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To: Team ThreeFrom: Scott AllanDate: 4/9/03RE: Suggestions for Team Three Working Paper

PROPOSED QUESTIONS:During the years preceding 9-11, was our policy making establishment stuck in a "coldwar mindset" that prevented it from formulating an effective counterterrorism policy?

Did the USGhave a clear and comprehensive counterterrorism policy with ampleleadership? How was it articulated to other nations (and to terrorist groups)?

Were our policy makers focusing too heavily on institutionalized cold war threatsas opposed to asymmetrical threats? Was the USG focusing on state sponsors ofterrorism (i.e. Iran) when more attentions should have been given to cross-bordergroups such as Al-Qaeda?

Did policy makers place too much faith in coercion and containment (carried overfrom cold war thinking) when formulatinga counterterrorism strategy? Did theyconsider preemption as a viable alternative? Did policy makers rely too heavilyon a "law enforcement" approach (i.e. arrests and trials) in the mid-to-late 1990's?

Prior to 9-11, was enough priority given to f ighting terrorism or wascounterterrorism eclipsed by other issues such as relations with China,peacekeeping in the Balkans, etc.? Were enough financial resources directed tothe counterterrorism groups in the USG?

-Did the USGunderstand Al-Qaeda well enough? What were the USG's efforts to understand andeliminate the"root causes" of the

Al-Qaeda movement? What agencies were responsible forunderstanding Al-Qaeda's aims, philosophy,

targeting methods and recruitment techniques?

Were there any efforts by the USG to delegitimize the Wahhabism sect of Islamand acts such as "suicide bombings" in Islamic countries? Did the USG study the prior Al-Qaeda attacks closely enough? Did the USG fail

to learn lessons from prior attacks? Did we consult with other nations that had experience with Al-Qaeda?

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How did the USG attempt to remedy its negative "image" in the Islamic worldprior to 9-11?

--How did the USG address the Al-Qaeda problem with countries such as Egypt, SaudiArabia and Pakistan?

What leverage did we use to elicit their cooperation against radical movementsand what was their response? Did we condition aid, loans, arms sales, etc. basedupon their cooperation?

When dealing with these countries, did we subordinate our eounterterrorismagenda in favor of other issues (i.e. Egypt's role in the Palestinian peace process,Saudi Arabia's cooperation for a US military campaign against Iraq or securingstability between Pakistan and India)?

How did the USG address the terrorist sanctuaries in the Sudan andAfghanistan? What agencies were responsible formonitoring Al-Qaeda actions in those

countries? What actions were taken against those countries and were they successful in

combating terrorism or removing terrorist from the regions? Towhat extent did we seek Pakistani help in pressuring the Taliban? Could we

have stopped Islamabad's support for the Taliban without causing significantinternal political problems?

How did our support of radical Islamic groups during the Afghan war fit into oureounterterrorism policy? (W.Bass) Was there significant Congressional criticism of the CIA's support of the AfghanArabs?

-Why did the USG not seek custody of bin Laden when the Sudan was preparing toexpel him in 1996?-How did the Clinton administration change its eounterterrorism policy after the 1998embassy bombings?

Was this policy effectively implemented? How did covert action fit into this policy? How did the Bush administration react to the policy it inherited? Did it appreciate

the urgencyof the Al-Qaeda threats?

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BACKGROUNDREADING:

Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (2002). Lists established tenets of USG counterterrorism policy and how they changed in

the late 1990's (p, 119-223). Describes the Clinton administration's decision not to seek custody of bin Laden

from the Sudan (p. 247). Explains the Clinton administration's diplomatic efforts and covert action

program aimed at weakening Al-Qaeda and the Taliban (p. 256-325). Describes the evolution of the Bush administration's counterterrorism policy (p.

326-349),

Martha Crenshaw, Terrorism. Security, and Power (2002). Describes cold war tool of diplomatic coercion as ineffective against non-state

actors (p. 4-9). Lists four keycomponents of the Clinton administration's counterterrorism policy

(P- 10)- Describes the change in the Clinton administration's approach to counterterrorismafter the 1998 embassy bombings (p. 18).

Michael Elliot, The Secret History, Time Magazine (August 12, 2002). Describes transfer of the Clinton counterterrorism policy to the Bush

administration.

Barton Gellman, A Strategy's Cautious Evolution: Before Sept. 11, the Bush Anti-TerrorEffort was Mostly Ambition. The Washington Post (January 20,2002). Description of the Bush policy towards the Taliban (p. 9).

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Bruce Hoffman, Prepared Testimony Before the House Committee onGovernmentReform, (September 20,2001), 9-11 attacks underscore the need for a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy

(P - 2). USG's national security architecture is based on cold war threats (p. 3).

Paul Pillar, Terrorism and US Foreign Policy, (2001). Describes tenets of pre 9-11 counterterrorism policy (p, 8), Discusses pro's and con's of:

1) criminal law enforcement as a counterterrorism tool (p. 79-92);2) military force as a counterterrorism tool (p. 97-110); and3) assassination of terrorist leaders (p. 120-123).

Farced Zakaria, The Politics of Rage: Why do They Hate us?, Newsweek (October 15,2001).

Discusses underlying causes of Arab/Islamic hate towards the US.

POSSIBLE BRIEFERS (Team should discuss before contacting them):

Daniel Benjamin (CSIS)Daniel Byman (Georgetown University)Martha Crenshaw (Wesleyan University)Rohan Gunaratna (Universityof St. Andrews)Bruce Hoffman (RAND Corp.)Brian Jenkins (RAND Corp.)Paul Pillar (CIA)INDIVIDUALS TO INTERVIEW:

Sandy BergerRichard Clarke (Chairman of the Counterterrorism and Security Group; Clinton andG.W. Bush Administrations).Brent ScowcroftMichael Sheehan (State's Coordinator forCounterterrorism; Clinton Administration).Francis Taylor (State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism; G,W, Bush Administration)Phillip Wilcox (State's Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism; ClintonAdministration).