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The CaliphateVernie LieblPublished online: 11 Jun 2009.

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The Caliphate

VERNIE LIEBL

In mid-2006 Al Qaeda declared that the Iraqi city of Ramadi, then under the controlof Islamist insurgents, was to be the capital of a new Islamic caliphate.1 Despite this,Ramadi was eventually cleared of insurgents in 2007 and returned to the control ofthe Iraqi government, so it is unlikely that it is now an occupied capital of an Islamiccaliphate. However, the question needs to be asked, is there still a drive to establish anew Islamic caliphate? What exactly is a caliphate and as importantly, who could beor might be the new caliph?

One of the words that is often used or invoked in the so-called ‘Global War onTerrorism’ (GWOT)2 is the word ‘caliphate’. It has been used by American politicalfigures, by recent historical figures and, currently, by the ‘enemy’, which in thisinstance happens to be Muslim. Within this context, does a caliphate and a caliphhave any import for the GWOT (or not)? Is it in response to the GWOT or is it aconcept that pre-dates the US declaration of the GWOT?

A standard English-language encyclopedia, defines ‘caliphate’ as:

the rulership of Islam; caliph, the spiritual head and temporal ruler of theIslamic state. In principle, Islam is theocratic: when Muhammad died, a caliph[Arabic¼ successor] was chosen to rule in his place. The caliph had temporaland spiritual authority but was not permitted prophetic power; this was reservedfor Muhammad. The caliph could not, therefore, exercise authority in mattersof religious doctrine.3

The point can be argued, and has been,4 that the caliph was not only the temporaland spiritual (meaning able to head worship services and conduct religiousceremonies and rites) ruler, he was also God’s Deputy on Earth and thus wasqualified to comment on, or more importantly, reinterpret Sura, Hadith and Sunna.Therefore, the caliph also had scholarly authority, could exercise religious authorityand revise or establish religious doctrine. If the caliphate is restored, the potentialstruggle to define these differing interpretations would be critical not only to the USbut to all Muslims.

However, to be fair, one must see how a noted Muslim and Islamist(fundamentalist) describes what ‘caliphate’ means. Abul A’la Maududi said:

The political system of Islam is based on three principles: Tawhid (unity of God/Allah), Risalat (Prophethood) and Khilafat (Viceregency). Tawhid means only

Middle Eastern Studies,Vol. 45, No. 3, 373–391, May 2009

ISSN 0026-3206 Print/1743-7881 Online/09/030373-19 ª 2009 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/00263200902853355

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Allah is the Creator, Sustainer and Master of the universe and of all that existsin it, organic and inorganic. The sovereignty of this kingdom is vested only inHim. He alone has the right to command or forbid. . . . Hence it is not for us todecide the aim or purpose of our existence or to set limits of our authority; noris anyone else entitled to make these decisions for us. This principle of the unityof Allah totally negates the concept of the legal and political independence ofhuman beings, individually or collectively. No individual, family, class or racecan set themselves above Allah. Allah alone is the Ruler and His command-ments are the Law.

Now consider the Khilafat. According to the Arabic lexicon, it means‘representation.’ Man, according to Islam, is the representative of Allah onearth, His viceregent. That is to say, by virtue of the powers delegated (author’semphasis) to him by Allah, he is required to exercise his Allah-given authority inthis world within the limits prescribed by Allah. A state that is established inaccordance with this political theory will in fact be a human caliphate under thesovereignty of Allah and will do Allah’s will by working within the limitsprescribed by Him and in accordance with His instructions and injunctions.

The above explanation of the term Khalifah also makes it abundantly clearthat no individual or dynasty or class can be Khalifah, but that the authority ofcaliphate is bestowed on any community which accepts the principles of Tawhidand Risalat.5

Maududi very much wanted to restore the caliphate that had been abolished in hislifetime.

Today, a caliphate does not exist, nor has one existed for 85 years. The lastcaliphate, of the Ottoman Padishahs, was abolished by the first Turkish President,Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, in March 1924. In fact, to ensure that there would be norestoration of the Ottomans, he had a law passed which leveled the ‘penalty of hightreason on anyone who refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Great NationalAssembly or the principle of national sovereignty, or supported the restoration of thesultanate’.6 To compound the matter, a noted Islamic modernist scholar and Qadi ofAl-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt actually stated in his 1925 book ‘Al-Islam wa-usul al-hukm’ (Islam and the Principles of Government) that Turkey was justified inabolishing the caliphate, that it was not needed.7 As a specialist on the caliphate, AliAbd al-Raziq created great controversy when he explicitly stated that there was nobasis for the caliphate in either the Qur’an or in theHadith (oral traditions relating tothe sayings of the Prophet passed through a chain of transmission, or isnad, from oneof the Companions to today). Because of this, he also concluded that while theremay not be anything un-Islamic about having a caliphate, there also was nothing un-Islamic about not having one either – Islam and Muslims could get along just finewithout any caliphs to rule over them.8

Yet there are those today who seek to re-establish a caliphate, say that they want acaliphate or point out that a caliphate is the goal of Islamism. Also, there remains anundeniable ‘longing’ by many Muslims for a caliphate, based on views of a notnecessarily ‘Golden Age’ of Islam. In a 2007 poll conducted by the University ofMaryland of 4,384 Muslims in four nations (Morocco, Egypt, Pakistan andIndonesia), over 65 per cent interviewed answered positively to the question: ‘To

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unify all Islamic countries into a single Islamic state or caliphate.’9 Further, 65.5per cent of the respondents said yes when asked if: ‘To require a strict application ofShari’a law in every Islamic country.’10 In fact, an electronic ‘Caliphate OnLine’ sitehas been established in Great Britain which seeks to raise awareness about a newcaliphate and has even drawn up a tentative organizational chart of how a moderncaliphate would be organized politically.11

This continuing dialogue concerning a restored caliphate, both by Muslims,Islamists and non-Muslims, warrants many questions. First, who are the people thatclaim that a caliphate, presumably hostile to US interests as noted below, is the goalof Islamism? Second, who are these people that purportedly seek to re-establish acaliphate (Turkish law notwithstanding)? Third, if a caliphate were to be resurrected(and I use this word precisely) as many in the Muslim world seem to wish, whowould be ‘eligible’ to be the legitimate caliph. Conversely, inherent in the thirdquestion is: who would not be eligible to be caliph?

First, we should start with the Americans, who appear to be using the caliphateargument as a justification for the ongoing ‘Global War on Terror’ (or GWOT). InSeptember 2004 Vice President Dick Cheney said ‘They talk about wanting to re-establish what you would refer to as the seventh-century caliphate . . . governed byshari’a law, the most rigid interpretation of the Qur’an.’12 This is the earliest andclearest mention by a notable official in the Bush Presidential Administrationmentioning the word ‘caliphate’. It is interesting to note that the ‘they’ is ambiguousand the word ‘caliphate’ is associated with ‘shari’a law’, which is further defined asthe ‘most rigid interpretation of the Qur’an’.13

Almost a year later, in September 2005, General John Abizaid, the thencommander US Central Command, used the word during congressional hearings,stating: ‘They will try to re-establish a caliphate throughout the entire Muslimworld.’14 Following quickly upon the heels of General Abizaid, National SecurityAdvisor Stephen Hadley used the word in October 2005 during speeches in NewYork and Los Angeles. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was the next tomention ‘caliphate’, during a December 2005 speech in Washington DC and thenagain during a PBS interview.15

In September 2006 President Bush openly used the word caliphate, linking it to AlQaeda as a ‘hostile entity’. He stated:

They hope to establish a violent political utopia across the Middle East, whichthey call a ‘Caliphate’ – where all would be ruled according to their hatefulideology. Osama bin Laden has called the 9/11 attacks – in his words – ‘a greatstep towards the unity of Muslims and establishing the Righteous . . . Cali-phate’. This caliphate would be a totalitarian Islamic empire encompassing allcurrent and former Muslim lands, stretching from Europe to North Africa, theMiddle East, and Southeast Asia. We know this because al Qaeda has told us.16

In February 2007 Vice President Cheney, in a speech in Australia, again pointed outthat ‘terrorists aim to create a caliphate stretching from Spain, across North Africa,through the Middle East and South Asia, to Indonesia and beyond’.17 During

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the 2008 presidential primaries, even former governor and Republican candidateMitt Romney brought up the word, stating in a 12 October 2007 speech: ‘their goal isto unite the world under a single Jihadist caliphate’ and ‘collapse freedom-lovingnations like us’.18

To date (of the writing of this article) there has been no similar articulatedexpression by any notable Democrats in the United States concerning the re-establishment of or any efforts to restore a caliphate. As for the US academic andjournalistic communities, it is not within the purview of this article to address theissue of debate (or lack thereof) within those communities. Nor will there be a reviewof any comments made by current US-allied foreign governments on the re-establishment of a caliphate (although there are views on it, as then Prime Ministerof Great Britain Tony Blair articulated in a speech on 16 July 2005). It is sufficientfor this article to say that the present US administration has clearly articulated thatthe re-establishment of a caliphate is not to be envisioned as either a good thing or adesirable thing, specifically in the context of the GWOT.

There are several individuals in the Islamic fundamentalist pantheon who haveclearly articulated the need to re-establish a caliphate. However, before moving tothem it is important to note that the British advocated a caliphate, under Britishcontrol of course, from the mid-1800s to the 1920s. Also, there have beendistinguished individuals, such as Wilfrid Scawen Blunt (1840–1922), who called foran Arab Qureshi caliphate based in Mecca and limited to purely ‘spiritual’ matters asan entity to replace the devolving Ottoman caliphate.19 Non-Muslim imperialattempts and non-Muslim individuals will not be noted as they are neither Islamistnor articulators of a caliphate intended to secure both the dominance of Islam andthe enforcement of Islam.

The first significant modern Islamist is Sayyid Abu al-Ala Maududi20 (1903–79),the primary early advocate for the re-establishment of a caliphate. Born in theprincely state of Hyderabad, the largest of such and ruled by the Muslim Nizam,21

Mawdudi joined the South Asian ‘Khilafat’ movement in 1920.22 The ‘Khilafat’movement was an effort to force the British to preserve the Ottoman caliphate, whichwas ultimately abolished not by the British but, as stated earlier, constitutionally bythe Turks. The movement, ironically headed by Mohandas Gandhi (a Hindu) andspurned by the eventual founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (a Muslim),ended in 1924.

Maududi, however, eventually took up the cause of the re-establishment of thecaliphate as part of an effort to initiate a revival of an Islamic way of life. Initially asa member of the Khilafat movement and its Tehrik-e Hijrat (Migration Movement)while the Ottoman caliphate still existed, Maududi verbally articulated the need for acaliphate throughout the next several decades. It was only later that he recorded inwriting what he believed the concept meant (excerpted earlier) in Islamic Way ofLife.23 As founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami (Islamic Party, also called ‘JI’) in 1941, hiswas for many years a solitary voice calling for the caliphate while the Muslim worldwent through its various trials with socialism, communism, capitalism, Ba’athism,Nasserism, etc.

The partition of India in 1947 gave Maududi hope, false as it turned out, that theMuslim ruler of Hyderabad, the Nizam, might possibly reintroduce the caliphatebased on his princely state. When the Nizam of Hyderabad’s resistance against India

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quickly collapsed, Maududi equated Hyderabad’s fall with the destruction of theAbbasid caliphate in 1258 by the Mongols, the expulsion of the Muslim Moors fromSpain in 1492 and the fall of the Mughal Empire in 1858. For Maududi, the conceptand reality of a caliphate was still needed for Islam but the territory and faith wasnot yet present.

It is arguable that Maududi, disappointed with the failure of Hyderabad, possiblyhoped that the new nation of Pakistan – composed of Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhisand Pushtuns – could become a new caliphate. After all, the sole establishingcriterion of the new nation was Islam, in order to differentiate it from the co-ethnicgroups of a shrunken India, who were largely Hindu. There are to this day over adozen Pakistan-based Islamist parties who actively espouse the caliphate concept.Examples of such are the Tanzeem-e Islami, the Jamiat-ul Ansar and the Lashkar-eTaiyyiba (Bangladesh, once the eastern wing of a larger Pakistan before 1971, alsohas some caliphate groups, such as the Khelafat Majlish). To date there is noPakistan-based caliphate nor does it look as if there may be one any time soon.

In 1952 a relatively unknown Islamic theologian and Qadi (a judge who rules onmatters in accordance with shari’a) from Palestinian Haifa, Taqiuddin al-Nabhani(1909–79), established the Hizb ut-Tahrir, or Party of Liberation, in the Jordanianportion of Jerusalem. The justification of this new party was the re-establishment ofthe Khalifah in order to both protect Muslims and to spread Islam. A quote from thecurrent official website explains the purpose of this organization:

The rise of Hizb-ut-Tahrir was in response to Allah (swt)’s saying: T.M.Q. ‘Andlet there arise from amongst you a band that calls to the good and commandswhat is right and forbids what is evil and those are the ones who will attainfelicity’, in order to revive the Islamic Ummah after the severe decline to whichshe has sunk, to liberate her from the thoughts, systems and rules of Kufr, itssystems and from the hegemony and influence of the Kufr states, and in order towork towards establishing the Islamic Khilafah State so that the rules by whatAllah (swt) has revealed returns to the realm of life.24

The goals of al-Nabhani were, first, a peaceful restoration of the caliphate andonly then to have the newly restored caliph authorize renewed jihad against the kafir.Al-Nabhani left Jerusalem in 1953 for Syria, eventually moving on to Lebanon in1959 after being banned in 1955 by Jordan from ever returning to Jordanianterritory. Hizb-ut Tahrir seems to be willing to accept any male, theoretically, to be anew caliph. Reportedly the group has, in the past, unsuccessfully approached Libya’sMu’ammar al-Qaddafi, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and even Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeneito be leaders of a new caliphate.25

Hizb ut-Tahrir states that it has over a million members, and it does have asignificant presence in Lebanon, Malaysia, Indonesia, Denmark, Brunei and the UK.It is banned and often actively persecuted in Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Russiaand elsewhere. Its current repudiation of violence in seeking to re-establish thecaliphate has earned it the ire of most Islamic extremists, especially as it has explicitlycondemned terrorism, specifically mentioning the 9/11 attacks and the July 2005London attacks. While Al Qaeda has not specifically condemned it, the Al Qaeda-affiliated Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group has. Hizb ut-Tahrir’s message of a

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peaceful re-establishment appears to be gaining some traction only in Southeast Asiaand is thus considered to be out of the mainstream of Islamic activity.

Almost concurrent with al-Nabhani but of greater eventual influence was anEgyptian, greatly inspired by the works of Maududi and the militancy of the MuslimBrotherhood of Egypt, as the next Islamist advocate for a caliphate. Sayyid Qutb(1906–66) was born in Musha, Egypt, eventually trained as a teacher by 1928. Hiredby the Ministry of Education in 1933, Qutb gave early signs of being a prolific writer,publishing works of fiction, poetry and literary criticism. In 1948 he was sent to theUnited States by the Ministry (it was in this period when Qutb’s first majortheoretical work of religious social criticism, Al-’adala al-Ijtima’iyya fi-l-Islam (SocialJustice in Islam), was published in 1949) and then in 1950 to Europe. Apparentlydisliking what he saw, Qutb turned down a promotion and began writing newspaperarticles on social and political themes. In the early 1950s he joined the MuslimBrotherhood, was appointed editor to the weekly paper Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun andsoon became the director of the organization’s Propaganda Section.26 From 1953until his execution by the Egyptian government in 1966, Qutb spent at least ten yearsin prison, frequently tortured but writing prolifically.27 Heavily influenced by thepost-war world of Soviet atheistic confrontation with American materialism, Qutbbelieved that the values of the Qur’an were timeless (fair play, balance and humanity)and that the world must inevitably submit to Islam. He emphasized the dominanceof Islam as a ‘liberating ideology’ from secularism and that Islam would take theworld by ‘jihad’. Qutb was unapologetic in his conviction that Islam would retakeformer Muslim lands, move on to topple foreign governments in an offensive jihadand then establish a universal caliphate.28

Qutb is considered by many to be the founder of the modern Islamist extremist‘movement’, the inspiration of such individuals as Usama bin Laden and Aiman al-Zawahiri. Qutb’s writings, although suffused with recognizably European elements,stress that 1) Islam as in the time of the Prophet was in abeyance and currently in astate of jahiliyya, and 2) the enemy – the ‘Crusaders’ – were at the gates seeking thedestruction of Islam. Those enemies are ‘genetically coded’, according to Qutb,29 todestroy the identity of Muslims and establish foreign rule and rulers in Dar al-Islamin defiance of what Allah has revealed. For Qutb, only the caliphate could institute,preserve, enforce and expand Islam as Allah had instructed.

In 1996 a nearly unknown Afghan, Mullah Mohammed Omar, leader of arelatively new militant organization called the Taliban (which advocated a restoredcaliphate), stood on a balcony in Kandahar and wrapped himself in a cloak reputedto have belonged to the Prophet himself. He was acclaimed by the crowd as the‘Amir ul-Momineen’ or ‘Commander of the Faithful’. By this act this unknown manwas accorded a title normally given to the caliph himself.

Of itself this might be seen as an act of supreme hubris by just another guerrillagroup in Afghanistan, but in 1998 a second Muslim, Usama bin Laden, recognizedMullah Omar as the Amir ul-Momineen, pledging his personal loyalty to him as thelegitimate ruler of the state of Afghanistan.30 On 7 October 2001, the same day USforces invaded Afghanistan, Usama stated in a video that ‘Our nation has beentasting this humiliation and contempt for more than 80 years.’31 This was an explicitreference to the loss of the Ottoman caliphate 80 years previously, and the ‘Ournation’ meant all of Islam. The implicit message was that this was the beginning of

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the battle to re-establish the caliphate, with Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters as thevanguard.32

Usama bin Laden has been a seminal figure in Islamist ideology not because he isan intellectual like Maududi or Qutb, but because he is an able organizer, has accessto almost unlimited funding or fund-raising capacity and is a ‘celebrity’ to rallyaround. Born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Usama (1957–) is of Yemeni ancestry andbelieves that the restoration of shari’a law will correct all problems in the Muslimworld, that competing secular ideologies must be opposed and that jihad is necessaryto see the implementation of shari’a.

He purportedly left Saudi Arabia in 1979 for Afghanistan but seems to have spentmuch of his time in support roles, mainly in Pakistan. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwaitand subsequent Saudi request for US assistance in securing Saudi Arabia from Iraqiaggression (with the huge influx of US forces into Saudi territory) angered Usamaand led to him publicly criticizing the Saudi government. He was ostracized by thegovernment and left for Sudan in 1992.

In Sudan, he continued to harangue the Saudi government, for which he had hiscitizenship revoked and his family was persuaded to cut his yearly allowance of 7million dollars. He also became involved with Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), one ofwhose members was Aiman al-Zawahiri. In the wake of the EIJ assassinationattempt on President Mubarak of Egypt in 1995, EIJ was expelled and Usama wasforced to leave Sudan in 1996, moving to Afghanistan.

In 1998, Usama bin Laden and Aiman al-Zawahiri co-signed a fatwa in the nameof the ‘World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders’ which declaredthe killing of the Americans and their allies an ‘individual duty for every Muslim’ to‘liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque (in Jerusalem) and the holy mosque (in Mecca) fromtheir grip’.33 The organization issuing the fatwa is Al Qaeda and is, in essence, basedlargely in the intellectual work of Sayid Qutb. The major interpreter of what mightbe termed ‘Qutbism’ is Aiman al-Zawahiri.34

Aiman Al-Zawahiri (1951–) is also a major recent proponent of re-establishing thecaliphate. Born in a suburb of Cairo, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1965 andupon the execution of Qutb vowed to put Qutb’s vision of an Islamic caliphate intoaction.35 Graduating from Cairo University in 1978 with a medical degree, Zawahirihad already helped form a violent offshoot of the Brotherhood called EgyptianIslamic Jihad. Arrested in 1981 in the wake of the Sadat assassination, he was jailedfor three years. Upon his release in 1984 he moved to Jedda, Saudi Arabia, where hepractised medicine before moving on in 1986 to Peshawar, Pakistan. In Peshawar hereconstituted an expatriate Egyptian Islamic Jihad, eventually breaking from themain EIJ organization in 1991 as the leader of his Pakistan-based group. In 1993 hetoured California on a fund-raising trip, travelling as a Dr Abdul Mu’iz withthe Kuwait Red Crescent. In 1995 he had to leave Pakistan after an EIJ attack on theEgyptian Embassy there and was expelled from Sudan in 1996.

Eventually ending up in Afghanistan after six months in a Russian jail, Zawahirijoined with Usama for the issuance of the February 1998 fatwa, which he authored.In 1999 Egypt sentenced him to death in absentia and he earned a place on the FBI’s‘Most Wanted List’ in 2001. Zawahiri published the book Knights Under theProphet’s Banner in 12 instalments in December 2001 in the London-based Alsharqal-Awsat newspaper which outlined Al Qaeda’s ideology. He envisioned that

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strategy based on a view of Islam under siege by a predatory, Western-dominatedworld in which ‘there is no solution without jihad’.36

Already a proponent of Qutb’s vision for re-establishing a caliphate and a partywith Usama bin Laden in recognition of Mullah Omar as the new caliph byacceptance of the title Amir al-Momineen, Zawahiri further clarified in October 2005his ideas on a caliphate. Finally, in a letter37 from him to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi inIraq, dated 9 July 2005, Zawahiri referred several times to Al Qaeda’s goal toestablish first an ‘emirate’ which would then be developed into a caliphate. Zawahirireportedly once declared that terror attacks would be nothing more than disturbingacts, regardless of their magnitude, unless they led to a caliphate in the heart of theIslamic world.38 What would happen once the caliphate had been established wasnot covered, other than to continue the struggle to expand the Umma.

As can be seen, there have been and are individuals both in America and in theMuslim world either warning of the dangers of an assumed fundamentalist caliphateor calling for the restoration of a caliphate, often associated with a desire tolegitimize jihad. Seemingly opposite, both sides are using the single justification ofthe caliphate as a requirement to conflict. However, what seems to be missing fromthe ‘dialogue’ is that if a caliphate were to be restored, either by force or byagreement, who would be the caliph? Would there be any special qualifications orrequirements or would reference be made to any ‘qualified’ bloodlines for which anindividual could be selected as the inheritor of the position of caliph? As important,is there a basis to indicate who may not or cannot be caliph?39

There are several requirements that have been delineated that any potentialcandidate should meet. In his book An Introduction to History, Ibn Khaldun40

recorded exactly what the prerequisites are for assuming the mantle of the caliph.41

1) Knowledge: the caliph can execute the divine laws only if he knows them, thus hecannot blindly accept tradition but must be capable of independent decisionmaking.

2) Probity: the caliph must be unimpeachably honest, virtuous and just. He must beable to supervise the ulema although there is dispute on whether this quality isnullified if the caliph engages in innovations of previously articulated andaccepted Shari’a (theologically jurisdictional dogma).

3) Competence: the caliph must be willing to carry out the punishments fixed byShari’a and be strong enough to fulfill his political duties. He must be willing tounderstand warfare, to be able to assume responsibility for engaging the Ummain war and to declare war. He must lead the Umma in the Holy War against theenemy while maintaining religious laws and administering for the public good.

4) Physical fitness: the caliph must be sound in all senses and limbs, be free fromany disabilities such as blindness, deafness, insanity or missing limbs or eyes. Therequirement for, in essence, physical perfection precludes even physicaldeformity such as disfiguring features such as missing or extra digits, largefacial birthmarks, etc.

5) A fifth requirement, one which is still debated because it seems to stem fromQureshi origin, is that the caliph must be of Qureshi (preferably of Hashemite)

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descent.42 This was disputed by the Khwarijites as they felt that any piousMuslim should be eligible to be caliph, and is currently contested by theImamiyya (Twelver) Shi’a, who believe the caliph will be the Hujjat ibn Hasanibn Ali, the twelfth Imam who went into occultation43 (hidden by God) in 874upon the death of his father, who had been the eleventh Imam. A direct linealdescendant of Ali ibn Abu Talib, the fourth of the Rashidun caliphs, and Fatima,daughter of the Prophet Muhammad and wife to Ali, the twelfth Imam willsupposedly be returned from occultation as the Mahdi, or the ‘Guided One.’

A sixth requirement, that is unspoken because it is literally incomprehensible forIslam to consider otherwise, is that the caliph will be male.

The next issue is method of selection, meaning who chooses the caliph. Originally,the Prophet Muhammad had stated that after his death none would follow him,emphasizing that he was the Seal of the Prophets, the last one forever. Not only washe the last Nabi (prophet) but he was a Rasul (Messenger) because he had received aWahi (revelation) from Allah directly, having been given an Injil (gospel). With thedeath of Muhammad there could still be Rusul (pl) but no more Anbiyaa (plural ofNabi) or Wahi. Therefore, the question immediately and spontaneously arose amongthe companions of the Prophet of what to do.

Sidestepping the still contentious issue (1,400 years after the fact) as to who shouldhave been selected in 632 AD as the Muslim community leader/successor toMuhammad (Abu Bakr, Ali or one of the other Companions44), the available leaders(those not off on raids or missions to other tribes, etc.) of the Muslim community inMedina quickly selected Abu Bakr (the fourth convert to Islam and the first outsideMuhammad’s own family) as the new leader, or Khalifah Allah (Caliph of God).45

This selection is still disputed because the Shi’a believe that Ali (the second convertto Islam and the first male convert, also reportedly the only person to actually beborn in the Ka’aba itself), son-in-law of Muhammad, was designated by the Prophetto be his successor. Regardless of the feelings of Ali and his partisans, the successionprinciple of deliberation and selection by the Companions was established.

Abu Bakr was the first of the four caliphs who followed Muhammad, and thesewere also Companions. They have been called the Rashidun caliphs, meaning the‘rightly guided’ caliphs or the righteous caliphs, an appellation given them by theAbbasid caliphal dynasty over 100 years after the death of the last Rashidun caliph.46

The period of the Rashidun caliphs lasted only 29 years, 632 AD to 661 AD, but iscritical because it was during this period that Islam expanded swiftly, defeating anddisplacing the Sassanid Empire (Zoroastrian Persia), halving and almost destroyingthe Byzantine Empire (conquering Orthodox/Monophysite Christian Syria, Armeniaand Egypt) and expanding into South Asia (largely Buddhist Sindh), Central Asia(mixed Zoroastrian, Manichaean and shamanistic Uzbekistan) and through NorthAfrica (heretical Christian sects such as the Arianists and the Donatists) into theIberian Peninsula (Nicene Christian Spain). More importantly, the process ofselection of the caliph was systematized as Abu Bakr ruled for only two years, thenUmar ruled for ten years before being assassinated, Uthman for 12 years before hisassassination and finally Ali for five years before his assassination. They areconsidered the models of righteous rule and thus this period is considered the‘Golden Age’ of Islam. Notably, Shi’a Muslims consider the first three caliphs to be

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usurpers and that Ali should have been the rightful successor to Muhammad, basedon kinship, thus the division of Islam into a Sunni majority and a Shi’a minoritytoday.

After the Rashidun period, the caliphate passed to others who could not claim tohave been Companions of the Prophet, could not claim to be descendants ofCompanions and were completely removed from the Alid bloodline,47 with oneminor problematical exception.48 The Rashidun or rightly guided title was dropped,as these caliphal successors were generally considered to have the attributes of kingsvia conferred sacral authority. The caliph became, in many ways, a successor to theRoman/Byzantine imperial mantle. To most Muslims, the era of the ‘true’ caliphswas over.

Mu’awiyah, a member of the Banu Umayya clan of the Qureshi tribe, wasappointed in 640 AD as governor of Syria by Umar, the second Rashidun caliph.After clashing with the caliph Ali at the battle of Siffin in 657 AD, he wrested theleadership of the Muslim community from the Alid family (see note 48) in 661 ADafter the assassination of Ali. He thus did not take the title Caliph for himself duringhis 19-year rule as he felt it would be disrespectful to the family of the Prophet. Hisson Yazid, however, did claim the title of caliph for himself.

The Umayyad dynasty officially ruled from 680 AD to 750 AD before being nearlyextinguished by the Abbasids, who slaughtered almost every male in the Umayyadline except for Abd al-Rahman, who escaped to Iberia and set himself up as emir ofal-Andalus. For various reasons the Abbasids failed to suppress this last vestige ofthe Umayyads, which declared itself a branch caliphate in 929 AD, ruling fromCordoba until 1031 AD, when it was overthrown by a Berber army. Meanwhile, theAbbasids established a new caliphate in Baghdad, moving from the old Umayyadcapital of Damascus. Initially containing most of the lands conquered by Muslims,the Abbasids ruled from 751 AD to 1258 AD, when the last of the official line wastrampled to death inside a rolled up carpet by Mongol horsemen.

The Abbasids lost control of major portions of the caliphate when a Shi’a-ledinsurrection managed to establish a counter-caliphate in Egypt. This Shi’a caliphateis remembered as the Fatemids, as they claimed descent through the line of Fatima,daughter of the Prophet, wife of Ali and mother of Hasan and Hussein. Ruling overa largely Sunni and Copt Christian population, they lasted from 910 AD to 1171 AD.The Fatemid counter-caliphate was defeated in 1169 by a Turkish general who soondied and left the region ruled by the Fatemids to Salah al-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub, whois know in the West as Saladin. He abolished the Fatemid caliphate in 1171 andreturned Egypt to Sunni control, ruling both Egypt and Syria as the first of theAyyub Sultanate dynasty.

A second portion of the Abbasid caliphate was lost when the severelyfundamentalist Berber Almohads revolted and conquered Morocco and southernIberia, ruling from 1145 AD to 1269. Although they declared themselves a caliphate,it was not widely accepted beyond its own borders as a true caliphate. The lastAlmohad ruler was murdered by a slave and the region they had ruled largelyreverted to tribal entities, sub-regional sultanates, or city-states.

In 1261 the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt, originally founded from the AyyubSultanate, resurrected the Abbasid caliphal line from a surviving member but kept itunder complete Mamluk tutelage. This shadow caliphate, called so because it was

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restricted to mainly religious and ceremonial roles, was maintained from 1261 ADuntil 1517 AD. In 1517 the Mamluk Sultanate was defeated by the growing Ottoman(Turkish) Empire, who after occupying most of the Mamluk lands took custody ofal-Mutawakkil III, the last Abbasid caliph. He was transported to Istanbul andpurportedly formally surrendered the title, sword, and mantle of the Prophet toSelim I, Sultan and then caliph of the Ottoman Empire.49 With the defeat of theMamluks, Ottoman troops had also occupied Mecca and Medina, thus making theOttoman caliph an actual defender of the ‘Holy Cities’.

This is considered the last true caliphate, despite the fact that it was not Arab butTurk and no Ottoman Padishah ever claimed real or ‘associated’ descent from theQureshi or Hashemite lineage. The Ottomans lasted until 1924, actually losing theirexecutive power in 1908 when the Young Turk Revolution replaced existingmonarchical institutions with constitutional institutions, essentially leaving thecaliphate once again with largely a ceremonial role. This process, along with theviolent assaults upon the weakening empire during the First World War, led to theconstitutional abolishment of the caliphate in 1924.

There are currently several self declared-claimants or aspirants, either unorthodoxand/or illegitimate, to the caliphate title. Starting with the Sokoto caliphate,established in 1804 by an Imam Uthman dan Fodio, founder of the Fulani Empire, itwas the largest African political state just prior to the European colonial period.Awarded the title of Amir al-Mu’minin (Defender of the Faithful), he was also titledSarkin Musulmi (King of the Muslims). Essentially an ethnically-based geographicempire with no real claim to the ‘traditional’ caliphate, it was an honorary title givento a religious man who tried to establish a just and equitable social system based onshari’a. Physically conquered in 1903 by the British, the Sokoto caliph was retainedby the colonial administration as a ceremonial position and renamed sultan, a policycontinued to this day by the Nigerian government. Because of its unorthodox originand colonial continuance, there is little question of a ‘restored’ Sokoto caliphatebeing viewed as a legitimate claimant for a global caliphate by a majority of theworld’s Muslims. While the Sokoto caliph/sultan, currently Shayk as-SultanMuhammadu Sa’adu Abubakr and the 20th of the line, does not have any actualsecular power, he does retain much spiritual authority among the Fulani and Hausapeoples of northern Nigeria, approximately 70 million Muslims and half of Nigeria’spopulation. As such he is head of the Nigerian National Supreme Council forIslamic Affairs.

The current Moroccan royal dynasty, the Alaouite family, which came to power in1666, has a potentially marginal claim to a caliphal mantle. They claim descent fromMuhammad through his daughter Fatima Zahra and her husband, the fourthRashidun caliph Ali (similar to the reasoning of the Shi’a Fatamid counter-caliphate). The claim is not discussed or pressed and it is unlikely that it would betaken seriously, much as the claim of the Berber Almohads caliphate wasdisregarded by most Muslims 1,000 years ago.

In Pakistan, there is a movement called al-Jam�a’a al-Ahmad�ıya, or the AhmadiyyaMuslim Community, which was begun in 1889 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian (asmall town in northern Punjab). Mirza Ahmad is considered to be a Mujaddid as

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well as, inclusive, the Messiah, the Mahdi, and the second coming of Christ in onebeing. Mirza Ahmed died in 1908 and his successor assumed the title KhalifatulMasih (successor of the Messiah), which is used to the present, thus establishing apresumptive caliphate.50 Currently consisting of approximately 200 millionadherents in two sects, it is concentrated in South Asia. It is considered an apostatesect of Islam, legislatively declared by Pakistan to be non-Muslim in 1974 and againin 1984. The Ahmadiyya caliphate can in no way be considered part of thetraditional caliphate heritage and is generally anathema to most Muslims.

A last ‘illegitimate’ claim to the caliphate would be the Taliban claim of MullahMuhammad Omar. His claim is far out of the Arab mainstream even though he isputatively recognized by two notable Arabs, those being Aiman al-Zawahiri andUsama bin Laden. He is a Hotaki of the Ghilzai Pushtun, an ethnic Afghan, andclaims no descent from any Arab family, much less from the Qureshi or Hashemite.As to his competence to execute the intricacies of the shari’a, he is ill-educated,suffering from a limited education in a country torn by war. He is missing an eye andthus also fails the ‘freedom from defect or disability’ that Ibn Khaldun outlined.51

His claim is extremely unorthodox and is marginal at best, being generallydisregarded for the hyperbole that it is. It does have the potential, however, ofpropelling another as yet unknown candidate forward, especially if linked into thecurrent ‘jihadist fundamentalist movement’ which is convulsing the Muslim world. Anew caliphate is possible if established by force of arms, although there would be aneed to find a way, such as the Ottomans did by revising history, to give it legitimacyin order for it to avoid being viewed as a theocratic dictatorship.

There remain three potentially legal claimants to a traditional caliphate. Startingwith the most tenuous, the heir-apparent of the ‘absorbed’ Nizam of Hyderabad,currently Barkat Ali Khan Mukarram Jah Asaf Jah VIII, is a legitimate claimant toa restored caliphate. The caliphal claim is through marriage, as he is the son ofGeneral Azam Jah, eldest son of the last ruling Nizam of Hyderabad and PrincessDurr-e-Shevar daughter of Abdul Mejid II, the last Ottoman caliph and cousin andheir of the last Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. The line of the Nizamate, rulers of thelargest and wealthiest Princely State in pre-independence India, runs from thefounder, Asaf Jah I in 1725 to 1948, when the last ruling Nizam abdicated after Indiainvaded and occupied Hyderabad. The Nizam was married to Princess Durr-e-Shevar in November 1931 with the provision that the Nizam’s son was nominated asthe heir-apparent to the then caliph-in-exile Abulmecid II.52 Abdication from theNizamat in 1948 and absorption of Hyderabad into Hindu India has not legallyinvalidated the claim from an Islamic legitimacy perspective.

The current heir-apparent, Asaf Jah VIII lives in Istanbul, Turkey and his heir isPrince Azmet Jah.53 This combined line, uniting the Ottomans with the line ofMuslim Hyderabad in a South Asian Muslim caliphate, would potentially be highlyattractive to a large majority of Muslims in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, SoutheastAsia and possibly in southern and eastern Africa. It would most likely not beattractive to the Arab states or to the Islamic institutions that espouse an Islam thatis ‘Arab’. Most of the prerequisites to be caliph would probably be met except forone: that of being a member of the Qureshi, the Prophet Muhammad’s tribe.

Assumption of the caliphate by a combined Ottoman/Nizamat line would alsodraw upon a previous Muslim South Asian imperial dynasty that never advanced a

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claim to the caliphate, the Mughal Empire (although it was reported that EmperorAurangzeb did have the Khutba read in his name in 1660, which implies caliphalstatus54). The first Nizam had been granted governorship of the recently conqueredDeccan by the Mughals in 1713 and although independence was never openlydeclared, the Mughals soon recognized the autonomous status of the Nizamat andacknowledged its independence in 1724, although the Nizam himself never openlycommented upon it. It can be argued that residual legitimate Mughal authorityresides in the line of the Nizam.

The next claimant to the caliphate is the Osman family. Their claim, as describedearlier, is a combination of ‘Force Majeure’ (in the international law sense of theword) of the almost irresistible Ottoman military with the formal transfer oflegitimacy from the last Abbasid caliph, al-Mutawakkil III in 1517. Reinforcementof this claim to the caliphate was provided in 1774 when the Ottoman Empiredeclared a ‘Universal Caliphate’ based on the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca, signedbetween itself and the expanding Russian Empire. Aside from recognizing thecession of territory to Russia and granting of protection rights to the OrthodoxChurch over Christians in Ottoman territory, it also granted the Ottoman Empirethe right to protect Muslims in Russian territory. This was the first time ever that thepowers of a Muslim, not just an Ottoman, caliph had been exercised outside of thecaliphate borders and sanctioned by a European (or any foreign non-Muslim)power.

The current heir-apparent to the Ottoman caliphal throne is Ertugrul Osman V,who happens to reside in New York City.55 Living in a two-bedroom apartment overa restaurant on Lexington Avenue, his full title is ‘Devletli Necabetli ErtugrulOsman Efendi Hazrerleri’ and he is the 43rd head of the Imperial House of Osman.Born in 1912 in the then Ottoman Empire, he was attending school in Vienna,Austria when he received word that the caliphate was abolished. He moved to theUnited States in 1933 and assumed the title in 1994. He is the seventh post-imperialhead of the House of Osman and his heir-apparent is currently Prince BurhaneddinCem Efendi. There are, in strict genealogical order, a total of 25 men in the line ofsuccession to the title, the youngest being Prince Turan Cem Osmanoglu, born in2004 and a descendant of Murad V (who ruled for 93 days in 1876).

Restoration of the Ottoman caliphate is still currently illegal in Turkey and wouldmost likely not be welcomed by Arab Muslims. The long history of violence andoppression between Turk and Arab as well as the prerequisite of the caliph to be amember of the Qureshi family mitigates against a resurrected Ottoman caliphate.The most ardent non-Turkish supporters of the Ottomans are South Asians, witnessthe failed Khilafat movement in British India in the early 1920s in which IndianMuslims wanted the British government to preserve the Ottoman caliphate.Complicating the claim is the fact that the current post-imperial head has expressedno interest in such a restoration and has stated that democracy works very well inTurkey.56 He does believe, though, that a restored Sunni caliphate not necessarily ofTurkish lineage would make the world a better place.57

The final traditional and potentially most legitimate claimant to a restoredcaliphate is the Sharifan/Hashemite royal dynasty currently resident in Amman,Jordan in the person of King Abdullah II. The claim is based58 on the fact that thecurrent king is the 43rd direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, a powerful

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argument anywhere in the Muslim world. Secondly, the Hashemite family has ruledMecca and much of the surrounding Hejaz region of Arabia since 1200 AD.59

Thirdly, they are now a royal Arab family, one which does not subscribe to theextremely austere Peninsular Wahhabi creed of Hanbali Islam, with an extra-ordinary amount of international political credibility based upon the rule of KingHussein (1952–99) and his successor, the current king.

The first reported thoughts in declaring the Hashemites a new caliphal dynastywere by Sharif Abu Numayy in the thirteenth century. The thought was nevertranslated into fact due to the much stronger Mamluk and then Ottoman forces inSyria and Egypt. In 1858 and 1860 the Arabs of northern Syria, under a British effortto oppose French expansion into the Levant and Egypt, supported the establishmentof a ‘new Arabian state under the sovereignty of the Shereefs of Mecca’ as a kind ofcaliph.60 From 1870 onward the idea of a Sharifan caliphate was repeatedly andpublicly considered in various British circles, with the occasional support of suchMuslims as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakabi.61 Deposedas Sharif in October 1916 by the Ottomans, against whom he was in revolt as part ofthe Arab Uprising in the First World War, al-Husayn ibn Ali al-Hashimi, declared inNovember 1916 himself not only King of Hejaz, which was internationallyrecognized, but also Malik bilad-al-Arab (King of all Arabs), which was not. In1924, he went further and declared himself caliph,62 abdicating his kingship to hiseldest son, Ali bin Husayn, who ruled as such until his removal by the rival Saud/Wahhab dynasty of the Najd region of Arabia. The Sharifan ‘caliphate’ ostensiblylasted until the death in 1931 of al-Husayn, who lived in exile in Transjordan with hisson Abdullah bin al-Husayn.63

Abdullah, first emir (1921) and then king (1946), ruled Transjordan and uponthe death of his father did not assume the caliphate. Through the following reignsof Talal, Hussein, and now Abdullah II, no Hashemite king has openly consideredadopting the title of caliph.64 Yet the direct link to the Prophet is compelling, as isthe proximity and past responsibilities in reference to the possession of the Ka’abaand the city of Mecca itself. A return of Sharifan rule in the Hejaz would beopenly welcomed by some, especially if it were to rid the region of the influence ofthe Najdi Saud occupiers and the Muwahhidun.65 In such an instance, adeclaration by the Hashemite dynasty as a new caliphate just might be acceptedby many in the Muslim and, more critically, in the Arab world. However, as longas the Saudi royal family retains a tight security grip in the Peninsula and canlavish petro-dollars throughout the Middle East and elsewhere, such an event isnot likely to occur.

Barring any remarkable occurrence in the world, it does not appear likely at this timethat there will be a new or restored caliphate to guide and protect the Islamic world.All of the legitimate pretenders have either no ability to bring influence to bear(Nizam, Ottoman) or lack the desire to venture such an attempt in light of thepotentially disastrous consequences to them and their families (Hashemite). None ofthe other marginal, ceremonial, or insurgent claimants would be likely to be acceptedas even a serious candidate in competition with the legitimate pretenders. With thecurrent ascendancy of the House of Saud, its control of the two Holy Cities and a

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controlling share of the world’s oil supply, it is easy to say that it is highly unlikelythat any new caliphate will be seen.

Yet there may be the foundations of a new caliphate already in existence, onethat is not dependent upon the invocations of Islamists, if only a caliph can befound and unity of purpose is achieved. Inspired by the idea of uniting the Ummaagain in order to serve common political, economic and social interests, Muslimshad long sought for a way to work past the secularist, nationalist and socialistideologies present in modern Muslim nations. Finally prompted by the Israelioccupation of Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem in 1967, the Organization of theIslamic Conference (OIC) was founded in Morocco in 1969. Presently consisting of57 nations or entities (the PLO), its charter aims to preserve Islamic social andeconomic values; promote solidarity; increase cooperation in social, economic,cultural, scientific and political areas; uphold peace and security; and advanceeducation, particularly in the fields of science and technology. The OIC isestimated to a combined population of over 650 million people and a combinedGDP of $7.8 trillion.

A second, more regionally aligned organization (the Arab League) was founded inEgypt in 1945 by seven states. Excerpted directly from the Arab League website:

The Egyptian government first proposed the Arab League in 1943. Egypt andsome of the other Arab states wanted closer cooperation without the loss of self-rule that would result from total union. The original charter of the Arab Leaguecreated a regional organization of sovereign states that was neither a union nora federation. Among the goals the league set for itself were winningindependence for all Arabs still under alien rule, and to prevent the Jewishminority in Palestine (then governed by the British) from creating a Jewish state.The members eventually formed a joint defense council, an economic council,and a permanent military command.66

There are currently 22 members of the Arab League and three observers with anestimated population of 315 million people and an estimated combined GDP of $2.4trillion.

Potentially as important, in 1926, after two years of intense effort in the wake ofthe abolishment of the Ottoman caliphate, Al-Azhar University67 hosted the‘Congress of the Caliphate’ in order to re-establish the caliphate.68 Largely attendedby Egyptians and Palestinian Arabs, with minimal representation from elsewhere inthe Muslim world, the Cairo Congress advanced King Fuad I (installed by theBritish in 1922), king of Egypt (nominally independent under a British protectorate),as a candidate for caliph. Poorly run and subject to active interference from theSauds (Haji Abdul Wahhab was vice-president of the caliphate committee)69 and theBritish, the congress quickly broke down into largely procedural debates yetmanaged to deny Fuad’s bid, many considering him an ‘imperial stooge’.70

However, the congress managed to adopt two resolutions, one of which has anotable qualifier. Neither of these resolutions are disputed or discussed in Islam tothis day, but if a successful claimant can declare a caliphate then it is just possiblethat such a declaration would be based on the 1926 Cairo Congress and beconsidered to have the force of law as it came from Al-Azhar.

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The first resolution stated that when a new caliph is ‘appointed’, he must be a freesovereign capable of defending Islam. Important in that resolution was the omissionof one of the traditional five ‘prerequisites’ of caliph – descent from the Qureshitribe. Also not mentioned was that the appointed caliph not necessarily be inpossession of the two ‘Holy Cities’ of Mecca and Medina when appointed, atraditional ‘assumed’ requirement. The second resolution is potentially the mostsignificant, in that it states that ‘a Caliph can attain the office by conquest, providingalways that he be a Muslim’.71 More succinctly, Islam will rally to any Muslim whocan rise up, lead the Faithful, either destroy or force the enemies of Islam intosubmission, and declare himself caliph.

There exists now in the Muslim world legitimate caliphal bloodlines; organiza-tional and economic foundations; and potentially legal authority to restore thecaliphate today. All that is needed is the will. Maybe, just maybe, Aiman al-Zawahiridoesn’t dream in vain, if Allah wills it.

Notes

1. http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/entries/surge_iraq/, US Dipnote, US State Dept official blog

(accessed 9 April 2008). Also M. Fletcher, ‘How Life Returned to the Streets in a Showpiece City

that Drove out Al Qaeda’, UK, London Times, 31 Aug. 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/

world/iraq/article2358061.ece (accessed 27 April 2008).

2. It is unknown at the time of this article submission what the administration of President Obama will

call the GWOT.

3. The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition Online, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-cali

phat.html (accessed 7 April 2008).

4. P. Crone and M. Hinds, God’s Caliph, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp.1–4. See also

I. Goldziher, Muslim Studies, reprinted translation, NY, SUNY Press, 1967, pp.71–3.

5. http://www.islam101.com/politics/politicalsystem.htm. There is much more but the extract is adequate

for descriptive purposes. D. Pipes, The Caliphate, danielpipes.org, 12 Dec. 2005, http://www.

danielpipes.org/blog/548 (accessed 14 May 2008).

6. Dr. Y.L. Rizk, ‘A Diwan of Contemporary Life: A New Turkey’, Cairo, Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue

#488, 29 June–5 July 2000.

7. A.E. Mayer, ‘LAW: Modern Legal Reform’, in J. Esposito (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of the

Modern Islamic World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

8. Biography: Abd al-Raziq, Ali – Islamic Modernist, About.com, NY Times (accessed 14 May 2008).

9. START: Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (College Park, MD, Program on International

Policy Attitudes and University of Maryland), http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/

START_Apr07_quaire.pdf (accessed 7 May 2008).

10. START: Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (College Park, MD: Program on International

Policy Attitudes and University of Maryland, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/

START_Apr07_rpt.pdf (accessed 7 May 2008). Also see A.-K. Newell, What is the Caliphate, 8 Oct.

2007, UK; Caliphate Online: What is the Caliphate?, available at www.caliphate.eu/2007/10/tony-

blair (accessed 14 May 2008).

11. Newell, What is the Caliphate; Caliphate Online: Caliphate Organisation Chart, available at

www.caliphate.eu/eu/2007/10/caliphate-organisation-chart (accessed 15 May 2008).

12. E. Bumiller, ‘White House Letter: Watch word of the Day – Beware of the Caliphate’, NY,

International Herald Tribune, 11 Dec, 2005, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/12/11/news/

letter.php (accessed 14 May 2008).

13. To clarify, there is no single strictly codified and universal set of laws of shari’a available for viewing

and relatively easy interpretation. More correctly, shari’a is more of a system of how law should serve

humanity, a consensus of ‘unified belief’. It is based on the Qur’an, the hadith (sayings and actions of

Muhammad and his Companions), ijma (consensus), qiyas (analogy by deduction) and ijtihad

(reasoning). All of this has been accomplished by centuries of debate, interpretation and precedent by

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‘learned scholars’ called ‘alim’ in the singular and ‘ulama’ in the plural. There are plentiful publishing’s

on fiqh (technically a word referring to the science of Islamic law extracted from the above-noted

Islamic sources, actually means ‘deep understanding’ or ‘full comprehension’) over the last 1,400 years

which complement shari’a with evolving rulings and interpretations by Islamic jurists.

14. Pipes, The Caliphate.

15. Bumiller, ‘White House Letter’.

16. Office of the Press Secretary, White House, ‘President Discusses Global War on Terror’, Washington,

DC, 5 September 2006; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060905-

4.html (accessed 21 May 2008).

17. L. Yaxley, ‘Cheney Warns of Terrorist Caliphate Stretching to Indonesia’, Australia, PM Radio, 23 Feb.

2007; available at http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2007/s1855793.htm (accessed 28 May 2008).

18. PRNews Wire, ‘DNC: Romney’s ‘Jihad’ Ad Shows Lack of Foreign Policy Credentials’, Washington,

DC, Democratic National Committee Release, 12 Oct. 2007; DNC: Romney’s ‘Jihad’ Ad Shows Lack

of Foreign Policy Credentials, available at www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories/10-12-2007/

0004681123 (accessed 12 Oct. 2008).

19. M. Kramer, ‘Pen and Purse: Sabunji and Blunt’, in C.E. Bosworth et al. (eds.), The Islamic World

From Classical to Modern Times: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lewis (Princeton, NJ: Darwin, 1989),

pp.771–80. Also available at ‘Arab Pen, English Purse: John Sabunji and Wilfrid Scawen Blunt’ by

Martin Kramer, www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/blunt (accessed 7 May 2008).

20. The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World describes Maududi as ‘one of the most influential

and prolific contemporary Muslim thinkers. His interpretive reading of Islam has contributed greatly to

the articulation of Islamic revivalist thought and has influenced Muslim thinkers and activists from

Morocco to Indonesia. His impact is evident in the exegesis of Sayyid Qutb of Egypt, as well as in the

ideas and actions of Algerian, Iranian, Malaysian and Sudanese revivalist activists’.

21. Full title is Nizam-ul-Mulk, meaning ‘Administrator of the Realm’; the dynasty was founded in 1719

and ruled until 1948, when India invaded and drove out the Nizam. The largest and wealthiest of the

princely states, it ruled an area nearly as large as Great Britain with a population in excess of 16

million mostly Hindu Indians before its forcible annexation into India.

22. Maududi wrote one of his first published works on the caliphate, that being: Mas’ala-e Khilafat (The

Question of Caliphate) (Delhi, 1922). Maududi was caught up in the fervour and himself joined the

migration of some 18,000 Indian Muslims (called Hijratis) to India via the Khyber Pass; he was

repatriated to British India several months later along with several thousand other disillusioned and

destitute ex-mujahideen. C. Allen, God’s Terrorists (Cambridge, MA: De Capo Press, 2006).

23. A.A. Mawdudi, Islamic Way of Life (Delhi: Markazi Maktaba Islami, 1967), p.40.

24. Hizb-ut-Tahrir Official Website of Hizb ut tahrir – a political party whose ideology is Islam, available

at www.hizbuttahtir.org (accessed 5 May 2008).

25. J.V. McQuaid, The Struggle for Unity and Authority in Islam: Reviving the Caliphate? (Alexandria,

VA: CNA Center for Strategic Studies, 2007), p.21.

26. S. Akhavi, The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1995).

27. T. Stanley, PWCHE.Org; PWHCE Middle East Project: Sayyid Qutb Profile, available at

www.pwhce.org/qutb (accessed 3 May 2008).

28. E. Schecter, ‘Memories of Sayyid Qutb: An Interview with John Calvert’, Tel Aviv, Worldpress.org

interview, 19 Sept. 2005; see Memories of Sayyid Qutb: An Interview With John Calvert, available at

www.worldpress.org/Mideast/2150 (accessed 5 May 2008).

29. ideofact: Qutbdex 1, available at www.ideofact.com/archives/000553 (accessed 20 April 2008).

30. M. Scheuer, ‘The Pious Caliphate Will Start From Afghanistan’, Jamestown Global Terrorism

Analysis, Vol.2, No.12, 24 June 2005; see ‘The Pious Caliphate Will Start From Afghanistan: Is al-

Qaeda’s Long-Held Afghan Strategy Now Unfolding?’, available at www.Jamestown.org/programs/

gta/single (accessed 7 May 2008).

31. BBC News, South Asia Text of Usama Bin Ladin Video Oct 7 2001 (BBC translation), available at

news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1585636 (accessed 28 May 2008).

32. BBC News, SOUTH ASIA, Bin Laden’s warning, available at news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/

1585636 (accessed 7 May 2008).

33. Usama Bin-Muhammad Bin-Ladin; Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu-Yasir Rifa’i Ahmad Taha, Mir

Hamzah, Fazlur Rahman, World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders: ‘Fatwa’

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Statement (Arabic), al-Quds al-Arabi, Feb. 1998. English language version of the fatwa translated by

the Federation of American Scientists of the original Arabic document published in the newspaper al-

Quds al-Arabi, London, UK, 23 Feb. 1998, p.3.

34. Y. Aboul-Enein, ‘Ayman al-Zawahiri: The Ideologue of Modern Islamic Militancy’, Air University,

Alabama, Counterproliferation Paper # 21, March 2004.

35. L. Wright, The Looming Tower (New York: Knopf Publishing Group, 2006), p.37.

36. B. Hoffman, ‘Scarier than Bin Laden’, Washington DC, Washington Post, 9 Sept. 2007, p.B1,

available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/07AR2007090702056 (ac-

cessed 7 May 2008).

37. Translation on GlobalSecurity.org website, see Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi (accessed 7 May

2008). This translation of the 9 July 2005 letter was posted to Global Security only after being released

by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on 11 Oct. 2005.

38. McQuaid, The Struggle for Unity and Authority in Islam, p.16.

39. Clearly a caliph would have to be a Muslim, but what kind of Muslim?

40. Ab�u Zayd ‘Abdu r-Ra.hman bin Mu.hammad bin Khald�un (1332 AD/732 AH–1406 AD/808 AH), was

a famous historian, scholar, theologian, and statesman born in North Africa. He is considered the

forerunner of several social scientific disciplines: demography, cultural history, historiography, the

philosophy of history, sociology, and modern economics. He is sometimes considered to be a ‘father’

of these disciplines, or even the social sciences in general, for anticipating many elements of these

disciplines centuries before they were founded.

41. F. Rosenthal (trans.), Ibn Khaldun: The Muqaddimah (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

1967), pp.158, 159.

42. This in essence glorification of the lineage of the Qureshi appears to contradict the essence of Islam,

that all men are equal before God. The near deification of the Prophet’s lineage can also be considered

shirk, which is stated as an unforgivable sin in Islam. Specifically, the categories of sin are shirk by

Rub�ub�ıyah (worship) and shirk by al-Asma was-Sifat (deification).

43. Born in 868, Hujjat ibn Hasan was only six years old when he supposedly went into occultation. His

occultation is in two periods, an initial ‘minor’ one and a second ‘major’ one. The minor occultation

period is listed as 874 to 939, in which deputies of the Imam maintained contact between him and the

world. The major occultation period commenced in 939 in which all contact was broken and the Imam

was (and still is) hidden by God, only to return at such a time as God decides. Upon his return

absolute justice will be brought to the world, but then al-Masi al-Dhajjal (the false messiah, who will

be one-eyed) will appear and then Issa (Jesus) will return to assist the Imam/Mahdi to defeat al-

Dhajjal, destroy the Jews and bring peace and justice to the world.

44. Companions indicates ‘Companions of the Prophet’. There is controversy as to exactly what

this means but it has generally been taken to mean that a Companion was one who was close to

Muhammad. There are 50 or 60 usually listed as Companions but some describe all early

Muslims prior to the death of Muhammad as Companions or those who were at Muhammad’s

last sermon on his last Hajj to Mecca. This runs the Companions into the thousands and tens of

thousands.

45. Crone and Hinds argue that the caliphs were not mere successors to Muhammad as leaders of the

Muslim community but were actually deputies of God. Goldziher describes the caliphs as ‘the

successor of the prophet approved of by God.’ Crone and Hinds, God’s Caliph, p.5; Goldziher,Muslim

Studies, p.61. For further clarification, see Sura 2:28, 2:31, 7:75 and 38:25 of the Qur’an.

46. The Abbasids came to power in 750 AD.

47. Succession through Ali and Fatima.

48. Unfortunately just a footnote to history, Ali bin al-Husayn, son of Ali, grandson of the Prophet

Muhammad and thus a member of the Ahl al-Bayt (household of Muhammad), which the Caliph Ali

had declared the only person entitled to assume the mantle of caliph, is considered by some (primarily

Shi’a, who consider Husayn to be the second of the twelve Shi’a Imams, Ali being the first) to be a 5th

Rashidun caliph. He served only seven months, voluntarily relinquishing his rule to Mu’awiyah bin

Abi Sufyan, then governor of Syria and founder of the Umayyad dynasty, after an armed stand-off

and then a nearly successful assassination attempt on Hasan’s life.

49. This has never been actually established and has largely been expounded by the Ottomans themselves

only after the signing of the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca in 1774 after being defeated in the Russo-

Turkish War of 1768–74.

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50. M. Ahmed, Khilafat and Caliphate, Al Islam website, pdf document, pp.10–13; available at http://

www.alislam.org/topics/khilafat/khilafat-and-caliphate.pdf (accessed 1 June 2008). This website is

maintained and run by the Ahmadiyya Muslim Group.

51. Unless he is considered to be the false messiah, al-Dhajjal. Then his claim to the caliphate assumes

‘legitimacy’ as a counter-caliphate intended to persecute Muslims.

52. W. Dalrymple, ‘The Lost World of Hyderabad’, Pakistan, Dawn/The Guardian News Service,

December 2007, available at www.dawn.com/2007/12/11/int13 (accessed 11 Dec. 2007).

53. Azmet Jah is a film cameraman and has worked extensively in Hollywood; he plans to return to

Hyderabad to try and recoup both the family name and lost assets. Dalrymple, ‘The Lost World of

Hyderabad’.

54. J.T. Wheeler, The History of India from the Earliest Ages, Vol. IV, Part II (London: Trubner & Co.,

1881), p.322.

55. F.A. Bernstein, ‘Not Quite a Castle, but It’s Home’, NY, NY Times, 26 March 2006.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. All real or claimed lineages to the Prophet Muhammad are via his daughter Fatima, as there were no

living sons to have any offspring. Muhammad’s first wife was Khadija bint Khuwayhd and she bore

him six reported children, two sons named Qasim and Tayyeb (or Tahir) who both died in infancy,

and four daughters, Fatima, Zainab, Ruqayya and Umm Kulthum. Fatima was married to Ali ibn

Abu Talib, the fourth caliph, from whom all Alid lineages are derived.

59. In the time of Muhammad, the Banu Hashemite sub-clan (of the Banu Abd Manaf clan of the Banu

Qureshi tribe) were the keepers of the Ka’aba.

60. J. Teitelbaum, ‘Sharif Husayn ibn Ali and the Hashemite Vision of the Post-Ottoman Order: from

Chieftaincy to Suzerainty’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.34, No.1 (Jan. 1998), pp. 103–21.

61. Ibid.

62. Undoubtedly encouraged by selective viewing of British political attitudes towards a Sharifan

caliphate.

63. C. Buyers, ‘Al-Hashimi Dynasty’, The Royal Ark website, UK, 2007, Hejaz, available at

www.royalark.netJordan/jordan (accessed 21 May 2008). This is currently the internet’s most

comprehensive website on the genealogies of current Royal and ruling houses.

64. Intriguingly, the Hashemite family did aim to unite Syria, Transjordan and Iraq into a Hashemite

union in the period from the 1920s to 1958. The effort failed due to Syrian and Iraqi nationalism and

distrust of the Hashemite dynasty, to Egyptian and Saudi obstructionism, and to familial discord

among the Hashemites. See R. Simon, ‘The Hashemite ‘Conspiracy’: Hashemite Unity Attempts,

1921–1958’, UK, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.5, No.3 (June 1974), pp. 314–27.

65. The Saudis are considered occupiers of the Hejaz and the Muwahhidun (roughly Arabic for

Unitarians, known in the West as Wahhabis) are not well liked in Mecca. Both the Sauds and the

Muwahhidun are considered ‘inferior’ and barbarous by the Arabs of the Hejaz. The presence of the

Hashemite dynasty in nearby Jordan is a constant political thorn that the Saudi dynasty must deal

with in regards to the Hejaz and much of the Arab world.

66. Arabji website; Arab League Page, available at www.arabji.com/ArabGovt/ArabLeague (accessed 30

May 2008).

67. Ironically this Sunni university, whose stated aim is the propagation of Islamic religion and culture

and the Arabic language (the language of the Qur’an), was founded in 988 AD by the Fatamids, the

Shi’a counter-caliphate.

68. A.H. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970),

p.184; and also M. Kramer, Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1986), pp.86–105.

69. M.V. Bruinessen, ‘Muslims of the Dutch East Indies and the Caliphate Question’, Paris, Studia

Islamica, Vol.2, No.3 (1995), p.140.

70. Ibid., pp.126–30.

71. ‘Wanted: a Calif’, US, Time, 31 May 1926. No byline was on the article, which was written on 24 May

1926.

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