notionally a hub arrangement which implies that the facility would be a shared facility with common storage facilities and load out facilities but the liquefaction trains may be owned and operated separately. Such a facility is expected to include some duplication in facilities and it would be less space efficient than a single operator 10Mtpa plant. To account for this inefficiency a notional additional 20ha has been added to the 10Mtpa plant footprint. Air Cooled vs Water Cooled Plants It is noted that an air cooled plant may require a greater area than water cooled plant and consequently plant area may need to be increased if air cooling is used. This study has assumed that either option is possible and in selecting the appropriate footprint area it has assumed the smallest reasonable footprint area, being a site using water cooling. This approach means that some sites may not be suitable for some plant designs, but it ensures that potentially suitable sites for water cooled plants are not excluded from consideration. Plant Footprints and Derived Plant Areas Table 5.4 outlines the assumed plant footprints and the minimum site areas required based on a 220 m safety buffer. Sites located on the waterfront are beneficial as the safety buffer need not be applied on the seaward property boundary. Table 5.4 – Representative Plant Footprints and Minimum Site Areas

LNG Plant Size Plant Footprint Minimum site area with 220 m buffer all around

Minimum site area with 220 m buffer – 3 sides

1.5Mtpa 9 ha 55 ha 38 ha 3Mtpa 9 ha 55 ha 38 ha 10Mtpa 95 ha (includes

additional 20ha for hub arrangement)

200 ha 170 ha

Plants Areas For the 1.5Mtpa and 3Mtpa plant sites, the areas derived above are larger than that proposed for the LNG Ltd and RLMS private client proposals, as well as the advice provided by two of the potential LNG proponents with interest in the APSDA. As a result, the approach to determining the minimum site area required for the smaller plants has been revisited. Upon reviewing the risk data contained within the LNG Ltd EIS, it was determined that a minimum site area of 30 ha would be adopted for the


purposes of this report as the risk contours were just outside the property boundary for the 25 ha site. The proposed minimum site area for the 10Mtpa plant is slightly larger than the site area proposed for the GLNG, however it is considered reasonable to adopt the 200 ha minimum site area because of the inefficiencies associated with a hub facility layout. Therefore for the purposes of this report the minimum site areas for LNG plants of 1.5, 3 and 10Mtpa are as stated in Table 5.5. Table 5.5 – Recommended Plant Site Areas

LNG Plant Size (Mtpa) Minimum Site Area (ha) 1.5 30 3 30 10 200

5.4 Port Considerations 5.4.1 LNG Tanker Berth Location The following extracts from SIGTTO - LNG Operations in Port Areas – Essential Best Practices for the Industry, Section 4 - Terminal Site Selection, underscores the importance of correctly locating the tanker berth to mitigate risk.

“The most important single determinant of risk attached to the LNG operations in port areas is the selection of the site for the marine terminal – the location of the tanker berth(s). The chosen site crucially determines the entire subsequent profile of risk for tanker operations; the approach channel (if any); the berthing and un-berthing manoeuvres; proximity to other port traffic and external ignition sources. The site selection process is formed by many considerations other than the risk implications for tanker operations. Availability of suitable land for the installation and the effects of associated local planning laws, constraints arising from the infrastructure of gas distribution and usage from the terminal and many other factors will weigh heavily in the selection process – not least constraints of acceptable cost. Therefore, compromising some or all of the principle criteria for site selection is often unavoidable. No site should be selected for an LNG terminal that produces unavoidable potential threats to the security of its associated tanker operations thereafter, for as long as the terminal will operate. Such risks, accepted as routine at inception of a terminal, even if they appear remote in the first instance, will inevitably come closer to realisation as the installation operates over its intended life span.”

LNG tanker berths are dedicated fit-for-purpose structures, as are coal export berths. Increasing port efficiency by using berths interchangeably is not an option and the need for an exclusion zone at the LNG vessel manifold of minimum radius 250m, would lead to restrictions to the operations of the other berths in the MCF.


For these reasons a dedicated LNG berth separated from the proposed MCF would be the best solution. Further investigations will be required to understand requirements for specific plant sizes and operations in relation to the arrangement of berths and industries within the Abbot Point Multi Cargo Facility. 5.4.2 Proximity to Berthing Facilities The least cost option is to minimise the length of the LNG cryogenic pipes from storage tank to ship load out, however this often requires a trade-off against the dredging cost to provide sufficient depth for passage of the laden vessel on all stages of the tide. LNG terminals usually have an approach trestle up to 6km in length, with one or two dedicated berths, similar in form to the existing coal export facility at Abbot Point. The dredging cost per berth at the proposed MCF will be substantially reduced as the current design includes 12 berths. The length of LNG pipes would depend mostly on the location of the plant. To minimise cost, it is usual to locate the storage tank nearby the trestle abutment in close proximity to the production plant. In the case of Woodside’s latest LNG project Pluto on the north-west shelf of Australia, the planning stage considered the Maitland Industrial Estate and West Intercourse Island option which was at odds with this premise. Although the tanks were located at the trestle abutment, the plant was 14km away and the berth was 4km seaward. This option was deemed to be “impractical” and discarded. It is assumed this meant “too costly” and “technically infeasible”. The longest separation distance between the storage tanks and the berth for an operating facility, appears to be a maximum of 5-6km, which would suggest a practical limit for capital and operating costs. Examples are the Gorgon Project, which has approximately 4.8 km separation between the tanks and the manifold although during Front End Engineering Design (FEED) a 5km long jetty option was included. The proposed Rosignano LNG Terminal on the north-west coast of Italy proposes LNG transfer lines that will run for a distance of 5.2 km, of which 0.4 km is on the jetty extension, 1.8km is on the existing jetty and 3 km is onshore. The pipeline length between the LNG storage and marine load out at the Brunei LNG plant is approximately 5km (as measured from Google Earth). A Joint Venture of BG international, Shell, Chevron and NNPC have been developing a greenfield project site approximately 140 km east of Lagos, Nigeria. The dedicated marine terminal originally included a jetty with a trestle length of approximately 8 km. The layout was subsequently revised to a port in/on the coastline with a breakwater structure, and minimal jetty. Ultimately the decision regarding the suitability of sites at Abbot Point rests with the proponents. It may be that the 10Mtpa hub arrangement is able to accommodate longer LNG pipeline lengths due to the economics involved, however the evidence based on existing plants in operation, suggests that the proximity of berthing facilities is a constraint in the siting of LNG facilities at Abbot Point.


5.4.3 Ship Loading Typically LNG vessels are loaded at around 10,000 cubic metres per hour (m3/h) using multiple loading arms, although higher rates are achievable. Individual loading arms are available in sizes from 100mm diameter to 400mm diameter, with 300 m3/h and 4000 m3/h discharge rates respectively. The total time at berth also includes cooling the vessel before loading, if required, purging and draining the lines and performing safety checks. The typical time at berth for any of the plant capacities considered in this report will be in the range of 24 hours to 36 hours. If the LNG tanker berth was incorporated into the protected harbour in the proposed MCF 12 berth layout, the operation of the port would be restricted for the entire time the LNG vessel was in port. Due to the existence of the 250m exclusion zone around the LNG vessel’s manifold, adjacent berths would be affected and manoeuvring of vessels restricted. Dedicating the outer berth to the LNG operations would reduce the number of berths impacted by the exclusion zone and eliminate restrictions on manoeuvring of vessels in the inner harbour but is in proximity to the shipping access channel. SIGTTO Information Paper No. 14 Clause 6.2 recommends that jetties handling hazardous cargoes be located to avoid a collision risk with other vessels. . Future additions to the MCF should separate the LNG terminal from the MCF to eliminate restrictions caused by the LNG vessels at the MCF and significantly reduce the risk of collision with other vessels. In this configuration, the existence of an LNG marine terminal or LNG vessels manoeuvring in the port would not be expected to cause higher levels of congestion than would occur for any mix of vessels. 5.4.4 Port Requirements Size of LNG Carriers Relative to the Three LNG Plant Sizes The capacity of ships and storage tanks continues to trend upwards in search of greater economies in the transportation of LNG. The most cost efficient vessel to export LNG is the largest vessel able to depart without tidal constraint. At Abbot Point, this should not be a constraint because LNG vessels have the shallowest draft of the mix of vessels visiting the port. The liquefaction process is continuous, meaning that vessel calls are on a rigid schedule to ensure that the storage tank is not over-filled. For the same tank capacity, a doubling in production rate of LNG requires twice as many vessel calls. Table 5.6 below summarises the range of vessels available, the most common being the 138,000m3 to 155,000 m3 vessels.


Table 5.6 - Range of LNG Vessels and Parameters

LNG Capacity Current 138,000-155,000m3

Q Flex 200,000-215,000m3

Q Max 255,000-265,000m3

Tanks 4-5 5 5 Length (m) 283 - 290 315 345 Beam (m) 44 - 49 50 55 Laden Draft (m) 11 – 11.5 12 12 -12.5

The current coal loading facility at the Port of Abbot Point caters for Cape size bulk carriers, which are approximately 300m long with a beam of 50m and draft of around 18.6m. The Q Flex LNG vessel has similar length and breadth, but draws significantly less water at a maximum of 12m. Even the Q Max which is 15% longer and 10% wider than the bulk carrier has only a 12.5m maximum laden draft. The channel depth designed to suit the Cape size bulk carriers would therefore be more than adequate for the maximum LNG vessels likely to use the facility. 1.5Mtpa Facility

A 1.5 Mtpa LNG plant would require a tank of approximately 180,000m3 storage capacity with 145,000m3 capacity vessels calling approximately once per fortnight. It would be feasible to use a smaller tank, smaller ships and a higher vessel arrival rate to reduce capital costs, but the overall cost would be higher. 3Mtpa Facility

Darwin LNG has been in operation for several years and planning has commenced for an expansion of the facility to increase the original 3.5 Mtpa LNG production capacity. The storage tank capacity is 188,000m3 and the LNG vessels are typically in the range 145,000m3, although the original design catered for vessels as small as 89,000m3. This throughput would double the vessel call rate, all else being equal, reducing the arrival interval to approximately 7 days. 10Mtpa Facility

At over three times the throughput of the 3Mtpa scenario, the two day interval between vessel arrivals necessary to transport 10Mtpa, is infeasible. The plant would require larger storage capacity to handle larger vessels to reduce the required number of vessel calls to a practical number, or two berths would be necessary to handle the higher call rate. Approach Channel and Swing Basin Design Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses (PIANC) - Approach Channels, A Guide to Design, addresses the matter of access channel and swing basin design. The following summarises the information available in PIANC for concept design purposes and as part of the design development, any conclusions drawn would require verification by simulation modelling in consultation with the Harbour Master. Channel Depth

The concept design method for calculation of depth of channel is outlined in section 5.3.2 of PIANC. The depth is determined based on:


1. At-rest draft of the design vessel; 2. Tide height throughout transit of channel; 3. Squat (hydrodynamic effect causing moving vessels to sit lower in the water); 4. Wave induced motion; 5. A safety clearance to the bottom; 6. Water density.

PIANC recommends that a depth/draft ratio of 1.1, 1.3 or 1.5 be adopted in sheltered, exposed to waves up to 1m high and exposed to wave heights > 1m respectively. The appendix in the SIGTTO reference states that the channel depth should not be less than 13m below Chart Datum. Channel Width

Section 5.3 Channel Concept Design Method of PIANC provides a table of parameters for consideration in calculating an approach channel width, in addition to the basic manoeuvring lane of 1.5 B, where B is the vessel beam or width. These parameters are summarised as follows:

1. Speed; 2. Cross wind; 3. Cross current (@HW + 1.6); 4. Longitudinal current; 5. Waves; 6. Aids to navigation; 7. Bottom surface; 8. Waterway depth; 9. Cargo hazard; 10. Bank clearance.

A worked example in PIANC Table 5.7 shows that the hazardous nature of LNG vessel cargoes compared to container vessels, would produce an additional channel width requirement of 1.5 B or approximately 75m. The appendix in the SIGTTO reference states that the channel width should be about five times ship beam (5 B), however the PIANC approach outlined above or simulation modelling at the detailed stage, may lead to a greater channel width. Swing Basin PIANC Approach Channels – A Guide to Design states in section 5.3.6.5 Berthing and Swing Areas, that provision for swinging a vessel 180 degrees, then a circle of diameter 1.8 – 2 times length of ship is required. It also notes the need for simulation to define an envelope of tracks for a full range of wind, current, ship size, around which the turning basin can be chosen. The appendix in the SIGTTO reference states that the turning area should be 2 – 3 ship lengths. This would require modifications to the design and location of the swing basin. The MCF proposal could be modified to accommodate LNG vessels. In short, the approach channel as shown in Figure 6 may need to be widened slightly, the depth


will be governed by the Cape size bulk carriers, and a turning basin will be required to accommodate LNG vessels. Vessel Transiting Distance The responsibility for the safe movement of ships in ports rests with the Harbour Master, who must ensure that the provisions of the Maritime Safety (Queensland) Act 2002 are met. Planning navigation channels must consider not only the passage of a vessel in the channel for the environmental conditions, but the proximity of the moving vessel to moored vessels. Significant surge, sway and yaw movements (ie 3 dimensional movement) may be experienced by the moored vessel, to the extent that loading operations must cease, or in the extreme case, mooring lines are broken. Where vessels are proceeding in the same direction as the LNG tanker, the separation would equate to the stopping distance of the vessel, usually in the vicinity of 1-2 nautical miles. In the case of Abbot Point, particularly with a separate LNG marine terminal to the west of the protected harbour in the MCF, there should be no vessel interaction issues and operating the port as a whole with a single lane channel should not significantly impact upon vessel departure and arrival times. 5.5 Services Water will be required for the operation of an LNG plant. For larger plants or a hub arrangement, the scale may justify using sea water. Currently there is no reticulated supply of water to the APSDA, however the Water for Bowen project proposes to supply water to the APSDA and the Port of Abbot Point. This project would provide a reticulated water supply that LNG facilities could use. Potable water will be required for domestic purposes and could rely on a reticulated supply, on site collection, trucked in or a combination of these options. Some power needs may be met from the grid, however LNG plants usually meet their energy needs from the gas source as it is more economic to do so. Sewage disposal is required for plant personnel (toilet, showers etc). Sewage disposal can be via a reticulated system, an on site treatment plant or on site disposal by filtration. This will be driven by scale and available area. This is not a significant issue and is not a driver for site location. 5.6 Access LNG plants will require vehicular access between the site and the port and between the site and the Bruce Highway. The Bruce Highway provides access to Townsville and Bowen where inputs and outputs of the LNG facilities such as chemicals, waste and other requirements may be sourced and contracted services located. Bowen is expected to accommodate the bulk of the operations workforce. Desirably sealed road access to the site should be available. Sites which have good access to the Bruce Highway would be preferred. A Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor linking the MCF and the APSDA industrial area has been identified. The Bowen Abbot Point Flood Modelling Study recommended


that this corridor be constructed above the 500 year ARI flood level to provide all weather access between industrial sites and the port. Access to the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor would be a significant advantage to proposed development sites at Abbot Point as it would provide access for gas to a LNG plant and give a direct link for a cryogenic pipeline to the likely load out facility at the MCF. Access to an eastern jetty option at the Port would rely on the Abbot Point Road for access to adjoining land for a pipeline corridor. Section 5.2.4 discusses the separation distances from an LNG pipeline and other linear infrastructure that are appropriate for planning purposes. Depending on the location of LNG plants, it is possible that the gas delivery pipeline and/or LNG pipeline will need to cross the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor and the infrastructure located in the corridor. The method of crossing this infrastructure is dependent on the type of infrastructure and its location. LNG and gas pipelines have essentially the same requirements and the crossings may be effected by the pipe being: g

below ground; or above ground and if above ground either:

located above; or below the infrastructure.

For example when a pipe crosses a powerline it is likely to be either underground or above ground and beneath the powerline, whereas when a pipeline crosses a conveyor it could do so by locating underground or above ground and either above or beneath the conveyor. Pipelines need to be constructed in accordance with appropriate standards and a risk assessment undertaken. These standards will inform a decision on the likely crossing method. The crossing of linear infrastructure by pipelines creates additional points of conflict but it is possible to achieve. Whilst it is preferable for pipelines to not cross other infrastructure it should not be regarded as a constraint to the location of LNG facilities. 5.7 Topography Like other industrial developments, a flat site is desired for LNG plants. In the APSDA it is likely that earthworks and drainage will be necessary to achieve flood protection and a level pad for construction of the plant. This would have implications for the capital costs. Modelling will be required to demonstrate that there are no adverse impacts on the Kaili Valley Wetlands. 5.8 Geology/Stability Where the geotechnical conditions are less suitable, the construction of the plant and the storage tank will require ground improvement measures or structural piling to support the design loads. Less suitable geotechnical conditions include where the ground has limited load bearing capacity to ensure the stability of structures. This is particularly relevant for LNG storage tanks where the ground has to bear significant weight. At Abbot Point the coastal dunes and low-lying marshy wetlands are likely to be of most concern.


5.9 Environment It is preferable to locate any development outside ecologically sensitive areas. The main environmental issues in the Abbot Point area are endangered and of concern regional ecosystems, important wetlands (Kaili Valley Wetlands) and the Marine Parks immediately offshore. Land containing endangered and of concern regional ecosystems as well as the Kaili Valley Wetlands should be avoided if possible. Figure 8 shows environmental constraints with the APSDA. 5.10 Extreme Weather The design of LNG facilities needs to have due regard to likely risks including those presented by severe weather. Some of the hazards presented by extreme weather may be managed by appropriate siting whilst others are best dealt with through building design or operational procedures. Like any other structure, the mitigation of risk to LNG plants from earthquake and cyclonic winds is best managed through appropriate design in accordance with relevant standards and codes of practice. Flood, storm surge and bushfires may be accommodated by appropriate siting. The existence of the coal export facility at Abbot Point and the operating LNG facilities in Darwin and on the west coast of Australia, indicate that extreme weather challenges applicable to Abbot Point will likely be manageable. 5.10.1 Flood Queensland State Planning Policy 1/03: Mitigating the Adverse Impacts of Flood, Bushfire and Landslide’s first outcome, broadly states that development needs to be compatible with the nature of the risk. The risk (both probability and consequence) of damage to property and safety of people needs to be considered when assessing the level of immunity any development should have from flood. A generally applied principle in Australia is that development should be above the 1 in 100 year ARI flood level. The Bowen Abbot Point Flood Modelling Study modelled the 1 in 100 year ARI inundation level resulting from both flooding and storm surge (see Figure 7). The study recommended a flood immunity level of RL 4.45m AHD. The Kaili Valley Wetlands and the majority of the land between this wetland and the foreshore (including some existing port assets) are below RL 4.46m ASL and any development in this area will need to meet flood immunity levels. The notable exception is Mt Luce and immediately surrounding land. The majority of the wetland is below RL 1.5m AHD level, with sites on the edge of the permanent wetlands rising to above RL 4.0m AHD. Land above RL 4.45m AHD in close proximity to the proposed MCF is limited and therefore the range of suitable sites for LNG in this area is limited. Any development in this area would be subject to receiving the required approvals for filling. Given the existing high degree of susceptibility to inundation of the Abbot Point area from a 1 in 100 year ARI flood and 1 in 100 year storm surge, it is anticipated that plant areas would need to be filled to at least the 1 in 100 year ARI flood and storm surge levels of RL 4.45m AHD.


The Bowen Abbot Point Flood Modelling Study also proposed that access between the port and industrial areas are above the 1 in 500 year ARI event to ensure secure access from the port to the industrial sites. To achieve 1 in 500 year ARI flood immunity requires only an additional 100mm in elevation. 5.10.2 Bushfire Bushfire Risk Analysis undertaken for Whitsunday Regional Council by Queensland Fire and Rescue Service indicates the Abbot Point area to the north of the Bruce Highway is of low bushfire hazard with medium bushfire hazard around Mt Luce and Mt Little and near to the Port of Abbot Point facilities. There are also small high bushfire hazard areas located in the Mt Little area. South of the Bruce Highway the majority of the land is medium bushfire hazard, with small areas of high bushfire hazard on Mt Roundback and low bushfire hazard to the west of Mt Roundback. Appropriate mitigation strategies are considered likely to be available to manage the bushfire risk including maintaining appropriate clearances. Based on the mapping undertaken, bushfire hazard in the Abbot Point area is not considered to be a significant siting constraint although site specific assessment will be required to be undertaken by each proponent. 5.11 Summary of Siting Requirements Table 5.7 provides a set of siting requirements for LNG facilities. These siting requirements were used to identify potential sites for LNG plants at Abbot Point.



NOTES

DISCLAIMER

Base data: Geodata V3Image provided by DIPRegional Ecosystems v6: DERM, March 2010.

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NORTH COAST LINE

MOUNT LUCE

MOUNT LITTLE

MOUNT ROUNDBACK

MERINDA

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148°10'0"E

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PROJECT

TITLE

DATE

CLIENT

MAY 2011

FIGURE 8 - ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS WITHINAPSDA





LEGEND


Highway

Secondary Road

Minor Road

Railway


5m Contours (m ASL) - Contour information incompleteSouth of Bruce Highway & above 40m

^ Cultural Heritage Sites within APSDA

Vegetation Regrowth within APSDA

Directory of Important Wetlands within APSDA

QLD Regional Ecosystems v6 within APSDA (DERM March 2010)

Endangered - Dominant

Endangered - Sub-dominant

Of Concern - Dominant

Of Concern - Sub-dominant


Table 5.7 Summary of Adopted Siting Requirements

SUBJECT CRITERIA

1.5 Mtpa 3 Mtpa 10 Mtpa Safety and Hazard Ship transits 1-2 nautical miles (SIGTTO) Loading arm operations 250m The processing plant 220m from plant footprint perimeter to property boundary Cryogenic pipeline – maximum total length

6 km 6 km Limited by economic viability

Plant Site Area Plant and storage tank site area with buffer

30ha 30ha 200ha

Services Water A pipeline from an external source or seawater will be required for LNG process water and cooling.

Potable water supply required for domestic purposes. Could use reticulated supply or transport water in by truck.

Sewage Sewage treatment plant or connection to reticulated sewage. Power Not essential as power can be generated from within the process, but if grid power available it may be

used. Access Close or direct access to proposed Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor is preferred. Sites which are on the

western side of the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor and sites on eastern side of Abbot Point Road for an eastern jetty option will avoid their pipelines crossing other infrastructure. Sealed road access from plant to the Bruce Highway is preferred for workforce to access facilities and delivery and removal by truck of chemical and other products required by and generated by the process.

Site issues Slope Flat site required for the plant footprint. Fill or benching will be required on sloping sites. Ground stability Stable ground conditions preferred but can be mitigated using appropriate construction techniques. Impact on environmental Should avoid:


SUBJECT CRITERIA

1.5 Mtpa 3 Mtpa 10 Mtpa significant areas Endangered and regional ecosystems;

Important Wetlands; Cultural heritage sites; RAMSAR Area; National Parks, Marine Parks and GBRMP.

Flooding and Storm Surge Land to be above RL 4.45m AHD. Low sites will require fill, complete with drainage, to ensure no adverse impacts on wetlands.


6. POTENTIAL LNG FACILITY SITES The Development Scheme for the APSDA divides the APSDA into land use precincts. The purpose of the Industry Precinct is to provide for the establishment of industrial development that is of regional, State and national significance. LNG is considered a “high impact industry use”. High impact industry is a use that is considered highly likely to meet the purpose of the land use designation in the Industry Precinct. The central part of the APSDA has been the subject of a number investigations including the Land and Infrastructure Planning Study for the Central Portion of the Abbot Point State Development Area. As investigations into this area have already been undertaken, it was not considered necessary to revisit the suitability of the central area for LNG facilities. Sections 4 and 5 of this study identified the siting requirements for LNG facilities. A review of potential sites at Abbot Point suitable for LNG facilities of 1.5Mtpa, 3Mtpa and 10Mtpa were then investigated. In reviewing potential sites it was assumed that the marine load out facilities would be located at either:

the proposed MCF to be located to the west of the existing coal jetty; or a jetty located to the east of the existing coal export jetty.

The following four potential LNG sites have been identified for assessment:

A site at the proposed MCF– this is a proposed area of reclaimed land for a protected port.

A site at the base of Mt Luce– this is a relatively small area located at the eastern base of Mt Luce located to the immediate west of the proposed Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor.

A site near the foreshore– this is an area of land located to the west of the proposed X110 port expansion area stockpiles and between the Kaili Valley Wetlands and the foreshore.

A site at the base of Mt Little – this is an area located at the northern base of Mt Little, to the east of Abbot Point Road and rail line.

The location of these sites is shown in Figure 9.


7. IMPACT ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL LNG SITES This section reviews each of the four sites identified for investigation. For each site the impact of LNG facilities on the following have been considered:

environmental and physical constraints of the sites; current and future surrounding land use; the port including expansion plans; the proposed MCF; the proposed Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor; and known infrastructure proposals, these include the Water for Bowen project,

the proposed temporary haul road between the proposed quarry at Mount Little and the MCF.

Where an impact is identified the options for mitigation are discussed. It should be noted this study has been undertaken at a strategic level. This study does not recommend any particular site for LNG, rather, it identifies opportunities and constraints for the four sites investigated. It will be incumbent upon each private sector proponent to satisfy itself that any location is a viable site as part of the normal due diligence process required to reach a final investment decision. Likewise, the attainment of all environmental and other project approvals associated with any project is the responsibility of the project proponent. There are some inconsistencies between the potential LNG sites identified in this report and the Development Scheme for the APSDA. On further investigation into these sites as above, amendments to the Development Scheme for the APSDA may be made. This study has only been undertaken for the purpose of investigating suitability of LNG at Abbot Point. It does not imply that the sites may be suitable for other uses. 7.1 Multi Cargo Facility Site 7.1.1 DescriptionThe MCF is a proposal by NQBP to reclaim land for a protected harbour and associated land to meet the long term trade needs of Queensland. The proposed MCF would create up to 12 Cape size shipping berths, a shipping access channel and tug harbour for the port. The current proposed design of the MCF is provided in Figure 6 and, as discussed in section 5.4, future modifications to the MCF design to accommodate LNG may minimise the potential for impacts on the operations of the existing and proposed coal export berths. The current MCF design proposes a reclaimed area of approximately 350ha, with the bulk of the reclamation occurring between a protected harbour and the mainland. The MCF is notionally designed to have 12 berths with the opening to the protected harbour located on the northern side. The area proposed to be reclaimed for the MCF is expected to be large enough to accommodate a 1.5Mtpa, 3Mtpa or 10Mtpa LNG facility. Based on the current MCF design a 10Mtpa LNG plant would occupy in the order of 60% of the available MCF



NOTES

DISCLAIMER


Mt Luce Site

Multi Cargo Facility Site

Foreshore Site

Mt Little Site

ABBOT PO

INT ROAD

BRUCE HIGHWAY

NORTH COAST LINE

CO

LLIN

SVIL

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EWLA

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H

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°0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500

MetersDatum: GDA94


PROJECT

TITLE

DATE

CLIENT

MAY 2011

FIGURE 9 - POTENTIAL LNG PLANT SITES





LEGEND



Highway

Secondary Road

Minor Road

Railway


5m Contours (m ASL) - Contour informationincomplete above 40m



Potential LNG Plant Sites

Existing Port Facilities (Up to X50 Expansion) -NQBP

Proposed Port Facilities (X80 and X110 Expansion )-NQBP




Proposed Dredging Channel and Berth -NQBP


land. The use of 200ha of the MCF reclaimed land for one project would be likely to restrict the usability of the MCF for other cargoes. An expansion of the MCF could reduce the percentage of MCF land used by a 10Mtpa LNG plant. 7.1.2 Environmental and Physical Constraints Whilst there are environmental issues associated with reclamation of land for the proposed MCF, once the site is created, there should be no on-site environmental constraints associated with this site. The reclaimed site would be flat and elevated above storm surge level. Given the site would be made from dredged material, it is likely an LNG plant and storage tank would require piling or other foundation treatment to ensure the buildings’ and facilities’ structural integrity. 7.1.3 Impact on Current and Surrounding Uses It has been recommended in section 5, for planning purposes, that a 1.5Mtpa and 3Mtpa LNG plant not locate on sites of less than 30ha in size and a 10Mtpa LNG plant should not locate on sites of less than 200ha in size. These site areas include the plant footprint and an area surrounding the plant used for safety buffers to adjacent industrial uses. Whilst each project would need to consider its specific risks, provided the specified overblast, heat radiation and risk contours (safety buffers) are contained within the LNG plant’s site boundaries, the LNG plant should not restrict the use of surrounding MCF land for industrial or port purposes. 7.1.4 Impact on the Port of Abbot Point (including expansion) The proposed MCF site is well separated from the existing Port of Abbot Point. Current proposals, in addition to the proposed MCF, for the port involve:

the expansion of berths at the existing jetty; a new jetty and berths located to the west of the existing jetty; and new stockpile areas immediately to the west of existing stockpiles.

The current port expansion proposals as outlined above would be well separated from a potential MCF LNG plant site. Land based conflict between the port operations and a LNG plant on the MCF is not anticipated. In respect of the impact of LNG shipping movements on the operations of the Port of Abbot Point, Section 5.4 concluded in respect of future additions to the MCF for an LNG terminal that the existence of an LNG marine terminal or LNG vessels manoeuvring in the port would not be expected to cause higher levels of congestion than would occur for any mix of vessels. The use of the MCF for the marine load out of LNG is not therefore expected to impact the operation of the existing or expanded port (excluding the MCF). The port has a short channel to deep water which reduces the transit time of LNG ships and therefore the delay to other ships using the channel. 7.1.5 Impact on the Proposed MCF The use of up to 200ha of the 350ha of available reclaimed land for a 10Mtpa LNG plant on the proposed MCF, would likely impact the operation of the MCF, as it would limit opportunities for other activities to develop on the MCF. The smaller 1.5Mtpa and 3Mtpa require smaller areas and their demand for land is significantly less at 30ha. LNG plants of this size are considered to not unduly limit the use of the MCF.


The load out of LNG from the MCF, as it is currently designed, has the potential to impact the utility of the MCF. If a LNG tanker berth was incorporated into the protected harbour in the proposed MCF, the operation of the port would be restricted for the entire time the LNG vessel was in port. This is because the existence of a 250m exclusion zone around the LNG vessel’s manifold would restrict the manoeuvring of vessels at adjacent berths. Alternatively, dedicating the outer berth of the MCF to the LNG operations would reduce the number of berths impacted by the LNG load out exclusion zone and eliminate restrictions on manoeuvring of vessels in the inner harbour. Siting in this location would need to consider shipping regulations in regard to LNG that require consideration of vessel collision. Future additions to the MCF should separate the LNG terminal from the MCF to eliminate restrictions caused by the LNG vessels at the MCF and significantly reduce the risk of collision with other vessels. In this configuration, the existence of an LNG marine terminal or LNG vessels manoeuvring in the port would not be expected to cause higher levels of congestion than would occur for any mix of vessels. 7.1.6 Impact on Proposed Multi-User Infrastructure Corridor Locating a LNG facility on the proposed MCF would not impact on the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor as the proposed site would be of a sufficient distance from the corridor not to be a hazard or safety risk. The gas feed stock pipeline to supply a LNG facility on the MCF would be contained within the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor. The design of the corridor should take into account the space needed for this infrastructure and the ignition risk. It is recommended that space be allocated in the corridor on the west for a gas feedstock pipeline. 7.1.7 Impact on Known Infrastructure Proposals There are no known infrastructure proposals which would be affected by this proposal. 7.2 Mt Luce Site 7.2.1 Description The Mt Luce site is located at the eastern base of Mt Luce. Figure 10 shows the site. The site adjoins the western boundary of the proposed Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor linking the Central APSDA Industry Precinct with the proposed MCF. The site is approximately 1340m in length on its eastern boundary tapering to approximately 530m at its western boundary. The site is approximately 475m at its widest point. The shape of the block is dictated by the slope of the land in the west, south west and north west and the proposed Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor in the east. The site is approximately 50ha in area. The site’s area is considered large enough for smaller plants (ie up to 3Mtpa). The site’s area is not considered sufficient for a 10Mtpa plant footprint. The site is irregularly shaped and relatively narrow, making it difficult to make effective use of the entire site. It is expected an LNG plant on this site would transport the LNG from the plant to the MCF for export, using the adjoining proposed Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor (see



NOTES

DISCLAIMER

Base data: Geodata V3Regional Ecosystems V6: DERM, March 2010.Important Wetlands Data: EPA, 2008Other Data sources provided by DIP

1340 m530

m

475 m

220m Offset to Proposed Infrastructure Corridor

Mount Luce SiteApprox. 50 ha


5

10

40

35

30

25

20

15

2.5

10

2.5

5

2.5

°0 50 100 150 200

metresDatum: GDA94


PROJECT

TITLE

DATE

CLIENT

MAY 2011

FIGURE 10 - MOUNT LUCE SITE




!ABBOT POINT

LEGEND


Potential LNG Plant Site

Proposed Feed Gas Pipeline

Proposed LNG Pipeline to MCF



QLD Regional Ecosystems v6 within APSDA (DERM, March 2010)



Figure 10). The site is located approximately 3km from a potential LNG load out point on the MCF, if the pipeline used the proposed Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor. The land is currently used for broadacre cattle grazing. A track runs north-south through the site giving access across the Kaili Valley Wetlands to the south. 7.2.2 Environmental and Physical Constraints The site is for the most part gently sloping however its western extremities rise sharply. Depending on the land area required for the plant footprint it may be necessary for some substantial earthworks and benching to achieve flat areas. This is considered a financial rather than technical constraint. The environmental impacts of such earthworks would need to be considered and investigated. The site is above the RL 4.45m AHD level and is therefore above the nominated flood immunity level for industrial use in this area. The site is not affected by remnant endangered or “of concern” ecosystems. It is however classified in the Abbot Point State Development Area Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor Study as part of the site having high ecological conservation values. Approximately half of the site is within the area defined as the Kaili Valley Wetlands. The proposed Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor would be to the site’s east and would be constructed on fill within the wetland area. A LNG plant on this site would need to consider the impacts on the wetlands in assessing the suitability of the lower areas of the site for an LNG plant. Use of the lower areas of the site would need to consider the means of mitigating any potential adverse impact and ensure the functionality of the wetland is not compromised. 7.2.3 Impact on Current and Surrounding Uses The site is located in the zone between the Kaili Valley Wetlands and Mt Luce which rises steeply to the west and appears to be lightly timbered. There does not appear to be any existing activity on the site or surrounding land which would affect or be affected by an LNG plant. However, Mt Luce is currently being investigated as a potential source of quarry material for the MCF. In April 2011, an Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 referral was made by the NQBP regarding this quarry. Some of the proposal’s quarry infrastructure is intended to be located on the Mt Luce site. The timing of this possible extractive industry and potential impacts would need to be considered as part of any proposal. The Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor is proposed to be developed to the site’s immediate east. A proposed LNG plant footprint must, for planning purposes, be located so the safety buffer around the plant does not extend beyond the site and onto the proposed Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor. A maximum 220m safety buffer, as proposed in Section 5, from the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor is shown in Figure 10. A significant portion of the Mt Luce site is located within the 220m safety buffer. The area of the site available for an LNG plant is significantly reduced by the 220m safety buffer. Further, the area that is beyond this safety buffer is the steeper western part of the site. There is therefore the potential for a conflict between the use of the site for an LNG plant and the operation of the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor. Whether this potential conflict represents an unacceptable risk needs to be carefully considered.


There is therefore a moderate risk of conflict between an LNG plant on this site and the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor. The potential quarry represents a competing use for this land. The quarry may also provide an opportunity as the removal of material could ultimately result in more flat land and a larger usable footprint of land available for an LNG plant. 7.2.4 Impact on the Port of Abbot Point (including expansion) The proposed site is well separated from the existing Port and its impact is expected to be limited. 7.2.5 Impact on the Proposed MCF It is assumed that the LNG plant at the Mt Luce site would use the MCF as a load out berth. Section 7.1.5 discusses the effect of a load out facility on the MCF and notes that a modified MCF design which separates the LNG load out from the remainder of the MCF would be optimal. The development of an LNG plant at Mt Luce would not have a direct impact on the proposed MCF if the storage tank is located on the Mt Luce site. Alternatively, the storage tank could be located on the MCF and a cryogenic pipeline constructed between the LNG plant and the storage tank. The objective in siting the storage tank at the MCF would be to locate it in very close proximity of the load out point. If the storage tank is located at the MCF, it should allow sufficient separation distance from the storage tank to other MCF activities. 7.2.6 Impact on Proposed Multi-User Infrastructure Corridor Impact of Plant on Multi-User Infrastructure Corridor The proposed plant site is located adjoining the proposed Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor. The site’s long narrow shape makes it more difficult to locate an LNG plant and maintain safety buffers within the site’s boundary (see Figure 10). Safety buffers would need to be established by a project specific quantitative risk assessment, however there is a moderate risk that a plant footprint on the site would not be able to retain its safety buffers within its site boundaries. LNG plant risk assessments over this site would be required to demonstrate that the acceptable risk criteria for industrial activity as outlined in Section 5.2.3 are retained within the eastern boundary of the Mt Luce site (or an alternative acceptable solution demonstrated) so as to not impact on the future utility of the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor. These requirements set out in Section 5.2.3 are that LNG facilities should:

contain the 50 in a million per year chance of fatality per year risk contour (50 x 10-6) within the site boundaries;

heat radiation should not exceed 23kW/m2 at the site boundaries; blast overpressure should not exceed 14kPa at the site boundaries.

LNG (Cryogenic) Pipeline in the Multi-User Infrastructure Corridor An LNG plant at the Mt Luce site is likely to locate the cryogenic pipeline connecting the plant, storage tank and load out facility in the proposed Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor as the site adjoins this corridor’s western boundary. A pipeline from the Mt


Luce site to the MCF would logically be located on the western extremity of the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor. If the load out facility is located on the western side of the MCF, the pipeline would avoid having to cross other linear infrastructure located in the corridor. As discussed in Section 5.2.4, it is suggested that a reasonable distance from the LNG pipeline to a source of ignition, for planning purposes, be 30m. A separation distance of 30m from the LNG pipeline to some types of infrastructure will therefore need to be maintained. An example of infrastructure which should be separated from the LNG pipeline is conveyors where moving parts such as rollers are potentially a source of ignition. Locating the LNG pipeline on the western edge of the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor should halve the area of the Infrastructure Corridor potentially impacted by the separation distance to the LNG pipeline. It is important to note that the LNG pipeline does not sterilise land within 30m of the LNG pipeline, as there are items of linear infrastructure such as other types of pipelines which are not a source of ignition. For example raw water, sea water for LNG plant cooling and gas or slurry pipelines are likely to be acceptable adjoining infrastructure in the corridor. The LNG pipeline is therefore a minor to moderate constraint to the use of the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor. Planning is required to ensure appropriate linear infrastructure is located in close proximity to any LNG pipeline. A project specific quantitative risk assessment would need to be prepared which would provide specific information regarding acceptable separation of LNG pipeline to sources of ignition. As also identified in Section 5 there may be physical structures which could ameliorate the risk of nearby ignition sources such as barrier fences, but these are likely to be expensive. A preferable approach is to avoid the need for these physical barriers by appropriate early planning of the corridors layout at the design stage. The feedstock gas pipeline would also be located within the Multi-user Infrastructure corridor. 7.2.7 Impact on Known Infrastructure Proposals The proposed site is not expected to have any effect on known infrastructure proposals. The use of the land adjoining the LNG pipeline in the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor for a water pipeline (eg such as the proposed Water for Bowen project) is likely to be a suitable application. 7.3 Foreshore Site 7.3.1 Description With a land area of approximately 68ha, this site is considered large enough for 1.5Mtpa and 3Mtpa LNG plants. There may also be sufficient land for a 10Mtpa plant if sufficient surrounding land/wetland can be employed for safety buffers. Figure 11 shows the site. The site is in reasonable proximity to the proposed MCF, however the site is located on the eastern side of the proposed Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor and the LNG pipeline would need to cross the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor if the load out


facility was at the western end of the MCF, creating potential for conflict with other infrastructure located or to be located on the corridor. The Foreshore site is approximately 2.5km in a straight line from a MCF marine load out point and in the order of 4km if it used the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor and followed the MCF perimeters, so as to reduce impact on other activities. The site is flat. The entire site is located below the RL 4.45m AHD level which is the minimum recommended level to provide flood immunity to 1% AEP. The site would need to be filled to elevate it above the recommended flood immunity level. The site has been defined as part of the Kaili Valley Wetlands, although aerial photography and anecdotal evidence suggest the land is dry under most conditions. Land immediately to the east, south and west of the site appears to be permanent wetland. The site has reasonable dimensions and a significant part of the site may be able to be developed. Approximately 1.2km to the east of the site is the existing port coal stockpile areas. Coal stockpiles associated with the X110 Expansion of the port are proposed to be located within approximately 300m east of the Foreshore site. It is understood that NQBP is considering using the Foreshore site for construction lay down purposes for the MCF project. The land is currently used for cattle grazing. Access to the site appears to be available by tracks from the west and by a track from the port. 7.3.2 Environmental and Physical Constraints The site is defined as part of the Kaili Valley Wetlands which may restrict the development of the site. Planning law in Queensland require the Department of Environment and Resource Management to assess certain material changes of use and subdivisions involving “high impact earthworks” within defined wetland in the Great Barrier Reef Catchment. The policy objective is to ensure development in wetland areas is planned, designed, constructed and operated to minimise or prevent the loss or degradation of the wetlands and their values, or to enhance these values. Further, given that the site is below RL 4.45m AHD it is likely that fill would be required to bring the land to above required flood and inundation immunity levels. This need for fill should be carefully considered in term of its impact on the wetlands. The site also contains some areas of “of concern” remnant ecosystem. The large majority of this remnant ecosystem is located around the perimeter of the permanent wetland. Removal of this vegetation would require government approval. It is considered likely that the plant footprint for a 1.5Mtpa and 3Mtpa plant would be able to be located on the site without disturbing the majority of these areas. A larger plant of 10Mtpa may be able to use the identified site for its plant footprint, but it is likely to have a greater impact on the existing remnant ecosystem on the site. 7.3.3 Impact on Current and Surrounding Uses The site is currently used for broad scale grazing and the existing use is not a constraint to the site’s development. The Port of Abbot Point, and areas proposed for its future expansion, are located to the east. The site’s area is expected to be sufficient for a 1.5Mtpa or 3Mtpa plant to develop and to maintain safety buffers



NOTES

DISCLAIMER

Base data: Geodata V3Regional Ecosystems V6: DERM, March 2010.Important Wetlands Data: EPA, 2008Other Data sourcesand Imagery provided by DIP.

1400 m

560 m

715 m


220m Offset to LNG Site

Proposed Multi Cargo Facility

5

2.5

1015

20

25

35

30

4025

5

2.5

5

15

5

5

5

5 2.5

2.5

5

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10

20

0 °0 100 200 300 400

MetresDatum: GDA94


PROJECT

TITLE

DATE

CLIENT

MAY 2011FIGURE 11- FORESHORE SITE




!ABBOT POINT

Foreshore SiteApprox. 68 ha

LEGENDAbbot Point State Development Area Boundary





Proposed LNG Pipeline to MCF




QLD Regional Ecosystems v6 within APSDA (DERM, March 2010)

Of Concern - Dominant



within the boundaries of the site and therefore not affect surrounding existing or potential uses. This would need to be tested by a project specific risk assessment. It is probable that a 10Mtpa plant footprint could locate on the site, with the use of surrounding land and wetland as the safety buffer. This would need to be tested by a project specific quantitative risk assessment. Figure 11 shows a 220m safety buffer around the Foreshore site. The site has sufficient separation from the port expansion areas and the safety buffer does not intersects the proposed Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor. Any LNG facility development on the site would need to demonstrate that its safety buffers did not extend into the proposed port development areas or the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor. It is also noted that this site has been identified as a possible lay down area for the proposed MCF project at the port. There may therefore be competing demand for this site. 7.3.4 Impact on the Port of Abbot Point (including expansion) As Figure 11 indicates, the Foreshore site has a reasonable separation from the existing and proposed port expansion areas and it is not anticipated to have an impact on these operations. The site is located between the existing port and the proposed MCF and near to the abutment of the proposed second jetty (X110 Expansion). This site is therefore a prime piece of land for future port expansion or use as part of a Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor for road, pipes, conveyors etc between the existing port, the second jetty and proposed MCF. The Foreshore site’s highest and best use may be for uses other than for an LNG plant. This view is strengthened by the fact that the port is considering it as a lay-down area for the proposed MCF. It is therefore important to understand and confirm any future plans for this land. 7.3.5 Impact on the Proposed MCF It is assumed that a LNG plant at the Foreshore site would use the proposed MCF as a load out berth. It is possible that the site could access a load out facility on a proposed eastern jetty but this is considered less attractive than the MCF due to greater distance and the substantial port related infrastructure that would need to be crossed to reach any jetty. Section 7.1.5 discusses the effect of a load out facility on the MCF and suggests a future addition to the MCF to separate the LNG load out from the remainder of the MCF. The site is well separated from the proposed MCF and it is not anticipated to have a direct impact on the MCF, provided the storage tank is located on the Foreshore site. If the LNG storage tank is located on the MCF and a cryogenic pipeline constructed between the LNG plant and the storage tank it is considered that an MCF design (see Section 7.1.5), which has a stand-alone LNG load out facility and land dedicated for LNG facilities, would allow reasonable separation distances from the storage tank to other MCF activities. 7.3.6 Impact on Proposed Multi-User Infrastructure Corridor Impact of Plant on Multi-User Infrastructure Corridor An LNG plant would need to ensure that its safety buffers did not extend onto the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor. Whilst this would need to be tested by a project specific quantitative risk assessment, the assessment undertaken (see Figure 11)


indicates that a safety buffer of 220m between the Foreshore site and Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor can be maintained. LNG (Cryogenic) Pipeline in the Multi-User Infrastructure Corridor An LNG plant on the Foreshore site is likely to use the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor to transport LNG via a cryogenic pipeline to the MCF. The LNG pipeline could either travel along the eastern boundary of the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor before heading west to the MCF load out facility, or it could immediately cross the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor and then travel along the western boundary of the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor before heading west to the MCF load out facility. The issues of surrounding nearby sources of ignition are relevant to the use of the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor by the cryogenic LNG pipeline from the Foreshore site to the MCF and are discussed in Section 7.2.6. If the Foreshore site is used for an LNG plant, the LNG pipeline from the Foreshore site would need to cross existing and future infrastructure in the corridor to reach the proposed western load out facility. This creates conflict points and the need to manage potential conflicts between infrastructure and the LNG pipeline at the crossing points. Crossing of the corridor by the LNG pipeline is manageable by, for example, being located underground, nevertheless, the crossing, in whatever manner undertaken, creates a further complication and points of risk which needs to be managed. The LNG pipeline crossing is considered to have a minor to moderate impact on the operation of the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor. 7.3.7 Impact on Known Infrastructure Proposals The proposed site is not expected to have any effect on known infrastructure proposals. 7.4 Mt Little Site 7.4.1 Description The Mt Little site is located between Mt Little and Salt Water Creek. The Mt Little site has an approximately 1080m frontage to the Abbot Point Road and a depth of approximately 2255m. The site has an area of approximately 154ha. It potentially has sufficient land for either a 1.5 Mtpa or 3 Mtpa plant. There may also be sufficient area for a 10Mtpa plant if use can be made of the surrounding land for safety buffer area. Figure 12 shows the site. The site is located on the Abbot Point Road, which is a private port access road owned by NQBP. The rail line transporting coal to the port is located on the western side of Abbot Point Road. The land appears to be used for cattle grazing, with the more easterly area of the site being lightly timbered. There are indications from aerial photography that the north eastern part of the site, near to the Abbot Point Road is devoid of vegetation probably due to more frequent inundation. The land to the north of the site appears to be low-lying coastal wetland. Euri Creek is located to the east of the site with the mouth of the creek located to the north east. To the south of the site the land rises steeply towards Mt Little. A quarry exists to the



NOTES

DISCLAIMER

Base data: Geodata V3.Regional Ecosystems V6: DERM, March 2010.Important Wetlands Data: EPA, 2008.Other Data sources provided by DIP.

2255m1080

m


ABBO

T PO

INT

RO

AD

Mount Little

52.5

10

15

25

20

30

40

35

2.5

2.5

30

520

5

30

25

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5

25

2.5

35

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.5

5

2.5

20

15

5

2.5

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5

5

2040

2.5

20

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2.5

525

5

5

2.5

20

35

5

2.5

10

5

5

5

5

10

2.5

30

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20

2.5

2.510

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15

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2.5

2.5

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20

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2.5

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1525

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10

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10

°0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000

metresDatum: GDA94


PROJECT

TITLE

DATE

CLIENT

MAY 2011FIGURE 12 - MOUNT LITTLE SITE




! ABBOT POINT

Mount Little Site Approx 154ha

NQBPQuarry

220m Offset to LNG Site

#

#0

NQBP Quarry to LNG Site

Approx 250m

Proposed Eastern Jetty

LEGENDAbbot Point State Development Area Boundary

Existing Port Facilities (Up to X50 Expansion)





Proposed LNG Pipeline to Jetty

Proposed Eastern Jetty


5m Contours (m ASL) - Contour information incomplete above 40m


QLD Regional Ecosystems v6 within APSDA (DERM, March 2010)Of Concern - Dominant



south of the site at the base of Mt Little. It is understood that NQBP own the quarry land. The site is approximately 10km in a straight line to the proposed MCF and approximately 13.5km on the most likely possible pipeline route to the MCF load out facility. On the basis of the considerable distances to the MCF it is not considered to be a realistic load out option for LNG produced at this site. The investigation into the Mt Little site option includes investigation into LNG being transported to a new jetty located to the east of the existing coal export jetty. It has been suggested that the LNG pipeline would travel along the eastern side of the Abbot Point Road before meeting the proposed jetty abutment north east of the rail line balloon loop (see Figure 12). The distance between the site and jetty load out would be approximately 9km. This is a considerable distance and may not be a realistic load out option for LNG produced at this site 7.4.2 Environmental and Physical Constraints The majority of the site is gently sloping land with the more southerly parts rising more sharply to Mt Little. The northern boundary is defined by a watercourse. Approximately 50% of the site is located below the RL 4.45m AHD level and is therefore subject to flooding and inundation (see Figure 12). The north western part of the site, which is arguably the most attractive for a plant footprint as it is flatter and nearer to the road and proposed eastern jetty, is the lowest part of the site and likely to be subject to more frequent inundation. Fill on the lower lying areas would require regulatory assessment as discussed in Section 7.3.2. A substantial portion of the north western part of the site and the riparian corridor along the creek which bounds the north of the site are covered by “of concern” regional ecosystem. There are several environmental and physical constraints related to any pipeline between the site and a proposed eastern jetty. The majority of this pipeline would traverse through a beach dune system that provides turtle rookery habitat as well as containing cultural heritage sites. Part of the LNG pipeline would be located on strategic port land and may impact on the Environmental Protection Precinct identified in the Port of Abbot Point Land Use Plan. The consideration of an eastern jetty should also take into account turtle habitat. This includes the turtle rookery and turtle feeding habitat along the eastern part of the Port of Abbot Point. This feeding habitat may also be important for other marine fauna. Development of the Mt Little site for LNG industry is constrained by the environmental and physical constraints of the site, an eastern jetty and any pipeline in between. 7.4.3 Impact on Current and Surrounding Uses The long narrow nature of the block reduces the design flexibility. Nevertheless, an LNG plant of up to 10Mtpa on the Mt Little site should be able to retain safety buffers


within a site boundary. It is anticipated that, if necessary, use could be made of the surrounding wetlands and Mt Little area for inclusion in the safety buffer areas. Siting of a LNG plant would need to be cognisant of the NQBP quarry to the south and any expansion of the facility. The quarry is approximately 250m south of the Mt Little site (see Figure 12) and beyond the recommended maximum safety buffer of 220m. It is likely any expansion of the quarry would take rock from the Mt Little foothill which heads south and away from the Mt Little site. Given the distance of the quarry from the site, the quarry should not impact on the ability to use the Mt Little site for an LNG plant. However, the anticipated impacts of an adjoining LNG plant on the future operation of the quarry and the impacts of the quarry on a future LNG plant (eg blasting) should be considered. 7.4.4 Impact on the Port of Abbot Point (including expansion) The site is well separated from the port and would not interfere with its operations other than the quarry, which is discussed above. The proposed LNG pipeline from the site to an eastern jetty option would most likely be located on the east (seaward) side of the Abbot Point Road and rail line, and therefore would not cross this infrastructure. Further, any expansion of the rail infrastructure adjacent to Abbot Point Road is anticipated to be to the west of the existing rail line. The LNG plant and pipeline should have a negligible impact on the existing port. The proposed eastern jetty stands apart from the existing and proposed port facilities. The separation of the eastern jetty from the existing coal export berths and the MCF, would allow close to independent operation of each, controlled by the Harbourmaster. 7.4.5 Impact on the Proposed MCF The site is well separated from the MCF and would not use the MCF for LNG export. There is not anticipated to be any impact to the MCF by using this site. 7.4.6 Impact on Proposed Multi-User Infrastructure Corridor The site is well separated from the proposed Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor and would not use the MCF for LNG export. There is not anticipated to be any impact to the Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor by using this site. 7.4.7 Impact on Known Infrastructure Proposals Often land on or adjoining a road will be used to locate linear infrastructure because it provides easy access and landowners are generally not as concerned about infrastructure abutting existing infrastructure such as a road. The Water for Bowen pipeline is proposing to follow the western side of the rail corridor in the vicinity of the Mt Little site. It therefore would have no direct impact on the most likely location of any LNG pipeline for the Mt Little site, to the east of Abbot Point Road. It is reasonable to expect future infrastructure to seek to locate near to the Abbot Point Road.


An LNG pipeline should be located consistent with plans for future infrastructure, in particular avoiding crossing other pipelines and infrastructure and the need to separate an LNG pipeline from sources of ignition (see discussion in Section 7.2.6). There is no expected immediate impact of locating an LNG pipeline within or close to Abbot Point Road, but it is recommended that the siting of the LNG pipeline be undertaken in the context of broader planning of this road, rail and linear infrastructure corridor to ensure it does not compromise the use of the Abbot Point Road corridor for other linear infrastructure in the future. Initial assessment is that the most likely location of any LNG pipeline associated with the Mt Little site would be on the eastern side of Abbot Point Road with future infrastructure located between any LNG pipeline and Abbot Point Road and to the west of the road.


8. KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS This study includes a number of findings and conclusions which are intended to help guide the Coordinator-General and potential proponents with further detailed planning and investigations for LNG facilities at Abbot Point. Key conclusions are summarised below. Safety and Buffers The report found that for Abbot Point safety will be the key driver in site selection, rather than infrastructure demands or amenity issues, such as odour and noise. Safety is a significant issue both at the plant and the berth and the study suggests a separation distance of 220m from the plant footprint to the site boundary for plants of 1.5 – 10Mtpa. This distance is based on a review of other LNG projects risk assessments. Any project would need to undertake its own risk assessment specific to its proposal to confirm appropriate safety buffer distances. Based on a separation distance of 220m, plant footprint and site areas proposed by other LNG projects and advice from potential LNG plant proponents, the report concludes that minimum site areas required for LNG plants are:

1.5Mtpa – 30ha; 3Mtpa – 30ha; and 10Mtpa – 200ha.

The study identified the importance of correctly locating the LNG tanker berth to mitigate risk. The study identifies that generally LNG tanker berths are dedicated fit-for-purpose structures, they are not interchangeable with other products and they will require an exclusion zone (expected to be 250m radius). They therefore have the potential to restrict the operations of nearby berths and the best solution is to provide dedicated LNG berths separated from other berths. Potential LNG facility sites The report undertook a preliminary assessment of four potential LNG sites. This analysis found that there were opportunities and constraints for each site. It should be noted this study has been undertaken at a strategic level only. This study does not recommend any particular site for LNG, rather, it identifies opportunities and constraints for the four sites investigated. It will be incumbent upon each private sector proponent to satisfy itself that any location is a viable site as part of the normal due diligence process required to reach a final investment decision. Likewise, the attainment of all environmental and other project approvals associated with any project is the responsibility of the project proponent. This study has only been undertaken for the purpose of investigating suitability of LNG at Abbot Point. It does not imply that the sites may be suitable for other uses. In addition to the four sites assessed, industrial land in the central APSDA may be appropriate for LNG facilities, provided the safety buffers are retained within the boundaries of the site. The evidence, based on existing plants in operation, is that the economics of transporting LNG the considerable distance between the central APSDA sites and the berthing facilities will be a constraint to use of these sites.


Services LNG plants usually are able to meet their power requirements from the gas source. LNG plants would require water for plant operation and potable water and sewerage disposal for personnel. The proposed Water for Bowen project is one option for the supply of water to the APSDA. By-Products and Synergies An LNG plant may attract other industries to the area as it would bring a significant supply of gas to the area. It would therefore be desirable for third party access to be made available to the gas transported to any LNG plant, as this would be attractive to other industry considering locating in the APSDA. Development considerations This study discusses a number of constraints and considerations relating to the establishment of a LNG facility at Abbot Point.

It is recommended that a site is only suitable for LNG facilities if the site does not impose unacceptable levels of risk. The report found LNG plants should retain safety buffers within the boundaries of their sites (and potentially on undevelopable wetlands and ocean). If this occurs their impact on surrounding industrial uses is likely to be limited.

The study found that the optimal solution for marine load out would be a dedicated LNG berth in the MCF. Further investigations will be required to understand requirements for specific plant sizes and operations in relation to arrangement of berths and industries within the Abbot Point MCF.

LNG plant sites are less financially attractive when not close to the shipping load out facility. However, it is not reasonable to assert that sites are unsuitable due to their distance from the marine load out terminal. Therefore, sites located in the central area of the APSDA should not be precluded from use for LNG facilities.

The Kaili Valley Wetlands and the majority of land between this wetland and the foreshore is below RL 4.46m ASL. Any development in this area would need to meet flood immunity levels. Earthworks and drainage would likely be necessary to achieve flood protection and a level pad for construction of a LNG plant.

The need for a significant amount of fill to raise a site to a level of flood immunity is a major constraint. Proposals would need to take into account recently introduced regulations designed to reduce the impact of earthworks on wetlands in the Great Barrier Reef Catchment (including the Kaili Valley Wetlands).

There is a potential for conflict between LNG pipelines and some other types of linear infrastructure. It is recommended the design/layout of the selected Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor should allocate space for LNG pipelines on its western edge and allocate space for infrastructure which is a potential source of ignition greater than 30m from the LNG pipeline, unless a quantitative risk assessment demonstrates a lesser distance.

This report found that whilst it is preferable for pipelines to not cross other infrastructure this should not be regarded as a constraint to the location of LNG facilities.

Where the geotechnical conditions are less suitable, the construction of the plant and the storage tank would require ground improvement measures or structural piling. At Abbot Point the coastal dunes and low-lying marshy


wetlands are likely to be of most concern. The main environmental issues in the Abbot Point area are endangered and

of concern regional ecosystems, important wetlands and the Marine Park. These areas should be avoided where possible and/or the impact limited.

Some of the hazards presented by extreme weather and bushfires may be managed by appropriate siting whilst others are best dealt with through building design or operational procedures.

Finally, this report concludes that LNG industry is broadly suitable and may be developed in the Abbot Point area subject to the resolution of a number of issues. It also concludes that there are parcels of land within the APSDA that may be suitable for the development of LNG facilities subject to further investigations.


9. REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS 9.1 References Abbot Point Coal Terminal X110 Expansion – Infrastructure development Project Draft Voluntary Environmental Assessment, North Queensland Bulk Port Corporation, October 2009 http://www.ghd.com/X110Expansion/ea.html Abbot Point State Development Area Multi-user Infrastructure Corridor Study, Final Report, The Coordinator-General, November 2010 http://www.dlgp.qld.gov.au/resources/plan/land/state_development_areas/abbot_point/multi-user-infrastructure-corridor.pdf Australian Pacific LNG Project EIS, Australian Pacific LNG, March 2010 http://www.aplng.com.au/eispdfs.html Bowen Abbot Point Flood Modelling Study – Assessment of Flooding Constraints, Minister for Industrial Development, prepared by Mausell Australia Pty Ltd, March 2008 Bushfire Risk Analysis Map, GIS Unit, Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, June 2008 http://www.ruralfire.qld.gov.au/Bushfire_Safety/Building_in_Bushfire_Prone_Areas/Risk_Whitsunday.pdf Land and Infrastructure Planning Study for the Central Portion of the Abbot Point State Development Area, The Coordinator-General, November 2010 http://www.dlgp.qld.gov.au/resources/plan/land/state_development_areas/abbot_point/land-and-infrastructure-planning-study.pdf Development Scheme for the Abbot Point State Development Area, Queensland Government, June 2008 http://www.dip.qld.gov.au/resources/plan/land/state_development_areas/abbot_point/abbot_point_sda_development_scheme.pdf Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Facilities, the International Finance Corporation and World Bank, April 2007 Gladstone LNG Project – Fisherman’s Landing, Environmental Impact Statement, Gladstone LNG Pty Ltd, September 2008 GLNG Project Environmental Impact Statement, Santos Ltd, March 2009 http://www.glng.com.au/Content.aspx?p=90 Guideline for Hazard Analysis, Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No 6, NSW Department of Urban Affairs and Planning, 1992 HAZOP Guidelines, Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No 8 Hazard and Operability Study, NSW Department of Urban Affairs and Planning, 1995


Information Paper No 10 – Hazardous Industry Planning for Safety, Chemical Hazard and Emergency Management (CHEM) Services, Department of Emergency Services, September 1998 http://www.emergency.qld.gov.au/chem/publications/pdf/hazindps.pdf Interim Risk Objectives: A guide for Assessing MHF and Possible MHF Development Applications, Department of Emergency Services, Undated http://www.emergency.qld.gov.au/chem/publications/pdf/Interim_Risk_Objectives_for_MHFs.pdf LNG Operations in Port Areas, Essential Best Practices for the Industry, Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators Ltd (SIGTTO), 2003 Media release, Premium price for Abbot Point Coal Terminal boosts disaster recovery, Premier and Minister for Reconstruction, the Hon Anna Bligh and Minister for Finance and Arts the Hon Rachel Nolan, 3 May 2011 http://statements.cabinet.qld.gov.au/MMS/StatementDisplaySingle.aspx?id=74576 North Queensland Bulk Port Corporation Ltd website - Abbot Point (15 March 2010) http://www.nqbp.com.au/index.cfm?contentID=15 Port of Abbot Point - Land Use Plan, North Queensland Bulk Ports Corporation, October 2010 http://www.nqbp.com.au/publications/PortofAbbotPointLandUsePlan.pdf Presentation IIR Conference -_ Queensland LNG Developments, Energy World Corporation – 15 February 2010 http://www.asx.com.au/asxpdf/20100218/pdf/31ns6p0dkg7hbv.pdf Quantitative Risk Assessment Explained, QGC, January 2010 http://qclng.com.au/uploads/docs/998_QRA_Explained_WEB.pdf Queensland Curtis LNG EIS, QGC, July 2009 http://qclng.com.au/eis/draft-eis/ Referral of proposed action, Mt Luce Quarry, Abbot Point, North Queensland Bulk Ports Corporation, April 2011, EPBC Reference No. 2011/5924 http://www.environment.gov.au/cgi-bin/epbc/epbc_ap.pl?name=current_referral_detail&proposal_id=5924 Report for Proposed Abbot Point - Multi Cargo Facility (MCF) - Initial Advice Statement, North Queensland Bulk Ports Corporation Limited, 28 July 2009, http://www.dip.qld.gov.au/resources/project/abbot-point-cargo-facility/initial-advice-statement.pdf Risk Criteria for Land Use Safety Planning, Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No 4, NSW Department of Urban Affairs and Planning, 1992 Site Selection for LNG Ports and Jetties, Information Paper No 14, Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators Ltd (SIGTTO), January 1997 Standard No 59A for the Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), 2006 State Planning Policy 1/03: Mitigating the Adverse Impacts of Flood, Bushfire and Landslide, Queensland Government, September 2003


Temporary State Planning Policy - Protecting Wetlands of High Ecological Significance in Great Barrier Reef Catchments, Queensland Government, May 2010 http://www.derm.qld.gov.au/wildlife-ecosystems/ecosystems/pdf/wetlands-spp.pdf Water for Bowen – Environmental Impact Statement, Sunwater Limited, October 2009 http://www.sunwater.com.au/current_projects_Bowen.htm#EIS


9.2 Abbreviations AHD – Australian Height Datum APSDA - Abbot Point State Development Area ARI - Average Recurrence Interval AS – Australian Standard BOG – Boil off gas CHEM - Chemical Hazards and Emergency Management CO2 – Carbon Dioxide CSG – Coal Seam Gas DEEDI – Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation DES – Department of Emergency Services DIP – Department of Infrastructure and Planning EIS – Environmental Impact Statement GBRMP – Great Barrier Reef Marine Park HAT – Highest Astronomical Tide HICB - Hazardous Industry and Chemical Branch IAS – Initial Advice Statement kW/m2 - Kilowatts per Square Meter LAT – Lowest Astronomical Tide LNG – Liquefied Natural Gas LPG – Liquid Petroleum Gas MCF – Multi Cargo Facility MDEA - Methyldiethanolamine Mm3 – Million cubic metres MSQ – Maritime Safety Queensland Mtpa – Million tonnes per annum NFPA – National Fire Protection Association


NQBP – North Queensland Bulk Port Corporation Ltd PIANC – Permanent International Association of Navigational Congress QRA – Quantitative Risk Assessment RL – Reduced Level SDA – State Development Area SIGTTO – Society of International Gas Terminal and Transport Operators


APPENDIX A - ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY GUIDELINES FOR LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS (LNG) FACILITIES

Environmental, Health, and Safety GuidelinesLNGLIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS FACILITIES

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Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Facilities

Introduction

The Environmental, Health, and Safety (EHS) Guidelines are technical reference documents with general and industry-specific examples of Good International Industry Practice (GIIP)1. When one or more members of the World Bank Group are involved in a project, these EHS Guidelines are applied as required by their respective policies and standards. Theseindustry sector EHS guidelines are designed to be used together with the General EHS Guidelines document, whichprovides guidance to users on common EHS issues potentially applicable to all industry sectors. For complex projects, use of multiple industry-sector guidelines may be necessary. A complete list of industry-sector guidelines can be found at: www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/Content/EnvironmentalGuidelines

The EHS Guidelines contain the performance levels and measures that are generally considered to be achievable in new facilities by existing technology at reasonable costs. Applicationof the EHS Guidelines to existing facilities may involve the establishment of site-specific targets, with an appropriatetimetable for achieving them. The applicability of the EHS Guidelines should be tailored to the hazards and risks established for each project on the basis of the results of an environmental assessment in which site-specific variables, such as host country context, assimilative capacity of the environment, and other project factors, are taken into account.

1 Defined as the exercise of professional skill, diligence, prudence and foresight that would be reasonably expected from skilled and experienced professionals engaged in the same type of undertaking under the same or similar circumstances globally. The circumstances that skilled and experienced professionals may find when evaluating the range of pollution prevention and control techniques available to a project may include, but are not limited to, varying levels of environmental degradation and environmental assimilative capacity as well as varying levels of financial and technical feasibility.

The applicability of specific technical recommendations should be based on the professional opinion of qualified and experienced persons. When host country regulations differ from the levels and measures presented in the EHS Guidelines, projects are expected to achieve whichever is more stringent. If less stringent levels or measures than those provided in these EHS Guidelines are appropriate, in view of specific project circumstances, a full and detailed justification for any proposed alternatives is needed as part of the site-specific environmental assessment. This justification should demonstrate that the choice for any alternate performance levels is protective of human health and the environment.

Applicability

The EHS Guidelines for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Facilitiesinclude information relevant to LNG base load liquefactionplants, transport by sea, and regasification and peak shavingterminals. For coastal LNG facilities including harbors, jetties and in general coastal facilities (e.g. coastal terminals marine supply bases, loading / offloading terminals), additional guidance is provided in the EHS Guidelines for Ports, Harbors, and Terminals. For EHS issues related to vessels, guidance is provided in the EHS Guidelines for Shipping. Issues related to LPG/Condensate production and storage in Liquefaction plant are not covered In this Guideline. This document is organizedaccording to the following sections:

Section 1.0 — Industry-Specific Impacts and ManagementSection 2.0 — Performance Indicators and Monitoring Section 3.0 — ReferencesAnnex A — General Description of Industry Activities


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1.0 Industry-Specific Impacts and Management

This section provides a summary of EHS issues associated with LNG facilities, along with recommendations for their management. These issues may be relevant to any of the activities listed as applicable to these guidelines. Additional guidance for the management of EHS issues common to most large industrial facilities during the construction phase is provided in the General EHS Guidelines.

1.1 Environment

The following environmental issues should be considered as part of a comprehensive assessment and management program that addresses project-specific risks and potential impacts. Potential environmental issues associated with LNG facilitiesinclude the following:

Threats to aquatic and shoreline environments

Hazardous material management

Wastewater

Air emissions

Waste management

Noise

LNG transport

Threats to Aquatic and Shoreline EnvironmentsConstruction and maintenance dredging, disposal of dredgespoil, construction of piers, wharves, breakwaters, and otherwater-side structures, and erosion may lead to short and long-term impacts on aquatic and shoreline habitats. Direct impactsmay include the physical removal or covering of sea floor, shore,or land-side habitat while indirect impacts may result fromchanges to water quality from sediment suspension ordischarges of stormwater and wastewater. Additionally, the

discharge of ballast water and sediment from ships during LNGterminal loading operations may result in the introduction of invasive aquatic species. For LNG facilities located near the coast (e.g. coastal terminals marine supply bases, loading / offloading terminals), guidance is provided in the EHSGuidelines for Ports, Harbors, and Terminals.

Hazardous Materials ManagementStorage, transfer, and transport of LNG may result in leaks or accidental release from tanks, pipes, hoses, and pumps at land installations and on LNG transport vessels. The storage and transfer of LNG also poses a risk of fire and, if under pressure, explosion due to the flammable characteristics of its boil-off gas.

In addition to the recommendations for hazardous materials and oil management discussed in the General EHS Guidelines,recommended measures to manage these types of hazards include:

LNG storage tanks and components (e.g. pipes, valves,and pumps) should meet international standards forstructural design integrity and operational performance to avoid catastrophic failures and to prevent fires and explosions during normal operations and during exposure to natural hazards. Applicable international standards may include provisions for overfill protection, secondarycontainment, metering and flow control, fire protection (including flame arresting devices), and grounding (to prevent electrostatic charge).2

Storage tanks and components (e.g. roofs and seals) should undergo periodic inspection for corrosion and structural integrity and be subject to regular maintenance and replacement of equipment (e.g. pipes, seals,

2 See US Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 4049 CFR Part 193: LiquefiedNatural Gas Facilities: Federal Safety Standards (2006) and European Standard (EN) 1473: Installation and Equipment for Liquefied Natural Gas - Design of Onshore Installations (1997), and NFPA 59A Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (20012006).


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connectors, and valves).3 A cathodic protection system should be installed to prevent or minimize corrosion, as necessary;

Loading / unloading activities (e.g. transfer of cargo between LNG carriers and terminals) should be conducted by properly trained personnel according to pre-establishedformal procedures to prevent accidental releases and fire /explosion hazards. Procedures should include all aspects of the delivery or loading operation from arrival to departure, connection of grounding systems, verification of proper hose connection and disconnection, adherence to no-smoking and no-naked light policies for personnel and visitors.4

SpillsLNG is a cryogenic liquid (–162°C [–259°F]) that is not flammable in liquid form. However, boil-off gas (methane) forms as the LNG warms, and under certain conditions could result in a vapor cloud if released. Uncontrolled releases of LNG couldlead to jet or pool fires if an ignition source is present, or a methane vapor cloud which is potentially flammable (flash fire) under unconfined or confined conditions if an ignition source is present. LNG spilled directly onto a warm surface (such aswater5) could result in a sudden phase change known as a Rapid Phase Transition (RPT)6.

3 Several methods exist for inspecting tanks. Visual inspection may reveal cracks and leaks in tanks. X-ray or ultrasonic analysis can be used to measure wall thickness and pinpoint crack locations. Hydrostatic testing may indicate leaks caused by pressure, while a combination of magnetic flux eddy current and ultrasonic analysis can be used to detect pitting.4 Examples of good practice for LNG loading and unloading include LiquefiedGas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals - 3rd edition (2000), Societyof International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators Ltd (SIGTTO) and USCode of Federal Regulations (CFR) 33 CFR Part 127: Waterfront facilities handling liquefied natural gas and liquefied hazardous gas.5 LNG vaporizes rapidly when exposed to ambient heat sources such as water, producing approximately 600 standard cubic meter of natural gas for each cubic meter of liquid.6 A potentially significant environmental and safety hazard from LNG shipping is related to Rapid Phase Transition (RPT) that can occur when LNG is accidentally spilled onto water at a very fast rate. The heat transfer from water

In addition to recommendations for emergency preparedness and response provided in the General EHS Guidelines,recommended measures to prevent and respond to LNG spillsinclude the following:

Conduct a spill risk assessment for the facilities and relatedtransport / shipping activities;

Develop a formal spill prevention and control plan that addresses significant scenarios and magnitude of releases. The plan should be supported by the necessary resources and training. Spill response equipment should be conveniently available to address all types of spills,including small spills7;

Spill control response plans should be developed in coordination with the relevant local regulatory agencies;

Facilities should be equipped with a system for the early detection of gas releases, designed to identify theexistence of a gas release and to help pinpoint its source so that operator-initiated ESDs can be rapidly activated, thereby minimizing the inventory of gas releases.

An Emergency Shutdown and Detection (ESD/D) system should be available to initiate automatic transfer shutdownactions in case of a significant LNG leak;

For unloading / loading activities involving marine vesselsand terminals, preparing and implementing spill prevention procedures for tanker loading and off-loading according to applicable international standards and guidelines which specifically address advance communications and planning with the receiving terminal;8

to spilled LNG causes LNG to instantly convert from its liquid phase to its gaseous phase. The large amount of energy released during a RPT can cause a physical explosion with no combustion or chemical reaction. The hazard potential of rapid phase transitions can be severe, but is generally localized within the spill area.7 Small spills of LNG or refrigerant are unlikely to need spill response equipmentfor manual response, since they will evaporate quickly.8 See US EPA Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 4049 CFR Part 193: Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities: Federal Safety Standards (2006) and European Standard (EN) 1473: Installation and Equipment for Liquefied Natural Gas -


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Ensuring that onshore LNG storage tanks are designed with adequate secondary containment (e.g., high nickel-content welded steel inner tank and reinforced concrete outer tank; single wall tank with an external containment basin, full containment tank design) in the event of a sudden release;

Facilities should provide grading, drainage, orimpoundment for vaporization, process, or transfer areas able to contain the largest total quantity of LNG or other flammable liquid that could be released from a singletransfer line in 10 minutes9;

Material selection for piping and equipment that can be exposed to cryogenic temperatures should follow international design standards;10

In case of a gas release, safe dispersion of the released gas should be allowed, maximizing ventilation of areas and minimizing the possibility that gas can accumulate in closed or partially closed spaces. Spilled LNG should be left to evaporate and evaporation rate should be reduced, if possible, e.g. covering with expanding foam; and

The facility drainage system should be designed such that accidental releases of hazardous substances are collected to reduce the fire and explosion risk and environmental discharge. The LNG spill drainage system (trough and sump system) design should be optimized to reduce vaporization rates to limit the overall vapor dispersion area.

WastewaterThe General EHS Guidelines provide information on wastewater management, water conservation and reuse, along with wastewater and water quality monitoring programs. The

Design of Onshore Installations (1997), and NFPA 59A Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (2006)9 EN 1473 standard suggests the impoundment system to be considered on the basis of a Risk Assessment10 NFPA 59A Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (2001)

guidance below is related to additional wastewater streams specific to LNG facilities.

Cooling Water and Cold Water StreamsThe use of water for process cooling at LNG liquefaction facilities and for revaporization heating at LNG receiving terminals may result in significant water use and discharge streams. Recommendations to control cooling and cold water use and discharge streams include the following:

Water conservation opportunities should be considered for LNG facility cooling systems (e.g. air cooled heat exchangers in place of water cooled heat exchangers and opportunities for the integration of cold water discharges with other proximate industrial or power plant facilities).The selection of the preferred system should balance environmental benefits and safety implications of the proposed choice11. Additional guidance on water conservation is provided in the General EHS Guidelines);

Cooling or cold water should be discharged to surface waters in a location that will allow maximum mixing and cooling of the thermal plume to ensure that the temperature is within 3 degrees Celsius of ambient temperature at the edge of the mixing zone or within 100 meters of the discharge point, as noted in Table 1 of Section 2.1 of this Guideline;

If biocides / chemical use is necessary, carefully select chemical additives in terms of dose concentration, toxicity, biodegradability, bioavailability, and bioaccumulation potential. Consideration should be given to residual effects at discharge using techniques such as risk based assessment.

11 For example, where space is limited (e.g. offshore), explosion risks are key in the decision of the preferred options. A balance in terms of an overall HSE risk ALARP approach is recommended.


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Other Wastewater StreamsOther waste waters routinely generated at LNG facilities include process wastewater drainage, sewage waters, tank bottom water (e.g. from condensation in LNG storage tanks), fire water, equipment and vehicle wash waters, and general oily water. Pollution prevention and treatment measures that should be considered for these waste waters include:

Sewage: Gray and black water from showers, toilets and kitchen facilities should be treated as described in the General EHS Guidelines.

Drainage and stormwaters: Separate drainage systems for drainage water from process areas that could be contaminated with hydrocarbons (closed drains) and drainage water from non-process areas (open drains) should be available to the extent practical. All process areas should be bunded to ensure drainage water flows into the closed drainage system and that uncontrolled surface run-off is avoided. Drainage tanks and slop tanks should be designed with sufficient capacity for foreseeable operating conditions, and systems to prevent overfilling should be installed. Drip trays, or other controls, should be used to collect run-off from equipment that is not contained within a bunded area and the contents routed to the closeddrainage system. Stormwater flow channels and collection ponds installed as part of the open drainage system should be fitted with oil / water separators. Separators may include baffle type or coalescing plate type and should be regularly maintained. Stormwater runoff should be treated through an oil / water separation system able to achieve an oil and grease concentration of 10 mg/L, as noted in Section 2.1, Table 1 of this Guideline. Additional guidance on the management of stormwater is provided in the GeneralEHS Guideline.

Firewater: Firewater from test releases should be contained and directed to the facility drainage system or to

a storage pond and wastewater treatment, if contaminated with hydrocarbons.

Wash waters: Equipment and vehicle wash waters should be directed to the closed drainage system or to the facility’s wastewater treatment system.

General oily water: Oily water from drip trays and liquid slugs from process equipment and pipelines should be routed to the waste water treatment system.

Hydrostatic testing water: Hydrostatic testing of LNG equipment (e.g. storage tanks, facility piping systems, transmission pipeline connections, and other equipment)involves pressure testing with water during construction / commissioning to verify their integrity and to detectpotential leaks. Chemical additives may be added to the water to prevent internal corrosion. Pneumatic testing with dry air or nitrogen may be employed for cryogenic piping and components. In managing hydrotest waters, the following pollution prevention and control measures should be considered:o Reducing the need of chemicals by minimizing the

time that test water remains in the equipmento Careful selection of chemical additives in terms of

concentration, toxicity, biodegradability, bioavailability,and bioaccumulation potential

o Using the same water for multiple tests

If discharge of hydrotest waters to surface waters or land is the only feasible alternative for disposal, a hydrotest water disposal plan should be prepared that considers points of discharge, rateof discharge, chemical use and dispersion, environmental risk,and required monitoring. Hydrostatic test water quality should be monitored before use and discharge and should be treated tomeet the discharge limits in Table 1 in Section 2.1 of this Guideline.12 Further recommendations for managing hydrotest

12 Effluent discharge to surface waters should not result in significant impact on human health and sensitive habitats. A disposal plan that considers points of


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water for pipelines are available in the two EHS Guidelines for Onshore and Offshore Oil and Gas Development,respectively.

Air EmissionsAir emissions (continuous or non-continuous) from LNG facilitiesinclude combustion sources for power and heat generation (e.g. for dehydration and liquefaction activities at LNG liquefaction terminals, and regasification activities at LNG receiving terminals), in addition to the use of compressors, pumps, and reciprocating engines (e.g. boilers, turbines, and other engines). Emissions resulting from flaring and venting, as well as fromfugitive sources, may result from activities at both LNG liquefaction and regasification terminals. Principal gases fromthese sources typically include nitrogen oxides (NOX), carbon monoxide (CO), carbon dioxide (CO2), and, in case of sour gases, sulfur dioxide (SO2).

For LNG plants with important combustion sources, air quality impacts should be estimated by the use of baseline air qualityassessments and atmospheric dispersion models to establish potential ground level ambient air concentrations during facility design and operations planning as described in the General EHS Guidelines. These studies should ensure that no adverse impacts to human health and the environment result.

All reasonable attempts should be made to maximize energy efficiency and design facilities to minimize energy use. The overall objective should be to reduce air emissions and evaluate cost-effective options for reducing emissions that are technically feasible. Additional recommendations on energy efficiency are addressed in the General EHS Guidelines.

discharge, rate of discharge, chemical use and dispersion and environmentalrisk may be necessary. Discharges should be planned away from environmentally sensitive areas, with specific attention to high water tables, vulnerable aquifers, and wetlands, and community receptors, including water wells, water intakes, and agricultural land.

Significant (>100,000 tons CO2 equivalent per year) greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from all facilities and support activities should be quantified annually as aggregate emissions in accordance with internationally recognized methodologies and reporting procedures.13

Exhaust GasesExhaust gas emissions produced by the combustion of naturalgas or liquid hydrocarbons in turbines, boilers, compressors, pumps and other engines for power and heat generation, can be the most significant source of air emissions from LNG facilities. Air emission specifications should be considered during all equipment selection and procurement.

Guidance for the management of small combustion sources with a capacity of lower or equal to 50 megawatt thermals (MWth), including air emission standards for exhaust emissions, is provided in the General EHS Guidelines. For combustion source emissions with a capacity of greater than 50 MWth refer to the EHS Guidelines for Thermal Power.

At regasification terminals, the selection of SubmergedCombustion Vaporizers (SCV),Open Rack Vaporizers (ORV)14,Shell and Tube Vaporizers, and Air Vaporizers should be assessed, taking into consideration baseline environmental conditions and environmental sensitivities. If other thermal energy is available within a short distance (e.g. a nearby refinery), waste heat recovery (WHR) / shell and tube vaporizers could be considered.

13 Additional guidance on quantification methodologies can be found in IFC Guidance Note 3, Annex A, available at www.ifc.org/envsocstandards14 If ORVs are used for LNG vaporization, no air emissions are expected from an LNG regasification terminal during normal operations, except for fugitive emissions of methane- rich gas.


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Venting and Flaring Flaring or venting is an important safety measure used at LNGfacilities to ensure gas is safely disposed of in the event of an emergency, power or equipment failure, or other plant upset condition. Flaring or venting should be used only in emergencyor plant upset conditions. Continuous venting or flaring of boil-offgas under normal operations is not considered good industry practice and should be avoided. Guidance for good practice with respect to flaring and venting is provided in the EHS Guidelines for Onshore Oil and Gas Development.

Boil Off Gas (BOG)After LNG liquefaction, stored LNG emits methane gas vapor, known as ‘boil off gas’ (BOG), due to heat from ambient conditions and tank pumps, in addition to barometric pressure changes. BOG should be collected using an appropriate vapor recovery system (e.g. compressor systems). For LNG plants (excluding LNG carrier loading operations) the vapor should be returned to the process for liquefaction or used on-site as a fuel; on board LNG carriers BOG should be re-liquefied and returned to the storage tanks or used as a fuel; for re-gasification facilities (receiving terminals), the collected vapors should be returned to the process system to be used as a fuel on-site, compressedand placed into the sales stream/pipeline, or flared.

Fugitive Emissions Fugitive emissions at LNG facilities may be associated with cold vents, leaking pipes and tubing, valves, connections, flanges, packings, open-ended lines, pump seals, compressor seals,pressure relief valves, and general loading and unloadingoperations. Methods for controlling and reducing fugitive emissions should be considered and implemented in the design, operation, and maintenance of facilities. The selection of appropriate valves, flanges, fittings, seals, and packings should be based on their capacity to reduce gas leaks and fugitive

emissions15. Additionally, leak detection and repair programs should be implemented.

Additional guidance for the prevention and control of fugitive emissions from storage tanks are provided in the EHSGuidelines for Crude Oil and Petroleum Product Terminals.

Waste ManagementNon-hazardous and hazardous wastes routinely generated at LNG facilities include general office and packaging wastes,waste oils, oil contaminated rags, hydraulic fluids, used batteries, empty paint cans, waste chemicals and used chemical containers, used filters, spent sweetening and dehydration media (e.g. molecular sieves) and oily sludge from oil water separators, spent amine from acid gas removal units, scrap metals, and medical waste, among others.

Waste materials should be segregated into non-hazardous andhazardous wastes and considered for re-use / recycling prior todisposal. A waste management plan should be developed that contains a waste tracking mechanism from the originating location to the final waste reception location. Storage, handling and disposal of hazardous and nonhazardous waste should be conducted in a way consistent with good EHS practice for waste management, as described in the General EHS Guidelines.

NoiseThe main noise emission sources in LNG facilities includepumps, compressors, generators and drivers, compressor suction / discharge, recycle piping, air dryers, heaters, aircoolers at liquefaction facilities, vaporizers used during regasification, and general loading / unloading operations of LNG carriers / vessels.

15 See US EPA Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 4049 CFR Part 193: Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities: Federal Safety Standards (2006) and European Standard (EN) 1473: Installation and Equipment for Liquefied Natural Gas -Design of Onshore Installations (1997), and NFPA 59A Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (2006)


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Atmospheric conditions that may affect noise levels include humidity, wind direction, and wind speed. Vegetation, such astrees, and walls can reduce noise levels. Installation of acoustic insulating barriers can be implemented, where necessary.Maximum allowable log equivalent ambient noise levels that should not be exceeded and general recommendations for prevention and control of noise are described in the GeneralEHS Guidelines.

LNG TransportCommon environmental issues related to vessels and shipping (e.g. hazardous materials management, wastewater and other effluents, air emissions, and solid waste generation and management related to LNG tankers / carriers), and recommendations for their management are covered in the EHSGuidelines for Shipping. Emissions from tugs and LNG vessels, especially where the jetty is within close proximity to the coast, may represent an important source affecting air quality.

LNG vessel design, construction and operations should comply with international standards and codes16 relating to hull requirements (e.g. double hulls with separation distances between each layer), cargo containment, pressure / temperature controls, ballast tanks, safety systems, fire protection, crew training, among other issues17. Specific recommendations to mitigate Rapid Phase Transition (RPT) include the following:

16 Examples of international standards and codes include the InternationalMaritime Organization’s (IMO) International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk, known as the International Gas Carrier Code (IGC Code). Further guidance is provided in the standards, codes of practices, principles and guidelines issued by the Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO), available at www.sigtto.org.17 LNG transport ships are required to have an “Onboard Emergency Plan,” as established by international regulations (Rule 26 of Appendix I of the MARPOL 73/78 agreement). LNG Facilities’ contingency plans should cover loading / unloading operations, and, as recommended by the IMO, should include communications and coordination between the “ship and shore”.

The pressure rating of the actual LNG cargo tanks shouldbe maximized;

The LNG cargo tanks pressure relief system should actuate as quickly as possible, in order to relieve the large volumes of vapor that can be generated by an RPT event.

1.2 Occupational Health and Safety

Occupational health and safety issues should be considered as part of a comprehensive hazard or risk assessment, including, for example, a hazard identification study [HAZID], hazard and operability study [HAZOP], or other risk assessment studies. The results should be used for health and safety management planning, in the design of the facility and safe working systems, and in the preparation and communication of safe working procedures.

Facilities should be designed to eliminate or reduce the potential for injury or risk of accident and should take into account prevailing environmental conditions at the site location including the potential for extreme natural hazards such as earthquakes or hurricanes.

Health and safety management planning should demonstrate: that a systematic and structured approach to managing health and safety will be adopted and that controls are in place to reduce risks to the lowest practicable level; that staff isadequately trained; and that equipment is maintained in a safe condition. The formation of a health and safety committee for the facility is recommended.

A formal Permit to Work (PTW) system should be developed for the facilities. The PTW will ensure that all potentially hazardous work is carried out safely and ensures effective authorization of designated work, effective communication of the work to be carried out including hazards involved, and safe isolation procedures to be followed before commencing work. A lockout /


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tagout procedure for equipment should be implemented to ensure all equipment is isolated from energy sources before servicing or removal.

The facilities should be equipped, at a minimum, with specialized first aid providers (industrial pre-hospital care personnel) and the means to provide short-term remote patient care. Depending on the number of personnel present and complexity of the facility, provision of an on-site medical unit and doctor should be considered. In specific cases, telemedicine facilities may be an alternative option.

General facility design and operation measures to manageprincipal risks to occupational health and safety are provided in the General EHS Guidelines. General guidance forconstruction and decommissioning activities is also provided along with guidance on health and safety training, personal protective equipment and the management of physical, chemical, biological and radiological hazards common to all industries.

Occupational health and safety issues associated with LNG Facilities operations include the following:

Fire and explosion

Roll-over

Contact with cold surfaces

Chemical hazards

Confined spaces

Occupational health and safety impacts and recommendations applicable to LNG transport by ships are covered in the EHS Guidelines for Shipping.18

18 Construction and equipment of ships carrying liquefied gases in bulk and gas carriers need to comply with the requirements of the International Gas Carrier Code (IGC Code), published by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).Further guidance is provided in the standards, codes of practices, principles and

Fires and ExplosionsFire and explosion hazards at LNG facilities may result from thepresence of combustible gases and liquids, oxygen, and ignition sources during loading and unloading activities, and / or leaks and spills of flammable products. Possible ignition sources include sparks associated with the buildup of static electricity19,lightning, and open flames. The accidental release of LNG may generate the formation of an evaporating liquid pool, potentially resulting in a pool fire and / or the dispersion of a cloud of natural gas from pool evaporation.

In addition to recommendations for hazardous materials and oil management, and emergency preparedness and response provided in the General EHS Guidelines, the following measures are specific to LNG facilities:

LNG facilities should be designed, constructed, and operated according to international standards20 for the prevention and control of fire and explosion hazards, including provisions for safe distances between tanks in the facility and between the facility and adjacent buildings;21

Implementing safety procedures for loading and unloading of product to transport systems (e.g. rail and tanker trucks, and vessels22), including use of fail safe control valves and emergency shutdown and detection equipment (ESD/D);

guidelines issued by the Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO).19 Static electricity may be generated by liquids moving in contact with other materials, including pipes and fuel tanks during loading and unloading of product. In addition, water mist and steam generated during tank and equipment cleaning can be come electrically charged, in particular with the presence of chemical cleaning agents. 20 An example of good practice includes the US National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Code 59A: Standard for the Production, Storage, and handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) (2006) and EN 1473. Further guidance to minimize exposure to static electricity and lightening is available in APIRecommended Practice: Protection Against Ignitions Arising out of Static,Lightning, and Stray Currents (2003).21 If adequate spacing between the areas cannot be ensured, blast walls should be considered to separate process areas from other areas of the facility and/orstrengthening of buildings should be considered.22 See Liquefied Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals - 3rd edition(2000), Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators Ltd (SIGGTO) and US EPA Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 33 CFR Part 127:


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Preparation of a formal fire response plan supported by the necessary resources and training, including training in the use fire suppression equipment and evacuation.Procedures may include coordination activities with local authorities or neighboring facilities. Furtherrecommendations for emergency preparedness and response are addressed in the General EHS Guidelines;

Prevention of potential ignition sources such as:o Proper grounding to avoid static electricity buildup and

lightning hazards (including formal procedures for the use and maintenance of grounding connections);23

o Use of intrinsically safe electrical installations and non-sparking tools;24

o Implementation of permit systems and formal procedures for conducting any hot work during maintenance activities,25 including proper tank

cleaning and venting,

o Application of hazardous area zoning for electrical

equipment in design;

Facilities should be properly equipped with fire detectionand suppression equipment that meets internationally recognized technical specifications for the type and amount of flammable and combustible materials stored at the facility. Examples of fire suppression equipment may include mobile / portable equipment such as fire extinguishers, and specialized vehicles. Fixed fire suppression may include the use of foam towers and largeflow pumps. The installation of halon-based fire systems is not considered good industry practice and should be

Waterfront facilities handling liquefied natural gas and liquefied hazardous gas, and NFPA 59A Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (2006)23 For example, see Chapter 20, ISGOTT (1995).24 For example, see Chapter 19, ISGOTT (1995).25 Control of ignition sources is especially relevant in areas of potential flammable vapor-air mixtures such as within vapor space of tanks, within vapor space of rail / truck tankers during loading / unloading, near vapor disposal / recovery systems, near discharge vents of atmospheric tanks, in proximity to a leak or spill.

avoided. Fixed systems may also include foam extinguishers attached to tanks, and automatic or manually operated fire protection systems at loading / unloadingareas. Water is not suitable for fighting LNG fires as it increases the vaporization rate of LNG, but.26

All fire systems should be located in a safe area of the facility, protected from the fire by distance or by fire walls;

Explosive atmospheres in confined spaces should be avoided by making spaces inert;

Protection of accommodation areas by distance or by fire walls. The ventilation air intakes should prevent smoke from entering accommodation areas;

Implementation of safety procedures for loading and unloading of product to transport systems (e.g. ship tankers, rail and tanker trucks, and vessels27), including use of fail safe control valves and emergency shutdown equipment/structures.28;

Preparation of a fire response plan supported by thenecessary resources to implement the plan;

Provision of fire safety training and response as part of workforce health and safety induction / training, including training in the use fire suppression equipment and evacuation, with advanced fire safety training provided to a designated fire fighting team.

Roll-overStorage of large quantities of LNG in tanks may lead to a phenomenon known as “roll-over”. Roll-over may occur if LNG stratifies into layers of different densities within the storage tank,resulting in pressures that, in the absence of properly operating safety-vent valves, could cause structural damage.

26 Good practice examples include the US National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 59A or other equivalent standards.27 An example of good industry practice for loading and unloading of tankers includes ISGOTT.28 Good practice examples include the US National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 59A or other equivalent standards.


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Recommended measures to prevent roll over include the following:

Monitor LNG storage tanks for pressure, density, and temperature all along the liquid column;

Consider installation of a system to recirculate the LNG in within the tank;

Install pressure safety valves for tanks designed to accommodate roll over conditions;

Install multiple loading points at different tank levels to allow for the distribution of LNG with different densities within the tank to prevent stratification.

Contact with Cold SurfacesStorage and handling of LNG may expose personnel to contactwith very low temperature product. Plant equipment that can pose an occupational risk due low temperatures should be adequately identified and protected to reduce accidental contact with personnel. Training should be provided to educate workers regarding the hazards of contact with cold surfaces (e.g. cold burns), and personal protective equipment (PPE) (e.g. gloves, insulated clothing) should be provided as necessary.

Chemical HazardsThe design of the onshore facilities should reduce exposure of personnel to chemical substances, fuels, and products containing hazardous substances. Use of substances and products classified as very toxic, carcinogenic, allergenic, mutagenic, teratogenic, or strongly corrosive should be identified and substituted by less hazardous alternatives, wherever possible. For each chemical used, a Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) should be available and readily accessible on the facility. A general hierarchical approach to the prevention of impacts from chemical hazards is provided in the GeneralEHS Guidelines.

Facilities should be equipped with a reliable system for gas detection that allows the source of release to be isolated and the inventory of gas that can be released to be reduced. Blowdown of pressure equipment should be initiated to reduce system pressure and consequently reduce the release flow rate. Gasdetection devices should also be used to authorize entry and operations into enclosed spaces. Liquefaction facilities with gas treatment operations may have the potential for releases of hydrogen sulfide (H2S). Wherever H2S gas may accumulate,the following measures should be considered:

Development of a contingency plan for H2S release events, including all necessary aspects from evacuation to resumption of normal operations;

Installation of monitors set to activate warning signals whenever detected concentrations of H2S exceed 7 milligrams per cubic meter (mg/m3). The number and location of monitors should be determined based on an assessment of plant locations prone to H2S emissions and occupational exposure;

Provision of personal H2S detectors to workers in locations of high risk of exposure along with self-contained breathing apparatus and emergency oxygen supplies that is conveniently located to enable personnel to safely interrupt tasks and reach a temporary refuge or safe haven;

Provision of adequate ventilation of occupied buildings andof adequate safety systems( e.g. airlocks, ventilation shut down by gas detection) to avoid accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas;

Workforce training in safety equipment use and response in the event of a leak.

Confined SpacesConfined space hazards, as in any other industry sector, are potentially fatal to workers. Confined space entry by workers and the potential for accidents may vary among LNG terminal


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facilities depending on design, on-site equipment, and infrastructure. Confined spaces may include storage tanks, secondary containment areas, and stormwater / wastewater management infrastructure. Facilities should develop and implement confined space entry procedures as described in the General EHS Guidelines.

1.3 Community Health and Safety

Community health and safety impacts during the construction and decommissioning of facilities are common to those of most other industrial facilities and are discussed in the General EHS Guidelines.

Community health and safety impacts during the operation of LNG Facilities are related to potential accidental natural gas leaks, in either liquid or gas form. Flammable gas or heat radiation and overpressure may potentially impact community areas outside the facility boundary, although the probability of large magnitude events directly associated with storage operations in well designed and managed facilities is usually negligible29. The layout of a LNG facility and the separation distance between the facility and the public and/or neighboring facilities outside the LNG plant boundary should be based on an assessment of risks from LNG fire (thermal radiation protection), vapor cloud (flammable vapor-dispersion protection), or other major hazards.

LNG facilities should prepare an emergency preparedness and response plan that considers the role of communities and community infrastructure in the event of an LNG leak or explosion. Ship traffic, including at loading and unloading jetties, associated with LNG facilities should be considered, with

29 The assessment and control of risks to the community should follow recognized international standards, for example, EN 1473. The definition of protection distances for LNG storage and other facilities should be considered for adoption––for example, U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 49, Part 193.16–to protect the surrounding areas

respect to local marine traffic patterns and activities. Location of ship loading / unloading facilities should also consider the presence of other shipping lanes and other marine activities in the area (e.g. fishing, recreation). Additional information on the elements of emergency plans is provided in the General EHS Guidelines. General shipping safety management strategies also applicable to LNG transport by sea are covered in the EHSGuidelines for Shipping.

SecurityUnauthorized access to facilities should be avoided by perimeter fencing surrounding the facility and controlled access points (guarded gates). Public access control should be applied. Adequate signs and closed areas should establish the areas where security controls begin at the property boundaries. Vehicular traffic signs should clearly designate the separate entrances for trucks / deliveries and visitor / employee vehicles. Means for detecting intrusion (for example, closed-circuittelevision) should be considered. To maximize opportunities for surveillance and minimize possibilities for trespassers, the facility should have adequate lighting.

2.0 Performance Indicators and Industry Benchmarks

2.1 Environmental Performance

Emission and Effluent Guidelines Effluent guidelines are described in Table 1. Air emissions from LNG facilities should be controlled through the application of techniques described in Section 1.1 of these Guidelines. Guideline values for process effluents in this sector are indicative of good international industry practice as reflected in relevant standards of countries with recognized regulatory frameworks. Combustion source emissions guidelines


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associated with steam and power generation activities from sources with a capacity equal to or lower than 50 MWth are addressed in the General EHS Guidelines with larger power source emissions addressed in the EHS Guidelines for Thermal Power.

Table 1. Effluent Levels for LNG FacilitiesParameter Guideline

Hydrotestwater

Treatment and disposal as per guidance in section 1.1 of this document. For discharge to surface waters or to land:

o Total hydrocarbon content: 10 mg/Lo pH: 6 - 9o BOD: 25 mg/Lo COD: 125 mg/Lo TSS: 35 mg/Lo Phenols: 0.5 mg/Lo Sulfides: 1 mg/Lo Heavy metals (total): 5 mg/Lo Chlorides: 600 mg/L (average), 1200 mg/L

(maximum)

Hazardousstormwaterdrainage

Stormwater runoff should be treated through an oil/water separation system able to achieve oil & grease concentration of 10 mg/L.

Coolingwater

The effluent should result in a temperature increase of nomore than 3° C at edge of the zone where initial mixing and dilution take place. Where the zone is not defined, use 100 m from point of discharge. Free chlorine (total residual oxidant in estuarine / marine water)concentration in cooling / cold water discharges (to be sampled at point of discharge) should be maintained at 0.2 parts per million (ppm).

Sewage

Treatment as per guidance in the General EHS Guidelines, including discharge requirements. Provision of facilities to receive LNG tanker effluents may be required (see EHS Guidelines for Ports and Harbors).

Resource Use and Energy ConsumptionTable 2 provides examples of resource and energy consumption indicators in this sector. Industry benchmark values are provided for comparative purposes only and individual projects should target continual improvement in these areas. They are presented here as a point of reference for comparison to enable facility managers to determine the relative efficiency of the project and can also be used to assess performance changes over time.

Environmental MonitoringEnvironmental monitoring programs for this sector should be implemented to address all activities that have been identified to have potentially significant impacts on the environment, duringnormal operations and upset conditions. Environmental monitoring activities should be based on direct or indirect indicators of emissions, effluents, and resource use applicable to the particular project.

Monitoring frequency should be sufficient to provide representative data for the parameter being monitored. Monitoring should be conducted by trained individuals following monitoring and record-keeping procedures and using properly calibrated and maintained equipment. Monitoring data should be analyzed and reviewed at regular intervals and compared with the operating standards so that any necessary corrective actions can be taken. Additional guidance on applicable sampling and analytical methods for emissions and effluents is provided in the General EHS Guidelines.

Table 2. Resource and Energy Consumption

Parameter Unit IndustryBenchmark

Energy consumption of LNG transportation1

Energy consumption –regasification plants

MJ/GJ gas per 100 km

MWe

19–201

20–302

Water consumption -ORV systems3 m3/hr 30,000

Notes:1 IEA, 19992 Offshore GBS or floating regasification unit of 8 GSm 3/year3 Thermal delta of 5°C for a 8 GSm 3/year regasification plant


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2.2 Occupational Health and Safety

Occupational Health and Safety GuidelinesOccupational health and safety performance should be evaluated against internationally published exposure guidelines, of which examples include the Threshold Limit Value (TLV®) occupational exposure guidelines and Biological Exposure Indices (BEIs®) published by American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH),30 the Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards published by the United States National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety (NIOSH),31

Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs) published by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the United States (OSHA),32 Indicative Occupational Exposure Limit Values published by European Union member states,33 or other similar sources.

Accident and Fatality RatesProjects should try to reduce the number of accidents among project workers (whether directly employed or subcontracted) to a rate of zero, especially accidents that could result in lost work time, different levels of disability, or even fatalities. The accidentand fatality rates of the specific facility may be benchmarked against the performance of facilities in this sector in developed countries through consultation with published sources (e.g. US Bureau of Labor Statistics and UK Health and Safety Executive)34.

30 http://www.acgih.org/TLV/30 Available at: http://www.acgih.org/TLV/ and http://www.acgih.org/store/31 Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg/32 Available at: http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=999233 Available at: http://europe.osha.eu.int/good_practice/risks/ds/oel/34 Available at: http://www.bls.gov/iif/ and http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/index.htm

Occupational Health and Safety MonitoringThe working environment should be monitored for occupational hazards relevant to the specific project. Monitoring should be designed and implemented by accredited professionals35 as part of an occupational health and safety monitoring program.Facilities should also maintain a record of occupational accidents and diseases and dangerous occurrences and accidents. Additional guidance on occupational health and safety monitoring programs is provided in the General EHS Guidelines.

35 Accredited professionals may include Certified Industrial Hygienists, Registered Occupational Hygienists, or Certified Safety Professionals or their equivalent.


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3.0 References and Additional SourcesAmerican Petroleum Institute (API). 2003. Recommended Practice. Protection Against Ignitions Arising out of Static, Lightning, and Stray Currents. API RP 2003. Washington, DC: API.

ABS Consulting. 2004. Consequence Assessment Methods for Incidents Involving Releases from Liquefied Natural Gas Carriers. Report for FERC. Houston, TX: ABS Consulting.

Aspen Environmental Group. 2005. International and National Efforts to Address the Safety and Security Risks of Importing Liquefied Natural Gas: A Compendium. Prepared for California Energy Commission. Sacramento, CA:Aspen Environmental Group.

California Energy Commission. 2003. Liquefied Natural Gas in California: History, Risks, and Siting. Staff White Paper. No. 700-03-005. Sacramento, CA: California Energy Commission. Available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/naturalgas/index.html

Center for Energy Economics (CEE). 2003a. Introduction to LNG. An Overview on Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), its Properties, the LNG Industry, Safety Considerations. Sugar Land, Texas: CEE. Available at http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/

CEE. 2003b. LNG Safety and Security. Sugar Land, Texas: CEE. Available at http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/

European Union. European Norm (EN) Standard EN 1473. Installation and Equipment for Liquefied Natural Gas – Design of Onshore Installations. Latest Edition. Brussels: EU.

Kidnay, A.J., and W.R. Parrish. 2006. Fundamentals of Natural Gas Processing. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.

International Energy Agency (IEA). 1999. Automotive Fuels Information Service. Automotive Fuels for the Future: The Search for Alternatives. Paris: IEA. Available at http://www.iea.org/dbtw-wpd/textbase/nppdf/free/1990/autofuel99.pdf

International Maritime Organisation (IMO). 1983. International Gas Carrier Code (IGC Code). IMO 782E. Latest edition. London: IMO.

International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals (ISGOTT). 1995. 4th ed. ICS & OCIMF. London: Witherbys Publishing.

IMO. 1978. MARPOL 73/78. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto. London: IMO.

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). 2006. NFPA 59A. Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). Quincy, MA:NFPA.

Nova Scotia Departm ent of Energy. 2005. Code of Practice. Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities. Halifax, Nova Scotia: Department of Energy. Available at http://www.gov.ns.ca/energy

Sandia National Laboratories. 2004. Guidance on Risk Analysis and Safety Implications of a Large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Spill Over Water. SAND2004-6258, December 2004. Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Livermore, California: Sandia National Laboratories.

Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO). 1997Site Selection and Design of LNG Ports and Jetties. London: SIGTTO. Available at http://www.sigtto.org

SIGTTO. 2000. Safety in Liquefied Gas Marine Transportation and Terminal Operations. London: SIGTTO. Available at http://www.sigtto.org

United States (US) Environment Protection Agency (EPA). Code of Federal Regulations 49 CFR Part 193. Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities: Federal Safety Standards. Latest edition. Washington, DC: US EPA. Available at http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title49/49cfr193_main_02.tpl

United States (US) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 33 CFR Part 127: Waterfront facilities handling liquefied natural gas and liquefied hazardous gas. Latest addition. Washington, DC: US EPA


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Annex A: General Description of Industry ActivitiesLiquefying natural gas allows a significant volume reduction, which creates the ability to store and transport large liquefied natural gas (LNG) volumes by ship. The LNG chain includes the following phases of activities:

Phase 1: Natural gas production (upstream activities and facilities);

Phase 2: Transportation of natural gas to processing / liquefaction plants;

Phase 3: Treatment of natural gas (dehydration, removal of hydrogen sulfide (H2S), etc.);

Phase 4: Natural gas liquefaction;

Phase 5: Loading of LNG in LNG carrier ships and transportation to the receiving terminals;

Phase 6: Unloading and storage of LNG in the receiving terminals;

Phase 7: Regasification of LNG by heat exchange; and

Phase 8: Distribution of natural gas to the network through gas transmission pipelines.

Raw natural gas should be “conditioned” before its use to remove heavier hydrocarbons and undesired components or impurities. Gas conditioning can take place in separate or stand-alone facilities or can be integrated in the LNG liquefactionplant, and typically includes the extraction of heavier hydrocarbons such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and natural gas liquids (NGL) such as propane and butane. The conditioned gas (methane-rich gas) is then treated in the LNG liquefaction facilities. To be transported, the LNG is cooled to approximately –162°C where it condenses to a liquid at atmospheric pressure reducing to approximately 1/600 of its original volume and reaching a density of 420 to 490 kilogramsper square meters (kg/m²).

Natural Gas LiquefactionA typical LNG base load liquefaction plant flow scheme is shown in Figure A1. The process and utility requirement depends on site conditions, feed gas quality, and product specification. In a typical scheme, the feed gas is delivered at high pressure (up to 90 bar) from upstream gas fields via pipelines, and any associated condensate is stabilized and removed. The gas is metered and its pressure controlled to the design operating pressure of the plant.

The gas is pretreated to remove any impurities that interfere with processing or are undesirable in the final products. These treatments include sweetening and dehydration, and consist of the removal of acid gases and sulfur compounds––for example, carbon dioxide (CO2,), hydrogen sulfide (H2S), and mercaptans,removal of mercury and other trace contaminants, as needed, and removal of water.

The dry sweet gas is then cooled by refrigerant streams to separate heavier hydrocarbons. The treated gas is subjected to multiple cooling stages by indirect heat exchange with one or more refrigerants, whereby the gas is progressively reduced in temperature until complete liquefaction. The pressurized LNG is further expanded and subcooled in one or more stages to facilitate storage at slightly above atmospheric pressure. Flashed vapors and boil-off gas (BOG) are recycled within the process. The resulting LNG is stored in atmospheric tanks ready for export by ship.

Heavier hydrocarbons that may be separated during cooling are fractionated and recovered. Ethane is normally reinjected into the gas stream to be liquefied. Propane and butane can either be reinjected or exported as LPG products and pentane (orheavier components) can be exported as a gasoline product.


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Liquefaction processes mainly use mechanical refrigeration, in which heat is transferred from the natural gas, through exchanger surfaces, to a separate closed-loop refrigerant fluid. The refrigerant loop uses the cooling effect of fluid expansion, requiring work input via a compressor. A number of different LNG processes have been developed and the most common ones include:

Cascade, in which a number of separate refrigerant loops are used, with different single-component fluids, such as propane, ethylene, and methane; and

Mixed refrigerant, which uses a mixture of nitrogen and light hydrocarbons.

Key utilities required to support the processing units include the following:

Fuel gas (derived from the process streams) to generate electric power;

Cooling medium (water or air); and

Heating medium (steam or hot oil system).

LNG TransportLNG is transported from the liquefaction plant site to regasification terminals through specially designed LNG carriers having a typical capacity of 80,000 m3 up to 260,000 m3. Onboard tanks function as large thermos-type containers (pseudo-dewar), which enable the LNG to remain as a liquid for the duration of transport. A very small amount of gas is produced in the tanks and is collected to prevent a gradual buildup in pressure and can be used as the carrier’s fuel. There are five containment systems, constantly monitored for the presence of gas and temperature change, in use for new LNG carriers:36

36 Relevant and detailed characteristics of tanks are covered in the guidance documents and design specifications developed by SIGTTO

Two self-supporting type designs:o Spherical (Moss) tank,o Prismatic tank.

Two-membrane type designs (TGZ Mark III and GT96).Membrane tanks use two flexible steel membranes (primary and secondary) to contain the cargo.

LNG Onshore Regasification TerminalThe LNG regasification terminals typically consist of the following systems:

LNG unloading system, including jetty and berth;

LNG storage tank(s);

In-tank and external LNG pumps;

Vapor handling system;

LNG vaporizers

LNG is transferred to unloading lines and onto onshore LNG tanks by the ship pumps. During ship unloading, the vapor generated in the storage tank by displacement is returned to the ship’s cargo tanks via a vapor return line and arm, maintaining a positive pressure in the ship. One or more large-capacity tanksare installed for receiving and storing LNG.

During normal operation, BOG is produced in the tanks and liquid-filled lines by heat transfer from the surroundings. The BOG is typically collected to be recondensed in the LNG stream. During ship unloading, the quantity of vapor generated is higher. From the compressor suction drum, vapor is routed to the vapor return lines to the ship or to the BOG compressors. The vapor that is not returned to the ship is compressed and directed to the recondenser.

LNG from the storage tanks is sent by the in-tank pumps to the recondenser. The BOG generated during plant operation is also


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routed to this vessel where it is mixed with the subcooled LNG and condensed.

Multistage high-head send-out pumps take the LNG from the recondenser and supply it to the vaporizers, where the heat exchange between the LNG and a heating medium allows vaporization of the high-pressure LNG, and the gas generated is sent directly to the export line. The most common types of vaporizers are as follows:

Open rack vaporizers (ORVs), which use seawater to heat and vaporize the LNG;

Submerged combustion vaporizers (SCVs), which use burners fed by send-out gas to generate heat for vaporization; and

Shell and tube (or intermediate fluid) vaporizers, where an external source of heat is available.

Flare and Vent Systems In case of extreme turndown or emergency conditions, BOG could be generated in quantities that exceed the capacity of the recondenser. In this case BOG is sent to the atmosphere through flaring or venting. If emergency venting is implemented, consideration should be given to the cold methane slump after discharge to avoid the cold methane from reaching a grade above the lower flammability limit (LFL).

LNG Offshore Receiving TerminalFollowing are the design types of offshore LNG Facilities:

Gravity-based structures (GBS),

Floating regasification and storage units (FSRUs),

Floating regasification units (FRUs), and

Mooring systems with regasification.

A GBS is a fixed concrete structure laying on the sea floor with all plant facilities located on the top of the GBS.

An FSRU is an LNG carrier ship modified to include the regasification systems. They are floating structures moored to the seabed via a turret mooring system. The systems required for the LNG pumping, vaporization, BOG handling, and natural gas export to shore are located on the deck of the FSRU.

The FRU concept is based on the conversion of a crude oil carrier, which is modified to provide a platform for the regasification process and to enable mooring and LNG offloading from the LNG carriers. The FRU has no or limited LNG storage, so the LNG received from the carrier is instantly vaporized and transferred. A large gas storage volume also enables the unit to function as a peak-shaving facility.

The mooring systems with regasification can consist of the following:

A single point mooring (SPM) tower, in which the topsides regasification facilities are installed on a fixed tower structure. The LNG carrier should be moored via a rotating arm structure on the fixed tower. The carrier slowly discharges LNG to the SPM tower, where the LNG is simultaneously vaporized and transferred through the gas pipeline; and

A disconnectable riser turret mooring (RTM), which is a mooring and offloading system enabling high pressure discharge from an LNG carrier with an on-boardregasification plant.


APRIL 30, 2007 19

WORLD BANK GROUP

Figure A.1: Liquefied Natural Gas Production

Gas wells Reception Acid gas removal

Naturalgas

Acid gas treatment

Dehydrationmercuryremoval

Condensatestabilization

Fractionation

Liquefaction

LPG

LNG

CondensateStorage

andloading


APPENDIX B - LIST OF POLICIES AND STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO THE LNG INDUSTRY


List of Guidelines, Standards and Codes of Practice Applicable to the LNG Industry

AS/NZS ISO 31000, Standard for Risk Management Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No. 10 – Land Use Safety Planning (2007) (HIPAP10) AS 3961-2005, The storage and handling of liquefied natural gas AS 3846: The Handling and Transport of Dangerous Cargoes in Port Areas US National Fire Protection Association: NFPA 59A: Standard for the Production, Storage and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas AS/NZS 4452:1997(a), The Storage and Handling of Toxic Substances AS 1940:2004, The Storage and Handling of Flammable and Combustible Liquids AS 3780:1994, The Storage and Handling of Corrosive Substances SIGTTO – Site Selection and Design for LNG Ports and Jetties Information Paper No. 14 SIGTTO - LNG Operations in Port Areas, Essential Best Practices for the Industry Maritime Safety (Queensland) Act 2002 The Dangerous Goods Safety Management (DGSM) Act 2001 and the DGSM Regulation 2001 PIANC - Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses - Approach Channels, A Guide to Design BS EN 1473, Installation and Equipment for LNG BS EN 1532, Installation and Equipment for Liquefied Natural Gas. Ship to Shore Interface SIGTTO - Guidelines for Ship to Shore Access for Gas Carriers SIGTTO - Liquefied Gas Handling Principles on Ships and Terminals SIGTTO - A Guide to Contingency Planning for Marine Terminals Handling Liquefied Gases in Bulk United States DOT - 49 CFR 193, Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities Federal Safety Standards OCIMF - Safety Guide for Terminals Handling Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk


APPENDIX C –APPENDIX FROM SIGTTO INFORMATION PAPER 14 -SITE SELECTION AND DESIGN FOR LNG PORTS AND JETTIES


LNG Ports – Risk Reduction Appendix - SIGTTO Information Paper 14

(Where figures are given they refer to LNG carriers of 135,000 m3 capacity) 1 The Port 1.1 Port Analysis Speed restrictions for LNG carriers should be appropriate to limit grounding and

collision damage. 1.2 Approach Channels and Turning Basins Navigable depths (for most LNG carriers) should generally not be less than 13

metres below the level of chart datum. Under keel clearances should be established in accordance with the sea-bed

quality. Channel width should be about five times the beam of the ship (approximately

250 metres). Turning areas should have a minimum diameter of two to three times the ship's

length (approximately 600 to 900 metres). Short approach channels are preferable to long inshore routes which carry

more numerous hazards. Traffic separation schemes should be established in approach routes covering

many miles. Anchorages should be established at the port entrance and inshore, for the safe

segregation of LNG carriers and to provided lay-by facilities in case, at the last moment, the berth proves unavailable.

1.3 Navigational Aids Buoys to mark the width of navigable channels should be placed at suitable

intervals. Leading marks or lit beacons, to mark channel centrelines and to facilitate

rounding channel bends, should be appropriately placed. Electronic navigational aids, to support navigation under adverse weather

conditions, are needed in most ports. Lit navigational aids should be provided to allow ship movements at night. 1.4 Port Services Tugs should be made available and three to four are normally required giving

140 tonnes total bollard pull. (Tugs may be required to meet LNG carriers farther offshore).

Mooring services are often required and these services should normally provide a minimum of two boats, each having at least 400 horsepower.

Escort services comprising fast patrol craft, to clear approach channels, turning areas, jetty, etc. should be provided in busy port areas.

Firefighting services comprising specially equipped craft, or, one or more suitably equipped tugs should be provided.

1.5 Port Procedures Traffic control or VTS systems should be strictly enforced to ensure safe harbor

manoeuvring between the pilot boarding area and the jetty. Speed limits should be introduced in appropriate parts of the port approach, not

only for the LNG carrier but also for other ships. Pilotage services should be required to provide pilots of high quality and

experience. Pilot boarding areas should be at a suitable distance offshore. Ship movements by nearby ships, when the LNG carrier is pumping cargo,

should be disallowed.


Pilots and tugs should be immediately available in case the LNG carrier has to leave the jetty in an emergency.

1.6 Port Operating Limits Environmental limits for wind, waves, and visibility should be set for ship

manoeuvres and these should ensure adequate safe margins are available under all operating conditions.

Weather limits for port closure should be established. 1.7 Weather Warnings Forecasting for long range purposes should be provided to give warning of

severe storms, such as typhoons and cyclones. Forecasting for short range purposes, such as those required for local storms

and squalls, should be made available. 2 The Jetty 2.1 Jetty Location Jetty location should be remote from populated areas and should also be well

removed from other marine traffic and any port activity which may cause a hazard.

The maximum credible spill and its estimated gas-cloud range should be carefully established for the jetty area.

River bends and narrow channels should not be considered as appropriate positions for LNG carrier jetties.

Breakwaters should be constructed for jetty areas exposed to sea action, such as excessive waves and currents.

Restrictions, such as low bridges, should not feature in the jetty approach. Ignition sources should be excluded within a predetermined radius from the jetty

manifold. 2.2 Jetty Layout Mooring dolphin spacing - between the outermost dolphins - should not be less

than the ship's length (approximately 290 metres). Mooring dolphins should be situated about 50 metres inshore from the berthing

face. Mooring points should be suitably positioned, and have suitable strength, for

the environmental conditions. Quick-release hooks should be provided at all mooring points. Breasting dolphin spacing should be designed to ensure that the parallel body

of the ship is properly supported. Fendering for the dolphins, and for the berth face, should be to a suitable

standard. 2.3 Jetty Equipment. Pipelines and pumps etc should be designed to provide a rapid port turn-round. Emergency Release Systems at the hard arms should be fitted in accordance

with industry specifications. The ERS should be suited to both ship and shore by interlinking and a PERC should be fitted to each hard arm for emergency stoppage and quick release purposes.

Emergency shut-down valves should be fitted to both ship and shore pipelines and should form part of the ERS system.

Powered emergency release couplings (PERCs) with flanking quick-acting valves should be fitted to the hard arm as part of the ERS system.

Plugs both on ship and shore to carry all ESD and communication signals should be standardised.

Surge pressure control should be provided in LNG pipelines. Communications equipment (telephone, hot-line and radios) should be provided

for ship/shore use.


Load monitors, to show the mooring force in each mooring line, should be fitted to quick release hooks.

Gangways should be provided to give safe emergency access to or from the ship.

2.4 Basic Firefighting Facilities Water curtain pumps and pipelines should be provided. Fixed Dry Powder systems should be provided. Gas detection monitors should be fitted at strategic locations. Fireproof material should be used for the construction of hard arms (no

aluminium). 2.5 Jetty Procedures On shore jetty safety zones should be effectively policed while the ship is

alongside thus providing control over visitors and vehicles. Offshore safety zones should be effectively policed by a guard boat to limit the

approach of small craft. Passing ships, close to the jetty, should have their speed controlled by the

harbor VTS system. Communications procedures should be well established and tested. Contingency plans should be available in written form. Operating procedures should be available in written form. A Port Information/Regulation Booklet should be provided for passing

operational advice to the ship.


APPENDIX D – RISK CONTOUR MAPPING GLADSTONE LNG PROJECTS


Australia Pacific LNG Fatality Risk Contours

Source: Australia Pacific LNG Project EIS


Gladstone LNG Project – Fisherman’s Landing Fatality Risk Contours

Source: Gladstone LNG Project – Fisherman’s Landing, Volume 1 EIS

QUEENSLAND CURTIS LNG VOLUME 5: CHAPTER 18

QGC LIMITED PAGE 19 JULY 2009

Figure 5.18.5 Risk Contours for the LNG Facility – HIPAP Risk Levels (Fatality Risk Per Year)

18.4.2.7 LNG Facility QRA Key Findings and Conclusions

The hazards and risks associated with the proposed LNG Facility are similar to those of other LNG export facilities worldwide. The design and location of the terminal result in public risk levels that are clearly acceptable by the HIPAP guidelines. In addition, when the vulnerability zones for the largest credible events associated with the LNG export terminal are overlaid on the proposed plot plan, the radiant and overpressure levels necessary to cause damage according to HIPAP10 guidelines have minimal impact on offsite areas.

sustainability assessment for lng industry at abbot point · multi cargo facility (mcf). in...

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