TheNatureofTrueVirtue

byJonathanEdwards

TableofContents

ChapterI:Showingwhereintheessenceoftruevirtueconsists

ChapterII:Showinghowthatlove,whereintruevirtueconsists,respectstheDivineBeingandcreatedbeings

ChapterIII:Concerningthesecondaryandinferiorkindofbeauty

ChapterIV:Ofself-love,anditsvariousinfluence,tocauselovetoothers,orthecontrary

ChapterV:Ofnaturalconscience,andthemoralsense

Chapter VI: Of particular instincts of nature, which in some respectsresemblevirtue

Chapter VII: The reasons why those things that have beenmentioned,whichhavenottheessenceofvirtue,haveyetbymanybeenmistakenfortruevirtue

Chapter VIII: In what respects virtue or moral good is founded insentiment;andhowfaritisfoundedinthereasonandnatureofthings

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ChapterI:Showingwhereintheessenceoftruevirtueconsists.

WHATEVER controversies and variety of opinions there are about thenature of virtue, yet all excepting, some sceptics, who deny any realdifference between virtue and vice,mean by it something beautiful, orrathersomekindofbeauty,orexcellency.Itisnotallbeautythatiscalledvirtue; for instance, not the beauty of a building, of a flower, or of therainbow;butsomebeautybelongingtobeingsthathaveperceptionandwill.Itisnotallbeautyofmankindthatiscalledvirtue;forinstance,nottheexternalbeautyofthecountenance,orshape,gracefulnessofmotion,or harmony of voice: but it is a beauty that has its original seat in themind. But yet perhaps not every thing that may be called a beauty ofmind, is properly called virtue.There is a beauty of understanding andspeculation; there is something in the ideas and conceptions of greatphilosophers and statesmen, that may be called beautiful; which is adifferentthingfromwhatismostcommonlymeantbyvirtue.

Butvirtueisthebeautyofthosequalitiesandactsofthemind,thatareofamoral nature, i. e. such as are attendedwith desert or worthiness ofpraise or blame. Things of this sort, it is generally agreed, so far as Iknow, do not belongmerely to speculation; but to the disposition andwill,or(touseageneralword,Isupposecommonlywellunderstood)tothe heart. Therefore, I suppose, I shall not depart from the commonopinion,whenIsay,thatvirtueisthebeautyofthequalitiesandexercisesoftheheart,orthoseactionswhichproceedfromthem.Sothatwhenitisinquired,whatisthenatureoftruevirtue?thisisthesameastoinquire,whatthatis,whichrendersanyhabit,disposition,orexerciseofthehearttrulybeautiful?

Iusethephrasetruevirtue,andspeakofthingstrulybeautiful,becauseIsupposeitwillgenerallybeallowed,thatthereisadistinctiontobemadebetween some things which are truly virtuous, and others which onlyseemtobeso,throughapartialandimperfectviewofthings:thatsome

actions and dispositions appear beautiful, if considered partially andsuperficially, or with regard to some things belonging to them, and insome of their circumstances and tendencies, which would appearotherwiseinamoreextensiveandcomprehensiveview,whereintheyareseenclearly intheirwholenature,andtheextentof theirconnexions intheuniversalityofthings.

There isageneralandparticularbeauty.Byaparticularbeauty,Imeanthatbywhichathingappearsbeautifulwhenconsideredonlywithregardto its connexionwith, and tendency to, someparticular thingswithin alimited,andasitwereaprivate,sphere.Andageneralbeautyisthatbywhich a thing appears beautiful when viewed most perfectly,comprehensively, anduniversally,with regard to all its tendencies, andits connexions with every thing to which it stands related. The formermaybewithoutandagainstthelatter.Asafewnotesinatune,takenonlybythemselves,andintheirrelationtooneanother,maybeharmonious;which,whenconsideredwithrespect toall thenotes in the tune,or theentireseriesofsoundstheyareconnectedwith,maybeverydiscordant,and disagreeable. That only, therefore, is what I mean by true virtue,which, belonging to the heart of an intelligent being, is beautiful by ageneralbeauty,orbeautifulinacomprehensiveview,asitisinitself,andasrelated toevery thingwithwhich it standsconnected.Andtherefore,whenweareinquiringconcerningthenatureoftruevirtue—whereinthistrueandgeneralbeautyoftheheartdoesmostessentiallyconsist—thisismyanswertotheinquiry:—

True virtuemost essentially consists inBENEVOLENCETOBEING INGENERAL. Or perhaps, to speak more accurately, it is that consent,propensity,andunionofhearttobeingingeneral,whichisimmediatelyexercisedinageneralgoodwill.

Thethingsbeforeobservedrespectingthenatureoftruevirtue,naturallylead us to such a notion of it. If it has its seat in the heart, and is thegeneral goodness and beauty of the disposition and its exercise, in themost comprehensive view, considered with regard to its universaltendency,andas related toevery thingwithwhich it stands connected;what can it consist in,buta consentandgoodwill tobeing ingeneral?Beauty does not consist in discord and dissent, but in consent and

agreement.Andifeveryintelligentbeingissomewayrelatedtobeingingeneral,andisapartoftheuniversalsystemofexistence;andsostandsinconnexionwiththewhole;whatcanitsgeneralandtruebeautybe,butitsunionandconsentwiththegreatwhole?

Ifanysuchthingcanbesupposedasaunionofhearttosomeparticularbeing,ornumberofbeings,disposingittobenevolencetoaprivatecircleorsystemofbeings,whicharebutasmallpartofthewhole;notimplyingatendencytoanunionwiththegreatsystem,andnotatallinconsistentwith enmity towards being in general; this I suppose not to be of thenatureoftruevirtue;althoughitmayinsomerespectsbegood,andmayappearbeautifulinaconfinedandcontractedviewofthings.—Butofthismoreafterwards.

ItisabundantlyplainbytheHolyScriptures,andgenerallyallowed,notonlybyChristiandivines,butbythemoreconsiderableDeists,thatvirtuemostessentiallyconsistsinlove.AndIsuppose,itisownedbythemostconsiderable writers, to consist in general love of benevolence, or kindaffection:thoughitseemstomethemeaningofsomeinthisaffairisnotsufficientlyexplained;whichperhapsoccasionssomeerrororconfusionindiscoursesonthissubject.

WhenIsay,truevirtueconsistsinlovetobeingingeneral,Ishallnotbelikelytobeunderstood,thatnooneactofthemindorexerciseofloveisof thenatureof truevirtue,butwhathasbeing ingeneral, or thegreatsystemofuniversalexistence,foritsdirectandimmediateobject:sothatnoexerciseoflove,orkindaffection,toanyoneparticularbeing,thatisbutasmallpartofthiswhole,hasanythingofthenatureoftruevirtue.But,thatthenatureoftruevirtueconsistsinadispositiontobenevolencetowards being in general; though from such a disposition may ariseexercises of love to particular beings, as objects are presented, andoccasions arise. No wonder, that he who is of a generally benevolentdisposition, should be more disposed than another to have his heartmovedwithbenevolentaffectiontoparticularpersons,withwhomheisacquaintedandconversant,andfromwhomarisethegreatestandmostfrequentoccasions for excitinghisbenevolent temper.Butmymeaningis, that no affections towards particular persons or beings are of thenature of true virtue, but such as arise from a generally benevolent

temper, or from that habit or frame of mind, wherein consists adispositiontolovebeingingeneral.

Andperhapsitisneedlessformetogivenoticetomyreaders,thatwhenI speak of an intelligent being having a heart united and benevolentlydisposedtobeingingeneral,Itherebymeanintelligentbeingingeneral.Notinanimatethings,orbeingsthathavenoperceptionorwill;whicharenotproperlycapableobjectsofbenevolence.

Love is commonly distinguished into love of benevolence, and love ofcomplacence.Loveof benevolence is that affectionorpropensity of thehearttoanybeing,whichcausesittoinclinetoitswell-being,ordisposesittodesireandtakepleasureinitshappiness.AndifImistakenot,it isagreeabletothecommonopinion,thatbeautyintheobjectisnotalwaysthegroundofthispropensity;butthattheremaybeadispositiontothewelfare of those that are not considered as beautiful, unless mereexistence be accounted a beauty. And benevolence or goodness in theDivineBeingisgenerallysupposed,notonlytobepriortothebeautyofmanyofitsobjects,buttotheirexistence;soastobethegroundbothoftheir existence and their beauty, rather than the foundation of God'sbenevolence;asitissupposedthatitisGod'sgoodnesswhichmovedhimtogivethembothbeingandbeauty.Sothatifallvirtueprimarilyconsistsinthataffectionofheart tobeing,which isexercised inbenevolence,oraninclinationtoitsgood,thenGod'svirtueissoextendedastoincludeapropensitynotonlytobeingactuallyexisting,andactuallybeautiful,butto possible being, so as to incline him to give a being beauty andhappiness.

Whatiscommonlycalledloveofcomplacence,presupposesbeauty.Foritisnootherthandelightinbeauty;orcomplacenceinthepersonorbeingbelovedforhisbeauty.Ifvirtuebethebeautyofanintelligentbeing,andvirtue consists in love, then it is plain inconsistence, to suppose thatvirtueprimarilyconsistsinanylovetoitsobjectforitsbeauty;eitherinaloveofcomplacence,whichisdelightinabeingforitsbeauty,orinaloveof benevolence, that has the beauty of its object for its foundation. Forthatwouldbetosuppose,thatthebeautyof intelligentbeingsprimarilyconsistsinlovetobeauty;orthattheirvirtuefirstofallconsistsintheirlovetovirtue.Whichisaninconsistence,andgoinginacircle.Becauseit

makes virtue, or beauty ofmind, the foundation or firstmotive of thatlove wherein virtue originally consists, or wherein the very first virtueconsists;or,itsupposesthefirstvirtuetobetheconsequenceandeffectof virtue. Which makes the first virtue both the ground and theconsequence, both cause and effect of itself. Doubtless virtue primarilyconsistsinsomethingelsebesidesanyeffectorconsequenceofvirtue.Ifvirtueconsisesprimarilyinlovetovirtue,thenvirtue,thethingloved,isthe love of virtue: so that virtuemust consist in the love of the love ofvirtue—and so on in infinitum. For there is no end of going back in acircle. We never come to any beginning or foundation; it is withoutbeginning,andhangsonnothing.—Therefore,iftheessenceofvirtue,orbeauty ofmind, lies in love, or a disposition to love, itmust primarilyconsistinsomethingdifferentbothfromcomplacence,whichisadelightinbeauty,andalsofromanybenevolencethathasthebeautyofitsobjectforitsfoundation.Becauseitisabsurdtosay,thatvirtueisprimarilyandfirstofalltheconsequenceofitself;whichmakesvirtueprimarilypriortoitself.

Norcanvirtueprimarilyconsistingratitude;oronebeing'sbenevolenceto another for his benevolence to him. Because this implies the sameinconsistence.Foritsupposesabenevolencepriortogratitude,whichisthe cause of gratitude. The first benevolence cannot be gratitude.Therefore there is room left for no other conclusion, than that theprimaryobjectofvirtuous love isbeing,simplyconsidered;or that truevirtueprimarilyconsists,notinlovetoanyparticularbeings,becauseoftheir virtue or beauty, nor in gratitude, because they love us; but in apropensity and union of heart to being simply considered; excitingabsolutebenevolence, if Imay so call it, tobeing ingeneral. I say, truevirtueprimarilyconsistsinthis.ForIamfarfromasserting,thatthereisno true virtue in any other love than this absolute benevolence. But Iwouldexpresswhatappearstometobethetruth,onthissubject,inthefollowingparticulars.

Thefirstobjectofavirtuousbenevolenceisbeing,simplyconsidered:andif being, simply considered, be its object, then being in general is itsobject;andwhat ithasanultimatepropensityto, is thehighestgoodofbeingingeneral.Anditwillseekthegoodofeveryindividualbeingunless

it be conceived as not consistent with the highest good of being ingeneral.Inwhichcasethegoodofaparticularbeing,orsomebeings,maybe given up for the sake of the highest good of being in general. Andparticularly,iftherebeanybeingstatedlyandirreclaimablyopposite,andan enemy to being in general, then consent and adherence to being ingeneralwillinducethetrulyvirtuoushearttoforsakethatenemy,andtoopposeit.

Further, if BEING, simply considered, be the first object of a trulyvirtuousbenevolence,thenthatobjectwhohasmostofbeing,orhasthegreatest share of existence, other things being equal, so far as such abeing is exhibited to our faculties, will have the greatest share of thepropensity and benevolent affections of the heart. I say, "other thingsbeing equal," especially because there is a secondary object of virtuousbenevolence, that I shall take notice of presently, which must beconsidered as the ground or motive to a purely virtuous benevolence.Purebenevolence in its first exercise isnothingelsebutbeing'sunitingconsent,orpropensitytobeing;andincliningtothegeneralhighestgood,and to eachbeing,whosewelfare is consistentwith thehighest generalgood,inproportiontothedegreeofexistence,*understand,"otherthingsbeingequal."

Thesecondobjectofavirtuouspropensityofheartisbenevolentbeing.Asecondarygroundofpurebenevolenceisvirtuousbenevolenceitselfinitsobject.When any one under the influence of general benevolence, seesanotherbeingpossessedofthelikegeneralbenevolence,thisattacheshishearttohim,anddrawsforthgreaterlovetohim,thanmerelyhishavingexistence: because so far as the being beloved has love to the being ingeneral, so farhisownbeing is,as itwere,enlarged;extends to,and insome sort comprehends, being in general: and therefore, he that isgovernedbylovetobeingingeneral,mustofnecessityhavecomplacenceinhim, and thegreaterdegreeofbenevolence tohim, as itwereoutofgratitude tohim forhis love to general existence, that his ownheart isextended and united to, and so looks on its interest as its own. It isbecausehis heart is thusunited to being in general, that he looks on abenevolent propensity to being in general, wherever he sees it, as thebeautyofthebeinginwhomitis;anexcellencythatrendershimworthy

of esteem, complacence, and the greater good will.—But several thingsmay be notedmore particularly concerning this secondary ground of atrulyvirtuouslove.

1. That loving a being on this ground necessarily arises from purebenevolencetobeingingeneral,andcomestothesamething.Forhethathas a simple and pure good will to general existence, must love thattemperinothers,thatagreesandconspireswithitself.Aspiritofconsenttobeingmustagreewithconsenttobeing.Thatwhichtrulyandsincerelyseeksthegoodofothers,mustapproveofandlovethatwhichjoinswithhiminseekingthegoodofothers.

2.Thissecondarygroundofvirtuouslove,isthethingwhereintruemoralor spiritual beauty primarily consists. Yea, spiritual beauty consistswholly in this,and in thevariousqualitiesandexercisesofmindwhichproceed from it, and the external actions which proceed from theseinternal qualities and exercises. And in these things consists all truevirtue, viz. in this love of being, and the qualities and actswhich arisefromit.

3.Asallspiritualbeautyliesinthesevirtuousprinciplesandacts,soitisprimarilyonthisaccounttheyarebeautiful,viz.thattheyimplycontentandunionwithbeing ingeneral.This is theprimaryandmostessentialbeautyofeverythingthatcanjustlybecalledbythenameofvirtue,orisanymoralexcellencyintheeyeofonethathasaperfectviewofthings.Isay, "the primary and most essential beauty," because there is asecondary and inferior sort of beauty; which I shall take notice ofafterwards.

4. This spiritual beauty, which is but a secondary ground of virtuousbenevolence, is the ground, not only of benevolence, but complacence,andistheprimarygroundofthelatter;thatis,whenthecomplacenceistrulyvirtuous.Lovetousinparticular,andkindnessreceived,maybeasecondaryground:butthisistheprimaryobjectivefoundationofit.

5. It must be noted, that the degree of the amiableness of true virtue,primarilyconsisting inconsent,andabenevolentpropensityofheart tobeing in general, is not in the simple proportion of the degree of

benevolent affection seen, but in a proportion compounded of thegreatnessofthebenevolentbeing,orthedegreeofbeingandthedegreeof benevolence. One that loves being in general, will necessarily valuegoodwilltobeingingeneral,whereverheseesit.Butifheseesthesamebenevolenceintwobeings,hewillvalueitmoreintwo,thaninoneonly.Becauseitisagreaterthing,morefavourabletobeingingeneral,tohavetwobeings to favour it, thanonlyoneof them.For there ismorebeingthatfavoursbeing:bothtogetherhavingmorebeingthanonealone.So,ifonebeingbeasgreatastwo,hasasmuchexistenceasbothtogether,andhas the same degree of general benevolence, it is more favourable tobeing ingeneral, than if thereweregeneralbenevolence inabeing thathadbuthalfthatshareofexistence.Asalargequantityofgold,withthesamequality,ismorevaluablethanasmallquantityofthesamemetal.

6.Itisimpossiblethatanyoneshouldtrulyrelishthisbeauty,consistingin general benevolence, who has not that temper himself. I haveobserved, that if any being is possessed of such a temper, he willunavoidablybepleadedwiththesametemperinanother.Anditmayinlikemanner be demonstrated, that it is such a spirit, andnothing else,whichwill relish such a spirit. For if a being, destitute of benevolence,shouldlovebenevolencetobeingingeneral,itwouldprizeandseekthatfor which it had no value. For how should one love and value adisposition to a thing, or a tendency to promote it, and for that veryreason,whenthethingitselfiswhatheisregardlessof,andhasnovaluefor,nordesirestohavepromoted.*

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CHAPTERII:Showinghowthatlove,whereintruevirtueconsists,respectsthe

DivineBeingandcreatedbeings.

FROM what has been said, it is evident, that true virtue must chieflyconsistinLOVETOGOD;theBeingofbeings,infinitelythegreatestandbest.Thisappears,whetherweconsidertheprimaryorsecondarygroundof virtuous love. Itwasobserved, that the first objective groundof that

love,whereintruevirtueconsists,isBEINGsimplyconsidered:and,asanecessary consequenceof this, thatbeingwhohas thegreatest shareofuniversal existence has proportionably the greatest share of virtuousbenevolence, so far as such a being is exhibited to the faculties of ourminds,otherthingsbeingequal.ButGodhasinfinitelythegreatestshareof existence. So that all other being, even the whole universe, is asnothingincomparisonoftheDivineBeing.

Andifweconsiderthesecondarygroundoflove,ormoralexcellency,thesamethingwillappear.ForasGodisinfinitelythegreatestBeing,soheisallowed to be infinitely the most beautiful and excellent: and all thebeautytobefoundthroughoutthewholecreation,isbutthereflectionofthe diffused beams of that Being who hath an infinite fulness ofbrightnessandglory.God'sbeautyisinfinitelymorevaluablethanthatofallotherbeingsuponboth thoseaccountsmentioned,viz. thedegreeofhis virtue, and the greatness of his being, possessedof this virtue.AndGodhassufficientlyexhibitedhimself,bothinhisbeing,andhisinfinitegreatness and excellency: and has given us faculties, whereby we arecapableofplainlydiscoveringhisimmensesuperioritytoallotherbeings,in these respects. Therefore, he that has true virtue, consisting inbenevolence to being in general, and in benevolence to virtuous being,must necessarily have a supreme love toGod, both of benevolence andcomplacence.Andalltruevirtuemustradicallyandessentially,and,asitwere, summarily, consist in this. Because God is not only infinitelygreaterandmoreexcellentthanallotherbeing,butheistheheadoftheuniversal system of existence; the foundation and fountain of all beingand all beauty; fromwhomall is perfectly derived, and onwhomall ismostabsolutelyandperfectlydependent;ofwhom,andthroughwhom,andtowhomisallbeingandallperfection;andwhosebeingandbeautyare, as it were, the sum and comprehension of all existence andexcellence: much more than the sun is the fountain and summarycomprehensionofallthelightandbrightnessoftheday.

Ifitshouldbeobjected,thatvirtueconsistsprimarilyinbenevolence,butthat our fellow-creatures, and not God, seem to be the most properobjectsofourbenevolence; inasmuchasourgoodnessextendethnot toGod,andwecannotbeprofitabletohim.—TothisIanswer,

1. A benevolent propensity of heart is exercised, not only in seeking topromotethehappinessofthebeingtowardswhomitisexercised,butalsoinrejoicinginhishappiness.Evenasgratitudeforbenefitsreceivedwillnotonlyexciteendeavourstorequitethekindnesswereceive,byequallybenefitingourbenefactor,butalso ifhebeaboveanyneedofus,orwehave nothing to bestow, and are unable to repay his kindness, it willdisposeustorejoiceinhisprosperity.

2.ThoughwearenotabletogiveanythingtoGod,whichwehaveofourown, independently; yet we may be the instruments of promoting hisglory,inwhichhetakesatrueandproperdelight.*—Whateverinfluencesuchanobjectionmayseemtohaveon themindsof some,yet is thereany that owns the being of a God, who will deny that any benevolentaffection is due toGod, andproper to be exercised towards him? If nobenevolence is to be exercised towards God, because we cannot profithim, then, for the same reason, neither is gratitude to be exercisedtowardshim forhisbenefits tous;becausewecannot requitehim.Butwhereistheman,whobelievesaGodandaprovidence,thatwillsaythis?

Thereseemstobean inconsistence insomewritersonmorality, in thisrespect,thattheydonotwhollyexcludearegardtotheDeityoutoftheirschemes ofmorality, but yetmention it so slightly, that they leavemeroom and reason to suspect they esteem it a less important andsubordinate part of true morality; and insist on benevolence to thecreatedsystem,insuchamanneraswouldnaturallyleadonetosupposethey lookuponthatasby far themost importantandessential thing intheirscheme.Butwhyshould thisbe?If truevirtueconsistspartly inarespect to God, then doubtless it consists chiefly in it. If truemoralityrequiresthatweshouldhavesomeregard,somebenevolentaffectiontoourCreator,aswellastohiscreatures,thendoubtlessitrequiresthefirstregardtobepaidtohim;andthathebeeverywaythesupremeobjectofourbenevolence.Ifhisbeingaboveourreach,andbeyondallcapacityofbeing profited by us, does not hinder, but that nevertheless he is theproperobjectofourlove,thenitdoesnothinderthatheshouldbelovedaccordingtohisdignity,oraccordingtothedegreeinwhichhehasthosethingswhereinworthinessofregardconsists,sofaraswearecapableofit. But this worthiness, none will deny, consists in these two things,

greatness andmoral goodness.And those thatownaGod,donotdenythat he infinitely exceeds all other beings in these. If theDeity is to belookeduponaswithin that systemofbeingswhichproperly terminatesour benevolence, or belonging to that whole, certainly he is to beregardedastheheadofthesystem,andthechiefpartofit:ifitbeproperto call him a part, who is infinitely more than all the rest, and incomparisonofwhom,andwithoutwhom,alltherestarenothing,eitheras to beauty or existence. And therefore certainly, unless we will beatheists, we must allow that true virtue does primarily and mostessentially consist in a supreme love to God; and that where this iswanting,therecanbenotruevirtue.

Butthisbeingamatterofthehighestimportance,Ishallsaysomethingfurthertomakeitplain,thatlovetoGodismostessentialtotruevirtue;andthatnobenevolencewhatsoevertootherbeingscanbeofthenatureoftruevirtuewithoutit.

Andtherefore,letitbesupposed,thatsomebeings,bynaturalinstinct,orby some other means, have a determination of mind to union andbenevolence to a particular person, or private system,* which is but asmallpartof theuniversal systemofbeing:and that thisdispositionordetermination of mind is independent on, or not subordinate to,benevolence to being in general. Such a determination, disposition, oraffectionofmindisnotofthenatureoftruevirtue.

This is allowed by all with regard to self-love; in which good will isconfinedtoonesinglepersononly.Andtherearethesamereasonswhyanyotherprivateaffectionorgoodwill,thoughextendingtoasocietyofpersons independent of, and unsubordinate to, benevolence to theuniversality,shouldnotbeesteemedtrulyvirtuous.For,notwithstandingitextendstoanumberofpersons,whichtakentogetheraremorethanasingle person, yet the whole falls infinitely short of the universality ofexistence;andifputinthescaleswithit,hasnogreaterproportiontoitthanasingleperson.

However, itmaynotbeamissmoreparticularly toconsider thereasonswhyprivateaffections,orgoodwilllimitedtoaparticularcircleofbeings,fallinginfinitelyshortofthewholeexistence,andnotdependentuponit,

norsubordinate togeneralbenevolence,cannotbeof thenatureof truevirtue.

1. Such a private affection, detached from general benevolence, andindependent on it, as the case may be, will be against generalbenevolence, or of a contrary tendency; and will set a person againstgeneralexistence,andmakehimanenemytoit.Asitiswithselfishness,or when a man is governed by a regard to his own private interest,independentofregardtothepublicgood,suchatemperexposesamantoact the part of an enemy to the public. As, in every case wherein hisprivate interest seems to clash with the public; or in all those caseswherein such things are presented to his view, that suit his personalappetitesorprivateinclinations,butareinconsistentwiththegoodofthepublic.Onwhichaccount,aselfish,contracted,narrowspiritisgenerallyabhorred,andisesteemedbaseandsordid.Butifaman'saffectiontakesinhalfadozenmore,andhisregardsextendsofarbeyondhisownsinglepersonastotakeinhischildrenandfamily;orifitreachesfurtherstilltoa larger circle, but falls infinitely short of the universal system, and isexclusive of being in general; his private affection exposes him to thesame thing, viz. to pursue the interest of its particular object inopposition to general existence: which is certainly contrary to thetendency of true virtue; yea, directly contrary to the main and mostessential thing in its nature, the thing on account of which chiefly itsnatureandtendencyisgood.Forthechiefandmostessentialgoodthatisin virtue, is its favouring being in general. Now certainly, if privateaffectiontoalimitedsystemhadinitselftheessentialnatureofvirtue,itwouldbeimpossiblethatitshould,inanycircumstancewhatsoever,haveatendencyand inclinationdirectlycontraryto thatwhereintheessenceofvirtuechieflyconsists.

2. Private affection, if not subordinate to general affection, is not onlyliable,asthecasemaybe,toissueinenmitytobeingingeneral,buthasatendencytoitasthecasecertainlyis,andmustnecessarilybe.Forhethatisinfluencedbyprivateaffection,notsubordinatetoaregardtobeingingeneral, sets up its particular or limited object above being in general;and thismost naturally tends to enmity against the latter, which is byright the great supreme, ruling, and absolutely sovereign object of our

regard.Evenasthesettingupanotherprinceassupremeinanykingdom,distinct fromthe lawfulsovereign,naturallytendstoenmityagainstthelawfulsovereign.Whereveritissufficientlypublished,thatthesupreme,infinite, and all-comprehending Being requires a supreme regard tohimself; and insists upon it, that our respect to him should universallyruleinourhearts,andeveryotheraffectionbesubordinatetoit,andthisunderthepainofhisdispleasure,(aswemustsupposeitisintheworldofintelligentcreatures,ifGodmaintainsamoralkingdomintheworld,)thenaconsciousnessofourhavingchosenandsetupanotherprincetoruleoverus,andsubjectedourheartstohim,andcontinuinginsuchanact,mustunavoidablyexciteenmity,andfixusinastatedoppositiontotheSupremeBeing.Thisdemonstrates,thataffectiontoaprivatesocietyorsystem,independentongeneralbenevolence,cannotbeofthenatureoftruevirtue.Forthiswouldbeabsurd,thatithasthenatureandessenceof truevirtue,andyetat thesametimehasa tendencyopposite to truevirtue.

3.Notonlywouldaffectiontoaprivatesystem,unsubordinatetoaregardto being in general, have a tendency to oppose the supreme object ofvirtuousaffection,asitseffectandconsequence,butwouldbecomeitselfanoppositiontothatobject.Consideredbyitself initsnature,detachedfrom its effects, it is an instance of great opposition to the rightfulsupremeobject of our respect. For it exalts its private object above theothergreatandinfiniteobject;andsetsthatupassupreme,inoppositiontothis.Itputsdownbeingingeneral,whichisinfinitelysuperiorinitself,and infinitely more important, in an inferior place; yea, subjects thesupremegeneralobject tothisprivate infinitely inferiorobject:whichistotreatitwithgreatcontempt,andtrulytoactinoppositiontoit,andtoact in opposition to the true order of things, and in opposition to thatwhich is infinitely the supreme interest; making this supreme andinfinitely important interest, as far as in us lies, to be subject to, anddependenton,aninterestinfinitelyinferior.Thisistoactthepartofanenemytoit.Hethattakesasubject,andexaltshimabovehisprince,setshimas supreme insteadof theprince, and treatshisprincewhollyasasubject,thereinactsthepartofanenemytohisprince.

Fromthesethings,Ithink,itismanifest,thatnoaffectionlimitedtoany

privatesystem,notdependingonnorsubordinatetobeingingeneral,canbeofthenatureoftruevirtue;andthis,whatevertheprivatesystembe,letitbemoreorlessextensive,consistingofagreaterorsmallernumberof individuals, so longas it containsan infinitely littlepartofuniversalexistence, and so bears no proportion to the great all-comprehendingsystem.Andconsequently,thatnoaffectionwhatsoevertoanycreature,or any system of created beings, which is not dependent on, norsubordinate to, apropensityorunionof theheart toGod, the supremeandinfiniteBeing,canbeofthenatureoftruevirtue.

Fromhencealso it isevident, thatthedivinevirtue,orthevirtueof thedivinemind,mustconsistprimarily in lovetohimself,or inthemutualloveandfriendshipwhichsubsistseternallyandnecessarilybetweentheseveralpersonsintheGodhead,orthatinfinitelystrongpropensitythereisinthesedivinepersonsonetoanother.Thereisnoneedofmultiplyingwords, toprovethat itmustbethus,onasuppositionthatvirtue, in itsmost essential nature, consists in benevolent affection or propensity ofhearttowardsbeingingeneral;andsoflowingouttoparticularbeings,ina greater or lesser degree, according to the measure of existence andbeautywhichtheyarepossessedof.Itwillalsofollow,fromtheforegoingthings, thatGod's goodness and love to createdbeings, is derived fromandsubordinatetohislovetohimself.*

With respect to themanner inwhich a virtuous love in created beings,onetoanother,isdependenton,andderivedfromlovetoGod,thiswillappear by a proper consideration of what has been said; that it issufficienttorenderlovetoanycreatedbeing,virtuous,ifitarisefromthetemper of mind wherein consists a disposition to love God supremely.Becauseitappearsfromwhathasbeenalreadyobserved,allthatlovetoparticularbeings,whichisthefruitofabenevolentpropensityofhearttobeing in general, is virtuous love. But, as has been remarked, abenevolent propensity of heart to being in general, and a temper ordisposition to love God supremely, are in effect the same thing.Therefore, if love to a created being comes from that temper, orpropensityoftheheart,itisvirtuous.However,everyparticularexerciseof love toacreaturemaynotsensiblyarise fromanyexerciseof love toGod,oranexplicitconsiderationofanysimilitude,conformity,union,or

relationtoGod,inthecreaturebeloved.

Themost proper evidence of love to a created being, arising from thattemperofmindwhereinconsistsasupremepropensityofheart toGod,seemstobetheagreeablenessofthekindanddegreeofourlovetoGod'sendinourcreation,andinthecreationofallthings,andthecoincidenceoftheexerciseofourlove,intheirmanner,order,andmeasure,withthemanner in which God himself exercises love to the creature in thecreationandgovernmentoftheworld,andthewayinwhichGod,asthefirst cause and supreme disposer of all things, has respect to thecreature's happiness, in subordination to himself as his own supremeend. For the true virtue of created beings is doubtless their highestexcellency,andtheirtruegoodness,andthatbywhichtheyareespeciallyagreeabletothemindoftheirCreator.Butthetruegoodnessofathing,mustbeitsagreeablenesstoitsend,oritsfitnesstoanswerthedesignforwhichitwasmade.Therefore,theyaregoodmoralagents,whosetemperofmind, or propensity of heart, is agreeable to the end for whichGodmademoralagents.But,ashasbeenshown,thelastendforwhichGodhasmademoralagents,mustbethelastendforwhichGodhasmadeallthings:itbeingevident,thatthemoralworldistheendoftherestoftheworld;theinanimateandunintelligentworldbeingmadefortherationalandmoralworld,asmuchasahouseispreparedfortheinhabitants.

By these things, it appears, that a truly virtuousmind,beingas itwereunderthesovereigndominionoflovetoGod,aboveallthings,seeksthegloryofGod,andmakesthishissupreme,governing,andultimateend.ThisconsistsintheexpressionofGod'sperfectionsintheirpropereffects,—the manifestation of God's glory to created understandings,—thecommunications of the infinite fulness of God to the creature,—thecreature's highest esteem of God, love to, and joy in him,—and in theproperexercisesandexpressionsofthese.Andsofarasavirtuousmindexercisestruevirtueinbenevolencetocreatedbeings,itchieflyseeksthegoodof thecreature; consisting in itsknowledgeorviewofGod'sgloryandbeauty, itsunionwithGod, conformityand love tohim,and joy inhim.Andthatdispositionofheart,thatconsent,union,orpropensityofmind to being in general, which appears chiefly in such exercises, isVIRTUE, truly so called; or in other words, true GRACE and real

HOLINESS.Andnootherdispositionoraffectionbutthisisofthenatureoftruevirtue.

Corollary. Hence it appears, that those schemes of religion or moralphilosophy, which—however well in some respects they may treat ofbenevolencetomankind,andothervirtuesdependingonit,yet—havenotasupremeregardtoGod,andlovetohim,laidasthefoundation,andallothervirtueshandledinaconnexionwiththis,andinsubordinationtoit,arenottrueschemesofphilosophy,butarefundamentallyandessentiallydefective. And whatever other benevolence or generosity towardsmankind, and other virtues, or moral qualifications which go by thatname, any are possessed of, that are not attended with a love to God,whichisaltogetherabovethem,andtowhichtheyaresubordinate,andonwhichtheyaredependent,thereisnothingofthenatureoftruevirtueorreligioninthem.Anditmaybeassertedingeneral,thatnothingisofthe nature of true virtue, inwhichGod is not the first and the last; orwhich, with regard to their exercises in general, have not their firstfoundation and source in apprehensions of God's supreme dignity andglory,andinanswerableesteemandloveofhim,andhavenotrespecttoGodasthesupremeend.

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ChapterIII:Concerningthesecondaryandinferiorkindofbeauty.

THOUGHwhat has been spoken of is, alone, justly esteemed the truebeautyofmoralagents,orspiritualbeings;thisalonebeingwhatwouldappearbeautifulinthemuponaclearandcomprehensiveviewofthings;and therefore alone is the moral amiableness of beings that haveunderstandingandwill,intheeyesofhimthatperfectlyseesallthingsastheyare;yetthereareotherqualities,othersensations,propensities,andaffectionsofmind,andprinciplesofaction,thatoftenobtaintheepithetofvirtuous,andbymanyaresupposedtohavethenatureoftruevirtue;whichareentirelyofadistinctnaturefromthis,andhavenothingofthatkind;andthereforeareerroneouslyconfoundedwithrealvirtue.

That consent, agreement, or union of being to being, which has beenspoken of, viz. the union or propensity ofminds tomental or spiritualexistence,maybecalledthehighestandprimarybeauty;beingtheproperandpeculiarbeautyofspiritualandmoralbeings,whicharethehighestand first part of the universal system, for whose sake all the rest hasexistence.Yetthereisanother,inferior,secondarybeauty,whichissomeimageofthis,andwhichisnotpeculiartospiritualbeings,but is foundeven in inanimate things; which consists in a mutual consent andagreementofdifferentthings,inform,manner,quantity,andvisibleendor design; called by the various names of regularity, order, uniformity,symmetry,proportion,harmony,&c.Suchisthemutualagreementofthevarioussidesofasquare,orequilateraltriangle,orofaregularpolygon.Such is, as it were, the mutual consent of the different parts of theperiphery of a circle, or surface of a sphere, and of the correspondingparts of an ellipsis. Such is the agreement of the colours, figures,dimensions,anddistancesofthedifferentspotsonachessboard.Suchisthe beauty of the figures on a piece of chintz or brocade. Such is thebeautiful proportion of the various parts of a human body, orcountenance.Andsuchisthesweetmutualconsentandagreementofthevariousnotesofamelodioustune.ThisisthesamethatMr.Hutchinson,inhisTreatiseonBeauty,expressesbyuniformityinthemidstofvariety.Which isnoother than theconsentoragreementofdifferent things, inform,quantity,&c.Heobserves, that the greater the variety is in equaluniformitythegreaterthebeauty.Whichisnomorethantosay,themorethereareofdifferentmutuallyagreeingthings,thegreateristhebeauty.Andthereasonof that is,because it ismoreconsiderabletohavemanythingsconsentonewithanother,thanafewonly.

Thebeautywhichconsistsinthevisiblefitnessofathingtoitsuse,andunityofdesign, isnotadistinct sortofbeauty fromthis.For it is tobeobserved,thatonethingwhichcontributestothebeautyoftheagreementandproportionofvariousthings, istheirrelationonetoanother;whichconnects them, and introduces them together into view andconsideration,andwherebyonesuggeststheothertothemind,andthemind is led to compare them, and so to expect and desire agreement.Thus the uniformity of two ormore pillars, as theymay happen to befound in different places, is not an equal degree of beauty, as that

uniformity in so many pillars in the corresponding parts of the samebuilding.Someansandanintendedeffectarerelatedonetoanother.Theanswerablenessofathingtoitsuseisonlytheproportionandfitnessofacause,ormeans,toavisiblydesignedeffect,andsoaneffectsuggestedtothemind by the idea of themeans. This kind of beauty is not entirelydifferentfromthatbeautywhichthereisinfittingamortisetoitstenon.Onlywhenthebeautyconsistsinunityofdesign,ortheadaptednessofavarietyofthingstopromoteoneintendedeffect,inwhichallconspire,asthevariouspartsofaningeniouscomplicatedmachine,thereisadoublebeauty,asthereisatwofoldagreementandconformity.First,thereistheagreement of the various parts to the designed end. Secondly, throughthis designed end or effect, all the various particulars agree one withanotherasthegeneralmediumoftheirunion,wherebythey,beingunitedinthisthird,areallunitedonetoanother.

Thereason,oratleastonereason,whyGodhasmadethiskindofmutualagreementofthingsbeautifulandgratefultothoseintelligentbeingsthatperceive it, probably is, that there is in it some image of the true,spiritual,originalbeauty,whichhasbeenspokenof;consistinginbeing'sconsenttobeing,ortheunionofspiritualbeingsinamutualpropensityand affection of heart. The other is an image of this, because by thatuniformity diverse things become as itwere one, as it is in this cordialunion.AnditpleasesGodtoobserveanalogyinhisworks,asismanifestin fact, in innumerable instances; and especially to establish inferiorthings with analogy to superior. Thus, in how many instances has heformed brutes in analogy to the nature of mankind! and plants, inanalogy to animals, with respect to the manner of their generation,nutrition,&c.Andsohehasconstitutedtheexternalworldinanalogytothespiritualworld,innumberlessinstances;asmightbeshown,ifitwerenecessary, and here were a proper place for it.—Why such analogy inGod'sworkspleaseshim,itisnotneedfulnowtoinquire.Itissufficientthathemakes an agreement of different things, in their form,manner,measure,&c.toappearbeautiful,becausehereissomeimageofahigherkindofagreementandconsentofspiritualbeings.Ithaspleasedhimtoestablisha lawofnature,byvirtueofwhich theuniformityandmutualcorrespondence of a beautiful plant, and the respect which the variousparts of a regular building seem to have one to another, and their

agreementandunion,andtheconsentorconcordofthevariousnotesofamelodioustune,shouldappearbeautiful;becausethereinissomeimageoftheconsentofmind,ofthedifferentmembersofasocietyorsystemofintelligentbeings,sweetlyunitedinabenevolentagreementofheart.

Andherebytheway,Iwouldfurtherobserve,probablyitiswithregardto this image or resemblance, which secondary beauty has of truespiritualbeauty, thatGodhassoconstitutednature, thatthepresentingof this inferior beauty, especially in those kinds of it which have thegreatest resemblanceof theprimarybeauty, as theharmonyof sounds,andthebeautiesofnature,haveatendencytoassistthosewhoseheartsareundertheinfluenceofatrulyvirtuoustemper,todisposethemtotheexercisesofdivinelove,andenliveninthemasenseofspiritualbeauty.

From what has been said we may see, that there are two sorts ofagreement or consent of one thing to another. (1.) There is a cordialagreement;thatconsistsinconcordandunionofmindandheart:which,if not attended (viewing things in general) with more discord thanconcord, is truevirtue,and theoriginalorprimarybeauty,which is theonly true moral beauty. (2.) There is a natural union or agreement;which, though some image of the other, is entirely a distinct thing; thewill, disposition, or affection of the heart having no concern in it, butconsistingonly inuniformityandconsentofnature, form,quantity,&c.(asbeforedescribed,)wherein liesan inferior secondary sortofbeauty,whichmay indistinction from the other, be callednatural beauty.Thismay be sufficient to let the reader know how I shall hereafter use thephrasescordialandnaturalagreement;andmoral,spiritual,divine,andprimary original beauty, and secondary or natural beauty. Concerningthis latter, the inferior kind of beauty, the following things may beobserved:

1. The causewhy secondary beauty is grateful tomen, is only a law ofnature,whichGodhasfixed,oraninstincthehasgiventomankind;andnottheirperceptionofthesamethingwhichGodispleasedtoregardasthegroundorrulebywhichhehasestablishedsuchalawofnature.Thisappearsintwothings.

(1.)ThatwhichGodrespects,asthegroundofthislawofnature,whereby

things having a secondary beauty are made grateful to men, is theirmutual agreement and proportion, inmeasure, form,&c. But, inmanyinstances,personsthataregratifiedandaffectedwiththisbeauty,donotreflectonthatparticularagreementandproportion,which,accordingtothe lawofnature, is thegroundandruleofbeauty in thecase,yea,areignorantofit.Thus,amanmaybepleasedwiththeharmonyofthenotesinatune,andyetknownothingofthatproportionoradjustmentofthenotes,which,bythelawofnature,isthegroundofthemelody.Heknowsnot,thatthevibrationsinonenoteregularlycoincidewiththevibrationsin another; that the vibrations of a note coincide in time with twovibrationsof its octave; and that twovibrationsof anote coincidewiththreeofitsfifth,&c.—Yea,hemaynotknow,thattherearevibrationsofthe air in the case, or any corresponding motions in the organs ofhearing, in the auditory nerve, or animal spirits.—So a man may beaffectedandpleasedwithabeautifulproportionofthefeaturesinaface,and yet not know what that proportion is, or in what measures,quantities, and distances it consists. In this, therefore, a sensation ofsecondary beauty differs from a sensation of primary and spiritualbeauty, consisting in a spiritual union and agreement.Whatmakes thelattergrateful, isperceiving theunion itself. It is the immediateviewofthat wherein the beauty fundamentally lies, that is pleasing to thevirtuousmind.

(2.)God, in establishing such a law—thatmutual natural agreement ofdifferentthings,inform,quantity,&c.shouldappearbeautifulorgratefultomen—seemstohavehadregardtotheresemblancethereisinsuchanaturalagreement,tothatspiritual,cordialagreement,whereinoriginalbeautyconsists.Butitisnotanyreflectionupon,orperceptionof,sucharesemblance,thatisthereasonwhysuchaformorstateofobjectsappearbeautiful to men: but their sensation of pleasure, on a view of thissecondarybeauty, is immediatelyowingto the lawGodhasestablished,ortheinstincthehasgiven.

2. Another thing observable concerning this kind of beauty, is, that itaffectsthemindmore(otherthingsbeingequal)whentakennoticeofinobjects which are of considerable importance, than in little trivialmatters. Thus, the symmetry of the parts of a human body, or

countenance,affects themindmore than thebeautyofa flower.So thebeautyofthesolarsystem,morethanasgreatandasmanifoldanorderanduniformityinatree.Andtheproportionsofthepartsofachurch,ora palace, more than the same proportions in some little slightcompositions,madetopleasechildren.

3. Not only uniformity and proportion, &c. of different things, isrequisite, in order to this inferior beauty; but also some relation orconnexion of the things thus agreeing one with another. As theuniformityorlikenessofanumberofpillars,scatteredhitherandthither,doesnotconstitutebeauty,oratleastbynomeansinanequaldegree,asuniformity inpillars connected in the samebuilding, inparts thathaverelation one to another. So, if we see things unlike, and verydisproportioned,indistantplaces,whichhavenorelationtoeachother,this excites no such idea of deformity, as disagreement, inequality, ordisproportion in things related and connected; and the nearer therelation, and the stricter the connexion, somuch the greater andmoredisgustfulisthedeformity,consistingintheirdisagreement.

4. This secondary kind of beauty, consisting in uniformity andproportion,notonlytakesplaceinmaterialandexternalthings,butalsoin things immaterial; and is, inverymany things,plainand sensible inthelatter,aswellastheformer.Andwhenitisso,thereisnoreasonwhyit shouldnot be grateful to them that behold it, in these aswell as theother,byvirtueofthesamesense,orthesamedeterminationofmind,tobegratifiedwithuniformityandproportion.Ifuniformityandproportionbe the things that affect and appear agreeable to this sense of beauty,thenwhyshouldnotuniformityandproportionaffectthesamesenseinimmaterial things as well as material, if there be equal capacity ofdiscerning it in both? and indeed more in spiritual things (cœterisparibus) as these are more important than thingsmerely external andmaterial?

This is not only reasonable to be supposed, but is evident in fact, innumberlessinstances.Thereisabeautyoforderinsociety,besideswhatconsistsinbenevolence,orcanbereferredtoit,whichisofthesecondarykind.As,whenthedifferentmembersofsocietyhavealltheirappointedoffice,place,andstation,accordingtotheirseveralcapacitiesandtalents,

andeveryonekeepshisplace,andcontinues inhisproperbusiness. Inthis there is a beauty, not of a different kind from the regularity of abeautifulbuilding,orpieceofskilfularchitecture,wherethestrongpillarsare set in their proper place, the pilasters in a place fit for them, thesquare pieces of marble in the pavement, the pannels, partitions, andcornices,&c.inplacesproperforthem.Astheagreementofavarietyofthings in one common design,—as of the parts of a building, orcomplicatedmachine,—isoneinstanceofthatregularitywhichbelongstothesecondarykindofbeauty,sothereisthesamekindofbeautyinwhatis called wisdom, consisting in the united tendency of thoughts, ideas,andparticularvolitions,toonegeneralpurpose:whichisadistinctthingfrom the goodness of that general purpose, as being useful andbenevolent.

There is a beauty in the virtue called justice, which consists in theagreement of different things, that have relation to one another, innature, manner, and measure; and therefore is the very same sort ofbeautywiththatuniformityandproportion,whichisobservableinthoseexternal and material things that are esteemed beautiful. There is anatural agreement and adaptedness of things that have relation one toanother,andanharmoniouscorrespondingofonethingwithanother.Hewhofromhiswilldoeseviltoothers,shouldreceiveevilfromthewillofhimorthemwhosebusinessitistotakecareoftheinjured,andtoactintheirbehalf,inproportiontotheevilofhisdoings.Thingsareinnaturalregularityandmutualagreement,inaliteralsense,whenhewhoseheartopposesthegeneralsystem,shouldhavetheheartsofthatsystem,ortheheartoftherulerofthesystem,againsthim;and,inconsequence,shouldreceive evil, in proportion to the evil tendency of the opposition of hisheart. So, there is an agreement in nature andmeasure, when he thatloves has the proper returns of love; when he that from his heartpromotes thegoodof another,hashisgoodpromotedby theother; forthereisakindofjusticeinbecominggratitude.

Indeedmost of the duties incumbent on us, if well considered, will befoundtopartakeofthenatureofjustice.Thereissomenaturalagreementof one thing to another; some adaptedness of the agent to the object;some answerableness of the act to the occasion; some equality and

proportion in things of a similarnature, andof adirect relationone toanother. So it is in relativeduties;dutiesof children toparents, andofparents to children; duties of husbands andwives; duties of rulers andsubjects; duties of friendship and good neighbourhood; and all dutiesthatweowetoGod,ourcreator,preserver,andbenefactor;andalldutieswhatsoever, considered as required by God, and as what are to beperformedwitharegardtoChrist.

It is this secondarykindofbeauty,whichMr.Wollaston seems tohavehad in his eye, when he resolved all virtue into an agreement ofinclinations,volitions,andactionswithtruth.Heevidentlyhasrespecttothe justice there is in virtues and duties; which consists in one beingexpressingsuchaffections,andusingsuchaconduct,towardsanother,ashathanaturalagreementandproportiontowhatisinthem,andwhatwereceive from them: which is asmuch a natural conformity of affectionandactionwithitsground,object,andoccasion,asthatwhichisbetweenatruepropositionandthethingspokenofinit.

But there is another and higher beauty in true virtue, and in all trulyvirtuousdispositionsandexercises,thanwhatconsistsinanyuniformityorsimilarityofvariousthings;viz.theunionofhearttobeingingeneral,or toGOD, theBeing of beings,which appears in those virtues; and ofwhich those virtues, when true, are the various expressions or effects.Benevolencetobeingingeneral,ortobeingsimplyconsidered,isentirelyadistinctthingfromuniformityinthemidstofvariety,andisasuperiorkindofbeauty.

It is true, thatbenevolence tobeing in general,will naturally incline tojustice, or proportion in the exercises of it.He that loves being, simplyconsidered,willnaturally,otherthingsbeingequal,loveparticularbeing,in a proportion compounded of the degree of being, and the degree ofvirtue, or benevolence to being, which they have. And that is to lovebeingsinproportiontotheirdignity.Forthedignityofanybeingconsistsinthosetwothings.Respecttobeing,inthisproportion,isthefirstandmostgeneralkindofjustice;whichwillproduceallthesubordinatekinds.Sothat,afterbenevolencetobeingingeneralexists,theproportionwhichisobservedinobjectsmaybethecauseoftheproportionofbenevolencetothoseobjects:butnoproportionisthecauseorgroundoftheexistence

ofsuchathingasbenevolencetobeing.Thetendencyofobjectstoexcitethat degree of benevolence, which is proportionable to the degree ofbeing,&c.istheconsequenceoftheexistenceofbenevolence,andnottheground of it. Even as a tendency of bodies one to another, by mutualattraction,inproportiontothequantityofmatter,istheconsequenceofthe being of such a thing as mutual attraction; and not attraction theeffectofproportion.

By this it appears, that just affections and acts have a beauty in them,distinct from and superior to the uniformity and equality there is inthem:forwhich,hethathasatrulyvirtuoustemper,relishesanddelightsinthem.Andthatistheexpressionandmanifestationthereisinthemofbenevolencetobeingingeneral.Andbesidesthis,thereistheagreementof justice to the will and command of God; and also something in thetendencyandconsequencesofjustice,agreeabletogeneralbenevolence,asthegloryofGod,andthegeneralgood.Whichtendencyalsomakesitbeautiful to a truly virtuous mind. So that the tendency of generalbenevolence to produce justice, also the tendency of justice to produceeffectsagreeabletogeneralbenevolence,bothrenderjusticepleasingtoavirtuousmind.Anditisontheseaccountschiefly,thatjusticeisgratefultoavirtuoustaste,oratrulybenevolentheart.Butthoughitbetrue,thatthe uniformity and proportion there is in justice, is grateful to abenevolentheart,asthisuniformityandproportiontendstothegeneralgood;yet that isnoargument that there isnootherbeauty in itbut itsagreeingwithbenevolence.Forsotheexternalregularityandorderofthenaturalworld gratifies benevolence, as it is profitable, and tends to thegeneralgood;butthatisnoargumentthatthereisnoothersortofbeautyin externaluniformityandproportion,butonly its suitingbenevolence,bytendingtothegeneralgood.

5. From all that has been observed concerning this secondary kind ofbeauty,itappears,thatthedisposition,whichconsistsinadeterminationofmind to approve andbepleasedwith this beauty, considered simplyandby itself, has nothing of the nature of true virtue, and is entirely adifferentthingfromatrulyvirtuoustaste.Forithasbeenshown,thatthiskindofbeautyisentirelydiversefromthebeautyoftruevirtue,whetherit takes place in material or immaterial things; and therefore it will

follow,thatatasteofthiskindofbeautyisentirelyadifferentthingfromatasteoftruevirtue.Whowillaffirm,thatadispositiontoapproveoftheharmonyofgoodmusic,orthebeautyofasquare,orequilateraltriangle,isthesamewithtrueholiness,oratrulyvirtuousdispositionofmind?Itis a relish of uniformity and proportion that determines the mind toapprovethesethings.Andthereisnoneedofanythinghigher,orofanything in any respect diverse, to determine themind to approve and bepleased with equal uniformity and proportion among spiritual thingswhich are equally discerned. It is virtuous to love true virtue, as thatdenotesanagreementoftheheartwithvirtue.Butitarguesnovirtueforthehearttobepleasedwiththatwhichisentirelydistinctfromit.

Though it be true, that there is some analogy in it to spiritual andvirtuous beauty—as far as material things can have analogy to thingsspiritual,ofwhichtheycanhavenomorethanashadow—yet,ashasbeenobserved,mendonotapproveitbecauseofanysuchanalogyperceived.And not only reason but experience plainly shows, that men'sapprobation of this sort of beauty does not spring from any virtuoustemper,andhasnoconnexionwithvirtue.Forotherwisetheirdelightinthebeautyofsquares,andcubes,andregularpolygons,intheregularityof buildings, and the beautiful figures in a piece of embroidery, wouldincrease in proportion tomen's virtue; and would be raised to a greatheight in some eminently virtuous or holy men; but would be almostwhollylostinsomeothersthatareveryviciousandlewd.Itisevidentinfact,thatarelishofthesethingsdoesnotdependongeneralbenevolence,oranybenevolenceatalltoanybeingwhatsoever,anymorethanaman'slovingthetasteofhoney,orhisbeingpleasedwiththesmellofarose.Atasteofthisinferiorbeautyinthingsimmaterial, isonethingwhichhasbeenmistakenbysomemoralists,foratruevirtuousprinciple,supposedtobeimplantednaturallyintheheartsofallmankind.

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ChapterIV:Ofself-love,anditsvariousinfluence,tocauselovetoothers,orthe

contrary

MANY assert, that all love arises from self-love. In order to determinethis point, it should be clearly determined what is meant by self-love.Self-love, I think, is generally defined "a man's love of his ownhappiness;"whichisshort,andmaybethoughtveryplain:butinrealityisanambiguousdefinition,as theexpressionhisown, isequivocal,andliabletobetakenintwoverydifferentsenses.Foraman'sownhappinessmayeitherbetakenuniversally,forallthehappinessorpleasureofwhichthemindisinanyregardthesubject,orwhateverisgratefulandpleasingtomen;oritmaybetakenforthepleasureamantakesinhisownproper,private,andseparategood.Andsoself-lovemaybetakentwoways.

1. Itmay be taken for the same as his lovingwhatsoever is pleasing tohim.Whichcomesonlytothis,thatself-loveisaman'sliking,andbeingsuitedandpleasedinthatwhichhelikes,andwhichpleaseshim;or,thatitisaman'slovingwhatheloves.Forwhateveramanloves,thatthingisgratefulandpleasingtohim,whetherthatbehisownpeculiarhappiness,orthehappinessofothers.Andifthisbeallthattheymeanbyself-love,nowondertheysupposethatalllovemayberesolvedintoself-love.Foritisundoubtedlytrue,thatwhateveramanloves,hislovemayberesolvedintohislovingwhatheloves.—Ifbyself-loveismeantnothingelsebutaman'slovingwhatisgratefulorpleasingtohim,andbeingaversetowhatis disagreeable, this is calling that self-love, which is only a generalcapacity of loving or hating; or a capacity of being either pleased ordispleased;which is the same thing as aman'shaving a faculty ofwill.For if nothing could be either pleasing or displeasing, agreeable ordisagreeable,toaman,thenhecouldinclinetonothing,andwillnothing.But ifhe is capableofhaving inclination,will andchoice, thenwhatheinclinesto,andchooses, isgratefultohim,whateverthatbe;whetheritbehisownprivategood,thegoodofhisneighbours,orthegloryofGod.And so far as it is grateful or pleasing to him, so far it is a part of hispleasure,good,orhappiness.

But if this be what is meant by self-love, there is an impropriety andabsurdityevenintheputtingofthequestion,Whetherallourlove,orourlove toeachparticularobjectofour love,doesnotarise fromself-love?For thatwouldbe the sameas to inquire,Whether the reasonwhyourlove is fixedon suchand suchparticularobjects, isnot, thatwehavea

capacityof loving some things?Thismaybeageneral reasonwhymenlove or hate any thing at all; and therein differ from stones and trees,which lovenothing,andhatenothing.But itcanneverbeareasonwhymen's love is placed on such and such objects. That a man in generalloves, and is pleased with happiness, or has a capacity of enjoyinghappiness, cannot be the reasonwhy such and such things become hishappiness: as for instance, why the good of his neighbour, or thehappiness and glory of God, is grateful and pleasing to him, and sobecomesapartofhishappiness.

Orifwhattheymean,whosaythatalllovecomesfromself-love,benot,thatour lovingsuchandsuchparticularpersonsandthingsarises fromourlovetohappiness ingeneral,butfromalovetoourmenhappiness,whichconsistsintheseobjects;so,thereasonwhywelovebenevolencetoourfriends,orneighbours,is,becauseweloveourhappiness,consistingintheirhappiness,whichwetakepleasurein:—stillthenotionisabsurd.Forheretheeffectismadethecauseofthatofwhichitistheeffect:ourhappiness,consistinginthehappinessofthepersonbeloved,ismadethecause of our love to that person.Whereas the truth plainly is, that ourlove to the person is the cause of our delighting or being happy in hishappiness.Howcomesourhappinesstoconsistinthehappinessofsuchaswe love,butbyourheartsbeing firstunited to them inaffection, sothatweasitwerelookonthemasourselves,andsoontheirhappinessasourown?Menwhohavebenevolencetoothershavepleasurewhentheysee others' happiness, because seeing their happiness gratifies someinclination thatwas in theirheartsbefore.Theybefore inclined to theirhappiness;whichwasbybenevolenceorgood-will;andtherefore,whentheyseetheirhappiness,theirinclinationissuited,andtheyarepleased.But the being of inclinations and appetites is prior to any pleasure ingratifyingtheseappetites.

2. Self-love, as the phrase is used in common speech,most commonlysignifies aman's regard to his confined private self, or love to himselfwithrespecttohisprivateinterest.

ByprivateinterestImeanthatwhichmostimmediatelyconsistsinthosepleasures,orpains,thatarepersonal.Forthereisacomfort,andagrief,that some have in others' pleasures, or pains; which are in others

originally,butarederivedtothem,orinsomemeasurebecometheirs,byvirtue of a benevolent union of heart with others. And there are otherpleasuresandpainsthatareoriginallyourown,andnotwhatwehavebysuchaparticipationwithothers.Whichconsistinperceptionsagreeable,or contrary, to certain personal inclinations implanted in our nature;suchasthesensitiveappetitesandaversions.Suchalsoisthedispositionorthedeterminationofthemindtobepleasedwithexternalbeauty,andwithall inferior,secondarybeauty,consistinginuniformity,proportion,&c. whether in things external or internal, and to dislike the contrarydeformity.Suchalsoisthenaturaldispositioninmentobepleasedinaperceptionoftheirbeingtheobjectsofthehonourandloveofothers,anddispleased with others' hatred and contempt. For pleasures anduneasiness of this kind are doubtless as much owing to an immediatedetermination of themind by a fixed law of our nature, as any of thepleasuresorpainsofexternalsense.Andthesepleasuresareproperlyofthe private and personal kind; being not by any participation of thehappinessorsorrowofothers,throughbenevolence.Itisevidentlymereself-love that appears in this disposition. It is easy to see, that aman'slove to himself willmake him love love to himself, and hate hatred tohimself.AndasGodhasconstitutedournature,self-loveisexercisedinnoonedispositionmorethaninthis.Men,probably,arecapableofmuchmorepleasureandpainthroughthisdeterminationofthemind,thanbyanyotherpersonal inclinationor aversionwhatsoever.Thoughperhapswedonotsoveryoftenseeinstancesofextremesufferingbythismeans,as by some others, yet we often see evidences of men's dreading thecontemptofothersmorethandeath;andbysuchinstancesmayconceivesomethingwhatmenwouldsuffer,ifuniversallyhatedanddespised;andmay reasonably infer something of the greatness of the misery, thatwould arise under a sense of universal abhorrence, in a great view ofintelligent being in general, or in a clear view of the Deity, asincomprehensibly and immensely great, so that all other beings are asnothing and vanity—together with a sense of his immediate continualpresence,andaninfiniteconcernwithhimanddependenceuponhim—andlivingconstantlyinthemidstofmostclearandstrongevidencesandmanifestations of his hatred and contempt. These things may besufficienttoexplainwhatImeanbyprivateinterest;inregardtowhich,self-love,mostproperlysocalled,isimmediatelyexercised.

AndhereIwouldobserve,thatifwetakeself-loveinthissense,solovetosome others may truly be the effect of self-love; i. e. according to thecommonmethod and orderwhich ismaintained in the laws of nature.Fornocreatedthinghaspowertoproduceaneffectanyotherwisethanbyvirtueof the lawsofnature.Thus, thatamanshould lovethosewhoareofhisparty,andwhoarewarmlyengagedonhisside,andpromotehisinterest,isthenaturalconsequenceofaprivateself-love.Indeedthereisnometaphysicalnecessity,inthenatureofthings,thatbecauseamanloves himself, and regards his own interest, he therefore should lovethose that love him, and promote his interest, i. e. to suppose it to beotherwise impliesnocontradiction. Itwillnot follow fromanyabsolutemetaphysicalnecessity, thatbecausebodieshavesolidity,cohesion,andgravitationtowardsthecentreoftheearth,thereforeaweightsuspendedonthebeamofabalanceshouldhavegreaterpowertocounterbalanceaweightontheotherside,whenatadistancefromthefulcrum,thanwhenitisnear.Itimpliesnocontradictionthatitshouldbeotherwise;butonlyas it contradicts that beautiful proportion and harmony, which theAuthor of nature observes in the laws of nature he has established.Neitheristhereanyabsolutenecessity,thatbecausethereisaninternalmutualattractionofthepartsoftheearth,oranyothersphere,wherebythewholebecomesonesolidcoherentbody, thereforeotherbodies thatarearoundit,shouldalsobeattractedbyit,andthosethatarenearest,beattracted most. But according to the order and proportion generallyobservedinthelawsofnature,oneoftheseeffectsisconnectedwiththeother,sothatit isjustlylookeduponasthesamepowerofattractioninthe globe of the earth, which draws bodies about the earth towards itscentre,withthatwhichattractsthepartsoftheearththemselvesonetoanother; only exerted under different circumstances. By a like order ofnature, aman's love to those that love him, is nomore than a certainexpressionoreffectofself-love.Nootherprincipleisneedfulinordertothe effect, if nothing intervenes to countervail the natural tendency ofself-love.Thereforethereisnomoretruevirtueinamanthuslovinghisfriendsmerelyfromself-love,thanthereisinself-loveitself,theprinciplefromwhence it proceeds. So, aman being disposed to hate those thathate him, or to resent injuries done him, arises from self-love, in likemanner as loving those that love us, and being thankful for kindnessshownus.

But it is said by some, that it is apparent there is someother principleconcerned in exciting the passions of gratitude and anger besides self-love, viz. moral sense, or sense of moral beauty and deformity,determiningthemindsofallmankindtoapproveof,andbepleasedwithvirtue,andtodisapproveofvice,andbeholditwithdisplicence;andthattheirseeingorsupposingthismoralbeautyordeformity,inthekindnessof a benefactor, or opposition of an adversary, is the occasion of theseaffectionsofgratitudeoranger.Otherwise,whyarenot theseaffectionsexcitedinustowardsinanimatethingsthatdousgoodorhurt?Whydonotweexperiencegratitudetoagarden,orfruitfulfield?Andwhyarewenotangrywithatempest,orblastingmildew,oranoverflowingstream?Weareverydifferentlyaffectedtowardsthosethatdousgoodfromthevirtue of generosity, or hurt us from the vice of envy andmalice, thantowards things that hurt or help us, which are destitute of reason andwill.Concerningthis,Iwouldmakeseveralremarks.

1.Thosewho thusargue, thatgratitudeandangercannotproceed fromself-love, might argue in the same way, and with equal reason, thatneithercantheseaffectionsarisefromlovetoothers:whichiscontrarytotheir own scheme. They say, that the reason why we are affected withgratitude and anger towards men, rather than things without life, ismoralsense:whichtheysayistheeffectofthatprincipleofbenevolenceorlovetoothers,orlovetothepublic,whichisnaturallyintheheartsofallmankind.ButnowImightsay,accordingtotheirownwayofarguing,gratitudeandangercannotarisefromlovetoothers,orlovetothepublic,or any sense of mind that is the fruit of public affection. For howdifferently are we affected towards those that do good or hurt to thepublicfromunderstandingandwill,andpublicmotive,fromwhatwearetowardssuchinanimatethingsasthesunandtheclouds,thatdogoodtothepublic,byenlighteningandenliveningbeamsandrefreshingshowers;ormildew, and an overflowing stream, that does hurt to the public, bydestroyingthefruitsoftheearth!Yea,ifsuchakindofargumentbegood,it will prove that gratitude and anger cannot arise from the unitedinfluenceofself-love,andpubliclove,ormoralsensearisingfrompublicaffection. For, if so,why arewenot affected towards inanimate things,that are beneficial or injurious both to us and the public, in the samemanner as to them that areprofitable orhurtful to bothon choice and

design,andfrombenevolenceormalice?

2.Onthesupposition,thatmenlovethosewholovethem,andareangrywiththosewhohatethem,fromthenaturalinfluenceofself-love;itisnotatallstrangethattheAuthorofnature,whoobservesorder,uniformity,andharmony inestablishing its laws, shouldsoorder, that it shouldbenaturalforself-lovetocausethemindtobeaffecteddifferentlytowardsexceedinglydifferentobjects;andthatitshouldcauseourhearttoextenditself in onemanner towards inanimate things, which gratify self-love,without senseorwill, and in anothermanner towardsbeingswhichwelookuponashavingunderstandingandwill,likeourselves,andexertingthesefacultiesinourfavour,andpromotingourinterestfromlovetous.Nowonder, seeingwe love ourselves, that it shouldbenatural to us toextendsomethingofthatsamekindoflovewhichwehaveforourselves,tothemwhoarethesamekindofbeingsasourselves,andcomplywiththe inclinations of our self-love, by expressing the same sort of lovetowardsus.

3. If we should allow that to be universal, that in gratitude and angerthereistheexerciseofsomekindofmoralsense—asitisgrantedthereissomethingthatmaybesocalled—allthemoralsensethatisessentialtothose affections, is a sense of DESERT;which is to be referred to thatsenseof justice,beforespokenof,consisting inanapprehensionof thatsecondary kind of beauty that lies in uniformity and proportion;whichsolvesallthedifficultyintheobjection.Others' loveandkindnesstous,ortheirill-willandinjuriousness,appeartoustodeserveourloveorourresentment.Or,inotherwords,itseemstousnootherthanjust,thatastheyloveusanddousgood,wealsoshouldlovethemanddothemgood.Andsoitseemsjust,thatwhenothers'heartsopposeus,andtheyfromtheir hearts do us hurt, our hearts should oppose them, and that weshoulddesirethemselvesmaysufferinlikemanneraswehavesuffered,i.e. there appears to us to be a natural agreement, proportion, andadjustmentbetweenthesethings;whichisindeedakindofmoralsense,orsenseofbeautyinmoralthings.But,aswasbeforeshown,itisamoralsenseofasecondarykind,andisentirelydifferentfromasenseorrelishof the original essential beauty of true virtue; andmay bewithout anyprinciple of true virtue in the heart. Therefore, doubtless, it is a great

mistake in any to suppose, that themoral sense which appears and isexercised inasenseofdesert, is thesamethingasa loveofvirtue,oradispositionanddeterminationofmind tobepleasedwith true virtuousbeauty, consisting in public benevolence. Which may be furtherconfirmed,ifitbeconsidered,thatevenwithrespecttoasenseofjusticeor desert, consisting in uniformity, and agreement between others'actions, towards us, and our actions towards them, in a way of well-doing,orof ill-doing, it isnotabsolutelynecessarytothebeingofthesepassionsofgratitudeandanger,thatthereshouldbeanynotionofjusticein them, inanypublicorgeneralviewof things:aswillappearbywhatshallbenextobserved.

4.Thoseauthorswhohold, that themoralsense,which isnatural toallmankind,consistsinanaturalrelishofthebeautyofvirtue,andsoarisesfromaprincipleof true virtue implantedbynature in thehearts of all,hold that true virtue consists in public benevolence. Therefore, if theaffectionsofgratitudeandangernecessarilyimplysuchamoralsenseastheysuppose,thentheseaffectionsimplysomedelightinthepublicgood,andanaversionof themind topublicevil.And if so, thenevery timeamanfeelsangerforopposition,orgratitudeforanyfavour,theremustbeat least a supposition of a tendency to public injury in that opposition,andatendencytopublicbenefit inthefavourthatexciteshisgratitude.Buthowfaristhisfrombeingtrue!Forinstance;aship'screwenterintoaconspiracyagainst themaster, tomurderhim,andrunawaywith theship,andturnpirates:butbeforetheybringtheirmatterstoripenessforexecution,oneofthemrepents,andopensthewholedesign;whereuponthe rest are apprehended and brought to justice. The crew are enragedwith him that has betrayed them, and earnestly seek opportunity torevengethemselvesuponhim.Andforaninstanceofgratitude;agangofrobbers that have long infested the neighbouring country, have aparticularhousewhither theyresort,andwheretheymeet fromtimetotime, todivide theirbooty, andhold their consultations for carryingontheir pernicious designs. The magistrates and officers of the country,aftermanyfruitlessendeavourstodiscovertheirsecretplaceofresort,atlength are well-informed where it is, and are prepared with sufficientforcetosurprisethem,andseizethemall,attheplaceofrendezvous,atanhourappointed,when theyunderstand theywillallbe there.A little

before the arrival of the appointed hour, while the officers with theirbandsareapproaching,somepersonissokindtotheserobbers,astogivethemnoticeoftheirdanger,soasjusttogivethemopportunitytoescape.They are thankful to him, and give him a handful of money for hiskindness. Now, in such instances, I think it is plain, that there is nosuppositionofapublicinjuryinthatwhichistheoccasionoftheiranger;yea,theyknowthecontrary.Noristhereanysuppositionofpublicgoodin thatwhichexcites theirgratitude;neitherhaspublicbenevolence,ormoralsense,consisting inadeterminationtoapproveofwhat is forthepublicgood,anyinfluenceatallintheaffair.Andthoughtherebesomeaffection,besidesasenseofuniformityandproportion,thathasinfluenceinsuchangerandgratitude,itisnotpublicaffectionorbenevolence,butprivate affection; yea, that affection which is to the highest degreeprivate,consistinginaman'sloveofhisownperson.

5. The passion of anger, in particular, seems to have been unluckilychosen as a medium to prove a sense and determination to delight invirtue,consistinginbenevolencenaturaltoallmankind.Forifthatmoralsense which is exercised in anger, were that which arose from abenevolenttemperofheart,beingnootherthanasenseorrelishof thebeauty of benevolence, one would think, a disposition to anger shouldincrease, at least in some proportion, as a man had more of a sweet,benign, and benevolent temper: which seems contrary to experience,which shows that the lessmenhaveofbenevolence, and themore theyhaveofacontrarytemper,themorearetheydisposedtoangeranddeepresentmentofinjuries.

And though gratitude be that which many speak of as a certain nobleprincipleofvirtue,whichGodhasimplantedintheheartsofallmankind;and though itbe true there isagratitude that is trulyvirtuous;and thewantofgratitude,oranungratefultemper,istrulyvicious,andarguesanabominabledepravityofheart;yetIthink,whathasbeenobservedmayserve to convince such as impartially consider it, not only that not allanger, orhating thosewhichhateus, but also thatnot all gratitude, orloving thosewhich love us, arises from a truly virtuous benevolence ofheart.

Anothersortofaffections,whichmaybeproperlyreferredtoself-love,as

itssource,andwhichmightbeexpectedtobethefruitofit,accordingtothegeneral analogyofnature's laws, is that of affections to suchas areneartousbythetiesofnature.Sucharethoseofwhosebeingswehavebeentheoccasion,inwhomwehaveaverypeculiarpropriety,andwhosecircumstances, even from the beginning of their existence, many waysleadthemtoahighesteemofus,andtotreatuswithgreatdependence,submission,andcompliance.These theconstitutionof theworldmakesto be united in interest, and accordingly to act as one, in innumerableaffairs, with a communion in each other's affections, desires, cares,friendships, enmities, and pursuits. As to the opinion of those whoascribe thenatural affection there is betweenparents and children to aparticularinstinctofnature,Ishalltakenoticeofitafterwards.

Andasmenmaylovepersonsandthingsfromself-love,somaytheirlovetoqualities and characters arise from the same source. Some representthis,asthoughtherewereneedofagreatdegreeofmetaphysicalrefiningtomakeitout,thatmenapproveofothersfromself-love,whomtheyhearof at a distance, or read of in history, or see represented on the stage,from whom they expect no profit or advantage. But perhaps it is notconsidered,thatwhatweapproveofinthefirstplaceisthecharacter;andfromthecharacterweapprovetheperson.Andisitastrangething,thatmenshouldfromself-lovelikeatemperorcharacter,which,initsnatureand tendency, falls in with the nature and tendency of self-love; andwhich we know by experience and self-evidence, without metaphysicalrefining,inthegeneraltendstomen'spleasureandbenefit?Andonthecontrary,isitstrangethatanyshoulddislikewhattheyseetendstomen'spain and misery? Is there need of a great degree of subtilty andabstraction,tomakeitout,thatachild,whohasheardandseenmuchofwhatiscalculatedstronglytofixanideaofthepernicious,deadlynatureoftherattlesnake,shouldhaveanaversiontothatspeciesfromself-love;soastohaveadegreeofthisaversionanddisgustexcitedbyseeingeventhepictureofthatanimal?Andthatfromthesameself-loveitshouldbepleasedwithalivelyrepresentationofsomepleasantfruitofwhichithasoftentastedthesweetness?Or,withtheimageofsomebird,whichithasalwaysbeentoldisinnocent,andwithwhosepleasantsingingithasoftenbeenentertained?Yetthechildneitherfearsbeingbittenbythepictureofthesnake,norexpectstoeatofthepaintedfruit,ortohearthefigureof

thebirdsing.Isupposenonewillthinkitdifficulttoallow,thatsuchanapprobationordisgustofachildmaybeaccounted for fromitsnaturaldelightinthepleasuresoftasteandhearing,anditsaversiontopainanddeath, through self-love, together with the habitual connexion of theseagreeable or terrible ideaswith the form and qualities of these objects,theideasofwhichareimpressedonthemindofthechildbytheirimages.

Andwhereisthedifficultyofallowing,thatapersonmayhatethegeneralcharacterofaspitefulandmaliciousman,forthelikereasonashehatesthegeneralnatureof a serpent;knowing, fromreason, instruction, andexperience,thatmaliceinmenispernicioustomankind,aswellasspiteorpoisoninaserpent?Andifamanmayfromself-lovedisapprovethevicesofmalice,envy,andothersofthatsort,whichnaturallytendtothehurtofmankind,whymayhenot from the sameprinciple approve thecontrary virtues of meekness, peaceableness, benevolence, charity,generosity, justice, and the social virtues ingeneral;which,heas easilyand clearly knows, naturally tend to the good of mankind?—It isundoubtedly true, that somehave a love to these virtues froma higherprinciple. But yet I think it as certainly true, that there is generally inmankindasortofapprobationofthem,whicharisesfromself-love.

Besideswhathasbeenalreadysaid,thesamethingfurtherappearsfromthis; that men commonly are most affected towards, and most highlyapprove,thosevirtueswhichagreewiththeirinterestmost,accordingtotheirvariousconditionsinlife.Weseethatpersonsoflowconditionareespeciallyenamouredwithacondescending,accessible,affabletemperinthe great; not only in those whose condescension has been exercisedtowards themselves; but they will be peculiarly taken with such acharacterwhentheyhaveaccountsofitfromothers,orwhentheymeetwithitinhistory,oreveninromance.Thepoorwillmosthighlyapproveandcommendliberality.Theweakersex,whoespeciallyneedassistanceand protection, will peculiarly esteem and applaud fortitude andgenerosityinthoseoftheothersex,ofwhomtheyreadorhear,orwhichtheyhaverepresentedtothemonastage.

Ithinkitplainfromwhathasbeenobserved,thatasmenmayapprove,andbedisposedtocommend,abenevolenttemperfromself-love;sothehigherthedegreeofbenevolenceis,themoremaytheyapproveofit.This

will account for some kind of approbation, from this principle, even oflovetoenemies,viz.asamanlovinghisenemiesisanevidenceofahighdegree of benevolence of temper; the degree of it appearing from theobstacles it overcomes. And it may be here observed, that theconsiderationof the tendencyand influenceof self-lovemayshow,howmeningeneralmayapproveofjusticefromanotherground,besidesthatapprobation of the secondary beauty there is in uniformity andproportion, which is natural to all. Men, from their infancy, see thenecessity of it, not only that it is necessary for others, or for humansociety;buttheyfindthenecessityofitforthemselves,ininstancesthatcontinuallyoccur;whichtendstoprejudicetheminitsfavour,andtofixanhabitualapprobationofitfromself-love.

Again,thatforementionedapprobationofjusticeanddesert,arisingfroma sense of the beauty of natural agreement and proportion,will have akind of reflex and indirect influence to cause men to approvebenevolence, anddisapprovemalice; asmensee thathewhohatesandinjures others deserves to be hated and punished, and that he who isbenevolentandlovesothers,anddoesthemgood,deserveshimselfalsotobelovedandrewardedbyothers,astheyseethenaturalcongruityoragreement,andmutualadaptedness,ofthesethings.Andhavingalwaysseen this,malevolence becomes habitually connected in themind withtheideaofbeinghatedandpunished,whichisdisagreeabletoself-love;andthe ideaofbenevolence ishabituallyconnectedandassociatedwiththeideaofbeinglovedandrewardedbyothers,whichisgratefultoself-love. And by virtue of this association of ideas, benevolence itselfbecomesgrateful,andthecontrarydispleasing.

Somevicesmaybecomeinadegreeodiousbytheinfluenceofself-love,through an habitual connexion of ideas of contempt with it; contemptbeing what self-love abhors. So it may often be with drunkenness,gluttony, sottishness, cowardice, sloth, niggardliness. The idea ofcontempt becomes associatedwith the idea of such vices, bothbecausewe are used to observe, that these things are commonly objects ofcontempt,andalsofind,thattheyexcitecontemptinourselves.Someofthemappearmarksof littleness, i. e.of smallabilities,andweaknessofmind,andinsufficiencyforanyconsiderableeffectsamongmankind.By

others,men's influence iscontracted intoanarrowsphere,andbysuchmeanspersonsbecomeof less importance, andmore insignificant.Andthingsof littleimportancearenaturallylittleaccountedof.Andsomeoftheseillqualitiesaresuchasmankindfindittheir interesttotreatwithcontempt, as they are very hurtful to human society.—There are noparticularmoralvirtueswhatsoever,butwhat insomeorotherof theseways, and most of them in several, come to have some kind ofapprobation from self-love, without the influence of a truly virtuousprinciple; nor any particular vices, butwhat, by the samemeans,meetwithsomedisapprobation.

Thiskindofapprobationanddislike,throughthejointinfluenceofself-loveandassociationofideas,isinmanyvastlyheightenedbyeducation.Thisisthemeansofastrong,close,andalmostirrefragableassociation,in innumerable instances of ideas, which have no connexion any otherway than by education; and is themeans of greatly strengthening thatassociation,orconnexion,whichpersonsareledintobyothermeans:asanyonewouldbeconvinced,perhapsmoreeffectuallythaninmostotherways, if they had opportunity of any considerable acquaintance withAmericansavagesandtheirchildren.

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ChapterV:Ofnaturalconscience,andthemoralsense.

THERE is yet another disposition or principle, of great importance,natural tomankind;which, ifweconsidertheconsistenceandharmonyofnature's laws,mayalsobelookeduponas, insomesort,arisingfromself-love,orself-union;andthatis,adispositioninmantobeuneasyinaconsciousnessofbeing inconsistentwithhimself,andas itwereagainsthimselfinhisownactions.Thisappearsparticularlyintheinclinationofthemindtobeuneasyintheconsciousnessofdoingthattoothers,whichheshouldbeangrywiththemfordoingtohim,iftheywereinhiscase,andheintheirs;orofforbearingtodothattothem,whichhewouldbedispleasedwiththemforneglectingtodotohim.

Ihaveobserved,fromtimetotime,thatinpurelovetoothers,i.e. lovenot arising from self-love, there is an union of the heartwith others; akindofenlargementof themind,whereby it soextends itselfas to takeothersintoaman'sself:andthereforeit impliesadispositiontofeel,todesire,andtoactasthoughotherswereonewithourselves.So,self-loveimplies an inclination to feel and act as one with ourselves; whichnaturally renders a sensible inconsistence with ourselves, and self-oppositioninwhatweourselveschooseanddo,tobeuneasytothemind:which will cause uneasiness of mind to be the consequence of amalevolent and unjust behaviour towards others, and a kind ofdisapprobationofactsofthisnature,andanapprobationofthecontrary.Todothattoanother,whichweshouldbeangrywithhimfordoingtous,andtohateapersonfordoingthattous,whichweshouldinclinetoandinsistondoingtohim,ifwewereexactlyinthesamecase,istodisagreewithourselves,andcontradictourselves.Itwouldbeforourselvesbothtochooseandadhereto,andyettorefuseandutterlyreject,theverysamething.Nowonderthisiscontrarytonature.Nowonder,thatsuchaself-opposition, and inward war with a man's self, naturally begetsunquietness,andraisesdisturbanceinhismind.

Thusapprovingofactions,becausewethereinactas inagreementwithourselves;andthusdisapproving,andbeinguneasyintheconsciousnessof disagreeing with ourselves, in what we do, is quite a different thingfromapproving or disapproving actions because in themwe are unitedwithbeing ingeneral:which is lovingorhatingactions froma senseofthe primary beauty of true virtue, and of the odiousness of sin. Theformer of these principles is private; the latter is public, and trulybenevolentinthehighestsense.Theformer—aninclinationtoagreewithourselves—isanaturalprinciple:butthelatter—anagreementorunionofhearttothegreatsystem,andtoGodtheheadofit,whoisallandallinit—isadivineprinciple.

In that uneasiness nowmentioned, consists very much of that inwardtroublemenhavefromreflectionsofconscience:andwhentheyarefreefromthisuneasiness,andareconscioustothemselves,thatinwhattheyhaveacted towardsothers, theyhavedone the samewhich they shouldhaveexpectedfromtheminthesamecase,thentheyhavewhatiscalled

peace of conscience,with respect to these actions.And there is also anapprobation of conscience, respecting the conduct of others towardsourselves.Aswhenweareblamed,condemned,orpunishedbythem,andareconscioustoourselvesthatifwewereintheircase,andtheyinours,weshould in likemannerblame,condemn,andpunish them.And thusmen'sconsciencesmayjustifyGod'sangerandcondemnation.WhentheyhavetheideasofGod'sgreatness,theirrelationtohim,thebenefitstheyhave received from him, themanifestations he hasmade of his will tothem,&c.strongly impressedontheirminds,aconsciousness isexcitedwithin them of those resentments, which would be occasioned inthemselvesbyaninjurioustreatmentinanywiseparallel.

There certainly is such a consciousness as this often-timeswithinmen,implied in the thoughts and views of the mind, of which, perhaps onreflection, they couldhardly give an account.Unlessmen's consciencesare greatly stupified, it is naturally and necessarily suggested; andhabitually, spontaneously, instantaneously, and, as it were, insensibly,arisesinthemind.Andthemoresoforthisreason,thatwehavenootherway to conceive of any thingwhich other persons act or suffer, but byrecalling and exciting the ideas of what we ourselves are conscious wehavefoundinourownminds;andbyputtingtheideaswhichweobtainby this means in the place of another; or, as it were, substitutingourselves in their place. Thus we have no conception, whatunderstanding, perception, love, pleasure, pain, or desire are in others;butbyputtingourselvesasitwereintheirstead,ortransferringtheideaswe obtain of such things in our ownminds by consciousness into theyplace;makingsuchanalteration,astodegreeandcircumstances,aswhatwe observe of them requires. It is thus in all moral things that weconceiveofinothers;andindeedineverythingweconceiveof,belongingto others,more than shape, size, complexion, situation, andmotion oftheir bodies. And this is the only way that we come to be capable ofhaving ideas of any perception or act even of the Godhead. We nevercouldhaveanynotionwhatunderstandingorvolition,loveorhatredare,either in created spirits or in God, if we had never experienced whatunderstanding and volition, love and hatred, are in our own minds.Knowingwhattheyarebyconsciousness,wecandenylimits,andremovechangeablenessandotherimperfections,andascribethemtoGod.

Butthoughmeninthinkingofothersdoasitwereputthemselvesintheirplace,theydoitsohabitually,instantaneously,andwithoutsetpurpose,that they can scarce give any account of it, and many would think itstrangeiftheyweretoldofit.Inallaman'sthoughtsofanotherperson,inwhateverheapprehendsofhismoralconducttoothersortohimself,ifitbeinlovingorhatinghim,approvingorcondemninghim,rewardingorpunishinghim,henecessarily,as itwere,putshimself inhisstead;andthereforethemorenaturally,easily,andquietlyseeswhetherhe,beinginhisplace,shouldapproveorcondemn,beangryorpleasedasheis.

Naturalconscienceconsistsinthesetwothings.

1.Inthatdispositiontoapproveordisapprovethemoraltreatmentwhichpasses between us and others, from a determination of themind to beeasyoruneasy,inaconsciousnessofourbeingconsistentorinconsistentwith ourselves. Hereby we have a disposition to approve our owntreatmentof another,whenweare conscious toourselves thatwe treathimsoasweshouldexpecttobetreatedbyhim,wereheinourcaseandweinhis;andtodisapproveofourowntreatmentofanother,whenweareconsciousthatweshouldbedispleasedwiththeliketreatmentfromhim,ifwewereinhiscase.Soweinourconsciencesapproveofanother'streatmentofus, ifwe are conscious to ourselves, that ifwewere inhiscase,andheinours,weshouldthinkitjusttotreathimashetreatsus;and disapprove his treatment of us, when we are conscious that weshould think it unjust, if we were in his case. Thus men's consciencesapprove or disapprove the sentence of their judge, by which they areacquittedorcondemned.Butthisisnotallthatisinnaturalconscience.Besides this approving or disapproving from uneasiness as beinginconsistentwithourselves, there isanother thing thatmustprecede it,and be the foundation of it. As for instance, when my consciencedisapprovesmyowntreatmentofanother,beingconscioustomyself,thatwere I in his case, I should be displeased and angry with him for sotreatingme;thequestionmightbeasked,Whatwouldbethegroundofthat supposed disapprobation, displeasure, and anger, which I amconsciouswouldbeinmeinthatcase?Therefore,

2.Theotherthingwhichbelongstotheapprobationordisapprobationofnatural conscience, is the sense of desert which was spoken of before;

consisting, as was observed, in a natural agreement, proportion, andharmony, between malevolence or injury, and resentment andpunishment; or between loving and being loved, between snowingkindness and being rewarded, &c. Both these kinds of approving ordisapproving,concurintheapprobationordisapprobationofconscience:the one founded on the other. Thus, when a man's consciencedisapproves of his treatment of his neighbour, in the first place, he isconscious,thatifhewereinhisneighbour'sstead,heshouldresentsuchtreatment from a sense of justice, or from a sense of uniformity andequality between such treatment, and resentment, and punishment; asbeforeexplained.Andthen,inthenextplace,heperceives,thatthereforeheisnotconsistentwithhimself,indoingwhathehimselfshouldresentin that case; and hence disapproves it, as being naturally averse tooppositiontohimself.

Approbation and disapprobation of conscience, in the sense nowexplained, will extend to all virtue and vice; to every thing whatsoeverthatismorallygoodorevil,inamindwhichdoesnotconfineitsviewtoaprivatesphere,butwilltakethingsingeneralintoitsconsideration,andis free from speculative error. For, as all virtue ormoral goodmay beresolved into love toothers, eitherGodor creatures; so,meneasily seetheuniformityandnaturalagreementthereisbetweenlovingothers,andbeing accepted and favoured by others. And all vice, sin, ormoral evilsummarilyconsistinginthewantofthislovetoothers,orinmalevolence;so, men easily seethe natural agreement there is between hating anddoingilltoothers,andbeinghatedbythem,andsufferingillfromthem,orfromhimthatactsforall,andhasthecareofthewholesystem.Andasthis sense of equality and natural agreement extends to allmoral goodandevil;so,thislaysafoundationofanequalextentwiththeotherkindof approbation and disapprobation which is grounded upon it, arisingfromanaversiontoself-inconsistenceandopposition.Forinallcasesofbenevolence, or the contrary, towardsothers,weare capableofputtingourselvesintheplaceofothers,andarenaturallyledtodoit;andsoofbeing conscious to ourselves, how we should like or dislike such,treatmentfromothers.Thusnaturalconscience,iftheunderstandingbeproperly enlightened, and stupefying prejudices are removed, concurswiththelawofGod,isofequalextentwithit,andjoinsitsvoicewithitin

everyarticle.

And thus, in particular, we may see in what respect this naturalconscienceextendstotruevirtue,consistinginunionofhearttobeingingeneral, and supreme love to God. For, although it sees not, or ratherdoesnottaste,itsprimaryandessentialbeauty,i.e.ittastesnosweetnessin benevolence to being in general, simply considered, for nothing butgeneral benevolence itself can do that, yet, this natural conscience,common tomankind,may approveof it from thatuniformity, equality,and justice, which there is in it; and the demerit which is seen in thecontrary,consistinginthenaturalagreementbetweenthecontrary,andbeinghatedofbeingingeneral.Men,bynaturalconscience,mayseethejustice,ornaturalagreement,thereisinyieldingalltoGod,aswereceiveall from him; and the justice there is in being his that made us, andwillingly so, which is the same as being dependent on his will, andconformedtoitinthemannerofourbeing;asweareforourbeingitself,andintheconformityofourwilltohis,onwhosewillweareuniversallyandmostperfectlydependent.ThereisalsojusticeinoursupremelovetoGod; anatural agreement in ourhaving a supreme respect tohimwhoexercises infinite goodness to us, and from whom we receive all well-being.Besides,disagreementanddiscordappearsworsetonaturalsensein thingsnearly related,andofgreat importance:and therefore itmustappearvery ill,as itrespects the infiniteBeing,andthat infinitelygreatrelationwhich there isbetween theCreatorandhis creatures.And it iseasy to conceive how natural conscience should see the desert ofpunishment,inthecontraryoftruevirtue,viz.oppositionandenmitytobeing in general. For, this is only to see thenatural agreement there isbetween opposing being in general, and being opposed by being ingeneral;withaconsciousnesshow,ifwewereinfinitelygreat,weshouldexpect to be regarded according to our greatness, and shouldproportionably resent contempt. This natural conscience, if well-informed,willapprove,oftruevirtue,andwilldisapproveandcondemnthewantofit,andoppositiontoit;andyetwithoutseeingthetruebeautyof it. Yea, if men's consciences were fully enlightened, if they weredelivered frombeingconfined toaprivatesphere,andbrought toview,and consider things in general, and delivered from being stupified bysensualobjectsandappetites,astheywillbeatthedayofjudgment,they

wouldapprovenothingbuttruevirtue,nothingbutgeneralbenevolence,and those affections and actions that are consistent with it, andsubordinatetoit.Fortheymustsee,thatconsenttobeingingeneral,andsupremerespecttotheBeingofbeings,ismostjust;andthateverythingwhich is inconsistent with it, and interferes with it, or flows from thewantofit,isunjust,anddeservestheoppositionofuniversalexistence.

Thus has God established and ordered that this principle of naturalconscience,which,thoughitimpliesnosuchthingasactualbenevolenceto being in general, nor any delight in such a principle, simplyconsidered,andso impliesnotrulyspiritualsenseorvirtuoustaste,yetshould approve and condemn the same things that are approved andcondemnedbya spiritual senseorvirtuous taste.And thatmoral sensewhichisnaturaltomankind,sofarasitisdisinterested,andnotfoundedinassociationofideas,isthesamewiththisnaturalconscience.

Thesenseofmoralgoodandevil,andthatdispositiontoapprovevirtue,anddisapprovevice,whichmenhavebynaturalconscience,isthatmoralsense so much insisted on in the writings of many of late. Amisunderstandingofthis,seemstohavemisledthosemoralistswhohaveinsisted on a disinterested moral sense, universal in the world ofmankind, as an evidence of a disposition to true virtue, consisting in abenevolenttemper,naturallyimplantedinthemindsofallmen.Someoftheargumentsusedbythesewriters,indeedprove,thatthereisamoralsenseortaste,universalamongmen,distinctfromwhatarisesfromself-love. Though I humbly conceive, there is some confusion in theirdiscourses on the subject, andnot a proper distinction observed in theinstances ofmen's approbation of virtue,which they produce. Some ofwhich are not to their purpose, being instances of that approbation ofvirtuewhicharisesfromself-love.Butotherinstancesprove,thatthereisamoraltaste,orsenseofmoralgoodandevil,naturaltoall,whichdonotproperlyarisefromself-love.YetIconceivetherearenoinstancesofthiskindwhichmaynotbereferredtonaturalconscience,andparticularlytothatwhich Ihaveobserved tobeprimary in theapprobationofnaturalconscience, viz. a sense of desert, and approbation of that naturalagreement there is, inmannerandmeasure, in justice.But I think it isplain from what has been said, that neither this, nor any thing else

wherein consists the sense of moral good and evil, which there is innatural conscience, is of the nature of a truly virtuous taste, ordeterminationofmindtorelishanddelightintheessentialbeautyoftruevirtue,arisingfromavirtuousbenevolenceofheart.

Butitfurtherappearsfromthis;iftheapprobationofconsciencewerethesamewiththeapprobationoftheinclinationoftheheart,orthenaturaldisposition and determination of themind to love and be pleasedwithvirtue, thenapprobationandcondemnationofconsciencewouldalwaysbeinproportiontothevirtuoustemperofthemind;orrather,thedegreewould be just the same. In that person who had a high degree of avirtuoustemper,therefore,thetestimonyofconscienceinfavourofvirtuewould be equally full: But hewho had but little, would have as little adegreeof the testimonyof conscience forvirtue,andagainstvice.But Ithinkthecaseisevidentlyotherwise.Somemen,throughthestrengthofvice intheirhearts,willgoonandsinagainstclearer lightandstrongerconvictionsofconsciencethanothers.Ifconscience,approvingdutyanddisapproving sin, were the same thing as the exercise of a virtuousprinciple of the heart, in loving duty and hating sin, then remorse ofconscience will be the same thing as repentance; and just in the samedegree as the sinner feels remorse of conscience for sin, in the samedegree is the heart turned from the love of sin to the hatred of it,inasmuchastheyaretheverysamething.

Christianshavethegreatestreasontobelieve,fromtheScriptures,thatinthefuturedayoftherevelationoftherighteousjudgmentofGod,whensinners shall be called to answer before their judge, and all theirwickedness,inallitsaggravations,broughtforth,andclearlymanifestedintheperfectlightofthatday,andGodwillreprovethem,andsettheirsinsinorderbeforethem,theirconscienceswillbegreatlyawakenedandconvinced, theirmouthswillbe stopped,all stupidityof consciencewillbeatanend,andconsciencewillhaveitsfullexercise;andthereforetheirconscienceswillapprovethedreadfulsentenceofthejudgeagainstthem;andseeingthattheyhavedeservedsogreatapunishment,willjoinwiththe judge in condemning them.And this, according to the notion I amopposing,wouldbe the same thingas theirbeingbrought to the fullestrepentance; their hearts being perfectly changed to hate sin and love

holiness; and virtueorholiness ofheart in themwill bebrought to themostfullandperfectexercise.Buthowmuchotherwisehavewereasontosuppose itwill thenbe!Then the sinandwickednessof theirheartwillcome to its highest dominion and completest exercise; they shall bewholly leftofGod,andgivenup to theirwickedness, evenas thedevilsare!WhenGodhasdonewaitingonsinners,andhisSpiritdonestrivingwiththem,hewillnotrestraintheirwickedness,ashedoesnow.Butsinshall then rage in their hearts, as a fire no longer restrained or keptunder. It is proper for a judge when he condemns a criminal, toendeavoursotosethisguiltbeforehimastoconvincehisconscienceofthejusticeofthesentence.ThistheAlmightywilldoeffectually,anddotoperfection,soasmostthoroughlytoawakenandconvincetheconscience.But ifnaturalconscience,andthedispositionof theheart tobepleasedwithvirtue,werethesame,thenatthesametimethattheconsciencewasbroughttoitsperfectexercise,theheartwouldbemadeperfectlyholy;or,wouldhavetheexerciseoftruevirtueandholinessinperfectbenevolenceof temper.But insteadof this, theirwickednesswill thenbebrought toperfection,andwickedmenwillbecomeverydevils,andaccordinglywillbesentawayascursedintoeverlastingfirepreparedforthedevilandhisangels.

Butsupposingnaturalconsciencetobewhathasbeendescribed,allthesedifficultiesandabsurditiesarewhollyavoided.Sinnerswhentheyseethegreatness of the Being in contempt of whom they have lived withrebellion and opposition, and have clearly set before them theirobligations tohim, as theirCreator,Preserver,Benefactor,&c. togetherwiththedegreeinwhichtheyhaveactedasenemiestohim,mayhaveaclearsenseofthedesertoftheirsin,consistinginthenaturalagreementthereisbetweensuchcontemptandoppositionofsuchaBeing,andhisdespisingandopposingthem;betweentheirbeingandactingassogreatenemiestosuchaGod,andtheirsufferingthedreadfulconsequencesofhis being and acting as their great enemy; and their being consciouswithinthemselvesofthedegreeofanger,whichwouldnaturallyariseintheirownheartsinsuchacase,iftheywereintheplaceandstateoftheirjudge.Inordertothesethings,thereisnoneedofavirtuousbenevolenttemper, relishing and delighting in benevolence, and loathing thecontrary. The conscience may see the natural agreement between

opposing and being opposed, between hating and being hated,withoutabhorring malevolence from a benevolent temper of mind, or withoutlovingGodfromaviewofthebeautyofhisholiness.Thesethingshavenonecessarydependenceoneontheother.

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ChapterVI:Ofparticularinstinctsofnature,whichinsomerespectsresemblevirtue.

THEREarevariousdispositionsand inclinationsnatural tomen,whichdependonparticular lawsofnature,determiningtheirmindstocertainaffectionsandactionstowardsparticularobjects;whichlawsseemtobeestablished chiefly for the preservation of mankind, and theircomfortably subsisting in the world. These dispositions may be calledinstincts.

Someoftheseinstinctsrespectonlyourselvespersonally:sucharemanyofournaturalappetitesandaversions.Someofthemaremoresocial,andextendtoothers:sucharethemutualinclinationsbetweenthesexes,&c.—Some of these dispositions aremore external and sensitive: such arethosethatrelatetomeatanddrink,andthemoresensitiveinclinationsofthe sexes towards each other. Others are more internal and mental:consisting inaffectionswhichmankindnaturallyexercise towardssomeof their fellow-creatures, and in come cases towards men in general.Someofthesemaybecalledkindaffections;ashavingsomethinginthemof benevolence, or a resemblance of it: and others are of an angryappearance;suchasthepassionofjealousybetweenthesexes,especiallyinthemaletowardsthefemale.

It is only the former of these two lastmentioned sorts that it is tomypurposetoconsiderinthisplace,viz.thosenaturalinstinctswhichhavetheappearanceofbenevolence,andsoinsomerespectsresemblevirtue.TheseIshallthereforeconsider;andshallendeavourtoshow,thatnoneofthemcanbeofthenatureoftruevirtue.

That kind affection which is exercised one towards another in natural

relation,particularly the loveofparents to theirchildren,callednaturalaffection, isbymanyreferred to instinct. Ihavealreadyconsidered thissort of love as an affection that arises from self-love; and in that view,haveshownitcannotbeofthenatureoftruevirtue.Butifanythink,thatnaturalaffectionismoreproperlytobereferredtoaparticularinstinctofnaturethantoself-love,asitscause,Ishallnotthinkitapointworthyofanycontroversyordispute.Inmyopinionbotharetrue;viz.thatnaturalaffectionisowingtonaturalinstinct,andalsothatitarisesfromself-love.Itmaybesaidtoarisefrominstinct,asitdependsonalawofnature.Butyet it may be truly reckoned as an affection arising from self-love;because, though itarises froma lawofnature,yet that is sucha lawasaccording to the order and harmony every where observed among thelaws of nature, is connected with and follows from self-love; as wasshown before. However, it is not necessary to my present purpose toinsist on this. For if natural affection to a man's children, or nearrelations,isanaffectionarisingfromaparticularindependentinstinctofnature—which theCreator inhiswisdomhas implanted inmen for thepreservationandwell-beingoftheworldofmankind:yetitcannotbeofthe nature of true virtue. For it has been observed, and, I humblyconceive, provedbefore, (Chap. II.) that if anybeing or beingshavebynatural instinct, or any other means, a determination of mind tobenevolence, extending only to some particular persons or private,system,howeverlargethatsystemmaybe—orhowevergreatanumberofindividuals itmaycontain, so longas it containsbutan infinitely smallpartofuniversalexistence,andsobearsnoproportiontothisgreatanduniversalsystem—suchlimitedprivatebenevolence,notarisingfrom,notbeing subordinate to, benevolence to being in general, cannot have thenature of true virtue. However, it may not be amiss briefly to observenow,that it isevident toademonstration, thoseaffectionscannotbeofthenatureoftruevirtue,fromthesetwothings.

First, That they do not arise from a principle of virtue. A principle ofvirtue, I think, is owned by the most considerable of late writers onmoralitytobegeneralbenevolenceorpublicaffection:andIthinkithasbeen proved to be union of heart to being simply considered; whichimplies a disposition to benevolence to being in general. Now, by thesupposition, the affections we are speaking of do not arise from this

principle;andthat,whetherwesupposetheyarisefromself-love,orfromparticular instincts: because either of those sources is diverse from aprincipleofgeneralbenevolence.And,

Secondly, These private affections, if they do not arise from generalbenevolence, and they arenot connectedwith it in their first existence,have no tendency to produce it. This appears from what has beenobserved: for being not dependent on it, their detached andunsubordinate operation rather implies opposition to being in general,than general benevolence; as every one sees and owns with respect toself-love. And there are the very same reasons why any other privateaffection,confinedtolimitsinfinitelyshortofuniversalexistence,shouldhave that influence, aswell as love that is confined to a single person.Nowupon thewhole,nothingcanbeplainer than thataffectionswhichdo not arise from a virtuous principle, and have no tendency to truevirtue,astheireffect,cannotbeofthenatureoftruevirtue.

For the reasons which have been given, it is undeniably true, that ifpersonshaveabenevolentaffectionlimitedtoaparty,ortothenationingeneral,ofwhichtheyareapart,orthepubliccommunitytowhichtheybelong,thoughitbeaslargeastheRomanempirewasofold;yea,iftherecouldbeacausedeterminingapersontobenevolencetowardsthewholeworld of mankind, or even all created sensible natures throughout theuniverse, exclusiveofunionofheart togeneral existenceandof love toGod—notderivedfromthattemperofmindwhichdisposestoasupremeregard tohim,nor subordinate to suchdivine love—it cannot be of thenatureoftruevirtue.

If what is called natural affection, arises from a particular naturalinstinct, much more indisputably does that mutual affection whichnaturallyarisesbetweenthesexes.IagreewithHutchisonandHumeinthis,thatthereisafoundationlaidinnatureforkindaffectionsbetweenthesexes,diversefromallinclinationstosensitivepleasure,andwhichdonot properly arise from any such inclination. There is doubtless adispositionbothtoamutualbenevolenceandmutualcomplacence,thatare not naturally and necessarily connected with any sensitive desires.Butyetitismanifestsuchaffectionsasarelimitedtooppositesexes,arefrom a particular instinct thus directing and limiting them; and not

arisingfromaprincipleofgeneralbenevolence;forthishasnotendencytoanysuchlimitation.Andthoughtheseaffectionsdonotproperlyarisefrom the sensitive desires which are between the sexes, yet they areimplantedbytheAuthorofnaturechieflyforthesamepurpose,viz.thepreservation or continuation of the world ofmankind. Hereby personsbecome willing to forsake father and mother, and all their naturalrelations in the familieswhere theywere born and brought up; for thesakeofastatedunionwithacompanionoftheothersex,inbearingandgoingthroughthatseriesoflabours,anxieties,andpains,requisitetothebeing,support,andeducationofafamilyofchildren;andpartlyalsoforthecomfortofmankindasunited inamarriage-relation.But I supposefew, ifany,willdeny, that thepeculiarnaturaldispositions thereare tomutual affectionbetween the sexes, arise froman instinct orparticularlaw of nature. And therefore it is manifest, from what has been saidalready, that those natural dispositions cannot be of the nature of truevirtue.

Another affection which is owing to a particular instinct, is that pitywhichisnaturaltomankindwhentheyseeothersingreatdistress.It isacknowledged,thatsuchanaffectionisnaturaltomankind.ButIthinkitevident,thatthepitywhichisgeneralandnatural,isowingtoaparticularinstinct,andisnotofthenatureoftruevirtue.Iamfarfromsaying,thatthere isno such thingasa trulyvirtuouspityamongmankind;or, thatnoneistobefound,whicharisesfromthattrulyvirtuousdivineprincipleofgeneralbenevolencetosensitivebeings.YetatthesametimeIthink,thisisnotthecasewithALLpity,orwiththatdispositiontopitywhichisnaturaltomankindincommon.IthinkImaybeboldtosay,thisdoesnotarisefrombenevolence,norisitproperlycalledbythatname.

If all thatuneasinesson the sightofothers' extremedistress,whichwecallpity,wereproperlyof thenatureofbenevolence, thentheywhoarethesubjectsof thispassion,mustneedsbe inadegreeofuneasiness inbeingsensibleofthetotalwantofhappiness,ofallsuchastheywouldbedisposedtopityinextremedistress.Forthatcertainlyisthemostdirecttendency and operation of benevolence or good will, to desire thehappiness of its object. But now this is not the case universally, wheremen are disposed to exercise pity. There are many who would not be

sensiblyaffectedwithanyuneasinesstoknowthatothersweredead—yeamen,whoarenot influencedby the considerationof a future state, butviewdeathasonlyacessationofallsensibility,andconsequentlyanendofallhappiness—whoyetwouldhavebeenmovedwithpitytowardsthesamepersons, if theyhadseenthemundersomeveryextremeanguish.Somewouldbemovedwithpitybyseeingabrute-creatureunderextremeand long torments,whoyet suffernouneasiness inknowing thatmanythousandsofthemeverydayceasetolive,andsohaveanendputtoalltheirpleasure.Itisthenatureoftruebenevolencetodesireandrejoiceintheprosperityandpleasureofitsobject;andthat,insomeproportiontoitsdegreeof prevalence.Butpersonsmaygreatlypity those that are inextremepain,whosepositivepleasure theymay still bevery indifferentabout. In this case, a man may be much moved and affected withuneasiness,whoyetwouldbeaffectedwithnosensiblejoyinseeingsignsofthesameperson'senjoymentofveryhighdegreesofpleasure.

Yea,pitymaynotonlybewithoutbenevolence,butmayconsistwithtruemalevolence,orwithsuchillwillasshallcausemennotonlynottodesirethepositivehappinessofanother,buteven todesirehis calamity.Theymaypitysuchanonewhenhiscalamitygoesbeyondtheirhatred.Amanmay have truemalevolence towards another, desiring no positive goodforhim,butevil;andyethishatrednotbeinfinite,butonlytoacertaindegree.Andwhenhesees thepersonwhomhethushates inmisery farbeyond his ill will, he may then pity him: because then the naturalinstinctbeginstooperate.Formalevolencewillnotovercomethenaturalinstinct, incliningtopityothersinextremecalamity,anyfurtherthanitgoes,ortothelimitsofthedegreeofmiseryitwishestoitsobject.Menmaypityothersunderexquisitetorment,whenyettheywouldhavebeengrieved if theyhadseen theirprosperity.Andsomehavesuchagrudgeagainstanother, thattheywouldbefar fromuneasyat theirverydeath,nay,wouldevenbegladofit.Andwhenthisisthecase,itismanifestthattheirheart is voidof benevolence towards suchpersons, andunder thepowerofmalevolence.Yetat thesametime, theyarecapableofpityingeventheseverypersons,iftheyshouldseethemunderadegreeofmiseryverymuchdisproportionedtotheirillwill.

These things may convince us, that natural pity is of a nature very

differentfromtruevirtue,andnotarisingfromadispositionofhearttogeneral benevolence; but is owing to a particular instinct, which theCreator has implanted, chiefly for the preservation ofmankind, thoughnotexclusiveoftheirwellbeing.ThegivingofthisinstinctisthefruitofGod'smercy,andaninstanceofhislovetotheworldofmankind,andanevidence, that though the world be so sinful, it is not God's design tomake it a world of punishment; and therefore hasmany waysmade amercifulprovisionofreliefinextremecalamities.Thenaturalexercisesofpityextendbeyondthosewithwhomwearenearlyconnected,especiallyincasesofgreatcalamity;because,commonlyinsuchcases,menstandinneed of the help of others besides their near friends, and becausecommonly those calamities which are extreme, without relief, tend totheirdestruction.ThismaybegivenasthereasonwhymenaresomadebytheAuthorofnature, thattheyhavenoinstinct incliningasmuchtorejoice at the sight of others' great prosperity and pleasure, as to begrievedattheirextremecalamity,viz.becausetheydonotstandinequalnecessityofsuchaninstinctasthatinordertotheirpreservation.Butifpure benevolence were the source of natural pity, doubtless it wouldoperate to as great a degree in congratulation, in cases of others' greatprosperity,asincompassiontowardsthemingreatmisery.

The instincts which in some respects resemble a virtuous benevolence,areagreeabletothestatethatGoddesignedmankindforhere,whereheintendstheirpreservationandcomfortablesubsistence.Butintheworldof punishment—where the state of the wicked inhabitants will beexceedingdifferent,andGodwillhavenoneofthesemercifuldesignstoanswer—wehavegreat reason to think, therewillbenosuch thingasadispositiontopity, inanycase;asalsononaturalaffectiontowardnearrelations,andnomutualaffectionbetweenoppositesexes.

Toconclude,natural instinct,disposingmentopityothers inmisery, isalsoasourceofakindofabhorrenceinmenofsomevices,ascrueltyandoppression; and so of a sort of approbation of the contrary virtues,humanity,mercy,&c.whichaversionandapprobation,however,sofarastheyarisefromthiscauseonly,arenotfromaprincipleoftruevirtue.

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ChapterVII:Thereasonswhythosethingsthathavebeenmentioned,whichhavenottheessenceofvirtue,haveyetbymanybeen

mistakenfortruevirtue.

THEfirstreasonmaybethis,thatalthoughtheyhavenotthespecificanddistinguishingnatureandessenceofvirtue,yettheyhavesomethingthatbelongstothegeneralnatureofvirtue.Thegeneralnatureoftruevirtueislove.Itisexpressedbothinloveofbenevolenceandcomplacence;butprimarily in benevolence to persons and beings, and consequently andsecondarily in complacence in virtue, as has been shown. There issomethingofthegeneralnatureofvirtueinthosenaturalaffectionsandprinciplesthathavebeenmentioned,inboththoserespects.

Inmanyofthesenaturalaffectionsthereappearsthetendencyandeffectofbenevolence, inpart.Othershave trulyasortofprivatebenevolence,but which in several respects falls short of the extent of true virtuousbenevolence, both in its nature and object. Pity to others in distress,thoughnotproperlyofthenatureoflove,ashasbeendemonstrated,yethaspartlythesameinfluenceandeffectwithbenevolence.Oneeffectoftruebenevolenceisforpersonstobeuneasywhentheobjectsofitareindistress,andtodesiretheirrelief.Andnaturalpityhasthesameeffect.

Naturalgratitude,thoughnotproperlycalledlove—becausepersonsmaybemovedwithadegreeofgratitudetowardsothersoncertainoccasionsforwhomtheyhavenorealandproperfriendship;as intheinstanceofSaultowardsDavid,onceandagain,afterDavid'ssparinghis life,whenhe had so fair opportunity to kill him—yet has the like operation andeffectwithfriendship,inpart,foraseason,andwithregardtosomuchofthe welfare of its object, as appears a deserved requital of kindnessreceived.Andinotherinstances,itmayhaveamoregeneralandabidinginfluence,soasmoreproperly tobecalledby thenameof love.So thatmany times men, from natural gratitude, do really with a sort ofbenevolence, love thosewho love them. From this, togetherwith someother natural principles, men may love their near friends, their ownparty, their country, &c. The natural disposition there is to mutual

affection between the sexes, often operates by what may properly becalled love. There is oftentimes truly a kind both of benevolence andcomplacence.Astherealsoisbetweenparentsandchildren.

Thus these thingshavesomethingof thegeneralnatureofvirtue.Whattheyareessentiallydefective in, is, thattheyareprivate intheirnature;theydonotarisefromanytemperofbenevolencetobeingingeneral,norhave they a tendency to any such effect in their operation. But yetagreeingwithvirtueinitsgeneralnature,theyarebeautifulwithintheirownprivatesphere,i.e.theyappearbeautifulifweconfineourviewstothatprivatesystem,andwhileweshutoutallotherthingstowhichtheystandrelatedfromourconsideration.Ifthatprivatesystemcontainedthesumofuniversalexistence,theirbenevolencewouldhavetruebeauty;or,inotherwords,wouldbebeautiful,allthingsconsidered;butnowitisnotso.Theseprivatesystemsaresofarfromcontainingthesumofuniversalbeing,orcomprehendingallexistencetowhichwestandrelated, that itcontains but an infinitely small part of it. The reason whymen are soreadytotaketheseprivateaffectionsfortruevirtue,isthenarrownessoftheirviews;andaboveall,thattheyaresoreadytoleavetheDivineBeingoutoftheirview,andtoneglecthimintheirconsideration,ortoregardhimintheirthoughts,asthoughhedidnotproperlybelongtothesystemof real existence, but was a kind of shadowy, imaginary being. AndthoughmostmenallowthatthereisaGod,yet,intheirordinaryviewofthings, his being is not apt to come into the account, and to have theinfluenceandeffectofrealexistence,asitiswithotherbeingswhichtheysee, andare conversantwith,by their external senses. In their viewsofbeautyanddeformity,andintheir inwardsensationsofdisplicenceandapprobation, it is not natural to them to view the Deity as part of thesystem,andastheheadofit,incomparisonofwhomailotherthingsaretobeviewedwithcorrespondingimpressions.

Yea,weareapt, through thenarrownessofourviews, in judgingof thebeautyofaffectionsandactions,tolimitourconsiderationtoonlyasmallpartofthecreatedsystem.Whenprivateaffectionsextendthemselvestoaconsiderablenumber,wearereadytolookuponthemastrulyvirtuous,andaccordinglytoapplaudthemhighly.Thusitiswithrespecttoaman'slovetoalargeparty,oracountry.Forthoughhisprivatesystemcontains

butasmallpartevenoftheworldofmankind,yet,beingaconsiderablenumber, they—through the contracted limits of his mind, and thenarrownessofhisviews—arereadytoengrosshissight,andtoseemasiftheywereall.Hence, among theRomans, love to their countrywas thehighest virtue; though this affection of theirs, so much extolled, wasemployedasitwereforthedestructionoftherestofmankind.Thelargerthenumberis,towhichthatprivateaffectionextends,themoreaptmenare, through thenarrownessof their sight, tomistake it for truevirtue;becausethentheprivatesystemappearstohavemoreoftheimageoftheuniversal.

And this is thereasonwhyself-love isnotmistaken for truevirtue.Forthough there be something of the general nature of virtue in it, as loveandgoodwill,yettheobjectissoprivate,thelimitssonarrow,thatitbyno means engrosses the view; unless it be of the person himself, whothroughthegreatnessofhispridemayimaginehimselfasitwereall.Theminds ofmen are large enough to take in a vastly greater extent. Andthoughself-loveisfarfrombeinguselessintheworld,yea,itisexceedingnecessarytosociety;yeteverybodyseesthatif itbenotsubordinateto,andregulatedby,anothermoreextensiveprinciple,itmaymakeamanacommon enemy to the general system.And this is as true of any otherprivate affection, notwithstanding its extent may be to a system thatcontains millions of individuals. And though private systems bear nogreater proportion to thewhole of universal existence, than one alone;yet, they bear a greater proportion to the view and comprehension ofmen'sminds, andaremoreapt tobe regardedas if theywereall, oratleastassomeresemblanceoftheuniversalsystem.

Thus I have observed how many of these natural principles resemblevirtueinitsprimaryoperation,whichisbenevolence.Manyofthemalsohave a resemblance of it in its secondary operation, which is itsapprobation of and complacence in virtue itself. Several kinds ofapprobation of virtue, are not of the nature of a truly virtuousapprobation, consisting in a sense and relish of the essential beauty ofvirtue.Asparticularly,theapprobationofconscience,fromasenseoftheinferior and secondary beauty which there is in virtue, consisting inuniformity; and from a sense of desert, consisting in a sense of the

natural agreement of loving and being beloved, showing kindness andreceivingkindness.So,fromthesameprinciple,thereisadisapprobationofvice,fromanaturaloppositiontodeformityanddisproportion;andasenseofevildesert,orthenaturalagreementthereisbetweenhatingandbeing hated, opposing and being opposed, &c. together with a painfulsensation naturally arising from a sense of self-opposition andinconsistence.Approbationofconscienceisthemorereadilymistakenforatrulyvirtuousapprobation,becausebythewiseconstitutionofthegreatGovernoroftheworld,whenconscienceiswellinformed,andthoroughlyawakened,itagreeswithhimfullyandexactly,astotheobjectapproved,though not as to the ground and reason of approving. It approves allvirtue, and condemns all vice. It approves true virtue, and indeedapprovesnothingthatisagainstit,orthatfallsshortofit;aswasshownbefore.Naturalconscienceisimplantedinallmankind,tobeasitwereinGod'sstead,asaninternaljudgeorrule,wherebytodistinguishrightandwrong.

Ithasalsobeenobserved,howthatvirtue,consisting inbenevolence, isapproved;andvice,consistinginillwill,isdisliked;fromtheinfluenceofself-love,togetherwiththeassociationofideas.Inthesamemanner,mendislike those qualities in thingswithout life or reason,withwhich theyhave always connected the ideas of hurtfulness, malignancy,perniciousness; but approve those things with which they habituallyconnecttheideasofprofit,pleasantness,&c.Thisapprobationofvirtue,and dislike of vice, is easilymistaken for true virtue, not only becausethose things are approved by it that have the nature of virtue, and thethings disliked have the nature of vice; but because here is a greatresemblanceofvirtuousapprobation,itbeingcomplacencefromlove;thedifferenceonly lying in this, that it isnot fromlove tobeing ingeneral,butfromself-love.

There isalso,asbeforeshown,a likingofsomevirtues,andadislikeofsomevices,fromtheinfluenceofthenaturalinstinctofpity.Thisweareapt tomistake for theexerciseof truevirtueonmanyaccounts.Here isnotonlyakindofcomplacence,andtheobjectsofcomplacencehavethenature of virtue, and the virtues themselves are very amiable, such ashumanity,mercy,tendernessofheart,&c.andthecontraryveryodious;

but besides, the approbation is not merely from self-love, but fromcompassion; an affection that respects others, and resemblesbenevolence,asbeforeexplained.

Anotherreasonwhythethingsmentionedaremistakenfortruevirtue,is,thatthereisindeedatruenegativemoralgoodnessinthem.Byanegativemoralgoodness,Imeanthenegationorabsenceoftruemoralevil.Theyhavethisnegativemoralgoodness,becausebeingwithoutthemwouldbean evidence of amuch greatermoral evil. Thus the exercise of naturalconscienceinsuchandsuchdegrees,whereinappearssuchameasureofsensibility, though itbenotof thenatureof realpositivevirtue,or truemoral goodness, yet has a negative moral goodness; because in thepresent state of things, it is an evidence of the absence of that higherdegree of wickedness, which causes great insensibility, or stupidity ofconscience. For sin is not only against a spiritual and divine sense ofvirtue, but is also against the dictates of that moral sense which is innaturalconscience.Nowonder, that thissense,being longopposedandoftenconquered,growsweaker.Allsinhasitssourcefromselfishness,orfrom self-love, not subordinate to a regard to being in general. Andnatural conscience chiefly consists in a sense of desert, or the naturalagreement between sin andmisery. But if self were indeed all, and somoreconsiderablethanalltheworldbesides,therewouldbenoilldesertinamanregardinghimselfaboveall,andmakingallotherinterestsgiveplace toprivate interest.Andnowonder thatmen,by longacting fromthe selfish principle, and by being habituated to treat themselves as iftheywere all, increase inpride, and come to lookon themselves as all,and so to lose entirely the sense of ill desert in theirmaking all otherinterests give place to their own. And no wonder that any, by oftenrepeating acts of sin without punishment, or visible appearance ofapproaching punishment, have less and less present sense of theconnexionofsinwithpunishment.

That sense which an awakened conscience has of the desert of sin,consistschieflyinasenseofitsdesertofresentmentfromtheDeity,thefountainandheadofuniversalexistence.Butnowonderthat,bya longcontinuedworldlyandsensuallife,menmoreandmoreloseallsenseofthe Deity, who is a spiritual and invisible Being. Themind being long

involvedin,andengrossedby,sensitiveobjects,becomessensualinallitsoperations, and excludes all views and impressions of spiritual objects,and is unfit for their contemplation. Thus conscience and generalbenevolence, are entirely different principles; and thus a sense ofconsciencediffers from theholy complacenceof abenevolent and trulyvirtuous heart. Yet wickedness may by long habitual exercise greatlydiminish a sense of conscience. So that there may be negative moralgoodness, in sensibility of conscience, as itmay be an argument of theabsenceof thathigherdegreeofwickedness,whichcausethstupidityofconscience.

So with respect to natural gratitude; though there may be no virtuemerelyinlovingthemthatloveus,yetthecontrarymaybeanevidenceofagreatdegreeofdepravity,asitmayargueahigherdegreeofselfishness,sothatamaniscometolookuponhimselfasall,andothersasnothing,andsotheirrespectandkindnessasnothing.Thusan increaseofpridediminishes gratitude. So doth sensuality, or the increase of sensualappetites; which, coming more and more under the power andimpression of sensible objects, tends by degrees to make the mindinsensibletoanythingelse.Thoseappetitestakeupthewholesoul;and,throughhabitandcustom,thewaterisalldrawnoutofotherchannels,inwhichitnaturallyflows,andisallcarriedasitwereintoonechannel.

In like manner, natural affection, and natural pity, though not of thenatureofvirtue,maybediminishedgreatlybytheincreaseofprideandsensuality; and, as the consequence of this, be habitually disposed toenvy,malice, &c. These lusts, when they prevail to a high degree,mayovercomeanddiminish theexerciseof thosenaturalprinciples;evenasthey often overcome and diminish common prudence in a man, whoseekshisownprivateinterestinpointofhealth,wealth,orhonour;andyetnoonewill think itproves thatamanbeingcunning in seekinghisown personal and temporal interest, has any thing of the nature andessenceoftruevirtue.

Anotherreasonwhythesenaturalprinciplesandaffectionsaremistakenfortruevirtue,is,thatinseveralrespectstheyhavethesameeffectwhichtruevirtuetendsto;especiallyinthesetwoways:

1. The present state of the world is so constituted by the wisdom andgoodnessofitssupremeRuler,thatthesenaturalprinciples,forthemostpart,tendtothegoodofmankind.Sodonaturalpity,gratitude,parentalaffection, &c. Herein they agree with the tendency of generalbenevolence,which seeks and tends to the general good.But this is noproofthatthesenaturalprincipleshavethenatureoftruevirtue.Forself-loveisexceedingusefulandnecessary;andsoarethenaturalappetitesofhunger, thirst,&c. Yet nobodywill assert that these have the nature oftruevirtue.

2.Theseprincipleshavealikeeffectwithtruevirtueinthisrespect,thatthey tend several ways to restrain vice, and prevent many acts ofwickedness. So natural affection, love to our party, or to particularfriends, tends to keep us from acts of injustice towards these persons;which would be real wickedness. Pity preserves from cruelty, whichwouldberealandgreatmoralevil.Naturalconsciencetendstorestrainsiningeneral.Butthiscannotprovetheseprinciplesthemselvestobeofthenatureoftruevirtue.ForsoisthispresentstateorderedbyamercifulGod,thatevenself-loveoftenrestrainsfromactsoftruewickedness;andnotonlyso,butputsmenuponseekingtruevirtue;yet isnotitselftruevirtue,butisthesourceofallthewickednessthatisintheworld.

Anotherreasonwhytheseinferioraffections,especiallysomeofthem,areaccountedvirtuous,is,thatthereareaffectionsofthesamedenominationwhicharetrulyvirtuous.Thus,forinstance,thereisatrulyvirtuouspity,or a compassion to others, under affliction or misery, from generalbenevolence. Pure benevolence would be sufficient to excite pity toanother in calamity, if there were no particular instinct, or any otherprincipledeterminingthemindthereto.Itiseasytoseehowbenevolence,which seeks another's good, should cause us to desire his deliverancefromevil.Andthisisasourceofpityfarmoreextensivethantheother.Itexcitescompassionincasesthatareoverlookedbynatural instinct;andeveninthosecasestowhichinstinctextends, itmixesits influencewiththenaturalprinciple,andguidesandregulatesitsoperations.Andwhenthis is the case, the pity which is exercised, may be called a virtuouscompassion.Sothereisavirtuousgratitude;oragratitudethatarisesnotonlyfromself-love,butfromasuperiorprincipleofdisinterestedgeneral

benevolence.As,whenwereceivekindnessfromsuchaswelovealready,wearemoredisposedtogratitude,anddisposedtogreaterdegreesofit,than when the mind is destitute of any such friendly prepossession.Therefore,when the superiorprincipleof virtuous lovehasagoverninghand,andregulatestheaffair,itmaybecalledavirtuousgratitude.Thereisalsoavirtuousloveofjustice,arisingfrompurebenevolencetobeingingeneral; as that naturally and necessarily inclines the heart, that everyparticular being should have such a share of benevolence as isproportionedtoitsdignity,consistinginthedegreeofitsbeing,andthedegreeofitsvirtue.Andthusitiseasytosee,howtheremaybeavirtuoussense of desert different from what is natural and common; and avirtuous conscientiousness, or a sanctified conscience. And as, whennatural affections have their operations mixed with the influence ofvirtuousbenevolence,andaredirectedanddeterminedthereby,theymaybecalledvirtuous;sotheremaybeavirtuousloveofparentstochildren,andbetweenothernearrelatives;avirtuousloveofourtown,orcountry,ornation.Yea,andavirtuouslovebetweenthesexes,astheremaybetheinfluence of virtue mingled with instinct; and virtue may govern withregardtotheparticularmannerofitsoperation,andmayguideittosuchendsasareagreeabletothegreatpurposesoftruevirtue.

Genuine virtue prevents that increase of the habits of pride andsensuality, which tend to diminish the exercises of the useful andnecessary principles of nature. And a principle of general benevolencesoftensandsweetensthemind,makesitmoresusceptibleoftheproperinfluenceofthegentlernaturalinstincts,directseveryoneintoitsproperchannel,determinestheexercisetothepropermannerandmeasure,andguidesalltothebestpurposes.*

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ChapterVIII:Inwhatrespectsvirtueormoralgoodisfoundedinsentiment;andhowfaritisfoundedinthereasonand

natureofthings.

VIRTUEisacertainkindofbeautifulnature,formorquality.Thatformorqualityiscalledbeautiful,whichappearsinitselfagreeableorcomely,ortheviewofwhichisimmediatelypleasanttothemind.Isay,agreeableinitself,andimmediatelypleasant,todistinguishitfromthingswhichinthemselves are not so, but either indifferent or disagreeable;which yetappear eligible, andagreeable indirectly, for something elsewithwhichtheyareconnected.Suchindirectagreeableness,oreligiblenessinthingsnotforthemselves,butforsomethingelse,isnotbeauty.Butwhenaformorqualityappearslovely,pleasing,anddelightfulinitself,thenitiscalledbeautiful;andthisagreeablenessorgratefulnessoftheideaisBEAUTY.Itisevident,thatthewaywecomebytheideaofbeauty,isbyimmediatesensation of the gratefulness of the idea called beautiful; and not byfinding out by argumentation any consequences, or other things withwhichitstandsconnected;anymorethantastingthesweetnessofhoney,orperceivingtheharmonyofatune,isbyargumentationonconnexionsand consequences. The manner of being affected with the immediatepresenceofthebeautifulidea,dependsnotonanyreasoningsabouttheidea, afterwehave it,beforewecan findoutwhether itbebeautifulornot;butontheframeofourminds,wherebytheyaresomade,thatsuchanidea,assoonaswehaveit,isgrateful,orappearsbeautiful.

Therefore, if thisbe all that ismeantby themwhoaffirm that virtue isfoundedinsentiment,andnotinreason,thattheywhoseethebeautyoftrue virtue do not perceive it by argumentation on its connexions andconsequences,butbytheframeoftheirownminds,oracertainspiritualsensegiventhemofGod—wherebytheyimmediatelyperceivepleasureinthe presence of the idea of true virtue in their minds, or are directlygratifiedinthevieworcontemplationofthisobject—thisiscertainlytrue.But if therebybemeant, that the frameofmind,or inward sensegiventhembyGod,wherebythemindisdisposedtodelightintheideaoftruevirtue,isgivenarbitrarily,sothatifhehadpleasedhemighthavegivenacontrarysenseanddeterminationofmind,whichwouldhaveagreedaswellwiththenecessarynatureofthings,thisIthinkisnottrue.

Virtue, as I have observed, consists in the cordial consent or union ofbeingtobeingingeneral.Andthatframeofmind,wherebyitisdisposedtorelishandbepleasedwiththeviewofthis,isbenevolence,orunionof

heart, to being in general; or it is an universally benevolent frame ofmind.Because,hewhosetemperistolovebeingingeneral,mustthereinhave a disposition to approve and be pleased with love to being ingeneral. Therefore, now the question is, whether God, in giving thistempertoacreatedmind,actssoarbitrarily,thatthereisnothinginthenecessary nature of things to hinder, but that a contrary tempermighthaveagreedorconsistedaswellwiththatnatureofthingsasthis?

And in the first place, to assert this would be a plain absurdity, andcontrarytotheverysupposition.Forhereitissupposed,thatvirtueinitsvery essence consists in agreement or consent of being to being. Nowcertainly agreement itself to being in general must necessarily agreebetterwithgeneralexistence,thanoppositionandcontrarietytoit.

Iobserve, secondly, thatGod ingiving to thecreaturesucha temperofmind, gives thatwhich is agreeable towhat isby absolutenecessityhisowntemperandnature.For,asobserved,Godhimselfisineffectbeingingeneral; andwithout all doubt it is in itself necessary, thatGod shouldagreewithhimself,beunitedwithhimself,orlovehimself:andtherefore,whenhegivesthesametempertohiscreatures,thisismoreagreeabletohisnecessarynature, thantheoppositetemper:yea, the latterwouldbeinfinitelycontrarytohisnature.

Let it be noted, thirdly, that by this temper only can created beings beunitedtoandagreewithoneanother.Thisappears,becauseitconsistsinconsent and union to being in general; which implies agreement andunion with every particular being, except in such cases wherein unionwiththemisbysomemeansinconsistentwithuniontogeneralexistence.Butcertainly,ifanyparticularcreatedbeingwereofatempertoopposebeing in general, that would infer the most universal and greatestpossiblediscord,notonlyofcreatureswiththeirCreator,butofcreatedbeingsonewithanother.

Fourthly, There is no other temper but this, whereby aman can agreewithhimself,orbewithoutself-inconsistence, i.e.withouthavingsomeinclinationsandrelishesrepugnanttoothers;andthatforthesereasons.Everybeingthathasunderstandingandwillnecessarilyloveshappiness.For,tosupposeanybeingnottolovehappiness,wouldbetosupposehe

didnot lovewhatwas agreeable tohim;which is a contradiction: or atleastwouldimply,thatnothingwasagreeableoreligibletohim,whichisthesameastosaythathehasnosuchthingaschoice,oranyfacultyofwill.Sothateverybeingwhohasafacultyofwill,mustofnecessityhavean inclination to happiness. And therefore, if he be consistent withhimself, and has not some inclinations repugnant to others, he mustapprove of those inclinations whereby beings desire the happiness ofbeingingeneral,andmustbeagainstadispositiontothemiseryofbeingingeneral:becauseotherwisehewouldapproveofoppositiontohisownhappiness. For if a temper inclined to the misery of being in generalprevailed universally, it is apparent, it would tend to universalmisery.But he that loves a tendency to universal misery, in effect loves atendencytohisownmisery:andashenecessarilyhateshisownmisery,he has then one inclination repugnant to another. And besides, itnecessarily follows from self-love, thatmen love to be loved by others;becauseinthisothers' loveagreeswiththeirownlove.Butifmenlovedhatred to being in general, they would in effect love the hatred ofthemselves; and so would be inconsistent with themselves, having onenaturalinclinationcontrarytoanother.

These thingsmay help us to understand why that spiritual and divinesense, by which those who are truly virtuous and holy perceive theexcellencyoftruevirtue,isinthesacredScripturescalledbythenameoflight, knowledge, understanding, &c. If this divine sense were a thingarbitrarilygiven,withoutanyfoundationinthenatureofthings,itwouldnot properly be called by such names. For if there were nocorrespondence,oragreement,insuchasensewiththenatureofthings,anymore than therewould have been in a contrary sense, the ideaweobtain by this spiritual sense could in no respect be said to be aknowledgeorperceptionofanythingbesideswhatwasinourownminds.Forthisideawouldbenorepresentationofanythingwithout.Butsinceitisagreeable,intherespectsabovementioned,tothenatureofthings;andespecially since it is the representation of the moral perfection andexcellency,oftheDivineBeing;herebywehaveaperceptionofthatmoralexcellency of whichwe could have no true ideawithout it. And herebypersons have that true knowledge of God, which greatly enlightens themindintheknowledgeofdivinethingsingeneral,andwhich,asmightbe

shown,ifitwerenecessarytothemainpurposeofthisdiscourse,inmanyrespects,assistspersonstoarightunderstandingofthingsingeneral;viz.to see thenatureand truthof them, in theirproperevidence.Whereas,thewantofthisspiritualsense,andtheprevalenceofthosedispositionswhich are contrary to it, tends to darken and distract the mind, anddreadfullytodeludeandconfoundmen'sunderstandings.

Norcanthatmoralsense,commontomankind,whichthereisinnaturalconscience,betrulysaidtobenomorethanasentimentarbitrarilygivenbytheCreator,withoutanyrelationtothenecessarynatureofthings:butrather, this is established in agreement with the nature of things; soestablished, as no sense of mind that can be supposed of a contrarynatureandtendencycouldbe.Thiswillappearbythesetwothings:

1.Thismoralsense—iftheunderstandingbewell informed,exercisedatliberty,andinanextensivemanner,withoutbeingrestrainedtoaprivatesphere—approvestheverysamethingswhichaspiritualanddivinesenseapproves; and those things only; thoughnot on the same grounds, norwith the same kind of approbation. Therefore, as that divine sense isagreeable to the necessary nature of things, as already shown; so thisinferiormoralsense,beingsofarcorrespondenttothat,mustalsosofaragreewiththenatureofthings.

2. It has been shown, that this moral sense consists in approving theuniformity and natural agreement there is between one thing andanother. So that, by the supposition, it is agreeable to the nature ofthings.Forthereinitconsists,viz.adispositionofmindtoconsentto,orlike,theagreementofthenatureofthings,ortheagreementofthenatureandformofonethingwithanother.Andcertainly,suchatemperofmindismoreagreeabletothenatureofthingsthananoppositetemper.

The use of language is to express our SENTIMENTS, or ideas, to eachother;sothatthosetermsbywhichthingsofamoralnaturearesignified,express those moral sentiments which are common to mankind.Therefore, thatMORAL SENSE which is in natural conscience, chieflygovernstheuseof language,andis themind'sruleof language inthesematters.It is indeedthegeneralnaturalrulewhichGodhasgiventoallmen,wherebytojudgeofmoralgoodandevil.Bysuchwords,rightand

wrong,goodandevil,whenusedinamoralsense, ismeantincommonspeech,thatwhichdeservespraiseorblame,respectorresentment;andmankindingeneralhaveasenseofdesert,bythisnaturalmoralsense.

Therefore,hereisaquestionwhichmaydeservetobeconsidered:seeingsentiment is the rule of language, as to what is called good and evil,worthy and unworthy; and it is apparent that sentiment, at least as tomanyparticulars,isdifferent,indifferentpersons,especiallyindifferentnations—thatbeingthoughttodeservepraisebyone,whichbyothersisthoughttobeworthyofblame—howthereforecanvirtueandvicebeanyotherthanarbitrary;notatalldeterminedbythenatureofthings,butbythesentimentsofmenwithrelationtothenatureofthings?

In order to the answering of this question with clearness, it may bedivided intotwo:viz.Whethermen'ssentimentsofmoralgoodandevilarecasualandaccidental?And,whethertheirwayofusingwordsinwhattheycallgoodandevil, isnotarbitrary,withoutrespecttoanycommonsentimentconformedtothenatureofthings?

As to the first, Iwouldobserve, that thegeneraldispositionorsenseofmind,exercisedinasenseofdesertofesteemorresentment,maybethesameinall:thoughastoparticularobjectsandoccasionswithregardtowhichitisexercised,itmaybeveryvariousindifferentmen,orbodiesofmen,throughthepartialityorerrorthatmayattendthevieworattentionofthemind.Inall,anotionofdesertofloveorresentment,mayconsistin thesamething, ingeneral—asuitableness,ornaturaluniformityandagreement, between the affections and acts of the agent, and theaffections and treatment of others some way concerned—and yetoccasions and objects, through a variety of apprehensions about them,andthevariousmannerinwhichtheyareviewed,byreasonofthepartialattention of the mind, may be extremely various. Besides, example,custom, education, and association, may contribute to this, in waysinnumerable.Butitisneedlesstoenlargehere,sincewhathasbeensaidby others,Mr.Hutchison in particular,may abundantly show, that thedifferenceswhichare tobe foundamongdifferentpersonsandnations,concerningmoralgoodandevil,arenotinconsistentwithageneralmoralsense,commontoallmankind.

Nor, secondly, is the use of thewords, good and evil, right andwrong,whenusedinamoralsense,altogetherunfixedandarbitrary,accordingto the variety of notions, opinions, and views, that occasion theforementionedvarietyofsentiment.Forthoughthesignificationofwordsis determined by particular use, yet that which governs in the use ofterms, is general or common use. And mankind, in what they wouldsignifybyterms,areobligedtoaimataconsistentuse:becauseitiseasilyfound that the end of language, which is to be a common medium ofmanifestingideasandsentiments,cannotbeobtainedanyotherwaythanby a consistent use of words; both thatmen should be consistent withthemselves, and onewith another, in the use of them.Butmen cannotcall any thing right orwrong,worthy or ill-deserving, consistently, anyotherwaythanbycallingthingsso,whichtrulydeservepraiseorblame,i. e. things, wherein all things considered there is most uniformity inconnectingwith thempraise or blame. There is no otherway inwhichtheycanusethesetermsconsistentlywiththemselves.Thusifthievesortraitorsmaybeangrywithinformersthatbringthemtojustice,andcalltheir behaviour by odious names; yet herein they are inconsistentwiththemselves;because,whentheyputthemselvesintheplaceofthosewhohave injured them, they approve the same things they condemn. Andtherefore, such are capable of being convinced, that they apply theseodious terms in an abusive manner. So, a nation that prosecutes anambitiousdesignofuniversalempire,bysubduingothernationswithfireandsword,mayaffixterms,thatsignifythehighestdegreesofvirtue,totheconductof suchasshowthemostengaged,stable, resolutespirit inthisaffair,anddomostof thisbloodywork.Butyet theyarecapableofbeing convinced, that they use these terms inconsistently, and abuselanguage in it, and so having theirmouths stopped. And not only willmen use such words inconsistently with themselves, but also with oneanother, by using them any otherwise than to signify true merit or illdeserving,asbeforeexplained.Forthereisnowayelsewhereinmenhaveanynotionofgoodorilldesert, inwhichmankindingeneralcanagree.Mankind in general seem to suppose some general standard, orfoundationinnature,foranuniversalconsistenceintheuseofthetermswherebytheyexpressmoralgoodandevil;whichnonecandepart frombut through error and mistake. This is evidently supposed in all theirdisputesaboutrightandwrong;andinallendeavoursusedtoprovethat

anythingiseithergoodorevil,inamoralsense.