Session 40Jan-Feb. 2022

The consolidation of a de facto State in Venezuela1

Formal submission to the United Nations Human Rights Council for the Universal Periodic Review-Venezuela

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The consolidation of a de facto State in VenezuelaFormal submission to the United Nations Human Rights Council for the Universal Periodic Review-Venezuela

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Introduction and context1. Venezuela has not followed the recommendations in the area of justice and the

rule of law since the UPR began. Regarding the UPR 2012-2016, Venezuela accepted 193 of the 274 recommendations of the States in the Human Rights Council during its second cycle, took note of another 28 and did not support 53, referring to freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, and association; ar-bitrary or politically motivated detentions; and independence and proper func-tioning of the powers and organs of the State. In the area of the administration of justice, it has not complied with any of the recommendations, although it accepted some and took note of others.

2. Failure to comply with the recommendations and the refusal to accept oth-ers explain why today Venezuela is facing a complex humanitarian emergency (CHE)2. This situation is a direct consequence of the progressive dismantling of the rule of law3, which has led to an institutional breakdown4 and the loss of democracy5. In this institutional deterioration, which has given rise to more and more serious human rights violations, even systematic ones6, the justice system has played a key role7.

3. A very clear example that the Venezuelan justice does not ensure the rights of the people is that in May 2016 Civil Society Organizations went to the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ by its Spanish acronym) to demand the protection of the rights to health and life, based on the serious situation at the time8. Five years later, we are still in CHE, and the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court has not yet responded to the demand.

4. Furthermore, most of the violations and crimes documented by the Interna-tional Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela (FFM)9 and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)10 have not led to exhaustive investigations, prosecutions and convictions of the alleged perpetrators; in the few cases where there are trials, only junior staff are tried, not the chain of command11. This has also been pointed out by the Inter-Amer-ican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)12 and the Secretary General of the Organization of American States and the panel of independent experts in their report published in 201813.

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5. As a consequence of the above, today a de facto State14 reigns in Venezue-la since the Executive concentrates all power and exercises enormous social and economic control15 without any comptroller, thanks to the co-option of institutions, including the Judicial Power and, in particular, the TSJ16. In this re-gard, OHCHR has made reference to the close relations that exist between the members of the Supreme Court with the Government and the ruling party, as well as the control that the highest court has over the decisions of lower judges throughout the country, especially in the field of criminal law17.

6. As for the Public Ministry (MP by its Spanish acronym), another key element for the proper functioning of the administration of justice, it does not have in-dependence either. Its highest authority (Attorney General) was not appointed as established by the Constitution18, that is, by the National Assembly (AN by its Spanish acronym)19, but by a parallel body, created by the ruling party, the National Constituent Assembly (ANC by its Spanish acronym), in view that the parliament at that time (2017) was dominated by the opposition. The new At-torney General in 2018 eliminated the career of the officials of that institution, through a resolution20. To this is added that the National Executive and the AN have progressively taken away investigative powers from the MP to give them to the police, specifically to the Scientific, Criminal and Criminal Investigations Corps (CICPC by its Spanish acronym)21, whose officials have been singled out by FFM for commit alleged crimes against humanity by extrajudicial execu-tions22. The TSJ has also contributed to taking away the functions of the MP23.

7. Added to this serious situation of progressive deinstitutionalization is the po-licing24 and militarization25 of Venezuelan society, which has worsened with COVID-19. In this context, the presence of irregular and armed groups (gangs)26 is not surprising, some of which act as paramilitary groups in support of the Government (collectives)27, and others are simply criminals. Nowadays, there are struggles for control of the territory as in the Apure state, which is on the border with Colombia, specifically between a dissident group of the Revolu-tionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc by its Spanish acronym) and the Ven-ezuelan government28. Likewise, between gangs and the Government, as in the case of the Caracas area, known as “La Vega”29.

8. Finally, although in December 2015, the AN managed to win the opposition, for the first time in seventeen years of Chavismo30, it was never able to exercise its functions due to the systematic annulment of its decisions by the TSJ31.

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As a result of this situation, citizens were losing rights, such as the right to active and passive voting, as well as the possibility of making them effective as there were no independent and autonomous authorities to turn to, which in turn led to increased government power and greater repression and persecu-tion of dissent.

I. Annulment of Parliament, persecution of dissent, and generalized repression

9. In December 2015, Venezuelans gave the majority of the AN to the opposition. However, it had not yet been installed and had already begun to be neutralized by the Supreme Court, which de facto eliminated it through 145 sentences, from December 2015 to December 202032.

10. In 2020 alone, the Supreme Court issued twenty-six rulings against the AN, of which the content of many is still unknown33. In the last five years, the highest court issued an average sentence every twelve days against the Parliament34. Judgments 155 and 156 of March 28 and 29, 2017, with which he assigned himself parliamentary functions35. These decisions provoked massive demon-strations, which lasted for almost four months and left «133 people killed, 4.000 injured, and more than 5.000 arbitrarily detained»36, in addition to cementing the role of the Judiciary as a repressive body37. The decisions also opened the doors to the imposition of international sanctions on the Government, which, since 201738, were subsequent to the CHE declared by Ban Kin Moon in 201639 and denounced by the Civil Society Organizations in 201540.

11. To the above must be added the figure of the questioned ANC, whose members were illegitimately elected in August 2017, without a referendum as required by the Constitution41, and which self-erected as the highest power of the State42. By decision of the President of the Republic, he ceased his functions at the end of 2020 without presenting a new Constitution, which in theory should be the result of his installation43.

12. By May 2020, more than ninety-six opposition parliamentarians and Chavismo dissidents, principals and alternates, had suffered some type of political per-secution44. The TSJ played a leading role in the case of some thirty opposition deputies, violating their parliamentary immunity45. Five of them have been im-prisoned46 and as of June 2021 at least two were still deprived of their liberty:

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Juan Requesens (with a measure of the house for prison)47 and Gilberto Sojo (who has been detained for more than four months)48.

13. The use of military justice against civilians has become common in recent years. During the wave of anti-government protests in 2017, 786 civilians were pre-sented before military courts49, in contravention of the provisions of the Consti-tution and international human rights treaties. Emblematic cases are that of the trade unionist Rubén González50 and the opposition deputy Gilber Caro51, who after being released twice returned to prison at the end of 2019, was released in 2020 for a presidential pardon52.

14. However, on July 13, 2021, a new arrest warrant was issued against him, al-though no longer within the framework of military jurisdiction. This order also referred to other leaders of the same political party, Popular Will: Emilio Grat-erón, former mayor of the Municipality of Chacao in Caracas; Hasler Iglesias, former president of the Federation of University Centers and currently an engi-neer and university professor; and Luis Somaza, who works with former deputy Juan Guaidó, who was president of the AN elected in December 2015, from 2019 to the end of 2020. The arrest warrant was issued by the Public Ministry, at the request of the current president of the National Assembly53, dominated by the ruling party. The day before, another former deputy, Freddy Guevara54, was arbitrarily detained, who had been pardoned in 2020, having also been processed by the Supreme Court in 201755.

15. Regarding the use of military justice against civilians, the Constitutional Cham-ber of the Supreme Court issued judgment No. 246 of December 14, 2020, in which it established the possibility for military judges to prosecute people who are not members of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB by its Spanish acronym)56. The IACHR issued a statement urging it to definitively abandon the trial of civilians by the military criminal jurisdiction57.

II. Cancellation of the passive and active vote

16. After the electoral defeat in the parliamentarians of 2015, the Government artic-ulated new strategies to stay in power through the TSJ and the National Elec-toral Council (CNE by its Spanish Acronym)58. In the first sentence of 2016 of the Constitutional Chamber, it was established that the political groups that had obtained less than 1% of the votes in December 2015 had to renew the payroll

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of their registrants on the basis of an alleged prohibition of double membership, not foreseen in the Venezuelan Constitution59. The result was that of the six-ty-seven parties that participated in the 2015 elections, fifty-nine had to carry out this procedure, but only seventeen succeeded60.

17. The ANC joined the maneuver and canceled three of the main opposition par-ties, in retaliation for not having nominated candidates in the December 201761 mayoral elections. Then, with judgment No. 53 of January 25, 2018, the Consti-tutional Chamber annulled the registration of the Democratic Unity Table (MUD by its Spanish Acronym)62, alleging that by grouping together various political organizations, the illegal act of double political militancy would be incurred, not prohibited by the Constitution, as already said. Thanks to these maneuvers, three years after the parliamentary elections in December 2015, only seventeen political parties remained, and of them only five opposition parties63.

18. These conditions made it easier for the President of the Republic to compete practically only in the disputed presidential elections of May 2018, which were also convened in advance and unconstitutionally by a body that did not have the powers to do so, the ANC64. Instances such as the Organization of Ameri-can States (OAS) considered these elections illegitimate.

19. In 2020, the Constitutional Chamber appointed, for the fifth time in twenty-one years of Chavismo, the rectors of the CNE, usurping the functions of Parliament65, and despite the fact that the AN had advanced with the respective procedure. This appointment was the most flawed of all the previous ones since the TSJ appointed two of its members as rectors: Indira Alfonzo, president of the Electoral Chamber; and Gladys Gutiérrez, the magistrate of the Constitutional Chamber, disregarding the principles of independence, autonomy, and transparency of article 294 of the Constitution and international standards on the matter66.

20. Then the TSJ intervened in opposition parties and dissidents of Chavismo, im-posing new directives on them with people related to the Government; and en-abled other parties not registered in the CNE for having been outlawed at some point67, in order to create an opposition to the Government's measure for the parliamentary elections of December 6, 202068.

21. The TSJ also authorized the CNE, an administrative body, to reform the Organ-ic Law on Electoral Processes (LOPRE by its Spanish name), again usurping the functions of Parliament69. The number of seats in the AN was increased by 66%, the proportion of deputies to be elected nominally was reduced from 70% to 48% (133) and the list vote was increased to 52%70.

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22. In the face of the aforementioned measures and government threats such as «he who does not vote, does not eat»71, it should not be surprising that the governing party, PSUV, won 68% of the votes in the elections and almost 92% of the seats in parliament elections72.

III. Annulment of constitutional guarantees and human rights treaties

23. Between January 2016 and January 2021, Venezuela remained under a state of emergency due to economic emergency, with the endorsement of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, without having the parliamentary approval required by the Constitution. The National Executive issued thirty-two decrees that kept the economic emergency in force, despite the fact that the Magna Carta only allows this type of measure to last sixty days, extendable for an equal period74. In reality, 16 decrees of a state of exception were issued due to economic emergency and another 16 more, each of which extended the original decree for a further 60 days, with the intention of giving an institutional facade. Thanks to this maneuver, the Government assumed powers that corresponded to parliament, such as approving the national budget, loans, and public interest contracts75.

24. Additionally, in the framework of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Maduro admin-istration issued decree No. 4,160 on March 13, 2020, with which it declared a state of alarm under the pretext of adopting:

«Urgent, effective and necessary measures for the protection and preservation of the health of the Venezuelan population, in order to mitigate and eradicate the epidemic risks related to the coronavirus and its possible strains, guaranteeing timely, effective and efficient attention to cases that originate»76.

25. Thus, Venezuela became the only country in the region in which two states of exception rule simultaneously77, in a totally unconstitutional manner and without notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations78.

26. Under this situation, hundreds of people have been arrested for protesting the lack of fuel or poor water or electricity services, and also for reporting on COVID-19 or the situation of hospitals79. The Foro Penal counted 281 arrests

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from January 1 to July 31, 202080. Many of the detainees have had their rights to due process, defense, and judicial guarantees violated, by not presenting them in time to a court or by not allowing them to contact their lawyers, as in-dicated in the OHCHR report of June 2021.

IV. Attacks on university autonomy and the right to association

27. Chavismo has tried to co-opt Venezuelan universities, without success. In 2009 it approved a new Organic Law on Education (LOE by its Spanish name), which provides that university elections are held in equal proportion for teachers, stu-dents, employees, and workers. This law is contrary to the University Law of September 8, 1970, which, according to the Constitution81, establishes that elections must be regulated by university councils and that limits the electorate to the university faculty82.

28. On the basis of the LOE, the TSJ has suspended rectoral and student elections to different houses of study and has rejected the requests to annul the regu-lations that have been presented to it by different universities. As if this were not enough, on August 27, 2019, the Constitutional Chamber issued sentence 324, which established «an electoral system outside the university legislation to elect the authorities of the houses of study»83. The ruling ordered eight national public universities84 to hold elections in six months to renew their rectoral and dean authorities, but following different guidelines from those established in their internal regulations and in the current University Law85. It established that if the elections were not held before February 2020, the positions would be declared vacant and the Minister of University Education could appoint provi-sional authorities86. This ruling must be understood as an instrument to harass and control the country's autonomous universities and their authorities.

29. Additionally, with the excuse of guaranteeing the legitimacy of its authorities, the Supreme Court, through some thirty judgments of its Constitutional and Electoral chambers, has obstructed the freedom of the members of the pro-fessional associations, violating their right of association. The directors of the Caracas, Aragua, and Zulia bar associations have intervened, as well as the Federation of Venezuelan Bar Associations and the Social Welfare Institute of the Lawyer87.

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RecommendationsIn the previous cycle of the UPR, the Venezuelan State accepted at least nine rec-ommendations and took note of another seven related to the administration of jus-tice88, but it has not complied any, which has caused major setbacks in the inde-pendence, impartiality, and autonomy of the Judicial Power, opening the doors to serious human rights violations. Therefore, Access to Justice makes the following recommendations:

1. Approve a Code of Ethics for magistrates and judges, in accordance with international guidelines for the independence and security of judges.

2. Promulgate a new Organic Law of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution.

3. Abandon the interference of the Executive Power in the decisions, appointments, and administration of the organs of the justice system.

4. That the Attorney General, the magistrates of the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman, and the Public Defender be appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

5. Give stability and autonomy to judges, prosecutors, and public defenders, as well as career incentives, training, and create mechanisms for their evaluation.

6. Resume the approach of current constitutional law, respecting legal security, and abandon the practice of legislating and acting as a constituent power from the rulings of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, violating the separation of powers and the popular will.

7. Eliminate the situation that allows the Executive to legislate at will.

8. That the Judicial Power cease the persecution of dissent and the repression of the population.

9. That the Judiciary stop attacking freedom of association and political participation, as well as freedom of expression and information.

10. That the intervention of the Judicial Power ceases in the national universities and professional associations of lawyers.

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11. That the judges and prosecutors be appointed by competition according to what is established in the Constitution.

12. That article 254 of the Constitution regarding the allocation of at least 2% of the ordinary national budget to the justice system is respected.

13. That the opacity of the Supreme Court, MP, Ombudsman, and Public Defense Office cease and they render accounts of their management in writing according to current regulations.

14. That the TSJ cease its practice of omitting the publication of the text of some of its judgments on its web portal and honoring the right of access to information.

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1. Prepared by the NGO Acceso a la Justicia (Acceso) is a non-profit, private and independent civil association, founded in 2010 and registered under the laws of Venezuela, whose mission is to defend justice, the rule of law, the separation of powers, judicial independence, democracy, freedom and human rights. Its website is: https://accesoalajusticia.org/.

2. Vid. https://humvenezuela.com/monitoreo, https://accesoalajusticia.org/venezuela-enfrenta-una-emergencia-huma-nitaria-compleja-y-la-comunidad-internacional-debe-tomar-cartas-en-el-asunto/, and https://www.examenonuve-nezuela.com/respuesta-humanitaria/el-silencio-de-agencias-de-la-onu-en-venezuela-afecta-la-salud-alimentacion-y-dignidad-de-las-personas-mas-vulnerables.

3. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Informe-La-toma-absoluta-del-Poder-en-Venezuela.pdf.4. Vid. https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/informes/pdfs/Venezuela2018-es.pdf and https://accesoalajusticia.org/el-quie-

bre-institucional-y-la-emergencia-humanitaria/.5. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/camino-a-la-dictadura/. 6. Vid. https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/45/33 y http://www.oas.org/documents/spa/press/Informe-Panel-Independien-

te-Venezuela-ES.pdf.7. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/rol-de-la-justicia-venezolana-segun-la-mision-internacional-independiente-de-de-

terminacion-de-hechos/, https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/informes/pdfs/Venezuela2018-es.pdf, http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/docs/anual/2020/capitulos/IA2020cap.4b-VE-es.pdf, https://accesoalajusticia.org/infor-me-de-gestion-de-acceso-a-la-justicia-y-del-poder-judicial-venezolano-agosto-2015-julio-2016/, https://accesoalajusticia.org/acceso-a-la-justicia-presenta-su-informe-anual-2017/, https://accesoalajusticia.org/informe-anual-2018-de-acceso-a-la-justicia/, https://accesoalajusticia.org/informe-anual-2019-persecucion-y-re-presion-la-consolidacion-de-un-estado-de-hecho-en-venezuela/, https://www.accesoalajusticia.org/el-papel-prota-gonico-del-poder-judicial-en-la-impunidad-y-la-represion-en-venezuela/ and https://accesoalajusticia.org/infor-me-anual-2020-la-consolidacion-de-un-regimen-autoritario-en-venezuela-sin-parlamento-ni-derecho-al-voto/.

8. Vid. https://cepaz.org/noticias/ongs-exigieron-al-tsj-que-se-pronuncie-sobre-demanda-solicitando-proteccion-a-los-derechos-a-la-salud-y-la-vida/.

9. Vid. https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/45/33 and https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFMV/A_HRC_45_CRP.11.pdf .

10. Vid. https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/44/54 y https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/47/55.11. Vid. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26872&LangID=E, https://acce-

soalajusticia.org/jueces-fiscales-venezolanos-en-la-mira-mision-onu/ and https://accesoalajusticia.org/fiscal-se-desdi-ce-en-sonados-casos-violaciones-dd-hh-para-evitar-cpi/.

12. Vid. http://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/reports/IA.asp?Year=2020 y https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/informes/pdfs/Venezue-la2018-es.pdf.

13. Vid. http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Informe-Panel-Independiente-Venezuela-EN.pdf. 14. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/venezuela-impuso-regimen-de-facto-sin-estado-derecho-nulo-ejercicio-ddhh/,

https://accesoalajusticia.org/informe-anual-2019-persecucion-y-represion-la-consolidacion-de-un-estado-de-he-cho-en-venezuela/ and https://accesoalajusticia.org/informe-anual-2020-la-consolidacion-de-un-regimen-autorita-rio-en-venezuela-sin-parlamento-ni-derecho-al-voto/.

15. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/coaccion-social-y-control-politico-a-traves-del-carnet-de-la-patria/. y https://accesoalajusticia.org/ilegitima-anc-reforzo-control-social-politico-poblacion/.

16. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/acceso-a-la-justicia-denuncio-ante-la-cidh-el-rol-del-tsj-en-el-regimen-de-facto/. 17. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/bachelet-denuncia-que-en-venezuela-los-jueces-cumplen-ordenes-del-tsj/. 18. Despite the fact that the Constitution in its article 347 ("The people of Venezuela are the depositary of the original

constituent power. In exercise of this power, they can convene a National Constituent Assembly in order to transform the State, create a new legal order and write a new Constitution”) is clear about the need for a referendum to be able to call an ANC, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court said it was not. Vine. https://accesoalajusticia.org/no-es-necesario-un-referendum-consultivo-previo-para-la-convocatoria-de-una-asntación-nacional-constituigencia/.

19. The Venezuelan Parliament.

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20. Resolution No. 2703 of September 13, 2018, published in Official Gazette No. 41,482 of September 14, 2018, which reforms, as indicated, Article 3 of the Statute of the Public Ministry (MP) (OG No. 40,785 of November 10, 2015) and establishes that all career positions of officials who serve in the Prosecutor's Office are transformed into positions of trust, which are freely appointed and removed and, as a consequence, these officials lose their stability. Vine. https://accesoalajusticia.org/eliminada-la-carrera-funcionarial-en-el-ministerio-publico/.

21. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/cicpc-el-caballo-de-troya-del-ejecutivo-nacional-para-interferir-en-la-justicia/ y https://accesoalajusticia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Informe-sobre-el-Desempen%CC%83o-del-Ministe-rio-Pu%CC%81blico-2000-2018.pdf.

22. Vid. https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/45/33 y https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFMV/A_HRC_45_CRP.11.pdf.

23. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/el-ministerio-publico-ha-sido-desmantelado-por-el-chavismo/. 24. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/la-desconfianza-en-las-policias-ha-aumentado-a-medida-que-ha-crecido-el-con-

trol-del-gobierno-sobre-las-instituciones/, https://accesoalajusticia.org/la-policia-es-mas-que-su-uniforme-el-ca-so-venezolano/ and https://accesoalajusticia.org/el-servicio-de-policia-venezolano-entre-la-realidad-y-la-percep-cion-2000-2019/.

25. Vid. https://www.controlciudadano.org/noticias/control-ciudadano-ultima-reforma-a-la-lofanb-esta-expandien-do-la-militarizacion-del-estado/ and https://accesoalajusticia.org/la-militarizacion-de-las-policias-cuando-el-reme-dio-es-peor-que-la-enfermedad/.

26. Vid. https://es.insightcrime.org/investigaciones/7-razones-para-calificar-a-venezuela-como-un-estado-mafioso/ and https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/44/54, paragraphs51-54 y 69.

27. Vid. https://www.infobae.com/america/venezuela/20/10/23/colectivos-chavistas-militares-y-guerrilleros-se-apropia-ron-del-negocio-del-combustible-en-venezuela-cada-uno-maneja-estaciones-de-servicio-en-la-frontera/ and https://www.eluniversal.com/venezuela/77648/civiles-armados-o-colectivos-pretenden-regular-llenado-de-gasolina-en-esta-ciones-de-servicio.

28. Vid. https://www.fundaredes.org/2021/04/20/apure-cronologia-de-un-conflicto-armado-en-la-frontera-venezolana/ and https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/47/55, paragraph 9.

29. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/amnistia-internacional-denuncia-14-violaciones-de-dd-hh-en-sucesos-de-la-vega/, https://accesoalajusticia.org/bachelet-denuncia-los-abusos-policiales-del-gobierno-de-maduro/, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/57778676.

30. Chavismo is the political regime that was born with Hugo Chávez Frías, president of Venezuela from 1999 to 2012, and that had its continuation with Nicolás Maduro, president of the country from 2013 to date.

31. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/el-tsj-vs-la-an/, https://accesoalajusticia.org/tsj-nos-deja-sin-parlamento-y-termi-na-con-la-democracia/ and https://accesoalajusticia.org/datos-y-tipos-de-sentencias-del-tsj-vs-an/.

32. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/el-tsj-vs-la-an/. 33. Despite the fact that Article 26 of the Constitution orders the State to guarantee "transparent" justice to Venezuelans,

the Supreme Court is increasingly opaque. Thus, not only does it fail to comply with its obligation to render accounts to citizens, but it also delays in publishing its decisions; in some cases, it does not even do so, it only limits itself to announcing them in press conferences or communiqués. An emblematic case is the press release of January 29, 2019 from the Plenary Chamber in which it decreed precautionary measures against the parliamentarian and president in charge of the Republic, Juan Guaidó, without so far, the existence of a legal ruling. The same occurs with the press release of April 1, 2019, in which he orders the ANC to lift his parliamentary immunity, fines him for contempt of the ban on leaving the country and orders the MP to prosecute him. A press release is not a legally established legal means to make the knowledge of a sentence possible. This practice violates the Magna Carta and the Code of Civil Procedure, which in its article 247 establishes that "the final judgments will be published and added to the file, in which the date and time of the publication will be recorded." Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/que-valor-juridico-tienen-notas-pren-sa-tsj-contra-juan-guaido/ . Another example of the opacity of the Supreme Court: https://accesoalajusticia.org/la-sa-la-constitucional-en-tiempos-de-pandemia-datos-sobre-opacidad-y-servicio-al-poder/.

34. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/el-tsj-vs-la-an/.

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35. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/la-disolucion-de-la-an-por-la-sala-constitucional/ and https://accesoalajusticia.org/.autorizacion-del-tsj-por-encima-de-la-an-al-ejecutivo-para-crear-empresas-mixtas/.

36. Vid. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/VE/HCReportVenezuela_1April-31July2017_EN.pdf y http://www.oas.org/documents/spa/press/Informe-Panel-IndependienteVenezuela-ES.pdf.

37. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/la-ausencia-de-independencia-del-sistema-de-justicia-venezolano-y-su-rol-represor/ y https://accesoalajusticia.org/la-falta-de-independencia-judicial-alarma-al-consejo-de-derechos-humanos-de-la-onu/.

38. The individual international sanctions are from 2015, as is the EHC situation, but this is the cause of a pre-existing deinstitutionalization situation to the sanctions, therefore, these cannot be the origin of that CHE. In addition, until 2017, there were no international sanctions that affected the country, but only those in power. Vid. https://cronica.uno/maduro-132-integrantes-circulo-poder-santados-303-veces-desde-2015-i/.

39. Vid. https://globovision.com/article/ban-ki-moon-en-venezuela-existe-una-crisis-humanitaria.40. Vid. https://www.examenonuvenezuela.com/respuesta-humanitaria/el-silencio-de-agencias-de-la-onu-en-venezuela-

afecta-la-salud-alimentacion-y-dignidad-de-las-personas-mas-vulnerables.41. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/no-es-necesario-un-referendum-consultivo-previo-para-la-convocato-

ria-de-una-asamblea-nacional-constituyente/.42. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Report-on-the-National-Constituent-Assem-

bly.-Its-use-as-part-of-the-institutional-facade-in-Venezuela.pdf.43. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/balance-de-la-constituyente-de-maduro-un-fraude-constitucional-de-princi-

pio-a-fin/ y https://cronica.uno/anc-se-despidio-limitando-funciones-legislativas-de-la-asamblea-nacional-elec-ta-el-6-d/.

44. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/persecucion-politica-a-diputados-de-oposicion-o-disidentes-en-venezuela/ 45. Vid. https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/45/33, paragraphs 28-30.46. Vid. https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2020/Chapters/IA2020cap.4b.VE-en.pdf.47. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/cronologia-del-caso-de-juan-requesens/ y https://accesoalajusticia.org/la-injusti-

cia-en-estado-puro-el-caso-requesens/.48. Vid. https://www.analitica.com/actualidad/actualidad-nacional/sucesos/lo-que-se-sabe-hasta-ahora-de-la-detencion-

de-gilberto-sojo/.49. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/la-injusticia-militar-venezolana-en-el-168-periodo-de-sesiones-de-la-cidh/ and

https://accesoalajusticia.org/la-justicia-militar-contra-la-protesta-social/.50. Vid. https://provea.org/actualidad/ruben-gonzalez-en-liber/.51. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/cronologia-del-caso-de-gilber-caro/.52. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/11-preguntas-para-entender-el-indulto-de-nicolas-maduro/.53. Vid. https://twitter.com/AccesoaJusticia/status/1415070898000891904 and https://globovision.com/article/jorge-ro-

driguez-pide-captura-de-gilber-caro-emilio-grateron-hasler-iglesias-y-luis-somaza.54. Vid. https://talcualdigital.com/agentes-de-seguridad-detienen-al-diputado-freddy-guevara-en-caracas/. 55. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/las-graves-contradicciones-del-tsj-en-el-caso-de-freddy-guevara/.56. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/justicia-militar-para-civiles-marchas-y-contramarchas-del-tsj/. 57. Vid. https://www.oas.org/es/CIDH/jsForm/?File=/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2021/071.asp.58. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/el-camino-a-la-eliminacion-de-los-partidos-politicos-de-oposicion-en-venezuela/.59. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/la-sala-constitucional-asume-poderes-legislativos-y-prohibe-la-doble-militancia/.

y https://accesoalajusticia.org/cne-le-elimino-la-competencia-al-gobierno-con-medidas-inconstitucionales/.60. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/venezuela-sin-partidos-politicos-opositores/.61. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/decreto-de-anc-contra-partidos-viola-libertad-politica-y-derecho-al-sufragio/.

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62. The MUD is an opposition political party that was actually a coalition of all the opposition groups that organized to be able to confront Chavismo. It has been one of the most voted parties in the history of the country. But its registration was annulled by a judgment of the Supreme Court without a request from a party and without any legal basis. Vine. https://accesoalajusticia.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/SC-N%C2%BA-53-25-01-2018.pdf.

63. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/venezuela-sin-partidos-politicos-opositores/.64. Other irregularities in the presidential elections were the notorious reduction in the electoral campaign period and the

lack of equitable access to the media. Vine. https://accesoalajusticia.org/claves-sobre-la-ilegitimidad-de-las-elecciones-del-20-de-mayo/.

65. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/tsj-nombra-a-cne-expres/.66. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/tsj-autorizo-a-tres-magistradas-a-tener-dos-cargos-publicos-simultaneamente/. 67. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/el-tablero-partidista-para-las-parlamentarias-2020/. 68. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/razia-de-partidos-politicos-en-venezuela/. 69. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/10-claves-sobre-el-sistema-electoral-aprobado-por-el-irrito-cne/ y https://accesoala-

justicia.org/tsj-ordena-al-ilegitimo-cne-cambiar-el-mejor-sistema-electoral-del-mundo/. 70. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/el-nuevo-sistema-electoral-venezolano-para-las-parlamentarias-2020/. 71. Vid. https://fr.reuters.com/article/idLTAKBN1AE0GY-OUSLD. 72. Vine. https://talcualdigital.com/guachimanelectoral-el-cne-ya-adjudico-los-escanos-psuv-253-otros-partidos-21/.

Here it can see the route of the 2020 parliamentarians: https://accesoalajusticia.org/parlamentarias-2020-a-la-medi-da-del-gobierno-de-maduro/.

73. The first decree of a state of emergency of economic emergency was published in the Official Gazette on 01/14/2016. To maintain its validity, 31 more decrees were issued every 60 days. In this link you can consult the complete list of the economic emergency decrees and the sentences that endorsed them: https://accesoalajusticia.org/el-estado-de-excep-cion-en-el-camino-a-la-dictadura/.

74. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/el-estado-de-excepcion-en-venezuela/. 75. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/estado-de-excepcion-para-que-ha-servido-y-para-que-no/ and https://accesoalajus-

ticia.org/para-que-ha-servido-el-estado-de-excepcion-en-venezuela/. 76. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/publicado-decreto-declara-estado-alarma-emergencia-sanitaria-coronavirus-covid-19/.77. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/alarma-y-emergencia-economica-la-excepcion-en-venezuela/.78. The UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights orders those countries that dictate a state of emergency to immediately

notify the international community through the United Nations Secretary General (art. 4.3). Vine. https://accesoala-justicia.org/venezuela-sigue-en-mora-con-la-onu/.

79. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/detenidos-en-cuarentena-por-contar-la-verdad-del-27-de-septiembre-al-26-de-oc-tubre-de-2020/, https://accesoalajusticia.org/detenidos-en-cuarentena-por-contar-la-verdad-del-23-de-julio-al-26-de-septiembre-de-2020/, https://accesoalajusticia.org/detenidos-en-cuarentena-por-contar-la-verdad-del-01-de-junio-al-18-de-julio-de-2020/, https://accesoalajusticia.org/detenidos-en-cuarentena-por-contar-la-verdad-abril-mayo-2020/

80. Vid. https://foropenal.com/reporte-sobre-la-represion-en-venezuela-julio-2020/. 81. Article 109 establishes: «The State will recognize university autonomy as a principle and hierarchy that allows pro-

fessors, professors, students, male and female graduates of their community to dedicate themselves to the search for knowledge through scientific, humanistic and technological research, for the spiritual and material benefit of the Nation. The autonomous universities will give their rules of government, operation and efficient administration of their assets under the control and surveillance established by law for such purposes. University autonomy is enshrined to plan, organize, develop and update research, teaching and extension programs. The inviolability of the university campus is established. The experimental national universities will achieve their autonomy in accordance with the law».

82. Article 34 establishes: «3. Elect and appoint its authorities based on participatory democracy, protagonist and revoca-ble mandate, for the full exercise and under equal conditions of the political rights of the members of the university community, professors, students, administrative staff, worker personnel and, graduates and graduates according to the Regulation. A comptroller council made up of the members of the university community will be elected».

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83. The sentence occurs nine years after the request presented by the current rector of the Central University of Venezuela (UCV), Cecilia García Arocha, by which she requested the suspension of the effects of article 34 number 3 of the Or-ganic Law of Education. The request was made so that, until the annulment appeal filed against him in 2009 by several rectors of national universities was decided, said article be suspended, which violated the provisions of the University Law. This ruling would be ratified by the Constitutional Chamber in judgment No. 389 of November 27, 2019. Vid. https://www.accesoalajusticia.org/sala-constitucional-ratifica-las-medidas-impuestas-contra-las-universidades-nacio-nales/.

84. Central of Venezuela, of Zulia, of Carabobo, National Experimental of Táchira, National Experimental of Puerto Ordaz, Los Andes, Simón Bolívar and Centro Occidental Lisandro Alvarado.

85. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/en-2019-el-chavismo-allano-el-camino-para-darle-el-zarpazo-definitivo-a-las-uni-versidades-nacionales/.

86. This was annulled by the Constitutional Chamber within hours of the deadline. Vine. https://accesoalajusticia.org/en-2019-el-chavismo-allano-el-camino-para-darle-el-zarpazo-definitivo-a-las-universidades-nacionales/.

87. Vid. https://accesoalajusticia.org/breve-reporte-la-intervencion-del-tribunal-supremo-en-los-colegios-de-aboga-dos-de-venezuela-2000-2020/.

88. Among the accepted recommendations in this matter, see the document entitled Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review *. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Addition. Observations on the conclusions and / or recommendations, voluntary commitments and responses of the State under review. The following numbers are indi-cated: 133,154 (Work to guarantee the independence of the Judiciary and continue efforts to combat crime with a pre-ventive approach and with a human rights perspective); 133.155 (Adopt adequate measures to ensure the independen-ce of the Judiciary, among other things by modifying the regulatory framework that provides for such independence); 133.156 (Adopt measures to ensure the independence and impartiality of judges and prosecutors, in all cases and in all circumstances, among other things putting an end to the provisional situation experienced by the majority of judges and prosecutors); 133.158 (Redouble efforts to guarantee the autonomy, independence and impartiality of the Judicial Power); 133.159 (Take measures to ensure the total independence and impartiality of the Judiciary); 133.164 (Guarantee the independence of the powers of the State, in particular the Electoral and Judicial powers, guarantee due process and avoid arbitrary detentions); 133.166 (Ensure the independence and impartiality of the Judicial Power and the police authorities and allow all parties to exercise their rights before the Judicial Power); 133.167 (Ensure that the legitimate independence of the public powers is respected, in accordance with the international commitments assumed) and 133.173 (Ensure that due process is guaranteed in all trials, in accordance with international standards). The recommendations on this issue on which it took note were those identified with the number: 133.137, 133.157, 133.160, 133.161, 133.162, 133.163, 133.165. Vine. https://undocs.org/es/A/HRC/34/6/Add.1

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