t8 b6 faa eastern region jennifer donahue fdr- 2 mfrs- draft and commitee sensitive 826

8/14/2019 T8 B6 FAA Eastern Region Jennifer Donahue Fdr- 2 MFRs- Draft and Commitee Sensitive 826

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[Classification]M E M O R A N D U M F O R THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Ad ministration (FA A) Boston Center Field Site Interview 1 withJennifer Donoghue, Regional Executive Manager (REM) for CommunicationsInformation Security (COM SAT), FAA Regional Operations Center (ROC)Type of even t: InterviewDate: Monday, September 22, 2003Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: Geoffrey BrownTeam Nu mber: 8Location: FA A Boston Center, Nashua, N ew HampshireParticipants - Non-Com mission: Chris , FAA General ConsulParticipants - Co mm ission: John A zzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NO TE: U nless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion ofthe interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

Donoghue's office at the FAA R OC in Burlington, M assachusetts is primarily acomm unications hub responsible for comm unications security, conferencing, andfacilitating a steady flow of information amongst FA A entities in the Boston Centerregion, between Boston Center and other FAA regional centers, and finally connectingBoston Center administration with FA A adm inistrative headquarters at the FAAWashington Operations Center (WOC).

On the morning of September 11, 2001 at the RO C there was a regional team m eeting, soevery administrative man ager was already there. App roximately 0830 EOT BarryO'Co nnor received a call from Boston C enter (Nashua, NH ) reporting the hijack ofAmerican Airlines Flight 11 (AA11). Donoghue's office of the ROC imm ediately put theadministrative manage rs in contact with the W OC , and proceeded to set up num erous


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conference calls between FAA entities. The ROC officially began handling the BostonCenter and New England region co mm unication priorit ies after AA1 1 impacted 1 WorldTrade Center, but Barry O'Connor was probably informed of the hijack prior to impact.

During the imm ediate aftermath, and the days fol lowing 9/11 COMSAT staff had somedifficulty identifying which c onfe rence call, and which co nferen ce net, to place callers in.The CO MS AT h as 120 lines, and these lines were fielded by four personnel, includingDonoghue. Often the callers requested to be placed in a net, or conference call, differentthan the one they intended to reach. For example, the FAA operated both a Tactical Netan d a Tertiary Net. The Tactical Net was for FAA only, and was not secure. The TertiaryNet w as not set up by the ROC, but the R OC could channel callers into it . This netconsisted of many different federal agencies. Donoghue was not clear on which netwould be considered th e "primary" net.

The ROC handled 9/11 by using their experience from major aircraft accidents. They hadno instructions and/or responsibility to contact NEADS, NORAD or any other militaryentity, an d Donoghue said that is the task of Boston Center's Traffic Management Unit(TMU).

Overall, Donoghue stated COM SAT was adequately prepared to handle their role in the9/11 FAA response, an d stated that desp ite the heavy load of calls COMSAT operationsran correctly.

Prior to 9/11, the COM SAT's hijack proce dure was to 1) contact the W OC ; 2) contact theR O C ' s only secu rity division; and 3) contact th e R O C ' s ow n management team.COM SAT had and has an Air Traffic Handbook (80-20) that considers a hijack a"security event", an d prior to 9/11 required the ROC to contact WOC, but now post 9/11includes primary and second ary no tification protocols (primary - W O C , RO C security;secondary - Regional Ad ministrator , REM, Air Traffic, an d Flight Standards). Since9/11, the C O M S A T has also installed a direct open line to the W O C .


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Donog hue stated she is concerned that post- 9/11 the COMSAT is not being adequatelyinformed of changes to priority and policy from WOC. According to Donoghue,CO M SA T is part of Com m and, Control and Com m unication (C3) operations, and shouldbe kept aware of both policy change an d should receive intelligence on possible securityincidents. She stated C OM SAT should be included in FAA em ergency preparednessconferences. Donoghue stated this combination of factors is the only way CO M SAT caneffectively keep info rm ation flowing internally am ong its counterpart am ong FA A 's 9regional centers, as well as flowing "upwards" to the WO C.

C O M S A T at the RO C has no direct respon sibilities to airline carriers.

COMSAT has not partaken in any post-9/11 drills, but Donoghue believes itsparticipation in preparing and passing inform ation for Hurricane Isabel demonstrated theusefulness of their open line to the WOC. Donoghue stated that the west coast regionaloperation centers may have participated in a hijack drill, or in a hazardous m aterials drillpost-9/11. COM SAT does now have a gene ral threat portion of its team m eetings, thatusually includes inform ation on any security threat level changes out of the W OC .

Donoghue has set up back-up capability at the Boston Center in Nashua, NH, and haspracticed evacuation an d relocation with he r t eam. But Donoghue stated that her teamstill should be directed by FA A on a clear and exact procedure of w ho to notify inanother large scale security event, and that practice runs on protocol and for anunderstanding of everyone at the R O C ' s roles, as well as the line of succession within theROC , would be useful.

Lastly, Donog hue explained that the Air Traffic team at the ROC has a CrisisManagem ent Room , with i t 's own com m unication abilities, that is used fo r weatherevents, an d would be instrumental in coordinating FAA air traffic control (AT C) duringother large scale events.


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Committee SensitiveM E M O R A N D U M FO R THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Interview of JenniferDonahue, Regional Executive Manager (REM ) fo r Comm unications Information Security(COMSAT), FAA Regional Operations Center (RO C)Type of event: Recorded InterviewDate: Monday, September 22, 2003Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: Geoffrey Brown and Miles KaraTeam Number: 8Location: FAA Boston C enter, Nashua, New HampshireParticipants - Non-Com mission: Chris Perito, FAA General C onsulParticipants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey BrownN OTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion ofth e interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

Donahue's office at the FAA RO C in Burlington, Massachusetts is primarily acomm unications hub responsible fo r communications security, conferencing, an dfacilitating a steady flow of information amongst FAA entities in the Boston Centerregion, between Boston Center and other FAA regional centers, and finally connectingBoston Center administration with FA A administrative headquarters at the FA AWashington Operations Center (WO C).On the morning of September 11, 2001at the ROC there was a regional team m eeting, soevery administrative manager was already there. Approximately 0830 EDT BarryO'Con nor received a call from Boston Cen ter (Nashua, N H ) reporting the hijack ofAmerican Airlines Flight 11 (AA11). Donahue's office immediately put theadministrative managers in contact with the W OC , and proceeded to set up numerousconference calls between FA A entities. The RO C officially began handling the BostonCenter and New England region communication priorities after AA11 impacted 1 WorldTrade Center, but Barry O'Conno r w as probably informed of the hijack prior to impact.During the immediate aftermath, and the days following 9/11 COMS AT staff had somedifficulty identifying which conference call, an d which conference net,to place callers in .The COM SAT has 120 lines, and these lines were fielded by four personnel, includingDonahue. Often the callers requested to be placed in a net,or conference call, differentthan the one they intended to reach. For exam ple, the FA A operated both a Tactical Netan d a Tertiary Net. The Tactical Net was for FAA only, and was not secure. The TertiaryNet was not set up by the ROC, but the ROC could channel callers into it . This net


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consisted of man y different federal agencies. Donahue was not clear on which net wouldbe considered the "primary" net.

The ROC handled events on 9/11 by using their experience from major aircraft accidents.They had no instructions and/or responsibility to contact NEADS, NO RAD or any othermilitary entity, and Donahue said that is the task of Boston Center's Traffic ManagementUnit (TMU).Overall, Donahue stated COMSAT was adequately prepared to handle its role in the 9/11FAA respo nse, and that despite the heavy load of calls CO MSA T oper ations rancorrectly.Prior to 9/11, the COMSAT's hijack procedure was to 1) contact the WO C; 2) contact theRO C's security division; and 3) contact the ROC's own management team. COMSAThad and has an Air Traffic Handbook (80-20) that considers a hijack a "security event",and prior to 9/11 required the ROC to contact WOC , but post 9/11 includes primary andsecondary notification protocols (primary - WOC, ROC security; secondary - RegionalAdministrator, REM, Air Traffic, and Flight Standards). Since 9/11, the COMSAT hasalso installed a direct open line to the WO C.Donahue stated she is concerned that post- 9/11 the COMSAT is not being adequatelyinformed of changes to priority an d policy from WOC. According to Donahue, COMSATis part of Command, Control and Communication (C3) operations, and should be keptaware of policy change and should receive intelligence on possible security incidents.Sh e stated CO MSAT should be included in FAA emergency preparedness conferences.Donahue stated this combination of factors is the only way COMSAT can effectivelykeep information flowing internally among its counterpart among FAA's 9 regionalcenters, as well as flowing "upwards" to the WOC .COMSAT at the ROC has no direct responsibilities to airline carriers.COMSAT has not partaken in any post-9/11 drills, but Donahue believes its participationin preparing an d passing information fo r Hurricane Isabel demonstrated the usefulness oftheir open line to the WOC. Donahue stated that the west coast regional operation centersmay have participated in a hijack drill, or in a hazardous materials drill post-9/11.COMSAT does now have a general threat item in its team meetings, that usually includesinformation on any security threat level changes from the WOC.Don ahue has set up back-up capability at the Boston Center in Nashua, N H, and haspracticed evacuation and relocation w ith her team. But Donah ue stated that her team stillshould be directed by FAA on a clear and exact procedure of who to notify in anotherlarge scale security event, an d that practice run s for an understanding of the roles ofROC personnel, as well as the line of succession within the ROC, would be useful.Lastly, Don ahue explained that the Air Traffic team at the ROC has a C risis ManagementRoom , with it's own co mm unication abilities, that is used for weather events, and wo uldbe instrumental in coordinating FAA air traffic control (ATC) during other large scaleevents.

t8 b6 faa eastern region jennifer donahue fdr- 2 mfrs- draft and commitee sensitive 826

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