The Anatomy of Combat

by

Raymond J. Volluzand

Raymond M. Volluz

On The

Presented at the

20th ISMOR Symposium

Eynsham Hall, Oxford, UK

26 ~ 29 August, 2003

Measure Of Effectiveness

In 1832, Carl von Clausewitz wrote:“But the first business of every theory (ON WAR) is to clear up conceptions and ideas which have been jumbled together, and, we may say, entangled and confused; and only when a right understanding is established, as to names and conceptions, can we hope to progress with clearness and facility, and be certain that author and reader will always see things from the same point of view. Tactics and strategy are two activities mutually permeating each other in time and space, at the same time essentially different activities, the inner laws and mutual relations of which cannot be intelligible at all to the mind until a clear conception of the nature of each activity is established.

He to whom all this is nothing, must either repudiate all theoretical consideration, or his understanding has not as yet been pained by the confused and perplexing ideas resting on no fixed point of view, leading to no satisfactory result, sometimes dull, sometimes fantastic, sometimes floating in vague generalities, which we are often obliged to hear and read on the conduct of War, owing to the spirit of scientific investigation having hitherto been little directed to these subjects.”

--- Clausewitz “On War”

Six Levels of Analysis

Level Type Activity Responsible

I Budgetary Structure Force National Government/US Defense Department

II Strategic Balance ResourcesVersus Threats

Joint Chiefs of Staff

III Strategic Plan Use of Resourcesto Achieve Objectives

Unified Commander(Theater)

IV Tactical Implement TheaterStrategy

Unit Commander

V Tactical Utilize Capability Military Element

VI Procurement Produce Capability Procurement Agency

- are Meaningful at all Levels

Manpower and Time -

figure 3-1

Six Levels of AnalysisInput/Output

III THEATER STRATEGY

IV ENGAGEMENT ANALYSIS

V DUEL ANALYSIS

VI CAPABILITY ANALYSIS

I FORCE STRUCTURE

II WORLD WIDE STRATEGY

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figure 9-7

MAN-DAYS in Theater Measures Input & Output at All Levels• MAN-DAYS permit us to specifically introduce the

vital factor of TIME, and the function of MANEUVER.

• MAN-DAYS permit us to interrelate and compare the widely-varying functions, such as Ground Combat, Tactical Air Strikes, and Rear-Area Maintenance.

• MAN-DAYS does not lead us into some of the cost effectiveness paradoxes.

5 chapter 1, section 2.0

Let me emphasize that:

• A Military Force is Designed to Conduct Military Operations.

• Military Operations are a Planned Use of Violence to Achieve a Political Objective

• A Political Objective, if Achieved, Will Change the Enemy’s Behavior

• But Military Objectives are:– To Occupy or Control Areas, or– To do Violence to People or Property

Theater Strategy Involves Terrain, Time and Manpower

figure 3-3

The Battle is Not Isolated

figure 3-4

Echelon Organization

figure 3-5

Geographic Regime

figure 3-6

Time Regime

figure 3-7

FIRE

MANEUVER

INTELLIGENCE

COMBATFUNCTIONS

SUPPLY

MAINTENANCE

CONSTRUCTION

TRANSPORTATION

SIGNAL

FIRE

MANEUVER

INTELLIGENCE

COMBATFUNCTIONS

SUPPLY

MAINTENANCE

CONSTRUCTION

TRANSPORTATION

SIGNAL

SUPPORTFUNCTIONS

SUPPORTFUNCTIONS

COMMANDCOMMAND

The Battle is Decided by Functional Performance

figure 3-8

Each FunctionHas Various Measures

• CHARACTERISTICS Measure Facets of PERFORMANCE; e.g. Rate of Fire, Lethality, Vehicle Capacity

• CAPABILITY Measures Maximum Rate of PERFORMANCE in Some Defined, Idealized Situation

• POTENTIAL Measures Attainable PERFORMANCE in an Actual Situation in a Specified Time Interval

– MEN W = MANPOWER INVESTMENT

– PRODUCTIVITY

– EFFICIENCY

– PACE

Then PERFORMANCE = W

CAPABILITY

MANPOWER INVESTMENT

POTENTIAL IN tCAPABILITY x t

PERFORMANCE IN t

POTENTIAL IN t

The Mechanism of Battle Modeled Can be Simply Described:• COMMAND triggers Functional Performance by

Elements;

• Performance results in Events which change Potentials for further Performance;

• Changed Potentials alter available Courses of Action,

• The altered situation results in further COMMAND triggering.

Command Continuously Plansand Triggers Performance

SUPERIOR COMMAND

SUBORDINATE UNITS OR ELEMENTS

ESTI-MATION DECISIONEDITING

FRIENDLY

ENEMY

TERRAIN &WEATHER

SITUATIONMAP

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10 figure 3-9

Blue Objective Function Guides Blue’s Decisions

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At this point:

• We can logically and mathematically connect:– COMMAND, INTELLIGENCE, FIRE,

MANEUVER, SUPPLY, MAINTENANCE, CONSTRUCTION, TRANSPORTATION, and SIGNAL

• Using MAN-DAYS, we can trace national effort from budget to battlefield and determine output over input

And the

MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS

is:

Man-Days in Theater

The CRUX of the Anatomy of Combat Analytic Approach

• From Concept to Deployment of any System, there are SIX LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

• Identifies TEN TACTICAL WAR FUNCTIONS

• Functional representation of Combat interrelates COMMAND, FIRE, MANEUVER, INTELLIGENCE, SUPPLY, TRANSPORTATION, MAINTENANCE, CONSTRUCTION and SIGNAL

The CRUX of the Anatomy of Combat Analytic Approach (continued)

• Developed MILITARY ELEMENT VALUE THEORY

• Concept of COMBAT POTENTIAL

• Models COMMAND as a GAME MATRIX

• Models INFORMATION FLOW

• Provides for Study of HUMAN FACTORS

• Recognizes Three Separate Levels of Performance for any Combat System; CAPABILITY, POTENTIAL and PERFORMANCE

The CRUX of the Anatomy of Combat Analytic Approach (continued)

• Developed a SYSTEM EVALUATION CRITERIA

• Constructs Sets of Interrelated Analytic Computational Models with Defined Interface Variables

• Develops Militarily Credible SCENARIOS

• Simplified TERRAIN Representation

The Impact of Terrorism: 11 September, 2001CASUALTIES:

3,046 New York, Washington DC, Pennsylvania

4 Airplanes Destroyed

POPULATION:

288 x 106 United States (2002 Census)

7.4 x 106 New York City

The Impact of Terrorism: AnalysisEstimated Blue Man-Days lost in one week*:

Date Man-Days Lost Cumulative

11 September 250 x 106 250 x 106

12 September 125 x 106 375 x 106

13 September 100 x 106 475 x 106

14 - 18 September 400 x 106 875 x 106

*plus subsequent and on-going Man-Days lost

Terrorist Input in Red Man-Days:Hi-jackers 19 men Directly Involved

Assume 20 x 4 = 80 men Directly & Indirectly

Over 1 year 29,200 Man-Days

Over 2 years 58,400 Man-Days

Leverage: (BLUE/RED or Percent)

1 year 875 x 106/29,200 = 29,965 (3,000,000%)

2 years 875 x 106/58,400 = 14,983 (1,500,000%)

The Impact of Terrorism Analysis (continued)

Any Questions???

Your Authors Would Like to Thank You for

Your Attention!

We invite you to visit the reference for this presentation, The

Anatomy of Combat. Available at this

symposium, complete on CD-ROM at no charge.

42

The Quest for the Holy Grail

Presented at the

17th ISMOR Symposium

Eynsham Hall, Oxford, UK

30 August, 2000

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Chapter 1, page 20

2

The Weapon Channel

Figure 8.1-8

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II II

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ARMY

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COMPANY

WEAPON

W = Weapon Crew + Higher-Echelon “Loading”

Distribution:

• COMMAND-CONTROL-COMMUNICATIONS - PER SUBORDINATE UNIT

• MOBILITY VEHICLES - PER WEAPON CREW STRENGTH OR WEAPON ASSIGNMENT

• SUPPLY HANDLING - PER TONS OF SUPPLY REQUIREMENT

• SUPPLY TRANSPORT - PER TON-MILES TRANSPORTED

• VEHICLE SUPPORT - PER TOTAL VEHICLES CAPACITY

• PERSONNEL SUPPORT - PER MAN

3

Weapon Channel Values in a Central European Scenario

figure 9, page 8

ROUNDS WEIGHTMANEUVER TANK SECTION 18.33 5.20 12.92 0.49

14.54 4.2318.62 5.2915.80 4.55

MTZD RIFLE SQUAD 17.01 2.29 370.00 0.0317.39 2.39

FIRE SUPPORT CO MG 10.87 2.55 97.00 0.0282MM MORT 13.45 2.04 27.36 0.11

13.62 2.76120MM MORT 17.52 3.71 31.20 0.45

17.87 3.90122MM HOW (T) 24.52 5.53 31.20 0.80

29.24 6.88122MM HOW (SP) 29.74 6.50130MM GUN 27.37 6.42 28.60 1.07

35.74 8.27152MM HOW (T) 27.56 6.53 23.40 0.96

31.02 7.78152MM GUN/HOW 26.76 6.14ASLT GUN 18.85 5.19 28.60 0.88HEAVY TANK 13.45 4.31 19.50 0.82ATGM 10.58 2.86 5.50 0.09

10.99 3.4912.23 3.5311.54 4.12

57MM AT (T) 22.69 5.12 65.00 0.36FROG 61.76 17.76 1.30 2.40

66.63 16.39200MM MRL 56.65 14.67 15.60 2.05

62.71 15.72140MM MRL 38.19 17.52 62.40 2.44240MM MRL 35.02 10.71 1.20 2.49SS-2 309.21 66.55 0.50 10.93SS-1 240.12 84.31 0.50 5.94

AIR DEFENSE 57MM (T) 34.83 6.85 130.00 0.7357MM (SP) 27.89 6.11 208.00 1.47SPU-4 16.77 4.29 50.00 0.01SA-3 51.60 13.09 1.00 3.34

51.71 13.29SA-2 34.69 10.73 1.50 3.02

(MEN) (VEHICLES) (MET TONS)

DAILY EXPENDITUREEQUIPMENTPERSONNELWEAPON

V = W ( t2 - t)

Where:– V = Value of the Target in Man-days– W = Personnel Allocated to the Weapon

Channels of the Target– t2 = Last Campaign Day the Target Can Affect

the Opposing Course of Action

– t = Day on Which the Target is Being Considered for Attack

Equation 1, Chapter 6, page 151

4

The Anatomy Of CombatThe Anatomy Of Combat

The Utility of ARM The Utility of ARM WeaponsWeapons

Presented at the 18th ISMOR Symposium

28 to 31 August, 2001by

Raymond J. Volluzand

Raymond M. Volluz

An Objective Function Examines - -

- - To Establish Utility of ARMs7

O.F. = STRIKE MISSION + SUPPRESSION MISSION + RED REJUVENATION

BLUE COMBAT POTENTIAL

RISK FUNCTION ANALYSIS

BY QUANTIFYING:

STRIKE MISSION VALUE

- BLUE VALUE LOST

SUPPRESSION MISSION VALUE

- BLUE VALUE LOST

RED REPAIR &

REPLACEMENT EFFORT

1t

2t

C,B B(s)N

Northern NATO Flank Scenario - -

- - Highlights Three Operations8

Value of Attacking Value of Attacking Command/Control NetsCommand/Control Nets

Presented at the 19th ISMOR Symposium

28 to 31 August, 2002by

Raymond J. Volluz12

REFLEX Project seeks to answer:

“What is the relative worth of attacking the ground-based Air

Defense Command Net?”

- - Goal

13

Preview of 19th ISMOR

Figure 8.6-15Air Defense Models

SINGLE-SITE FIREDOCTRINE MODEL

AIR-TO-AIRMODEL

TERMINAL EFFECTSMODEL

SAM INTERCEPTMISSILE MODEL

AMMUNITION SUPPLYMODEL

REPAIR/REPLACEMENTMODEL

ARM PERFORMANCEMODEL

ECM PERFORMANCEMODEL

INTERCEPTORMODEL

SAM SITEMODEL

GUN SITEMODEL

MULTI-SITEGEOMETRY MODEL

SIGNALMODEL

INTELLIGENCE MODEL

COMMANDMODEL

MACRO- MODEL

SCENARIO

BEST COURSE OFACTION FOR

RED OR BLUE

OPERATIONAL PROJECTEDUTILITY OF ARMsREFLEX STUDY (19th ISMOR)

LEGEND:

INTERFACE A

INTERFACE B

INTERFACE C

CONTROL

LEVEL I - BUDGETARYLEVEL II - STRATEGIC

LEVEL III - STRATEGIC

LEVEL IV - ENGAGEMENT

LEVEL V - DUEL

LEVEL VI - SYSTEM

Command Continuously Plansand Triggers Performance

SUPERIOR COMMAND

SUBORDINATE UNITS OR ELEMENTS

ESTI-MATION DECISIONEDITING

FRIENDLY

ENEMY

TERRAIN &WEATHER

SITUATIONMAP

FILES

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The Value of Attacking - -

- - Command & Control Nets

BLUE

RED COURSES OF ACTION

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BLUE’S VIEW RED’S VIEW

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RED COURSES OF

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RED UNCERTAINTYOF BLUE C/A

Perfect Command & Control (no uncertainty, no time lags,

instantaneous decision making)