the new economic model and marine fisheries development in latin america

The New Economic Model and Marine Fisheries

Development in Latin America

ANDY THORPEUniversity of Portsmouth, Southsea, UK

ALONSO AGUILAR IBARRAInstituto Nacional de la Pesca, Mexico

and

CHRIS REID *

University of Portsmouth, Southsea, UK

Summary. Ð The New Economic Model (NEM) has profoundly in¯uenced ®sheries developmentin Latin America, facilitating the emergence of new and increasingly in¯uential interest groupswithin the industry. It has also stimulated new forms of production and prompted new legislationto regulate ®shing in the region's most important ®shing countries. These changes have coincidedwith Latin America's increasing importance in world ®sheries production and trade. The NEM hasnot, however, resolved the sector's fundamental problems, such as over®shing, overcapitalizationand con¯ict, and has arguably exacerbated them. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Key words Ð Latin America, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru, ®sheries, exports, neoliberalism

1. INTRODUCTION

Marine ®sheries and aquaculture directlyemploy about one million people in LatinAmerica, 90% of whom are artisan producers(Bermudez & Aguero, 1994, pp. 38±39). Theregion contributes approximately one-®fth toworld marine ®sh production, while ®shing and®sh processing account for around one-®fthand one-eighth of Peruvian and Chilean exportearnings respectively (FAO, 1998; IDB, 1996).But, ®sheries development and management inLatin America is poorly covered in the litera-ture, especially with respect to the impact of theNew Economic Model (NEM). This is curiousconsidering the generous coverage of theNEMÕs impact upon other primary productindustries, such as agriculture and forestry(Garramon, 1988; Trejos, 1992; Conroy,Murray & Rosset, 1994; Thrupp, 1994; Weeks,1995; Silva, 1997).

This paper seeks to redress this anomaly. Inparticular, it hypothesizes that NEM policiesencouraged the unfettered expansion of

production and trade. It also suggests thatwhile neoliberal regimes in the region intro-duced legislative changes to regulate the sector,they have not fully confronted the main char-acteristic of marine ®sheries, namely theabsence of clearly de®ned property rights over®sheries resources. The result has been anintensi®cation of over®shing, overcapitalizationand con¯ict. Current e�orts to manage the®sheries more e�ectively are constrained byboth the shortage of management resourcesand the in¯uence of new and increasingly

World Development Vol. 28, No. 9, pp. 1689±1702, 2000Ó 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved

Printed in Great Britain0305-750X/00/$ - see front matter

PII: S0305-750X(00)00045-0www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev

* We extend our thanks to Roberto Bentivoglio (FAO),

Juan Carlos Cardenas and Patricio Igor Melillanca

(Ecoceanos), Mike Leo Weber, Emily Young and Karen

Barton for information and comments upon earlier

drafts. We also gratefully acknowledge the ®nancial

support of the University of Portsmouth, the European

Union and the MacArthur Foundation in presenting our

®ndings at conferences and workshops. Errors and

omissions remain the responsibility of the authors alone.

1689

powerful interest groups that have appearedwithin the sector.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2outlines the main problems inherent in marine®sheries, and indicates how they can be exac-erbated by NEM-type policies. Section 3delineates the pattern of ®sheries developmentin the regionÕs four main ®shing countriesÐChile, Argentina, Mexico and PeruÐhigh-lighting how the NEM has in¯uenced national®sheries development and policy. Section 4examines whether the NEM encouraged ¯eetgrowth, and whether ¯eet ownership hasbecome increasingly concentrated among larger®rms. In Section 5, we indicate how NEMpolicies have given rise to new con¯icts. Theconclusion suggests that the tendency to``privatize the ¯eet before privatizing theresource'' has, by introducing new interestgroups into the ®sheries environment, accen-tuated management problems while failing(presently) to resolve distributional concerns.

2. FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT AND THELATIN AMERICAN NEM

(a) The problems of ®sheries development

The outstanding ®sheries development issuesin Latin America are over®shing, overcapital-ization and con¯ict. Each originates from theabsence of clearly de®ned and enforceablerights to ®shery resources. Property rightscreate incentives to use resources e�ciently. Intheir absence, the ability of open access ®sheriesto yield an economic surplus or rent above thecosts of harvesting attracts an excessive level ofe�ort into the ®shery. 1 Competition between®shing enterprises (the so-called race for ®sh)continues until an equilibrium is reached. Atthis point, rising costs equal declining revenuesand ®rms earn no rents. Catches exceed theresourceÕs maximum sustainable yield (MSY),

and resources are biologically over®shed. 2

Attempts to raise productivity through inno-vation are destined to fail in the long run, asinitial improvements in productivity cause the®sh population to decrease and catch rates tofall. The task of regulation is to alleviate theseproblems and resolve the con¯icts they engen-der, although ®sheries management can itselfbe a source of con¯ict (Charles, 1992; Smith,1980).

Christy (1996, p. 19) has observed that LatinAmericaÕs ®sheries have passed through the

stages of neglect, nationalization and privati-zation before arriving at the present stage of®sheries management. This last stage is themost complicated because society demands thatresources are not only conserved, but alsocontribute to food production, export earnings,and employment. As these goals are oftencontradictory (Bailey & Jentoft, 1990),management strategies are advocated as a wayof preventing con¯icts.

Di�culties in e�ectively measuring andcontrolling inputs to a ®shery, however,focused management strategies on controllingoutput. Two output controls are especiallyimportant in this context, each o�ering distinctcosts and bene®ts (OECD, 1997, pp. 61±122).Total allowable catches (TACs) cap output atits MSY level. TACs curb over®shing, butbecause the ®shery remains open access, do nottackle the problem of overcapitalization. Indi-vidual transferable quotas (ITQs) address theissue of property rights. By ``privatizing'' theresource through allocating shares of the TAC,ITQs create incentives for owners to conserveresources and use inputs e�ciently, therebyeliminating overcapitalization. The drawback isthat ITQs are costly to regulate and enforce,and Latin American states have limitedmanagement resources (de G. Gri�th et al.,1991). Regulation and enforcement are not theonly concerns, as there are also substantivedistribution issues associated with the alloca-tion of ITQs (Cunningham, 1994). Nonetheless,as we illustrate below, ITQs are not out of placewithin the context of the Latin AmericanNEM.

(b) The NEM and its expected impact on®sheries development

Identifying the full impact of the NEM uponthe ®sheries sector is beyond the scope of thispaper. It is possible, however, to recognizecommon outcomes. First, the sector will beindirectly a�ected by NEM macroeconomicpolicies. Competitive real exchange rates willencourage greater participation in the industry,while reinforcing its traditional export-orien-tation. Privatization and deregulation willstimulate domestic and foreign direct invest-ment in the sector. Although this new invest-ment is welcome in many respects, the relativeimmobility of ®shing capital will ensure thatnew vessels are likely to complement, ratherthan replace, existing boats. Consequently,unless matched by incentives to decommission

WORLD DEVELOPMENT1690

older vessels, the net result will be greaterovercapitalization. This in turn will raise thelikelihood of overexploitation. Furthermore, ifthese incentives attract larger domestic andforeign ®rmsÐwho are able to invest in biggermore e�cient vesselsÐthen the NEM willherald not only a greater dominance of largevessels within the ¯eet, but also a concentrationof ownership within the sector.

Second, the scale and scope of such changeswill ultimately be determined by sector-spe-ci®c policies. As with land, NEM protagonistsview insecure access as a critical constraint one�cient resource use and development. Byimplication then, ®sheries policy shouldclearly designate access rights. If NEM pref-erences for land titling (Feder & Feeny, 1991;Stan®eld, 1990) were translated to the ®sher-ies sector we would expect to see amendmentsto the prevailing legislation so as to privatizethe underlying resource. Furthermore, to bemost e�ective, such amendments shouldensure that access rights are both enforcedand tradable. Hence, an ideal NEM strategywould create incentives to use resources in ane�cient and sustainable fashion. The mostsuitable instrument to ensure this would bethrough the allocation of ITQs. IntroducingITQs would be easier in emerging or under-exploited ®sheries, less so in mature ®sheriesfunctioning at or above MSY where con¯ictsare probable.

In sum, then, we hypothesize that NEMmacro-policy will tend to support overcapital-ization and size concentration. These tenden-cies are, moreover, likely to rapidly exacerbateover®shing unless there is a concomitantintroduction of a new resource rights regime,most typically through the approval of newnational ®sheries laws.

3. NEOLIBERALISM AND THEEVOLUTION OF MARINE FISHERIESMANAGEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

As shown in Table 1, the main commercial®sheries in Latin America are mostly harvestedat or beyond their maximum level.

Four main types of ®shery are represented.First, there are ®sheries for highly migratoryspecies, such as tuna. Second, there are indus-trial ®sheries for small pelagic species, italicizedin Table 1, which are most densely concen-trated around the upwelling Humboldt currento� Chile and Peru. These provide the inputs tothe ®shmeal and oil industry, and historicallyhave been the most important in economicterms. Third, there are continental shelf ®sher-ies for species such as hake, whiting and squid.Finally, there are socially important inshore®sheries, the most signi®cant of which are forshrimp. A brief synopsis of the development ofthese ®sheries and the role of the NEM in eachof the main ®shing nations is given below.

(a) Chile

Most Latin American countries were ill-prepared to exploit the ®sheries resourcescontained within the 200-mile exclusiveeconomic zones (EEZs) created by the ThirdUnited Nations Conference on the Law of theSea (UNCLOS III), held in Caracas in June1974. 3 Chile was an exception. Recently turnedneoliberal, an aggressive exchange rate policyin 1974±75 substantially improved exportearnings. Deregulation of the domestic capitalmarket and creation of the quasi-governmentalPro-Chile (Instituto de Promoci�on de Exporta-dores de Chile) in 1974 to promote exportsfurther encouraged trade expansion. The

Table 1. Status of principal Latin American marine ®sheries: 1995a ;b

Status Number of species Species

Overexploited 1 Brazilian SardinellaFully to overexploited 8 Peruvian anchovy; South American pilchard; Araucanian

herring; Argentine, South Paci®c,and Patagonian hake;Patagonian grenadier; short®n squid,

Fully exploited 1 Yellow®n tunaModerately to fullyexploited

4 Chilean jack mackerel; Californian pilchard; Paci®canchovy; Southern blue whiting

Moderately exploited 1 Club mackerelUnknown 1 Round sardinella

a Sources: FAO (1997a,b).b Criteria for inclusion: Landings exceeded 50,000 tons in at least one country during 1980±95. Pelagic species areitalicized.

THE NEM AND MARINE FISHERIES 1691

®sheries sector was a major bene®ciary. Thedecision to privatize the Northern ¯eet during1974±78, limit foreign ®shing activities 4 andrescind the permit-based access system topelagic stocks in 1978, saw additional e�ortenter the industry. By 1980, Chile had surpas-sed Peru as the regionÕs leading ®sh exporter.

As the rapidly expanding Northern indus-trial ¯eet quickly depleted anchovy stocks,vessels either switched to ®shing for jackmackerel and South American pilchard ormoved southward into underexploited ®shinggrounds. Fisheries investment was furtherencouraged in the early 1980s by substantialInter-American Development Bank (IDB)credits. 5 Although initially pro®table, thesesteps ultimately extended the problem ofover®shing to new ®sheries. Governmentattempts to resolve the problem in the early1980s by imposing minimum catch sizes andclosed seasons met with little success orsupport. A similar fate befell the 1986 edict,which sought to curb indirectly the problem ofovercapitalization by freezing the capacity ofthe Northern industrial ¯eet.

As evidence emerged that other ®sheries werealso threatened by over®shing, including thosefor hake and the Venus Antiqua clam aroundthe Bay of Ancud (Schurman, 1996, pp. 1702±1703), the government moved to develop a newregulatory framework. A new ®sheries law wasrecommended in 1989, but industry oppositiondelayed its approval until September 1991. Thenew Fisheries Law (Decree 430) ended openaccess to ®sheries de®ned as ``emerging'', ``ful-ly-exploited'' or ``recuperating''. Instead, acomplex system of ITQs was introduced whichis currently applied in the recuperating south-ern hake and red shrimp ®sheries, and theemerging Patagonian tooth®sh and orangeroughy ®sheries. A controversial bill to priv-atize the industrial ®sheries through ITQs waswithdrawn in August 1999 in response toprotests from artisanal ®shermen, ®shingworkers and environmentalists regarding itsdistributional e�ects (Fish Information Servi-ces, Sea-World, August 27, 1999).

(b) Argentina

ArgentinaÕs military governments during the1970s and early 1980s pursued a dualistic ®sh-eries strategy, licensing foreign boats to operatewithin the Argentine EEZ, while encouragingjoint ventures with foreign ®rms. This changedsharply after 1982. British restrictions on

Argentine naval movements following theFalklands/Malvinas war allowed foreign boatsto ®sh the Argentine EEZ with impunity.Consequently, an estimated 600 vessels wereactive in the region by 1986 (Weidner & Hall,1993, p. 270). In addition, local companies wereprevented from applying for permits to ®sh the150-mile Falklands Protection Zone overlap-ping ArgentinaÕs EEZ, as this would haveimplied recognition of British territorial claimsto the Islands (Marine Fisheries Review, 1989,p. 58). These constraints were exacerbated by acombination of an overvalued peso, capitalshortages, escalating in¯ation, and limiteddomestic markets due to the relative cheapnessof beef. As a result, there were few incentives toinvest in the ®sheries during the 1980s. None-theless, there were already concerns regardingthe overexploitation of the country's maincontinental shelf ground®sh ®shery for hake(Anon, 1998, p. 3).

The Menem (1989±1999) administrationÕsNEM revitalized the Argentine ®shing sector.By 1991, economic stability had been restored,exchange rate overvaluation eliminated, andtari�s and interest rates reduced. Investment inthe sector increased noticeably, encouraged bythe exemption of new vessels from trade taxes,simpli®ed procedures for ``naturalizing''foreign vessels introduced under the 1992Fisheries Law, an Executive 1992 Decree thatpermitted Argentine ®rms to lease foreignvessels, and improved international hake prices.Exports were further encouraged in September1993, when EU vessels were granted permissionto ®sh Argentine waters in return for a two-thirds reduction in EU tari�s on Argentine ®shproducts.

The result was increased pressure on resour-ces, which the 1997 Federal Fisheries Lawsought to abate by introducing TACs. By mid-1998, 30 species were subject to annual TACs.Unfortunately, the assignation of TACs was asource of con¯ict (Section 5) and, with thecountryÕs hake stocks on the verge of collapse,the Menem administration approved anEmergency 1998 Fisheries Law that proposeddraconian restrictions on ®shing e�ort duringthe next ®ve years. Pressure from the Argentine®shing industry ensured that the EU accessagreement was not renewed in May 1999, butthe passing of an emergency law the followingmonth to restrict hake ®shing has exacerbatedtensions between the Argentinean ®shingindustry and EU ®rms engaged in jointventures, each accusing the other of having


received favorable treatment (Fish InformationServices, Sea-World, August 2, 1999).

(c) Mexico

Mexican rati®cation of UNCLOS III in mid-1976 was followed by the 1977±1982 NationalFisheries Development Plan that aimed to raiseMexico from 28th to ®fth place among theworldÕs ®shing countries. The planÕs majorbene®ciary was the countryÕs hitherto under-exploited tuna ®sheries, private entrepreneursquickly moving in to exploit the open accessnature of the resource and the governmentincentives on o�er. As it transpired, marketswere the most pressing problem. The UnitedStates, MexicoÕs major tuna export market,embargoed Mexican tuna imports following theseizure of US vessels within the Mexican EEZin 1980 (de Andrade, 1999, p. 23). The pesoÕscollapse in 1982 exacerbated the sectorÕs prob-lems, doubling the costs of boats on order fromforeign shipyards, and the government capitu-lated to industry pressures and o�eredsubstantial support funds. Rescue operationsseverely decapitalized both the state ®sheriesbank Banpesca and the marketing/processingparastatal PROPEMEX. Although the situa-tion improved following the end of theembargo in 1986, its re-imposition during1990±99 in response to the Mexican failure toadopt dolphin-excluder devices on tuna netse�ectively discouraged new commissions duringthe NEM period.

MexicoÕs most signi®cant ®sheries in termsof export revenues and employment are itsinshore ®sheries. The most important of theseare the shrimp ®sheries, which accounted forbetween one-half and three-quarters of thesectorÕs export earnings between 1986 and1996 (SEMARNAP, 1997, p. 124). Histori-cally, cooperatives enjoyed exclusive access toshrimp and eight other inshore ®sheries. Yetdespite this, there were clear signs of overca-pitalization; an FAO/World Bank (1988) studysuggested that reductions of 29% and 49% inthe Paci®c and Gulf ¯eets, respectively, werenecessary to restore pro®tability. The situationworsened after the NEM introduced by theSalinas de Gortari (1988±94) administrationsubstantially curbed state support to thecooperative sector. Banpesca was closed andPROPEMEXÕs role reduced. Signi®cantly, theNEM also revised access arrangements to thecountryÕs inshore ®sheries. The 1992 FisheriesLaw withdrew the cooperativesÕ historic rights,

replacing them with a system of permits andconcessions. This provided a clear signal toprivate investors. There had been no privatelyowned shrimp trawlers in 1990. By 1992, therewere 450, and by 1993, 90% of the vessels inthe North Paci®c o�shore shrimp ®sherieswere privately owned (V�asquez Le�on &McGuire, 1993, p. 61), a trend duplicatedelsewhere. Although cooperatives remainactive in the inshore ®shery, catching smallershrimp for domestic markets (SEMARNAP,1996, pp. 20±21), these changes in propertyrights have provoked widespread con¯ict(Section 5).

(d) Peru

By the 1960s, Peru had developed the worldÕslargest industrial ®shery, catching anchovy tomanufacture ®shmeal and oil for export(Roemer, 1970; Appleyard, 1973). Over®shing,combined with the e�ects of a strong El Ni~no,caused anchovy stocks to collapse in 1972(Boerema & Gulland, 1973; Csirke, 1980), andthe Velasco government nationalized both ¯eetand processing companies in May 1973(Caviedes & Fik, 1993). Nationalizationenabled the state to regulate the anchovy ®sh-ery, although it did not prevent private ®rmsfrom entering the unregulated pilchard or jackmackerel ®sheries, nor licensed foreign vesselsfrom ®shing for hake and tuna (Weidner &Hall, 1993, p. 440). While the overexploitationof pilchard stocks prompted new managementmeasures in 1980, the government stoppedshort of assigning resource rights (MarineFisheries Review, 1981, p. 27).

The NEM introduced by FujimoriÕs admin-istration (1990±present) stimulated new invest-ment in the sector. A more competitiveexchange rate, the establishment of an exportpromotion commission PROMPEX in 1996,®nancial and tax reforms, and privatization ofthe ¯eet and processing companies, led toinvestment of some US$400 million during1991±95 (World Fish Report, December 7,1995, p. SP/4; March 13, 1997, p. SP/1).Although a new Fisheries Law was approvedin 1994, resources were not privatized. Instead,auctions of annual permits for ``surplus'' stockswere established. 6 Access to nonsurplus stocks,including the principal pelagic ®sheries, remainsa ``free-for-all'', with ®rms racing to capturethe largest possible share of the TAC beforethe ®shery is closed (Fishing News Interna-tional, November 1998, p. 31). Recognizing


that this encourages overcapitalization andever shorter ®shing seasons, the FisheriesMinistry is presently considering ITQs forun®shed and under®shed species, as well as theover®shed hake ®shery, although not as yetthe major pelagic ®sheries. Consequently, theindustrial ®shery remains considerably over-capitalized and indebted: only 40% of currentvessel and processing capacity is necessary toexploit fully the available resources, whiledebts were estimated at US$1200 million inApril 1999 (Fish Information Services, Sea-World, April 12, 1999). From the abovediscussion, it is clear that neoliberal regimesacross the region have only belatedly recog-nized the importance of privatizing ®sheriesresources as opposed to privatizing govern-ment-owned ®shing and processing companies.Consequently, the optimal ®rm strategy hasbeen to ``gear up'', to capture a greater share ofthese de facto open access ®sheries in the short-term, while establishing a strong presenceÐand hence bargaining positionÐto guardagainst new regulatory controls in the longerterm. Gearing-up is thus likely to accentuateovercapitalization, encourage concentrationand provoke increased con¯icts within thesector over time.

4. THE NEM AND SIZE, STRUCTUREAND CONCENTRATION WITHIN THE

LATIN AMERICAN MARINE FISHERIESSECTOR

(a) Fleet size

As annual recorded landings may be volatiledue to both biological and economic factors,®shing inputs (potential productivity) may o�era more reliable indicator of sectoral trends than®shing outputs (actual productivity). One of themost common input measures employed in thisrespect is the gross registered tonnage (GRT) ofvessels. Using this measure, the growth of LatinAmericaÕs ®shing ¯eet over the last quartercentury can be seen in Table 2.

Four distinct groupings are evident. The ®rstconsists of those countries where adoption ofthe NEM has coincided with a marked declinein ¯eet growth rates. This group includes mostof the Central American economies, Brazil(albeit a very recent reformer), Mexico, Vene-zuela and Ecuador. Here, as overcapitalizationand/or over®shing was evident in the majorinshore ®sheries before the adoption of theNEM (Weidner & Hall, 1993, pp. 188±189;Nadal Egea, 1996, pp. 242±265), the new

Table 2. Gross registered tonnage (GRT),a Latin American industrial ®shing ¯eets, 1970±95b

Groupc Country NEM dated NEM Average annual growth (% p.a.)

1970GRT

DateGRT

1995GRT

1970-NEM NEM-1995

1 Costa Rica 1986 0.0 5.2 3.1 N/A ÿ5:591 Mexico 1988 8.1 288.5 299.6 21.96 0.541 El Salvador 1989 4.9 3.5 3.6 ÿ1:76 0.471 Venezuela 1989 26.5 88.1 95.5 6.53 1.351 Guatemala 1991 0.8 2.9 2.5 6.32 ÿ3:641 Nicaragua 1991 * 12.1 12.4 N/A 0.611 Ecuador 1992 15.7 49.1 52.7 5.32 2.401 Hondurase 1992 0.8 14.4 14.8 14.04 0.901 Brazil 1994 8.0 19.2 17.8 3.72 ÿ7:292 Argentina 1991 9.5 128.7 212.6 13.21 13.372 Uruguay 1991 1.8 14.4 20.6 10.41 9.363 Chile 1975 16.0 15.4 168.2 ÿ0:76 12.703 Colombia 1991 0.1 4.3 14.1 19.61 34.574 Peru 1990 61.6 128.6 157.0 3.75 4.10

Panamae 1995 12.1 346.4 346.4 14.36 ±Total ± 165.0 ± 1,400.9 ± ±

a GRT ®gures for vessels over 100 GRT are in thousands. * Signi®es less than 100 GRT.b Sources: FAO (1998) and personal communications.c See text for details.d For current purposes, an economy is deemed to be following NEM policies once it has implemented a tradeliberalization program and stabilized in¯ation (IDB, 1996, p. 77).e The Panamanian and Honduran ®gures should be viewed with some caution due to the registration of vessels under¯ags of convenience.


macroeconomic environment and regulatoryregime o�ered few stimuli for additionalinvestment. Furthermore, the Mexican andVenezuelan tuna ®sheries, which had largelyunderpinned the ¯eetÕs growth in each country,were restricted by the US tuna embargo formost of the 1990s.

In the second group of countries, Argentinaand Uruguay, ¯eet growth was high before theNEM and continued at around the same levelthereafter. In Uruguay, the major contributionto ¯eet growth was the Clainsa companyÕsacquisition of eight stern trawlers following thecollapse of the Canadian cod ®shery. InArgentina, the number of trawlers leapt from263 in 1991 to 371 in 1995, despite concerns forcontinental shelf stocks. Two factors haveunderpinned this increase. First, the regulatoryregime was relaxed, allowing some foreign andjoint-venture vessels to be registered as Argen-tine. Second, tari�s on imported vessels werereduced to 4±10% of the vesselÕs value ``[to help]Argentine ®shermen take advantage of thelarge number of relatively modern, but inex-pensive used vessels available on the interna-tional markets'' (Weidner & Hall, 1993, p. 267).While Argentine ®rms capitalized on thisopportunity, the bene®ts derived from intro-ducing these large second-hand vessels werequestionable as, by exerting greater pressureson scarce resources, they provoked greatercon¯ict between ®shing enterprises.

The third group, comprising Chile andColombia, have recorded markedly higher ¯eetgrowth since adopting the NEM. In Chile, theopen access regime operating before the 1992Law was a major factor behind the eleven-foldgrowth of vessel GRT in the industrial ®sheriesduring 1975±95. 7 Although contrary to itsintention, the 1992 Law actually contributed toovercapitalization, as ®rms in the industrial®sheries lobbied for a 27-month transitionalperiod that allowed vessels ``under construc-tion'' to enter ``fully-exploited'' ®sheries (Arti-cle 3, transitory arrangements). Colombian¯eet growth has been dramatic in the post-NEM period, although it remains a smallplayer in the region's ®sheries.

Finally, Peruvian ¯eet growth has beenmoderate since 1970, when it accounted foralmost 40% of the regionÕs industrial ®shingcapacity. Although the number of vessels andGRT doubled over the subsequent 20 years,lack of investment by the stateÐtogether withthe crowding out of private sector investmentÐsaw the ¯eet badly a�ected by obsolescence.

Although the Fujimori administrationÕs goalhas been ¯eet modernization rather thanexpansion, total GRT increased during theNEM period. This can be attributed to thearti®cial distinction made between vesselscatching pelagic species for ®shmeal productionas against consumption. 8 Although Article 24of the 1992 Law required additions to theindustrial ¯eet to be balanced by decommis-sioning older boats, there were few safeguardsto ensure compliance. Predictably, many ®rmswere authorized to commission vessels for theconsumption ®shery but subsequently illegallyredirected their catches to the ®shmeal indus-try. The recently completed privatization ofPESCA PERU has increased the opportunitiesfor non-compliance.

In sum, the evidence in Table 2 suggests thatthe NEM has had no clear e�ect on the growthof ®shing ¯eets in the region. Growth hasdecreased in many countries, stayed high in afew, remained moderate in one, and increasedin only Chile and Colombia. The greatest ¯eetgrowth took place in the 1970s and 1980s,before the NEM was introduced in most of thecountries, stimulated by developments inextended ®sheries jurisdiction. In a number ofcases, therefore, the limits to growth had beenreached in advance of the NEM.

(b) Size concentration and ownership

The composition of the regionÕs ®shing ¯eetsvaried considerably before the NEM reforms,and the e�ect of the NEM on the size of boatshas been mixed. Concentration ratios presentedin Table 3 show that the dominance of largeboats in national ¯eets increased in mostcountries between 1970 and adoption of theNEM, with this increase being quite large insome cases. In the period between the NEMreforms and 1995 there was little change inconcentration ratios in most countries. Theratio increased slightly in Mexico, Venezuela,Uruguay, and Argentina, decreasing in Guate-mala, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.The only countries exhibiting a sharp increasein ¯eet concentration after adoption of theNEM were Chile and ColombiaÐthe twocountries with rapid ¯eet growth in this period.

As might be expected, given its long record ofindustrial ®sheries development, concentrationis particularly evident in Peru. The lack ofevidence of changes in size concentration sincethe adoption of the NEM is almost certainlyrelated to the longevity of ®shing capital. For


most ®rms, it will not have been worthwhile toreplace older but economically viable boats inthe short time between the introduction ofNEM policies and 1995.

In Chile, on the other hand, NEM-typeincentives have been in operation for over 20years. Here, with the number of ®shing vesselsexceeding 500 GRT increasing from three in1975 to 142 by 1995 (FAO, 1998), 9 sizeconcentration went hand-in-hand with owner-ship concentration (Pe~na-Torres, 1996, pp. 76±82; 1997, pp. 259±262). The main bene®ciary of¯eet privatisation was the Angelini conglom-erate. Through buying four enterprises fromthe state, it came to account for around 55±60%of Northern industrial ¯eet landings during thelate 1970s. The group maintained its share ofthe catch in the 1980s, buying-out the Tocopillacompany in 1984, Guanaye in 1985, and PuntaAngamos in 1989. In August 1999 it formed theConsorcio Pesquero del Norte with its nearestcompetitor, the Coloso company, anotherproduct of the 1974 privatization program. Theconsortium, which accounts for about 80% oflandings in the Northern Zone, intends torestructure its operations to restore pro®t levelsin the ®shery (Fish Information Services, Sea-World, September 1, 1999).

Foreign investment was also attracted intothe sector, although outright foreign ownershipis precluded by the countryÕs NavigationLaw. 10 Consequently, joint ventures haveproliferated, most particularly with Japanese

companies but also with interests from Iceland,New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Chinaand the Ukraine (Weidner & Hall, 1993).

Elsewhere in the region, increased ownershipconcentration is rather more di�cult todiscern. While the Argentine and Uruguayantrawl ®sheries have long been dominated bylarge vessels, there has been a tendency forvessel sizes to increase since the introductionof the NEM as new factory and freezer vesselshave been incorporated into the ¯eet. Thesedevelopments not only spawned increasedcon¯ict, but also pushed many long-estab-lished vertically integrated Argentine ®shingcompanies close to bankruptcy (Weidner &Hall, 1993, p. 264). Nonetheless, ownershipremains highly fragmented. 11 Foreigninvolvement in the sector has also noticeablyincreased, with Spanish, Japanese, Korean andTaiwanese companies entering into jointventures in accordance with the 1992 leasingscheme.

Peru has also permitted ®rms to lease orcharter foreign vessels (Fisheries Law 1992,Article 48), although this is not re¯ected in thestatistics on ¯eet growth and concentration asthese vessels need not be transferred to Peru-vian registration for ®ve years. The legislation,seen as the most attractive ever o�ered toforeign ®rms (Weidner & Hall, 1993, p. 451),has also encouraged direct foreign invest-ment, 12 although the dollar value of suchinvestment remains unquanti®ed.

Table 3. The Latin American ®shing ¯eet (decked vessels): concentration by GRT a ;b

Concentration in 1970 Concentration at NEM date Concentration in 1995

Chile 0.234 0.241 0.517Colombia 0.356 0.330 0.526Uruguay 0.813 0.864 0.891Venezuela 0.354 0.431 0.458Mexico 0.250 0.335 0.357Argentina 0.518 0.681 0.697Honduras 0.161 0.150 0.155Peru 0.663 0.822 0.825El Salvador 0.016 0.134 0.136Brazil 0.267 0.283 0.284Nicaragua 0.148 0.387 0.379Costa Rica ± 0.745 0.704Ecuador 0.403 0.500 0.443Guatemala 0.092 0.468 0.401Panama 0.475 ± 0.577

a Sources: FAO (1998) and personal communications.b Concentration ratios calculated in accordance with the class method recommended by Yao and Lui (1996).Concentration ratios across the region are not strictly comparable, as only Costa Rica, Peru and Uruguay recorddecked vessels of less than 5 GRT in their annual FAO returns, and El Salvador does not record vessels of less than25 GRT.


The situation is similar elsewhere. Largertrawlers, purse seiners, long-liners and ®shcarriers are recruited into the ®sheries,encouraged by liberal NEM policies towardinward investment. 13

5. NEW FISHERIES CONFLICTS

Although con¯ict may be endemic to ®sheriesdevelopment, NEM policies have contributedto the emergence of new ®sheries con¯icts,although we limit ourselves to discussing threeof the forms of con¯ict identi®ed by Charles(1992). The ®rst highlights the jurisdictionalcon¯icts arising from the removal of historic®shing rights in MexicoÕs shrimp ®sheries. Thesecond considers enforcement con¯icts in theemerging Chilean Patagonian tooth®sh ®shery.Finally, we examine interest group con¯ict inArgentina, focusing upon the hubbsi hake®shery.

(a) Jurisdiction con¯icts in Mexico

The ultimate source of con¯ict in most ®sh-eries is the absence of clearly de®ned rights.Recent con¯ict in MexicoÕs Paci®c coast shrimp®sheries, in contrast, is attributable to theremoval of the clearly de®ned exclusive ®shingrights historically possessed by cooperatives.The con¯ict emerged in 1990 when the MexicanCooperative Confederation reluctantly agreedto a reform of the shrimp ®sheries proposed bythe Ministry of Fisheries (SEMARNAP),which would ensure the ``best conditions ofcoexistence between cooperatives and theprivate sector'' (SEMARNAP, 1990, pp. 39±43). In return for the promise of funds torecapitalize ailing Paci®c shrimp coopera-tives, 14 the Confederation was required tolimit participation to its 1990 level and accept``privateers'' into the ®shery. This paved theway for the 1992 Fisheries Law to abolish thecooperativesÕ exclusive rights, replacing themwith a system of transferable permits andconcessions open to cooperatives and priva-teers alike. Private entrepreneurs quicklybought up antiquated cooperative vessels toacquire their permits. 15 Subsequent modern-ization or replacement of vessels heightenedpressures on o�shore shrimp stocks. Con¯ictwas exacerbated following the collapse of thepeso in 1994±95 as large numbers of unregu-lated ``free ®shermen'' entered the inshoreshrimp ®sheries, attracted by the potential of

harvesting a stock primarily destined for theexport market.

In September 1996, the private sector pres-sure group CANAINPES (the Chamber of theFishing Industry) withheld payments to thegovernment enforcement agency PROFEPA inprotest at its failure to prevent inshore ®sher-men from illegally operating beyond the ®ve-mile coastal zone in Sinaloa and Sonora. Whileinshore ®shermen openly accepted that theywere breaking the 1992 Law by ®shing outsidethe ®ve-mile zone, they argued that they hadfew realistic alternative employment opportu-nities. Low catches during 1998 led to escalat-ing violence with no obvious acceptablesolution for all parties. McGoodwinÕs (1987,p. 231) prescription for reducing con¯ict inthe inshore shrimp ®sheriesÐreducing shrimpexports and improving local and regionaldomestic shrimp marketsÐcontradicts theobjectives of the NEM regime. V�asquez Le�onÕs(1994, p. 79) recommendationÐco-manage-ment with the active participation of coopera-tives, private ®rms and government o�cialsÐisechoed in o�cial policy, as SEMARNAPencourages meetings of participants to try andgain local support for proposed ®sheryclosures. Nonetheless, complete reconciliationis likely to prove problematic and/or costly asthe re-allocation of rights has, by encouragingnew stakeholders into the ®shery, reduced thelikelihood of a mutually agreeable negotiatedsettlement.

(b) Enforcement con¯icts in Chile

In Chile, NEM policies not only inducedover®shing of traditional demersal ®sh stocks(Schurman, 1996; Ecoceanos, 1998, p. 3), butstimulated the development of new commercial®sheries. Over®shing and con¯ict quicklyemerged in these new ®sheries due to regulatoryand/or enforcement failures, as in ChileÕsPatagonian tooth®sh ®shery which straddlesthe Chilean EEZ, the Antarctic region andinternational waters. Recognition of thespeciesÕ commercial value led to the establish-ment of a ``research ®shery'' within the ChileanEEZ between August 1991 and July 1992. Its®ndings saw the government auction o� a 4,500mt TAC to 11 operators in December 1992.This was raised to 6,500 mt in 1993, a subse-quent government resolution allowing Chilean¯agged vessels to land an additional 3,350 mtfrom the region protected by the Conventionfor the Conservation of Antarctic Marine


Living Resources (CCAMLR). Chilean vessels,however, harvested more than double theestablished quota from 1992±95 due to fourfactors.

First, there was a scarcity of alternativespecies. The collapse of the southern hake andpink cusk eel ®sheries, traditional targets forthe Chilean southern ¯eet in the early 1990s,encouraged boats to transfer to the tooth®sh®shery. Second, the ®shery o�ered considerable®nancial returns: Ecoceanos (1998, p. 8) esti-mated that each clandestine 45±60 day ®shingtrip could yield pro®ts of US$3 million. Third,there was regulatory failure. As vessels were notobliged to carry an onboard monitoringsystem, skippers could declare that theircatches were taken in international waters.Finally, there was enforcement failure as Chil-ean courts refused to take punitive actionagainst Chilean registered vessels caught ille-gally ®shing in the CCAMLR area. 16

Local enforcement improved after the Fish-eries Secretariat insisted that monitoring devi-ces be installed from June 1993. This had twoe�ects. First, it encouraged vessels to relocateto Uruguay or Argentina, where tooth®shquotas were not set until 1995, to avoid pros-ecution by the Chilean authorities. Second, itencouraged marginal ®rms to leave the ®shery,concentrating ownership of quotas for Pata-gonian tooth®sh within the Chilean EEZamong seven companies, the main purchaserPesca Chile acquiring 33.8% of the 1997 quota(ISOFISH, 1999, p. 60). Con¯ict has resulted asother companies, most notably the RobertoVerdugo Gormaz group, challenged thispreeminence. Although Verdugo Gormaz, theFisheries Undersecretary during the early1980s, had participated in opening up the ®sh-ery, his companies had largely forsaken tooth-®sh ®shing in favor of controlling the morelucrative export processing trade. 17 But, astighter regulations reduced opportunities tobuy illegally landed tooth®sh, the groupattempted to register two boats in the ®shery.Its application was initially rejected by theFisheries Secretariat in early 1996 because theboats had been deployed outside Chile for morethan a year, but the ruling was overturned bythe Supreme Court in April 1997. Despite thisvictory, Verdugo Gormaz maintains that threeof ChileÕs largest ®shing companies (PescaChile, Emdepes and Friosur) exploited politicalcontacts to obtain strategic information andpreferential access to tooth®sh quotas(ISOFISH, 1999, p. 31).

This example indicates some of the di�cul-ties in managing a dynamic industry in which®rms are more mobile than their regulators. Insurveying ChileÕs ®sheries management policies,Christy identi®ed ``ine�ectual monitoringsurveillance and implementation of regulatorymeasures [and] lack of infrastructure andpersonnel'' (Christy, 1997, p. 81) as the mainproblems. Adopting ITQs, whatever theoutcome of current debates, will increase theburden of enforcement without increasingmanagement resources, and seems unlikelyto halt the emergence of con¯ict within new®sheries.

(c) Interest group con¯ict in Argentina

Powerful vested interests emerged in Argen-tinaÕs ®shing industry between 1992 and thepassing of the 1997 Fishing Law, most notablyin the hubbsi hake ®shery. While catchespeaked at 574,000 mt in 1995, continuedconcerns over the underlying resource stock®nally persuaded the government to address theissue in 1997. An informal accord between thegovernment and industry representatives inMay which agreed to a 20% reduction in theannual catch proved ine�ectual, and wassuperceded by the new Federal Fisheries Law inNovember 1997. This quickly encounteredopposition. CedePesca, the Center for Defenseof Ports and the National Fishery, opposedArticle 27 of the new Law as it established hakequotas for each vessel on the basis of averagecatches between 1989 and December 1996.They were supported by CAABPA, theAssociation of Highseas Fishermen, whocomplained that the Law discriminated in favorof the large factory and freezer vessels that hadentered the ¯eet following the 1992 ExecutiveDegree and the 1993 EU agreement. CaPeCa,the Freezer Vessel Owners Association, on theother hand, argued that the law simply insti-tutionalized ine�ciency as it prohibited futurequota transfers between refrigerated and free-zer vessels.

Tensions rose in late August 1998 whenEduardo Auguste, a former President ofCaPeCa, was appointed Fisheries Undersecre-tary. Although his appointment was backed byCaPeCa and CAPIP (the Patagonian IndustrialFishermenÕs Association), CedePesca ques-tioned the wisdom of letting ``the fox managethe hen-house'' (Fish Information Services,Sea-World, August 31, 1998). Tensions easedfollowing a series of meetings between the


industry and o�cials in September when the300,000 mt TAC set for 1997±98 was with-drawn and rules were agreed governing ®shinguntil the end of the year. A month later,however, the Federal Fisheries CouncilÕs deci-sion to ban freezer and refrigerated vessels fromthe ®shery for a month angered the CAPIP,CaPeCA and the Argentine Fishing CompanyCouncil (CEPA). As the ban took e�ect, theFederal Fisheries Council met to determinehake quotas for the next year. Its mainproposalsÐITQs equivalent to half of eachvesselÕs declared 1997 landings, plus partiallysegregated ®shing groundsÐgarnered littlesupport (Federal Fisheries Council, 1998). Itwas rejected by CaPeCa because it relegatedfreezer vessels to the poorest ®shing grounds.CedePesca and CAABPA complained that thisdecision would give the freezer ¯eet 54% of theTAC as against 38% under Article 27 of theFederal Fishing Law (CeDePesca, 1998).Nonetheless, the proposals became law onJanuary 14, 1999. The controversy shows nosigns of abating, however. CaPeCa lodged anappeal with the Federal Fisheries Council thefollowing month, while the Fisheries Directorof the European Commission and the BuenosAires and Chubut Provincial Fisheries Councilshave argued that it discriminated against theirinterests. The situation has deteriorated furthersince the ending of the EU agreement in May1999 and the imposition of a hake ban thefollowing month. Currently, Argentine ®rmsand those engaged in joint ventures with EU®rms are pressing their respective cases foraccess to remaining resources, ensuring that®sheries policy ®gured in the October 1999presidential election.

This form of con¯ict, between interest groupsand the state over the design and implementa-tion of ®sheries management, has been inten-si®ed by the emergence of powerful new ®rmsand interest groups. This is not unique toArgentina: Pe~na Torres (1997, pp. 265±266)identi®es a similar process of ``regulatorycapture'' in Chile during the passage of the1991 Law. As long as NEM policies encouragethe growth of large ®rms, however, suchcon¯icts seem likely to become more wide-spread.

6. CONCLUSION

This paper has explored the relationshipbetween the NEM in Latin America and the

commercial marine ®shing industries. It is arelationship that justi®es further investigation,not only because of the importance of ®shingwithin the region, but because of the regionÕscontribution to world ®sheries production andtrade. Although it is too early to appreciate thefull impact of the NEM upon the sector inmany countries, certain common patterns inthe process of adjustment are discernible.

It is clear that commercial ®sheries do notadjust smoothly to rapid structural adjustmentas ®rms are unable to respond quickly tosudden changes in market signals and leave theindustry. Yet the pace of reform has been swift.State-owned ®rms have been privatized, privi-leges withdrawn, and new regulations intro-duced. These changes have had profounddistributional consequences, with large ®rmsappearing to have bene®ted most from NEMincentives, particularly in those instances wherethey have allied with foreign capital. Theirgrowing in¯uence has been a feature of theNEM period, and will most likely result inmore intense con¯ict with managementauthorities in the future. Small-scale producershave not been bene®ciaries of the NEMreforms, and manyÐsuch as the ®shing coop-eratives in MexicoÐhave seen what littlesecurity they enjoyed under earlier regimesdisappear.

It is also evident that the conduct andmanagement of ®sheries under the NEM hasnot materially reduced the outstanding prob-lems of over®shing, overcapitalization andcon¯ict. In certain respects, these problemshave worsened. This is not, perhaps, surprising.The logic of privatization and deregulation,that market signals direct resources towardtheir best use, is at best dubious in a commonproperty resource industry. NEM policiesclearly recognized the importance of well-de®ned private property rights in agricultureand forestry. The failure to extend this logic tomarine ®sheries was a serious error. It is clearthat the failure to ``privatize the commons'' wasmore signi®cant than the privatization of state-owned ®shing companies. Recent e�orts in theregionÕs major ®shing countries to introduceITQs might be regarded as tacit acceptance ofthe earlier oversight.

In the long run, the transition to a system of®sheries management based upon clearlyde®ned rights should be the goal of LatinAmerican states. This will not, however, resolvethe sectorÕs problems in the short- to medium-term, and will mostly likely exacerbate them.


Governments must therefore persuade theindustryÕs powerful new interest groups thatthey will bene®t from such a regime. Ifgovernments are to enforce the discipline ofproperty rights they must acquire greatermanagement resources and expertise, which arealready scarce. Most importantly, though,

governments must recognize that con¯icts areindicators of the need to make new tradeo�sbetween competing management goals. Thisrequires a greater understanding of the distrib-utional consequences of ®sheries developmentpolicies, and consequently a greater apprecia-tion of the impact of the NEM on the sector.

NOTES

1. Fishing e�ort is a composite measure of the

productive inputs in a ®shery, de®ning capital and

labor, technical e�ciency, etc. As we do not attempt to

measure ®shing e�ort, we use the term in its simplest

sense. Accordingly, an increase in e�ort may describe an

increase in the number or size of boats, an improvement

in their e�ciency due to technological change, or simply

their more intensive use by ®rms.

2. For an explanation of why over®shing occurs at this

equilibrium, see Hannesson (1993).

3. The history of Latin American maritime jurisdiction

is dealt with succinctly in Orrego Vicu~na (1984, 1995)

and Paolillo (1995).

4. Foreign vessels were initially restricted to Southern

Chile and were gradually excluded as the Chilean

industry grew. A small number of foreign factory ships

were allowed into the hake ®shery after a ``naturaliza-

tion'' process (Weidner & Hall, 1993, p. 322).

5. A 1982 loan, the IDBÕs biggest ever credit to the

sector, injected US$32.9 million into Chile's industrial

®sheries, and US$13.5 million into the artisanal ®sheries

(Christy, 1996, p. 25).

6. This regulation currently applies only in the squid

®shery, where the main permit buyers are Japanese and

South Korean ®rms.

7. Growth was not restricted to the industrial ¯eet.

Schurman (1996, p. 1699) documents the growth in the

number of artisanal launches in Region VIIs Southern

hake ®shery during 1979±89.

8. Legislation following the collapse of the anchovy

®sheries favored state-owned ®rms in the ®sh meal

business, leaving food production to the private sector.

9. Chilean companies acquired vessels from Europe,

North America and other Latin American countries

when local shipbuilders were unable to deliver due to

excessive demand (Weidner & Hall, 1993, p. 311).

10. The law requires a Chilean majority shareholding

in all Chilean-¯agged vessels.

11. The two largest ®shing companies had a turnover

in 1997 in excess of US$40 million, followed by 11 ®rms

of between US$30 million and US$40 million, and a

further 10 with turnovers of US$20±30 million (Argen-

tina Business, December 9, 1998).

12. In this instance, by French, Russian, Korean and

Spanish companies.

13. Other examples of post-NEM foreign investment in

the region include: the re-¯agging of Spanish tuna boats

in Costa Rica, investment in Nicaraguan shell®sh

®sheries by Norwegian ®rms, Spanish±Venezuelan joint

ventures, and Taiwanese and US participation in

Uruguayan ®sheries (Fish Information Services, Sea-

World, various issues).

14. The government rescued 94 cooperatives with

outstanding debts of 264.7 million pesos in 1992

(SEMARNAP, 1996, p. 40).

15. Permits were granted on an individual basis. Nadal

Egea (1996, p. 359) suggests that as indebtedness

prevented cooperative boats from ®shing normally

during 1991±92, permits could be acquired cheaply.

16. The United Kingdom is especially active in appre-

hending transgressors in the CCAMLR region, but

Argentine and Chilean courts do not recognize the UKÕsactions due to the Falklands/Malvinas sovereignty

dispute (ISOFISH, 1999, p. 24).

17. Verdugo Gormaz purchased 5% of the original

tooth®sh quota in 1993, this increasing to 10% in the

1997 auctions. But the group dominates the frozen

tooth®sh trade, accounting for 62.1% of 1997 exports

(ISOFISH, 1999, pp. 31, 69).


REFERENCES

Anon. (1998). Squawking like a wild fowl. Samudra, 20,3±7.

Appleyard, W. P. (1973). Peru: a case study in theestablishment of a food ®sh industry for a developingcountry. Journal of the Fisheries Research Board ofCanada, 30, 2236±2241.

Argentina Business, December 9, 1998.Bailey, C., & Jentoft, S. (1990). Hard choices in ®sheries

development. Marine Policy, 14, 333±344.Bermudez, A., & Aguero, M. (1994). Socioeconomic

research on ®sheries and aquaculture in LatinAmerica. In A. T. Charles, T. P. Brainerd, A.Bermudez, H. M. Montalvo & R. S. Pomeroy,Fisheries socioeconomics in the developing world.Ottawa: IRDC.

Boerema, L. K., & Gulland, J. A. (1973). Stockassessment of the peruvian anchovy (Engraulisringens) and management of the ®shery. Journal ofthe Fisheries Research Board of Canada, 30, 2226±2235.

Caviedes, N., & Fik, T. J. (1993). Modeling change inthe Peruvian±Chilean Eastern Paci®c ®sheries.Geojournal, 30, 369±380.

CedePesca (1998). Resoluciones del consejo federalpesquero Mar del Plata, December 16.

Charles, A. T. (1992). Fishery con¯icts: a uni®edframework. Marine Policy, 16, 379±393.

Christy, F. T. (1996). The development and managementof marine ®sheries in Latin America and the Carib-bean. Policy Research Paper, Inter-American Devel-opment Bank, Washington, DC.

Conroy, M., Murray, D., & Rosset, P. (1994). Fruits ofthe crisis: gambling on nontraditional agriculture.Austin: University of Texas Press.

Csirke, J. (1980). Recruitment in the Peruvian anchovyand its dependence on the adult population. ICESRapports et Proc�es-Verbaux des R�eunions, 177, 307±313.

Cunningham, S. (1994). FishermenÕs incomes and ®sh-eries management. Marine Resource Economics, 9,241±252.

de Andrade, R. (1999). Fisheries disputes in LatinAmerica. Cepal Environmental and DevelopmentSeries Working Paper, 5, CEPAL, Santiago, Chile.

de G. Gri�th, D., Troadec, J-P., Gumy, A., Lupin,H. M., Aguero, M., Boeuf, G., & Huss, H. H. (1991).Fisheries and aquaculture research capabilities andneeds in Latin America: studies of Uruguay, Argen-tina, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. World Bank Techni-cal Paper (Fisheries Series), 148, World Bank,Washington, DC.

Ecoceanos (1998). Chilean and Argentinean companies/individuals involved in the patagonian tooth®sh ®sheryand trade in the southern ocean. Consultancy forAustral Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) andInternational Southern Oceans Long-line FisheriesInformation (ISOFISH). Valparaiso, Chile.

Feder, G., & Feeny, D. (1991). Land tenure andproperty rights: theory and implications. Develop-ment policy. World Bank Economic Review, 5, 135±153.

FAO (1997a). Review of the state of world ®sheryresources: marine ®sheries. FAO, Rome.

FAO (1997). Yearbook of ®sheries statistics: catches andlandings. FAO, Rome.

FAO (1998). Bulletin of ®sheries statistics: ®shery ¯eetstatistics 35. FAO, Rome.

FAO/World Bank (1988). Mexico: ®shery sector review.FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program, Rome.

Federal Fisheries Council, Argentina (1998). Cuoti®-caci�on, Acta 14/98 Consejo Federal Pesquero.

Fish Information Services, Sea-World, http://www.sea-world.com.

Fishing News International (1998). Peru ending race to®sh, p. 31.

Garramon, C. et al. (1988). Ajuste macroecon�omico ysector agropecuario en Am�erica Latina. IICA, BuenosAires.

Hannesson, R. (1993). Bioeconomic analysis of ®sheries.Oxford: Fishing News Books.

IDB (1996). Economic and social progress report 1996IDB, Washington, DC.

ISOFISH (1999). The Chilean ®shing industry: itsinvolvement in and connections to the illegal,unreported and unregulated exploitation of patago-nian tooth®sh. The Southern Ocean, OccasionalReport, 2.

Marine Fisheries Review (1989). Argentine±Soviet Fish-ery relations reviewed 1966±88, 51 (2), 55±68.

Marine Fisheries Review (1981). Peruvian ®shery devel-opments 1980±1, 43 (7), 27±8.

McGoodwin, J. R. (1987). MexicoÕs con¯ictual inshorepaci®c ®sheries: problem analysis and policy recom-mendations. Human Organization, 46, 221±232.

Nadal Egea, A. (1996). Esfuerzo y captura el colegio deM�exico, M�exico.

OECD (1997). Towards sustainable ®sheries: economicaspects of the management of living marine resources.Paris: OECD.

Orrego Vicu~na, F. (1984). The exclusive economic zone: aLatin American perspective. Westview: Boulder.

Orrego Vicu~na, F. (1995). Trends and issues in the law ofthe sea as applied in Latin America. Ocean Develop-ment and International Law, 26, 93±103.

Paolillo, F. (1995). The exclusive economic zone in LatinAmerican practice and legislation. Ocean Develop-ment and International Law, 26, 105±125.

Pe~na Torres, J. (1996). Economic analysis of marineindustrial ®sheries. Ph.D. dissertation, Queen Maryand West®eld College, University of London.

Pe~na-Torres, J. (1997). The political economy of ®shingregulation: the case of chile. Marine ResourceEconomics, 12, 253±280.

Roemer, M. (1970). Fishing for growth: export-leddevelopment in Peru, 1950±1967. Cambridge MA:Harvard University Press.

Schurman, R. A. (1996). Snails, southern hake andsustainability: neo-liberalism and natural resourceexports in Chile. World Development, 24, 1695±1709.

SEMARNAP (1990). Reuni®caci�on del sector coopera-tivo pesquero SEMARNAP, M�exico D.F.


SEMARNAP (1996). Programa de pesca y acuacultura1995-2000 SEMARNAP, M�exico D.F.

SEMARNAP (1997). Anuario estadistico de pesca 1996SEMARNAP, M�exico D.F.

Silva, E. (1997). The politics of sustainable development:native forest policy in Chile, Venezuela, Costa Ricaand Mexico. Journal of Latin American Studies, 29,457±493.

Smith, C. L. (1980). Management provoked con¯ict in®sheries. Environmental Management, 4, 7±11.

Stan®eld, D. (1990). Impacto del proyecto de titulaci�on detierras sobre el mercado de tierras en comunidadesrurales. INA Seminar, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, April.

Thrupp, L. A. (1994). Challenges in Latin America'srecent agro-export boom: sustainability and equity innontraditional export policies in Ecuador. WorldResources Institute, Washington, DC.

Trejos, R. (1992). Ajuste macroecon�omico y pobreza ruralen Am�erica Latina. IICA, San Jose, Costa Rica.

V�asquez Le�on, M. (1994). Avoidance strategies andgovernmental rigidity: the case of the small-scaleshrimp ®shery in two Mexican communities. Journalof Political Ecology, 1, 67±81.

V�asquez Le�on, M., & McGuire, T. R. (1993). Lainiciativa privada in the Mexican shrimp industry.Maritime Anthropological Studies, 6, 59±73.

Weeks, J. (1995). Structural adjustment and the agricul-tural sector in Latin America and the Caribbean.Basingstoke: ILAS/Macmillan.

Weidner, D., & Hall, D. (1993). World ®shing ¯eet: ananalysis of distant-water operations, past-present-future: vol. 4, Latin America. O�ce of InternationalFisheries, National Marine Fisheries Service, U.S.Department of Commerce, Silver Spring, Maryland.

World Fish Reports (various issues).Yao, S., & Lui, J. (1996). Decomposition of gini

coe�cients by class: a new approach. AppliedEconomics Letters, 3, 115±119.


the new economic model and marine fisheries development in latin america

Documents