Thoughts on Dh„tu-v„da and Recent Trends in Buddhist Studies

TAKASAKI Jikidõ

T HE FIRST THING that comes to mind in considering the majortrends of the past ten years in Buddhist studies is the claim madeby Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirõ that the idea of

tath„gata-garbha (which happens to be my area of specialization) is apseudo-Buddhist way of thinking, or is not Buddhist at all.1 Frankly, theclaim came as something of a shock to me, and even now continues toweigh heavily on my mind. Since I have known Hakamaya and Matsu-moto from the days when they attended my lectures as students and havekept up friendly relations with them ever since, I was not altogetherunaware of their way of thinking and the path by which they arrived attheir conclusions.

The idea that tath„gata-garbha thought has much in common withthe teachings of the mainstream of Indian thought as represented by theUpani¤ads and Ved„nta philosophy is a point I have often made myself,and was hardly any cause for alarm. But it is quite another thing to con-clude that such a way of thinking is “not Buddhist” simply because it issimilar to the mainstream of Indian thought. Here I part company withthem.

As a form of Indian thought, it is only natural that Buddhism shouldhave certain things in common with the mainstream of Indian thoughtthat it would not, for example, have in common with Christianity orIslam. The problem, as I see it, is how one de³nes “Buddhism.” Somede³nitions may even permit one to speak of “non-Buddhistic” forms of“Buddhism.” But such talk is relative to the world of intra-Buddhist the-oretical debate and should not be taken as absolute. But when I ³rstheard the claim that “the doctrine of tath„gata-garbha is not Buddhist”I was reminded of Nichiren’s attack on other Buddhist schools—that

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nenbutsu leads to hell, Zen followers are devils, Shingon is the ruin of thenation, members of the Ritsu school are traitors, and so forth—and dis-missed them as having nothing to do with normal academic debate.

Leaving to one side the question of whether or not tath„gata-garbhathought is Buddhist (a gesture to which the proponents of the idea willno doubt object), I would like to have a brief look at Matsumoto’s pro-posed neologism dh„tu-v„da as pointing to the speci³c structure of thedoctrine of tath„gata-garbha.

Tath„gata-garbha thought and Buddhist Vijñ„ptim„trav„da thoughtin many ways stand opposed to each other. For instance, the doctrine oftath„gata-garbha teaches the practice and attainment of a single vehicle(ekay„na), while the Vijñaptim„trav„da teaches three vehicles (triy„na).Even so, I ³nd the term dh„tu-v„da a rather accurate expression of thecommon structure found in both. In this sense, it is a useful tool for dis-cussing that question.

The idea of dh„tu-v„da takes as its model terms such as an„dhik„liko-dh„tu‹ (a beginningless substance or basis), as expounded in the verses ofthe Mah„y„na-abhidharma Sutra,2 or eko dh„tu‹ (the one realm), asfound in the even older Anðnatv„pur«atvanirdešaparivarta.3 Theseterms refer to the idea that samsara and nirvana exist together or share asingle “place” or “realm.” This “place” is the context within which onepasses, through practice, from samsara to nirvana. Those who experiencethis place as samsara are ordinary sentient beings; those who experience itas nirvana are Buddhas. For ordinary sentient beings, the tath„gata-garbharefers to the hoped-for result of Buddhahood, from the perspective ofthat potential. The „laya-vijñ„na (store consciousness) has as its basis thecauses of samsara, and these must be “overturned” or “converted” forone to attain nirvana. In the tath„gata-garbha tradition, the manifesta-tion of the bodhi-wisdom of the Dharma Body, which remains unmani-fested in ordinary sentient beings, is called “the Dharma Body that bearsthe mark of the conversion of the ground (of enlightenment).” Certainlyone may speak of this way of thinking as a “dh„tvasti-v„da” rather than a“šðnya-v„da.” Nonetheless, the “way of being” (asti) referred to here isnot of a substantialist or essentialist sort, but existential. It is a kind ofbeing that lacks selfhood (an„tman). This is clearly the case at least in theteachings accompanying the two examples I have given. I refer to thisidea of the continuity of samsara and nirvana through practice asekadh„tu-v„da.4

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What, then, is the basis for this ekadh„tu-v„da, the unity or continu-ity of samsara and nirvana? This is where the idea of the dharmadh„tuenters into the picture. The interpretation given in the Yogacara traditionis that the dharmadh„tu is equivalent to causality (prat‡tyasamutp„da); inthis sense it is the ground of the noble Buddha Dharma, the teachings ofthe Buddha.5 If one pursues the question further, one ³nds that this ideais based on the teaching of dharmadh„tu in the Avata½saka Sutra, wherethe term was used in an attempt to explain the meaning of the Buddha’sattainment of enlightenment. Still further back one discovers in theSa½yuttanik„ya of the P„li canon the term s„ dh„tu in the sense of “thenature of all dharmas” (dharmat„).6 There is yet another, distinct, mean-ing of dharmadh„tu given in the Abhidharma tradition, that is, as the“things” or “phenomena” that are the direct and indirect objects of ourconsciousness (as one of the eighteen categories of “things”).

The term dh„tu, then, has at least two meanings: the sense of “realm”or “place” (or the collection of “things” in that place), and the sense of a“cause” (or the common features that allow the classi³cation of all the“things” into a single group). This double meaning is basic to the notionof dh„tu-v„da. Such double (or multiple) meanings are not uncommonin Buddhist terms. One need look no further than the word dharma,which can refer as well to a phenomenon itself as to the nature of a thingthat distinguishes it from other things. The original Indian meaning wascloser to the second meaning of the “nature” of a phenomenon.Grammatically speaking it is more accurate to use the term dharmin torefer to the phenomenon itself.

Or again, consider the term prat‡tyasamutp„da. Originally it referredto the “causal” side of the process of conditioned arising, in contrast toprat‡tyasamutpanna, which refers to the resultant side of the process.Tachikawa Musashi has pointed out recently that in N„g„rjuna’s Mðla-madhyamakak„rik„, the term prat‡tyasamutp„da must be understood asincluding the meanings of both the causal and the resultant side.7

Tachikawa goes on to note that N„g„rjuna deliberately avoids distin-guishing between these two meanings so as to preserve them both in hisuse of the term. N„g„rjuna recognized that prat‡tyasamutp„da expressesthe nature of all phenomena (dharmat„), and that this is the meaning ofemptiness (šðnyata). He did not, however, use the term dharmadh„tu inits causal sense because he did not wish to acknowledge an independent“dharma-nature” apart from the phenomena themselves. In this sense

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N„g„rjuna’s position could be called adh„tu-v„da, though he did notdeny dharma-nature in the sense of prat‡tyasamutp„da or emptiness, nordid he deny nirvana as the goal of Buddhist practice.

In the Vijñ„ptim„trav„da tradition, the relationship between phe-nomena (dharmas) and the dharmadh„tu is spoken of in terms of theunity of samsara and nirvana, that is, as the “realm” (dh„tu) that is thebasis for conditioned and unconditioned dharmas. This “realm” is noneother than the unconditioned dharma of nirvana. The tath„gata-garbhatradition follows the same structure, except that it speaks in terms of thedharmak„ya and Buddha; that is, a Buddha is one who has correctly per-ceived dharmas (or the dharmadh„tu), and such a one is called a DharmaBody because he “has the Dharma as his body.”

Examples can be found in the Ãgama Sutras, where this Bahuvr‡hicompound is used adjectivally, but it is the tath„gata-garbha traditionthat ³rst uses “Dharma Body” as an independent technical term. It isinteresting to note that this term is also used in the sense of “the accu-mulation of dharmas” to mean the whole of the Buddha’s teachings, orsarvadharma, such as in the teaching of the collection of dharmas in ³veparts, of which the Buddha’s qualities consist.8 The tendency to perceivethe Buddha as one with the Dharma he has realized shares the same con-ceptual structure as the Upani¤ads, which teach that one “becomes”something by coming to know it.

The problem comes down to this. Is dh„tu-v„da, or the way of think-ing that is associated with dh„tu-v„da, an essential element of Buddhism?If it is essential, how far back in the history of Buddhist thought can it betraced? Can its origin be found in the thinking of the Buddha Š„kyamunihimself? The reference to s„ dh„tu in the Sa½yuttanik„ya mentionedabove speaks of the establishment of this dh„tu (that is, dependent origi-nation as the regular nature of dharmas) as a “law” or truth in such a waythat it is established from the outset, “whether or not a Tathagata appearsin the world” to discover and perceive it correctly. But this particular pas-sage seems to stem from a period after prat‡tyasamutp„da had becomeestablished as the basis of the Buddha’s teaching. The same idiomaticphrase (“whether or not a Tathagata appears in the world”) is used in theAªguttaranik„ya to speak of the “three characteristics of dharmas,”beginning with “the transience of all things,” as the established law ortruth, but this also appears to be a later development.9 Hence it is dif³cultto prove that the idea of dh„tu as prat‡tyasamutp„da is directly connected

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with the Buddha himself.There is, however, a passage in the Sutra of the Castle City [Nagara]

of the Sa½yuttanik„ya that, while not linked to the doctrine of prat‡tya-samutp„da, refers to the Buddha as simply one who has “discovered” theDharma.10 In this context the “Eightfold Path” is presented as the samepath that all Buddhas from time out of mind have trod. The same may besaid of the discovery of the truth of prat‡tyasamutp„da.

The opening “Chapter on the Buddha” of the Nid„na-Sa½yutta(section XII of the Sa½yuttanik„ya) claims that the Seven Buddhas of thePast all realized the teaching of prat‡tyasamutp„da, and that “eyes, wis-dom, insight, and light were aroused concerning the undiscoveredDharma.”11 While these may not be the direct words of the Buddha, it iscertainly true that the Buddha did not present himself as the author ofthe Path but only as one who discovered what was already there, one who“saw” the Dharma and thus awoke as a Buddha to become himself ateacher of that same Dharma. The Dharma is what the Buddha saw andwhat he taught. It is the foundation of Buddhism. In this sense Buddhismis different from the Indian mainstream that takes the idea ofatman=brahman as its foundational doctrine, which is where we ³nd theorigin of dh„tu-v„da in Buddhism.12

After the Buddha passed away, he was idealized and apotheosized,and this process of religious divination expanded the concept of dh„tu-v„da. Mahayana Buddhism, in turn, emphasized the Buddha more thanthe Dharma, in contrast to the Abhidharma tradition, which maintained acentral focus on the Dharma.13 Mahayana Buddhism was also in closercontact with day-to-day life in Hindu society. These factors may havecontributed to making Mahayana Buddhism more susceptible toinµuence by Hindu ways of thought.

Matsumoto bases his discussion on the assumption that Buddhismshould not permit inµuence from other Indian ways of thinking. This mayexplain why he tries to proscribe any teaching that even slightly resemblesnon-Buddhist Indian thought or that seems to smack of dh„tu-v„da ten-dencies. This leads him to reject samadhic concentration as well as theideas of liberation and nirvana as non-Buddhist, and explains why hecon³nes Buddhism to insight into prat‡tyasamutp„da. Still, the Buddhadid experience both samadhic concentration and nirvana, and it cannot bedenied that he instructed his disciples on these matters. There is also noevidence that he ever taught anything that would refute these teachings.

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We might note that one of the reasons Matsumoto insists thattath„gata-garbha thought is not Buddhist is that it holds to seeminglysubstantialist ideas such as a “Great Self” or the four “positive” traits ofnirvana as “eternal, blissful, selfhood, and pure.” These ideas are undeni-ably similar to the idea of an atman, and it is hardly surprising that theyshould come up for question. An even stronger reason for Matsumoto’sclaim is that the tath„gata-garbha tradition served as the source of thedevelopment of the thought of original enlightenment (hongaku shisõ) inJapanese Buddhism. His critique of the doctrine of tath„gata-garbhagives him the wedge he wants to drive into contemporary JapaneseBuddhism and pry open the minds of its scholars. This aspect of Matsu-moto’s work runs parallel with the efforts of Hakamaya, and has providedhis colleage with support for his own arguments. Of late Matsumoto’scritique has been aimed at the source of Japanese Buddhism, namely,Chinese Buddhism and in particular the Ch’an tradition.14 His argumentsare sharp, but at times he lets his expectations overshadow the evidenceand forces the facts to ³t his theories.

Hakamaya, meantime, has focused the sights of his critique of hon-gaku shisõ on Dõgen, claiming that the twelve-fascicle Shõbõgenzõ writtenby Dõgen in his later years contains his true position, and that the earlierwritings should be rejected in favor of the later ones.15 Dõgen specialistshave not been convinced.16 Even Matsumoto criticizes Hakamaya forhaving over-idealized Dõgen and argues that the dh„tu-v„da way ofthinking found in early works of Dõgen such as the “Bendõwa” were notrejected by Dõgen even in his later years. I must say, I agree.

➢ ➢ ➢

There are further undercurrents to Hakamaya’s and Matsumoto’s criti-cism of the present state of Buddhist studies. One senses a dissatisfactionwith the strong emphasis that has been put on objective textual studies inmainstream Japanese Buddhology. In the same vein, one cannot fail tofeel a disillusionment with religious studies in general for having takenthe ideal of value-free judgments to the point that almost anything claim-ing to be a religion deserves equal scholarly attention. Hakamaya andMatsumoto have taken the approach that Buddhology should concernitself with the question “What is Buddhism?” and pursue the truth ofBuddhism from a subjective perspective, rejecting what is non-Buddhist

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or anti-Buddhist. They call this “Critical Buddhism.” It is my view thatsuch judgments may serve to advance the cause of particular schools orsects within Buddhism, but that they are not the stuff of Buddhology.But now I understand that this very view has become the target of criticism.

[Translated by Paul L. Swanson]

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