the conclusion of ilustrado politics by michael cullinane

ILUSTRADO POLITICS: FILIPINO ELITE RESPONSES TO AMERICAN RULE, 18981908

Conclusion

At the end of the nineteenth century, a very large portion of Filipino society (possibly as much as 90 percent of the population) consisted of those who derived their living from farming, fishing, and labor. The income and livelihood of the largest segment of this underclassthe peasantrywere determined by access to land (as small holders, tenant farmers, or landless laborers). At the same time there was a growing body of urban laborers working at the margins of each of the major cities (Manila, Cebu, and Iloilo). Above this underclass existed a small body of elites (perhaps 10 percent of the population) who possessed greater wealth and status and controlled an increasingly large portion of the peasantry and labor force through a number of informal personal and formal socioeconomic mechanisms and institutions buttressed by the Spanish colonial legal and administrative systems. Outside the three major urban centers, two levels of elites, municipal and provincial, have been distinguished in the contemporary records, with the latter displaying considerable wealth and influence. In the urban centers, two categories of elites have been identified: a middle sector (made up of, among others, artisans, clerks, labor foremen, and employees of the colonial and commercial offices), and an urban elite of individuals and families that stood out from the others in terms of wealth and position. Wealth and status varied considerably among the four elite groups, with the provincial and urban elites possessing the greatest wealth and influence within their areas of operation.

In the last half of the nineteenth century, as educational opportunities expanded within the colonial society, an increasingly large number of Filipino elites (at all levels) attended municipal, provincial, and urban schools. Those who achieved more advanced education and obtained degrees and titles emerged as a recognizable subgroup of Filipino elites generally referred to in the Philippines as ilustrados. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, ilustrados studying in Spain formed a recognizable "Filipino"

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pressure group seeking reforms of the colonial government and changes in the relationship between Filipinos and Spain. Within the more repressive political environment of the Philippines, only very few ilustrados engaged in "propaganda," while most competed with one another for the highest posts available to them in the colonial bureaucracy. Few politically active ilustrados, in or out of the Philippines, advocated rebellion, most sought increased "autonomy," that is, a larger role for Filipinos in running the colonial government from parish and municipality to the highest levels of bureaucratic and judicial offices in Manila. The Katipunan, the revolutionary society of the 1890s, was established and led mostly by moderately educated representatives of Manila's urban middle sector and the municipal elites, mostly of Cavite, with only minimal participation from ilustrados. Nevertheless, the violence and devastation during the revolutionary era (18961897) shattered the lives of ilustrados everywhere and created a new environment for political involvement by the start of 1898.

Ilustrados played important roles at the very beginning of American rule in the Philippines. The earliest collaborators were among the most educated men of the country and their leaders had a clear sense of what cooperation with the Americans meant for themselves, for their colleagues, and for their people. As it became evident to these men that the Americans intended to establish a government in which important posts would be reserved for Filipinos, they began working closely with the Americans, at first with military officers and later with civilian representatives commissioned by the president of the United States. Confident of their abilities and their right to govern over their people and having suffered long the humiliation of inferior status under Spanish colonial officials and clergymen, the leading figures among the earliest collaborators advocated annexation in an effort to achieve equality with the colonizer. Contemplating a colonial government based on appointive positions emanating from the center, as was the case under Spain, this group of ilustrados established a

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close bond with the leading patron among the early American civilian administrators, William H. Taft, and formed a political organization, the Partido Federal, that not only worked with the Americans but genuinely sought many of the same goals as the American colonial officials. By 1901 this group of mostly Manilabased ilustrados had established a solid working relationship with the Taft government, which openly favored its members in appointments to high office, even naming three of its most prominent leaders, Pardo de Tavera, Legarda, and Luzuriaga, to the colony's highest lawmaking body, the Philippine Commission. Fully prepared to rule alongside the colonial authorities, these men were less inclined to engage in the variety of electoral politics they were assisting the Americans to set up in the pacified provinces.

Many other ilustrados, as well as lesseducated Filipinos throughout the archipelago, had initially joined the resistance to the Americans, forming alliances with the forces fighting to preserve the Philippine Republic of 1898, including among them a number of ilustrados working abroad (in Hong Kong, Spain, and North America) to obtain recognition for the Republic and to mobilize sentiments against the American imperial advance in the Philippines. The leadership of the resistance in the Philippines came from municipal elites and representatives of the urban middle sectors. When those in the resistance gradually quit the war and returned to Manila or elsewhere, they often retained their more fervent nationalist sentiments, especially when they found the new colonial government in close collaboration with the Federalistas, or what they preferred at the time to call the americanistas. Although some eventually joined the Federalistas, many were not inclined to do so, in part because of their opposition to annexation, but also because they belonged to different social and political networks that predated the events of 1898 (such as ethnic, kin, classmate, and/or socioeconomic groups). What resulted in Manila by 1900 was the emergence of a substantial group of disgruntled urbanbased ilustrados and members of the urban middle sector

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who found themselves at political odds with the favored Federalistas and unable to gain access to the new patronage system dominated at the top by Taft and the leaders of the Partido Federal.

For the next seven years these men endeavored to challenge the premises of Federalista supremacy, that is, the advocacy of annexation and the right to speak for the ilustrados. Until 1907, Filipino elites were divided by a single issue, whether to seek independence or to abandon the quest in favor of assimilation with the United States. The primary goals of the oppositionists, who acted as individuals and through a number of loosely organized groups in Manila, were to undermine Federalista control by demonstrating the popularity of the desire for independence and to obtain both recognition and position within the society and emerging political system. Without access to political patronage and with no elections in the city until 1907, these men and their nationalistic allies among the urban middle sector concentrated their efforts on a number of polemical activities (journalism, patriotic drama, labor organizing, establishing schools to propagate their ideals, and organizing political associations) in an effort to discredit their rivals and wrest control from them. In the process, most of these urbanbased "irreconcilables" began to involve themselves with the new colonial regime and its representatives, fully acknowledging that the military struggle was a thing of the past. As advocates of independence, they found an uneasy accommodation within the emerging colonial condition, focusing their efforts on acceptable forms of nationalist expression and on demonstrating their abilities in those areas that attracted the greatest response within the political milieu. The most prolific group of ilustrados, the lawyers, mastered the new codes imposed by the Americans, passed the bar examinations, and launched careers as successful attorneys in competition and cooperation with their American and Federalista adversaries (and occasionally partners). Aware of the colonial realities, most of these men established cordial relations with Americans and all but very few cultivated a respectful, if

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distant, relationship with Taft and the other leading American colonial administrators. By the time their opportunity came to challenge the Federalistas for political control, most were well integrated into the urban society and, to a very large degree, were already collaborating. As such, their primary grievances were concentrated on the annexationist policy of the Federalistas and the party's monopoly of major governmental positions.

As these developments played themselves out in Manila, more fundamental changes were occurring in the provinces as an electoral system was implemented linking each municipality to its provincial capital. As the FilipinoAmerican War came to an end in the provinces, most municipal and provincial elites made a rapid transition to accommodation with the American authorities. With little or no reference to the polemics of Manila or to the issue of collaboration, many prominent provincial ilustrados and municipal elites participated in the elections at the end of 1901. At the start of 1902, for the first time, the municipal elections for mayor (presidente) and councilors (consejales) in each province were linked to the election of the provincial governor, a position that had been reserved for Spaniards in the past regime. This was a significant political development that had a lasting impact on Filipino politics.

It was soon clear that provincial governors would wield considerable influence in the new colonial power structure at the local level and that elections would be the only way to capture the governorship. As the only Filipinos on the threeman provincial boards (until 1907), the governors were immediately in a position to influence patronage and the allocation of government resources. Competition for the governorship soon became intense and led to the formation of electoral alliances among prominent and powerful individuals and families seeking to control local political affairs. Although the selection of governors took place within an almost completely Filipino milieu, many of the earliest elections were influenced by locally prominent

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Americans, usually men holding key positions in the provincial government, such as constabulary officers, judges, or members of the provincial boards. The ease with which provincial political networks were formed was greatly facilitated by the highly restricted suffrage, limiting the electorate in most cases to the municipal and provincial elites. As political leaders emerged in the provinces they did so as politicians with electoral constituencies, unlike the Federalists of Manila, whose alliance with the Americans was the primary basis of their political success. When provincial politicians entered the national political arena they were not solely dependent on American patronage and were, therefore, in a better position (than the Manilabased Federalistas and their opponents) to establish a more permanent political base upon which to collaborate and negotiate with the colonial authorities. To a very large degree, the electoral system introduced during this early period, while confirming the existing social structure, provided local elites with a dynamic political institution (elections), upon which to consolidate their existing socioeconomic control at the local level and, significantly, to expand their influence over provincial and eventually national politics and government.

The early careers of both Quezon and Osmeña make it clear that these two men rose to local political prominence through the careful manipulation of local alliances and issues, as well as with the cooperation and assistance of influential American colonial officials and prominent Manilabased ilustrados. From their youthful educational pilgrimages, they had been exposed to the full range of contemporary nationalist sentiments and had integrated many of these elements into their personal and political lives. It was, in fact, their abilities to engage in nationalist discourse and their contacts with leading nationalists that allowed them to overcome their provincial origins and to take advantage of the possibilities presented by the new colonial rulers. At a very early stage both came to the realization that the traditional ilustrado career pattern aimed at high bureaucratic

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appointment would not lead to the most powerful and influential positions under the Americans. Both moved quickly and permanently into the realm of electoral politics, first at the provincial and then at the national level, taking the lead in the transition from the ilustrado bureaucrat to the lawyer politician who would come to dominate Philippine politics. In this endeavor both men were eminently skilled political practitioners who moved almost flawlessly toward their goal. Their ultimate success, however, must be viewed within the context of their relationships with the key figures around them (both Filipinos and Americans) and their good fortune at having been in the right place (the province) at the right time (the formative years of the new colonial regime).

As the FederalistaAmerican collaborative alliance began to break down between 1904 and 1905 and as it became clear that future positions of political power would come through the expanding electoral system rooted in the provinces (and not through appointments originating in Manila), a realignment of ilustrado politics and the collaborative arrangement began to take place. Although this change has most frequently been viewed in terms of a group of younger, more nationalistic politicians displacing the older, now discredited Federalistas, the situation was more complex. Though not widely acknowledged, it is evident that by 1905 the ilustrados of Manila had already reached an ideological consensus favoring independence over annexation, yielding a body of likeminded ilustrados divided into two broad political groupings, one in power (the Federalistas) and the other vying for power (the Nacionalistas). The political developments of the next two years (19051907), however, were not shaped by these men or their parties, which up to the time of the election for the assembly remained for the most part organizations confined to the greater Manila area. Moreover, the Nacionalista opposition was in complete disarray, unable to decide on candidates or party leaders. Rather than Nacionalistas replacing Federalistas in 1907, it was more a case of provincebased politicians replacing a small body of Manilabased

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ilustrados with no electoral experience and with very limited constituencies.1

The Partido Nacionalista did not come into power or, indeed, into existence until after the election, when its leaders formed the necessary coalition of provincial delegates to control the assembly.

The Federalistas of Manila were not the only losers in 1907. All urbanbased ilustrados unable or unwilling to make the transition to the new politics found themselves with little recourse except to pursue their professions and work for high bureaucratic posts, not unlike their condition under Spain. In a rather philosophical assessment of their electoral defeat, the Federalista organ, La Democracia (cited in Manila Times, 1 Aug. 1907), stressed that, in the final analysis, the colonial government was the real winner in 1907, since the Nacionalistas would be unable to obtain independence and would, therefore, "cooperate with the present government." The electoral struggle, the editors concluded, "was nothing but a fight waged to see which should be the governmental party." True enough, but what the editors of La Democracia failed to realize was that by 1907 access to bureaucratic office within the government was no longer determined solely by the colonial rulers. As Nacionalista influence grew within the colonial government, appointments were increasingly influenced by the leaders of the party in powera situation that did not exist under Spanish rule. From the outset, the Partido Nacionalista was a loosely organized and unstable coalition held together, not by its advocacy of independence, but by its leaders, who maintained their positions and their control over national politics by operating as effective brokers between colonial administrators and political elites at the local and national levels.

Thus, in 1907 an urbanbased assimilationist clique of wealthy ilustrados was displaced as the primary collaborative group by a mostly provincebased national coalition of ilustrados (with Manilabased allies) expounding a popular nationalist rhetoric. Despite this change, James LeRoy

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(1908, 85052), in his assessment of the first year of the Philippine Assembly, observed that the delegates lacked "real, logical party division" in that there was no "definite, practical issue" upon which to base such division. The near universal advocacy of independence by aspirants to political office after 1907 removed the only major issue that divided politically motivated ilustrados. Subsequently, divisions among political elites increasingly concentrated on the acquisition and control of political office and on the ability of nationallevel politicians to increase their authority and power within the colonial government.

Since the assembly did not seriously consider a proposal for independence in its inaugural year, LeRoy argued that independence was merely a "fictitious" issue. His dismissal of the independence issue, however, missed the critical point. For the Nacionalistas the demand for independence was and remained at the core of their political interactions with Americans, serving multiple purposes within the colonial milieu. As a matter of pride, the public advocacy of independence was important to most ilustrados. More generally, the sentiment for independence was undoubtedly popular among a very wide segment of Filipino society (regardless of how it was interpreted), making it mandatory for all political parties after 1907 to declare themselves for independence. Most important, however, the demand for independence was the most effective issue for ilustrado politicians to gain political leverage in their struggle with the Americans for increased political autonomy and control of government. No matter how Americans interpreted the Filipino demand for independence, few if any felt it an unreasonable request; most respected the Filipino desire for independence but had convinced themselves that the Filipinos were not yet ready for it (cf. Forbes 1909, 201). By not granting an independence that they themselves acknowledged as a legitimate Filipino goal, the Americans were obliged to continually bargain with elected political elites in search of increased autonomy within the colonial government. The issue of independence and the persistent demand for it by

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Filipino national politicians succeeded in obtaining major concessions from the colonial authorities, making the demand for "immediate, complete, and absolute independence" a most effective political slogan indeed.2

Late in his life Osmeña (1957, 1011) recalled the critical turning point of 1907 and explained the actions and accomplishments of the Nacionalistas under his leadership in this way:

So it was that from the start of our work in the Assembly I felt certain and confident that our best course was to work with America in the spirit of mutual understanding without sacrificing our dignity, our rights and our liberty. Under my leadership and throughout the life of the Assembly, therefore, we maintained a policy of mutual friendship and mutual cooperation with the United States. Looking back to this policy and its consequences, I can perhaps state truthfully that any other policy would have failed to secure for us the successive organic acts under which we gradually broadened our autonomy, inevitably leading to our independence and sovereignty.3

After more than fifty years, Osmeña was, in effect, publicly acknowledging that the accusations of La Independencia in 1899 – that he was an autonomista – were valid and that from the outset he had pursued a more pragmatic path to independence. For Osmeña this was a very successful path, one that permitted ilustrado politicians, like himself, to achieve their longsought goal: selfgovernment or "political autonomy" under colonial rule.

As an ilustrado from an urban elite background, educated for leadership over his less fortunate countrymen, Osmeña never questioned his right to rule in the name of his people. His knowledge, intelligence, and position in society provided him with undeniable qualifications for high position in the colonial government. Furthermore, within the legalistic framework of the new regime being imposed by the Americans, Osmeña

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possessed the most important credential for leadership, a law degree, and as the rule of law prevailed, the lawyers soon came to rule. Osmeña and his political associates were fond of referring to themselves as the "directing class," that category of Filipino society that quite naturally should direct the others.

As noted in chapter 5, the earliest public promotions of the concept of the "directing class" occurred in August 1905, when the Manilabased oppositionists who later formed the leadership of the Partido Nacionalista submitted a memorial to Secretary of War Taft during his visit to the Philippines. This unabashedly elitist document is a clear statement of the way in which this influential body of ilustrados viewed themselves and their society. The memorial stressed the capacity of educated Filipinos to rule over the "popular masses," who had over the centuries demonstrated their "capacity" to obey. "These factors," the memorial concluded, "are the only two by which to determine the political capacity of a country; an entity that knows how to govern, the directing class, and an entity that knows how to obey, the popular masses" (M. Kalaw 1927, 19394).4 The concept of the "directing class" was quite popular among nationalist ilustrados of the time. Quezon integrated the notions of this idealized class structure into his 1906 report on the province of Tayabas, where he stressed that the directing class, a body of peaceloving, lawabiding agriculturalists, enjoyed great influence and controlled public opinion, while the "common people" lived under them "happy and satisfied" (RPC 1906, 1:461).

Perhaps the most advanced statement in defense of educated elite rule within the context of the democratic institutions introduced by American colonialism was made by Macario Adriatico in an article published in 1917. Adriatico refined the theory of the directing class to mean the ilustrados, or, as he referred to them, "the Aristocracy of Intellect." "There is hardly any provincial governor or municipal president," he emphasized with some

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exaggeration, "who is not an intellectual person, and the intervention of the directing class is the most evident and patent in our Assembly in which there is gathered the cream of the intellectual element of each province or district, and thanks to the success achieved by our Assembly, our participation in the direction and government of our country has been more and more extended." By 1917, he could boast that "now we have a Senate, the members of which are all Filipinos, and, with the exception of the GovernorGeneral, the Secretary of Public Instruction, and a few Bureau chiefs, all Secretaries and Department heads and Bureau chiefs are also Filipinos, which is a recognition of our capacity to govern ourselves."5 It was, therefore, the existence of these educated men carrying out their responsibilities in government that demonstrated the Filipino capacity to rule and this, argued Adriatico, was all that was necessary for the establishment of a democratic government worthy of independence .6

By 1907 the body of men who controlled the assembly (led by Osmeña and Quezon)now the directors of the directing classcaptured national political positions that allowed them to share state power with the American colonial rulers. At this time, the program of "political education" envisioned by Root and implemented by Taft had retreated to Manila, where the socalled tutors in democracy supervised from afar, not overly eager to delve too deeply into the abyss of local Filipino politics.7 Over the next thirty years, Osmena and Quezon continuously worked to expand their power at the national level through manipulating nationalist discourse, controlling bureaucratic patronage at all levels of government (including some success at influencing the appointments of American governorsgeneral), and increasing the centralization of governmental functions that came under their control. By the time Manuel Quezon moved into the presidential palace in 1935, the directing class, led by the two former provincial politicians, represented a political oligarchy whose power was rooted in the democratic institutions imposed by the early American colonial authorities.8

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The two American colonialists most closely associated with Osmeña and Quezon's rise to national leadership, Forbes and Bandholtz, suffered no illusions about the kind of government emerging under presumed American tutelage. In private correspondence and diaries their sentiments were frequently revealed. Bandholtz was acutely aware of what he called the Filipino elite's "insatiable appetite for political power" and lamented from his imperialist vantage point the premature surrender of such power at the local level: "We started in by giving these people more authority than they could possibly handle."9 In his negative assessments, however, Bandholtz acknowledged neither his own complicity in the "giving" nor the personal rewards his political involvement yielded, even if he did quite often express his own rather hearty appetite for political power and intrigue.10 What he also failed to acknowledge was that the emerging Filipino political elite knew quite well how to handle authority and quickly converted it into political power, just as Bandholtz had done in Tayabas in 19001901.

Forbes was particularly dismayed at the operations of local government under Filipino political elites and saw as the only hopeshort of reversing the established direction"rigid continuing inspection."11 In a rather emotional description of Osmeña's inauguration as Speaker of the assembly a description that balanced elation over the victory of his political ally with misgivings over the future of Philippine democracyForbes wrote in his diary:

Everyone knew that here was the real leader of the Philippine Islands. He will order the disorder, and while he lasts make the Assembly a success. The only danger is lest the unthinking at home shall confound the capacity which the Assembly will show as evidence of a democratic capacity instead of the evidence of a power of being dominated. 12

Forbes went on to compare Osmeña's rule with that of Porfirio Diaz, the then constitutional dictator of Mexico. Despite this depiction of his close political colleague, many years later Forbes preferred to view Osmeña as the

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"Apostle of Cooperation," the man who made it possible for Forbes to become governorgeneral and to carry out many of the projects that were important to his administration. The cooperation that Forbes received from Osmeña was essential to the smooth functioning of the colonial state, in large part because Forbes could rely on Osmeña and Quezon to control Filipino politics and contain its more threatening polemics, permitting Forbes to concentrate on matters of greater concern to him. By comparing Osmeña with Diaz, the dictatorial head of an independent government, Forbes was, perhaps without realizing it, minimizing his own position and acknowledging the fact that he, as the governorgeneral, was the head of state under a government headed by Osmeña." Forbes seems to have believed that politics could be somehow separated from the tasks of the colonial state and never quite understood why, at the local level, government did not operate as smoothly as he would have liked. What he never realized was that Osmeña had as little control over local politics and government as he did; the only difference was that Osmeña could manipulate local political alliances to his advantage and therefore win votes and stay in office, not by supervising or correcting misguided local politicos but by keeping them on his side.

Both Filipino elites and American colonial officials expounded a popular rhetoric to justify, sometimes to mask, their more pragmatic actions and interactions. American colonial officials constructed themselves as teachers or purveyors of democracy and democratic institutions, as though pursuing a mission of practical political education that would uplift and develop the Filipino people. In reality, they managed only to establish their authority and control the upper levels of the colonial government. Filipino political elites framed their response to American imperialism in terms of their enduring struggle for "immediate, absolute, and complete independence," constructing themselves as twentiethcentury heirs of the propagandistas and revolutionaries of 1898. In reality, they concentrated their energies on controlling political offices and on influencing colonial

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policy. Ultimately, elements of the two rhetorical visions were realized. Democratic institutions, in particular the institution of elections, were implemented and had a lasting impact on Philippine politics and political culture. Similarly, by 1916 Filipinos obtained the promise of independence, which was formally recognized after the Japanese occupation in 1946. Nevertheless, along the way the ideological foundations of American colonialism and Filipino nationalism were reduced to rhetorical positions in the deepening interactions between the representatives of the two elites. As the FilipinoAmerican War ended, American colonial officials and Filipino politicians were locked in collaboration, a collaboration (though not devoid of conflict) that sustained both and led to the manipulation of the ideals that both espoused throughout the encounter. For both groups expedient political and personal objectives and tactics consumed their ideological commitments (cf. Hutchcroft 2000).

Working through the political institutions implemented between 1901 and 1907, the new generation of Filipino politicians gave birth to a national politics, altering forever the sociopolitical realities of Filipino society. The introduction of the electoral system within the social and colonial contexts existing at the century's turn contributed significantly to the strengthening of local elite dominance and facilitated the establishment of a hierarchical system through which local and national politicians could legitimize and expand their control over the society as a whole (cf. J. Go 1999). Democratic institutions from the beginning were manipulated and adjusted to serve the special interests of American colonial administrators and the Filipino directing class. The relationship that developed between Filipino politicians and American colonial officials, founded as it was on mutual interests, is the primary political legacy upon which "special" U.S.Philippine relations have been based up to the present.

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NOTES

1. It is interesting to speculate that if the American colonial government had not attempted to implement a system of elected officials at the provincial level and had not moved to establish a national elective assembly, it is possible that the prominent Federalistas would have remaineddespite their unattractive stand on Philippine independence and their conflicts with some of the leading American administratorsthe leading Filipinos in the collaborative government for some years to come. The irony is that it was the leading Federalistas who pushed the colonial government (directly through their contacts with Taft) to move in the direction of a national elective assembly (see, for example, Pardo de Tavera 1917, 6667).

2. By 1913, Quezon was confident enough in his relationship with Frank McIntyre, chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, to express his personal opposition to early independence, while at the same time negotiating with McIntyre for further political concessions. In this negotiation Quezon admitted that the American governorgeneral, Francis B. Harrison, unlike himself, actually favored independence: "He thinks he can turn us loose in about four years." See, for example, "Interview with Manuel Quezon, [by] General Frank McIntyre," in Schirmer and Shalom 1987, 5152 (from McIntyre's "Memorandum no. 11913," 29 Dec. 1913: 23, USNA). For an excellent study of nonelite responses to the nationalist political rhetoric of Filipino politicians see Ileto 1984, who makes it clear that the orator's cry for independence was perceived as part and parcel of a politics that had little to do with the quest for liberation.

3. In a radio speech delivered in Nov. 1940, Osmeña (1941, 2125) made a similar assessment of his career up to that date, stressing that after unsuccessful efforts to win their freedom by military efforts, Filipinos settled into a peaceful collaboration with the Americans to gradually prepare themselves for independence. In his opinion this policy of collaboration was successful.

4. A remarkably similar view of Filipino society was depicted by David Barrows in his 1902 testimony before the Senate (Affairs in the Philippine Islands 1902, 1:68082), though he did not draw the same conclusions about the positive aspects of this class structure.

5. Adriatico 1917, 4145. From the beginning, ilustrados had stressed the importance of education, advocating a highly restricted suffrage and stressing the inappropriateness of the large majority of uneducated Filipinos to vote (see, for example, Schurman 1902, 3133). When given the chance to determine who should be eligible to vote in their own Constitution of 1935, the ilustrado politicians, delegates to the

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convention, voted unanimously to deny the franchise to Filipinos who could not read and write (see Hayden 1942, 203).

6. The leading propagandist for the Nacionalistas during the preCommonwealth era was Maximo M. Kalaw, whose three books (1916, 1919, 1927) were wellcrafted statements representing the interests of the leading ilustrado politicians, in particular, Osmeña and Quezon. For Kalaw, credit for the success of American colonial institutions was due to the "directing class," and in his SelfGovernment in the Philippines (1919, 2021), he wrote: "Without belittling what America has done for the Philippines, there is no getting away from the fact that the progress towards democracy in the Philippines has been due mainly to the materials that America found there. This made America's task a great deal easier." In an important study of considerable interest, J. Go (1999, 337) has recently attempted to construct the cultural context of the Filipino elite response to American rule, arguing that Filipino elites "refashioned the Americans' imposed discourses and institutions in accordance with their preexisting political culture."

7. As their inability or unwillingness to attempt to alter the social realities of Filipino society became more and more apparent, most American officials on the ground began to stress the importance of the longterm impact of the education system being implemented under the colonial administration. As such, the Bureau of Education was kept under an American up to the time of the inauguration of the Commonwealth in 1935. Taft himself by 1908 had come to view education as the primary hope for the future and felt that it would take two or three generations before the democratizing influence introduced by Americans would take effect. For one of the clearest statements of Taft regarding the role of education and "practical political education," see Taft 1908, 2349; see also Cullinane 1971.

8. Cf. Mills 1937; Gallego 1938; Buenaventura 1941; McCoy 1988; Hutchcroft 2000. Two later assessments of colonial political institutions and their impact on postcolonial Filipino politics have focused on this issue. While acknowledging the positive influence of democratic institutions, Lopez (1966, 731, especially 21), concludes that America's "tacit alliance" with "a small group of educated Filipinos or wealthy property owners" postponed "to a much later day all important initiatives for the transformation of Philippine society." Similarly, Abueva (1976, 11433, especially 12223) stresses that the "tacit alliance" between the American colonialists and the "landowning elite" perpetuated the "oligarchical politics and centralized administration which were part of the Spanish legacy." In an interesting account, focused on the local level, the history of San Pablo, Laguna (Hernandez 1981, 4041), described the impact of American political institutions in this way: "On the eve of American occupation there already existed an articulate and economic elite in the hometown behind whom stood the

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other 90 percent of the local citizenry. Recognizing this, the American Government decided to govern the township through the elite class who in turn would determine the substantive policies to be adopted. The American program to democratize Philippine politics suffered from the high qualifications for voting. Only 3 percent of the population were eligible to vote. The result was the creation of an essentially oligarchical government controlled by the upper class or elite, just like during the Spanish time." For a more recent and carefully constructed study of the antecedents to American colonialism and of the prominent features of American colonial institutions pertaining to localcentral governance and politics, see Hutchcroft 2000. It is also significant to realize that the colonial bureaucracy itself was rapidly Filipinized. As De Jesus (2001, 59) has noted: "In 1903, Filipinos held just under half of the 5,500 jobs in the bureaucracy. By 1921, they held 90 percent of 14,000 jobs. By the mid1930s, Americans held only 1 percent of the Civil Service positions, most of them in the educational bureaucracy."

9. Bandholtz to John Bruce, 16 Feb. 1907, BP 1, MHC. When relations with the Nacionalistas became strained in early 1909, Bandholtz allowed his complaints to become more bitter: "I like the real Filipino, call him `little brown brother' or whatever you want to; he has many good and lovable traits and I enjoy him and like him. But it does hurt to see him such a blind tool in the hands of the unscrupulous upper classes" (see Bandholtz to Col. Mark L. Hersey, 4 May 1909, BP2, MHC).

10. In an interesting note on his old colleague, Forbes commented that Bandholtz "knew how to win the confidence, affection and esteem of prominent Filipinos, and he proved to be an honest and efficient politician (handler of men)" (quoted in the entry for "Bandholtz" in the E. Bowditch Correspondence, Cornell University Library, emphasis mine). Not all Americans approved the political maneuverings of Bandholtz and, as a result, did not agree with Forbes's positive assessment. When Bandholtz was being considered for appointment as chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, Dean C. Worcester wrote to Taft (then president), complaining of Bandholtz's political ties to the incumbent Nacionalista leaders, stressing: "General Bandholtz is first, last, and all the time a politician and there is always danger that he will sacrifice the public interest in pursuing a course which he deems likely to be popular" (Worcester to Taft, 2 May 1912, WP1, MHC). Worcester himself is a curious figure in this context. As the only man on both the Schurman and Taft Commissions, as an instrumental gobetween in the formation of the Partido Federal, and as the secretary of the Interior during the entire Taft era (19011913), he clearly had much to do with the decisions and legislation that went into the establishment of most of the governmental codes of this period and, yet, he wrote as though the evils of the system resulted from the works of others like Bandholtz (who had no legislative authority whatever). Worcester also had great disdain for Filipino politicians and frequently complained that they had been given too much; for example, in

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his 1914 report he wrote: "In many, if not in most, of the Christian provinces we have utilized the services of Filipino politicians who are openly opposed to the policy which we are endeavoring to carry out, and have thus placed between ourselves and the people a screen of shrewd and hostile men who can communicate with them as we cannot, who play upon their ignorance and their prejudices as we would not if we could, who keep them firm in the belief that all their troubles are due to the mucho malo gobierno Americano, and that all the advantages which they enjoy have been wrung from the unwilling and unjust Americans by the courage and political ingenuity of the local politicos." "For this condition of things," Worcester (1914, 2:96667) concluded, "we have ourselves to thank, and these are the men who would be governors under `selfgovernment."'

11. Forbes Journal (entry for 8 Oct. 1907), 2:311, FP, HLHU. The belief of Forbes and others in the American colonial administration that Filipino elected officials were incapable of managing the work of local government led to a series of amendments in the municipal and provincial codes between 1903 and 1905 that essentially stripped local governments of direct responsibilities over many primary functions (such as education, public works, and public health). Thus, even though Forbes grumbled about corrupt local officials, he was fully aware that their corruption remained for the most part within the Filipino sphere and that responsibility for the things that mattered to him resided outside the municipal hall (see Cullinane 1971; Hutchcroft 2000).

12. Forbes Journal (entry for 16 Oct. 1907), 2:318, FP, HLHU.

13. Forbes 1946, 5:479. Forbes's private sentiments, those written in his diary, often contrasted with his public statements on the assembly and its leadership (see, for example, Forbes 1909, 2013).

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the conclusion of ilustrado politics by michael cullinane

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