the irsn newsmagazine · editorial 13. n ea sa y 3 repères i january 2012 repères – published...

January 2012

The IRSN newsmagazine

First lessons learned

Digi

talG

lobe

Special Report

FUKUSHIMASpecial Report

FUKUSHIMA

2Repères I January 2012

Contents Fukushima Special Report

CRISIS 04 to 11In JapanNuclear disaster.Earthquake plus tsunami – a catastrophic combination 04

In FranceMobilisation. Understanding Fukushima from a distance 06Information activity. Taking on the challengeof transparency 08

SupportFranco-Japanese activities tailored to the emergencyEducation. The experts re-instilled confidence in the school community at the French-Japanese school in Tokyo 10Emergency services. Accompanying a rescue excavation mission 10Museum. Controlling radioactivity in art 10Airline company. Reassuring aircrews at Air France 11Navigation. Assessing risks at Louis Dreyfus Armateurs 11Media. Indicating the measures to be taken for Radio France personnel 11Dosimeter supplier. Maintaining quality 11French Embassy. Explaining the situation to French expatriates 11Robotics. Protecting workers 11

LESSONS LEARNED 12 to 23Nuclear safetyComplementary Safety Assessments.Analysing the resistance of French facilities 13Stress test. Close-up of the Gravelines nuclear power plant 17

Radiological impactRadiological impact on the Japanese population.Initial evaluation map 20Symbiose software. Monitoring environmental releases 20Téléray network. Working towards improvedenvironmental monitoring 21

Emergency response Three questions for. Didier Champion, Head of thecollective work conducted at IRSN concerning crisismanagement in the event of a nuclear accident or incidentin or affecting France 21

ResearchAreas of scientific research. The Fukushima crisishighlights the avenues to be explored 22

. Accident 8. Information

22. es rch

08. Information

22. Research

04. Accident

Editorial

13. N ea sa y

Repères I January 20123

Repères – Published by: Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire – 31, avenue de la Division-Leclerc, 92260 Fontenay-aux-Roses – Phone: +33 (0)1 58 35 88 88 – Website: www.irsn.fr – Email:[email protected] – Executive editor: Jacques Repussard – Managing editor: Marie-Pierre Bigot – Editor: Catherine Roulleau – Assistant editor: Isabelle Cussinet – Reading committee:Michel Brière and Jérôme Joly – Editorial assistance, editing, editing secretarial services, art direction, production: Emapress – Illustrations: Charlotte Heuzé – Computer graphics: Hervé Bouilly– Printed by: Galaxy (72) – Printed on Cyclus print – ISSN : 2103-3811 – January 2012.

T he Fukushima-Daïchi NPP accidentwas the first occurence showing thatan extreme natural event, that gener-ated stress levels far beyond nuclear powerplant design-basis values, could lead to acore meltdown accident. It also showed howthe massive destruction of a site and of thesurrounding infrastructures could delay andcomplicate all accident management opera-tions. However, the world's nuclear reactorswere built without making allowance forrisks associated with such events, becauseof their extremely improbable character. In order to avoid the re-occurence of suchaccidents, IRSN considers that checkingexisting safety margins against theseextreme hazards, or making adjust-ments here and there to optimise mar-gins, is not enough. What is needed isan additional level of defence-in-depthat nuclear facilities to ensure that theirvital safety functions remain operationalover a sufficient period of time in the event of any physicallypossible environmental hazard.This is what the Institute meansby “hardened core” safety, a notion that it intends to promote internationaly.

The “hardened safety core”inspired by Fukushima

Jacques Repussard,Director General of IRSN.

Olivier Seignette/Mikaël Lafontan/IRSN

13. Nuclear safety

Digi

talG

lobe

;Gré

goire

Mai

sonn

euve

/IRSN

;Noa

k/Le

bar

Flo

réal

/IRSN

Cover : damaged reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant after the accident.

Enhancing nuclear safety is the main drive of every action of IRSN.Within this scope the Institute takes the commit-ment to make the results of its research, studiesand reports accessible for all professionalsinvolved in nuclear safety, security and radiationprotection, as well as the public and civil society.That is why the Institute publishes a quarterlyFrench newsmagazine, Repères, who providesinformation on IRSN’s activities in the fields of research, radiological surveillance, nuclearsafety and security, and reflects the broad extentof its expertise. The international significance of the Fukushima accident prompted us to propose an English translation of our specialissue focused on the accident and on the firstlessons drawn by IRSN regarding nuclear safety.

About Repères

100 m0

123

4


07:36, 12 MarchReactor 1. An explosion occurred at thetop of reactor 1. A few hours earlier,venting had been started to reducecontainment pressure. Given the loss ofcooling system, the plant managerdecided to inject seawater into the reac-tor core as a last resort. �

13:00, 14 MarchReactor 3. An explosion occurred at thetop of reactor 3. The containment hadbeen vented 24 hours earlier. Seawa-ter was injected to cool down the reac-

tor core. There was also concern aboutthe spent fuel storage pool and on 17March a helicopter dropped seawateronto it, but with little success. The nextday, fire fighting systems were used tomake up for evaporation. �

22:00, 14 MarchReactor 4. A fire of unknown originbroke out in the fuel pool area of reac-tor 4 (which had already been shutdown for maintenance, with the coreunloaded). In the evening, another firebroke out, this time in the northwest of

CRISIS > JAPAN

On Friday 11 March 2011, at 14:46 local time (i.e. 06:46 in France), an 8.9-magnitudeearthquake occurred 80 km off the eastern coast of Japan’s island of Honshu, causing a loss of electrical power at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The reactors shut down and the emergency generators took over. The earthquake, however, had also triggered a tsunami and, 55 minutes later, 14-metre waves hit the coast, going over the top of the plant’s protective walls. The emergency generators were flooded and the water intakes used for cooling the reactor were damaged. Below is a briefaccount of what happened at the nuclear power plant and the repercussions.

4

Nuclear disaster

Earthquake plus tsunami – a catastrophic combination

11 March 2011Core meltdown. Reactors 4, 5 and 6 hadalready been shut down for mainte-nance. The earthquake caused theautomatic shutdown of the three reac-tors still in operation, namely reactors1, 2 and 3. It also led to the loss of thereactor off-site power supplies, caus-ing the on-site power supplies (emer-gency diesel generators) to take over.Fifty-five minutes later, a 14 metrestsunami wave damaged the plant’sseawater intakes, shutting down theemergency diesel generators of reac-tors 1 to 4. This was what caused thecore meltdown in reactors 1, 2 and 3,leading to radioactive release. Themeltdown required venting opera-tions to be carried out to bring downthe pressure inside the containmentbuildings. �

200 km0

G i

Shimane

Mihama

ai

Hamaoka

Fukushima 1Fukushima 2

O gawa

Tokaï

ata

PACIFICOCEAN

TokyoTaka

Ohi

Tomari

MonjuTsugura

Fugen

Shika

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa

Japanese nuclearfacilities

Marine contaminationThe marine environment suffered significant radioactive contamination. This was due to contaminated water from the plant being discharged directly into the sea up to around 8 April and, to a lesser extent, to fallout from some of the radionuclides (e.g. caesium-137) released to the atmosphere between 12 and 22 March.

Atmospheric contaminationThe series of decompressions and explosions resulted in the significant release of radionuclides such as iodine-131 and caesium-137. A few hours after the accident began, the Japanese authorities decided to evacuate 80,000 people within a 20 km radius of the site and advised those living within a 20-30 km radius to stay indoors.

Reactors 5 and 6Built more recently, these reactors are located ten metres above the first four and resisted better. One of the four generators of reactor 6 was used to cool the spent fuel storage pools of reactors 5 and 6 (which had already been shut down for maintenance). Following the explosion in the fuel pool area of reactor 4, openings were made in the pool area cladding to speed up the removal of radiolytic hydrogen.

56

the building, followed by an explosionin the fuel pool area. Water was pouredonto the pool through a concrete pumparm. �

22:10, 14 MarchReactor 2. An explosion occurred at thebottom of reactor 2. A loss of coolingsystem had been reported at 8:00 thatmorning. Seawater was injected tocool down the reactor core. �

CRISIS > JAPAN


The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant

Although all the nuclear power reactors operating in the world today make use of fissionenergy 1 to generate electricity, their design varies considerably. The Fukushima plant, forexample, is equipped with boiling water reactors (BWR). French plants operated by EDF,the national electric utility, have pressurised water reactors (PWR). There are two majordifferences between these technologies:� The size of the containment building, which is much smaller in BWRs, causing pressure to rise faster;� The cooling system. In BWRs, the steam generated during core cooling goes directly to the turbine. PWRs, however, have an intermediate system: the reactor coolant systemcools itself by transferring its heat to a secondary cooling system that drives the turbine.1. Phenomenon in which the nucleus of an atom splits, giving off a very large quantity of energy.

Different reactor technologies

5

Fukushima Daiichi (Daiichimeans “number one”) is a nuclear power plantoperated by TEPCO, the TokyoElectric Power Company.It consists of six American-designed boiling water reactorswith a power output of 460 to 1100 MW. The reactors were built in the 1970s.Dig

italG

lobe

The four damaged reactors.

4

3

21

Infographics: Hervé Bouilly - Source: IRSN


Mobilisation

Understanding Fukushima from

any crisis previously encountered andthe emergency response exercises reg-ularly conducted by IRSN, the FrenchNuclear Safety Authority (ASN) andFrench nuclear Operators. As a result,the CTC was reorganised to addressthe specific circumstances of the cri-sis. The ranks of the CTC were rein-forced by a group of engineers skilledin spoken and written Japanese andwho worked in rotation over thecourse of the four-week crisis. “Ordi-narily, the CTC consists of a manage-ment unit, a facility assessment unit, aradiological impact unit, a media rela-tions unit, and a secretariat and logis-tics unit,” explains Éric Cogez, an emer-gency situation and emergencyresponse organisation expert at IRSNwho is in charge of ensuring thesmooth operation of the CTC. “Weimmediately added a General Com-mand Post to the scheme.” A health

CRISIS > FRANCE

11:00 am, Friday, 11 March 2011.IRSN assembled the members ofits emergency response centre(CTC) at Fontenay-aux-Roses as soonas information on the impact of the 8.9-magnitude earthquake that rockedJapan at 6:46 am (Paris time), and theensuing tsunami, started to trickle in.Although trained in emergencyresponse exercises, little did the CTC’sexperts know that they were embark-ing on a four-week marathon duringwhich they would relay each other 24/7.As the crisis played out, the CTC wasstaffed around the clock by no fewerthan 30 experts during the day (threeof whom also served as spokespersons)and no fewer than 20 experts duringthe night. All told, the crisis mobilised200 of IRSN’s 1,700 staff members.

A specially organised CTC...The Fukushima disaster far exceeded

impact unit and an environmentalimpact unit were set up on the Mon-day following the quake in order torespond to the avalanche of questionsthat were rolling in.Each unit’s teams also had to reorgan-ise. “That Monday morning we under-stood that not only was this crisis goingto last, but that we were going to haveto cope with the time difference withJapan. We set up three teams thatworked in shifts to ensure they wouldhold out for the duration of the crisis,”remembers Franck Bigot, an expert inpressurised water reactors and one ofthe three key coordinators of the facil-ity assessment unit.

...for a crisis unlike any otherThe first concern shared by the expertswas how to collect information on anevent that was playing itself out 10,000km away. “This was a completely newsituation,” remembers Martial Jorel,Director of the CTC. “Until then, boil-ing water reactors (BWR) were rela-tively unknown in France. We couldn’tcontact TEPCO, the Japanese Opera-tor, and information was coming infrom various sources and not in realtime. We followed the reactor’s condi-tion by reading reports that were beingpublished on the websites of TEPCOand NISA1 [...] in order to understandwhat was happening to the reactors and

The Japanese reactor accident required a special organisation of IRSN’s emergency response The 200 trained experts mobilised to address the nuclear crisis rose to the challenge thanks to the

The need to assess the radiological impact of Fukushima across vast distances rapidly became clear at the emergency response centre (CTC).To meet this need, Damien Didier, an expert at IRSN, set up a support unit on theradiological impact of Fukushima. “The tools the CTC uses are designed for calculationsover short distances of 50 to 80 km,”he says.“As a result, we had to use research and development tools, interface them with available meteorological data for Japan, and build a map and film production environment.” The unit’s rapid response made it possible to estimate, as of the first weekend, the trajectory and impact of a possible radioactive plume over Japan.

A support unit at the CTC

The control room of IRSN’s emergency response centre (CTC) at Fontenay-aux-Roses.

The experts in the CTC’s health impact unit drafted responses to queries from the French Directorate General for Health.


a distance

pools and find out how water was beingfed in.” In the end, the radiologicalimpact unit is perhaps the unit thatworked the most effectively and asplanned. It possessed atmosphericrelease measurements and meteoro-logical data, and was able to calculatedeposits left by the plume as well as itstrajectories.

Synergy of skillsDespite the difficulties, the experts reg-ularly made diagnosis and prognosisof the situation. Everyone contributedtheir skills in the race against the clock.One example is the facility assessmentteam: “Each of the three key coordina-tors put their specific skills to work,”says Franck Bigot. “Emmanuel Rai-mond is an expert in the phenomenol-ogy of severe accidents such as reactorvessel ruptures or hydrogen releases.Karine Herviou possesses the skillsneeded to draw connections with radi-ological impacts on populations. As forme, I was more in a position to analysethe condition of the facility.”But this was just the beginning: “Ourcolleagues volunteered their skills, pro-ducing diagrams of the plant for exam-ple,” remembers Martial Jorel. “Andthis effort wasn’t limited to the CTC.Everyone at IRSN set to work.” DidIRSN’s day-to-day operations suffer?“We always managed to ensure that

routine assessments on the operationsof facilities in France were carried out,”says Pascal Quentin, a reactor safetyexpert who replaced Martial Jorel dur-ing the first weekend and was back athis desk the following Monday morn-ing. “All regular reports for the advi-sory committees were neverthelesshanded in on time.”IRSN also enlisted the help of partners,such as the French national weatherservice Météo-France. “We providedIRSN with forecasts to allow it to antic-ipate the movements of radioactive ele-ments and with analyses of the past

days’ weather conditions so that itcould retrospectively understand theobservations made,” says Jean-MarieCarrière, director of forecasts atMétéo-France. “We also provided theconclusions of our own forecast calcu-lations on where the plume was head-ing from Japan in order to combine ourresults.”Ultimately, the crisis lasted for six weeks, four of which requiredround-the-clock vigilance. The CTCwas disbanded at 12:00 pm (Paris time)on Friday, 29 April 2011. �

CRISIS > FRANCE

centre in France. support of all staff at the Institute.

Although not initially part ofthe CTC, the health impactand environmental impact unitsquickly proved to be vital. Thehealth impact unit set up basein an IRSN conference room.“Eight full-time experts, assistedby 16 experts working inrotation, responded to 1,300requests received in just fourweeks from physicians andOccupational Health Physicians,the press and the general public.They were especially busy whenthe contaminated air massesreached France,” says AlainRannou, the health impact unit’sradiation safety expert. The unitalso scanned 250 peoplereturning from Japan(journalists, expats, airlinepilots, etc.) with a whole-bodycounter to check them forcontamination and provided 300passive dosimeters to peopleheaded for Japan.The environmental impact unitwas set up in Le Vésinet, wherethe Téléray monitoring room islocated. All radiationmeasurements taken by anetwork of monitoring stationsthroughout France are sent tothis room, and most of IRSN’ssample processing andmetrology resources are locatedthere. This network was quicklyreinforced. Sensors were sentto France’s overseas regionsand territories and to the

French embassy in Japan, andactivated carbon filters wereinstalled to trap iodine-131, aradioisotope that is a by-product of nuclear fission. “Wealso increased the samplingfrequency by 50%. Over a six-week period we performed 1,200additional analyses on lettuce,milk and other samples that weasked Météo-France, DGAL 1

and DGCCRF 2 employees across France to send us,”explains Nathalie Chaptal-Gradoz, one of the people incharge of the unit. “IRSN’sfacilities at Cadarache andOcteville helped us to processthe extra inflow of samples” �

The health and environmentalsupport units

7

Top: the CTC’s facility assessment unit.Bottom: the CTC’s radiological impact unit.

1. Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency.

Whole-body scans were performed

at the Le Vésinet site.

Noa

k/Le

bar

FLo

réal

/IRSN

Phot

o es

say:

Gré

goire

Mai

sonn

euve

/IRSN

Whole-body scans were performed

at the Le Vésinet site.

1. French Directorate General on Food Safety.2. French Directorate for Competition, Consumer

Rights, and Protection Against Fraud.


of the requirements of our professionhave been very helpful during this crisis.”

Informing local authoritiesEverything began according to theusual modus operandi. “We informedthe main ministerial offices by tele-phone, including the Ministry of Ecol-ogy and Industry and the Prime Min-ister,” recalls Deputy Director GeneralMichel Brière, who was responsiblefor coordinating IRSN mobilisationduring the accident. “Considering theseriousness of the events, we veryquickly activated the CTC and notified

CRISIS > FRANCE

“In France, we have lived for overtwenty-five years with the mem-ory of the Chernobyl ‘lie’,” recallsMarie-Pierre Bigot, director of com-munication, who managed IRSN’sEmergency Response Centre (CTC)communication unit. Since its cre-ation in 2002, the Institute has led anactive information policy. It goeswithout saying, then, that satisfyingthe information needs of the localauthorities, the media, the populationor even civil society was a must dur-ing the accident in Japan. “The nearlyten years of day-to-day work withexperts and the mutual understanding

1. In the communication unit, Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet, Minister of Ecology, SustainableDevelopment, Transport and Housing; Éric Besson, Minister of Industry; Jacques Repussard,Director General of IRSN; and Marie-Pierre Bigot, Director of Communication. 2. ChristineGoudedranche, website manager, and Michel Brière, Deputy Director General, in thecommunication unit. 3. Pascale Portes, Press manager, and two of her collaborators. 4. Pressconference led by IRSN spokesman.

IRSN keeps us informed and we

make this informationpublic right away, in atransparent manner.”“Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet,minister of Ecology, the 16 March2011, at a hearing in the FrenchNational Assembly.

Phot

o es

say:

Gré

goire

Mai

sonn

euve

/IRSN

1 2

3 4

During the Fukushima accident, the Institute providedaccurate real-time information to local authorities, the media, the public and civil society, mobilising experts and the communication unit.

more and more political leaders anddecision-makers.” IRSN was in factfacing an unprecedented situation.“With requests coming from all sides,we implemented daily electronic bul-letins, summarising our analysis of thestate of the Japanese nuclear plantsand the consequences for the popula-tion and the environment.” Nearly allof the ministerial offices requested tosubscribe. IRSN also participated,each morning, in meetings of theinterministerial emergency response

group, led by the Sec-retary of the Defenceand National Security,service of the PrimeMinister. The Institute

was called upon by the Parliamentaryoffice of scientific and technologicalevaluation, which provides informa-tion to the parliament and guides itsdecisions. “I was called to present thelines of defence of the reactors,” saidMartial Jorel, director of the emer-gency response centre.

Responding to media in a comprehensible mannerAlso in high demand, the communi-cation unit responded to more thanone hundred interview requests eachday, with mandatory deadlines. “TheFrench newspaper Le Monde loops at10:30 am: they needed an expert by 9am at the latest,” recounts PascalePortes, press manager. The radio sta-tions needed regular informationflashes, and the television needed con-tent for 1 pm and 8 pm programs.”Three representatives were namedrapidly for different fields: facilitysafety, environment and health. Their greatest difficulty: “Providinginformation in real time, while taking

Information activity

Taking on the challenge of transparency


the time to validate and place into con-text the elements that were coming tous: What does this measured vesseltemperature mean?” summed upThierry Charles, spokesman for thefacilities department. “We were oneof the only institutes to provide somuch digested and interpreted infor-mation, which undoubtedly explainsthe progressive wealth of media fromChina, Japan, Korea, the UnitedStates, the United Kingdom andSwitzerland.” During this time, OlivierIsnard, an IRSN expert dispatched toJapan, provided on-site interviews forthe French living in Japan.In parallel, the press was monitoringthe news. “We learned about theearthquake from AFP and Reuters,and the first information on the powerplants came to us from their dis-patches,” explains Pascale Portes.“We were a relay between the expertsand journalists, in both directions.” Journalist Carole Laporte-Mani, sci-entific specialist at the French radiostation RTL, speaks of the Institute’scontribution: “IRSN was very reactiveduring the crisis, with daily presspoints, available spokesmen and apress department that was able tomanage meetings while respectingjournalists’ deadlines. It became mymain point of contact. We were get-ting a lot of raw information, at timescontradictory, from Japan. IRSN putit into perspective, prudently explain-ing why the data were reason to worryor not. You could feel the desire of theexperts to be as accurate as possible,to the extent of the information theyhad. They did this while learning touse language that was accurate with-out being too scientific. The only neg-ative points were the difficulty ofreaching the CTC by transportationand always having the same spokes-men. Journalists prefer to vary inter-viewed experts, as competent as theyare!”

Dealing with increased website trafficWith IRSN very present in the media,the public was quickly informed viathe website. “Starting Saturday, traf-fic on the irsn.fr site began increas-ing,” said website manager ChristineGoudedranche. “On March 23, theplume flew over France; we registered600,000 visits in one day, compared to

identified the experts of the CTC whocould answer their questions on thepassage of air over France or theimpact of the accident on the healthof an expatriate child.” In mid-September, a seminar was held withANCCLI1 to discuss issues of safetyfollowing Fukushima, and the com-plementary safety assessments car-ried out at the French nuclear plantsin particular. �

CRISIS > FRANCE

Shohei Sato, director of the department of nuclear systems security of JNES, the Japanese technical safety organisation.“After the Fukushima accident, JNES collected

information from all foreign safety authorities and theirtechnical institutes, to distribute it within our organisation

and transfer it to our safety authority, NISA. Of the hugeamount of gathered information, that of IRSN was remarkable in qualityand quantity. In particular, we followed the simulation of the radioactiveplume of Fukushima put online shortly after the accident. The reports onthe contamination and environmental effects on land and in the sea werealso complete and very important for us.”

9

DR

The magnitude of the earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan led,from day one, to the mobilisation of Frenchgovernment emergency response groups in support of the French expatriatecommunity, and to the civil security effortsof the Japanese authorities.As soon as it was clear that this catastrophewas going to be a nuclear crisis, starting the 12 of March, IRSN became directlyassociated with this mobilisation.The President and the Director General thusparticipated in the daily meetings organisedby the Secretary General of the Presidencyand the Cabinet Director of the PrimeMinister, but also in meetings at theemergency response center of the Frenchministry of Foreign Affairs, and in meetingsof the interministerial emergency responsecommittee, chaired by the Secretary Generalof National Defence and Security. Therefore,the analysis produced by the EmergencyResponse Centre of the Institute were,practically in real time, passed on to the highest authorities of the State,to help them in decision-making processes.

IRSN management, serving the State

Efficiency and reliability of information provided

1. Association nationale des comités et commissions locales d’information (French national association of local information committees).

� OVER THE FOUR WEEKS FOLLOWING FUKUSHIMA:

� � 5,000 press articles quoting IRSN � 1,365requests for interviews � 50 electronic bul-letins or summary of environmental moni-toring of France published � 612,000 visitsand 1,500,000 pages viewed on the irsn.frwebsite on 23 March 2011.

IN FIGURES

the normal 35,000 per month!” Mirrorsites for the visitors were set up todeal with the increase in traffic. Thesecond technical challenge: provid-ing public access to real-time mea-surements of radioactivity from sen-sors in mainland France and in Frenchoverseas departments and territories.“Our database Criter was first createdfor internal purposes. Within a fewdays’ time, we had to go from 2 to 20servers, and develop a lighter versionof the software.”The frequently asked questions (FAQ)and electronic bulletins published onthe website made it possible for boththe press and the public to monitorthe situation with quality information.“We know that they were even trans-lated into Japanese,” said Marie-PierreBigot, reporting on information pro-vided by NHK radio.

Relaying information to localinformation committees For his part, Michael Petitfrère, incharge of relations with the localinformation committees, informedtheir presidents and leaders. “We sentthem our electronic bulletins and we

Education

“The experts re-instilled confidence

in the school community”Michel Sauzet, principal of the Franco-Japanese high school in Tokyo.


How did you call upon the Institute?After the event of the 11th of March, aradiation protection expert was sent tothe French embassy. Before reopeningthe establishment, it was of the utmostimportance to inform the school com-munity about the environment inwhich the high school would be func-tioning on a day-to-day base. Theembassy services scheduled meetingswith the participation of local IRSNspecialists and IRSN specialists fromFrance to respond to the questions ofparents and staff.What type of information was provided to you?In a context where information waslacking or difficult to verify, and wherecontradictory rumours were creating

stress, the experts provided a lot ofpeace of mind. As far as organisationof the establishment was concerned,the security procedures implementedwere validated by their analysis, andmethods for accessing the premiseswere defined. How much did this reassure the French community in Japan? The meetings with the experts rein-forced the confidence of the numerouspeople following them, as did the ques-tion section (FAQ) placed online on thesites of the embassy and high school.Even if we had to increase the num-ber of meetings to calm the worriesof the population going to the estab-lishment, the quality of dialogue wasalways emphasized and very appre-ciated by all. �

Dalí, Miró and Picasso must besaved! At the time of theFukushima accident, 170 artworksfrom the Centre Pompidou in Pariswere on exhibit at the National Art cen-tre of Tokyo. The management of boththe centre and the modern art museumare taking the necessary measures torecover the collection loaned for theexhibit. In May, curator Brigitte Léaltravelled to Japan, accompanied bytwo organisers and the manager of theloans department.“As soon as we were informed of therisk of contamination, we contactedthe IRSN emergency response centre,”recounts the curator. “We were veryworried; it was the first time we werefaced with such a situation. We didn’tknow whether the pieces were liableto be damaged or irradiated, orwhether it was possible to handlethem without risk for the museumstaff. We were worried that uponreturn the pieces would contaminatethe whole museum... Very quickly,IRSN specialists analysed the art-works, transportation crates andexhibit halls. The results, which weredetailed in a precise report, made itpossible to reassure everyone. Today,the pieces are back in their storageareas or rooms at the museum. As aprecautionary measure, and especiallyto relieve any doubts, the crates weredestroyed.” �

Alain Savary, IRSNexpert, takesmeasurements on the works of art.

Museum. Controllingradioactivity in art

Oliv

ier C

haba

nis/

IRSN

DR

Alain Savary, IRSNexpert, takesmeasurements on the works of art.

“IRSN accompanied us before, during our rescue excavation mission and after ourreturn,” said lieutenant-colonel of the fire and rescue service, Bertrand Domeneghetti,one of the leaders of the national nuclear risk management support mission, of the

general directorate of civil security and emergency response 1.“In Japan, our dispatch group included IRSN expert OlivierIsnard. Although his main mission was to help the Frenchembassy, he also helped the group maintain contact withIRSN’s emergency response centre. Their forecast modelswere essential to our unit. Upon return to France, themembers of the group were subject to external and internalcontamination control. The luggage was inspected as well as the heavy equipment. The results were negative for thepeople, whereas a few objects, like gloves, parkas, shoes andtents, showed positive values of 2 to 5 times the backgrounddose. This return protocol created with IRSN is intended to become a baseline for civil security.” �

Emergency services. Accompanying a rescueexcavation mission

1. Ministry of the Interior, Overseas Territories and Immigration.

The French ambassador in Japan welcomes Frenchrescuers at the Tokyo-Naritaairport.

Yoshikazu Tsuno/AFP

The French ambassador in Japan welcomes Frenchrescuers at the Tokyo-Naritaairport.

CRISIS > FRANCE

Franco-Japanese activities tailorHow did IRSN help expatriates and companies in France and Japan get thr

Robotics

Protecting workers

“There’s a big difference between perform-ing an operation in a confined radioactiveenvironment on a worksite and in an openenvironment liable to be contaminated andwith which we’re not familiar,” stated OlivierBernard, engineer and radiation protectionspecialist at Cybernétix. At the moment ofthe earthquake, this company, which spe-cialises in robotics for operations performedin a hostile environment, was participatingin the dismantling of steam generators atthe Tokai-Mura site south of Fukushima.“From the 11th of March, we asked IRSN forinformation on the situation. The difficultywas characterising the risk, dispersion ofradioactive elements and the level of con-tamination. We decided to repatriate ourtwo workers. Upon arrival, they went toVésinet (Yvelines) for whole body counting.The results were negative. Before sendingworkers back to Japan, the Radiation Pro-tection and Health Department of the Insti-tute helped us to quantify the risks anddetermine the measures to take. Our work-ers carried dosimeters, radiation protectionsuits and counters.” �

Téléray sensors... in Japan and in theFrench overseas territories to help withenvironmental monitoring. “Our work-ers remain worried, about water andfood in Japan in particular,” said thedoctor with regret. “I took water fromthe Tokyo network and food samples tohave them tested by IRSN. The resultsshould calm the fears, but there is a lotof educating to be done.” �

1. Examination of the evaluation of received doses.

Airline company. Reassuring aircrews

Navigation. Assessing risks“Before sending workers into a zone that may be con-taminated, it is crucial to evaluate the situation andmake sure there is no risk,” stressed Alain Coatanhay,fleet general manager of the Louis Dreyfus Armateurs.When one of its ships had to repair an underwater fiberoptic cable that was damaged by the earthquake 120 kmeast of Fukushima, he turned to the Institute. “The infor-

mation provided was essential for reassuring the team. The experts helped us topresent the radiological situation and to set up a monitoring system, includingindividual dosimeters and radiation meters for the boat. One expert accompaniedthe ship to the work zone. Fortunately, there was zero exposure there!” �

11

French Embassy Explaining the situationto French expatriatesIRSN sent Olivier Isnard, a specialist innuclear crisis situations, to the Frenchembassy in Tokyo. He stayed five weekswith expatriates, French companies andalso with the ambassador Philippe Faure.Ambassador Faure praised the workaccomplished by the expert and his com-mitment to French citizens. He emphasi-zed “his pedagogical talents for explainingthe situation and the precautionary stepsto be taken” during this trying period.


The cable ship that carried out the repair. Lo

uis

Drey

fus A

rmat

eurs

The cable ship that carried out the repair.

CRISIS > FRANCE

ed to the emergencyough the Fukushima nuclear crisis? Testimonials.

“We have worked with the IRSNemergency response centre,”recalls Gérard Desmaris, OccupationalHealth Physician for Air France andradiation protection specialist. At LeVésinet (Yvelines), “36 whole bodycounts 1, all negative, were carried outfor the aircrews returning from Japan.The measurements reassured our air-crew and professional organisations.”The company itself has transportedradiation protection material, iodine,

and the Quai d’Orsay’s emergencyresponse centre. IRSN told us the mea-sures to take. Upon their return, ourteams went to the Vésinet analysis lab-oratory (Yvelines), and the equipmentwas put in storage before inspection.As one of the recorders had alreadybeen brought back in the newsroom,IRSN specialists went there to takemeasurements. No contamination wasdetected.” �

Media. Indicating themeasures to be taken

Two technicians and four journal-ists from Radio-France were cov-ering Fukushima in Japan. Sentabroad to follow the story of the earth-quake and tsunami, they were not pro-tected against radiation. Marie-PierreMeteau, nurse, had to replace theabsent company doctor. “I called IRSN

conferences with IRSN. IRSN hadordered 30,000 dosimeters long beforethe accident. As a precaution, the deliv-ery date had been moved up. And toavoid any risk of contamination, thedosimeters are manufactured in regionsfar away from Fukushima. They are alsoinspected by IRSN upon arrival.” �

Dosimeter supplier. Maintaining quality

The main supplier of radiophotolu-minescent dosimeters to IRSN isJapanese. Makoto Imai, director of thecompany, explains how Chiyoda Tech-nol, in Tokyo, managed the situation.“As soon as the accident took place, wedescribed the state of our facilities andour production capacity during video-

JAPC

/E-E

nerg

y/Cy

bern

étix

Operation in hostile environmentusing a robotic cutter.

Operation in hostile environmentusing a robotic cutter.


You have to imagine the unimaginable, Fukushimahas taught us. In France, evaluations are made to validate facility compliance and calculate theirresistance to disasters. New pathways for progressare taking shape, notably with the design andconstruction of equipment capable of withstandingthe worst stresses. Research is underway to predictthe future of radionuclides released by Fukushima,and also to improve monitoring and radiationprotection in France.

Increased safetyafter Fukushima

� Emergencyresponse

� Research

� Radiation protectionand Health

� Environmental monitoring

Soph

ie B

rand

stro

m/E

DF;N

oak/

Le b

ar F

loré

al/IR

SN;A

rnau

d Bo

uiss

ou/M

EDDT

L/IR

SN;L

aure

nt V

autr

in/E

DF;G

régo

ire M

aiso

nneu

ve/IR

SN;T

oma

Mar

k-M

Way

� Nuclearsafety

13 Repères I January 2012

uments. “The French specificationswere written mainly based on the spec-ifications written up by the EuropeanAssociation of Nuclear Safety Regula-tors, Wenra.”

79 priority facilitiesThere are some differences betweenthe European stress tests and theFrench CSAs. They required tworeports that are different in format,even if the content remains the same:“The scope of the French assessmentsis broader. They cover not only thereactors, but also the research facilitiesand fuel cycle facilities. A section ded-icated to contracting has been addedat the request of the High Committeefor Transparency and Information onNuclear Safety,” explained Daniel Qué-niart, Senior Advisor to the DirectorGeneral of IRSN, who participated inthe development of the critical analy-sis report of the Operator documents.

Nearly all of the French facilities arecovered in the CSAs. This corre-sponds to 58 pressurized water reac-tors, the EPR under construction, theresearch facilities and the fuel cyclefacilities. Seventy-nine facilities areconsidered priorities by the ASN,including the reactors that were cov-ered in reports submitted by the Oper-ators on the 15th of September 2011.For the others, the facility operatorshave an additional year to complywith the request. In practice, the different facilities toassess are numerous; however thereare only a few Operators, namely,EDF, the French Alternative Energiesand Atomic Energy Commission(CEA), Areva and Laüe-LangevinInstitute (ILL). In order to facilitate the CSAs, anintermediate step was observed. “Inthe beginning of June, the Operatorssubmitted a document summarising

Complementary Safety Assessments

Analysing the resistance of French facilitiesThe acronym CSA refers to the Complementary Safety Assessments. A complete inventory of French nuclear facilities that required extensive work.

CLOSE-UP� The assessment documentation

has eight chapters:� 1. Site presentation;� 2. Earthquake;� 3. Flooding;� 4. Extreme natural phenomena

(hail, lightning, tornado);� 5. Loss of heat sink/

electrical power supply;� 6. Severe accident management;� 7. Service provider companies;� 8. Summary of the site

and associated action plan.

The Three Mile Island (UnitedStates) accident and Cher-nobyl (Ukraine) accidentwere caused by internal fail-ures. However Fukushima

was provoked by extreme natural haz-ards. The latter led to an assessment ofthe resistance levels against earth-quakes and floods for the Europeannuclear plants, and those in France inparticular. It was also necessary todetermine the lengths of time beforeradioactive releases into the environ-ment would occur in the event of totalloss of electrical supply or heat sink.This was the subject of the complemen-tary safety assessments (CSA)requested from the French plant Oper-ators by the Nuclear Safety Authority(ASN) on the 5th of May 2011.The CSA procedure satisfies tworequests: that of Prime MinisterFrançois Fillon from 23 March 2011,to perform an audit of the safety of French facilities, and that of theEuropean Council, from 24 and 25March, to perform stress tests. “Thetwo requests were comparable,” saidKarine Herviou, IRSN expert in charge of preparing the CSA doc-

The inspections on the operator'spremises (here the Cruas plant) are carried out by ASN inspectorsaccompanied by IRSN experts.

LESSONS LEARNED > NUCLEAR SAFETY Photos: Grégoire Maisonneuve/IRSN


LESSONS LEARNED > NUCLEAR SAFETY

the procedure they planned to use toperform the CSAs,” explains CarolineLavarenne, expert from the Instituteand head of CSA document prepara-tion. “Based on an IRSN analysis ofthese documents, the Nuclear SafetyAdvisory Committees – who providetechnical support to the ASN - judgedthe procedures satisfactory, with cer-tain points for caution noted. Next, theAuthority required the Operators toconsider the impact of any high-riskfacilities, such as chemical facilities,located near a plant.”Over the summer, the Operators of the

79 priority facilities thus got down tothe task in order to submit their finalreport on the 15th of September.“Simultaneously, we at IRSN haveidentified the compliance gaps andpoints for improvement in the facilities,calculated the periods available beforeradioactive release, and re-examinedthe seismic risks of each site... so as todevelop an analysis template of theCSAs” explains Karine Herviou. Amonth and a half after receiving theOperators’ reports, IRSN was able topresent a synthesis and critical anal-ysis of their proposals before the

Nuclear Safety Advisory Committees,which enabled the committees to statetheir opinion.

The conclusions of the expertsFirst conclusion: if the facilities autho-rised in France can legitimately beconsidered safe, it is still true thatsome of them do not fully satisfy therequirements defined in the applica-ble safety requirements referencestate. These compliance gaps must bequickly eliminated.As regards the ability of the facilities towithstand scenarios beyond thoseimagined during design or re-evalua-tion, the conclusion of the experts istwo-fold. First, the Fukushima acci-dent, as well as the CSAs, have high-lighted certain limits of the currentsafety requirements reference states.“They do not consider the cumulativeimpact of the total loss of electricalpower supply or the loss of heat sinkwith the external hazards taken intoaccount in the different safety require-ments reference states,” explains Caroline Lavarenne. “Furthermore,Fukushima showed that it was possible.” Also, as the simultaneous occurrenceof events was not considered, theequipment necessary for managingsuch situations is not protected and atotal loss of heat sink or electricalpower supply simultaneously affect-ing several facilities on one site is not

Examination of the spent fueltransfer pipe at the Laüe-LangevinInstitute, Grenoble (Isère).

14

11 March 2011 :nuclear disaster at Fukushima Daiichi.

ASN takes a position: the Operators methodologies are judged acceptable if certain recommendations are integrated.

ASN received the Operators CSAs reports with their conclusions and evaluations . The ASN commissions IRSN to review the 79 files.

15 September to beginning of November: preparation of documentation by IRSN.

End of June to mid-October: inspections of the 79 facilities carried out by ASN inspectors accompanied by IRSN experts.

IRSN’s expert report returned to the ASN and members of the Nuclear Safety AdvisoryCommittees.

Meeting with the Nuclear Safety Advisory Committees for opinions on reactors, facilities and laboratories: analysis of the CSA reports of the Operators based on IRSN review.

Publication of the IRSN report.

French prime minister asks the ASN 1 to carry out a safety analysis of nuclear facilities.

The ASN asks Operators (EDF, ILL, AREVA and CEA) to carry out CSAs 2 in their nuclear facilities deemed to be priorities.

Submission of a note from the Operators to the ASN, presenting the methodology used for the evaluation, the organisation put into place to respect the deadlines and structure...

Meeting and opinion of the Nuclear Safety Advisory Committees for the reactors, facilities and laboratories: examination of procedures proposed by the Operators on the basis of IRSN analysis.

23March

5May

1June

6July

19July

15September

4November

8, 9 et 10November

17Nov

1. French Nuclear Safety Authority. 2. Complementary Safety Assessments.

Milestones for the Complementary Safety Assessments



In addition to the complementarysafety assessments (CSAs),inspections of the sites covered by the CSAs in 2011 were led by the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN). They wereperformed between June and November of 2011, around topicsrelated to the Fukushima accident: protection against externalhazards (earthquakes and flooding in particular), loss of electricalpower supply, loss of heat sink and operational management ofemergency situations. The goal of these 38 inspections lasting anaverage of three days, to which the IRSN experts were assigned:to control the compliance of equipment and organisation of theplant operator in terms of existing safety requirements referencestates. Before these inspections, IRSN has drawn up a supportguide, a sort of common template for the inspections to becarried out. “Participating in these visits with the ASN provided us with a vision of the field,” said Karine Herviou, IRSN expert in charge of preparing the CSA documentation. “For example, it allowed us to observe that the systems for protection againstflooding were not always completely deployed.” �

View from the field

considered. “Certain equipments, suchas pumps or depressurization and fil-tration devices, are common to twounits. There is mobile emergencyequipment on the sites, but they areintended for one reactor or one facil-ity only,” explained Karine Herviou.Final conclusion: the need to reinforceor put into place equipment for themanagement of extreme situationsthat is capable of withstanding large

earthquakes or floods. They will formthe “hardened safety core”. Today,each facility must have a minimum oftwo sets of vital equipment that areextremely robust and available in allcircumstances, to prevent a severeaccident or to control the conse-quences. “If we only prevent, wealways risk forgetting something andhelplessly watching a release likeFukushima take place,” said EmmanuelRaimond, project manager for analy-sis of severe accidents. “Systems forcontrolling a possible accident mustalso be designed.” Karine Herviousummarises this in one expression:“belt and suspenders”. The robustnessof the means for emergency responsemust also be enhanced for these situ-ations.

Issues already knownCertain conclusions of the CSAs matchlongstanding works, for the reactorsfor example. “The flood that occurredin 1999 at the nuclear power plant inBlayais had already raised the questionof combined climate hazards. Protec-tion against flooding had been rein-forced,” recalls Martial Jorel, reactorsafety specialist at IRSN. “After the acci-dent at Three Mile Island, the Frenchnuclear plants were equipped with sandfilters to depressurize the chamber inthe event of severe accident, as well as

� Transparency at all levels The Nuclear Safety Authority and IRSN desiredthe greatest possible transparency on the com-plementary safety assessments. Several doc-uments of the assessment process can be con-sulted online:

On the IRSN website (www.irsn.fr/en/):•The 500 pages assessment report submit-

ted by IRSN on 4 November 2011 follow-ing the review of the Operators CSAs reports(in French)

•A summary of this report (in English).

On the ASN website (www.french-nuclear-safety.fr):•The Operators CSAs reports (in French) •The Conclusions of the Nuclear Safety Advi-

sory Committees, based on the IRSN report(in French)

•The ASN report on the CSAs published inJanuary 2012 (in English).

READ IT ONLINE

hydrogen recombiners. Following thethird wave of ten-year inspections in2003, a decision was taken to reinforcethe bolts in the containment building,and to equip reactors with a system fordetecting a vessel break and a systemfor measuring hydrogen in the contain-ment.” Precious improvements, thatwould certainly have played a role ifthey had existed at the Fukushimaplant, although most probably stillincomplete due to the fact that theycannot necessarily withstand extremehazards. “The sand filters cannot with-stand earthquakes,” Martial Jorel noted.An analysis shared by Thierry Charles,his colleague in charge of safety in lab-oratories and plants. “Like the reactors,the fuel cycle facilities are subject toperiodic safety re-examinations whereeverything is reviewed from the pointof view of the latest data and knowl-edge. For example, the facility of com-pany FBFC, which produces uranium-based fuel, had benefited from severalreinforcements between 2003 and 2008,related to earthquake behaviour in par-ticular: reinforcement of buildings andconfinement with implementation of asecond leaktight barrier around theUF6 1 cylinders, fire protection, etc…”

Scheduled for 2012After the CSAs, the conclusions of theNuclear Safety Advisory Committees

ASN-IRSNinspection of

the coolingwater pump

station at theCruas plant(Ardèche).

ASN prescriptions addressed to the Operators for the implementation of requested modifications.

Report of the ASN on the CSAs submitted to the Prime Minister.

ember3January 2012

InJanuary

Herv

é Bo

uilly

/IRSN

- So

urce

IRSN



and the decisions taken by the ASN inthe beginning of 2012, each facilityoperator will propose a practical, pre-cise and concrete definition of theequipment to be put into place. Animplementation schedule, taking intoaccount the particular sensitivity ofcertain sites, should also be proposed.“The facility operators have made anumber of commitments in their doc-uments that they must implementtoday,” recalls Daniel Quéniart. Caroline Lavarenne adds: “The CSAsare only the first step of a long processof lessons learned followingFukushima. In France they are goingto lead to a reinforcement of the capac-ity of the facilities to maintain their fun-damental safety functions when facedwith hazards that are clearly greaterthan those retained during theirdesign.”What about the European stress tests?At the end of 2011, France, like eachof the member States, submitted afinal report on the complementarysafety assessments of their facilitiesto ENSREG (European Nuclear SafetyRegulators Group, who coordinates

this project for the European Counciland prepares European decisions) andthe European Commission. This ver-sion is slightly different in format, butits content is identical to the Frenchreport. “This report will be subject toa peer review during the first half of

2012,” Daniel Quéniart specified. Allthis is within the scope of movingtoward a common nuclear safetyapproach. �1. Uranium hexafluoride.

The local information committees, which are the embodiment of the public's right of reviewand right to information, have requested to monitor the preparation of the complementarysafety assessments (CSAs). They have asked IRSN to support them in this task. “On the 14thof September 2011, we brought together 80 people in Paris, especially the members of thelocal information committees and associations, to scrutinize the CSAs with them and to givethem basic and methodical elements,” explained Ludivine Gilli, in charge of the openness tosociety at IRSN. Four experts came to explain seismic and flood hazard, loss of heat sink, lossof electrical power supply and management of accident situations. Although all the subjectsgot a reaction, the loss of heat sink and power supply generated a lot of questions, as didseismic hazards.One month later, the submission of the Institute’s summary report led to another meetingbetween the IRSN and the local information committees, where they discussed theconclusions offered on the 24th of November. “All these meetings lead definitely to an increase in know-how and technical skills of these commissions and offer the Institute an outside view of its efforts. They help to identify emerging technical questions, contributingto IRSN considerations both in research and expertise.”

Helping local information committees in critical analysis

16

Three Mile Island (United States). In 1979,the Three Mile Island accident showed that a coremeltdown was possible. Procedures for managingthe final situations, the total loss of heat sink orelectrical power supply in particular, were added.Emergency response was developed. A newapproach was defined ("state-oriented" operatingprocedures), based on the real state of the facilityrather than on supposed scenarios. “This accidentwas the starting point for a research programmethat now provides for the anticipation andestablishment of measures,” adds EmmanuelRaimond, project manager for analysis of severeaccidents at IRSN. “Today, the French PWR's areequipped with hydrogen recombiners that limit thepossibility of explosion like Fukushima, andcontainment building venting and filtration systems,

making it possible to lower pressure while limitingreleases of radioactive particles. With the use ofsuch filters, in combination with containmentbuildings of even a bigger size, caesium releaseswould have been 10,000 to 100,000 times lower atFukushima.”

Chernobyl (Ukraine). In 1986, in addition tothe decommissioning of RBMK reactors (except inRussia), the main lessons learned were related tothe management of nuclear risk in Europe, thenecessity of transparency and large-scalemanagement of contaminated areas.

Blayais (Gironde). During the storm of 1999, acombination of high tides, depression and swellsgenerated waves flooding the facility site andrendered several safeguard systems inoperable.This led to a re-inforcement in site protectionagainst flooding. A list of strategic equipments hasbeen defined, which, using dikes or leaktight walls,should remain out of the water. This is thebeginning of an approach leading toward the re-inforcement of facility defence in-depth againstenvironmental hazards.

Learning lessons from events related to nuclear safety

Adél

aïde

Mai

sona

be -

CNPE

du

Blay

aisFollowing the storm of 1999, the height of the dike at the Blayais facility

was increased from 5.20 m to 8.50 m.Following the storm of 1999, the height of the dike at the Blayais facilitywas increased from 5.20 m to 8.50 m.


“We have inspected compliance pointby point,” confirms Denis Barras, wholed the operation in Gravelines. Thetask quickly proved time-consuming.“For example, as the site is locatedalong the sea, it is more exposed toflood hazard. It had to be confirmed thatin the event of a rising in waters, theequipment necessary for resupplyingthe facility with water would not beunder water, which requires inspectionof the walls and the leaktightness ofopenings (passageways, cables, pipes)...Just the inspection of the fire valves wasassigned to two people for four daysfor the inspections, preparation andphotographs of the reports and theinspection of the editor's work by a sec-ond person.” Occasional inspectionswere organised with the nationalteams to check that the emergencyequipment satisfied earthquakerequirements.


Gravelines (North), summer 2011.While tourists are visiting thecity redesigned by Vauban andtrying their luck at water sports, timeis not spent on leisure for the workersat the nuclear power plant, the largestsite in Europe with 6 900-MWe reac-tors. As for the 18 other EDF sites, allare mobilised for the preparation ofthe complementary safety assessments(CSA) report. More than 300 engineersfrom the EDF group are participating.“Since the end of March, EDF has cre-ated a project team at central depart-ment level, bringing together engineer-ing and production, and associatingother EDF areas, such as R&D,”recounts Philippe Renoux, head of pro-duction.

Centralised preparationThe main part of the preparation of theCSA reports is thus centralised. “Anational engineering team has been putinto place, with as many managers asthere are subjects: earthquakes, floods,loss of heat sink...” said Laurent Payen,project leader resonsable for the engi-neering part of the stress test. Only thesections on the particularities of theplant were prepared by the field man-ager. This division of work was pro-posed in June by EDF, assessed for amonth by IRSN and validated by theFrench Nuclear Safety Authority(ASN). “There are 58 reactors, but thereare only four different types of themaccording to power output.1 Whereasthe general layout drawings of the facil-ities are part of EDF engineering andproduction services, the detailed draw-ings are the responsibility of the facili-ties. IRSN field teams check the com-pliance of the facilities”, summarizedPascal Quentin, in charge of the assess-ments of the French pressurised waterreactor (PWRs).

Preparing a complementary safety assessment report means days of work. Testimonials from a unique summer in the North of France.

17

For Denis Barras, the CSA file repre-sented more than 1,500 hours of work.“It took up all of my days from June toSeptember and the same for five engi-neers from my team. ASN inspectionsalso had to be managed, while manag-ing the day-to-day, and in particular theanalysis of the third ten-yearly outage...”

Simultaneous visitsFollowing Fukushima, the site had tomanage consecutive ASN inspections.“That's six days of inspection betweenthe end of June and mid-October. Eachcovering one of the retained subjects:earthquake, flood, heat sink, electricalsupply, emergency situations and ser-vice providers,” enumerated FrançoisGodin, who checks the Gravelines sitefor the ASN. “Also participating weremembers of the local information com-mittee, members of the National Com-mittee for Transparency and Informa-

Stress test

Close-up of the Gravelinesnuclear power plant

Heat sink is one of the subjects addressed in the facility complementary safetyassessments.



tion on Security and inspectors fromthe Belgian nuclear safety authoritywithin the framework of long-standingexchanges. IRSN was present at the sixinspections at Gravelines, with one ortwo experts. These experts were eitherspecialists in one of the areas addressedor managers of the Gravelines site atthe Institute.”One ASN pilot inspector was prepar-ing the visit with an ASN copilot andexperts from the Institute. “IRSN spe-cialists participated in the preparationof visits. They contributed to the devel-opment of a common guide for allinspections, which is then applied bytaking into account the specifics of eachsite”, explains Karine Herviou, one ofthe IRSN experts preparing the CSAdocumentation. “This support repre-sented more than ten days of work.”On the field and in the meeting room,everything was carefully screened.“We were asked to implement theequipment to be used in case of an acci-dent,” recounts Denis Barras. “Wetherefore, with the inspectors present,tripped the alarms linked to the seismicsensors.”

What next?What are the conclusions drawn fromthese inspections? “We confirm that thelevel of safety is good at all facilities,”answers Philippe Renoux. “But we areconstantly working to improve it,” headded. Concerning Gravelines, severalpoints were addressed in a follow-upletter requiring a reply from the Oper-ator within two months. “Wedemanded certain urgent repairs,mainly of the filters in the reactor cool-ing system, of which the supports werecorroded by seawater and of which cer-tain anchors were missing,” notedFrançois Godin. “We asked the Oper-ator to review the diesel motor fuel

quality test procedure, as well as backuppower supply, which seems insufficientto use. For flooding, the everydaychecking that the hatches and doors areclosed seemed not to comply with theapplicable procedures.” Laurent Payenadded: “Gravelines being surroundedby a dense industrial base, we are work-ing on a convention with these compa-nies to limit the storage of dangerousproducts in the vicinity of the powerplant, and the implementation of analert protocol in the event of a prob-lem...”In parallel, the CSA report was pre-sented to the local information com-mittee of Gravelines, on the 11th ofOctober. Members were able to posetheir questions to EDF. Based on theresponses obtained and the informa-tion received during the technicalmeetings simultaneously organised byIRSN, the local information committeereformulated the questions. They werethen sent to the ASN for inclusion inthe final report in December. The Gravelines report and those of theother priority sites contribute to thenational analysis performed by IRSNin September and October. The IRSNanalysis mainly served as a base for theconclusions presented at the beginningof November by the ASN's NuclearSafety Advisory Committees. Based ontheir conclusions, on the record ofinspections and on the comments fromthe local information committees, inthe end of December, the ASN pre-pared a French report for submissionto the Prime Minister. A second reporthaving a different format but identicalcontent was drawn up for Europe. Itwas a tight schedule, but it wasrespected. �

1. Specifically: 34 PWR reactors of 900 MWe, 20 of 1,300 MWe, 4 of 1,450 MWe and 1 EPR reactor under construction, of 1,600 MWe.

Slight Moderate Medium

2012

Power reactor

Power reactor undergoing dismantling

Research reactors

Basic nuclear installations

Risk of flood

2011

Earthquake risk

Priority facilities

Very slight

Source Nuclear er Reactors in the World IAEA (31/12/2009)SSouourcrcee NNuucleear PoPower Reacttors in th

59

19 17

France

United Kingdom Germany

The European fleet of Nuclear Power PlantsThe fleet includes 144 operational power plants in Europe and 6 under construction, in 14 member States. France is ranked first, with 59 reactors, including one under construction in Flamanville (Manche).

The Gravelines nuclear power plant is the largestsite in Europe, with 6,900-MWe reactors.

Laur

ent M

ayeu

x/ED

F

The Operators of the power reactorsreactors, and fuel cycle facilities (enriassembly manufacturing and repro submitted their complementary safetyassessment report on the 15th of Se2011. In all, 79 facilities are conpriorities in France. The Operators 24 other facilities will need to submitreport on the 15th of Septemberat the latest.

Close-up of facili



4

3

1

2

7

3 7

2

1 1

1

5

2

4

4

2

4

1

2

4

4

2

4 1

2

3

2

2

6

2

2

1

4

3

1

1

1

1

La Hague

Flamanville

Cadarache

Tricastin

Marcoule

Romans Grenoble

Saclay

Chinon

Civaux

Paluel

Saint-Alban

Penly

Gravelines

Nogent-sur-Seine

Golfech

Cruas-Meysse

Chooz

Brennilis

Creys-Malville

Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux

Fessenheim

Dampierre-en-Burly

Blayais

Belleville-sur-Loire

Cattenom

Bugey

LYONCLERMONT-FERRAND

MARSEILLE

BORDEAUX

TOULOUSE

RENNES

ROUEN

LILLE

STRASBOURG

CAEN METZ

TOURS DIJON

BREST

ORLÉANS

NANTES

PARIS

108 7 6 4 4 4 2 2 1 1

SwedenSpain

Belgium CzechRepublicFinland Hungary Slovakia

BulgariaRomania

NetherlandsSlovenia

researchchment,

cessing)

ptembersideredof the their2012

ties

Herv

é Bo

uilly

/IRSN

- So

urce

IRSN


Radiological impact on the Japanese population

Initial evaluation map

Symbiose software

Monitoring environmental releases

obtained by the USA and the IRSN’ssimulation of radioactive releases, wehave drawn up a map of the doses thatthe Japanese population would be likelyto receive in the year following the acci-dent through external exposure to theradiation emitted by the contaminationdeposited on the ground,” saidFrançois Queinnec, then the coordina-tor of the unit dedicated to radiologi-cal consequences at the emergencyresponse centre. The experts looked inparticular at a 20 x 70 km strip of con-tamination located north-west ofFukushima, beyond the evacuationzone. “Between 20 and 35 km on thisnorth-west line, the doses reached 100to 500 mSv per year.”

Reacting quickly to provide protectionThe IRSN experts then cross-refer-enced this map with the populationdistribution data for the area. “Our cal-culations suggested that 2,200 inhabi-tants could receive an annual external

LESSONS LEARNED > RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT

70,000 Japanese people, living asfar as 80 km from the nuclearpower plant, are likely to receivedoses exceeding 10 millisieverts (mSv)during the first year following the acci-dent. This was the result of an evalua-tion carried out by IRSN experts inApril 2011. These figures raised thealarm, four weeks after the accident.“Based on aerial measurements

W hat happens to the radionu-clides emitted by a nuclearfacility? Symbiose, a toolused to model the transfer of radionu-clides into the environment, providesquantified answers to support the fieldinvestigations. “It simulates what hap-pens to radionuclides in the mediumthat constitute a continental environ-ment: agricultural land, rivers, inhab-ited areas, etc.,” summarises Marc-André Gonze, Project Manager andEngineer at the IRSN environmentalmodeling laboratory. “This applies tonormal or accidental operating condi-tions, or during the dismantling of facilities.”

In the first few days following the acci-dent, this laboratory collected and pro-cessed data characterising theFukushima region to feed the models:land use, agricultural production, foodrations, contamination of drinkingwater, etc. “Starting from an estimateof the source term and the atmosphericdeposits, our simulations have allowedan initial evaluation of the changes overa four-month period of the expectedcontamination levels in soil and agri-cultural produce in a radius of 80 km.Although the activity levels predictedby Symbiosis had been overestimated,the decay kinetics turned out to be fairlyrealistic.” In late April, the maps of

radioactive caesium deposits pub-lished jointly by the USA1 and Japan 2

made it possible to “refine our predic-tions and gain a more realistic pictureof the levels of caesium contaminationand their spatial variability.” The IRSN’s current aim is to analyseall the information it receives concern-ing the state of contamination of themedia and to embark on the qualifica-tion and consolidation of the con-stituent models of Symbiose. �

dose exceeding 100 mSv, 3,100 couldreceive doses between 50 and 100 mSv,21,100 could receive doses from 16 to50 mSv, 43,000 could receive dosesfrom 10 to 16 mSv, and 292,000 couldreceive doses from 5 to 10 mSv,” addsFrançois Queinnec.“Twenty-eight days after the disaster,IRSN was the first institute in the worldto publish a map showing that the dosi-metric impact on the non-evacuatedpopulation could be significant. Ten days later, an American estimate 1

confirmed the French results. This wasswiftly followed by a Japanese evalua-tion2 that obtained results that were 2to 2.5 times higher, but broadly consis-tent with the French and Americanresults.” Since then, gradual evacua-tion measures have been applied,which will reduce the calculated poten-tial impact. �1. Conducted by the American Department

of Energy.2. Conducted by the Japanese Ministry

of Education, Culture, Sport, Science, and Technology.

28 days after the Fukushima accident, the IRSN became the first institute to publish a mapshowing the radiological impact on the Japanese population living in the Fukushima area.

1. American Department of Energy. 2. Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sport, Science, and Technology.

Tom

a M

ark-

M W

ay

A Japanese resident measures the level of radioactivity in produce from his orchard.

To find out more: www.irsn.fr,menus: Research > Scientific tools >Computer code > Symbiose code

www


Téléray network

Working towardsimproved environ-mental monitoring

> CRISIS MANAGEMENT

T he renovation of the Téléray environmental radioac-tivity monitoring network began in 2007. “We planto renovate everything,” explains Guillaume Manifi-cat, head of monitoring networks at the Institute: “theprobes, signal transmission, data supervision, in other wordsthe management of alarms and repairs, and their siting,whether this involves the 160 existing probes or any addi-tional ones.” The radioactivity in the air is thus monitoredin real time all over France in order to detect any irregu-larities or accidents. There was also a plan to provide finermonitoring by covering the territory with at least one bea-con per department, and as many as 16 beacons aroundpower plants, at a radius of 10 to 20 km and 20 to 30 km.

A perfect partnershipThe ideal candidate: the roof of gendarme stations, whichhave a mast and a transmission network to which theprobes can be connected. “Discussions were already under-way, and Fukushima accelerated them, because beacons hadto be installed before the contaminated air masses arrivedover the Antilles. It was a perfect partnership: a meeting onTuesday morning, the go-ahead given at 3 PM, and sevenoperational probes overseas by the following Monday!” Anagreement is currently being drawn up for the installationof 260 probes on gendarme stations. These sites will sup-plement the 160 existing ones, which will be given new bea-cons. Even so, with the deposits from Fukushima extend-ing well beyond the 30 km zone, further reinforcement ofthe network is already being envisaged: “Fukushima hasconfirmed our decision to add probes from 10 to 30 km frompower plants, but it raises the question of whether we mightneed another circle of beacons at 50 km.” This would mean200 more beacons. �

More radiation monitors, more modernequipment: modernising of the Téléraynetwork was underway since 2007.Fukushima has given it fresh impetus.

What were the main lessons in crisis management that Fukushima taught us?Before Fukushima, the studies concerned scenarios on amoderate scale and the releases over the course of oneday. Fukushima showed us a more complex dimension,with releases over several days and deposits starting on16th March affecting the food chain and the habitat. Therewas a concertina effect between the managing of the emer-gency, with its evacuation measures, the question ofwhether or not to distribute stable iodine, etc., and the startof post-accident management across more extensive ter-ritories. The accident had an unprecedented impact on themarine environment, highlighting the gaps in our crisisexpertise. Providing calculations concerning the disper-sion of the pollution in the sea is not sufficient to enablethe right decisions to be made. We need to be able to pre-dict what we are likely to observe, when and where, sothat we can take preventive action. We need to know whichmarine species will be the worst affected, and whetherswimming can be allowed.

What about protecting the population?Fukushima will also lead us to review the emergency pro-tection doctrine. The current rules are fairly rigid: distri-bution of stable iodine and sheltering within 10 km, evac-uation within 5 km. Experience shows, however, thatalthough this 10 km radius is still the priority action zone,we must be prepared to go beyond that, both in space andin time, because the releases can be long-lasting. Supple-mentary elements must be added to the doctrine with thisin mind, and more flexibility must be allowed in the pro-tection strategy.

Will Fukushima also have an impact on the Institute?The IRSN has acted as an expert for many bodies in addi-tion to the Nuclear Safety Authority, of which it is the tech-nical support arm. When a nuclear crisis arises, nationalgovernment authorities, as well as local authorities underthe responsibility of Prefects, call upon the Institute. Thismeans that we must review our position in the nationalcrisis organisation. Internally, we must change our mobil-isation rules and stop applying an all-or-nothing system:we need to allow for intermediate levels of mobilisation ofour crisis organisation, with the possibility of mobilisingteams without necessarily activating the emergencyresponse centre. Finally, experience has also shown thatIRSN must be recognised as an actor that contributes infull measure to informing the public in real time.

Head of the collective workconducted at IRSN concerningcrisis management in the event of a nuclear accident or incident in or affecting France.

Three questions for... Didier Champion

Arn

aud

Boui

ssou

/MED

DTL

/IRSN

Noa

k/Le

bar

Flo

réal

/IRSN

21

A new-generationTéléray beacon installedon the roof of Navyheadquarters in Paris.


Areas of scientific research

The Fukushima crisis highlights

dent confirmed the realistic nature of accident scenarios leading to sig-nificant releases. “The crisis haschanged the priority of certain lines of research,” Bernard Chaumont con-firms. “Certain topics have becomemore urgent, such as studies on the health effects of low doses, and the effects of contamination on theenvironment–particularly the marineenvironment.”

Radiation protection around facilitiesThe scope of the work is turning outto be very broad: to gain a betterunderstanding of the effects of ioniz-ing radiation on the scale of a cell, aliving organism, or a population; tobe able to map contamination zonesquickly so that populations can bebetter protected from radioactive fall-out; to improve the individualdosimetry methods for personnelworking on an accident site; and tostrengthen the platform for the eval-uation of the dispersion of radionu-clides in the food chain. “We have

LESSONS LEARNED > RESEARCH

we hadn’t already thought of.” But theinitial feedback from Fukushima rein-forces certain safety and radiationprotection needs.

Prevention and damage limitation in facilitiesThe first issue identified by IRSN con-cerns the facilities themselves. Theaim is to better prevent accidents and,to do this, to better characterise nat-ural events (earthquake, flood, etc.).When these are given greater consid-eration, particularly in probabilisticsafety analysis, the weak points offacilities can be identified. This willrequire collaboration with otherresearch bodies, and certain under-lying problems will need to beanswered: “We will need to work out,for example, how to allow for rareevents, such as an earthquake thatexceeds all the predictions,” saysVéronique Rouyer, Head of Pro-grammes at IRSN. “Should they beconsidered sufficiently rare, and there-fore so unlikely that they should notbe given priority, or should we takethe opposite approach by allocating aresearch budget to them in view oftheir potential consequences?”Fukushima also showed that preven-tion is not enough; it is preferable tocontrol severe accidents in the eventthat they occur. “The phenomenologyof accidents like these is well knownnow,” adds Bernard Chaumont. “Therelevance of much previous researchhas been shown. For example, duringthe Japanese crisis, the release of fis-sion products was estimated, in par-ticular thanks to the work carried outfor the Phébus programme 1. How fardid the decay of the reactor coreprogress? What about breaches in thevessels?”The second strengthened line ofresearch: protection of persons andthe environment, because the acci-

Grégory Caplin, an engineer specialising incriticality research and analysis at IRSN,received questions from the Institute's emer-gency response centre concerning the riskof a criticality accident in Fukushima at thetime of the crisis.“Measurements and observations werereaching us from the contaminated area inJapan. We had to establish whether or notsuch an accident had occurred. We had adevelopment version of Vesta, a softwarethat simulates the state of the irradiatedfuel. It is flexible enough to model a boilingwater reactor. We were also helped by athesis project in progress concerning inversecalculation algorithms for our Prométhéesoftware. We normally examine a given sit-uation and look for its consequences, but inthis case, we had to take the consequencesof the accident as the starting point. Thanksto this work, we were able to assert thatthere was no evidence to confirm a critical-ity accident at Fukushima. I see this not justas a combination of circumstances, but asthe result of forward-looking research usinghigh-performance and operational instru-ments. Our responses were fast thanks to

our computing resources and our habitof conducting research almost

like an expert analysis.”

Operational toolsfor a fast response

Grégory Caplin, criticalityresearch and analysisspecialist engineer at IRSN.

Astec software simulation of a coremeltdown accident in a pressurizedwater reactor.

IRSN

DR

“This is not a revolution,” insistsBernard Chaumont, whohelps to coordinate researchat the Institute. He has been givenresponsibility for a working groupdedicated to post-Fukushima R & D.“The crisis did not give rise to newtopics or reveal any lines of research

Scientists did not wait for the Japanese disaster to occur before working on nuclear accidenta large number of tools were used to manage the crisis. But certain lines of research were


the avenues to be explored

found some discrepancies betweenthe territorial contamination predic-tions made by IRSN and the in-situmeasurements, suggesting that thesepredictive models need to beimproved,” acknowledges VéroniqueRouyer. She then adds: “Fukushimahas confirmed the need to open our-selves up more to the social sciencesat different levels: this could be at thelevel of a facility, to better understandthe role of human factors, for exam-ple in terms of decision-making beforeor after the accident, or, outside theboundaries of the power plant, workconcerning the resilience of society.”�

LESSONS LEARNED > RESEARCH

23

P ierre-Yves Bard is a seismologist in charge of the Flash Japan call for projects, launched on17th June by the French National Research Agency(ANR) and the JST 1. “This procedure, known as Flash,responds to exceptional events to collect data as soonas possible and learn as much from it as we can.” It is the second one of its kind; it was first triggeredfollowing the earthquake in Haiti. There was barely a month between the call forprojects and the submission of proposals to the ANR.The nine chosen projects were launched inSeptember. This pace was not too fast for an IRSNproject led by Christelle Adam-Guillermin, aradioecology and ecotoxicology biologist. Thisproject, known as Free Bird, studies the effects of ionising radiation on birds (barn swallows, tree sparrows and greenfinch in China) exposed in the area affected by the accident at Fukushima.“These species were chosen because of their differentlifestyles and the characteristics of their plumage.

The more colourful birds could be more sensitive toradiation if the anti-oxidant carotenoids that pigmenttheir feathers are used to counteract the oxidativestress due to radiation. The aim is to evaluate the impact on living organisms of chronic exposure to ionising radiation. Based on laboratory studies, we were able to estimate an acceptable dose ratebelow which no harmful effects on fauna and flora are anticipated. For birds, this value may be exceededby one or two orders of magnitude in the zone withina 100 km radius of the Fukushima site. In particular,the Free Bird project will test the robustness of this radiation protection criterion.”

Emergency launch of research projects

1. The Phébus PF severe accident programme is to help reduce the uncertainty concerningthe estimation of radioactive products in theevent of a core meltdown accident in a pressurized water reactor, and to increase the IRSN’s analysis and crisis managementexpertise in this field.

1. Japan Science and Technology Agency.

“Before it can be transported, spent fuel mustbe cooled for several years in pools,” remindsPhilippe March, head of an experimental labo-ratory focused on fuel cladding at IRSN.“Although the vulnerability of irradiated fuel inreactor pools was demonstrated by Fukushima,the issue has long been a subject of research atIRSN. The Mozart programme, which deter-mined the oxidation rates of cladding in airand the runaway limits of this reaction, hasmade it possible to estimate the time avail-able before cladding ruptures and releases ofradioactive substances. Nonetheless, Fukushi-ma means that we will have to specify the run-away conditions in order to determine thesetime margins more accurately and adapt theresponse measures where necessary. Over thecoming years we are going to work on thestrength of fuel cladding in an atmosphere thatis closer to real conditions and evaluate whetherthis cladding retains its confinement properties

after being uncovered then covered again withwater.”When asked what other tool was useful duringthe crisis, Olivia Coindreau, a researcher incharge of modelling at IRSN, replied: “ASTEC[Accident Source Term Evaluation Code], whichis used to determine the amount of radionu-clides released into the environment during asevere accident.” A special pool version ofASTEC, containing forthcoming results of exper-imental investigations on the behaviour ofcladding, is expected to be developed. “Had thepools emptied during the crisis, the currentreactor version of ASTEC could have been usedto quickly calculate the time periods prior to sig-nificant releases. Fortunately, that scenarioapparently did not occur. Still, it sent a strongmessage that work on the issue of accidentsinvolving irradiated fuel in pools must be con-tinued.”

Anticipating release in the event of uncovery in spent fuel pools

Noa

k/Le

bar

Flo

réal

/IRSN

Experiments in the radioecology and ecotoxicology laboratory.

Experiments in the radioecology and ecotoxicology laboratory.

prevention. On the contrary, bolstered by these events.

Noa

k/Le

bar

Flo

réal

/IRSN

Experts for expertsThe European Nuclear Safety Training and Tutoring Institute, ENSTTI is an initiative of the European Technical Safety Organizations Network-ETSON.ENSTTI provides vocational training and tutoring in methods and practices required to performassessment in nuclear safety, nuclear security and radiation protection. ENSTTI calls on European TSOs’ expertise to maximize the transmission of knowledge and pro-ficiency based on practical experience and culture. ENSTTI lecturers and trainers are recognized experts in their technical field coming from Euro-pean Technical Safety Organizations. ENSTTI trainees have the opportunity of sharing their experience with top experts in nuclear safety,nuclear security and radiation protection. ENSTTI contributes to the harmonization of nuclear safety and security practices and to the net-working of today and future nuclear safety experts in Europe and worldwide.

Programme and Registration online: www.enstti.eu

©Greg Epperson/Fotolia.com

For further information,contact us now:Tel.: 00 33 158359229Email: [email protected]: www.enstti.eu

2424_R12_ENGLISH_280212_OLI 28/02/12 19:15 Page 1

the irsn newsmagazine · editorial 13. n ea sa y 3 repères i january 2012 repères – published...

Documents