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National Intelligence Reforms

Background: The attacks on the United States on September 11,2001 exposed severe

shortcomings in our intelligence capabilities. We did not have effective access in

countries where we have no official presence; we were unable to penetrate hard targets

like terrorist organizations operating abroad or cells established in the United States.

Our investigations have confirmed grave dysfunctions in our national security

intelligence establishment. They are of two kinds, structural and cultural.

The structural problems are the simplest to understand and their remedies

straightforward. The government agencies charged with foreign and domestic intelligence

are the creatures of a different age with laws, regulations and organization fashioned for

external wars and internal threats of the last century where strict separation of foreign and

domestic activities was desired.

That legacy of nation-state focus, legislated walls and compartmentalized information

cannot deal with the kinds of transnational threats operating seamlessly at home and

abroad with speed and agility. Our most senior intelligence officials do not have

authorities, access and accountability to do what is expected of them. Nor do they have

the power to make the great organizational changes necessary to correct these problems.

The Commission therefore recommends specific sweeping organizational changes.

More important than organizational reform is dealing with the second category of

dysfunction we have broadly defined as cultural; process over output; bureaucratic

careerism; groupmink; a law enforcement rather than preventive mindset; deep aversion

to covert operations; fear of abusive litigation. These problems cannot be solved by

organizational changes however bold. They can be changed only by appointing,confirming and supporting proven leaders of talent and experience to the top positions of

the intelligence establishment. It is they who must sweep away the irrational security,

classification and career path obstacles to create a new, agile innovative career

environment in which excellence not mediocrity will flourish.

To accomplish such change these leaders must have new community wide authorities

over personnel policies, certain budgets and appropriations, and security classifications

and clearances.

Some of these changes can be done by executive order, many will require legislation, and

to succeed all will require major changes in Congressional oversight. We are makingspecific recommendations for congressional oversight reform.

To implement its recommendations, the Commission believes the President should

establish, through Executive Order, a six-month Intelligence Transition Task Force to: 1)

help develop legislation to implement the reforms; 2) develop a strategy for

implementing the reforms; and 3) report to the board on the status of the implementation.

This Task Force would report to a board consisting of the White House Chief of Staff, the



Director Generals would be the government's highest-ranking intelligence

official (Executive Level Three) responsible for their mission area and

responsible for both analysis and operations.

ii ) The national intelligence agencies - CIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, NSIS, and other

national capabilities - would be responsible for training, equipping, and

manning the national intelligence mission areas and supporting the DirectorGenerals of National Intelligence. The heads of these agencies would report

to the Director of National Intelligence (Figure One).

2) Integrate Domestic Intelligence while ensuring civil liberties by creating within FBI

an independent National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) with complete access to

all investigative intelligence and without law enforcement culture. Director of NSIS

to be selected by DNI, with concurrence of FBI.

3) Establish an NIA Chief of Intelligence Personnel to establish NIA-wide standards of

recruitment, training, certification and promotion to provide flexible assignments and

career paths across intelligence agencies and areas; to ensure the regular infusion

throughout the ranks of agents, analysts, and managers of thinkers from diverse

disciplines and professions with and without the government; to establish reserve

programs similar to the uniformed services, and generally to foster innovation and

creativity and stifle bureaucratic careerism.

4) Strengthening competitive analysis to ensure the President and senior national

security officials receive accurate, timely, complete and well-vetted intelligence

products; as well as the complete vetting of government views and improved analytic

quality control measures. Strengthen all-source, strategic intelligence analysis

capabilities within the CIA/DI on transnational topics through: required overseas

tours by analysts, additional training in transnational issues, significant financial

incentives for skills development, as well as financial incentives to recruit linguists,

additional analysts with area or scientific expertise.

a) Strengthen and keep independent, departmental intelligence elements like the

Defense Intelligence Agency, the military service intelligence units and the State

Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Strengthen their capability

through the setting of priorities, overseas tours, training in transnational issues,

and language training.

b) Establish an Executive Research Service (300 positions) separate from the

National Intelligence Authority and the policy departments. It would direct the

collection, translation, analysis and production of national security-related

research solely on the basis of openly available information. It would be

responsible to the National Security Council. It would contract out research andbuild research relationships with academia and research organizations.

5) Fixing the information sharing problems among the intelligence and law enforcement

communities that have come to light from the investigation of the September 11

attacks:

a) A new approach of managing and sharing "meta-data" should be established to

combine information about intelligence reporting, open sources and law



enforcement cases into one database. This meta-data would provide "pointers" to

the content generated by, and protected within, the intelligence collection

agencies including the FBI. This meta-data file would be available to all analysts

fo r research. [This approach is similar what was recommended by the Scowcroft

Review and the Markle Foundation Task Force on Creating a Trusted Information

Network for Homeland Security]

b) Establish the position of NIA Chief Information Officer, independent of any

intelligence agency, reporting to the DNI, for oversight of all major IT systems

and the establishment of standard IT protocols across intelligence and law

enforcement agencies to facilitate seamless, real time information integration.

c) The NIA/CIO would execute a strategy to phase out legacy systems, acquire

compatible replacement systems, make recommendations to the DNI on

information security and approve all major information technology acquisitions in

theNIA.

6) Establish an NIA Chief of Security responsible for developing a common set of

security rules, guidelines and programs across the National Intelligence Authority to

allow for improved information sharing, the breakdown of unnecessary

compartmentation, the increased protection of vital sources and methods and a

streamlining of the background investigation process for new hires.

7) Strengthen human source intelligence both overseas and domestically through a

phased national strategy to migrate case officers out of official cover status and out of

US embassies abroad; and the expansion of the FBI's NSIS as a domestic collection

arm of the Bureau. This transformation of our HUMINT capabilities, both

domestically and abroad, should be a national priority with a "fully operational

capability" achieved within three years. CIA should accelerate its current efforts to

reduce the nation's dependence on foreign liaison services, "walkins," and expand

unilateral collection in all regions, whether the US has a presence there or not.

8) Strengthen DNI financial controls over the National Intelligence Authority by

establishing an appropriation for national intelligence and developing the associated

financial systems for managing that appropriation.

a) Declassify the aggregate budget amount for national intelligence. Details of the

appropriations act would be classified and reported in a consolidated classified

annex to the President's Budget prepared at the direction of the DNI.

b) Establish a "National Intelligence Appropriations Act" that would include

funding for: 1) the Intelligence Community Management Account, 2) the Central

Intelligence Agency, 3) the National Security Agency, 4) the National Geospatial-

Intelligence Agency, 5) the National Reconnaissance Office, 6) the FBI'sNational Security Intelligence Service, and 7) other national intelligence

capabilities not identified above.

c) The National Intelligence Appropriations Act would be made to the Director of

National Intelligence, who would be held accountable for executing those funds

and their oversight. To meet this responsibility, the DNI would appoint a Chief

Financial Officer (CFO) for the National Intelligence Authority.



d) The CFO would allocate resources to the national intelligence agencies inaccordance with OMB apportionment guidelines, the DNI's direction, and theauthorization and appropriations acts.



Figure 1

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