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TALKING POINTS FOR DISCUSSION WITH

9-11 COMMISSION STAFF

April 1 -2, 2004

Brian Michael Jenkins

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1996 WHITE HOUSE COMMISSION FOCUSED ON

AIRCRAFT SABOTAGE

Crash of TWA 800 as consequence of suspected

sabotage led to creation of the Commission-actual

cause not clear for months.

Commission aware of plot in the Philippines to bring

down 12 U.S. airliners with explosives that might not

be detected.

Trial of Ramzi Yousef coincided with Commission's

deliberations.

Airline sabotage, not hijackings, had been source ofmost fatalities.

PanAm 103 Commission had recommended

deployment of explosives detection technology but

subsequent OTA committee recommended delay to

allow additional research; however, workable

technologies available by 1996.

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THE SUICIDE CRASH SCENARIOS SEEN AS

POSSIBILITY LONG BEFORE 9-11

In 1972, domestic hijacker threatened to crash airliner

into facilities at Oak Ridge-this was the incident that

led to universal passenger screening.

My 1989 RAND paper warned of possibility.

My 1993 briefing to World Trade Center Management

included among improbable (but possible) scenarios

crash of airliner into one of the towers.

1994-suicidal pilot crashed light aircraft into White

House.

In 1994 hijacking of Air Algeria flight, hijackers

reportedly overheard discussing crashing airliner into

Eiffel Tower.

1995 Bojinka plot included scenario to crash a plane

into CIA Headquarters.

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My July 1996 testimony before Senate Intelligence

Committee again mentioned possibility.

Did not envision multiple coordinated suicide

hijacking or collapse of a skyscraper.

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WHITE HOUSE COMMISSION RECOGNIZED POOR

PERFORMANCE OF SCREENERS

Wanted to improve screener performance, but did not

recommend federalization.

Wanted to make recommendations that had a chance

of implementation.

In smaller government, budget reduction climate,

proposal to create 60,000 new federal employees

would have been considered preposterous.

Terrorist threat to aviation considered low.

Billions of dollars would have been required to

support such a measure; Congress did not live up to

$100 million annual commitment.

Congress reminded Commission that last hijacking

had occurred years before, skeptical of new

measures.

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Industry opposed.

Passengers would not have tolerated current

measures before 9-11.

Commission did open the way for increased federal

involvement by arguing that ensuring adequate

aviation security was part of "providing for the

common defense" and therefore federal funds couldbe used.

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COMMISSION FACED UPHILL BATTLE TO IMPROVE

AIRLINE SECURITY

Terrorism threat to aviation simply not seen as

serious in mid-1990s.

Conclusion that TWA 800 brought down by

mechanical failure rather than terrorists undercut

Commission's persuasiveness.

Congress saw its primary mission as defending

taxpayers against needless alarm.

Some in Congress wanted cost-benefit analysis of

new security measures.

Keeping congressional commitment required

continued intervention by the White House.

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AIRLINE INDUSTRY EXERCISED POWERFUL

INFLUENCE ON CONGRESS AND FAA

Tended to see security as a compliance issue.

Generally opposed permanent increases in security.

Delayed creation and implementation of new rules.

Resisted deployment of explosives detection

technology, universal passenger-baggage match on

domestic flights and other measures.

Kept informed on White House Commission's

deliberations-some pressure on those perceived to

be hard-liners.

Opposed any additional cost to airlines or

passengers.

Exercised influence through Congress.