THESTANDARDOFCIVILISATIONINHISTORICALANDCONTEMPORARYINTERNATIONALRELATIONS:THECASEOFEASTTIMOR

AthesissubmittedinfulfilmentoftherequirementsfortheDegreeofMasterofArtsinPoliticalScience

attheUniversityofCanterbury

ByAimeeAdams

August2016

AcknowledgementsIhavebeenincrediblyluckytoreceiveimmensesupport,guidance,andencouragementwhilewritingthisthesis.Firstly,IwouldliketoexpressmygratitudetomysupervisorDr.JeremyMoses.Thanksforyourpatience,feedback,andyourclearadvice.Iamindebtedtoyoursuperspeedyturnaroundsonearlieriterationsofthiswork!WithoutwhichIwouldnothavebeenable to submit this thesis. I would also like to thank the administration staff from theDepartmentofPoliticalScienceandInternationalRelations,particularlythesuperstarsthatareJillDolbyandRochelleBloy.Iwouldnothavebeenabletogetthisthesisoverthelinewithoutthefriendshipandsupportofmy fellow students in the Locke building, thanks guys! Terribly nerdy political sciencediscussions and hilarious conversations about things that should not be mentioned in apublicly availabledocumentmade the longhours in theoffice soworth it. I alsoneed toacknowledgethepatienceandsupportoffriendsoutsideoftheuniversity,whohaveputupwithmy hermit-like behaviour, particularly in the last couple ofmonths. A bigmonth ofcelebrationisahead!Thebiggestthanksofallneedstogotomyloudestcheerleaders,myfamily.Icouldnothavedonethiswithoutyourunwaveringsupport.Loveyou!Last,butnot least,PedroandZeppelin. Yourhappy facesandwagging tails at theendofcrappywritingdayshelpedimmensely.

Abstract

The standard of civilisation has been prominent in both historical and contemporaryinternationalrelationstheoryanddiscourse.Thepracticesassociatedwithithaveresultedinamultidisciplinaryfieldofresearchthatexaminesthecausesandconsequencesofdividingtheworld intodistinctcategoriesofcivilisationalstatus,wherebypeopleandsocietiesarejudgedtobeeither‘civilised’or‘uncivilised’.

Theconquestandcolonisationofthenon-Europeanworldreliedheavilyontheuseofcivilisational language. During this time, ‘civilised’ nations used force and violence topurportedlyteachandnurturethe‘uncivilisedbarbarians.’Whilethispracticewasarguedtobe underpinned by humanitarianism, moral responsibility, and universal values, it oftenmisrepresentedwhatwastrulyhappeninginthecolonies,inwhichviolence,exploitation,andculturaldislocationwasstandardpractice.

The thesis intends to bring renewed attention to the dangers of employingcivilisationalpracticeandlanguageincontemporaryinternationalrelations.Itwillexploretheevolutionoftheconceptacrosstime,inordertodiscernhowcivilisationallanguagecanshapetheunderstandingofpermissibleactionsagainstpeople,andinparticular,howviolenceandinterventionislegitimised.ThethesisthenconsiderswhetherthestandardofcivilisationhasbeenemployedinthecontextofanumberofinterventionsinthecountryofEastTimor.

ThethesisconcludesthatthecaseofEastTimorindicatesthatcivilisationallanguageanditsassociated practices continue to exist in contemporary international relations. Theperpetuation of the practice of the standard of civilisation generates destructiveconsequencesforthestatesitiswieldedagainstandforthewiderinternationalcommunity.

TableofContents

Introduction..................................................................................................................................1Methodology..........................................................................................................................................3

HistoricalAnalysis..............................................................................................................................3DiscourseAnalysis..............................................................................................................................3ClassicalRealism................................................................................................................................4CaseStudy:EastTimor.......................................................................................................................5

StructureoftheThesis...........................................................................................................................6

ChapterOne:DiscourseonIntervention,ColonisationandtheStandardofCivilisation...........8PopeInnocentIV:TheStatusandRightsofInfidels...............................................................................8ConquestoftheNewWorld.................................................................................................................11FranciscodeVitoria:TheLawofNations.............................................................................................13PeaceofWestphalia:Sovereignty,ButNotforAll...............................................................................16EnlightenmentEra:TrueUniversalPrinciples?OrJustforthePrivilegedFew....................................18TheExceptionstothe‘Universal’Principles........................................................................................19TheCivilisingRoleofEuropeans:ACursoryNodtoEnlightenmentPrinciples....................................20RealityofCivilisingMissions:TrailsofBrutality,Exploitation,andCulturalDislocation......................21JohnStuartMill:Non-Intervention,withExceptions...........................................................................23Conclusion............................................................................................................................................26

ChapterTwo:TheChangingFacesoftheCivilisedandtheBarbarians....................................28JohnA.Hobson:The‘Parasitic’Civilised..............................................................................................28WorldWarOne:BarbariansontheInside...........................................................................................30WilsonianIdealismandtheLeagueofNations....................................................................................32TheLeagueofNationsMandateSystem..............................................................................................34

Table1.TheLeagueofNationsMandateTerritories.....................................................................35WorldWarTwo:BarbariansontheInside,Again................................................................................38TheUnitedNations:UniversalRightsforAll?......................................................................................40TheUnitedNationsTrusteeshipSystem..............................................................................................40

Table2.TheUnitedNationsTrustTerritories................................................................................42Conclusion............................................................................................................................................43

ChapterThree:TheDangersofMoralUniversalism:AClassicalRealistCritique....................45E.HCarr:AReactionAgainsttheWish-DreamsoftheInitialStage.....................................................46CarlSchmitt:Humanity,theFavouriteToolofImperialExpansion.....................................................50HansMorgenthau:TheMessianicFervouroftheMoralCode............................................................52Conclusion............................................................................................................................................54

ChapterFour:TheStandardofCivilisationandEastTimor.......................................................57TheFirstWaveofIntervention:PortugueseColonialism.....................................................................57DecolonisationorRecolonisation?.......................................................................................................62IndonesianInvasion.............................................................................................................................65Indonesia’sViolentRecolonisationofEastTimor................................................................................67InternationalResponse:DistancingPoliciesusingCivilisationalLanguage..........................................68StateSelf-InterestReignsSupreme......................................................................................................72TheMassacreatSantaCruz.................................................................................................................74ChangetotheIndonesianPosition:IndependenceatLast?................................................................76Bloodshedand‘Chaos’inEastTimor...................................................................................................76INTERFET:EntertheEnlightenedCivilisers..........................................................................................78UNTAET:TheKingofEastTimor..........................................................................................................82TheUN’sCrisisofLegitimacy...............................................................................................................84

Conclusion............................................................................................................................................87

Conclusion...................................................................................................................................90

Bibliography................................................................................................................................95

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Introduction

Thestandardofcivilisationisatermwhichhasbeenusedtobothdescribeandrationalisethepractice of dividing theworld into distinct categories of civilisational status,whereby the‘inherent’differencesinpeopleandsocietiesultimately leadstotheclassificationofbeingeither ‘civilised’ or ‘uncivilised.’ The practices associated with it have resulted in amultidisciplinaryfieldofresearchwhichexaminesthecausesandconsequencesofdividingtheworldintodistinctcategoriesofcivilisationalstatus.Thisthesissetsouttoexaminethediscourse on the standard of civilisation in historical international relations, through anexplorationofthehypothesisthatcontemporarymilitaryinterventioncontinuestoemploycivilisationallanguagetojustifyandlegitimiseviolenceandforce.

It is in this context that this thesiswill analysehowandwhy thediscourseon thestandardofcivilisationisusedinhistoricalandcontemporaryinternationalrelations,withaparticularfocusonmultipleinterventionsinEastTimor.1Indoingso,itwilladdressanumberofkeyquestions:Whoaredeemedtobethecivilised?Whoaredeemeduncivilised?Howarethesedistinctionsmeasuredordetermined?Howandwhydothesedistinctionschangeovertime?Whatroledoesidentityformationplayincivilisationaldiscourse?Whyisdiscourseonthestandardofcivilisationemployedbyactorsininternationalrelations?Andtowhateffect?Mostcritically,thisthesiswillexplorehowthecastingofpeopleintermsofcivilisationshapestheunderstandingofpermissibleactionsagainstthem.Thefindingofthisthesisisthatthecivilisational practices and language conducted by western European nations duringcolonisationare,indeed,reproducedincontemporaryinternationalrelations.

The standard of civilisation is a concept which has been described as “theassumptions,tacitandexplicit,usedtodistinguishthosethatbelongtoaparticularsocietyfromthosethatdonot.”2Civilisationaldiscoursehasbeenemployedthroughouthistorytoprovidetherationaleforvariousformsofdomination,exploitationandviolentactionsagainstthose people determined to be on the ‘outside’ of civilised international society. ThisdiscoursetendstopositionwesternEuropeancountries(andlatertheirsettlercolonies)astheenlightenedandadvancednations.Conductbetweenthesenationswouldbegovernedby the principle of equality, supported by international law. In this regard, an equalcommunityofnationswascreatedamongcivilisedpeoples,andaggressivewarandconquestagainsteachotherwasruledout.

1ThenameofthecountrywasofficiallychangedtotheDemocraticRepublicofTimor-LestewhenitgainedofficialindependencestatusinMay2002.Inthisstudy,thecountryisreferredtoasEastTimorintheperiodpriortoitachievingofficial independence.Wheneventsarediscussedpost-independence, thecountry is referred toasTimor-Leste.2GerritGong,TheStandardof‘Civilisation’inInternationalSociety(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1984),3.

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Whileontheperipheryoftheinternationalsystem,theuncivilisedwerenotaffordedprotectionfromtheconqueringandcolonialambitionsofthecivilisedstates.Thediscourseon the standardof civilisation is inextricablybound toprocessesof colonialisation, in thisregard.Colonialismbeganinthefifteenthcentury,duringtheAgeofDiscovery,andhas itoriginsinthePortugueseandSpanishdiscoveriesoftheso-called‘NewWorld.’DuringthisAgeofDiscovery,andthecolonialisationofthenon-Europeanworldwhichfollowed,westernEuropeanmonarchiesandstatesemployedtheuseofcivilisationallanguageinordertojustifyand legitimise their violent pacification and domination of indigenous societies. Thislanguage,which included labelling the ‘uncivilised’asanimals,barbarians,andsubhuman,hadtheimpactofexcludinganddiscipliningpeoplesandsocietiesunderstoodas‘differentand alien.’ Largely justified by the natural law theorising of medieval and discovery-eratheorists,thislanguageattemptedtogivenormativeandlegalunderpinningstotheviolentinterventionsinthenon-Europeanworld.

ThisthesisadoptsthedefinitionofcolonialismasoutlinedbyGermanhistorianJürgenOsterhammel.AccordingtoOsterhammel,colonialismisarelationshipofdominationwhichoccurs between aminority of foreign invaders against an indigenousmajority.3 From thisperspective,mostdecisionswhichaffectthelivesofthecolonisedpeopleareimplementedby their colonial rulers, in the pursuit of the self-interest of the “distant metropolis.”4Coloniserstendedtorejectanyculturalcompromiseswiththecolonisedpopulationsandtheycarriedouttheirdominationandsubjugationofindigenouspopulationswiththeconviction“oftheirownsuperiorityandoftheirordainedmandatetorule.”5AwetTeweldeWeldmichaelsuccinctlysummarisesthispositionasthe“almostuniversalunderstandingoftheWest’sruleovertherest.”6

The use of civilisational language also has an important relationship with theformation of identity. In order to fully recognise the commonalities among the equalcommunityofcivilisednations,itwasnecessarytoidentifythosewhoweredifferent,orthosewhowerethe‘other.’AccordingtoGerritGong,whatthecivilisedworldhadincommononlybecameapparentwhenitwas:“juxtaposedwiththe'barbarous'and'savage'worlds.”7Inthisregard,thestandardofcivilisationthereby“helpeddefinetheinternalidentityandexternalboundaries of the nineteenth century’s dominant society.”8 This process has had theconsequenceofcreatingahierarchicalinternationalsystem,wherebyexceptionstotherules

3 JürgenOsterhammel,Colonialism:ATheoreticalApproach, trans. Shelly J. Frisch (Princeton:MarkusWienerPublishers,1997),16.4Ibid.5Ibid.,16-17.6 Awet Tewelde Weldmichael, Third World Colonialism and Strategies of Liberation: Eritrea and East TimorCompared(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2013),2.7GerritGong,TheStandardof‘Civilisation’inInternationalSociety,36.8Ibid.,238.

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that applied to civilisednationshavebeenpromoted against the ‘uncivilised,’ in order tojustifyandlegitimiseinterventionagainstthem.

Methodology

HistoricalAnalysis

AspoliticaltheoristE.HCarrhasstated,“ourfirstbusiness,itwillbesaid,istocollect,classifyandanalyseourfactsanddrawourinferences;andweshallthenbereadytoinvestigatethepurposetowhichourfactsandourdeductionscanbeput.”9Inthisregard,thefirstmethodthat this thesis employs is the use of historical analysis. By employing a framework ofexamininghistoricaleventsanddiscourseabetterappreciationcanbegainedofitsdriversanditscharacteristics.Thisiscriticaltohelpingtoidentifyevidenceofitscontemporaryusein internationalrelations,which, inturn, facilitatesabetterunderstandingofthe inherentdangersinthecontinueduseofthemoralisticandinterventionistrhetoricwhichaccompaniesthestandardofcivilisation.

Throughthisapproach,thethesisseeksto“tracethethreadoflifeandlanguagethatconnectspastandpresent,”inordertopresentamore“criticalperspectiveonourpresent.”10AsAntonyAnghieargues,itisonlythroughastudyofhistorythatwecan“identifythecunningofcolonialism.”11ItisAnghie’sassertionthatbyidentifyinghistoricalcasesofcolonialism,andinthecaseofthisthesisalsothestandardofcivilisation,wecanidentifythedifferentformsinwhichitreproducesitself:“evenwhileseekingtoconcealitspresence,andtherolethatinternationallawplaysinthisprocess.”12

Primaryandsecondarysourcesofhistoricalmaterialwillbeexaminedinthisstudy.Speeches,ministerialbriefings,anddiplomaticcorrespondencewillbeanalysed,inordertogather evidence of civilisational language being used to justify and legitimise militaryintervention. Some of the primary material in this study was obtained by a request forinformationthroughtheNewZealandOfficialInformationActof1982.

DiscourseAnalysis

Thisstudyrecognisesthesignificant influencethat languagehasoveractionsanddecisionmakingininternationalrelations.Indeed,asKenBoothargues:“itisvitalthatstudentsofIR[internationalrelations]givelanguagemoreattentionthanhitherto,aswordsshapeaswell

9E.HCarr,TheTwentyYears’Crisis,1919-1939:AnIntroductiontotheStudyofInternationalRelations,2nded.(London:Macmillan,1946),2.10TerrenceBall,JamesFarr,andRussellL.Hanson,“Introduction,”inPoliticalInnovationandConceptualChange,eds.TerenceBall,JamesFarr,andRussellL.Hanson(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1989),4.11AntonyAnghie,“TimePresentandTimePast:Globalisation,InternationalFinancialInstitutions,andtheThirdWorld,”NewYorkUniversityJournalofInternationalLawandPolitics32,no.2(2000):289-90.12Ibid.

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asreflectreality.”13Itcertainlyappearsthatcivilisational languagehasbothdescribedandshapedtherealityoftheinternationalsystem.14Itisforthisreasonthatthethesiswillemploytheuseofdiscourseanalysis.AccordingtoMarkB.Salter,“discourseanalysisplaceslanguageatthecentreofitsanalysis,andinkeepingwiththecriticalspiritofitsproponents,focusesontheeffectsandimplicationsofparticular linguisticacts.”15 Inthisregard,thethesiswillexaminehowthediscourseofcivilisationalidentityhasbeenusedtoshapetheunderstandingofpermissibleactionsagainstpeople.FromJacintaO’Hagan’sperspective,discourseanalysiscanbeusedto“predictandprescribepoliticalinteraction;todefineandjustifyaparticularform of community; and to evaluate the particular institutions, values, and practices ofsocietiesatglobalandregionallevels.”16Thisstudywillusethismethod,inordertorevealtherepetitiveandcontinuoususeofcivilisationallanguagetocreatetheinferior‘other,’inordertojustifyviolenceanddominationininternationalrelations.

ClassicalRealism

Inordertoprovideacriticalanalysisofthestandardofcivilisation,civilisingmissions,andthecolonial activities ofwestern European nations, the thesiswill also examine the utility ofemployingthelensofclassicalrealismtoviewinginternationalrelations.Thepoliticaltheoryofclassicalrealismwasdevelopedbasedonthepoliticalthoughtofearlierphilosophersandwriters,butitlargelycameintoprominenceduringtheinter-warperiodfollowingWorldWarI. Initially representinga reactionagainst the “wish-dreamsof the initial stage,”or liberalinternational theory, realism “places its emphasis on the acceptance of facts and on theanalysisoftheircausesandconsequences.”17

Forclassicalrealists,there isastrongbeliefthatconsiderationsofself-interestandpowerlieatthecentreofdecision-makingbystates.Fromthisperspective,thisinsightwasseverelyundervaluedbyliberalthinkersoftheinterwarperiod.Whileotherpoliticaltheorieswere considered for use in this study, and have direct relevance to the domination andsubjugation of colonial territories, it was considered that classical realism provides anundervaluedandunderstudiedcritiqueofcolonialismandstandardofcivilisationdiscourse.Indeed,thethreerealistscholarsthatthisstudyexaminesallprovidedamningindictmentson the liberal international understanding that universal morality and ethical standardsexisted,andcouldbemade independentofpolitics.Theyalsoquestionedtheassumptionthat having a ‘universal conscience of mankind’ was both an achievable and desirable

13KenBooth,“Discussion:AReplytoWallace,”ReviewofInternationalStudies23,no.3(1997):374.14BrettBowden,TheEmpireofCivilisation:TheEvolutionofanImperialIdea(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2009),8.15MarkSalter,“NotWaiting for theBarbarians,” inCivilizational Identity:TheProductionandReproductionof‘Civilizations’ in International Relations, eds. Martin Hall and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (New York: PalgraveMacmillan,2007),82.16 JacintaO’Hagan,“Civilizational Identity,” inDiscoursesofCivilizational Identity,eds.MartinHallandPatrickThaddeusJackson(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2007),24.17E.HCarr,TheTwentyYears’Crisis,10.

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outcome.Inthisregard,classicalrealismstronglywarnsagainsttheuseoflanguagewhichhas all encompassing and universal appeal, as it has dangerous and unintendedconsequences.

Fromaclassicalrealistperspective,purporteduniversalprinciples,asarefoundinthestandardofcivilisationdiscourse,havetheeffectofcreatingatroublingfriendversusenemydichotomy,18ordangerousdistinctionsbetweenso-called“peace-lovingnations”versusthe“forcesofevil.”19Thesedistinctionsarearguedtoultimatelyleadtothedehumanisationofthe ‘enemyother,’whichwouldmakeconflictagainst themappearmorepermissibleandintense.20 It is inthiscontext,thatclassicalrealismprovidesan interestingandcompellingframeworktounderstandingthedangersofthestandardofcivilisation.

CaseStudy:EastTimor

InthecaseofinterventionsinEastTimor,theargumentwillbemadethatonanumberofoccasions ‘exceptions’ to the overarching international legal principle of non-interventionweredeemedpermissible,ascivilisationaldiscoursewasemployedinordertolegitimiseandjustifycolonisation,conquest,anddominationoverthepopulation.

The case of East Timor was chosen due to the unique nature in which multipleinterventionshave takenplace,byahostofdifferentactors. In this regard, therewasaninterest in examiningwhether civilisational discoursewas employed in all of the cases ofinterventionstudied.EachoftheinterventionsstudiedinEastTimorweredistinctlydifferent.Inthecaseofthefirstinvention,Portuguesecolonialismoccurredfromthesixteenthcenturyuntilthetwentiethcentury.ItwaswhenthePortuguesedecidedtoleaveitscolonyin1974thattheinvasionandoccupationbyIndonesiaoccurred.

When the Australian-led peacekeeping coalition, the International Force for EastTimor(INTERFET)arrivedinEastTimorin1999,itwasoneofthefewUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(UNSC)mandatedmissionsinwhichChapterVIIoftheUNCharterwasusedtogiveitalegalbasis.21FollowingtheinterventionofINTERFET,theUNdecidedthatfurtherworkin

18Carl Schmitt,TheConceptof thePolitical [1932], trans.GeorgeSchwab (Chicago:ChicagoUniversityPress,2008),49.19HansMorgenthau,InDefenseoftheNationalInterest:ACriticalExaminationofAmericanForeignPolicy(NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1951),94.20CarlSchmitt,TheConceptof thePolitical,27;andHansMorgenthau,TheMainspringsofAmericanForeignPolicy:TheNationalInterestvs.MoralAbstractions,”TheAmericanPoliticalScienceReview44,no.4(1950):839.21TheUNSCadoptedResolution1264on15September,1999.IthaddeterminedthatthesituationinEastTimorhadconstitutedathreattopeaceandsecurity,underChapterVIIoftheUNCharter,andasaresultitauthorisedtheestablishmentofamultinationalforce.TheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil,“Resolution1264(1999)of15September1999,TheUnitedNations,accessed14July,2016,https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/264/81/PDF/N9926481.pdf?OpenElement.

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EastTimorwasrequired,inordertotackletheissueofitbeinga‘failedstate.’ItwasinthiscontextthatUNTAETwasmandatedbytheUNSCtorebuildthecountry.

UNTAET,alongsidetheUNMissioninKosovo(UNMIK),wascompletelydifferentfromanymissiontheUNhadconductedinpast.ThelevelofcontrolandpowerwieldedbytheUNinthecasesofEastTimorandKosovowereunparalleled.Overtime,themissioncameunderincreasedcriticismforitsunwillingnesstoinvolvetheTimoreseindecisionmakingprocesses.Inthisregard,theabsolutecontrolandpowerwieldedbyUNofficialswasregardedbysomecommentatorsasbeingneo-colonialinnature.

ItisevidentthatineachofthesecasesofinterventioninEastTimorthatcivilisationaldiscourse was used by the interveners, in order to justify and legitimise their initialintervention and their continued presence in the country. In these cases, a clear patternemerged,whereby the intervenerwas cast in the ‘intervention story’ as the enlightenedciviliser,bringingtotheEastTimoresethegiftofadvancedcivilisation.TheTimorese,ontheotherhandwerecast,timeandagain,astheuncivilised,weak,inferior,others.

Itisinthecontextofthecontinuedoccupationofdifferentexternalactorsthatthisthesiswillexaminehowandwhythisprocessofpositioningintervenersastheenlightenedcivilised,whiletheTimoreseweretheweak,inferior,primitive,uncivilised,tookplace.ItwillbedeterminedthatcastingofthepeopleofEastTimorinthislightlegitimisedandjustifiedviolence and domination over them and resulted in negative consequences for Timoresesociety.

StructureoftheThesis

This thesis will begin by engaging with the early works of well-known philosophers andpolitical theorists in order to explore the evolution of the discourse on civilisation ininternationalrelations.Thefirstchapterwillexaminethehistoricaldiscourseonthestandardofcivilisationfromthethirteenthuntilthenineteenthcentury.Theuseofnaturallaw,anditstendencytobeemployedinordertolegitimiseandjustifyinterventionagainstnon-Christiansocieties, will be examined first. The centrality of natural law in legitmising violence andintevention intheconquestoftheNewWorldandthe latercolonisationofnon-Europeanterritories,willthenbeexamined.Thischapterwillalsoexplorethedevelopmentofliberalinternational theory, and in particular, the normative and moralistic language used tounderpintheliberalismofthisera.

The second chapter will analyse twentieth century thinking on the standard ofcivilisation.ItwillexploretheformationoftheLeagueofNationsandtheUnitedNations,withreferencetotheidealismandutopianisminherenttotheprojects.Followingthis,thereisanexaminationoftheinternationalisedlegalsystemsofdealingwithcolonialterritoriesduringthis period. Consideration is given to how the two totalwars of the period resulted in a

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challengetotheconceptionsthattheuncivilisedbarbarianswereonlyinthecolonies,andoutside ofwestern Europe. In practice, however, it will be outlined that domination andexploitationofpeoplesconsideredoutsideoftheinternationalsystemcontinued.

ChapterThreeexploresthecritiqueofliberalimperialismprovidedbyclassicalrealistthinkersE.HCarr,CarSchmitt,andHansMorgenthau.Itwilllookattherejectionoftheliberalinternationalunderstandingthatuniversalmoralityandethicalstandardsexist. Itwillthenconsider how classical realism can be used as a compelling critique against moraluniversalism,theinvocationof‘commonhumanity,’andfriendversusenemydichotomies.Itwillfindthatclassicalrealismprovidesacompellingcritiqueofcolonialismandthestandardofcivilisation.

The final chapter will apply the consequences of the analysis undertaken in theprevious chaptersandconsider itdirectly in relation toanumberof interventions inEastTimor.ThescopeoftheanalysisinthecaseofEastTimorwillincludethecolonisationofthecountrybyPortugal,theinvasionandoccupationbyIndonesia,aswellasthecontemporarypeacekeepingeffortsoftheAustralian-ledcoalitioninthelate1990s,andthelaternationandstatebuildingprojectsunderUnitedNations(UN)auspices.

Thisthesiswillcontendthatthestandardofcivilisationanditsaccompanyingcivilisingmissionshaveenduredovertime.Whileattimestheyhavebeenreproducedandrebrandedunderdifferent labels, theirtargetsandtheireffectshave largelyremainedthesame.Theobjective of this thesis is to bring attention to the dangers of employing civilisationallanguage.Byidentifyingandunderstandingthenatureandcharacteristicsofthestandardofcivilisation,anditseffects,itishopedthatwecanattempttoendthepractice,ratherthancontinuetobeinarepetitivecycleofdenigratingentiresocietiesofpeoples,inanattempttolegitimiseviolenceandforceagainstthem.InthecaseofEastTimor,itwillbeshownthatthepositioningoftheEastTimoresepeopleasinferior,backwardandprimitive,hadtheeffectofmakinginterventionagainstthemmoredangerousandviolent.Indeed,itwillbearguedthatthediscourseonthestandardofcivilisation,withitspurporteduniversalvaluesandliberalnorms,hasthepropensitytogeneratedestructiveandviolentconsequences,instarkcontrasttoitspromised‘civilising’role.

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ChapterOne:DiscourseonIntervention,ColonisationandtheStandardofCivilisation

In order to understand the implications of the discourse of civilisation in contemporaryinternationalrelations,itisnecessarytohaveanunderstandingofhowandwhythisconceptgainedsuch influence inhistoricaldiscourseandpractice. In thiscontext, thischapterwillexaminetheevolutionofthediscourseoncivilisationfromthethirteenthtothenineteenthcentury. Inparticular, thischapterwillanalysehowandwhydiscourseonthestandardofcivilisationwasemployed to justify interventionandviolenceagainst thosedeemedtobe‘barbarians’and‘uncivilised.’Howdidthecastingofpeoplesintermsofcivililisationshapetheunderstandingofpermissibleactionsagainstthem?Thischapterwillexaminehowthecastingofnon-Christiansocieties,asbeingnaturallyandinherentlydifferent,enforcedthetheorythatChristianshadtherightandtheauthoritytoexercisecontroloverpagansandlegitimatelydisposethemoftheirlandandproperty.Thispracticewaslateradaptedtobewieldedagainstnon-Europeansocieties,whoweredeemedtobe‘uncivilised’or‘barbarians.’In this regard, very specific languagewas usedbywestern Europeannations during theirconquering and colonisation of the non-European world. This language, which includedlabellingthe‘uncivilised’asanimals,hadtheimpactofexcludinganddiscipliningpeoplesandsocieties understood as ‘different and alien.’ This processwas employed in order to givenormative and legal underpinnings to the violent interventions conducted by WesternEuropean nations. The historical use of the discourse on the standard of civilisation hadprofound impact on legal understandings of indigenous population status and rights, forcenturiestocome.

PopeInnocentIV:TheStatusandRightsofInfidels

The emergence of medieval discourse on conquest, colonisation, and the standard ofcivilisationcanbetracedbacktotheCrusadesundertakenbyChristianarmies,fromtheyears1096to1271.22ThedominantschoolofthoughtonthenatureofmanatthistimewastheAlanian position, under the authority of the hierocratic canonist Alanus. FromanAlanianperspective, infidels,byvirtueoftheirnon-Christianity,possessednonatural legalrighttocontrolpropertyorterritory.23Thecastingofallnon-Christiansasbeingnaturallydifferentimbued the theory that Christians had the right to exercise control over pagans, andlegitimatelydispossessthemoftheirlandandproperty.ItwasinthisregardthatChristianarmiesattemptedtorationaliseandjustifytheirdominationandconquestofnon-Christiansocieties.

22James.A.Brundage,MedievalCanonLawandtheCrusader(Madison:UniversityofWisconsinPress,1969),76.23 Robert. A.Williams,TheAmerican Indian inWestern Thought: TheDiscourses of Conquest (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1990),45.

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Overtime,however,analternativetheoryonthenaturalrightsofmanbegantogaingreaterprominenceinphilosophicaldiscourse.TheHumanistresponsesoughttochallengetheAlanianunderstandingofthenaturalrightsofman,andwasheavily influencedbytheworkofGreekphilosopherAristotle.Underpinningthischallengewastheunderstandingthatinfidelshadnatural legal rights, including the right to hold property, and they should beprovided somemeasure of protection against the dispossession of their property.24 Thisunderstandingwas, inpart,promotedontheunderstandingthatallmenwerecreatedbygod,andthereforeallmenheldnaturalrights.25ThisfirmlychallengedtheAlanianprinciplethat natural rights were bestowed only on Christian populations, by virtue of theirChristianity.ThepapacywasreportedlysoafraidthatthisArtistotelianvisionwouldtakehold,andthreatentheChurch’sownAlanianworldview,thattheyoutlawedtheuseofAristotle’swork in all Church libraries.26 By themid-thirteenth century, one of themost influentialdoctrines, centred on this debate on the rights and duties of non-Christian and Christiansocieties,wasputforwardbyPopeInnocentIV,inhislegalcommentaryonanearlierpapaldecreebyPopeInnocentIII,titledQuodsuperhis.27

ThecommentarybyPopeInnocentIVwasparticularlyfocusedonexaminingthelegalquestionsraisedbymedievalChristianviolenceanddominationofnon-Christiansocieties.CentraltoInnocent’stheorisingwashisexaminationofthedebatesonwhetherconditionsexistedwhereChristianscouldlegallyandlegitimatelydispossessinfidelsoftheirsovereigncontroloverterritoryandproperty.Thisquestionwouldbecomecentraltotheunderstandingand justification of conquest and colonial expansion for centuries to come.28 In a criticaldeparturefromthenormativeunderstandingofpreviousPapaldiscourse,Innocentreadilyacceptedthatnon-Christianpeoplesdidpossessthesamenatural-legalrightsasChristians.Thecentraltenetwasthatallhumanbeings,whetherChristianornot,hadtherightundernatural law to exercise social and political rights, by rational means. As a result of thisreasoning,Innocentarguedthatnon-Christiansshouldbeabletodeterminetheirownleadersand exercise sovereign control over property and territory.29 Furthermore, on account of‘infidels’possessingthesenaturally-endowedrights,Christianscouldnotlegallyinvadeandplunder their lands, solely because of the infidels non-Christian status. Pope Innocent’sunderstandingofthenaturalrightsofinfidelscanbesuccinctlysummarisedinthefollowingexcerpt:

24Ibid.25Ibid.26Ibid.,43.27ForadetaileddiscussiononPopeInnocentIV’scommentaryQuodsuperhisseeJamesA.Brundage,MedievalCanonLaw,76-81.28BrettBowden,TheEmpireofCivilisation:TheEvolutionofanImperialIdea(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2009)107.29PopeInnocentIV,“CommentariaDoctissimainQuinqueLibrosDecretalium,”inTheExpansionofEurope:TheFirstPhase,ed.andtrans.JamesMuldoon(Pennsylvania:PennsylvaniaUniversityPress,1977),191.

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Sovereignty,possessions,andjurisdictioncanexistlicitly,withoutsin,amonginfidels,aswellasamongthefaithful.Thingsweremadeforeveryrationalcreature…andbecauseofthis,wesay it isnot lawful for thepopeor for the faithful to take sovereigntyor jurisdiction frominfidels.30

Readinisolation,thisdecreebyInnocentcouldbeseenasalargelyprogressivemomentinthehistoricalanalysisoftherightsofnon-Christiansocieties,yetInnocent’stheorisingdidnotconclude on this point. Rather, Innocent proceeded in his commentary to sanction thecontinuedinterventioninthedomesticaffairsofnon-Christianpopulationsbyhypothesisinganumberofexceptionstohisprinciplethat‘infidels’possessednaturalrights.

ItwasInnocent’sstrongbeliefthatthepapalofficereservedtherightofinterventionintheaffairsofalltheChurch’ssubjects,includinginfidels.InnocentbasedthisreasoningonthepremisethatStPeterhadbeenentrustedbyChristtocareforthespiritualwell-beingofthewhole “human flock,”which necessarily included infidels and pagans.31 Innocent alsoarguedthatinterventionagainstinfidelscouldtakeplaceiftheyhadclearlyviolatednaturallaw.32 According to Innocent, Christian princes were permitted to raise armies to punishseriousviolationsofnaturallawbynon-Christians,aslongasthearmiesallowedmissionariestoaccompanythem,inordertoconvertheathenlandstoChristianity.33Innocentdeliberatelyleftitunsaidwhatexactlyconstitutednaturallaw,allowingforinterpretationtocomefromthepapacyonacase-by-casebasis.Hedid,however,outlinetwoprimaryexamplesofwhatwouldconstituteabreachofnaturallawinhismind;sexualperversionandtheworshipofidols.34 The third primary exception to Innocent’s understanding of the natural rights ofinfidels,wasthattheyhadtoallowChristianmissionariestobeintheirpresenceinordertopreachgospel,otherwiseChristianarmieswould,again,be justified inwagingwaragainstthem.35 These three principles of exception were a novel attempt by Innocent to reachsynthesisbetweentheaforementionedAlanianandHumanistpositions.Whileheacceptedthatnon-Christianspossessednaturalrights,affordingthemsomemeasureofprotection,hisexceptionsallowedforthecontinuedinterventionagainstthem.

Formorethanthreecenturiesfollowinghisdeath,thethinkingofPopeInnocentIVstronglyinfluencedthosewhotheorisedoninternationallaw,intervention,andthenaturalrightsofman.Pope Innocentwas the firstmedieval theorist to attempt to systematicallyaddress thequestionofwhetherChristiannationscould legallyand legitimately interveneagainstnon-Christians.HispronouncementsonthestatusofinfidelrightswasarguablyhismostenduringcontributiontoWesternlegalthought.36Innocent’sattempttosynthesisethe

30Ibid.31Ibid.,191-192.32Ibid.,192.33Ibid.34Ibid.35Ibid.36Robert.A.Williams,TheAmericanIndian,44.

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AlanianandtheHumanistpositionshelpedtosparkadebateontherightsofmanthatwouldlastcenturies.WhileoneinterpretationofInnocent’sworkcouldbethathistheorisinghadattemptedtoaffordinfidelsameasureofprotectionagainstinterventionbyChristiannations,an alternative position could also be suggested. It could be argued that Innocentmerelyperpetuatedthetheorythattherecouldbejustifieddifferentialtreatmentofnon-Christianssocieties, and that rules of protection could be discarded, if andwhen it suited Christianarmies.

An analysis of later discourse on the standard of civilisation demonstrates thatInnocent’s three primary exceptions to the principle of non-intervention against infidels,providedEuropeancoloniserswithanexpansivelegitimisingmandateforwarsofcolonisationandconquest,andhelpedEuropeannationsenforcetheirownvisionofcivilisationontheworld.Indeed,Innocent’sexception-basedapproachtonon-interventioncontinuestobeadominantfeatureof interventiondiscourse incontemporary internationalrelations. InthecaseofinterventionsinEastTimor,theargumenthasbeenmadeonanumberofoccasionsthat ‘exceptions’ to theoverarching international legalprincipleofnon-interventionwerepermissible,asspecificcircumstancesmadeitlegitimateandlegalforcolonisation,conquest,andcontroloverthepopulationtooccur.Thisargument,indirectrelationtotheEastTimorcase,willbeexaminedincloserdetaillaterinthethesis.

ConquestoftheNewWorld

PopeInnocent’stheorisingonthenaturalrightsofman,andtheexceptionstotheprotectionsaffordedagainstintervention,continuedtohaveaprofoundinfluenceonthejustificationsused during the violent suppression of indigenous populations, through to Europe’sdiscoveriesof theNewWorld.37 Thediscoveryof theNewWorldbeganwithChristopherColumbus’ first expeditions on behalf of the Spanish Crown during his voyages to theAmericas in the late fifteenth century. The mission of European monarchies, which hademployed explorers such as Columbus, were heavily oriented towards economic andterritorialgains,whichwouldinturnenhancetheirstates’ownstandinginEurope.Analysisofthisearlyperiodofconquest illuminatesabrutalandviolentregimeofdominationandexploitation.AsBarryHindessargues,itwasdeemedquiteacceptableatthetimetodrivenativepopulationsfromtheirlands,enslavethem,workthemtodeath,orevenattimeshuntthemfor“sport.”38Theindigenouspeopleswhowerenotkilledthroughdirectviolentaction,or introduced disease and illness, were controlled and dominated by varying methods,includingcompulsion,periodsofdiscipline,andforcedschoolinginthewaysofthe‘civilised’Europeans.39

37TheNewWorldistodaythecontinentsofNorthandSouthAmerica.38BarryHindess,“TheLiberalGovernmentofUnfreedom,”Alternatives:Global,Local,Political26,no.2(2001):101.39Ibid.

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TheconquestbyEuropeansoftheNewWorldrequiredbothanormativeandalegalbasisinordertobeviewedaslegitimate.ThecolonisingnationsofEuropeheldstrongtothebeliefthatlegalrationale,underpinnedbynormativereasoning,wasanecessaryinstrumentofempire.40Thedominantunderstandingof therightsofmanat this timefollowedmorecloselytotheHumanistposition,wherebydispossessionofpropertyandterritorycouldnotbe justified solelydue toapopulation’snon-Christianity. In this context, the theorisingofPope Innocent IV provided an early basis of the rules which governed the interactionsbetween the colonisers and the indigenouspopulations. Indeed, the SpanishCrowndrewupon thework of Innocent in order to justify the conquistadors violent treatment of thepeoplesoftheNewWorld.41Theargumentwasmadebytheconquerorsthatmilitaryaction,inordertoforcecompliance,wasalegalexercise.ThereasoninggivenwasthatthepeoplesoftheNewWorldhadviolatednaturallaw,inpartthroughtheirworshipoffalseidolsandsexualpromiscuity,andthereforetheSpanish,asanadvancedcivilisednation,couldlegallyand justifiably take action against them. Rather than afford protection, Innocent’scommentary was wielded to enforce the idea that because they were ‘different’ to thecivilisedEuropeans,theindigenouspopulationoftheNewWorldcouldbetreateddifferently.

Ananalysisof thediscourseusedat this timealso reveals that therewasa strongattempt to legitimise the violent subjugationof the indigenouspopulationsby employingspecificlanguagetofurtherenforcetheunderstandingtheywere‘different’totheEuropeanconquerors.AccordingtoJosédeAcosta,asixteenth-centurySpanishJesuitmissionaryintheNewWorld,thenativepopulationswere,“absolutelybarbarous,andtheseareIndianswhohaveneitherlawsnorKingnorfixeddwellingsbutgoinherdslikewildanimalsandsavages.”42BrettBowdenidentifiesasimilarpattern,wherebythecolonisersandmissionariestendedtorefertotheindigenouspopulationsasanimals, insects,andinfants:“anythingbutcivilisedhuman beings.”43 Positioning the native populations as being subhuman, inferior, anddifferent,hadtheeffectofhelpingtojustifytheviolencerequiredtoenslaveandconquerthem.Thisprocessofemployingspecificlanguagetocastapopulationas‘different’andbeingthe ‘other’ is an enduring feature in international relations, and is a crucial element ofstandardofcivilisationdiscourse.AsimilarpatternoflanguagecanalsobeidentifiedduringinterventionsinEastTimor,wherebythePortuguese,theIndonesians,andlatertheUnitedNationsandAustralia,justifiedinterventionandviolenceonthebasisthattheTimoresewereprimitive, weak, and different. The positioning of the Timorese in this light had strikingparallels to the standard of civilisation discourse employed during the conquest andcolonisationoftheNewWorld.

40Robert.A.Williams,TheAmericanIndian,6.41Ibid.42JosédeAcosta,NaturalandMoralHistoryoftheIndies[1590],ed.JaneE.Mangan,trans.FrancesM.López-Morillas(NorthCarolina:DukeUniversityPress,2002),359.43BrettBowden,“CivilizationandSavagery,”inTheAshgateResearchCompaniontoRegionalisms,eds.TimothyShaw,AndrewGrant,andScarlettCornelissen(Farnham,England:AshgatePublishingLtd,2012),273.

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FranciscodeVitoria:TheLawofNations

In response to the reports of the extremely violent treatment and subjugation of theindigenous populations in the New World, a number of influential philosophers andtheologians began to question some of the arguments used to justify the conquistadors’actions.ThemostinfluentialofthesesixteenthcenturytheologianswasFranciscodeVitoria.Vitoria was a Spanish Dominican Friar, who himself was also heavily influenced by PopeInnocentIV’snatural-lawbaseddiscussionofinfidelrights.Hewasaleadingproponentoftherevival of the work of Saint Thomas Aquinas,44 arguing strongly that the law of natureunderpinnedman’srelationshipwiththeworld,whichinturngovernedthepracticeofhumansociety.45VitoriawasthefirstSpanishphilosophertosystematicallyapplytheimplicationsofnatural-lawdiscoursedirectlytoSpain’streatmentofthenativepopulationsoftheAmericas.Vitoria’s conception of a binding ‘Law of Nations’will be discussed inmore detail in thecoming section, but it is important to note that it gained great prominence in sixteenthcentury discourse, and beyond. The legal code that Vitoria promoted in the LawNationswouldgoontobecometheorderingprincipleregulatingthegrowingcontactbetweenthe‘civilised’statesofwesternEurope,andthe‘uncivilised’‘barbarians’forcenturiestocome.46

InVitoria’s lectureOntheIndiansLatelyDiscoveredhegrappledwiththequestion,“bywhatrightswerethebarbarianssubjectedtoSpanishrule”?47Uponconsideration,VitoriaadoptedthepositionthatthenativepopulationsoftheAmericashadsomefacultyofreason,andthereforepossessednaturallegalrights.48FromVitoria’sperspective,manwasarationalcreature and therefore natural rights afforded him the civil rights of ownership overproperty.49 In an argument the parallels the one given by Innocent before him, Vitoriaexpressed his belief that the Spanish colonialists could not simply dispossess the nativepopulationoftheirnatural-legalrighttohavecontroloverproperty:

the barbarians in question can not be barred frombeing true owners, alike in public andprivatelaw,byreasonofthesinofunbelieforanyothermortalsin,nordoessuchsinentitleChristianstoseizetheirgoodsandlands.50

44MichaelDonelan,“SpainandtheIndies,”inTheExpansionofInternationalSociety,eds.HedleyBullandAdamWatson(NewYork:ClarendonPress,1984),83.45AnthonyPagdenandJeremyLawrance,“Introduction,”inFranciscodeVitoria:PoliticalWritings,eds.AnthonyPagdenandJeremyLawrance(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1991),XV.46BrettBowden,TheEmpireofCivilisation,15.47FranciscodeVitoria,“OntheIndiansDiscoveredLately,”inFranciscodeVitoria:PoliticalWritings,eds.AnthonyPagdenandJeremyLawrance(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1991),233.48Ibid.,250.49Ibid.,242.50FranciscodeVitoria,ascitedinBrettBowden,TheEmpireofCivilisation,114.

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Shouldpropertybetakenfromthese‘barbarians,’Vitoriaarguedthatitwouldbeconsideredtheft “no less than if it were done to Christians.”51 These passages from Vitoria show adismissalof the foundationalpremiseof theaforementionedAlanianposition, inasimilarnature to that proposed by Innocent. In a departure from Innocent’s earlier theorising,however, Vitoria further argued that even if the ‘barbarians’ refused to abide bycommandmentsfromthePope,therewouldstillnotbesufficientcausetomakewaronthemandseizetheirproperty.52ThisreasoningdemonstratedVitoria’smoresecularorientation.DespiteVitoria’sseeminglyprogressivestance,furtherexaminationofhistheorisingrevealsthatheadvocatedanumberofexceptionstohisprinciplethatnativepopulationshadnatural-rights,whichaffordedthemprotectionfromexternalinterferenceandintervention.AswithInnocent before him, this had the impact of continuing to provide justifications for theconquestandviolentdominationoverpopulationsdeemedtobe‘different.’

CentraltoVitoria’stheorisingontheconquestandtreatmentofnativepopulationswas his conception of a universally binding ‘Law of Nations.’ Vitoria maintained that allsocietieswereboundbythisbodyofnatural-law,whichgovernedanddictatedtheirconduct.TheassertionwasmadestronglybyVitoriathatanytransgressionsagainsttheLawofNationscouldservetojustifyconquestoverthenativepopulations,goingasfarastoclaimthattheSpanish could enforce against them “the rights of war, despoiling them of their goods,reducing them to captivity, deposing their former lords and setting up new ones.”53 ThisargumentisanalogoustoPopeInnocent’stheorisingthatpunishmentscouldbecarriedoutagainstinfidelsiftheybreachednaturallaw.OneofVitoria’sargumentswasthatundertheLawofNations,nativescouldnot“causelesslypreventtheSpaniardsfrommakingtheirprofitwhere this can be done without injury to themselves.”54 Accordingly, from Vitoria’sperspective,whilenaturallawboughtwithitsomeprotectionforthe‘natives,’italsocamewithduties.Intheend,nativepopulationsweredeemedtohavebreachedtheseduties,timeand again, and they were thus wielded against them, in order to justify the violentinterventiondirectedatthembytheircolonisers.

In addition to Vitoria’s theory on the permissibility of taking action against nativepopulations,shouldtheybreachtheLawofNations,healsosawacivilisingroleforChristiannations.AsnativeswereviewedbyVitoriaashavingsomefacultyofreason,byvirtueoftheirhumannature,heattributedtheirlimitedintellectandbadbehaviourtotheirupbringing:“Iforthemostpartattributetheirseemingsounintelligentandstupidtoabadandbarbarousupbringing,forevenamongourselveswefindmanypeasantswhodifferlittlefrombrutes.”55

51 Francisco de Victoria, “On the Indians Discovered Lately,” in Francisco de Vitoria: De Indis et De Ivre BelliRelectiones,ed.ErnestNysandtrans.JohnPawleyBate(Washington:CarnegieInstitutionofWashington,1917),123.52Ibid.,137.53Ibid.,155.54Ibid.,152-153.55Ibid.,127-128.

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From Vitoria’s perspective, the way in which to improve the lives of these ‘unintelligentbarbarians’was for advanced Christian nations to teach and nurture them in theway ofadvanced civilisation. This would, eventually, overcome their ‘barbarous upbringings’. Incircumstanceswhereitwasdeemedthatnativepopulationswereincapableofadministeringpropergovernance,VitoriaarguedthattheSpanishshould,forciblyifnecessary,takecontrolof the administration. According to Vitoria, there were circumstances whereby nativesneededtobe,“ruledandgovernedbyothers,andthatitisgoodforthemtobesubjecttoothers, justassonsneedtobesubjecttotheirparentsuntilof fullage,andawifetoherhusband.”56Vitorialaterexpandedonthisthought,arguingthat‘brotherlycorrection’ofthe‘natives’byChristianswasanobligationwhichmustbeperformedinsomecircumstances,“itconcernsChristianstocorrectanddirectthem[thenatives];nay,itseemsthattheyareboundtodoso.”57InthesestatementsfromVitorialiesomeoftheearliestexpressionsoftheideaof‘whitemansburden’;thatistheobligationofthe‘civilised’whiteEuropeanstoattempttobringthe‘barbarians’intotheranksofthecivilisedsocietyofstates.58ThisviewbyVitorianecessarily meant that international society was hierarchical, with the civilised nationsplaying the part of the teachers, tutors, and enforcers, over the unintelligent and lowerranked‘barbarians,’whorequiredtutelage.

Vitoria’stheoryontheLawofNationsprovidedWesterndiscoursewithoneofthemost important arguments on the rights of ‘civilised’ Europeans to conquer and colonisenative populations. However, from the outset, there appeared to be an inherent flaw inVitoria’sargumentthatthereexisteduniversalnaturalrights,butwithexceptionsforsomeselectpeoples.Vitoria’sviewthattherewereexceptionstotheprotectionswhichnaturallawprovidedhadtheimpactofexcludinganddiscipliningpeoplesandsocietiesunderstoodas“differentandalien.”59Vitoriahadarguedthatthe indigenouspopulationoftheAmericaswere,bynature,affordedprotectionunderuniversalnaturallaws,andthisshouldprovidegroundfortheirhumanetreatment.However,hisexceptionsmadeitpossibletodisciplinethemasbeing inbreachof thesameuniversalnatural laws,whichhadobligated themtoacceptcivilisednationsrighttotradeandproselytisethem.60

Antony Anghie has described Vitoria’s exception-based view as being,“schizophrenic,”notingthatVitoriaviewedthe‘natives’asbeing“bothalikeandunliketheSpaniards.”61 Anghie maintains that it was this ‘schizophrenia’ on Vitoria’s behalf whichresultedintheperpetuationoftheargumentthattheSpanishhadlegitimateandjustifiable

56Ibid.57Ibid.,160-161.58BrettBowden,TheEmpireofCivilisation,114-115.59AntonyAnghie,“OntheIndiansLatelyDiscoveredandSixteenth-CenturyInternationalLaw,”ProceedingsoftheAnnualMeeting(AmericanSocietyofInternationalLaw)92(1998):374.60 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),142.61AntonyAnghie,“FranciscodeVitoriaandtheColonialOriginsofInternationalLaw,”SocialandLegalStudies5,no.3(1996):326-27.

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reasoning for intervening against the peoples of the Americas.62 Indeed, Spanish politicalelitessuccessfullywieldedVitoria’sexceptionalityprincipletoinevitablyfindthatthe‘natives’hadviolatedtheuniversallybindingLawofNations,withthese‘violations’subsequentlybeingusedasjustificationforconquestandcolonialisation.

Inasimilarmanner,thePortuguesewieldedcivilisationallanguageinordertojustifyandlegitimisetheirconquestanddominationofTimoresesociety.ThePortuguesecoloniserscastthemselvesastheenlightenedtutors,whiletheTimoresewerethe“ignorantPariahsinAsia.”63TheTimorese,inthiscontext,wereregardedasbeingsubordinate‘creatures,’who,asaresultoftheirinferiornatureandstrangeculturalpractices,werenotabidingbytheLawofNations.ThePortuguese,therefore,promotedthetheorythattheyhadanobligationtoteach,throughforceifnecessary,theTimoresetobecomecivilised.Itisinthiscontextthatitisevident that theworkofVitoriaexertedaprofound impacton the legal conceptionsofindigenouspopulationsstatusandrights,64aswellashavingasignificantimpactinshapingfuturediscourseonEuropeancolonialismandthestandardofcivilisation.

PeaceofWestphalia:Sovereignty,ButNotforAll

WhilethenaturallawtheorisingoftheologianssuchasFranciscodeVitoriacontinuedtobeused inorder to justifyand legitimiseEuropeancolonialactivity,westernEuropeanstateswerealsofightingwarsinsidethebordersofEurope.ThePeaceofWestphaliawasaseriesofpeace treaties in1648,which sought to settlemanyof theseconflictswithinEurope.TheTreatiescontainedexplicitprovisionsforreligioustolerance,whichsoughttoovercomethepowerfulreligiousdifferences inEuropebetweenCatholics,Calvinists,andLutherans,65bygranting the signatories supreme political authority within their own domains.66 BeforeWestphalia, western European populations had a variety of conflictual and overlappingsources of authority.67 The Treaties had the effect of assigning sovereign rulers to thesignatories’territories,whowouldthereforehaveprimaryauthorityandcontrolovertheirpopulations.

It isoftenarguedthatthePeaceofWestphaliahashadasignificant impactonthedevelopmentofinternationallaw,nationstates,andonthewaystatesinteracttoday.TheTreatieshavebeenarguedtobepivotaltomodernconceptionsofthestate,aswellasto

62Ibid.,326-327.63RoyalCommissionofPortugal,ascitedinPerryAnderson,“PortugalandtheEndofUltra-ColonialismPartTwo,”NewLeftReview16(1962):95.Emphasisisintheoriginal.64Robert.A.Williams,TheAmericanIndian,106.65 Treaty ofWestphalia. “Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and theirRespective Allies,” Yale Law School: The Avalon Project, accessed 17 May, 2016,http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp.66Ibid.67BarryHindess,“SovereigntyasIndirectRule,”inLaw,EthicsandGovernance:Re-envisioningSovereignty:TheEndofWestphalia,eds.TrudyJacobsen,CharlesSampford,andRameshThakur(Hampshire,England:Routledge,2016),302.

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formation of the principles ofmodern state sovereignty.68 Today, the term ‘Westphaliansovereignty’iscommonlyheldtomean,“thelegitimatedrightofsovereignstogoverntheirpeoplesfreeofoutsideinterference,whetheranysuchexternalclaimtointerferewasbasedonpolitical,legalorreligiousprinciples.”69Inthiscontext,JacksonNyamuyaMaogotoarguesthat from Westphalia through until the early nineteenth century, the concept of statesovereignty, “retained its conception as supreme authority, granting a state exclusivejurisdictionandcontroloverallobjectsandsubjectsinitsterritory,totheexclusionofanyotherinfluence.”70However,thisanalysisfailstorecogniseoraccountforthefactthattheWestphalian systemwas at its core a western European conception, which covered andappliedonly to those territories andpopulationswhichwere conceived tobepart of thefamilyofthe‘civilised’nations.

While the Peace ofWestphalia promoted the principle of non-interference in theinternalaffairsoftheparticipatingstatesofwesternEurope,historicalanalysisshowsclearlythattheseprinciplesdidnotapplytothoselivingoutsideofwesternEuropeanborders.Theprincipleofnon-interferenceimposednoconstraintontheactionsofEuropeancolonisers,who continued to conquer and colonise territories not covered by these internationalagreements.Thedominant thinkingat thetimewasthat theterritoriesoutsideofEuropecouldnotbeconceivedassovereignstates,asthepeoplelivinginthoseterritorieshadnotreachedanadequate‘standardofcivilisation’.ThisargumentiscapturedwellinthewritingsofJohnWestlake,anEnglishlegalscholar,whowrote:

Internationallawhastotreatnativesasuncivilised.Itregulates,forthemutualbenefitofthecivilised states, theclaimswhich theymake to sovereigntyover the regionand leaves thetreatmentofthenativestotheconscienceofthestatetowhichsovereigntyisawarded.71

From Westlake’s perspective, it would be absurd to conceive non-Europeans as havingsovereignty,andthereforeprotectionfromoutsideinterference,astheircivilisationalstatuswarrantedtheirtutelagebythecivilisedEuropeans.Fromhisreasoning,itwouldbeforthecivilisedtodeterminetheirtreatment.

68AliMazrui, “TheMovingCulturalFrontierofWorldOrder:FromMonotheismtoNorth-SouthRelations,” inCulture,IdeologyandWorldOrder,ed.R.B.JWalker(London:WestviewPress,1984),32.Itisimportanttonote,however,thatthereareanumberofscholarswhodiscountthetrueinfluenceofthePeaceofWestphaliaonthecontemporary understanding of the state, and state sovereignty. See for example Stèphane Beaulac, “TheWestphalianModelinDefiningInternationalLaw:ChallengingtheMyth,”AustralianJournalofLegalHistory8,no.2(2004):188.BeaulacarguesthatthetreatiesagreedtoatWestphaliahavelittletodowiththecreationofthemodernstatesystem,andanyrelationshipbetweenWestphaliaandmodernsovereigntyisamyth.69M.S.Janis,ascitedinStèphaneBeaulac,ThePowerofLanguageintheMakingofInternationalLaw:TheWord‘Sovereignty’ in Bodin and Vattel and the Myth of Westphalia (Leiden, the Netherlands: Martinus NijhoffPublishers,2004),68.70JacksonNyamuyaMaogoto,“WestphalianSovereigntyintheShadowofInternationalJustice?AFreshCoatofPaintforaTaintedConcept,”inLaw,EthicsandGovernance:Re-envisioningSovereignty:TheEndofWestphalia,eds.TrudyJacobsen,CharlesSampford,andRameshThakur(Hampshire,England:Routledge,2016),211.71JohnWestlake,ChaptersonthePrinciplesofInternationalLaw(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1894),143.

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ThecolonisingnationsofEuropehadnodifficultyinemployingnatural-lawargumentstolegitimiseterritorialexpansionoutsideofthebordersofEurope,inspiteoftheprotectionsafforded towestern Europeannationsunder thePeaceofWestphalia. In this regard, thearguments put forward by Pope Innocent IV and Francisco de Vitoria, to the effect thatbreaches of natural law would allow for legitimate intervention, were used heavily bycolonialists. This had the impact of dividing the world into those who were affordedprotection from intervention,against thosewhowerenot.According toP.A.HaymanandJohnWilliams,thisprocessofensuringthatpopulationsoutsideofEuropewerekeptfrombenefitingfromthenewconceptionofWestphaliansovereigntywasadeliberateact.ThiswasarguablydonebecausethesovereigntyoftheEuropeanstates“requiredthecontrasttothesubordinationofthecoloniestoacquiremeaning,andanormativecontrast-civilisationversusbarbarism-toacquirelegitimacy.”72This,again,demonstratesthecontinuingprocessof demarcating and entrenching ‘differences’ between the perceived ‘civilised,’ and the‘barbarians.’IntherelationsbetweenEuropeanstatesandpopulationsoutsideofEuropeanborders, theTreatiesofWestphaliareiteratedandreinforcedpreviousmedievalpractices,which reasserted the perception of the superiority of European Christianity andWestern‘civilisation.’73

EnlightenmentEra:TrueUniversalPrinciples?OrJustforthePrivilegedFew

When western European nations continued with their conquest and colonisation in theeighteenthandnineteenthcenturies,theycontinuedtodosowithasetofassumptionsabouttheproperandlegitimateconducttobehadwithnon-Europeanpopulations.EventssuchasthedraftingofFrance’s‘DeclarationoftheRightsofManandoftheCitizen,’aswellastheUnitedStates‘DeclarationofIndependence,’hadpromotedanunderstandingofthenaturaland equal rights of man in western European and American discourse.74 These events,stronglyassociatedwiththe‘Enlightenmentera,’addedcredencetothetheorythatunderthelawofnatureallmenwerecreatedequalandshould,therefore,beaffordedthesameprotectionfromthewagingofwaragainstthem.CentraltothisEnlightenmentperiodwasalso the promotion of the principles of democracy, liberty, common humanity, andhumanitarianism.Theuniversalityoftheseconcepts,andthepurportedsupportofthemininternationallaw,wereheavilypromotedbyEnlightenmentjuristsandtheorists.75Prominentfigures during this Enlightenment era included Voltaire, Immanuel Kant, Jean-JacquesRousseau, Adam Smith, and John Locke. German jurist and political theorist Carl Schmittcommented that enlightenment era thinkers held on to the belief that “humanity…is a

72P.A.HaymanandJohnWilliams,“WestphalianSovereignty:Rights,Intervention,MeaningandContext,”GlobalSociety,20,no.4,(2006):525.73RobertH.Jackson,“SovereigntyinWorldPolitics:AGlanceattheConceptualandHistoricalLandscape,”PoliticalStudies,47,no.3(1999):443.74LeonardWoolf,ImperialismandCivilisation(London:L.andV.Woolf,1933),31.75MarttiKoskenniemi,TheGentleCivilizerofNations,131.

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universal,i.e.,all-embracing,socialideal,asystemofrelationsbetweenindividuals.”76

Theimpactthisperiodofenlightenedthinkinghashadonthecurrentinternationalsystem,andmodernliberalinternationaltheory,inparticular,isarguablyimmeasurable.Forexample, Bowden argues that the dominant “architects” of international society today,“continuetobeinformedandinfluencedbyafaithintheEnlightenmentidealofprogressandhumankind’suniversal linearmarch towardmodernity.”77However,aswasevident in thenatural-lawtheoriespromotedbymedievalanddiscovery-eratheologians,aswellasintheTreatiesofWestphalia,exceptionstothepromoted‘universal’idealsbecomethedominantoccurrence.The ‘exceptions’ inenlightenmentdiscoursedirectlycontradictanypurported‘universality’inherenttotheprinciples.

TheExceptionstothe‘Universal’Principles

Whileitwaslargelypromotedinthedominantdiscourseofthenineteenthcenturythatallmenwerecreatedequal,andthereexisteduniversalprinciplesofhumanitarianism,manyalsorecognisedthatinrealityexceptionsexistedinpracticewithregardtothenatureoftheprotection and rights they truly afforded.One example can be found in thework of latenineteenthcenturyAmericandiplomat,HenryWheaton,whoarguedstronglythattheredidnotexistoneuniformsetofinternationallegalprincipleswhichappliedtoallstates:“public[international]law,withslightexceptions,hasalwaysbeen,andstillis,limitedtothecivilizedand Christian people of Europe or to those of European origin.”78 Purported universalprinciplesofequalityandhumanitycouldbesuperseded,inthisregard,inordertoallowforinterventionagainst‘uncivilised’peoples.Thestandardofcivilisation,ineffect,policedwhichpopulations could become part of the international society of states, and essentiallydeterminedwhetherornotastatewassovereign.79Thisprocessisevidentinthereasoninggivenforthe‘legitimate’conquestofAlgeria,byJamesLorimer,aScottishscholarinthelatenineteenthcentury:

GrotiuslaysitdownthatabandofrobbersisnotaState.OnthisgroundtheBarbaryStateswereneverrecognisedbyEuropeannations;andtheconquestofAlgeriabyFrancewasnotregardedasaviolationofinternationallaw…[had]Algeriacometorespecttherightsoflife

76Itisimportanttonote,however,thatSchmittwasastrongcriticofthepurported‘universal’idealsespousedbyEnlightenment thinkers, he argued that “theeighteenth-centuryhumanitarian conceptofhumanitywas apolemical denial of the then existing aristocratic-feudal system and the privileges accompanying it.” Schmittmaintainedthatanyconceptofuniversalhumanitycouldonlymaterialisewhen,“therealpossibilityofwar isprecludedandeveryfriendandenemygroupingbecomesimpossible.”Inthiscontext,itwasSchmitt’sviewthatitwasnearimpossibletobelievethattherewouldcomeatimewhentrueuniversalprinciples,suchashumanity,couldexist.Schmitt’scritiqueoftheseliberalidealswillbeexaminedindetailinanupcomingchapter.SeeCarlSchmitt,TheConceptofthePolitical[1932]trans.GeorgeSchwab(Chicago:ChicagoUniversityPress,2008),55.77BrettBowden,TheEmpireofCivilisation,2-3.78HenryWheaton,ElementsofInternationalLaw,3rded.(London:SampsonLow,SonandCo.,1863),16-17.79Forfurtheranalysis,seeGerritGong,TheStandardof‘Civilisation’inInternationalSociety(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1984),100.

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andproperty,itshistorywouldnothavepermanentlydepriveditoftherighttorecognition.80

TheconquestofAlgeriawasdeemedtobelegitimateonaccountofthefactthatacivilisednation,France,hadconqueredthe‘barbarous’stateofAlgeria.FromLorimer’sperspective,had Algeria reached a standard of civilisation, then it could have been recognised as asovereignstate,andbeprotectedfromtheconqueringFrench.

TheCivilisingRoleofEuropeans:ACursoryNodtoEnlightenmentPrinciples

Theexceptionstothe‘universal’liberalprinciplesoftheEnlightenmenterahadaprofoundimpact on both intervention and colonial policies in the nineteenth century and beyond.While exceptions continued to allow for the justification of intervention outsidewesternEurope, therewasa recognitionthat itwouldappear improper tonotacknowledgetheseuniversal principles, and effusive humanitarian rhetoric, in the practice of intervention.WesternEuropeanpoliticalelitesbegantopromotecivilisationasadutyorresponsibilityofadvancedEuropeanstospread,inordertoimprovethestandardsandconditionsofthenativepopulations in the colonies. Due to the perceived economic, political, and social‘backwardness’ofthepopulations incolonialterritories,theywere largelydeemedbytheEuropeancoloniserstobeunsuitedforholdingsovereignty.Untilsuchtimethatthesenon-Europeanpopulationsreachedasuitablestandardofcivilisation,theycouldnotbeaffordedprotectionfromtheWestphalianprincipleofnon-interferenceunderinternationallaw.Thecivilisedstateswould,therefore,takecontroloftheuncivilisedstates,andnurtureandtutorthemintheproperwaysofadvancedcivilisation.Thiswasotherwiseknownasthe‘civilisingmission,’ or ‘white man’s burden.’ This process closely mirrored Vitoria’s assumptionsconcerning the obligations of Christians to have a civilising role over non-Christianpopulations.

DiscourseonthecivilisingroleofEuropeanshadadirectimpactoninterventionandcolonialpoliciesofthelatenineteenthcentury.Oneexamplewhichdemonstratesthecentralroleof thecivilisingmissioncanbe foundduring theBerlinConferenceonAfrica in1885,wherebytheEuropeancolonialpowersagreed(amongthemselves)to“bindthemselvestowatchover thepreservationof thenative tribes,and tocare for the improvementof theconditionsoftheirmoralandmaterialwell-being,”withtheultimategoalbeingto,“instructthenativesandbringinghometothemtheblessingsofcivilisation.”81Internationallaw,inthis regard, began to become deeply embedded with the language of the standard ofcivilisation.82FromMarttiKoskenniemi’sperspective,thiswasdonedeliberately,asitwouldhave been “impossible to rationally explain, let alone to justify, why non-European

80 James Lorimer,The Institutes of the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate PoliticalCommunities,vol.1.(Edinburgh:WilliamBlackwoodandSons,1883),160-61.81Ascited inRolandParis, “InternationalPeacebuildingand theMissionCivilisatrice,”Reviewof InternationalStudies28,no.4(2002):651.82MarttiKoskenniemi,TheGentleCivilizerofNations,135.

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communitiescouldbesubjectedtomassivecolonization,”withoutthediscourseoncivilisingmissions.83

Byemployingtheuseofcivilisationallanguage,Europeancolonisingnationswereabletoreportthattheirinterventionsagainstnon-Europeanswerebasedonmoralandprincipledunderpinnings. The argument was made that humanitarian principles, as expounded byEnlightenment thinkers,werebeing followed,andonce the ‘blessingsof civilisation’werebought to thenative tribes, they couldalsoenter the ranksof ‘civilised states.’Once thisprocesshadoccurred,external interventionintotheirdomesticaffairswouldnolongerbenecessary, or indeed, legitimate. Until such time, however, the ‘civilised states’ had anobligationtointerfereintheaffairsofthe‘uncivilised,’inordertoteachandinstructtheminwesternEuropean‘universal’norms,values,andprinciples.

ThesecivilisingmissionswerenotonlybasedonthesenseofEuropeansocial,cultural,andeconomicsupremacy,butalsoontheoriesofracialsuperiority.84Acommonviewofthecolonialistsatthistimewasthatthenon-whiteskinnednativesofoverseasterritorieswere“not members of the same moral order.”85 This notion of racial superiority was deeplyentrenched in the ideology of the European colonisers, and further underpinned thelegitimisation,intheirview,ofthedifferentialtreatmentofcolonialpopulations.Aswiththelanguage used to justify violence during the conquest of theNewWorld, this nineteenthcenturylanguagepositionedthepopulationsinthecoloniesasbeinginferioranddifferent,whichhadtheeffectofhelpingtolegitimisetheviolencerequiredtoenslaveanddominatethem.

RealityofCivilisingMissions:TrailsofBrutality,Exploitation,andCulturalDislocation

Evidentinthediscourseofthecivilisingmissionatthistime,however,wasacleartensionbetweentheviolencerequiredtosuitablykeepcolonialsubjectsundercontrol,andtheliberalideals promoted by Enlightenment thinkers. As Jürgen Osterhammel has commented,methodsofwarfare,whichhadlongdisappearedfromuseagainstfellowEuropeans,werenowconsideredlegitimateinthefaceofthecolonial“enemywhodidnotseemtosubscribetothesameculturalcode.”86Intheeyesofmanycolonialists,theuseofpreviouslyoutlawedmilitaryactionwasnowdeemedtobelegitimateifwieldedagainstsubjectsinthecolonies.OneexampleofthisthinkingcanbefoundintheworkofJ.F.CFuller,aColonelintheBritishArmy in the early twentieth century. Colonel Fuller, in his bookTheReformation ofWar,writes,“insmallwarsagainstuncivilisednations,theformofwarfaretobeadoptedmust

83Ibid.84RolandParis,“InternationalPeacebuilding,”651.85A.PThornton,DoctrinesofImperialism(NewYork:JohnWiley&Sons,Inc.,1965),159.86 Jürgen Osterhammel, Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, trans. Shelly Frisch (Princeton: MarkusWienerPublishers,1997),44.

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tonewiththeshadeofthecultureexistingintheland,bywhichImeanthat,againstpeoplespossessingalowcivilisation,warmustbemorebrutalintype.”87

While European colonising nations spoke of the altruistic claims of bringing theuniversalprinciplesofequality,liberty,andhumanitarianismtothe‘hordesofbarbarians’inthecolonies,itisevidentthatoftentheirrhetoricdidnotmatchtheiractions.Ananalysisofthoselivingundercolonialruleandthe‘civilisingmission’toooftenrevealsmaltreatment,violence,forcedlabour,sexualexploitation,aswellasthelossoflandandresources.88Indeed,asWilliamBainhassuggested,thoselivingundercolonialrule:

couldonlylookonwithcynicismastheircolonialmastersspokeofthewhiteman’sburden.Theyareapttoremindallwhoask,notoftheiradvancementatthehandofabenevolent,humane and enlightened colonial ruler, but of their encounter with the West, the archaggressorofmoderntimes.89

Roland Paris offers a similar bleak view of the entire colonial process, maintaining thatexpressionsofmoralresponsibilityanduniversalvaluesbyEuropeancolonialpowersoftenmisrepresentedwhatwastrulyhappeninginthecolonies,inwhichcolonialstates,“blazedatrail of brutality, exploitation, and cultural dislocation.”90 Charles Salomon,whowroteonFrenchcolonisation in the latenineteenthcentury,arguedthat therewas“nowordmorevague, and has permitted the commission of more crimes, than that of civilization.”91Salomon saw absolute hypocrisy in discourse which professed that there were moralunderpinningstocivilisingmissions,andhefurthermaintainedthatacursorylookathistoryprovedthat“allcoloniesbeginswithviolence,injusticeandsheddingofblood:theresultiseverywhere the same; the disappearance of the native races coming into contact withcivilizedraces.”92

Inthecontextofnineteenthcenturycolonialism,there isastrongargumenttobemadethattheeffusivelegalcommitmentsandrhetoricontherightsofman,aswellasthecivilising role of the Europeans were, in fact, often misused to provide cover for brutalrepression and violence against colonial populations. While intervention and colonialismwereoftenglorifiedbythecivilisednationsastheprocessofthegiftingofcivilisation,therealitywasthatthoselivingoutsideofwesternEuropeweremoreoftenthannotsubjectedtorepressiveandviolentsubjugation,inordertoextractthemostprofitforthecolonisingnation as possible. From Hans Morgenthau’s perspective, the nineteenth century legal

87ColonelJ.F.CFuller,ascitedinBrettBowden,“CivilizationandSavagery,”279.88WilliamBain,BetweenAnarchyandSociety:TrusteeshipandtheObligationsofPower(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2003),129.89Ibid.90RolandParis,“InternationalPeacebuilding,”651.91CharlesSalomon,ascitedinMarttiKoskenniemi,TheGentleCivilizerofNations,106.92Ibid.

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commitments to ‘civilise’ clearly served the political purposes of particular nations.93Morgenthau argued that the so-called universal principles promoted by Enlightenmenttheorists were not universal at all, and indeed the ‘universal’ principles being promotedsimplysoughttoprotectthenation-statesinEurope.94FromMorgenthau’sperspective,these‘universal’principleswereneverintendedtohaveuniversalapplicability,andthereforetheseprincipleswerenevergoingtotrulyprovideprotectionforthestatesoutsidewesternEurope.ThedangersthatMorgenthaufindsinherenttothepromotionoftheseuniversalliberalidealswillbeexaminedindetailinanupcomingsectionofthisthesis.

JohnStuartMill:Non-Intervention,withExceptions

Oneofthemostinfluentialdebatesonthestandardofcivilisationinthenineteenthcenturycan be found in the work of John Stuart Mill. As an English philosopher and formeradministratorfortheEastIndiaCompany,Milliswidelyknownforhispromotionoftheliberalprinciplesofequality,liberty,andindividualfreedom,aswellasworkonthedefenceoftheprincipleofnon-intervention.Inhis1859essayAFewWordsonNon-Intervention,thecentralargumentmadebyMillwasthattheprincipleofnon-interventionshouldbepromotedandprotected. From Mill’s perspective, the relations between ‘civilised’ nations should begovernedbytheprincipleofequality,andfurthermore,internationallawshouldregulatetheconductandrelationsbetweenthesecivilisednations.95Inthisregard,Millfollowedcloselythe theorising of Francisco de Vitoria, and even referred to his doctrine on the properrelationshipbetweencivilisednationsasalsobeing the ‘LawofNations.’Milloutlinedhisstrongbeliefintheprincipleofnon-interventioninthefollowingstatement,“amongcivilisedpeoples,membersofanequalcommunityofnations,likeChristianEurope,aggressivewar,conquest and annexation are out of the question.”96 However,Mill’s liberalism has beenarguedtobeinextricablylinkedtothepracticeofexceptionalism.97OfinteresttothisthesisisMill’stheoryonthepermissibilityofcircumventingtheprincipleofnon-interventionagainstthosedeemedtobe‘barbarians’.

WhileMill’sfundamentalpremisewasthattheprincipleofnon-interventionshouldbe promoted and protected, he also outlined a number of ‘legitimate’ exceptions to thistheory, including that intervention against ‘barbarians’ could be permissible under somecircumstances.FromMill’sperspective,tosupposethatthesameinternationalprinciplesofprotection, and the same rules of internationalmorality, could operate between civilisednationsand“thebarbarians”inthecolonies,wasaverygraveerror.98Millarguedstronglythatifonewastocharacteriseinterventionagainst“barbarouspeople”asa“violationofthe

93HansMorgenthau,“ToInterveneorNottoIntervene,”ForeignAffairs45,no.3(1967):425.94Ibid.,425-26.95JohnStuartMill,“AFewWordsonNon-Intervention,”[1859]NewEnglandReview27,no.3(2006):260.96Ibid.97BeateJahn,“BarbarianThoughts:ImperialisminthePhilosophyofJohnStuartMill,”ReviewofInternationalStudies31,no.3(2005):599.98JohnStuartMill,“AFewWordsonNon-Intervention,”259.

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Law of Nations,” itwould only show one to be uneducated on the subject.99 As such, inkeeping with the reasoning of many philosophers and theologians before him, MillmaintainedthattherewereexceptionstotheprotectionthattheLawofNationsafforded.Inparticular,he suggested that therewere somewhoby reasonof limited facultywerenotdeserving of protection from intervention by outsiders. Mill defined these people as“barbarians,”whohadlimitedcapabilities,nocivilisedgovernment,andawoefulinabilitytoreciprocate in international agreements.100 This inability to abide by the principle ofreciprocityandfollowinternationallaw,inconjunctionwiththeir‘uncivilised’governments,made maintaining a stable relationship with the ‘barbarians’ impossible. If a stablerelationshipcouldnotbemaintained,Millbelievedthatcivilisednationscouldnot justbecontentwith taking a defensive position, rather amore aggressive intervention could berequired.101Civilisednationswouldbepermitted, inMill’sview,toconquerthebarbarousnation, and “assert somuchauthorityover them,and sobreak their spirit.”102While thislanguage appears to portray seemingly unlimited bounds to the intervention permissibleagainstbarbarians,Milldidlatertheorisethatinterventionbycivilisednationsshouldbeforthe“benefit”ofthebarbarians.103

Afterdividingtheworldintothesuperiorcivilised,versustheinferiorbarbarians,Millmadethefurtherargumentthatwhileinterventioncouldtakeplace,itshouldoccurwiththeend objective of bringing the ‘barbarians’ to a standard of civilisation.While fromMill’sreasoning the barbarians had no international legal rights as a nation, he believed theyshould, at the earliest possible opportunity, obtain the necessary conditions to becomeone.104 InhisessayOnLiberty,Millexpandedupon this idea,arguing that“despotism [bycivilisednations]isalegitimatemodeofgovernmentindealingwithbarbarians,providedtheendbetheirimprovement,andthemeansjustifiedbyactuallyeffectingthatend.”105Fromthisstatementitcanbeinterpretedthatinterventioncouldbeviewedasbothmorallyandlegally legitimate, if theobjectivewas to improve the lives of thesebarbarians, and if byassistingthemitwaslikelytheywouldobtaincivilisedstatus.FromMill’sperspective,aformof‘benigncolonialism’orcivilisingmissioncouldexist,wherebytheadvancednationswouldteachandnurturethebarbarians,inthehopesofassistingthemingainingcivilisedstatus.106

99Ibid.100Ibid.101Ibid.102Ibid.103Ibid.SeealsoJohnStuartMill,OnLiberty[1859](London:TheWalterScottPublishingCo.Ltd,2011),19.104JohnStuartMill,“AFewWordsonNon-Intervention,”259.105JohnStuartMill,OnLiberty,19.106WhereMill’sargumentbecomesmorecomplicatedisinhisassertionthatinterventionandcivilisingmissionscouldnotbringaboutfreeandlegitimategovernment,andtherebycivilisedstatus, inallcircumstances.FromMill’s perspective, therewere clear limitations to the civilising role of Europeans, as he believed that itwasimpossibletoexport freedomand legitimategovernmenttocolonisedpeoples, if theyhadnotdemonstratedsomecapacitytoobtainitthroughtheirownvolition.MillarguedinRepresentativeGovernment:“thegovernmentofapeoplebyitselfhasameaningandareality;butsuchathingasgovernmentofonepeoplebyanotherdoes

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IntheworkofJohnStuartMillthereisaclearperpetuationofthetheorythatrelationsbetween civilised nations are to be governed by the principle of equality, whereas therelationsbetweencivilisedand‘barbarian’peopleswerehierarchical,centredonthenotionthat thebarbarianswere somehow ‘different’. It is clear that the characterisationsof thecivilisedversusbarbarousnationswereemployedasanexclusionarytacticduringMill’stime,whichattemptedtojustifyandlegitimiseinterventionagainstpeoplesdeemedtobeontheperiphery of international relations. It is Mill’s assumption that there existed a rank ofsocieties,onascaleofcivilisation,whichdeterminedwhetheryouwereaffordedtherightstoso-calleduniversalprinciplesofequalityandliberty.Contemporaryscholars,suchasBeateJahn, have argued that Mill’s philosophy was, “rooted in a need to justify the politicalinequalityofhumanityonculturalgrounds.”107Political theorist,BhikhuParekh, takesthisideaeven further,with theassertion thatMill’sarticulationshad theeffectofcreating“aManicheantheoryoftwoworlds,oneisanareaoflight,theotherthatofdarkness,oneisperfect andwithoutblemish, theother irredeemablyevil, andeachgovernedby radicallydifferentprinciplesandnorms.”108

TheworkofMillonnon-intervention,andthecreationof‘legitimateexceptions’totheprincipleinthefaceofthe‘uncivilised,’continuestoidentifywithissuesthatarerelevantincontemporaryinternationalrelations.Indeed,fromtheperspectiveofCarolPrager,Mill’sworkis“timeless.”109Itisundeniablethatexceptionstothenormofnon-intervention,suchasthoseemployedbyMill,canbefoundinabundanceincontemporarypoliticaldiscourse.Mill’spositionthatinhumanitythereexistthosewithunequalmoralstatus,andthereforeunequalrights,resonatesstronglywiththediscourseemployedbyoutsideintervenersinEastTimor.IntheTimorcontext,thecharacterisationoftheentiresocietyasbeingprimitiveandinferiorisanalogoustoMill’sbarbarianclassification.FromthecolonisationofEastTimorbyPortugal,tomorecontemporaryinterventionsbyIndonesia,andlatertheUnitedNations,theTimoresewerelargelydeterminedtohavelimitedcapabilities,nocivilisedgovernment,andan inability to reciprocate in international agreements. These determinations madeaggressiveinterventionagainstthemappearmorelegitimate.Whenprovidingrationalefortheirinterventions,eachoftheexternalactorsusedthejustificationthatitwasbeingdoneforthebettermentoftheTimorese,eitherbynurturingthemtowardsadvancedcivilisation,ordevelopingliberalprinciplesofdemocratisationandgoodgovernance.ItwasifMillhadwrittenahandbookonhowtojustifyinterventioninthedomesticaffairsofanothernation,andeachoftheintervenersfollowedittotheletter.Inthisregard,Mill’sexceptionstothe

notandcannotexist.”Millwasof theopinionthat if thecolonialpopulationsdidnothave“sufficient loveoflibertytobeabletowrestitfrommerelydomesticoppressors,”thenthelibertybestowedonthembyoutsidehandswould not be real and legitimate. See John StuartMill,Considerations on Representative Government[1861](London:TheElectricBookCompany,2001),320;and“AFewWordsonNon-Intervention,”262.107BeateJahn,“BarbarianThoughts,”600.108BhikhuParekh,ascitedinInderS.Marwah,“ComplicatingBarbarismandCivilization:Mill’sComplexSociologyofHumanDevelopment,”HistoryofPoliticalThought32,no.2(2011):350.109CarolPrager,“InterventionandEmpire:JohnStuartMillandInternationalRelations,”PoliticalStudies53(2005):621.

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principleofnon-interventioncontinuetohaveastrongrelevancetoday.

Conclusion

This chapter has traced the evolution of the preeminent discourse on the standard ofcivilisation from the thirteenth through until the late nineteenth century. In commentarywhichwasfirstadvancedbyPopeInnocentIV,thedominantdiscoursepromotedacrossthistime period was the theory that exceptionality existed in international relations, wherecertainpeoples,byvirtueoftheirperceiveduncivilisedstatus,werenotaffordedprotectionfromexternalinterventionandinterference.Thestandardofcivilisationwasemployedwiththe clearobjectiveof creatingahierarchical international system,whereby the castingofpeoples as ‘barbarians’ and ‘different’was an attempt to legitimise violent action againstthem. Civilised nations, on the other hand, were afforded protection from externalintervention,owingtothecomityofnationsandthegoverningprinciplethatequalityamongthem should regulate their conduct. Due to their ‘civilised’ status, the norm of non-interventionaffordedthemprotectionfrominterferencebyexternalforces.

By the eighteenth century, any intervention against ‘civilised’ western Europeanstates hadbeenoutlawed. In this regard, international lawwas employed consistently tolegitimisethedifferentialtreatmentofthe‘barbarians’outsideofwesternEurope.AsJean-JacquesRousseauobserved,“everywherethestrong[are]armedagainsttheweakwiththeformidablepowerofthelaw,”andasaresult,“justiceandtruthmustbebenttoservethemostpowerful:thatistherule.”110TherefusaltorecognisethoseoutsideofwesternEuropeashavingsovereigncontroloverterritory,resources,andpeoples,hadtheimpactofgreatlypreventing non-Europeans from shaping the development of contemporary internationallaw.111 Thismeant that from the infancy of the international legal system, non-Europeanvaluesandnormsweresidelined,whileEuropeanoneswereheldtobe‘universal,’bothinnature and application. Civilisation was dominantly perceived as applying to westernEuropeansonly,andfromOsterhammel’sperspective,thisnotionthatnon-EuropeanswereutterlydifferentfromEuropeans,“wasacornerstoneofcolonialistthought.”112

Thereweregenuineattemptsbyphilosophersandtheologianstobuildsomemeasureof protection for indigenous populations against the violent actions of colonisers andconquerors.TheseattemptscancertainlybefoundinInnocentandVitoria’stheorisingonthenaturalrightsofman,andalso intherightspromotedbyEnlightenment-erathinkers.Thetheoretical perspectives analysedduring this timeframe indicate that thoughtwas indeedgiven to theneed tobetterprotect thosedeemed tobeon the ‘outside’of international

110Jean-JacquesRousseau,“TheStateofWar,”inRousseauonInternationalRelations,eds.StanleyHoffmannandDavidP.Fidler(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1991),33.111AnneOrford,ReadingHumanitarian Intervention:HumanRightsand theUseofForce in InternationalLaw(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003),28.112JürgenOsterhammel,Colonialism,108.

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society.However, timeandagain, exceptions touniversalprinciples andnon-interventioncontinued to give ‘civilised’ nations the mandate to commit their patterns of violentdominationandsubjugation.Exceptionalityisacontradictionofuniversalism.Ifexceptionsexist,andindeed,arebeingpromotedandwieldedastoolsofintervention,itisclearthattheliberal‘universal’rightsbeingadvanced,nevertrulyexistedinreality.Indeed,anexaminationofthe ‘civilisingmissions,’whichpurportedtoupholdtheseuniversalvalues,revealedtheinherenttensionsbetweentheliberalidealssuchasequalityandhumanitarianism,versustheviolencerequiredtokeepcolonialsubjectsundercontrol.

Thewritingandtheorisingofthepreeminenttheologians,philosophers,andscholarsin this chapter has had a significant impact on later discourse on intervention and thestandardofcivilisation.AsAnghieargues,earlytheologians,suchasFranciscodeVitoria,weresignificant contributors to the development of a set of concepts and arguments whichcontinuetobeemployedbymajorpowersincontemporaryinternationalrelations.113FromAnghie’s perspective, these concepts, “are simultaneously used to describe and evaluate,compareandcontrast,commendandcondemn.”114Themannerinwhichinternationallawwaswieldedinthenarrativeofliberalinternationalism,whichrepresentsitselfasthe“legalconscience of the civilized world,”115 also has resonance in contemporary internationalrelations scholarship. Indeed, these phenomena are certainly evident in the case of EastTimor,wherebyexceptionalitytothenormofnon-interventionwasapplied,timeandagain,tolegitimiseinterferenceandmilitaryoccupationinthecountry.WhentheUnitedNationsandtheAustralian-ledInternationalForceforEastTimor(INTERFET),intervenedinEastTimorinthelate1990sandearly2000s,theydidsounderthebannerofuniversalhumanitarianprinciples,andusedinternationallawtojustifytheirpresenceinthecountry.The‘conscience’ofthecivilisedworldwascalledupon,anditwasdeterminedthatinterventionwasnecessaryto save the inferior, poor, andweak Timorese. East Timorwas determined to be on theperipheryofinternationalsociety,andthe‘failing’ofthestatewasdeemedtobecausingathreattointernationalpeaceandsecurity.Thedangersofemployingthisdiscoursewillbeexaminedinfurtherdetail inanupcomingchapter. Inthenextchapter,twentiethcenturythinkingonthestandardofcivilisationwillbeanalysed.

113AntonyAnghie,“FranciscodeVitoriaandtheColonialOriginsofInternationalLaw,”332-33.114Ibid.115MarttiKoskenniemi,TheGentleCivilizerofNations,176.

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ChapterTwo:TheChangingFacesoftheCivilisedandtheBarbarians

Serious challenges to the standard of civilisation project emerged in the early twentiethcentury,withsignificantshiftsintheunderstandingofwhointheinternationalsystemcouldbe deemed ‘civilised,’ and who were the ‘barbarians’. While eighteenth and nineteenthcenturydiscoursehadtendedtoportraywesternEuropeanstobeenlightenedcivilisers,withthoseonthe‘outside’castasthebarbarians,thetwentiethcenturysawadistruptionofthislogic.Thischapterwillexaminethechallengesandshiftstothediscourseoncivilisation,withan early focus on emerging classical realist critiques of the liberal underpinnings of thecivilisingmissions.ItwillthenexaminehowthechangestothediscourseofthestandardofcivilisationlargelycameaboutasaresultoftheunprecedentedtotalwarsofWorldWarIandWorldWarII.Duringtheseworldwars,thediscourseofcivilisationwasheavilyinterwovenintothepropagandaofbothsides, inordertodemoniseanddehumanisetheenemy.Theintenselyviolentactionscommittedduringthewars,however,meantthatforthefirsttimethe ‘barbarian’ was seen to be dominantly inside the borders of Europe. This arguablychanged the way that Europeans saw themselves, and also had an impact on theirunderstandingofthenatureofpeopleoutsideofEurope.

Following both world wars, there were concerted attempts to create a peacefulinternational environment, based on liberal and idealistic beliefs in a common humanity,universalhumanrights,and thepossibilityofaharmonyof interestsamongstates.Theseperiods will be examined, with a particular focus on the attempt to internationalise thecontrolofcolonialterritories,firstlyundertheauspicesoftheLeagueofNations,andlaterundertheUnitedNations(UN).Whilethetwointernationalsystemsofcontrollingcolonies,and the peoples in them, were touted to represent significant changes to the relationsbetweenthoseoncedeemedthe‘civilised’andthe‘barbarians,’itisclearthatthecastingofcertainpeoplesintermsofcivililisationcontinuedtoshapetheunderstandingofpermissibleactions against them. It appears that the altruistic liberal claims of ‘developing’ peoplesoutsideofEurope,nowunderpinnedbythetwentiethcenturysensethattherecouldbea‘universalconscienceofhumanity,’waslargelyunsupportedbyanyrealconvictionoraction.Inthisregard,internationallaw,andthenewsystemsitsupported,revealedhowthebasicstructureofthecivilisingmissionswerereproducedandrebrandedinthetwentiethcentury.

JohnA.Hobson:The‘Parasitic’Civilised

Over the course of the twentieth century, a number of scholars and theorists began toseriously challenge the liberal anduniversal principleswhichwerepurported tounderpincolonialism and civilising missions. One such scholar was John A. Hobson, an Englisheconomistandsocialscientist,whowroteatthebeginningofthetwentiethcentury.Hobsonwas known at the time as being one of the most ardent critics of colonialism and

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imperialism,116thoughamoredetailedreadingofhisworksrevealsthat,likeJohnStuartMill,hebelievedthatinterventionbycivilisednationsagainst“lowerraces”wasnot“primafacieillegitimate.”117 Hobson argued that intervention was justifiable if civilised nations wereacting,“primarilytosecurethesafetyandprogressofthecivilisationoftheworld,”118andiftheywerealso,“acting for the realgoodof thesubject race.”119However,whereHobsondepartsfromMill is inhisstrongbeliefthattherehasneverbeenalegitimateexample, ineitherhistoricalorcontemporarydiscourse,wherethe“theoryofwhitegovernment,”hastrulysoughttosecuretheinterestsofthe“governedpeoples”inthecolonies.120Indeed,fromHobson’sperspective, the so-called ‘civilisednations’of theearly twentieth centurywereparasites, whose predatory actions were visible in their exploitation of the peoples andnaturalresourcesinthecolonies:

Theconditionofthewhiterulersoftheselowerracesisdistinctivelyparasitic;theyliveuponthesenatives,theirchiefworkbeingthatoforganisingnativelabourfortheirsupport.Thenormalstateofsuchacountryisoneinwhichthemostfertilelandsandthemineralresourcesareownedbywhitealiensandworkedbynativesunder theirdirection,primarily for theirgain:theydonotidentifythemselveswiththeinterestofthecountryoritspeople,butremainan alien body of sojourners, a ‘parasite’ upon the carcass of its ‘host’ destined to extractwealthfromthecountryandretiringtoconsumeitathome.121

ItisHobson’sassertionthatsovereignstatesdonotactintheinterestofotherexternalactors.Instead,“modernhistory isselfish,materialistic,short-sighted…[and]variedbyoccasionalcollusion.”122Hobson’sargumentsdemonstrateclearlyhiscriticismoftheliberal,idealistic,anduniversalrhetoricemployedtoattempttojustifycolonialismandthe‘civilising’missionsofhistime.Indoingso,Hobsonprovidesanearlyglimmerofclassicalrealisttheory,whichseekstoexplaintheinherentlyselfishnatureatthecoreofstatebehaviourininternationalrelations. The utility of employing a classical realist perspective, to understand themotivations of state behaviour and provide a critique of the liberal underpinnings of thestandardofcivilisationdiscourse,willbeexaminedincloserdetailinanupcomingsectionofthischapter.

116RolandParis,“InternationalPeacebuildingandthe'MissionCivilisatrice,”ReviewofInternationalStudies28,no.4(2002):651.117JohnA.Hobson,Imperialism:AStudy,3rded.(London:UnwinHyman,1938),232.118Ibid.119Ibid.120Ibid.,283121Ibid.,282.122Ibid.Englishpoliticalscientistandphilosopher,GoldsworthyLowesDickinson,agreedwithHobson’ssentimentthatthe‘civilisednations’didnothavethebest interestsofthe‘subjectrace,’ inmind.Dickinsonarguedthat“neverhasanystatemadeanyconquestinordertobenefitthepeopleconcerned,andnotinordertobenefititself.”Dickinsonfurtherclaimsthatstatesconquerbywarandviolence,andthenlabelitacivilisingmission,onlyinorderto“secureorextendtheirpower.”SeeGoldsworthyLowesDickinson,CausesofInternationalWar(NewYork:HarcourtBrace&Howie,1920),52-54.

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While from Hobson’s perspective, intervention against ‘lower races,’ couldtheoretically be legitimate under narrow circumstances, he limited the possibility ofintervention being carried out even further by arguing that in order for it to be deemedlegitimate, it would need to be carried out by “an organised representative of civilisedhumanity.”123Hobsonhadrecognisedthatstateshadconsistentlydemonstratedpatternsofself-centric and self-serving action, and as a result he was not willing to lay legitimateinterventioninthehandsofindividualstates.Hobsonwasoftheopinionthatuntila“genuineinternational council” existed,which had the ability to oversee, accredit, and supervise acivilisednationwiththedutyofeducatingthe“lowerraces,”theninterventionshouldnottakeplace.124ThisconceptforeshadowsthelatercreationoftheLeagueofNationsmandatesystem,createdtodealwithcolonialterritoriesfollowingtheendofWorldWarI,whichwillbeexaminedindetailbelow.

Despite his apparent championing of the idea of the creation of an overarchingsovereignpowerintheinternationalsystem,Hobsonwentontoacknowledgethathehadstrong reservations about the probable success of a genuine international council. ItwasHobson’s fear that “self-chosenoligarchsamong thenations,”mayattempt toderide theprocess,“underthecloakofthecivilisingmission,”andfurthermore,thesecivilisednationsmaylearntoliveparasiticallyonthelowerraces,andimposeonthemfraudulentacts,inthenameof the lower races “owngood.”125Hobson further feared that collusionwould takeplaceamongthedominantnationsofthetime,inordertowieldcontrolovertheinternationalcouncil,fortheirownself-interest.126Hobsoncalledthisfear,“thelargestandgravestperilofthe early future.”127 It is clear, again, in Hobson’s theorising that he is demonstrating aclassical realist perspective in attempting to explain the inherent dangers in installing afictitious‘sovereign’powerintheinternationalsystem.Asdetailedbelow,Hobson’sfearsofthesedangerswerenotunfounded.

WorldWarOne:BarbariansontheInside

WorldWarImarksanimportanthistoricalturningpointforthediscourseonthestandardofcivilisation.TheWorldWarresultedinthemasssocialandmilitarymobilisationofpeopleandresourcesacrosstheglobe,whileatthesametime,technologicaladvancesallowedforthespreadofpropaganda,withextremelystrongnationalisticundertones,neverbeforeseenonthisscale.Thediscourseofcivilisationwasheavilyinterwovenintothiswartimepropaganda,withDanielPicknotingthatitwouldbedifficulttooverestimatethecentralityofthenotionof‘civilisation’inthelanguageofWorldWarI.128Timeandagain,politicalleadersemployed 123JohnA.Hobson,Imperialism,285.124Ibid.,239.125Ibid.126Ibid.127Ibid. 128DanielPick,WarMachine:TheRationalisationofSlaughterintheModernAge(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1993),153.

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languagetoseparate‘us’from‘them,’withananalysisofthediscourseshowingthatbothsidesofthewarregularlyaccusedeachotherofcommittingbarbaricacts,whileatthesametimebothalsoclaimingtobeontherightsideofcivilisedsociety.129MarkB.SalterprovidestheexamplethatitwaslargelybelievedinBritainduringthewarthatthecitizensofGermanywere“visiblymarked-ifnotbyhis/herskincolour,thenbyhis/herunmaskablebarbarousbehaviour.”130Thisrhetoricaimedtobothbolsterstrongsentimentsofnationalidentity,aswellastodemoniseanddehumanisethe‘external’enemy.

Bywarsend,theAlliedPowerswerevictoriousagainsttheCentralPowers,atthecostofapproximatelyseventeenmillioncivilianandmilitarycasualties.Significantly,thewarhadbeenwagedbyEuropeans,againstEuropeans,andasaresulttheconcessionhadtobemadethatthe‘barbarian’enemymusthavebeenpresentwithinEuropeanborders.Foronce,the‘barbarians’ were not exclusively on the ‘outside,’ and in the colonies. Indeed, E.H CarrrecognisedthattheonsetofWorldWarIboughtwithitachangingperceptionofwhowascivilisedandwhowasuncivilised.Fromhisperspective,therealityofwarandconflicthadbeen “spirited out of sight by the political thinkers ofWestern civilisation,”131 for over ahundredyears.AccordingtoCarr,duringthisperiod“thebrutalitieswhich,intheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturies,wereconfinedtodealingsbetweencivilizedanduncivilizedpeopleswereturnedbycivilisedpeoplesagainstoneanother.”132

Thefactthatsuchviolentandbrutalactionshadbeencommittedinsidetheboundsof Europe laid a challenge to the belief of the civilisational superiority of white westernEuropeans. R.J. Vincent argues that the challenging of the civilisational superiority ofEuropeanswasadirectresultofthe‘barbarity’oftheirownactions,“whites[were]layingtorestthenotionoftheirinstinctivecomitybybutcheringeachotherinsuchunprecedentednumbers.”133Furthertothis,VincentarguedthattheactionsofEuropeansduringWorldWarI had resulted in the challenging of the belief that advanced civilisation could only beEuropean.134Intheaftermathofthisunprecedentedtotalwar,soshockedwerepeoplethatthislevelofbrutalityandviolencecouldoccurinEurope,andbeperpetratedbyEuropeans,that there were calls for the creation of an overarching international governing body toensurethatdevastationonthisscalewouldnotoccuragain.135TheLeagueofNationswas

129 See for example WoodrowWilson, “Joint Address to Congress Leading to a Declaration of War AgainstGermany,” The U.S National Archives and Records Administration, accessed 08 August, 2016,http://www.archives.gov/historical-docs/todays-doc/?dod-date=402.130MarkB.Salter,OnBarbarians:TheDiscourseof‘Civilisation’inInternationalTheory(BritishColumbia,Canada:UniversityofBritishColumbia,1999),148.131E.HCarr,TheTwentyYears’Crisis1919-1939:AnIntroductiontotheStudyofInternationalRelations,2nded.(London:MacMillan&Co.Ltd,1946),225.132Ibid.133R.J.Vincent,“RacialEquality,”inTheExpansionofInternationalSociety,eds.HedleyBullandAdamWatson(NewYork:ClarendonPress,1984),240.134Ibid.135SeeforexampleWoodrowWilson,“ThePuebloSpeech:25September1919,”StanfordUniversity,accessed17May,2016,

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subsequentlyfoundedon10January1920,withitsCovenantmaintainingthatthepurposeofthe organisationwas to “promote international cooperation and to achieve internationalpeaceandsecurity.”136

WilsonianIdealismandtheLeagueofNations

Intheimmediatepost-warera,UnitedStatesPresidentWoodrowWilsonwasattheforefrontofeffortstocreateapeacefulinternationalenvironment,basedontheferventbeliefinthepossibility of a harmony of interests among states. Wilson, and his supporters, arguedstronglythatpeaceandcooperationbetweenstateswasacommonanduniversalgoal,whichwould,intheend,supersedeanyconflictinginterests,orantagonisticpolitics.Inthisregard,therewasthoughttobeacommonanduniversalinterestinthemaintenanceofinternationalpeace and order.137 Underpinning this Wilsonian or utopian theory, was a faith that“regardlessofraceorreligion,”fundamentalanduniversalprinciplesofrightswouldcreatea“universal conscience ofmankind.”138 In outlining his vision for the future,Wilson reliedheavilyuponpurportedexpressionsofabsoluteanduniversalliberalprinciplesofhumanity;suchasequality,democracy,andhumanitarianism.InapublicaddressinAlabamain1913,Wilsonassertedhisunwaveringpositiononthesemoralprinciples:“Wedarenotturnfromtheprinciplethatmorality,andnotexpediency,isthethingthatmustguideus,andthatwewillnevercondoneiniquitybecauseitismostconvenienttodoso.”139

As E.HCarr later commented, this utopian theoryof the international systemwaslargelyborrowedfromtheworkdonebyearlierEnlightenment-erathinkers.140ForadvocatesoftheWilsonianvision,optimismconcerningapeacefulandcooperativefuturewasbasedonthe,“tripleconvictionthatthepursuitofthegoodwasamatterofrightreasoning,thatthespread of knowledgewould soonmake it possible for everyone to reason rightly on thisimportantsubject,andthatanyonewhoreasonedrightlyonitwouldnecessarilyactright.”141Inorder toachieve thisharmonyof interests in the international system,and inorder tospread and entrench these universal and moral rights, Wilson stressed the need forsupportiveinternationallawandinstitutions.

InWilson’sfamous‘FourteenPoints’address,hecalledstronglyforthecreationofaninternationalinstitutiontoguaranteethepoliticalindependenceandterritorialintegrityofall

http://sheg.stanford.edu/upload/Lessons/Unit%209_WWI%20and%20the%201920s/League%20of%20Nations%20ORIGINAL%20DOCUMENTS.doc.136LeagueofNations,“PreambleoftheCovenantoftheLeagueofNations,”YaleLawSchool,accessed01April,2016,http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp.137E.H.Carr,TheTwentyYearsCrisis,88-89.138WoodrowWilson,ascitedinThomasKnock,ToEndAllWars:WoodrowWilsonandtheQuestforaNewWorldOrder(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1992),8.139WoodrowWilson,“AddressBeforetheSouthernCommercialCongressinMobile,Alabama:October27,1913,”TheAmericanPresidencyProject,June15,2016,http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65373.140E.HCarr,TheTwentyYears’Crisis,24-25.141Ibid.

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states.142Wilsonmaintainedthatthisneworganisationwouldmake“theacceptedprinciplesof international law,”become,“theactual ruleofconductamongthegovernmentsof theworld.”143After the internationalpeace treaty todealwith theaftermathof thewarwassignedatVersailles,atwhichthelegalbasisfortheLeagueofNationswasaffirmed,WilsonsentamessagebacktotheAmericanpublic,declaringthattheneworganisation:“associatesthefreeGovernmentsoftheworldinapermanentleagueinwhichtheyarepledgedtousetheirunitedpowertomaintainpeacebymaintainingrightandjustice.Itmakesinternationallawarealitysupportedbyimperativesanctions.”144AsKoskenniemicomments,internationallawwasseenbyutopianidealists,suchasWilson,asthetoolwhichwould“channelpoliticaltensionsintocommittees,assemblies,andformaldisputesettlementmechanisms.”145Inthisregard,theutopianthinkersoftheearlytwentiethcenturyviewedthecreationoftheLeagueofNationsasbeingthewatershedmomentthatwouldendthepossibilityofwar.Theysawitscreationasapathwaytowardsaworldstate,whichwouldembraceallofhumanitywithit.

Giventhepurportedglobalexpressionsofabsoluteanduniversal liberalprinciples,whichwere so strongly argued tounderpin the creationof the League, thequestionwasraisedastowhatshouldbedonewiththecolonialpossessionsofthedefeatedstatesofWorldWar I.Wilsonwasreportedly fixedonthebelief that thereneededtobean internationalsolutiontothe‘colonialproblem.’146Asoneofhisfourteenpoints,Wilsondeclaredthatallcolonialclaimsshouldbebasedon,“thestrictobservanceoftheprinciplethatindeterminingallsuchquestionsofsovereigntytheinterestsofthepopulationsconcernedmusthaveequalweight.”147 Formany,Wilson’s idealismwas an inspiring rallying call for human equality,whereheappearedtocondemnthemisuseofpoliticalpowerinthecolonies,andtheunequalvoice afforded to those living under colonial rule.148 An expectation was generated thatsomething ‘new’needed tobedone, todealwith thecolonial territories.AsKoskenniemiasserts,theseterritoriesgrewtorepresent,“aformofcolonialadministration[whichcould]nolongerbecarriedoutbysinglecolonialsovereigns,butbytheinternationalcommunity.”149

142WoodrowWilson,“PresidentWoodrowWilson’sFourteenPoints:January,1918,”YaleLawSchool:TheAvalonProject,accessedJune15,2016,http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp.143WoodrowWilson,ascitedinLloydE.Ambrosius,“WoodrowWilson,Alliances,andtheLeagueofNations,”TheJournaloftheGildedAgeandProgressiveEra5,no.2(2006):148.144Ibid.145 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),461.146Ibid.,5.147WoodrowWilson,“PresidentWoodrowWilson’sFourteenPoints.”148 Bhikhu C. Parekh, “Liberalism and Colonialism: A Critique of Locke and Mill,” in The Decolonisation ofImagination:Culture,KnowledgeandPower,eds.BhikhuC.ParekhandJanNederveenPieterse(NewJersey:ZedBooks,1995),81.149MarttiKoskenniemi,TheGentleCivilizerofNations,173.

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TheLeagueofNationsMandateSystem

DuringthedeliberationsonwhattodowiththecolonialpossessionsofthedefeatedstatesofWorldWar I, theconceptofasystemwherebyexternalstateswouldhaveformal legalcontrolandguardianshipovertheterritorieswassuggestedintheworkofGeneralJanSmuts,aninfluentialSouthAfricanandBritishCommonwealthmilitary leader.GeneralSmutshadarguedthatthecoloniesofthelosingpowersofWorldWarIweretoouncivilisedtoproperlyengage in self-governance, and thus proposed that external states, namely the victoriousAllied Forces, should be endowed with the responsibility to administer their affairs.150AccordingtoSmuts,asaresultofthevariancesintheconditionsoflifeinthecolonies,thedegreeofthe‘guidinghand’bytheexternalstatewouldneedtovaryconsiderably.151Inhisview, theGermancolonies in thePacificandAfricawere identifiedas requiringparticularattention, as they were “inhabited by barbarians, who not only cannot possibly governthemselves, but to whom it would be impracticable to apply any ideas of political self-determinationintheEuropeansense.”152ThispositionpromotedbySmutmirrorscloselytheearlierbelief inEuropean‘civilisingmissions,’ashasbeenexaminedinprecedingsections.WilsonandhisadvisorsborrowedheavilyfromSmuts’proposalinordertoestablishanewsystem for controlling colonial territories, which would be called the League of NationsMandateSystem.

UnderArticle 22 of the Covenant of the League ofNations, itwas decreed that asystemwouldbecreatedwherebythecoloniesandterritorieswhichwerenolongerunderthesovereigncontrolofthelosingstatesofWorldWarIwouldbeheldina“sacredtrustofcivilisation.”153 Owing to their inability to “stand by themselves under the strenuousconditionsofthemodernworld,”154theseterritorieswouldbeentrustedtothetutelageofso-called ‘advancednations,’ namely the victors ofWorldWar I. The League agreedwithSmuts’ assessment that the character and level of control wielded over the mandateterritorieswouldneedtodiffer,basedonanassessmentoftheirstageofdevelopment,theireconomic conditions, and the geographical locationof the territory.155 Theassessmentofdevelopment or, in other words, each territory’s position in the hierarchy of civilisation,wouldnecessarilybeconductedbyrepresentativesofthese‘advancednations.’ThedraftersoftheCovenantarrivedattheconclusionthattherewerethreecivilisationalcategoriestothemandatesystem,whichwereknownasA,B,andCclassmandates.156

150J.C.Smuts,TheLeagueofNations:APracticalSuggestion(London:HodderandStoughton,1918),25.151Ibid.,16.152Ibid.,15.153TheLeagueofNations,“Article22oftheCovenantoftheLeagueofNations,”YaleLawSchool,accessed01April,2016,http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp.154Ibid.155Ibid.156 Refer to the table below for details on themandate territories, aswell as their respective administrativepowers.Thefirstcategory(A) includedtheterritorieswhichhadpreviouslybelongedtotheOttomanEmpire,theseweredeemedtohavereachedafairlyadvancedstateofdevelopment,andthereforeadministrativeadvice

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Table1.TheLeagueofNationsMandateTerritories 157

andassistancewouldonlybeuntilsuchtimethattheywouldbeableto“standalone.”Thesecondcategory(B)was chiefly those of Central Africa, who were deemed to have demonstrated a lesser level of civilisation.Administrationinthiscasewouldnecessarilybemoreheavy-handed.Forthethirdcategoryofmandates(C),the‘advancednations’wouldhavenearlyunbridledcontrolovertheterritories.AccordingtotheLeague,thisgroup,primarilyfromSouth-WestAfricaandtheSouthPacific,requiredthehighestlevelofadministrativecontrol,owingtothe“sparsenessoftheirpopulation,ortheirsmallsize,ortheirremotenessfromthecentresofcivilization.”Theadministratingnationshadthepowertowieldsuchwiderangingcontroloverthese‘thirdclass’territories,thattheLeaguemaintainedthattheycouldactasifthemandatewasanintegralpartofthe‘advancednations’ownsovereignterritory.SeeTheLeagueofNations,Article22.157 Information on mandate territories and administrative powers was gathering from Neta Crawford,“DecolonisationasanInternationalNorm:TheEvolutionofPractices,ArgumentsandBeliefs,”inEmergingNormsofJustifiedIntervention:ACollectionofEssaysfromaProjectoftheAmericanAcademyofArtsandSciences,eds.LauraReedandCarlKaysen(Cambridge:CommitteeonInternationalSecurityStudiesandtheAmericanAcademyofArtsandSciences,1993),41.

Class MandateTerritory ‘Advanced’Nation:AdministrativePower

A

Iraq

Palestine*

SyriaandLebanon

*(included modern-day IsraelandJordan)

GreatBritain

GreatBritain

France

B

Togo

Cameroons

Tanganyika

Ruanda-Urundi

FranceandGreatBritain

FranceandGreatBritain

GreatBritain

Belgium

C

South-WestAfrica

NewGuinea

Samoa

Marshall,Caroline,andMarianaIslands

SouthAfrica

Australia

NewZealand

Japan

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The concept of guardianship and tutelage over the mandate territories wasrepresentedatthetimeasasignificantshiftintherelationshipbetweenperceivedcivilisedanduncivilisedstates.Thecommitmentmadebythecivilisednationswasthattheywouldaltruisticallyassistthedevelopmentofcolonialpopulations,andovertimetheirteachingandnurturingwouldhelpthe‘uncivilised’becomeenlightenedandcivilisedsocieties.Thiswouldbe based strongly onWilsonian idealism and the liberal principles of self-determination,liberty,andhumanitarianism.WhilethisprocesswaslargelycontractedouttothevictorsofWorldWar I, inordertoretainsomeoversightover theprocess,Wilsondictatedthat theLeague of Nations would maintain an overarching authority, to ensure that the civilisednationsputtheinterestsofthemandateterritoriesovertheirown.AccordingtoPresidentWilson:

itshallbethedutyoftheLeaguetoseethatallnationswhichareassignedasthetutorsandadvisorsanddirectorsofthosepeoples,shalllooktotheirinterestsandtotheirdevelopmentbeforetheylooktotheinterestandmaterialdesiresofthemandatorynationitself.158

Thisgesturecanbeseenasanodtowardstheconcernsraisedbyscholars,suchasHobson,whobelievedthatstateself-interestwould inevitablyandnaturallybepromotedovertheinterestsofcolonialpopulations.However,withthisin-builtoversightmechanisminplace,WilsonclearlybelievedthatthedraftersoftheLeagueofNationshadcreatedaninnovativeinternationalised systemofprotection.Wilsonwas reportedly soproudof thedraftingofArticle 22 that he proclaimed that a system had been created whereby territorialaggrandisementandexploitationof“theworld’smostdisadvantagedpeoples,”wouldfinallycometoanend.159

ForWill J.Selzer, themandatesystemrepresenteda fundamentalshift inhowtheWesternnationsactedtowardsthecolonies,as“moralobligationsweretranslatedintolegalcommitments, the performance of which were subjected to international scrutiny andsupervisionunderaformalandregularisedprocedure.”160However,deeperanalysisofthemandatesystemsuggeststhatHobson’sfearthattheinternationallawwouldbecontrolledbydominationnations,forthestateself-interest,waswell-founded.Manycommentators,eventhosethathadexpressedsupportforWilson’sliberalideals,viewedthemandatesystemwithsuspicion.161SerioustensionsbetweenPresidentWilson’sidealism,andthetruenatureofstatebehaviourintheinternationalsystem,canbefoundasearlyasthedecisionmakingprocess regardingwhichof theadministratingstateswouldhavecontrolovereachof thecolonialterritories.

158WoodrowWilson,ascitedinWilliamBain,BetweenAnarchyandSociety:TrusteeshipandtheObligationsofPower(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2003),101.159Ibid.160WillJ.Selzer,TheTrusteeshipCounciloftheUnitedNationsandSelf-Government:WithParticularReferencetoBritishEastAfrica(Michigan:UniversityMicrofilmsInternational,1959),4.161WilliamBain,BetweenAnarchyandSociety,103.

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Theselectionprocesstodeterminewhichofthe‘advancednations’wouldhavepowerandcontrolover themandate territoriesdemonstratedearlyon thatstate interest in thisprocesswasnotoverlyaltruistic,nor trulybasedonWilson’sutopianuniversalprinciples.Who got to control which of the colonial territories was a process of intense politicalwrangling and contention. Analysis of these deliberations demonstrates that there werenumerousoccasionswherethe ‘advancednations’werenotoverly interested inwhowasbest suited to assist the development of the individual mandate territories, rather theirargumentsoverwhoobtainedcontrolwerecentredprimarilyonnotionsofself-interestandsecurityconcerns.

Oneprimeexampleof this takingplacecanbe found in the report thatAustralianPrimeMinister,WilliamHughes, spoke forcefully aboutAustralia’s claim to the largest ofGermany’s Pacific Islands, New Guinea. PrimeMinister Hughesmaintained that AustraliacouldnotbeatpeaceifNewGuineawasinthehandsofanotherpower,whetherthatbeanEuropeanally,oreveninthehandsoftheLeagueofNations.162Hugheshadarguedwithhisfellow ‘advanced nation’ leaders that the Pacific islands “encompassed Australia like afortress,”andasaresultwere,“asnecessarytoAustraliaaswatertoacity.”163TheAustralianPrimeMinisterboldlyputforwardCanberra’sclaimtoNewGuineainhisassertionthat,“NewGuineawasessentialtothesafetyofAustralia;Australiawasademocracy;theAustralianswereon the spot.”164Absent fromtheseassertionswas theclaim thatCanberrawasbestplacedtoassistinthedevelopmentofthepeopleofNewGuinea.Soassuredofhiscountry’sright tohavecontrolover this territory, itwas reported thatHughes threatened toderailAustralia’ssupportfortheentireLeagueofNationsprojectifhisdemandswerenotmet.165Intheend,HugheswassuccessfulinhisclaimformandatepoweroverNewGuinea,andtheAustraliangovernmentwasgiftedsupremesovereigncontroloverthePacificnation.

ItisclearthatdespitetheliberalprinciplesexpoundedinPresidentWilson’sidealism,Article22oftheCovenantoftheLeagueofNationsperpetuatedeighteenthandnineteenthcenturystandardofcivilisationdiscourseandpractice.The‘new’systemofinternationalisedcontrolovertheterritoriesdid littletochangetherealityoftheinternationalsystem.ThiswasparticularlyevidentinthecontinuationofthepositioningofpowerfulEuropeanstates,andtheirpredominantlywhiteformercolonies,astheenlightenedcivilisers,andpittingthemagainst those under their tutelage as the ‘uncivilised barbarians.’ An examination of theconductof the ‘civilised’nationsuncoversplentyof evidence to suggest thatexploitationcontinuedunabated,despitetheexplicitprohibitionintheLeague’sCovenant.Therealitywasthattheadministeringpowerscontinuedtheirpatternsofsubjugation,violence,andforcedlabourpracticesinthecolonies,includingtheonesunderthemandatesystem.166ForG.L.

162WilliamHughes,ascitedinWilliamBain,BetweenAnarchyandSociety,98.163Ibid.164Ibid.165Ibid.,100.166NetaCrawford,“DecolonisationasanInternationalNorm,”41.

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Dickinson,therewasnosectionoftheLeague’sCovenantmoreimportantthatArticle22,buthe was fiercely critical of the “pursuit of imperialistic policies” during the bargaining forcontroloverthemandates,wherethe‘advancednations,’hadbeen“inspiredbyeconomicimperialismof the crudest kind.”167 Somuch for the sacred trustof civilisation,Dickinsonlamented.168Whilethiscontinuedtobethecase,DickinsonarguedthattheCovenantoftheLeague couldneverbeanythingmore than “apieceof solemnhypocrisy.”169 In completeagreement with Dickinson’s position, Woolf noted that the mandate system was clearlyintended to be used as a “cloak of fine phrases to cover the nakedness of the olderimperialism,tocontinuethesubjectionandexploitation…underthenewnameofasacredtrust insteadof thatofa JointStockCompany.”170 Itcertainlyappearedthat themandatesystemsimplyperpetuatedwhathadalreadyexistedininternationalrelations,wherebythegovernance of peoples would be determined by external ‘enlightened’ powers, whiletraditionalformsofgovernanceinthecoloniescontinuedtobedisregardedasthestrangeanduncivilisedactionsof‘barbarians’.

Analysisofthemandatesystemleadstotheconclusionthatrealpolitikconflictedwiththe purported moral and liberal underpinnings of President Wilson’s idealism. As NetaCrawfordhasargued,itwouldhavebeenviewed“unseemlytosimplytransferthespoilstothevictorswithoutatleastanodtoself-determination.”171Asaresult,theadvancednationsnoddedtoliberalidealsonpaper,butcontinuedwiththeirpoliciesofeconomic,cultural,andsocial exploitation in the colonies. This appears strikingly similar towhathappenedwhenenlightenment-eraphilosophyfailedtotranslateintoreality.Thestarkreality,inthecontextofthemandatesystem,wasthatthevictorsofwarwantedtheirspoils,andtheLeagueofNationslackedtheauthoritytodemandthatpowerfulstatesactanydifferently.InspiteofWilson’sviewthatfundamentalanduniversalprinciplesofrightswouldcreatea“universalconscienceofmankind,”172stateself-interestprevailed,andthecontrol,withthethreatoruseofviolenceandforce,continuedinthecolonieslargelyunabated.

WorldWarTwo:BarbariansontheInside,Again.TheoutbreakofanotherWorldWarin1939sawthedestructionofanysemblanceofpeaceintheinternationalsystem.AswithWorldWarI,thedichotomiseddiscourseofthecivilisedandthebarbarianwasusedextensivelyinwartimepropaganda,byboththeAlliedForcesand theAxis Powers.Allied leaders regularly describedAdolfHitler as beingbarbaric andclaimedthatNazismposedthegreatestthreatto‘civilisation’.173Ontheopposingside,Hitlerreferenced theviolenceandoppression conducted in theBritish coloniesasprovidinghis 167G.L.Dickinson,CausesofInternationalWar,91;101.168Ibid.,101.169Ibid.,101.170LeonardWoolf,ImperialismandCivilisation,2nded.(London:L.andV.Woolf,1933),127.171NetaCrawford,“DecolonisationasanInternationalNorm,”40.172WoodrowWilson,ascitedinThomasKnock,ToEndAllWars,8.173MarkB.Salter,OnBarbarians,173.

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blueprintfortheThirdReich’s“ruthlessandbarbarousmanner.”174Aswaswitnessedduringthe era of conquest and colonisation, the actions of both sides of the war required thediscursivepracticeof ‘othering,’whereby the ‘enemyother’was vilified anddescribedassubhuman, inorder to legitimisetheviolencenecessarytodefeat them. InregardstotheThirdReich,“Jews,SintiandRoma,homosexuals,Poles,andcommunistswererepresentedas inferiorand less-than-human.”175Ashasbeenexploredearlier, thisprocessmirrorstheactionsandlanguageemployedbyEuropeanconquistadorsandcolonialists,whoreferredtocolonialsubjectsassubhumanandasanimals,inordertolegitimiseviolentactsagainstthem.Ofkeyinterestishowidentitywaspoliticisedbypoliticalleaders,inordertoelicitsupportforincreasinglevelsofviolentactions.

The application of colonial language and practices during bothWorldWars had asignificant impactonstandardofcivilisationdiscourse. In theend, thecleardemarcationsbetweentheEuropean‘civilised’andthenon-European‘uncivilised,’whichhadenduredevenbefore the timeof Pope Innocent IV,was seriously challenged. The level of brutality andviolence conductedmade it problematic to attempt to return to the previously simplisticcolonialistdichotomyof thecivilisedcoloniserversusthebarbariancolonised. Indeed, theactionsthathadoncemadecolonialsubjectsappear‘uncivilised’priortothewar,suchastheworship of idols and perceived sexual deviance, now “paled before a thunderstruckconfrontationofgaschambersandgenocide.TheglamouroftheEuropeanimagefadedinthefiercerglowofhigh-explosivebombsonLondonandHamburg.”176FromAlfredZimmern’sperspective,therewasnodoubtthatbarbarianswerelocatedinsideofEurope,ashenotedat the onset of the war that, “our choice is not between a civilized life of our own andadmittingthebarbarianwithinourwalls.Hedwellstherealready.”177Theabrogationofthecomityofnations,theabandonmentoftheprincipleofnon-interventionbetween‘civilisednations,’andthedisregardforinternationallawappearedtoeffectivelyputpaidtothenotionthat the world could continue to be neatly divided into nineteenth and early twentiethcenturyclassificationsofthe‘civilised’andthe‘barbarian.’

Atthecloseofthewar,withtheLeagueofNationsdissolved,thevictorsofthewar

were left,again,withadecision tomakeas towhatneededtobedonewith thecolonialterritories. It appeared that an opportunity had arisen whereby outdated dichotomisedcivilisationaldiscourseandactionscouldbefinallybedoneawaywith.Optimismappearedto

174AdolfHitler,Hitler’sTableTalk:1941-1944,trans.NormanCameronandR.H.Stevens(London:WeidenfeldandNicolson,1953),527.Hitlerregularlyusedthecivilised/barbariandichotomyinordertoselltotheGermanpublictheviolencerequiredforGermanimperialconquest.HeinvertedtheuseofthewordbarbariantosignifypositiveactiononbehalfoftheThirdReich.ItwasHitler’sargumentthattobe‘barbaric’ininternationalrelationswasbothanecessaryandnaturalaction.Hitlerpointedsquarelyat theactionsofBritishcolonialists,aspriorevidenceofbarbarismbeingconducted,forthenationalinterest.175MarkB.Salter,OnBarbarians,179.176A.PThornton,DoctrinesofImperialism(NewYork:JohnWiley&Sons,Inc.,1965),209.177AlfredZimmern,TheProspectsofCivilisation(London:OxfordUniversityPressattheClarendonPress,1939),29.

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be short lived, however, as the League’s system simply served as the archetype for theestablishmentoffurthertutelageanddominationoverthecoloniesandtheperpetuationofhierarchicalprotectionmechanismsunderinternationallaw.

TheUnitedNations:UniversalRightsforAll? WhentheUNwasformedin1945,representativesof fiftycountriescametogetherunderverysimilarcircumstancestotheirpredecessorsundertheLeagueofNations.TheCharteroftheUNdeclaredthattheMemberStatesweredetermined,“tosavesucceedinggenerationsfrom the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow tomankind.”178Thissecondattemptinthetwentiethcenturyatanoverarchinginternationalinstitutionwasalsostronglyunderpinnedbyprofesseduniversalliberalprinciples,previouslyfirmly promoted by Enlightenment thinkers and then later byWilsonian utopianism. Thesecond line of the Preamble of the Charter outlines this clearly, where it reaffirms theorganisation’s“faith in fundamentalhumanrights, in thedignityandworthof thehumanperson,intheequalrightsofmenandwomenandofnationslargeandsmall.”179TheeffusiveuniversalrhetoricoftheUNCharterwasadvancedevenfurtherbytheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(UDHR),adoptedinDecember1948.UDHRhasbeenheraldeda“milestonedocumentinthehistoryofhumanrights,”wherebytheDeclarationwasproclaimedtobethe“commonstandardofachievementsforallpeoplesandallnations.”180Inthisregard,itsetoutthatalistofnegotiated‘fundamentalhumanrights’wouldbeuniversallyapplicableandprotected.181Withtheseenshrinedfundamentalhumanrightsinhand,itappearedtobetheopportunemoment to create lasting change to the treatment of those once labelled the‘barbarians.’TheUnitedNationsTrusteeshipSystemThereplacementoftheLeagueofNationsbytheUNboughtwithitthesubstitutionoftheoldmandatesystemwithanewtrusteeshiparrangement.Likethemandatesystemwhichprecededit,theinternationaltrusteeshipsystemembracedthelegaluseofforeigntutelageasamethodforthe‘enlightenment’ofcolonialterritories.Eleventerritorieswereheldunderthistrusteeshipsystem,witheachoftheterritoriessubjecttoseparateagreementswiththeir

178TheUnitedNations,“PreambleoftheCharteroftheUnitedNations,”TheUnitedNations,accessed04July,2015,http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/index.html.179Ibid.180TheUnitedNations,“TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,”TheUnitedNations,accessedon04July,2015,http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.181ForthefullrangeoffundamentalhumanrightsenshrinedintheDeclaration,seeIbid.WhiletheDeclarationisnotcommonlyheldtobelegallybinding,itisarguedthatitcontainsasetofuniversalprinciplesandrights,whichinspiredhumanrightsstandardstobeenshrinedinlaterinternationalinstruments,whicharearguedtobelegallybinding.OneexamplebeingtheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights.SeetheOfficeoftheHighCommissioneronHumanRights,“DeclarationonHumanRightsDefenders,”TheUnitedNations,accessedon04July,2015,http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/SRHRDefenders/Pages/Declaration.aspx.

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respectiveadministratingstatesregardingthelevelofauthorityandcontrolwhichwouldbewieldedoverthem.182SimilartoArticle22oftheLeagueofNationsCovenant,Article76oftheUNCharterstatedthat itspurposewastopromotethepolitical,economic,andsocialadvancementof the trust territories,with thegoalbeing theirdevelopment towards self-government and self-determination.183 Again, the administering states were expected topromotetheinterestsofthecolonialterritories,abovethoseoftheirown.184Asaresultofthecivilisationallanguagewieldedbybothsidesduringtheworldwars,therewereseriousattemptsbythedraftersoftheChartertoavoidexplicitcivilisationaldiscourse,whichhadalsobeenveryevidentintheLeagueofNationsmandatesystem.Whiledirectuseofrhetoricsuchas‘civilised,’‘uncivilised,’andthe‘sacredtrustofcivilisation’isabsentfromtheCharter,theeffectsofthetrusteeshipsystemlargelymirroredthatofitspredecessor.

182Refertothetablebelowfordetailsonthetrustterritories,aswellastheirrespectiveadministrativepowers.183 United Nations, “Article 76 of the United Nations Charter,” United Nations, accessed 01 July, 2016,http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/index.html.184Ibid.

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Table2.TheUnitedNationsTrustTerritories185

185 Information on trust territories and administrative powers was gathered from: The United Nations, “TheUnited Nations and Decolonisation: Trust Territories,” The United Nations, accessed January 10, 2016,http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/selfdet.shtml.

TrustTerritory

Administering

Power

DateofIndependence

WesternSamoa

NewZealand

1962

MarshalIslandsMicronesiaNorthernMarianasPalau

UnitedStates

1990*1990*1990–SelfgoverningasCommonwealthofUS1994**Semi-autonomous:CompactofFreeAssociationwiththeUS

NewGuinea

Australia

1975-UnitedwiththeNon-Self-GoverningTerritoryofPapua,tobecometheindependentStateofPapuaNewGuinea

Nauru

Australia,onbehalfofAustralia,NewZealandandtheUnitedKingdom

1968

BritishCameroons

GreatBritain

1961-NorthernterritoryincorporatedintoNigeria;southernterritoryincorporatedinCameroon

FrenchCameroons

France

1960-Cameroon

Ruanda-Urundi

Belgium

1962-BecameRwandaandBurundi

Somaliland

Italy

1960-UnitedwithBritishSomalilandProtectoratetoformSomalia

Tanganyika

GreatBritain

1961-Tanzania

BritishTogoland

GreatBritain

1957-IncorporatedintoGhanabyplebiscite

FrenchTogoland

France

1960-Togo

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Thetrusteeshipsystemcontinuedthepatternofpositioningpowerfulstates(andtheirconduits)astheenlightenedcivilisers,andpittedthemagainstthoseundertheirtutelage.While the architects of the trusteeship system argued that the liberal principles of self-governmentandself-determinationwerecentraltothenewsystem,andthatitrepresentedtheinternationalcommunity’scondemnationofcolonialexploitationandviolence,186thereisstrongevidencetosuggestthattheseidealswereonlygivenlipservicebythegreatpowers.Indeed,inhisstudyoftwentiethcenturycolonialism,Osterhammelnotesthatthetrusteeshipsystemdidnothingtochangetherealitiesofthoselivingundercolonialrule.187WhileAnghiearguesthatthesesystemsofcolonialcontrolhadtheeffectoftransformingthe“nativeandher territory into an economic entity,” which was always with the primary intention tocultivateprofits,andexportthembacktothemetropolis.188Eveniftheadministeringnationshadthebettermentofthecolonialpopulationsinmind,whichappearstobeacontentiousargumentgivenhistoricalevidence, itdidnotovercomethefact thatthebasicdichotomybetween the ‘civilised’ and the ‘uncivilised’was still at play, even if no longer specificallyarticulated in those terms.189 Indeed, Koskenniemi observes that the mandate andtrusteeship systems continued to, “play upon a Eurocentric view about the degrees ofcivilizationandlegalstatus.”190

Conclusion Itappearsthatthealtruisticliberalclaimsof‘developing’colonialterritoriesforthebenefitofitspeoples,underpinnedbyasenseofanewlygained‘universalconscienceofhumanity,’waslargelyunsupportedbyanyrealconvictionoractionduringtheearlytomid-twentiethcentury. In practice, domination and exploitation of peoples considered outside of theinternational system continued. In order to attempt to legitimise their actions, powerfulstatesusedthenewsystemsofinternationallawtocontinuetheir‘tutelage’oftheircolonialsubjects.IntheaftermathofWorldWarII,thelevelofbrutalityandviolenceconducteddidmakeitproblematictoattempttoreturntothepreviouslysimplisticcolonialdichotomyofthe civilised coloniser versus the barbarian colonised, but this did not mean that thehierarchalnatureof the international systemchanged inanymeaningfulway.Protectionswerecontinued tobeafforded to theprivileged in thesystem(namely theUnitedStates,westernEurope,andtheirAllies),whiletherestoftheworldcontinuedtobedominatedandcontrolled by the ‘civilised,’ or in themore palatable language of the ‘democratic, peacelovingnations.’ International law continued tobewieldedas amechanism toensure thisdominationandcontrolwassustained.Whilenolongercarriedoutwithexplicitreferenceto 186AntonyAnghie,“TimePresentandTimePast:Globalisation,InternationalFinancialInstitutions,andtheThirdWorld,”NewYorkUniversityJournalofInternationalLawandPolitics32,no.2(2000):278.187 JürgenOsterhammel,Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, trans. Shelly Frisch (Princeton:MarkusWienerPublishers,1997),115-116.188AntonyAnghie,TimePresentandTimePast,283.189AliMazrui,“TheMovingCulturalFrontierofWorldOrder:FromMonotheismtoNorth-SouthRelations,” inCulture,IdeologyandWorldOrder,ed.R.B.JWalker(London:WestviewPress,1984),35.190MarttiKoskenniemi,TheGentleCivilizerofNations,174-175.

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civilisationalstatus,thetrusteeshipsystem,andthecontinueddominationandsubjugationperformedbypowerfulstates,revealshowthebasicstructureofthecivilisingmissionswasreproduced and rebranded under new forms of international law and internationalinstitutions.Intheanalysistofollow,theclassicalrealistcritiqueofthesetwentiethcenturycivilising missions, and particularly the moral universalism which accompanies it, will beexamined.

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ChapterThree:TheDangersofMoralUniversalism:AClassicalRealistCritique.

Inthe inter-warperiod,anumberof influentialvoicesaddedweighttotheunderstandingthat purported acts of liberal ‘moral universalism,’ and the interventionist logic whichaccompaniedit,haddamagingeffectsontheinternationalsystem.Inparticular,itwasarguedthatasystemofviewinginternationalrelations,wherebytherewasanacceptanceofthefactsand reality of theworld, and a following analysis of their causes and consequences,wasdesperatelyneeded.191Inthiscontext,thepoliticaltheoryofclassicalrealismwasdeveloped,basedonthepoliticalthoughtofearlierphilosophersandwriterssuchasThucydides,NiccoloMachiavelli,andThomasHobbes.Classical realismemphasises the“irresistiblestrengthofexistingforcesandtheinevitablecharacterofexistingtendencies,”andinsiststhatthebestpracticeisinacceptingandadaptingoneselftotheseexistingforcesandtendencies.192Inthiscontext,thischapterwillexaminetheworkofthreeofthemostinfluentialtheoristsattheforefrontofthecreationanddevelopmentofthepoliticaltheoryofclassicalrealism;E.HCarr,Carl Schmitt, andHansMorgenthau. Their reflections on the international systemhave anumberofsignificantcommonalities,includingtheunderstandingthatconsiderationofself-interestandpowerlieatthecentreofdecision-makingbystates.Fromtheirperspectives,thisinsightwasseverelyundervaluedbyliberalthinkersofthetime,suchasPresidentWilson,whoconverselythoughtthattheestablishmentofinternationalinstitutionswouldleadtotheeliminationofpowerpoliticsfrominternationalrelations.

These three realist scholars rejected the liberal international understanding thatuniversalmoralityandethicalstandardsexisted,andcouldbemadeindependentofpolitics.Theyalsoquestionedtheassumptionthathavinga ‘universalconscienceofmankind’wasbothanachievableanddesirableoutcome.Fromaclassicalrealistperspective,whenaliberalthinkerpreachesthatanactionorpolicyistheresultofsomesenseofmoraluniversalism,itisimmediatelyperceivedtobeadisingenuousclaim,wherebyitislikelythat,“[he]isclothinghisowninterestsintheguiseofuniversalinterestsforthepurposeofimposingitontherestof the world.”193 Furthermore, the invocation of ‘humanity’ as an all encompassing anduniversal concept has dangerous and unintended consequences, which need to berecognised.194Fromaclassicalrealistperspective,thesepurporteduniversalprinciplesalsohavetheeffectofcreatingatroublingfriendversusenemydichotomy,195orasMorgenthaucharacterisedit,thecreationofaclearanddangerousdistinctionbetweenso-called“peace-

191E.HCarr,TheTwentyYears’Crisis,10.192Ibid.193Ibid.,75.194Seeforexample Ibid.,88;CarlSchmitt,TheConceptofthePolitical [1932]trans.GeorgeSchwab(Chicago:ChicagoUniversityPress,2008),54;HansMorgenthau,“TheMainspringsofAmericanForeignPolicy:TheNationalInterestvs.MoralAbstractions,”TheAmericanPoliticalScienceReview44,no.4(1950):850-851.195CarlSchmitt,TheConceptofthePolitical,49.

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lovingnations”versusthe“forcesofevil.”196Thesedistinctionsmadebetweenpeopleswouldultimately lead to the dehumanisation of the ‘enemy other,’ which would make conflictagainstthemappearmorepermissibleandintense.197Thisprocesshasstrongparallelstotheactions of colonial nations, and the accompanying standard of civilisation discourse, aspreviouslyoutlinedinthisthesis.

Carr,Schmitt,andMorgenthau,wereallheavilycriticaloftheidealismandutopianismunderpinningboththeLeagueofNationsandtheUnitedNations,arguingthattheircreationwassymptomaticofone-sidedintellectualism,198andbasedonafraudulentandflawedbeliefinutopianandliberalideals,whichsimplydidnotexistinreality.199Theontologicaldebatebetween realism and liberalism (including their various sub-branches) endures ininternational relations today. Indeed, French historian Albert Sorel foresaw this enduringbattle occurring, when he argued as early as the 1870s that therewould be an “eternaldisputebetweenthosewhoimaginetheworldtosuittheirpolicy,andthosewhoarrangetheirpolicytosuittherealitiesoftheworld.”200Inthiscontext,thischapterwillexaminethedangers Carr, Schmitt, and Morgenthau saw in the liberal international theory, heavilypromotedduringtheirtime,andwillalsoconsidertheirproposalsforanalternativewayoftheorisingaboutinternationalrelations.Laterinthisthesis,thecontinuedapplicabilityandrelevanceofthecritiqueofliberalinternationaltheorywillbeexploredindirectreferencetointerventioninEastTimor.

E.HCarr:AReactionAgainsttheWish-DreamsoftheInitialStage

E.HCarriswidelyconsideredtobeoneofthemostimportantpioneersofthepoliticaltheoryofclassical realism.HisbookTheTwentyYears’Crisiswent topress in July1939,andhadreachedtheproofingstagewhenWorldWarIIbrokeoutinSeptember1939.Carrmadethedecisionnottorevisethebookinlightoftheoutbreakofthenewwar,butratherleaveitasitwaswrittenatthetime.201Asaresult,hisworkstandsasbothacritiqueandapropheticwarning of the dangers of the utopian liberalism of the inter-war period. From Carr’sperspective,he saw thecrisisof the twentyyearsbetween1919and1939asbeing, “theabruptdescentfromthevisionaryhopesofthefirstdecadetothegrimdespairofthesecond,fromautopiawhichtooklittleaccountofreality,toarealityfromwhicheveryelementofutopiawas rigorously excluded.”202 In this regard, Carrwasheavily critical of theutopian

196HansMorgenthau,InDefenseoftheNationalInterest:ACriticalExaminationofAmericanForeignPolicy(NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1951),94.197CarlSchmitt,TheConceptofthePolitical,27;andHansMorgenthau,“TheMainspringsofAmericanForeignPolicy,”839.198E.HCarr,TheTwentyYears’Crisis,27.199 See for example Ibid.,9-10; Carl Schmitt,Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty[1922],trans.GeorgeSchwab(Chicago:ChicagoUniversityPress,2005),36-37;HansMorgenthau,PoliticsAmongNations:TheStruggleforPowerandPeace,6thed.(NewYork:Knopf,1985),112.200AlbertSorel,ascitedinE.HCarr,TheTwentyYears’Crisis,11.201Ibid.,1.202Ibid.,224.

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‘reality’thattheliberalthinkersoftheearlytwentiethcenturyhadattemptedtoconvincetheworldwasanachievablepossibility.203ForCarr,thepurportedethicalstandardsanduniversalprinciples which liberalism promoted to be independent of politics were particularlytroubling.204ItwasCarr’sviewthattheinternationalliberalismofthetwentiethcenturyhadstrongparallelstothedevelopmentofnaturallawinWesterndiscourse,andhereferencedGermanhistorianFredrichMeineckeinordertoexplainhisviewoftheroleofutopianismintheinternationalpoliticsoftheperiod:

TheprofounddefectoftheWestern,naturallawtypeofthoughtwasthat,whenappliedtoreal life of the state, it remained a dead letter, did not penetrate the consciousness ofstatesmen, did not hinder themodern hypertrophy of state interest, and so led either toaimlesscomplaintsanddoctrinairesuppositionsorelsetoinnerfalsehoodsandcant.205

Givenhisstrongmisgivingsaroundliberalideology,itwasCarr’sbeliefthatareassessmentandacknowledgmentofthetrueutilityofliberalinternationalrelationstheorywasrequired.

It was Carr’s argument that the “utopian stage” of political science, so ferventlysupportedbyWilsonandhisliberaldevotees,wasinfactsimplyan“initialstage”or“infantscience”ofpoliticaltheory.206Duringthisstage,Carrarguedthattheliberaladvocateswouldpay “little attention to the analysis of cause and effect;” rather, theywould devote theirenergiestotheelaborationofpurportedvisionaryprojects,“whosesimplicityandperfectiongivethemaneasyanduniversalappeal.”207Inthisregard,attentionwouldbeconcentratednearly entirely on the end alleged to be achieved. Carr noted that the end appeared soimportanttotheliberal,thatanyanalyticalcriticismofthemeansofachievingitwouldlikelybe “branded as destructive and unhelpful.”208 From Carr’s perspective, the reliance andadherencetotheutopianidealsofthisstagefacilitatedthereturntowarinthe1930s.Itwasthe bankruptcy of the foundations of twentieth century liberalism that had made theinternationalsystemuntenable,anditwasnotatallsurprisingtoCarrthatwarconfrontedtheworldagain.Whentheseliberal‘visionaryprojects’ultimatelybrokedown,becauseoftheirwoeful inability to be grounded in reality, itwouldonly be then that leaderswould“reluctantlycallintheaidofanalysis.”209Indeed,itwasduringtheinterwarperiodthatmoreandmoreEuropeanpoliticalelitesbegantoconcedethatthe liberalunderpinningsof thepurported‘civilisingmissions’hadbeenafarce.Anexampleofthiscanbefoundinthework

203WhilesomehavedismissedCarr’sviewsasprovidinganoverlycriticalandbleakviewofinternationalrelations,typicallybasedonlyonacursoryreadingofhisworks,Carrhimselfadmittedthat,atitscore,realismhadacriticalandsomewhatcynicalwayofviewingtheworld.ItwasCarr’sviewthattherewouldbeoccasionswhereutopianthoughtwouldneedtobediscussedseriously,inorderto“counteractthebarrennessofrealism.”Indeed,Carrarguedthat“maturethoughtcombinespurposewithobservationandanalysis,”and“soundpoliticalthoughtandsoundpoliticallifewillbefoundonlywherebothhavetheirplace.”SeeIbid.,10.204Ibid.,21.205FriedrichMeinecke,ascitedinIbid.,88.206Ibid.,5;8.207Ibid.,5.208Ibid.,8.209Ibid.,5.

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ofAlbertSarraut,whowouldgoontobecomethePrimeMinisterofFrance.Speakinginhiscapacity as Colonial Secretary of State for France in 1923, Sarraut’s position can besummarisedinthefollowing:

Whatistheuseofpaintingthetruth?Atthestart,colonisationwasnotanactofcivilisation,was not a desire to civilise. It was an act of forcemotivated by interests…The origins ofcolonisationisnothingelsethanenterpriseofindividualinterests,aone-sidedandegotisticalimpositionofEuropeancapitalistaggressiveness,onewhichhasbeenrightlytermed‘colonialimperialism’.210

ThisexcerptfromSarrautshouldnotbereadasatotalrejectionofthecolonialproject(whichFrancewasheavilyinvestedin);ratherSarrautbelieveditwasimportanttoembedsometruthandrealityintheprocess.Colonialpossessionsweretobeobtainedandprotected,butitwasimportanttonote,fromSarraut’sperspective,thattherealitywasthatthiswasdonesolelywiththeinterestofthewesterncolonisingnationsinmind.

Carr’scriticismofliberalismwasalsobasedonhisdismissaloftheliberalbeliefintheharmonyofinterestsbetweenstates,whichhadbeensoheavilyupheldbyWilsonandhisfollowers.Carrthoughtthatthedoctrineoftheharmonyofinterestswas,infact,“anelegantdisguiseforsomeparticularinterest,”andthatanytheoriesofacommonmorality,promotedby the so-called representatives of the international community, were actually just theproductsofthedominantgroupsofnations.211Assoonasanyattemptwasmadetoapplythesepurporteduniversalprinciplestoconcretepoliticalreality,Carrarguedthattheywouldberevealedasthe“transparentdisguisesofselfishvestedinterests.”212ForCarr,thismeantthat the entire League of Nations project was doomed to fail, as “the unruly flow ofinternational politics,” could never bedealt successfully by the “formulae inspiredby thedoctrines of nineteenth century liberal democracy.”213 If there was no true harmony ofinterestsbetweenstates,norauniversalconscienceofhumanity,asCarrhadasserted,thenthissuggeststhattheentireliberalprojectoftheLeagueofNationswasbuiltonfraudulentfoundations.Inthiscontext,CarrwassharplycriticaloftheestablishmentoftheLeague,andparticularly of the view that the organisation could eliminate power politics frominternationalrelations.

FromCarr’sperspective, thearchitectsof theLeagueofNationshadattempted toadvancetheideathatpowerpoliticswas“themarkofthebadoldtimes,”withtheimpactbeingthatpowerhadbecome“atermofabuse.”214However,theprimaryreasonthatpowerpoliticswasmarredwithsuchcontempt,accordingtoCarr,wasthattheleadingpowershad

210AlbertSarraut,ascitedinKwameNkrumah,TowardsColonialFreedom:AfricaintheStruggleAgainstWorldImperialism(London:Heinemann,1962),3-4.211E.HCarr,TheTwentyYears’Crisis,79.212Ibid.,88.213Ibid.,31.214Ibid.,103.

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aprimaryinterestinthepreservationofthestatusquo,whichtheyenjoyedthroughavirtualmonopolyofpoliticalpower.215Internationalcooperationleadingtopeacewasnotthetrueendgame,rathertheseleadingpowersdidnotwantotherstatestodisruptthestatusquo,and challenge their ascendance in the international system. Indeed, as Jeremy Mosescomments in his analysis of Carr, the ultimate ends of utopian liberalism, when viewedthroughCarr’slens,“laynotinthepromiseofperpetualpeace,butinthemaintenanceandexpansionofaparticularconstellationofpower.”216

Inhis condemnationof theutopianismof theearly tomid-twentiethcentury,Carrobservedaproblematictrend,wherebymoralismwasbeingwieldedtocreatedifferencesbetweenpeoples,inanattempttolegitimiseactionagainstthem.AccordingtoCarr,therewas inherentdanger inthepropagationoftheorieswhichweredesignedto“throwmoraldiscreditonanenemy.”217Inthisregard,CarrcitedformerFrenchForeignMinister,AlexandreColonna-Walewski, inordertodemonstratethepervasivenessofthisthought inEuropeandiplomacy. In1857,Colonna-Walewskisaid,“it[is]thebusinessofadiplomattocloaktheinterestsofhiscountryinthelanguageofuniversaljustice.”218ForCarr,thedoubleprocessof morally discrediting one’s enemy, while at the same time justifying one’s own, wasabundantlywidespreadintheearlytwentiethcentury.AccordingtoCarr,

Todepictone’senemiesorone’sprospectivevictimsasinferiorbeingsinthesightofGodhasbeen familiar technique at any rate since the days of theOld Testament. Racial theories,ancientandmodern,belongtothiscategory;fortheruleofonepeopleorclassoveranotherisalwaysjustifiedbyabeliefinthementalandmoralinferiorityoftheruled.219

Carrsimilarlydiscussedthedangersofusingcivilisationallanguagetodiscredittheenemy,andtojustifypolicyobjectives.HecitesanAmericannavaladviserwhohadarguedstronglythat“civilisationdemands…thatnavalwarfarebeplacedonahigherplane.”220Carrobservedthat during World War I, this type of conviction was carried, “to a pitch of emotionalfrenzy.”221 According to Carr, it was therefore the role of the realist to “uncover thehollownessofthisconviction,”andexposethesedangerousdistinctionsforwhattheywere,for,“principlesarededucedfromthepolicies,notthepoliciesfromtheprinciples.”222Ifthesedisingenuoustheoriesdesignedtodiscreditanenemyweretocontinuetocloakthemselvesin“internationalmorality,”thenCarrfearedthattheinternationalarenawouldcontinueto

215Ibid.216JeremyMoses,“MoralTriumphalisminRecentAustraliaForeignPolicy:HarshLessonsfromTimor-LesteandtheSolomonIslands,”PaperpresentedattheNewZealandPoliticalScienceAssociationAnnualConference.UniversityofCanterbury,August2006,6.217E.HCarr,TheTwentyYears’Crisis,72. 218Ibid. 219Ibid.,71.220Ibid.,73-74.221Ibid.,77.222Ibid.,73.

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bedominatedby,“consummateinternationalhypocrites.”223Inthissense,Carr’sfearsforthefutureofinternationalrelations,wereverycloselyalignedwiththatofGermanscholar,CarlSchmitt.

CarlSchmitt:Humanity,theFavouriteToolofImperialExpansion

CarlSchmittwasaprominentconservativelegalscholarandpoliticaltheoristinpost-WorldWar I Germany, and is considered one of the leading critics of liberalism, as well as thepurported universal moral principles which accompany it. His critique of liberalism andparliamentarydemocracyprimarily inspiredhisworkinTheConceptofthePolitical,whichGeorgeSchwabcalls“undoubtedlyoneofthemostimportanttractsofpoliticalthoughtofthe twentieth century.”224 Schmitt’s association with Nazism, however, resulted in a“shadow” over his life, and the discrediting of some of his writings from that period.225However, this association fails to weaken the strength of his insights on the dangers ofliberalism,utopianism,anduniversalistichumanitarianrhetoric.Indeed,Mosesarguesthatitwas perhaps Schmitt who, “best pinpointed the dangers of an emergent liberalhumanitarianismininternationalpoliticsasarecipeforongoingwarsofintervention.”226

InSchmitt’sview,universalisticmoralprinciplesandthelanguageofhumanityhadtheimpactof liftingall restraintonhowwarcouldbewaged.FromSchmitt’sperspective,theinvocationof the languageof humanity, by liberal leaders such asWilson,would actuallymakeitpossibleforpeopletobe“driventothemostextremeinhumanity.”227Inanargumentsimilar to that of Carr’s, Schmitt believed that by invoking the term humanity, therenecessarilywouldbethecreationofthe‘enemyother,’whowouldthusberemovedfromhumanityaltogether.228Thiswouldresultinviolentandabhorrentactionsbeingcommittedagainst the enemy, which under ‘normal’ circumstances would be unlawful underinternational law. In a similar pattern to what occurred during the colonisation period,methods of warfare and violence, which had long disappeared from use against fellowEuropeans,werenow,again, considered legitimate in the faceof theenemywhodidnotseemtosubscribetothesameculturalcode.229Ofinteresthereishowidentityispoliticisedbypolitical leaders, particularly in timesof conflict andwar, inorder to elicit support forincreasinglevelsofviolentactions.Thus,accordingtoSchmitt:

223Ibid.,80.224GeorgeSchwab,“Introduction,”inTheConceptofthePolitical[1932],byCarlSchmitt,trans.GeorgeSchwab(Chicago:ChicagoUniversityPress,2008),5.225 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),424.226JeremyMoses,“MoralTriumphalisminRecentAustraliaForeignPolicy,”3.227CarlSchmitt,TheConceptofthePolitical,54.228CarlSchmitt,“TheLegalWorldRevolution,”Telos72(1987):87-88.229JürgenOsterhammelnotedthatthiswasthecaseduringEuropeancolonisationofnon-Europeanterritoriesintheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturies,seeColonialism:ATheoreticalOverview,trans.ShellyFrisch(Princeton:MarkusWienerPublishers,1997),44.

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If he discriminates within humanity and thereby denies the quality of being human to adisturberordestroyer,thenthenegativelyvaluedpersonbecomesanunperson,andhislifeisnolongerofthehighestvalue:itbecomesworthlessandmustbedestroyed.Conceptssuchas‘humanbeing’thuscontainthepossibilityofthedeepestinequalityandbecomethereby‘asymmetrical.’230

ForSchmitt,thecreationofthepoliticalenemywouldnecessarilymakethemthe“other,thestranger… existentiallysomethingdifferentandalien,”andthisprocesswouldmake,intheextremecase,conflictagainstthempossible.231Inthiscontext,Schmittarguedthatjustifyingone’sactiononthebasisofanyclaimtomoraluniversalism,wouldhaveincalculablenegativeeffects.232Humanitycouldneverbeapoliticalconcept,forSchmitt,astherewas“nopoliticalentityorsocietyandnostatus[which]correspondstoit.”233Itwasthereforebothfalseanddangerousforliberalstoclaimotherwise.TracyB.StrongascertainsthatSchmitt’sattempttoremoveclaimsofuniversalmoralprinciplesfromtheliberalrepertoireisbecauseofhisfearthat,“insuchframeworksallclaimstogoodwillrecognisenolimitstotheirreach.”234

It is in the contextof Schmitt’sbelief in thedangersof the conceptof auniversalhumanity,thathewashighlycriticaloftheLeagueofNations.ForSchmitt,theLeaguedidnotrepresenthumanity, itwasnotuniversal,norwas it trulyan internationalorganisation.235Indeed, because the League was underpinned by purported universal principles, Schmittarguedthatitintroduced“newpossibilitiesforwars,permitswarstotakeplace,sanctionscoalition wars, and by legitimizing and sanctioning certain wars it sweeps away manyobstaclestowar.”236WhatSchmittobservedoccurringduringthisinterwarperiodwasthattheGreatPowersandtheLeaguewereveilingtheirpoliticalobjectivesunderthedichotomyofthegoodfriend,versusthebadenemy.237Thiscreationofthedistinctionbetweenfriendandenemy liberatedtheGreatPowersandtheLeague fromrestraint indealingwith ‘theenemy.’238While liberals claimed that theLeaguecouldpositively ‘depoliticise’ theworld,through the aid of definitions and constructions such as that of a ‘common humanity,’Schmitt argued that itwas foolish anddeceptive todisregard the centralityof states andpoliticsininternationalrelations.239Instead,Schmittviewedliberalthoughtasadisingenuous

230CarlSchmitt,“TheLegalWorldRevolution,”88.231CarlSchmitt,TheConceptofthePolitical,27.232Ibid.,54233Ibid.,55.234TracyB.Strong,“Foreword,”inTheConceptofthePolitical[1932],byCarlSchmittandtrans.GeorgeSchwab(Chicago:ChicagoUniversityPress,2008),xxi.235CarlSchmitt,TheConceptofthePolitical,55.236Ibid.,54.237MarttiKoskenniemi,TheGentleCivilizerofNations,434.238OneofthecentralthemeofSchmitt’sTheConceptofthePoliticalishisunderstandingofthe“friend-foe”or“friend-enemy”distinction.ForSchmitt,politicalactionsandmotivescanbereducedtothedistinctionbetweenfriendandenemy.Thefriend/enemydistinctioniscentraltoSchmitt’sdefinitionofpolitics,andassuchheisnotcriticalofstatesthatmakethesedistinctions.ItistheinjectionofuniversalvaluesandcategoriesintothemthatSchmittconsidersfoolishanddangerous.SeeCarlSchmitt,TheConceptofthePolitical,26.239Ibid.,70.

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attempttotiethepoliticaltotheethical,andtosubjugateittoeconomics.240AswithCarr,SchmittbelievedthatthetrueobjectiveoftheGreatPowers,andbyeffecttheircontrolovertheLeague,layintheirattempttoguaranteethe“existingfrontier”ofthestatusquo.241Inthis context, Koskenniemi maintains that Schmitt was highly critical of the universalisingtendenciesofinternationallaw,whichcouldnotbedetachedfromhisoverallnegativeviewonthedepoliticisationandneutralisationcharacterisingWesternliberalthought.242

HansMorgenthau:TheMessianicFervouroftheMoralCode

HansMorgenthauwasstronglyinfluencedbySchmitt’stheoriesonthedangersofpurporteduniversalmoralismininternationalrelations,andhearguedcorrespondinglythattherewouldbeseriousnegativeconsequencesifliberalinternationaltheorycontinuedinitsdisingenuousattemptto‘depoliticise’theinternationalsystem.Morgenthauiswidelyconsideredoneofthemost influential theoristsonpolitical realism in thepost-WorldWar IIperiod.HewasstronglyinfluencedbytheworkofbothCarrandSchmitt,withMorgenthau’s1929universitydissertationbeing conceivedpartly as a reply to Schmitt’sTheConcept of the Political.243Morgenthau’s own work in Politics Among Nations became pivotal to the evolution ofclassicalrealisminthepost-WorldWarIIera.LikeCarrandSchmittbeforehim,Morgenthauwas heavily critical of utopianism symptomatic of the post-WorldWar I era, and of theuniversalmoralrhetoricwhichaccompaniedit.Morgenthaucontinuedhiscriticismofliberalinternational theory following the end ofWorldWar II, andwas particularly vocal in hisoppositiontothefalseclaimsthattheUnitedNationssymbolisedthedepoliticisationoftheinternationalsystem,aswellasthefallacythatitoperatedasthetruesovereign,capableofenforcingthemoralprincipleswhichunderpinnedliberaltheory.

Inhiscritiqueofliberalinternationaltheory,Morgenthauwasparticularlyfocusedon“penetratingthroughhumanitarianrhetoric,”inordertomakeagenuineassessmentofthedangers ofmoral universalism.244 ForMorgenthau, it was evident that humanitarian andmoralrhetoricwasbeingwieldedbypowerfulstates,inordertodisguisetheirownnationalinterests. Itwashisassessmentthatstatesmen,moreoftenthannot,reasonedin“simplemoralistictermsofabsolutegoodandabsoluteevil.”245Theimpactofthis,inMorgenthau’sview,wasthecreationofaclearanddangerousdistinctionbetweenso-called“peace-lovingnations”versus the“forcesofevil,” leaving theonlypolicyoptionavailable:“tocrush theenemy; force him into unconditional surrender; [and] re-educate him in the ways ofdemocratic, peace-loving nations.”246 Morgenthau, like Schmitt, argued that this process

240Ibid.,61.241Ibid.,56.242MarttiKoskenniemi,TheGentleCivilizerofNations,427.243Ibid.,440.244Ibid.,451.245HansMorgenthau,InDefenseoftheNationalInterest,223.246Ibid.,94.

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intensified the likelihood, and the intensity, of conflict in the international system, bysupportingtheideologicaljustificationsforviolentactionsagainstthe‘enemy’.247

ForMorgenthau,theuseofmoralandhumanitarianrhetorictojustifyandlegitimiseviolenceandconflictwasabundantlyevidentduringWorldWarII.Duringthewar,conflictsbetweenthe‘democratic’and‘non-democratic’nationswereclearlyrepresentedasacontestbetweengoodandevil,withbothsidespromotingtheirparticularviewofbeingthe‘good’and the ‘righteous,’ in the absolute good versus absolute evil dichotomy.248Morgenthauviewedthisasthepracticewhereby“themoralcodeofonenationflingsthechallengeofitsuniversalclaimwithmessianicfervorintothefaceofanother,whichreciprocatesinkind.”249In this context, Morgenthau believed strongly that the use of this moral reasoning andrhetorichadresultedintheviewthattheendofthewarcouldonlycomeaboutthroughtheutterdestructionoftheevilincarnate,whichfromtheperspectiveoftheAlliedForceswastheAxisPowers.250Attheheartofthesemoralclaims,forMorgenthau,wastherealitythatthesestruggleswereactuallyforinternationaladvantage,intermsofpower.251Thisstruggleforpowerwasonlyperpetuatedfurther,withtheassistanceofinternationallegalprinciples,inthepost-Warperiod.

AtthecloseofWorldWarII,andwiththecreationoftheUnitedNations,Morgenthaucontinued his criticism of the universal morality argued to underpin liberal internationaltheory.MorgenthauhadbeeninfluencedbyCarrandSchmitt’sviewsonthedangersoftheliberalattempttoshapeinternationallawinorderto‘depoliticise’theinternationalsystem.From Morgenthau’s perspective, depoliticisation was actually a political calculation bypowerful states to enforce the status quo, and further consolidate their advantages andpowerinthesystem.252Indeed,forMorgenthau,internationallawwaslittlemorethan“thetransientexpressionofpowerbyhegemonicstates.”253Inthisregard,thepurporteduniversalmoralismoftheUNprojectwassimplyusedbyahostofdifferentpowerfulstatestojustifyanddisguisetheirownparticularclaims.AsMorgenthauargued,itwascommonplaceforallnationstoappearas“championsoftheUnitedNations,andquoteitsCharter,”simplyinorderto support the particular policies theywere pursuing.254 As a result, the policies of thesestates, each claiming to be representative of the universal conscious of all, becamecontradictory,aseachstatewasintruthattemptingtoconcealitstruecharacterundertheguise of universality.255 Inmany cases, the ‘messianic fervour’ of themoralism argued to

247HansMorgenthau,“TheMainspringsofAmericanForeignPolicy,”839.248Ibid.249HansMorgenthau,PoliticsAmongNations:TheStruggleforPowerandPeace[1948],6thed.(NewYork:Knopf,1985),246.250HansMorgenthau,“TheMainspringsofAmericanForeignPolicy,”852.251Ibid.,”839.252HansMorgenthau,ScientificManvs.PowerPolitics(London:LatimerHouseLimited,1947),42-44.253JeremyMoses,“MoralTriumphalisminRecentAustraliaForeignPolicy,”9.254HansMorgenthau,PoliticsAmongNations,112.255Ibid.

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underpin the foreignpolicyofnations,becamesoconsuming that thesenationsbegantobelieve their own rhetoric, whichMorgenthau viewed as being particularly dangerous.256Morgenthau’sbeliefinthispracticecanbeaptlysummarisedinthefollowing:

Thus, carrying their idols before them, the nationalistic masses of our time meet in theinternationalarena,eachgroupconvincedthatitexecutesthemandateofhistory,thatitdoesforhumanitywhat itseemstodofor itself,andthat it fulfilsasacredmissionordainedbyProvidence,howeverdefined.LittledotheyknowthattheymeetunderanemptyskyfromwhichtheGodshavedeparted.257

Inthiscontext,Morgenthauisclear inhisbeliefthatanyappealtomoralprinciples intheinternationalspherehasnoconcreteuniversalmeaning,rathertheyarethereflectionsofthepreconceptions of a particular nation.258 FromMorgenthau’s perspective, the UN wouldalwaysbebeholdentotheinterestsofthepowerfulstatesintheinternationalsystem,andtherefore it could never truly have the authority and power to control and dictate statebehaviour.TheUN,inMorgenthau’sview,wouldneverbethetrue‘sovereign.’Thebasicfactofinternationalpoliticswas“theabsenceofasocietyabletoprotecttheexistence,andtopromote the interests, of the individual nations.”259 Clearly, this view was diametricallyopposedtotheliberalbeliefssoferventlyupheldbyWoodrowWilsonduringthecreationoftheLeagueofNations,andlaterbyFranklinD.RooseveltwhentheUNwasestablished.

Conclusion

In their assessments of the dangers of liberal international theory, Carr, Schmitt, andMorgenthau,allcalledforgreateremphasistobegiventotheacceptanceoffactsandreality,andontheanalysisoftheircausesandconsequences.Thetaskoftherealist,asCarrputit,was to “bring down the whole cardboard structure of utopian thought by exposing thehollownessofthematerialoutofwhichitisbuilt.”260Inthisregard,eachoftheseclassicalrealisttheoristsarguedthatpoliticalrealismshouldbeusedtothoroughlyundermineliberalinternationalism, and particularly its dangerous purported universal and absolute moralstandards.Thistaskwouldnotbewithoutitsdetractors,indeed,Schmittforewarnedthattheliberalwouldattempttorefutethe“politicalphenomenaandtruths,”ofrealism,andwouldinsteadcallit“amoral,uneconomical,unscientificandabovealldeclarethisadevilryworthyofbeingcombated.”261Thesecritiquesofrealismenduretoday,andasthisthesiswillsoondemonstrateinrelationtointerventioninEastTimor,theycontinuetobewieldedagainstallthosewhoquestionthemoraluniversalismofliberalprojects.

256Ibid.,249.257Ibid.258HansMorgenthau,InDefenseoftheNationalInterest,35.259HansMorgenthau,“TheMainspringsofAmericanForeignPolicy,”854.260E.HCarr,TheTwentyYears’Crisis,75.261CarlSchmitt,TheConceptofthePolitical,65-66.

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Forallofthetheoristsexaminedinthischapter,themannerinwhichinternationallaw was controlled and employed in the narrative of liberal international theory wasespecially concerning. There is certainly evidence to suggest that expressions of moralresponsibilityanduniversalvalues,oftenthroughtheauspicesof international institutionsandinternationallaw,misrepresentedandconcealedwhatwashappeninginreality.Whetherit be extreme violence in the face of the ‘inhuman’ enemyofWorldWar I and II, or thecontinuationofoppressionandsubjugationagainstthenativepopulations inthecolonies,conflictandcontinuedinterventionremainedever-presentininternationalrelations.Ashasbeendemonstratedthroughoutthisthesis,itappearsthatliberaltheoryhasbeenheldout,disingenuously,toberepresentativeofthelegalandmoralconscienceofhumanity.Itisinthis context thatCarr, Schmitt, andMorgenthauviewed international liberal theorybeingresponsibleforthecreationoftheenvironmentnecessarytolegitimiseviolenceandwar,inordertosupress,andultimatelydestroycompletely,the‘enemyother’.Indeed,Carr,Schmitt,andMorgenthauallstronglywarnedagainsttheliberalpenchantforcastingofpeoplesandterritories as being outside of humanity, as it inevitably made them vulnerable to theimperialisticambitionsofpowerfulstates,andmadeinternationalconflictmorepossible.

Inthecontextofthisthesis,thereisgreatinterestinthepatternsthattheseclassicalrealists observed. Throughout the early tomid-twentieth century, there appears to be aconsistent and repetitive process of the use of universal moral rhetoric to create theappearance of inherent differences between peoples, in order to legitimise and justifyviolenceandinterventionagainstthem.Inthisregard,therecertainlyappearstobestrongparallelsbetweentwentiethcenturyliberalinternationaltheory,andtheexceptionstotheprotectionsaffordedundernatural-law,identifiedinthisthesisfromthethirteenthcenturyonwards.InPopeInnocentIV’stime,standardsofprotectioncouldbediscarded,ifandwhen,itsuitedChristianarmies.InPresidentWilson’stime,standardsofprotectionandthenormof non-intervention could be discarded, if and when, it suited the Allied Forces armies.Evident,also,isastrongcorrelationbetweenthelanguageemployedtojustifyinterventioninthetwentiethcentury,andthatofstandardofcivilisationdiscourseidentifiedthroughoutthis thesis.Whileby theendofWorldWar II thiswas largelynotcarriedoutwithexplicitreferencetocivilisationalstatus,thecontinueduseofeffusivemorallanguagetolegitimiseinterventionrevealshowthebasicstructureofthecivilisingmissionswasreproducedandrebrandedundernewinternationallawandininternationalinstitutions.

These processes appear to be continuing in contemporary international relations.Indeed, the use of international law to legitimise intervention, and the subsequentdominationandcontrolofEastTimor inthe late1990sandearly2000soffersapertinentexampleofthisproblem.Furthermore,thepositionthatinhumanitythereexiststhosewithunequalmoralstatus,andthereforeunequal rights,which legitimises interventionagainstthem,resonatesstronglywiththediscourseemployedbyoutsideintervenersinthecaseofEastTimor.Thenextchapterofthisthesiswillconsidertheapparentpatternsoflanguage

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employed,acrosshistory,tojustifyinterventionagainsttheTimorese.Inthisregard,itwillconsidercloselytheverysamedangersCarr,Schmitt,andMorgenthauidentifiedinrelationto liberal humanitarianism in international politics. It will also consider how the basicstructureofthecivilisingmissionswasreproducedinEastTimor.Indeed,itwillbearguedthatinterventionswereneverbasedonthealtruisticnotionsofacommonhumanity,oruniversalhuman rights, in the case of East Timor. Rather, as Carr, Schmitt, and Morgenthau allidentified,interventionissymptomaticofcalculatedassessmentsofnationalinterest,andthedesire of powerful nations to retain their ascendance, or preserve the status quo, in theinternationalsystem.

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ChapterFour:TheStandardofCivilisationandEastTimor

TherehasbeenacontinuouspatternofviolenceandsubjugationagainstthecountryofEastTimor, by a number of outside interveners. In order to legitimise and justify theseinterventions,civilisationallanguagehasbeenemployed,timeandagain,tocasttheentireEastTimoresesocietyasbeingbackward,primitive,anddifferent.Ineachofthecasesthatwillbeexploredinthischapter,theintervenershaveattemptedtopositionthemselvesastheenlightenedcivilisers,byusingemotiveandeffusivelanguagewhichportraystheir‘civilising’roleinthecountry.Itisinthiscontext,thatthischapterwillanalysehowandwhydiscourseonthestandardofcivilisationwasemployedtojustifyinterventionandviolenceagainsttheEastTimorese.Howdidthecastingofthemasbeingnaturallyandinherentlydifferentandbackwardenforcethetheorythatexternalactorshadtherightandtheauthoritytoexercisecontroloverthemand‘legitimately’dispossessthemoftheirsovereignty?

This chapter will begin with an examination of the colonisation of East Timor byPortugal,which first promoted the understanding of the inferior andbackward nature ofTimoresesociety.TheinvasionandoccupationbyIndonesiawillthenbeexplored,withdirectreferencetothelanguageusedbytheIndonesianstojustifyandlegitimisetheiroccupationof the country. In the case of the Australian and New Zealand Governments, the use ofcivilisationallanguagetodistancethemselvesfromthecrisis,duringIndonesia’soccupation,willbeanalysed.Inparticular,briefingsanddiplomaticcorrespondenceonthecrisisinEastTimor,producedbythesegovernmentsatthetime,willbeanalysedinordertodiscoverhowthesetwocountrieshadalreadymadeadeterminationontheirwishforthefutureofEastTimor,basedsolelyontheirownnationalinterest.Inthisregard,civilisationallanguagewasalso used to reinforce and justify their decisions to not become directly involved in theconflict. Finally, this chapter will consider how contemporary intervention in East Timor,throughanAustralian-ledpeacekeepingmissionandlateraUNmandatednationandstate-buildingexercise,alsoreliedheavilyonmoralisticandcivilisational language.Ofparticularinterest ishow theactionsof the contemporary intervenersdemonstrated that therearestrongparallelswith thecolonialisationand thecivilisingmissionsofprevious-eras. In thecaseofEastTimor,itappearsthatacontemporaryformofthestandardofcivilisationwasmanifested in the twentieth and early twenty-first century, to the detriment of Timoresesociety.

TheFirstWaveofIntervention:PortugueseColonialism

Inthesixteenthcentury,PortugueseexplorerFerdinandMagellanbecamethefirstEuropeanto leada voyageofdiscoverywhich fully circumnavigated the globe. From1519 to1522,MagellanandhiscrewexploredthewesterncoastofAfrica,roundedtheCapeofGoodHope,andeventuallycrossedtheIndianOcean,establishingtradingoutpostsandscoutingfornew

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colonialterritories.262TheItalianscholar,AntonioPigafetta,accompaniedMagellanandhiscrew on their historic voyage andwrote of the first recorded European contactwith thepeopleofTimor,inwhichhedescribedtheTimorese“ashuntersandforagers,who,saveforgoldenornamentsthatdangledonsilkthreadfromtheirears,andwentaroundnaked.”263ThePortuguesearenotthefirsttohavereportedcontactwiththepeopleofTimor,however,asithasbeendiscoveredthatChineseandMoslemtraderswerealreadywellacquaintedwiththevariouscoastaltradingpointsintheregionbythistime..264

During the sixteenth century, Portuguese presence in what is now known as theIndonesian archipelago primarily consisted of annual voyages to collect sandalwood andslaves, and trade in finished goods.265 By the seventeenth century, it was clear thatPortuguese predominance in the area was being challenged by the Dutch, with thePortuguesebeingdrivenalmostentirelyoutofSouth-EastAsia,withtheoneexceptionbeingtheeasternhalfoftheislandofTimor.

FromJillJolliffe’sperspective,PortuguesecolonisationandoccupationofEastTimorcouldthusbecharacterisedashavingtwophases.Thefirstphasewasthemercantilephase,inwhichthePortugueseexercisedpowerprimarilythroughcoastalcontactandsmalltradingposts,“relyingonpoliticaltreatieswithlocalcoastalliurais[tribalchiefs]tomaintainabalanceofpowerintheinterior.”266Thesecondphase,thesettlerphase,onlycameaboutwhentheirpresenceintheregionwasthreatenedbytheDutch,and“whenpenetrationanddirectforceagainstinteriorkingdomsbecamenecessarytoassertsupremacy.”267ThisquesttoholdontotheirpositioninTimorwas,inpart,basedoneconomicconsiderations,astheregionsuppliedthePortuguesewithhighlylucrativesandalwoodandslaves.Indeed,boththeDutchandthePortuguese carried out their flourishing slave trade from Timor well into the nineteenthcentury,when itwasreportedthat,“Timoreseof reproducingagehavebeendeportedasslavesforseveralcenturies,”andthatpracticallyeveryshiparrivinginBatavia268fromTimorcarriedslaves.269By1895,theprocesshadbegunwherebyaseriesofboundaryagreementsweresignedbetweentheDutchandPortuguese,whichformallygavePortugallegalcontrol

262HowardJ.Wiarda,“PortugalinAsia:OngoingSocialandPoliticalConceptsandInstitutions,”inNationbuildingin East Timor, eds. Graca Almeida Rodrigues and Heather Wharton (Clementsport, Canada: The CanadianPeacekeepingPress,2002),43.263DavidHicks,RhetoricandtheDecolonisationandRecolonisationofEastTimor(NewYork:Routledge,2015),17.264 Jill Jolliffe,EastTimor:NationalismandColonialism (StLucia,Queensland:UniversityofQueenslandPress,1978),22.265JohnG.Taylor,EastTimor:ThePriceofFreedom(London:ZedBooksLtd,1999),3.266JillJolliffe,EastTimor:NationalismandColonialism,22.267Ibid.268BataviawasthecapitalcityoftheDutchEastIndies,whichisnowknownasJakarta.269JillJolliffe,EastTimor:NationalismandColonialism,25.

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over the Eastern side of the island, while the Dutch gained sovereign jurisdiction of thewesternside,amalgamatingitintoitslargesphereofcontrolovertheDutchEastIndies.270

DespitecenturiesofcolonialruleovertheeasternhalfofTimor,itwasnotuntilthenineteenthcenturythatstrongevidenceof‘standardofcivilisation’discoursebecameevidentintheofficialpoliciesofthePortuguesegovernment.In1898,aPortugueseRoyalCommissionreleaseditsreportonthecountry’scolonialpossessions,concludingthat:

Thestate[Portugal]…shouldhavenoscruplesinobligingandifnecessaryforcingtheserudeNegroesinAfrica,theseignorantPariahsinAsia,thesehalfsavagesinOceania,towork,thatis,tobetterthemselvesbywork,toacquirethroughwork,thehappiestmeansofexistence,tocivilisethemselvesthroughwork.271

Indeed, as SelverB. Sahin concludes, “thePortuguese colonial historiographyattributes acivilisingroletoPortugueseruleintheisland”and,furthermore,thePortuguesetendedtodepict“themilitarycampaignstakenagainstTimoreserebellioussubjectsasactsofbenightedpacificationorcivilisationefforts.”272Ashasbeenoutlinedearlierinthisthesis,theprocessoftheconquestandcolonisationofterritoriesrequired,bythenineteenthcentury,bothanormativeandalegalbasisinordertobeviewedaslegitimate,particularlybythenineteenthcentury.Inthisregard,thecommentaryofnatural-lawtheorists,suchasFranciscodeVitoria,greatly influencedthe languageemployedbyPortuguesecolonisers.Certainly, thecursoryreferenceintheCommission’s1898reporttoworkingtheircolonialsubjectsinordertobringthemthe“happiestmeansofexistence”andto“civilise”them,couldbeinterpretedasanattempttosatisfytheburgeoningargumentsthatinterventionandviolenceinthecoloniesrequiredmoralandhumanitarianjustificationstobeviewedaslegitimate.

In1930,underPrimeMinisterAntonioSalazar,LisbonfurtherformalisedPortugal’s‘civilisingmission’underitsnewColonialAct.TheActhadthecorefunctionofcentralisingLisbon’s political control over the colonies, bringing them under its direct rule.273 Thelegislationhadtheimpactofreducingthealreadyminimalrightsheldbytheinhabitantsofthe colonies,by creating cleardemarcationsbetween the civilisational statusof all nativepopulations.AccordingtoJolliffe,Salazar’snewActstressedthatallconstitutionalrightsweredependentupon“assimilationtoaPortuguesestandardofcivilisation.”274InthecontextofEastTimor,Portugueseofficialsmadethedecisiontoidentifyanddividethepopulationintotwo primary categories; the indigenes (‘unassimilated’ natives) or the não civilizado

270 Awet TeweldeWeldmichael,ThirdWorld Colonialism and Strategies of Liberation: Eritrea and East TimorCompared(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2013),30.271RoyalCommissionofPortugal,ascited inPerryAnderson,“PortugalandtheEndofUltra-ColonialismPartTwo,”NewLeftReview16(1962):95.Emphasisisfromtheoriginal.272 Selver B. Sahin, “Building the State and Nation in Kosovo and East Timor,” (University of Canterbury,Christchurch,2007),152-153.http://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/bitstream/10092/3328/1/Thesis_fulltext.pdf273JohnG.Taylor,EastTimor:ThePriceofFreedom,12.274JillJolliffe,EastTimor:NationalismandColonialism,42.

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(‘uncivilised’ persons), versus the assimilados (‘assimilated’ natives).275 In order to gainassimiladosstatus,onehadtospeakPortuguese,earnasufficientincome,andprovethathepossesseda“goodcharacter,”276or“livedintheEuropeanmanner.”277Inreturn,theywouldbegiftedvotingrightsandPortuguesecitizenship.BydemonstratingthatuncivilisedpeopleexistedinEastTimor,andatthesametimeshowingtheprogressiontoassimiladosstatuswas a possibility (at least on paper), itmeant that the Portuguese could claim that theircontinuedoccupationofTimorwaswarrantedandlegitimate.ThePortuguesecouldclaim,inthisregard,thattheirpresencewasarequisiteforthedevelopmentoftheTimoreseandthecontinuedmarchofitspeopletowardadvancedcivilisation.Toputthisclaimintoperspective,however,ithasbeenreportedthatby1950,only1.8percentoftheentirepopulationofEastTimor was considered by Portuguese officials to have obtained assimilados status.278Affording privileged civilisational status to only select few in Timor also played well intoPortugal’soverall calculatedpolicyofdivideand rule,andhelped themto justifyviolenceagainstthosetheyhaddeemedbeingnãocivilizados. Indeed,theTimor-LesteCommissionforReception,TruthandReconciliationlaterrecordedthatthePortuguesecolonisers’“tacticsof playing groups against each other” hadweakened indigenous political alliances,whichdeeplyrestricted“thedevelopmentoftheunitythatisrequiredfornationbuilding.”279

ThereisaconspicuousdearthofinformationontheconditionsofcoloniallifeunderPortugueserule intheearlytomid-twentiethcentury,particularlyundertheauthoritarianregimeofPrimeMinisterSalazar.Indeed,JolliffecharacterisesEastTimorasbeing“aclosedbook to theoutsideworld.”280Whatcanbeagreedupon,according to Jolliffe, is that thebrutalpracticesoftwentiethcenturyPortuguesecolonialismoccurredinEastTimor.281WhilethePortuguesegovernmentclaimedthat itspresenceinTimorwasbasedonitsadvancedcivilisational status, and its nurturing of the Timorese towards advanced civilisation, therealityoflifeunderPortugueseruleappearstobemarredbybloodyandviolentpacificationoperations, aswell as forced labourpractices.As justoneexample, in1910 therewereanumberoflarge-scalerebellionsagainstthePortugueseinEastTimor.TheseuprisingswereultimatelyviolentlyquelledwhentwoPortuguesewarshipsweresenttoTimor.Ithasbeenreported that in excess of 3,000 Timorese were killed, and over 4,000 captured andimprisonedfortheirrolesintherebellion.282TheTimoreseinvolvedintherebellionsreportedthattheireffortswereinresponsetothebrutalityandsubjugationinflictedbytheircolonial

275JohnG.Taylor,EastTimor:ThePriceofFreedom,13.276Ibid.277SelverB.Sahin,“BuildingtheStateandNationinKosovoandEastTimor,”127.278JillJolliffe,EastTimor:NationalismandColonialism,42.279TheTimor-LesteCommissionforReception,TruthandReconciliation,“Chega!TheReportoftheCommissionforReception,TruthandReconciliation,”7,accessed22July,2014.http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/.280JillJolliffe,EastTimor:NationalismandColonialism,43281Ibid.282TheUnitedNationsDepartmentofPoliticalAffairs,TrusteeshipandDecolonization,“Decolonization:IssueonEast Timor, August 1976,” 7. The United Nations, accessed 27 January, 2014.http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/pdf/decolonization/decon_num_7-1.pdf.

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masters.283DuringWorldWarII,Australiansoldierswereabletoprovidesomeinsightintotheactionsofthecolonialrulers,andreportedbacktheirobservationsofthecruelforcedlabourpracticesconductedbythePortuguese.Asoneaccountputit“itisacommonsighttoseegangsofnativesropedorchainedtogetherworkingonthericefieldsormarchingbacktothecalabooseatnight.”284In1947,anAustraliansoldierreturnedtoTimorinhiscapacityasa member of the AustralianWar Graves Commission, and what he observed provides adamningindictmentontheentirePortuguese‘civilising’roleinEastTimor:

After centuries of colonial rule the natives are as backward and helpless as ever…Forcedlabourunderthewhipgoesonfromdawntodusk,andthePortuguesecolonists,includingthoseexiledfromSalazar’sPortugal…livewiththesamemixtureofcivilityandbrutalityastheyhad350yearsago.285

ItwasreportssuchasthesewhichhadcausedJohnA.Hobsontolabeltheso-called‘civilisednations’ofthetwentiethcenturyasparasites,whofeduponthecarcassoftheir ‘host,’ inordertoextractwealthfromthecountry,andthenretiredtoconsumeitathome.286

AnanalysisofthepolicyandactionsofthePortuguesegovernmentidentifiestheuseofcivilisationallanguage,wieldedinordertolegitimisetheviolentsubjugationofindigenouspopulations.InthecontextofthecolonisationofEastTimor,thePortuguesehadpositionedtheTimorese,andindeedthenativepopulationsofalloftheircolonialterritories,asbeingsubhuman, inferior, and different. This process allowed Portuguese officials to justify theviolencerequiredtoconquerandenslavetheTimorese,bothtotheirdomesticconstituentsin Lisbon, and to other ‘advanced’ European nations. The argument was made by thePortuguesethat theeconomic,political,andsocial ‘backwardness’of theTimoresemeanttheywereunsuitedtohavingsovereigncontrolovertheirownterritoryandresources.UntilsuchtimethattheTimoresehadreachedasuitablestandardofcivilisation,itwasessentialthatthePortugueseretainsupremesovereigncontrol,sotheycould‘nurture’theTimoresetowardsawesternconceptionofcivilisation.Theidentificationofpeopleasbeinginferior,barbarians,savages,animals,orevensubhuman,isaprocessthatisrepeatedtimeandtimeagain in the Timor context, and is certainly not only evident in the case of Portugueseconquestandcolonisation.AsCarlSchmitt laterwarned,the languageofhumanity,whichevidentlyunderpinsPortugal’scivilisationaldiscourse,actuallyhadtheeffectofdriving“themostextremeinhumanity.”287InthecontextofthecolonisationofEastTimor,itwasnevertrulyan‘actofcivilising,’andthedesiretocolonisethesmallSouth-EastAsianterritorywasnotbasedonmoralreasoning,noronasenseofhumanitarianduty.Atitscore,colonisationwasanactofforceandviolence,motivatedbythestateself-interestofPortugal,orasAlbert 283JamesDunn,Timor:APeopleBetrayed,2nded.(Sydney:ABCBooks,1996),17.284TheAlliedDirectorateofIntelligence,ascitedinJillJolliffe,EastTimor:NationalismandColonialism,43.285GlenFrancis,ascitedinibid.,47.286JohnA.Hobson,Imperialism:AStudy,3rded.(London:UnwinHyman,1938),282.287CarlSchmitt,TheConceptof thePolitical [1932],trans.GeorgeSchwab(Chicago:ChicagoUniversityPress,2008),54.

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Sarraut aptly termed colonialism, “[the] one-sided and egotistical imposition of Europeancapitalistaggressiveness.”288

DecolonisationorRecolonisation?

DuringWorldWarII,PortuguesecolonialcontrolofEastTimorwastemporarilysuspendedwhentheislandwasfirstinvadedbytheJapanese,andthenbytheAlliedAustralianandDutchforces.289Attheendofthewar,thecapitalDiliwasalmostentirelyinruins,withJamesDunncommentingthatitappearedthewarhadtakenthecountry“backtotheStoneAge.”290Inthepostwarperiod,Lisbonwasbothunwilling,andunable,todevotethefundsnecessarytorebuildthecountry.Ultimately,thePortuguesereliedontheirfavouredmethodofcarryingoutforcedlabourpractices,inordertorebuildtheinfrastructureonlymostnecessarytothecolonialleaders.291

Inthepost-warperiod,theglobaleffortstowardsdecolonisationwererapidlygainingmomentum. East Timor’s former Dutch-controlled neighbours, Indonesia, formally gainedtheirindependencein1949.292By1960,aresolutionhadbeendraftedandagreeduponbynearlyallmembersoftheUNGeneralAssembly,293inwhichcolonialismwascondemnedas“alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation.”294 Titled, Resolution 1514 (XV), theDeclarationontheGrantingofIndependencetoColonialCountriesandPeoples, itdirectlyreferencedtherightsrhetoricoftheUNCharter,wherebythefundamentalhumanrights,andequalstatusofallpeople,wastobeupheldfor,“nationslargeandsmall.”295AccordingtoBrentWellsch,thedecolonisationprocessrepresenteda“normativeshift” in internationallegal thought, regarding the inalienable rights of native populations. From Wellsch’s

288AlbertSarraut,ascitedinKwameNkrumah,TowardsColonialFreedom:AfricaintheStruggleAgainstWorldImperialism(London:Heinemann,1962),3-4.289WhilePortugalremainedneutralduringWorldWarII,JapaneseforcesbecameconvincedthattheAlliedForces(namelyAustralia)wasplanningtoseizeEastTimoranduseitasabasetoattackJapan’sposition.TheJapaneseultimatelycommitted20,000troopstothesmallislandterritory.AlliedAustralianandDutchforcesrespondedbylandinginEastTimor,whereitbecamethesceneofintenseandbrutalfightingbetweenthetwocombatants.Thewar fought inTimorwas reportedly responsible for thedeathofapproximately40,000Timorese.ForamoredetailedaccountoftheexperienceofWorldWarIIforEastTimor,seeJamesDunn,Timor:APeopleBetrayed,15-25.290Ibid.,23.291Ibid.,25.292TheProclamationofIndonesianIndependencewasdeliveredon17August,1945,andmarkedthebeginningofthearmedIndonesianresistanceagainsttheDutchcolonialists.In2005,thegovernmentoftheNetherlandsannounced that they had accepted the 17 August, 1945 as Indonesia’s de facto date of independence. SeeGovernment of the Netherlands, “Relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia,” Government of theNetherlands,accessed12July,2016.https://www.government.nl/topics/international-relations/contents/indonesia.293Most of the nations holding colonial territories abstained from voting on the resolution, which included:Portugal,SouthAfrica,Australia,Belgium,France,Spain,GreatBritain,andtheUnitedStates.294TheUnitedNationsandDecolonisation,“DeclarationontheGrantingofIndependencetoColonialCountriesandPeoples:AdoptedbyGeneralAssemblyResolution1514(XV)of14December1960,”TheUnitedNations,accessedon01July,2014.http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml.295Ibid.

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perspective, “modes of tutelage and wardship were outlawed, and self-government wasaccepted as the natural right of all nations. Thus, this process officially ended the era ofempire.”296However,thisviewoffersanoverlysimplisticassessmentoftheprocess,andfailsto recognise the actual impact of the discourse on the decolonisation of colonial states.Indeed, Robert H. Jackson argues that in reality sovereigntywas still often based on thejudgement, by the most privileged in the international system, of whether a state was‘capable’ofprovidingforitssubjects.297Inthiscontext,theinternationalsystemcontinuedtobedivided into twodistinct tiers: thosedeemedtobecapableofbeingsovereign,andthose that were not. Certainly, in the case of East Timor, the rhetoric on decolonisationresultedinverylittlechangetomodesoftutelageandwardship,whichwerewieldedoverthemfordecadestocome,frommultiplesources.Sovereignty,self-determination,andself-governmentfortheTimoresewastrulyadistantprospect.

It was not until the overthrow of Salazar’s regime in 1974 that the process ofPortugal’s withdrawal from East Timor began. The new Portuguese government madedecolonisationoneofitspriorityissues,notingthatthecolonieshadbeenasignificantdrainon the Portuguese economy.298 The Portuguese government offered the Timorese threechoices:continuedlinkswithPortugalandagradualpathtowardsindependence,integrationwithIndonesia,orcompleteandrapidindependence.299Timoresepoliticalparties,whichhadbeenpreviouslyoutlawed in the coloniesunder Salazar’s rule,quicklyemerged.Twopro-independencepartiesrapidlygainedwidespreadsupport,theUniãoDemocráticaTimorense(UDT) and Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (FRETILIN), with the twoparties later formingapoliticalalliance.Supporting integrationwith Indonesia,AssociaçãoPopularDemocráticaTimorense(APODETI),garneredasignificantlysmallersupportbaseatthetime.

TimoreseofficialsmadeanumberofvisitstoJakartaduringthisperiodtodiscusswiththeIndonesiangovernmenttheprospectsofaviableandpeacefuldecolonisationprocessforthecountry. In1974,Timoreseofficials reported, “therewouldbenopoint inour joiningIndonesia after decolonisation…instead of the Portuguese over us we would have theJavanese. This would be recolonisation, not decolonisation.”300 FRETILIN’s platform wasstronglybasedonthetotalrejectionofcolonialism,andinitsfirstpartymanifestoitassertedstrongly its policy to struggle against “colonialism and any form of domination of our

296 Brent Wellsch, “The Ethics of Reconstruction: The Dissolution and Re-emergence of Trusteeship WithinInternational Society,” (Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia, Canada, 2007), 2.http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/obj/thesescanada/vol2/002/MR31692.PDF.297RobertH.Jackson,“Quasi-States,DualRegimes,andNeo-ClassicalTheory:InternationalJurisprudenceandtheThirdWorld,”InternationalOrganisation41,no.4(1984):532.298 JohnG.Taylor,EastTimor:ThePriceofFreedom,171.Thecostofcounterinsurgencywars intheirAfricancolonies,inparticular,hadalargeburdenonanalreadybleakeconomicoutlook.299JillJolliffe,EastTimor:NationalismandColonialism,61.300AwetTeweldeWeldmichael,ThirdWorldColonialismandStrategiesofLiberation,33.

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people.”301During1974and1975,PortugueseofficialsalsoheldregularmeetingswiththeirIndonesiancounterparts,todiscusstheindependenceprocessforthepeopleofEastTimor,andprovideassurancesthatitsneighbourwouldnotposeathreattoIndonesianpeaceandsecurity.Duringthecourseofthesemeetings,IndonesiareaffirmeditspositionthatPortugalretainedlegitimateauthorityoverEastTimor,andthatitencouragedthe“speedyandorderlyimplementationoftheactofself-determinationbythepeopleofPortugueseTimor.”302

ByJuly1975,theprospectsofapeacefulresolutiontothequestionofEastTimor’sfuturebrokedown,withthealliancebetweenUDTandFRETILINdisintegrating.Ithasbeenreported that someUDT leadershadbeen in secret contactwithhigh-ranking Indonesianofficials,whohadwarnedthattheywouldnottolerateanindependentEastTimorontheirdoorstep, which had ‘communist’ links (a claim made against FRETILIN).303 Reportedly,IndonesianofficialsorderedUDTtotakeimmediatestepstodismantleFRETILIN,andtoforman anti-communist front against them. In return, Indonesia promised its support forUDTleadership in the independence process.304With the tacit support of the Indonesians, inAugust 1975, some leaders from UDT attempted to overthrow and imprison FRETILINmembers, and seizedanumberof key institutions inDili, leading toabloodycivilwar.305Approximately3,000Timoresefledthecapitalduringthefighting,andnearlyallremainingPortuguese officials escaped the country.306 ByNovember, it appeared that FRETILIN hadquelledtheUDTassault,andhadgainedalmostentirecontrolofthecountry.Havingfounditself in de facto control, FRETILIN proclaimed that East Timor had decided uponindependence,anditsubsequentlyannouncedtherenamingofthecountry:TheDemocraticRepublicofEastTimor.However,thedeclarationofindependenceendedupbeingoneofthetriggersforIndonesianPresidentSoeharto,whowouldsoonauthorisethefull-scaleinvasionofEastTimor.307

On4December,1975,theIndonesianGovernmentreiterateditsofficialpositionthat,in spite of the violent civil war, Portugal continued to have the “sole authority in theTerritory.”308However,atthesametime,moralrhetoriccreepedintothelanguageusedbyIndonesia,andintheverysamestatementitalsoclaimedthatithada“moralobligationto

301AscitedinDavidHicks,RhetoricandtheDecolonisationandRecolonisationofEastTimor(NewYork:Routledge,2015),67.302TheUnitedNationsDepartmentofPoliticalAffairs,TrusteeshipandDecolonization,“Decolonization:IssueonEastTimor,”22.303RogerS.Clark,“DecolonisationofEastTimorandUnitedNationsNorms,”YaleJournalofWorldPublicOrder7no.1(1980-1981):7.304Ibid.305Ibid.306P.H.Gibson,ActingSecretaryofExternalRelationsandTradetoTheMinisterofExternalRelationsandTrade,“BriefingbyNewZealandMinistryofExternalRelationsandTrade,13May1991,”ReleasedundertheOfficialInformationAct.307TheTimor-LesteCommissionforReception,TruthandReconciliation,“Chega!”57.308TheUnitedNationsDepartmentofPoliticalAffairs,TrusteeshipandDecolonization,“Decolonization:IssueonEastTimor,”29.

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protect the people in the Territory of Timor,” purportedly in order to ensure that “theaspirations and wishes of the entire people of Portuguese Timor,” were respected.309Certainly,theclaimbeingmadebyIndonesiawasthatFRETILIN’scontroloverthecountrywasnotthewillofthepopulation,andcertainlynotsupportedbyAPODETI,normostUDTadvocates.Mostinteresting,forthepurposeofthisthesis,istheIndonesianGovernment’suseofmoralisticclaimsofresponsibilityanditsassociatedobligationto‘protect’thepeopleofEastTimor.Withthebenefitofhindsight,itcannowberecognisedthatthislanguagewasused with the specific intention of justifying and legitimising their impending militaryinterventioninthecountry.WhileIndonesiawasoneofthefirstnationstohave“destroyedthevestigesofcolonialism,”intheirownliberationfromDutchrulemorethantwenty-fiveyears earlier, they ended up becoming the perpetrators of oppressive re-colonialisationagainsttheirless-powerfulneighbour.310

IndonesianInvasion

AfterinitiallyannouncingthatitwascontentwiththeassurancesgainedfromPortugalthatEastTimor’sindependencewouldnotbeathreattoIndonesianpeaceandsecurity,PresidentSoehartobegantoincreasinglybelievethathiscountry’ssecuritycouldonlybeassurediftheTimoresedidnotgainsovereigncontrolofitsterritory.Thereasonsforthischangehavebeenheavilydebatedinliterature,thoughoneofthedominantargumentsisthatthispolicychangewas“heavilyconditionedbytheColdWaranti-communismofthetime.”311 Indeed, intheIndonesianuseofthefearofcommunisminTimor,JakartawasabletofindsympatheticearsamongitskeyWesternandAsianalliesfortheintervention.OnDecember7,1975,Indonesianforces invaded East Timor. On the same day, the Portuguese Government informed thePresidentoftheUNSecurityCouncil(UNSC)thatIndonesiahadlaunchedamilitaryoffensive,usingnaval,air,andlandforces.Portugallabelledtheintervention“anactofaggression.”312Indonesiainitiallydeniedanydirectinvolvementinthemilitaryintervention,claiminginsteadthatDilihadbeen“liberated”byUDTandAPODETIforces,andtheseforceshadonlybeensupportedbyIndonesian“volunteers.”313However,onlyaweeklater,on18December,1975,Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, announced Indonesia’s establishment of a‘provisionalgovernment’inEastTimor.314

309Ibid.Emphasisadded.310AwetTeweldeWeldmichael,ThirdWorldColonialismandStrategiesofLiberation,2.311TheTimor-LesteCommissionforReception,TruthandReconciliation,“Chega!”33.312 TheUNSC debated the intervention and unanimously passed a resolution on 22December deploring theinvasion,callingfortheimmediatewithdrawalofIndonesiantroops,andreaffirmingtherightofthepeopleofEast Timor to self-determination. See The United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 384 (1975) of 22December 1975, The United Nations, accessed 18 August, 2016,http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/384(1975).313TheUnitedNationsDepartmentofPoliticalAffairs,TrusteeshipandDecolonization,“Decolonization:IssueonEastTimor,”30.314RogerS.Clark,“DecolonisationofEastTimorandUnitedNationsNorms,”9.

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The Indonesian invasion of East Timor was brutally violent. Many scholars andcommentators have characterised the initial invasion, and the subsequent actions of theIndonesianforcestocontroltheterritory,asbeinggenocidal innature.315Thewidespreadexecutionsofcivilianswasreliablyreported,andtheonlyforeignjournalistremaininginEastTimoratthetime,AustralianRogerEast,wascapturedonthedayoftheinvasionandlaterexecutedonDili’swaterfrontbyIndonesiantroops.316Anumberofmasskillingsalsooccurredinthefirstdaysoftheinvasion.317Indeed,ithassubsequentlybeenreportedthatIndonesiantroopsweregivenorderstocrushtheTimoreseruthlessly.AccordingtoJohnG.Taylor,thetroopsweretold“theywerefightingcommunistsinthecauseofJihadjustastheyhaddoneinIndonesiain1965.TheTimoresewereportrayedasbackward,primitive,sub-humans.”318After the invasion, the Indonesian Armed Forces reported back on the ‘condition’ of theTimoresetheyhadencountered:

Feeble mentality is very evident among the Timorese, particularly among the oldergeneration. Their feeblementality results in unhealthy physical and economic conditions.Theselowsocial,economic,andmentalconditionsarethesourceofmanynegativefeaturesbecause they result in extremely inappropriate thought processes and experiences… EastTimorsocietysogreatlyyearnstobeguidedanddirectedinallspheresoflife.319

ThecivilisationallanguageusedbyIndonesianforcesandofficialsisstriking.Therhetoricisvery reminiscentof the languageemployedbyEuropeancolonisers,during their ‘civilisingmissions.’ The Timorese, in this regard, have clearly been cast as the different, weak,barbarians,whobehavebadlyasaresultoftheirinferiornature.Itwastheduty,therefore,of theadvanced Indonesians to ‘guide’and ‘direct’Timoresesociety.Theportrayalof theTimorese as being backward and subhuman facilitated the convincing of the Indonesiansoldiersthattheywerefightingagainstsomethinginnatelydifferenttothemselves.AstheTimorese were constructed to be seen as different, and not seen as possessing humanqualities,“itmadenodifferencewhetherhewaswearingauniformandbearingarmsornot–whetherindeedhewasaman,womanorchild.Hehadnomorerightsthanawildanimaloraninsect.”320ThecastingoftheTimoreseinthislighthelpedtoshapetheunderstandingofpermissibleactionsagainstthem.Indeed,thisprocesshelpstoexplainthelevelofbrutality

315Seeforexample,AwetTeweldeWeldmichael,ThirdWorldColonialismandStrategiesofLiberation,127;andNoamChomsky,“EastTimorRetrospective,”LeMondeDiplomatique,accessedon12June,2014.https://chomsky.info/199910__/.316TheTimor-LesteCommissionforReception,TruthandReconciliation,“Chega!”63.317Ibid.,64.Oneeyewitnesstosomeoftheatrocitiesreportedthefollowing:“At2.00pm(onDecember7,1975)59men,bothChineseandTimorese,wereboughtontothewharf…Thesemenwereshotonebyone…Thevictimswereorderedtostandontheedgeofthepierfacingthesea,sothatwhentheywereshottheirbodiesfellintothewater.”AscitedinAwetTeweldeWeldmichael,ThirdWorldColonialismandStrategiesofLiberation,127.318JohnG.Taylor,EastTimor:ThePriceofFreedom,70.319AngkatanBersenjata(IndonesianArmedForces),ascitedinJohnG.Taylor,EastTimor:ThePriceofFreedom,129.320MichaelHoward,“ConstraintsonWarfare,”inTheLawsofWar:ConstraintsonWarfareintheWesternWorld,eds.MichaelHoward,GeorgeJ.Andreopoulous,andMarkR.Schulman(NewHavenandLondon:YaleUniversityPress,1994),8.

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andviolence inflicted, thesummaryandwidespreadexecutionsofcivilians,aswellas themasskillings,conductedbytheIndonesianforces.TheTimorese,inthiscontext,neededtoberuthlesslyquelled,inordertobemalleabletobeingcivilised,whichwasultimatelyfortheir‘owngood.’Thisprocesswasclearly identified,andwarnedagainst,byHansMorgenthau,whenhearguedthatmoralistictermswouldleadtotheonlyoptionavailableto“crushtheenemy; force him into unconditional surrender; [and] re-educate him in the ways ofdemocratic,peace-lovingnations.”321

Classical realist theorists E.H Carr, Carl Schmitt, andHansMorgenthau all stronglywarnedagainst thecastingofpeoplesasbeingoutsideofhumanity,as it inevitablymadethemvulnerable to the imperialisticambitionsofpowerful states,andmade internationalconflict more possible. The argument could be made that Indonesia’s positioning of theTimoreseasbeingoutsideofhumanity,wasmadeeasierbythethoughtalreadypromotedbythePortuguese,thattheTimoresewereweak, feeble,and inferior. Indeed, ithasbeenargued that the stereotype of the ‘barbarian’ ismost successful when it is leveraged offpreviouslyheld impressionsandopinions. In this context,HomiK.Bhabha,apre-eminentscholarinthefieldofcontemporarypost-colonialstudies,assertsthat,“thestereotype,whichis amajor discursive strategy, it is a form of knowledge and identification that vacillatesbetweenwhat is already in place, already known, and something thatmust be anxiouslyrepeated.”322Inthisregard,arepetitivecycleofcivilisationallanguageiswieldedagainsttheTimorese, and it is increasingly difficult to break it, as the stereotype becomes fixed andbeginstobecomeregardedas‘knowledge.’AccordingtoBhabha,itisthereforeimportantinthepost-colonialcontexttoexposestereotypesas“falserepresentationofagivenreality.”323

Indonesia’sViolentRecolonisationofEastTimor

Inthetwenty-yearperiodfollowingtheirintervention,IndonesiastrengtheneditsdominanceandcontroloverEastTimor.IrenaCristalischaracterisesthisperiodofIndonesianoccupationas“oneofthemostdreadfulhumanitariancatastrophesthatanynationhaseversuffered.”324WhilePaulCleary’spositionisthatitwasoneoftheworstcasesofgenocideinthetwentiethcentury.325 The death toll in East Timor, as a direct result of Indonesian intervention andoccupation,varieswidely.Someobserversputthefigureat300,000,326whileothershaveputitatthelowernumberof183,000.327Whatisclear,however,isthatfearandviolencewerecommonmethodsemployedbyIndonesianofficialsandforcestosubjugateanddominate

321HansMorgenthau,InDefenseoftheNationalInterest:ACriticalExaminationofAmericanForeignPolicy(NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1951),94.322HomiK.Bhabha,TheLocationofCulture[1994]republishedwithnewprefacebyauthor(NewYorkandLondon:Routledge,2004),94-95.323Ibid.,107.324IrenaCristalis,EastTimor:ANation’sBitterDawn,2nded.(London:ZedBooks,2009),116.325PaulCleary,Shakedown:Australia’sGrabforTimorOil(Crow’sNest,Australia:Allen&Unwin,2007),XXIX.326CatholicChurchofEastTimor,ascitedbyIrenaCristalis,EastTimor:ANation’sBitterDawn,116.327PaulCleary,Shakedown:Australia’sGrabforTimorOil,116.

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Timoresesociety.Violencewascommittedonsucharegularbasis,thateventheIndonesian-appointedRegionalPeople’sRepresentativeAssemblyinEastTimorprotestedonanumberofoccasionsagainsttheunacceptableviolencebeingcommittedbyIndonesianforces.Inspiteofthe inherentrisks involved inmakingtheirconcernspublic, theAssemblyreportedthatthey received,“regularverbalaswellaswritten reportsorcomplaints frompeopleabouttorture,maltreatment,murders,andotherunimaginablecases,”theAssemblyfurtherwrotethatselectIndonesianmilitaryleaders,“haveintroducedbehaviourofconquerorstowardsaconqueredpeoplewithgreatbrutality.”328

TheAssemblyalsorecognisedatthetimethestrongparallelsbetweenthemethodsusedtoconquerandcolonise,andthosebeingemployedbytheIndonesians.AwetTeweldeWeldmichaelsupportstheassertionthatthisperiodwas“secondarycolonialism,”inwhichhearguesthatitboreastrongresemblancetothecolonialactivitiesofwesternEuropeansinthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturies.329AccordingtoWeldmichael,Jakartahad“imposedtheir administrative structures, languages, and ritualson the subjects,whowerenotonlyexpectedtoacceptlosingtheirownrightsbutalsotosingtheircolonisers’praisesongs.”330ThevaluesandbeliefsofIndonesiansocietyweresystematicallyandforciblyenforcedinEastTimor,inordertoreorienttheperceivedprimitiveandbackwardpopulation.

InternationalResponse:DistancingPoliciesusingCivilisationalLanguage

InacquiescingtheirWesternandAsianalliestosupport,orataminimum,turnablindeyetotheirinvasionofEastTimor,JakartahighlightedthefearthatindependencecouldleadtothecountrybecomingabasefortheinfiltrationofIndonesiaandAustraliabycommunistnations.InMay1974,anofficialfromIndonesia’sStateIntelligenceAgencybriefedAustralianEmbassystaffinJakartaonthe‘evidence’thattheyhadgathered,whichshowedthecrediblethreatthatcommunismposedinEastTimor.331SoehartometwithAustralianPrimeMinister,GoughWhitlam,twiceintheleaduptotheinvasionofEastTimor,332andintheofficialAustralianreportsonthemeetings,whicharenowamatterofpublicrecord,Soehartoreferencesthecommunist threat posedby thePortuguese ‘abandonment’ of East Timor.333 In response,

328 First Level Regional People’s Representative Assembly of the Province of East Timor, “Report on theDevelopmentofGovernmentAffairsinEastTimor:August1981,”ascitedinAwetTeweldeWeldmichael,ThirdWorldColonialismandStrategiesofLiberation,134.329Ibid.,8.330Ibid.331AustraliaDepartmentofForeignAffairs,“CablefromAustralianEmbassyinJakartatoCanberra,22May1974,”inDocumentsonAustralianForeignPolicy:AustraliaandtheIndonesianIncorporationofPortugueseTimor,1974-1976,ed.WendyWay(Melbourne:DepartmentofForeignAffairsandTradeandMelbourneUniversityPress,2000),56.Accessed04January,2016.http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Documents/australia-and-the-indonesian-incorporation-of-portuguese-timor-1974-1976.pdf.332 SoehartoandWhitlam firstmet inWonosobo,near Yogyakarta,on6 September, 1974. They latermet inTownsville,Queensland,on4April,1975.333TheTimor-LesteCommissionforReception,TruthandReconciliation,“Chega!”36.

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WhitlamappearstohavegivenSoehartothe‘greenlight’totakeoverthecountry.334WhitlamadvisedSoehartothatitwastheAustralianGovernment’spositionthatEastTimorshouldbeintegrated into Indonesia, givingalmost identical rationale towhatSoehartohadalsoputforward; itwas clear that East Timorwas not viable as an independent state, andwouldthereforebecomethefocusofattentionofpowerfulcommunistcountries.335

ContemporaryscholarswritingonthehistoryofIndonesianoccupationofEastTimorhavelargelycondemnedtheactionsoftheWhitlamgovernment.ItisclearthatWhitlamandhisofficialsprizedgreatlythemaintenanceofgoodrelationswiththeIndonesians,thoughDenisFreneyarguesthattoachievethisend,“hewasquitewillingtoallowEastTimortobedrownedinblood.”336Clearly,however,theAustraliangovernmentwaskeentokeeptheirlevel of direct and public involvement in the conflictminimal. In a brief prepared by theDepartmentofForeignAffairsinApril,1975,itwasreportedthat“thedegreeofAustralianinvolvementwill,itishoped,bekepttoaminimum.”337Thisthemewasrepeatedinabriefingpaper prepared by the Australian Ambassador in Jakarta, who suggested that Australianpolicy should be based on “disengaging ourselves as far as possible from the Timorquestion.”338 The Ambassador further recommended that if Indonesia was to intervene,Australiashould,“act inawaywhichwouldbedesignedtominimise thepublic impact inAustraliaandshowprivatelyunderstandingtoIndonesiaoftheirproblems.”339

Whilehopingtokeeptheirdirectinvolvementintheconflict‘toaminimum,’duetotheir determination of what was best for the national interest, Australian officials alsoattemptedtojustifytheirinactionduetotheperceivedbackwardnessofTimoresesociety.AccordingtoadiplomaticcablefromtheDepartmentofForeignAffairs(DFA),whenPortugalhadfirstannounceditsintentiontoleaveEastTimor,AustralianofficialshadalreadydoubtedtheabilityoftheTimoresetodemonstratethenecessaryskillsfor“genuineself-government,”as a result of their “backwardness” and “inexperience.”340 In the same cable, Australianofficialscommentedontheirperceptionofthe‘condition’oftheTimoresepeople,“socialand

334ThereisevidencetosuggestthattheAustralianPrimeMinister’ssupporteventippedthescalesinSoeharto’sown decisionmaking on the invasion. According to a report by the Australian Ambassador to Portugal, untilSoeharto’smeetingwithWhitlamhehadbeenundecidedaboutTimor’sfuture.However,WhitlamsupportforEastTimor’s incorporation into Indonesia, “helped themtocrystallise theirown thinking,and theywerenowfirmly convinced of the wisdom of this course.” See Australia Department of Foreign Affairs, “Cable fromAustralianEmbassyinLisbontoCanberra,14October1974,”inDocumentsonAustralianForeignPolicy,119.335Ibid.336DenisFreney,Timor:FreedomCaughtBetweenthePowers(Nottingham,England:SpokesmanBooks,1975),53.337 Australia Department of Foreign Affairs, “Briefing for theMinister for Foreign Affairs, ANZUSMinisterialMeeting,April,1975,”inAustralianDefenceandForeignPolicy1968-1975,eds.J.RWalshandG.JMunster(HongKong:J.RWalshandG.JMunster,1980),191.338AustraliaDepartmentofForeignAffairs,“CablefromAustralianEmbassyinJakartatoCanberra,17August,1975,”inDocumentsonAustralianForeignPolicy,313.339Ibid.340AustraliaDepartmentofForeignAffairs,“SavingramtoPostsfromtheDepartmentofForeignAffairs,3July,1974,”inDocumentsonAustralianForeignPolicy,63.

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economic standardsare verybackwardanddepressedbut theTimorese,havingnootherstandardofreference,areunawareofthewretchednessoftheircondition.”341IntheperiodimmediatelybeforeIndonesianintervention,AustralianofficialshadalreadymadetheirowndeterminationthatEastTimorwassimplynotviable,duetotheincapacityoftheTimoreseto “handle” self-governing or independent status.342 In these examples of diplomaticcorrespondence, there isa clearuseof civilisational language toposition theTimoreseasbeinginferiorandbackward.

WhileNewZealanddidnothavenearlythesamelevelofinfluenceonthepoliciesofIndonesia compared with its Australian neighbours, the government’s position on theinvasionandoccupationofEastTimorstillprovidessomeclearexamplesofthedistancingpoliciesundertakenbywesternnations,andthecontinuedpositioningofthepeopleofTimorasbeingbackward,inferior,andultimately,ill-suitedforindependence.LiketheAustralians,NewZealandofficialsdulyrecognisedthatinthecontextofEastTimortheirstronginterestwasinmaintainingagoodrelationshipwithIndonesia,“evenifthismightonoccasionrequiresome measure of compromise on matters of principle.”343 The year after Indonesianintervention,aMinistryofForeignAffairs (MFA)brieftothePrimeMinisteradmittedthatNewZealand’s“closetieswithIndonesia”underpinnedtheirbeliefthat“integrationofTimorwouldbethemostlogicalsolution.”344Inthiscontext,MinistryofficialsremindedthePrimeMinisterthatNewZealandhadbeen“restrainedinanycriticismofIndonesia’sactions.”345

InapatternsimilartothatofAustralianofficials,NewZealandgovernmentstaffalsousedcivilisationallanguageinordertohelpjustifytheirlackofdirectandpublicactionontheEastTimor issue. In theweekafter Indonesian intervention,MFAofficials referencedEastTimoras“abackwardcolony.”346InareportbytheNewZealandAmbassadortoIndonesia,followinghisvisit toEastTimor in1978,hemadehisassessmentof the ‘condition’of theTimoresepeopleinstrikingcivilisationallanguage:

In sum, the people are poor, small, riddledwith disease and almost totally illiterate, verysimpleand,aswe’retoldagainandagain‘primitive’.Theyarealmostcompletelyundertheinfluenceoftheir‘Rajas’.Consideredashumanstocktheyarenotatallimpressive–andthis

341Ibid.,64.342AustralianDepartmentofForeignAffairs,“PolicyPlanningPaper,3May,1974,”inDocumentsonAustralianForeignPolicy,51.343NewZealandMinistryofForeignAffairs,“BriefingtothePrimeMinisterontheIssueofPortugueseTimor,10December,1975.”ReleasedundertheOfficialInformationAct.344NewZealandMinistryofForeignAffairs,“BriefingtothePrimeMinister forCallbytheAmbassadoroftheRepublicofIndonesia,5May,1976.”ReleasedundertheOfficialInformationAct.345Ibid.346NewZealandMinistryofForeignAffairs,“BriefingtotheMinisterofForeignAffairsontheIssueofPortugueseTimor,23December,1975.”ReleasedundertheOfficialInformationAct.

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issomethingthatonehastothinkaboutwhenjudgingtheircapacitytotakepartinanactofself-determinationoreventoperformasresponsiblecitizensofanindependentcountry.347

The judgement being made by these New Zealand officials appears to imply that theirperceptionof theTimoreseasbeing ‘simple’and ‘primitive,’ insomemanner justifiedtheactionsofIndonesia.Itiscertainlynoteworthyherethatanassessmentwasbeingmadeofthe‘humanstock’ofanentiresociety,inordertorationalisetheperceivedinabilityoftheTimoresetoberesponsiblecitizens,ortakepart inactsofself-determination.NevermindthatthepeopleofEastTimorwerenotgiventheopportunitytoprovetheseNewZealandofficials wrong. Given the effusive humanitarian discourse so deeply enshrined incontemporaryinternationallegalthought,onemayhavethoughtthatthismannerofthinkingandrhetorichadbeenbanishedtotheeraofconquestandcolonialism,butitappearsnot.

Theseearlypoliciesofdistancing,andclaimsoftheTimoresebeinginferior,primitive,weak, and backward, had a significant impact on the future decisions and policies of theAustralianandNewZealandgovernments.IthasbeensuggestedthatthedecisionsmadebyWhitlam and his officials firmly dictated the course of Australian policy on the issue ofIndonesia andEast Timor for decades to come. From JamesDunn’s perspective,Whitlamappearedtohave“adisdainfor,andinsensitivitytowardsEastTimor.”348DunnfurtherarguesthatitwasWhitlam’sstrongbeliefthattheTimoresewere,“anondescript,backwardpeoplewhoseclaimtoself-rulecouldhardlybetakenseriously.”349InherbookNegligentNeighbour,Marie Leadbeater notes New Zealand played a key role in the continued “moral anddiplomaticsupport”ofIndonesia’sposition.350LeadbeaterishighlycriticalofthepatternsofsecrecyinNewZealand’sforeignpolicyontheissueofEastTimor,andquestionsthepoliticalallegiancestotheUnitedStatesandAustralia,whichsheviews“tieandbindNewZealandforeignpolicydirections.”351

The position being promoted throughout these briefings and diplomaticcommunicationswasthatduetotheperceivedbackwardnessofTimoresesociety,Indonesianintervention could be justified. In this context, an implicit understanding was given thatthroughIndonesian intervention,andtheeventual integrationofEastTimor intoJavanesesociety,theIndonesianswouldbeabletoimprovethe‘condition’oftheTimorese,orinotherwords,‘civilise’them.TheTimorese,inthiscontext,wereclearlycastasbeing‘different,’andtheir‘condition’madethemfall‘outside’oftheconceptionofthecomityofnations.IftheTimoresewereconsidered‘like’theAustraliansandNewZealanders,andifinternationallawand customs applied to them in practice, it would have been difficult for Canberra and

347NewZealandMinistryofForeignAffairs, “CableonEastTimor:TheAmbassadorsVisit,13 January,1978.”ReleasedundertheOfficialInformationAct.348JamesDunn,Timor:APeopleBetrayed,169.349Ibid.350MarieLeadbeater,NegligentNeighbour:NewZealand’sComplicityintheInvasionandOccupationofTimor-Leste(Nelson,NewZealand:CraigPottonPublishing,2006),14.351Ibid.,14-16.

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WellingtontoexplaintheiracquiescencetoIndonesia’sactions.Beingcastasbeingonthe‘outside’ of international society provided the rationale for various forms of domination,exploitation,andviolentactions,againsttheTimorese.

ItisnoteworthythatAustralianandNewZealandofficialshadfeltthatitwaswithintheir purview tomake resolute conclusion on the perceived lower nature and backwardconditionoftheentireTimoresesociety.Thisrevealstheirownsenseofsuperiority,aswellastheirbeliefintheir‘enlightened’nature.Thisdemonstratestheongoinghierarchicalnatureof the international system,whereexceptionalitycanbepromoted inorder to justifyandlegitimise violent intervention, against identified ‘lower ranked’ peoples. The process ofstereotyping an entire society of people as being “existentially something different andalien,”352hadextremelynegativeconsequences for thepeopleofEastTimor. Indeed,CarlSchmitthadwarnedagainstpoliciesofthisnature,wherebyusinghumanitarianrhetoricinordertodenythequalitiesofbeinghumanwouldresultinlifenolongerbeingofthehighestvalue,becomingworthless,andultimatelyneedingtobedestroyed.353

StateSelf-InterestReignsSupreme

By 1978, the Australian Government had made public their decision to grant de factorecognitiontotheIndonesianoccupationofEastTimor.ThisrecognitionallowedAustralianofficialstobeginnegotiationswithJakartaontherightstotheseabedbetweenAustraliaandEastTimor,whichheldhighlylucrativehydrocarbondeposits.EvenpriortotheIndonesianinvasion,theAustraliangovernmenthadrecognisedprivatelythatnegotiatingwithJakartaontheissuewouldbeeasierthanhavingto‘closethegap’withPortugal,oranindependentEast Timor.354 In order to deflect criticismof Canberra’s decision to recognise Indonesiancontrol of the country, government officials advised the ForeignMinister that he shouldemphasisethepotentialbenefittoAustraliathattheseabedwouldbring:“IfquestionsareaskedaboutthesechangestheGovernmentcouldexplainitspositionbyarguingthatitwasnecessarytoacknowledgeIndonesia’sclaimtoEastTimorforthepurposeofnegotiatinganinternational agreementwhich is verymuch inAustralia’s interest.”355 In the caseof EastTimor,humanitarianprinciples,fundamentalhumanrights,andself-determination,wereall

352CarlSchmitt,TheConceptofthePolitical,27.353CarlSchmitt,TheLegalWorldRevolution.”Telos72(1987):88.354InaSecretCabletoDFAinAugust,1975,AmbassadorWoolcottwrotethefollowing:“WeareallawareoftheAustralian defence interests in the Portuguese Timor situation but I wonder whether the Department hasascertainedtheinterestoftheMinisteroftheDepartmentofMineralsandEnergyintheTimorsituation.ItwouldseemtomethatthisDepartmentmightwellhaveaninterestinclosingthepresentgapintheagreedseaboarderand this could be much readily negotiated with Indonesia by closing the present gap that with Portugal orindependentPortugueseTimor.IknowIamrecommendingapragmaticratherthanaprincipledstandbutthatiswhatnational interestand foreignpolicy isallabout.”AustraliaDepartmentofForeignAffairs,“Cable fromAustralianEmbassy inJakartatoCanberra,17August,1975,”ascited inDocumentsonAustraliaDefenceandForeignPolicy,200.355AustraliaDepartmentofForeignAffairs,“BriefingtotheMinisterofForeignAffairs,”ascitedinPaulCleary,Shakedown,29-30.

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castaside.NotonlydidAustralianofficialsfeelthatstateself-interestreignedsupreme,theywerewillingtoexploitrevenuegeneratingpotentialtotheAustralianpublic,inordertojustifytheiractions.

WhenGareth EvansbecameAustralian ForeignMinister in 1988, he expressedhisdeterminationtoadd“ballast”totherelationshipwithJakarta,andhisintentiontoconcludenegotiationsontheseabedagreement.356InFebruary,1991,EvansandIndonesianForeignMinister,AliAlatas,conductedahighlypublicisedsigningceremonyforthenewlyconcludedagreement,inanairplaneflyingdirectlyoverEastTimor.Clinkingtheirchampagneglasses,theytoastedwhatJohnPilgerdescribedas“thedivisionoftheirspoils.”357DuringhisvisittoIndonesia in regards to thesigning,Evanswasaskedby journalistshowhe reconciled thecontinued reports of mass killings and human rights abuses against the Timorese withAustralia’scloserelationshipwithIndonesia,Evansrepliedthatthehumanrightsrecordhad“in our judgment, conspicuously improved, particularly under the present militaryarrangements.”358Thiswasinspiteofoverwhelmingevidence,fromreputableagenciessuchastheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross,ofcontinuingmasskillingsandallegationsof genocidal acts.359 When later asked about the international legal principle of notrecognisingandexploitingterritorytakenbyforce,Evansresponded:

WhatIcansayissimplythattheworldisaprettyunfairplace,thatit’slitteredoverthecourseofthedecadesandthecenturieswithexamplesofacquisitionsbyforcewhichhaveprovedtobe,forwhateverreason,irreversible.360

MichaelE.SallamaintainsthatrhetoricsuchasthiswasconsistentwithAustralia’soverallstrategy inregardstotheabysmalhumanrightssituation inEastTimor,wherebycriticismagainstIndonesiawasconsistentlydeflected.WhenpressedontheissuebytheAustralianmedia,Sallaassertsthatthegovernmentwouldonlyeverexpressitsviews“inacontextofoverall improvements in Indonesia’s human rights environment, thereby minimisingIndonesianreactiontoAustralianorinternationalcriticismsbyacknowledgingpastoroverallimprovements.”361JohnG.TaylorsupportsthisassertioninhisanalysisofAustralianforeign

356GarethEvans,ascited in JamesCotton,“Introduction:EastTimorandAustralia -Twenty-FiveYearsof thePolicyDebate,”inEastTimorandAustralia:AIIAContributionstothePolicyDebate,ed.JamesCotton(Canberra,Australia:AustralianDefenceStudiesCentreandtheAustralianInstituteofInternationalAffairs,1999),9.357 Videoof the signing ceremony canbe viewed inDeath of aNation: The Timor Conspiracy,produced anddirectedbyDavidMunro,writtenbyJohnPilger(Birmingham,England:CentralIndependentTelevision,1994),at57minutes,accessed05December,2015,http://johnpilger.com/videos/death-of-a-nation-the-timor-conspiracy.358GarethEvans,ascitedinJohnPilger,“OnlyAustraliaremainstruetotheuber-sheriffinWashington,5April,2004.” Accessed 05 December 2015, http://johnpilger.com/articles/only-australia-remains-true-to-the-uber-sheriff-in-washington.359JohnG.Taylor,EastTimor:ThePriceofFreedom,97.360GarethEvans,ascitedinMarkAarons,“IndependenceorDeath,”inEastTimor:AWesternMadeTragedy,eds.MarkAaronsandRobertDomm(Sydney:LeftBookClub,1992),39.361MichaelE.Salla,“AustralianForeignPolicyandEastTimor,”170.

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policyatthetime,andfurtherarguesthatCanberra’spolicywasto“publiclyfeigndisbeliefandignoranceofeventsin[the]remoteisland.”362

TheactionsofAustraliaandNewZealandinregardstotheinvasion,andsubsequenttwenty-year occupation of East Timor, can be largely characterised by their attempt todistancethemselvespubliclyfromtheissue.Behindcloseddoors,briefingsanddiplomaticrecordsshowimplicitsupportfortheintervention,whilepublicly,theywerecarefulnottooverlychastisetheIndonesians.TheuseofcivilisationallanguagecanbeseenasanattempttoprovidejustificationforwhytheIndonesianswereforcedintointerveningmilitarilyinEastTimor,and,inturn,whythetwocountriesavoideddirectinvolvementinthecrisis.Evenwhenbrutal and violent treatment of the Timoresewas reliably reported, there is evidence tosuggestthatthesituationwasdeliberatelymisrepresentedtothepublic.Thefundamentalhumanrights‘ofnationsbigandsmall,’certainlydidnotappeartoholdsignificantswayinthepolicymakingofAustraliaorNewZealand.Theargumentcouldbemade,inthisregard,thatcivilisationaldiscoursecanhaveadualeffect.Whileitcanbeusedasatooltolegitimiseand justify violent interventionon thepart of the intervener, it can alsobeemployedbyexternalactors inanattempttodistancethemselvesfromhavinganyresponsibility inthesituation.ForAustraliaandNewZealand,thedeterminationwasmadethatstateself-interestdictated that East Timor should be under Indonesian control, even if it was contrary touniversalistic humanitarian rhetoric, which has been enshrined and agreed upon ininternationallaw.Inordertoconvincetheirdomesticconstituentsofthis‘exceptiontotherule,’ they relied on the fear of communism and civilisational discourse to promote falsestereotypesoftheTimorese,inordertojustifyandlegitimisetheirinaction.

TheMassacreatSantaCruz

On12November,1991,IndonesianforcesopenedfireonagroupofTimoresedemonstratingattheSantaCruzcemetery.363Anestimated180peoplewerekilled,andmanymoreinjured,allwhiletheeventswerefilmedbyjournalists.364Someofthevideofootagewaslaterturnedintoadocumentary,whichWeldmichaelnotes,“shockeditsviewers’consciencesintodoingsomething…andirreversiblyturnedthetideofinternationalapathytowardsthesufferingoftheTimorese.”365SantaCruzwascertainlyaturningpointforpublicawarenessandattentiononthecontinueddominationandbrutalrepressionoftheTimoresepeople.Indeed,Benedict

362JohnG.Taylor,EastTimor:ThePriceofFreedom,55.363ThegrouphadgatheringatthecemeteryinregardstothemurderofSebastiãoGomes,whohadbeenshotdeadbytroopstwoweeksearlier.ForadetailedaccountontheeventswhichledtothemassacreatSantaCruzCemetery,seeAwetTeweldeWeldmichael,ThirdWorldColonialismandStrategiesofLiberation,236-241.364 JohnG. Taylor,East Timor: The Price of Freedom, 213-14. International journalistswere granted the rareopportunitytoenterEastTimorinordertocoverthevisitofaPortuguesedelegationtoDili.Thevisit,however,hadbeencancelledjustpriortoitsdeparturefromLisbon,andjustbeforetheeventsofSantaCruz.365MaxStahl,anexperienceddocumentaryfilmmaker,wasoneofthejournalistswhomanagedtosmugglevideofootageoutofTimor,documentingthehorrorsthatoccurredatSantaCruz.ThefootagewaslaterturnedintothedocumentaryInColdBlood.SeeAwetTeweldeWeldmichael,ThirdWorldColonialismandStrategiesofLiberation,240.

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Anderson argues that the footage of the Santa Cruz massacre “proved to have moreimmediate impact than themountains ofwritten evidence accumulated by human rightsorganizationsonthesixteenpreviousyearsofbrutalIndonesianrule.”366

While Santa Cruz was an important moment for galvanising activism and publicattention,withacademic researchandmediacoverageonEastTimor increasingafter theevent,367thisdidnotequatetomeaningfuldirectactiononthepartofanyofIndonesia’skeyWestern or Asian allies. Indeed, Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans immediatelyattempted tominimise the involvement of the Indonesian Government in themassacre,telling reporters that theeventwas “anaberration,not anactof statepolicy.”368ClintonFernandesreportsthatbothEvans,andAustralianPrimeMinisterPaulKeating,continuedtopursueclosermilitarytieswiththeSoehartoregimeintheaftermathofSantaCruz,inspiteof a public outcry, including from Australian citizens.369 An Amnesty International reportsupports the assertion that there appeared to be nomeaningful change to bilateral andmultilateralassistancegiventoIndonesia,eventhoughsomegovernmentshadarguedthatthey had linked their economic assistance to Indonesia’s human rights performance.370Indeed, the report found that inmany cases, aid donations to Indonesia increased in theperiod immediately following Santa Cruz, leading Amnesty to lament, “thewillingness offoreigngovernmentstoconductbusinessasusualsendsaclearsignalthathumanrightstakesecondplacetoeconomicinterests.”371However,inspiteofthelackofchangetotheforeignpolicyofIndonesia’sallies,ScottSeldersarguesthat,importantly,themassacrehadrevealedthat Indonesia could no longer declare, “it had broughtmodernization to backwater EastTimorandthattheTimorese,asidefromafewmalcontents,appreciatedtheseefforts.”372Indeed,IndonesianForeignMinisterAliAlataslaterfamouslyadmitted;“12November1991constituted a watershed in Indonesian diplomacy on East Timor and since that date,international support for Indonesia’s position inexorably declined while that for theindependencemovementinEastTimormarkedlyincreased.”373

366BenedictAnderson,TheSpectreofComparisons:Nationalism,SoutheastAsiaandtheWorld(LondonandNewYork:Verso,1998),137.367AwetTeweldeWeldmichael,ThirdWorldColonialismandStrategiesofLiberation,213.368GarethEvans,ascitedinClintonFernandes,“R2PandtheEastTimorIntervention,”inResponsibilitytoProtectand Sovereignty, eds. Ramesh Thakur and Charles Sampford (Farnham, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited,2013),71.369Ibid.370AmnestyInternational,IndonesiaandEastTimor:PowerandImmunity:HumanRightsUndertheNewOrder(Reportnumber:ASA21/017/1994,31August,1994,7)Accessed04June,2016.https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa21/017/1994/en/.371Ibid.372ScottSelders,PatternsofViolence:NarrativesofOccupiedEastTimor(Concordia,Canada:ConcordiaUniversityPress,2008),101.373AliAlatas,ThePebbleintheShoe:TheDiplomaticStruggleforEastTimor(Jakarta:AksaraKarunia,2006),64.

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ChangetotheIndonesianPosition:IndependenceatLast?

InMay, 1998, President Soeharto resigned, in thewake of theAsian economic crisis andpopulardemonstrationsagainsthiminthestreetsofnearlyall Indonesia’smajorcities.AswiththeexitofthePortuguesemorethantwentyyearsearlier,ittookthedismantlingofaregimeintheintervener’scountrytoseethepossibilityof independenceglimmeragaininEastTimor.ItwasonlyonemonthafterSoeharto’sresignationthatForeignMinisterAlatasconvinced the newly appointed President Habibie to announce a ‘special status’ for EastTimor,whichgaveitincreasedautonomyfromIndonesia.374EastTimoreseleadersrejectedthisoffer,however,andimmediatelycalledforareferendumtobeinternationallysupervisedon East Timor’s future.375 Negotiations occurred, primarily between Indonesian andPortuguese officials under UN auspices, and a number of packages, falling short ofindependence,wereoffered.TheTimoreseheldstrongtotheirdemandforareferendum.376

By May, 1999, the UN, Indonesia, and Portugal all agreed that a ‘popularconsultation’377wouldbeheldinEastTimor,inAugust,underthesupervisionoftheUN.Theconsultationwould involve asking the Timorese if theywerewilling to approve a specialautonomyagreementfortheterritorywithinIndonesia.Avoteagainstautonomywouldbeinterpreted as an expression of support for independence. Earlier, the IndonesiangovernmenthadalsoannouncedthatFRETILINleader,XananaGusmao,wouldbemovedtohousearrest,fromCipinangPrisonwherehehadbeenservingatwenty-yearprisonsentence.ThismovereportedlycameaboutasaresultofdirectpressurefromUNSecretaryGeneral,KofiAnnan,whohadvisitedGusmao,andwantedhimtoplayanactiveroleinthecountry’spoliticalfuture.Itappears,however,thattheannouncementslargelycaughttheIndonesianarmed forces off-guard, and a number of leading politicians and army officials publiclyobjectedtothegovernment’schangeofpolicy.378

Bloodshedand‘Chaos’inEastTimor

TheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(UNSC)announcedinJuly1999thatithadestablished,through Resolution 1246, the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), with its

374IthasbeenreportedthatPresidentHabibiehadlimitedtiestotheIndonesianarmedforcesinEastTimor,andfoundtheinternationalpublicandmediacriticismonJakarta’sroleinTimor“embarrassing.”Asthenewleaderof Indonesia,somehavesuggestedhewaskeento impressonhisallieshiscommitmenttohumanrightsandinternationallaw.WhileinAlatas’sinfamousphrase(andthetitleofhislaterbook),Timorwas“apebbleintheshoe.”ForadetailedanalysisofthemotivationsofHabibieandAlatasontheissueofEastTimoratthistimeseeIrenaCristalis,EastTimor:ANationsBitterDawn,93-96.375JohnG.Taylor,EastTimor:ThePriceofFreedom,222.376OnesuchproposalcameinAugust1998,whenForeignMinisterAlatasproposes‘wide-ranging’autonomyforEastTimor,wherebyJakartawouldonlyexcludeTimoresecontroloverforeignaffairs,defence,andsomefinancialmatters.PortugaltellstheIndonesiansthatitispreparedtoconsidertheproposal,butonlyasaninterimmeasure.Timoreseleadersrebufftheoffer.377 Indonesia reportedly rejected the term ‘referendum,’ because of implications for the legitimacy of theiroccupation.SeeIrenaCristalis,EastTimor:ANationsBitterDawn,152.378JohnG.Taylor,EastTimor:ThePriceofFreedom,223.

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primary task being to both organise and conduct the popular consultation.379 On theannouncementoftheUN-ledconsultation,ithasbeenreportedthatleafletsweredistributedacrossEastTimor,“warningthatdeathlistshadbeendrawnup,andthatdeathsquadswerepreparingtogofromvillagetovillage,eliminatingpro-independencesupporters.”380AttacksagainstTimoresebyparamilitariesfromIndonesiaincreased,andSecretaryGeneralAnnanhadtotwicepostponetheconsultationasaresult.Justbeforetheconsultationsweretotakeplace,CatholicChurchofficials inEastTimor reportedthat themilitiaattackshadclaimedapproximately6,000livesinthepastsixmonths,andafurther80,000peoplehadbecomeinternallydisplacedasaresultoftheviolence.381On30August,theconsultationsfinallytookplace,andUNAMETsubsequentlyannouncedthat78.5percentofEastTimoresehadvotedtorejecttheIndonesianGovernment’sautonomyproposal.382AlmostimmediatelyaftertheannouncementofthewillofthemajorityofTimoresetobeindependent,IndonesianmilitiaincreasedtheirattacksonTimoresecivilians.

The New Zealand Government had proposed in early September that a regionalgrouping of countries could “mount a support operation to prevent the country fromdescending into chaos and halt the bloodshed.”383 However, the Australian Government,unwillingtoinvolveitselfdirectlyintheconflict,rebutted:“justforeveryonewhostillhasnotgotthemessage,AustraliahasnointentionofinvadingIndonesia.”384InMay,1999,AustralianForeign Minister Alexander Downer had argued strongly against any deployment ofpeacekeepersinEastTimor,employingcivilisationallanguagetoarguethatanyinterventionwouldhaveneo-colonialattributes:

WestillhearthecallfrombunyipNapoleonsforAustraliatosendpeacekeepingforcestoEastTimorimmediately…suchpeopleseemtoconfuse‘peacekeeping’with‘gunboatdiplomacy’intheirenthusiasmforusto‘goteachthenativesathingortwo.’Perhapstheyneedtobetaughtthelessonlearntbymychildrenlongago-thattalkingtoughdoesn'tmakeyoutough,anymorethanwearingacostumewillmakeyouSuperman.385

However,withtheviolencenotshowinganyendinsight,andwithUNAMETpersonnelfleeingthecountry,386itbecameevidentinthehallsoftheUNinNewYorkthat‘something’hadto

379TheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil,“Resolution1246(1999)of11June1999,”TheUnitedNations,accessed23February,2016,https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/174/13/PDF/N9917413.pdf?OpenElement.380JohnG.Taylor,EastTimor:ThePriceofFreedom,XX.381Ibid.,XXIII.382AscitedinBorisKondoch,“TheUNAdministrationofEastTimor,”JournalofConflict&SecurityLaw6,no.2(2001):248.383NewZealandForeignMinister,DonMcKinnon,ascitedinJohnG.Taylor,EastTimor:ThePriceofFreedom,XXIX.384ThisstatementwascompletelyoutofsyncwithAustraliaclaim justmonthsearlier, that ithadrevoked itsrecognitionofIndonesia’sannexation,andnowviewedEastTimorasanon-selfgoverningterritory.Seeibid.385AlexanderDowner,ascitedinJeremyMoses,“MoralTriumphalism,”13-14.386AsUNAMETpersonnelbriefedTimoreseleadersontheirdecisiontoleavethecapital,thefollowingcommentsbyMadreEsmeralda,aCanossianSisterinDili,wasrecorded.“Fortwentyyears,theTimoresepeoplehavenot

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be done. On 15 September, 1999, the UNSC, approved a peacekeeping mission to EastTimor,387andAustraliadecidedintheendthatitwould,“dontheSupermancostumeandflytotherescueofthebeleagueredEastTimoresepeople.”388

INTERFET:EntertheEnlightenedCivilisers

TheInternationalForceforEastTimor(INTERFET)hadthekeyobjectivesunderitsmandatetorestorepeaceandsecurityinEastTimor,supporttheactivitiesofUNAMETstaff,andtofacilitatehumanitarianassistanceforthepeopleofEastTimor.389Themissionwasauthorisedby the UNSC to “take all necessary measures,” in order to achieve its mandate.390 Thedeployment of INTERFET,whose strength ultimately reached 11,500 troops,391was not atypical ‘blue-helmeted’ UN peacekeepingmission due to the urgency underwhich itwasdeployed.Instead,INTERFETwasamultinationalforce,ledbyAustraliaandsupportedbyanarrayofothercountries,includingNewZealand.392

Inordertorationaliseandjustifytheirabout-turnonthepolicyofdirectinterventioninEastTimor,thegovernmentsofAustraliaandNewZealandreliedontheuseofemotiveandmoralisticlanguage.ThislanguagehadtheeffectofpositioningtheTimoreseastheweak,suffering,vulnerablevictims,indesperateneedofsaving.393Inthisregard,itwouldbetheresponsibilityofthe‘advanced’nationsofAustraliaandNewZealandtobetheirliberators,andtoprotectandsavethem.Cleardistinctionswerecreatedbetweenthepowerfulheroesand theweak victims. This language echoed strongly the language used to legitimise thecivilising missions of the nineteenth century, whereby the benevolent tutelage of theuncivilised,whowereunabletogovernthemselves,wouldbeconductedbyadvancedandenlightenednations.

RatherthanemployinglanguagetodistanceAustraliafromthecrisis,PrimeMinisterJohnHowardwasfacedwiththedutyofexplainingtotheAustralianpublichisgovernmentsrationalefornowleadingamilitaryinterventioninEastTimor.InhisAddresstotheAustralian

believed inanyone.ButUNAMEThadreassuredthemeverydaythatwhatevertheoutcome,theywouldstayafterthevote.Thepeoplebelievedthis…Theyvoted.Nowyou’llleaveustodielikedogs?Wewanttodielikepeople.”AscitedinIrenaCristalis,EastTimor:ANation’sBitterDawn,222.387TheUNSCadoptedResolution1264on15September,1999.IthaddeterminedthatthesituationinEastTimorhadconstitutedathreattopeaceandsecurity,underChapterVIIoftheUNCharter,andasaresultitauthorisedtheestablishmentofamultinationalforce.TheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil,“Resolution1264(1999)of15September1999,TheUnitedNations,accessed14July,2016,https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/264/81/PDF/N9926481.pdf?OpenElement.388JeremyMoses,“MoralTriumphalism,”14.389TheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil,“Resolution1264.”390Ibid.391JaratChopra,“TheUN’sKingdomofEastTimor,”Survival42,no.3(2000):28.392Theinternationalforcecomprisedofsometwentycountriesbythecompletionofitsmandate.Theprimarytroop contributing countries were, however, Australia, the United States, New Zealand, and Thailand. IrenaCristalis,EastTimor:ANation’sBitterDawn,237.393AnneOrford,ReadingHumanitarianIntervention,172.

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Nation,HowardfirstspokeofhowAustralian’shadbeen“horrifiedbytheviolenceagainstthepeopleofEastTimor.”394Whatwasparticularlyconcerning,accordingtoHoward,wasthesensethata“small,vulnerablecommunitywasabouttobedeniedthefreedomtheyhavesoughtforsolong.”395Inthiscontext,helaterarguedtoParliamentthatAustraliacarriedthe“special burden of leadership,” to see that peacewas installed in East Timor.396 Howardassertedinthesamespeechthat:“ourtroopsaregoingtodefendwhatthissocietybelievestobe right.”397 In thecaseofNewZealand,DefenceMinisterMarkBurton repeatedonanumberofoccasionsthatitwasNewZealand’sstrongdesire“toprotectthedemocraticrightsof a people who have suffered so much.”398 In a later speech, Minister for OverseasDevelopmentAid,MattRobson,spokeeffusivelyofthe‘underprivileged’peopleoftheworld,andtheirkeendesireforhumanrights, linkingittohisgovernmentsefforts inEastTimor:“thecryforhumanrightscomesnotfromtheStatebutfromthepeople,andbyinlarge,fromtheunder-privileged.”399EvenAnneOrford,who laterarguesstronglyagainsttheemotiveinterventionistrhetoricoftheAustraliangovernment,admitsthatintervention“wasmademore urgent by the repeated representation of the Timorese as defenceless, powerless,hystericalandunprotected.”400

TheAustralian-ledinterventioninEastTimorusheredinaneweraofforeignpolicyinCanberra,termedthe‘HowardDoctrine.’Thisdoctrinesawamoreassertiveandaggressiveforeignpolicy, inwhichAustralia committed itself “tobeing theproviderof first resortofregionalsecurityinthePacific.”401WiththisassertivenewpolicycamethenecessarysharpincreaseintheAustraliandefencebudget.402Howardtoldreportersthatinthenewsecurityenvironment“defencewillhave tocome first,”andhe furtherunderlined that thiswould

394JohnHoward,“AddresstotheNation:September19,1999,”AustralianGovernment:DepartmentofthePrimeMinisterandCabinet,accessed04July,2014,https://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/release/transcript-30441.395Ibid.396JohnHoward,“SpeechtoParliament:EastTimor,21September,1999,”AustralianGovernment:DepartmentofthePrimeMinisterandCabinet,accessed04July,2014,https://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/release/transcript-30442.397Ibid.Emphasisadded.398MarkBurton,“WelcomeHomefromTimorParade,8June,2000,”NewZealandGovernment,accessed04July,2016,https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/welcome-home-timor-parade.Also,MarkBurton,“SpeechtoMedalPresentation Ceremony, Christchurch, 22 August, 2001,”New Zealand Government, accessed 04 July, 2016,https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/speech-medal-presentation-ceremony-christchurch.399 Matt Robson, “A Wider View of Disarmament and Arms Control, 14 February, 2001,” New ZealandGovernment,accessed04July,2016,https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/wider-view-disarmament-and-arms-control.Inanunseemlyturnofevents,Robsonthentriedtoscorepoliticalpointsbyappealingtothis‘cry’forhumanrightsinEastTimor,andattemptedtocasthiscentre-leftgovernmentasthemorallysuperiorpoliticalparty in New Zealand. Directly after his comment about the underprivileged cry for human rights, Robsonasserted: “It is not all surprising tome that centre-left and centre-right governments inNewZealandhaveadifferentperspectiveonthesematters.”400AnneOrford,ReadingHumanitarianIntervention,10.401MalcolmCook,“TheLimitsoftheHowardDoctrine,12February,2008,”TheLowyInterpreter,accessed04July,2016,http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2008/02/12/The-limits-of-the-Howard-Doctrine.aspx.402 The Australian Government initially provided $860million in supplementation to the Defence budget tosupport Australia’s military contribution to East Timor. Australian Department of Defence, “Defence AnnualReport,1999-2000,”5.Accessed06July,2016,http://www.defence.gov.au/AnnualReports/99-00/full.pdf.

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comeatthecostoffuturetaxcuts,earlierpromisedbythegovernment.403ThePrimeMinisterwasstronginhisclaimthatthisassertivepolicy,andthedivertingofpublicfundsinordertoachieve it, was based onmoral reasoning and principles. According to Howard, the newinterventionistpolicywasduetoAustralia’sprincipleddecisiontodefend“thevaluesweholdasAustralians.Wewerewillingtobeindisputewithournearestneighbour,todefendthosevalues.Andwewereable tobuildonourassociationswithnationsoutsideofAsia in thecourseofthat.”404

ThereferencetotheassociationwithnationsoutsideofAsia,inordertoachievehisnewinterventionistforeignpolicy,wasHoward’sbignodtoAustralia’srelationshipwiththeUnitedStates.FredBrenchley,followinganexclusiveinterviewwithHoward,termedit“themore muscular Australia prepared to fulfil the role of regional deputy to the global USpoliceman.”405AccordingtoBrenchley,Howardembracedthe‘deputy’concept,andspokeatlengthaboutAustralia’sstrengthasaregionalplayer:“wehavedisplayedourresponsibility,shoulderedtheburden.”InacontinuationofhispositioningofAustraliaasbeingthedeputysheriff,HowardassertedthatAustralia“hasaparticularresponsibilitytodothingsaboveandbeyondinthispartoftheworld.”406

The Australian Government was not alone in its sense of a morally justifiedresponsibilityandleadershipintheregion.Albeitonasmallerscale,NewZealandalsosawintervention in East Timor as an opportunity to demonstrate its ‘enlightened state’credentials,andalsotoenhanceitsrelationshipwiththeUnitedStates.ThethenNewZealandForeignMinister,PhilGoff,madeexplicitWashington’sexpectationofNewZealand’sroleinthe region, and that the United States had signalled its satisfaction with New Zealand’scurrentactivities:“theAmericanswholooktoothersinregionalareastohelpsettleconflictand achieve regional security, have acknowledged New Zealand’s contribution.”407 In aspeechinWashingtonin2000,Goffoutlinedthisexpectationfurther,andnotedthatitwasonethatNewZealandreadilyaccepted:“thereisanexpectationinthatSouthWestPacificandbeyondthatNewZealandandAustraliashouldcarrytheburdenforsecurityresponseandassistance.Thatisaresponsibilityweaccept.”408

The sense of Australia’s moral superiority in the region, in particular, was widelypickedupinthemediareportingofinterventioninEastTimor.Somecommentatorsagreed 403FredBrenchley,“TheHowardDefenceDoctrine,”BulletinwithNewsweek117,no.6193(September,1999).404Ibid.405Ibid.406Ibid.407PhilGoff,“ConsequencesoftheCrisisoverEastTimorforIndonesiaandtheRestoftheAsia-PacificRegion,5July,2000,”NewZealandGovernment,accessed06July,2016,https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/consequences-crisis-over-east-timor-indonesia-and-rest-asia-pacific-region.408PhilGoff,“RecentDevelopmentsintheAsiaPacificRegionandUS/NZRelations,13September,2000,”NewZealandGovernment,accessed06 July,2016,https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/recent-developments-asia-pacific-region-and-usnz-relations.

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thatitwastimeforAustraliatotakeitsplaceastheenlightenedbringerofpeaceandjusticetotheregion,withGregSheridanarguingthat“itisthetimethatAustraliaconceivedofitselfastheUSoftheSouthPacific.”409SheridanwentontoarguethatAustraliansoldiersshouldbe stationed semi-permanently in East Timor and “if necessary, other regional basketcases.”410Inheranalysisofthemediareportingonintervention,OrfordfoundthatAustralian-ledforceswereframedastheheroes,andthe“potentialsavioursoftheEastTimorese,agentsofdemocracyandhumanrightsabletooverpowerthosebentonkillinganddestruction.”411Ontheotherhand,OrfordfoundthatthedominantmediaportrayaloftheTimoresewastheywere“childlike,primitive[and]…unabletogovernthemselves.”Inthisregard,MichaelWalzerclaimsthatinterventionisincrediblydependentonthisvictimmodel,andwithoutitmilitaryinterventionisverydifficult,ifnotimpossible,tojustify.412

The language employed by the Australian and New Zealand governments clearlyattemptedtopositionthemselvesastheenlightenedcivilisers,andthebringersofpeaceandliberalprinciplestoanuncivilisedandinferiornation.Their“interventionstory,”accordingtoOrford,waspremisedupontheircapacitytobringtheirownparticularliberalvisiontothepeopleofEastTimor.413Thelanguageusedduringthiseraofanewassertiveinterventionism,fromAustralia in particular, resulted in thepromotionof the sense theywere “agents offreedom, order, democracy, liberalisation, transparency, humanitarianism and humanrights.”414Analogous to thecivilisingmissionsof thenineteenthcentury, it appeared thatAustraliaandNewZealandhadagreedtobindthemselvesto‘protect’theTimorese,careforthe improvementoftheconditionsoftheirmoralandmaterialwell-being,andultimately,instructandbringhometothemtheblessingsofcivilisation.415

It certainly appears that there is a compelling relationship between the languageemployedtojustifycivilisingmissionsandtheinterventionbyINTERFETforcesinEastTimor.For the language to have the desired effect, the East Timorese necessarily needed to beportrayedastheantithesistotheAustralianandNewZealanders:undemocraticandilliberal,withawoefulinabilitytoprotecttheirowncitizens.AsHansMorgenthaupreviouslywarned,thisprocessofemployingsimplemoralistic language, in termsofdemocraticpeace-lovingnationsversusthosewhoarenot,onlyintensifiedthelikelihood,andtheintensity,ofconflictintheinternationalsystem.416Indeed,Orfordarguesthattheinterventionstoriescreatedto

409 Peter Symonds, “Australian Foreign Minister Unveils Plan for the Colonial Occupation of East Timor,”International Committee of the Fourth International, accessed 08 July, 2016,http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2006/06/etim-j07.html.410Ibid.411AnneOrford,ReadingHumanitarianIntervention,10.412MichaelWalzer,ArguingaboutWar(NewHavenandLondon:YaleUniversityPress,2004),71.413AnneOrford,ReadingHumanitarianIntervention,34.414Ibid.415ThishasstrikingsimilaritiestowhatthewesternEuropeannationsagreedtodoinregardstotheirAfricancoloniesduringtheBerlinConferenceonAfricain1885.SeeRolandParis,“InternationalPeacebuildingandtheMissionCivilisatrice,”ReviewofInternationalStudies28,no.4(2002):651416HansMorgenthau,“TheMainspringsofAmericanForeignPolicy,”839.

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justifycontemporaryinterventioninEastTimor:“ignoreahistoryinwhichimperialpowersannouncedandcelebratedtheirsuperiorityinsimilarlanguage,withtragicconsequences.”417It is her belief that this humanitarian interventionist rhetoric simply rehearses colonialfantasies, whereby the tutelage of those deemed uncivilised continues in contemporaryinternationalrelations.418Intherepetitionoftheirclaimstobetheenlightenedleaders,withresponsibilityoverEastTimor,notonlyaretheTimoresedenigratedasthe inferior,weak,other,butitopensAustraliaandNewZealand“toallegationsofneo-imperialism,bullyingandarrogance.”419

UNTAET:TheKingofEastTimor

WhileINTERFETforcesweresuccessfulintheirmissiontoexpelpro-IndonesianmilitiasfromEast Timor, they were clearly ill-suited and ill-equipped to address the wide range ofchallengeswhichfacedEastTimorintheimmediatepost-conflictenvironment.Inordertoaddresstheperceivedneedforthe‘internationalcommunity’to‘rebuild’the‘failed’country,theUnitedNationsTransitionalAdministration inEastTimor(UNTAET)wasestablishedbyUNSCResolution1272.420TocharacteriseUNTAET’smandateaswiderangingwouldbeanunderstatement. Indeed, alongside the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo(UNMIK), thescopeofUNTAET’spowerandcontroloverthecountrywasunprecedented.TheUNTAETmandategrantedthemissioncontroloverallbranchesofthegovernment,anditalsoexercisedalllegislativeandexecutiveauthority.ThelegislativeandexecutivepowersfortheentirecountrywereultimatelyputinthehandsoftheSpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretaryGeneralandTransitionalAdministrator,SergioVieiradeMello.Intheabsenceofan elected legislature in East Timor, de Mello had the sole authority to issue legalregulations.421 When considering UNMIK and UNTAET, Louise Frechette, the UN DeputySecretaryGeneralatthetime,remarkedthattheywere:“qualitativelydifferentfromalmostany other theOrganisation has ever undertaken. In each place theUnitedNations is theadministration,responsibleforthefulfillingallthefunctionsofaState…thisisaneworderofmagnitudefor[the]Organisation.”422

TheattemptbyUNTAETtobepeace-keeper,nation-builder,andstate-builder,allatthesametime,wasmadepossibleduetothenewpostColdWarenvironment.Inthisnewinternational

417AnneOrford,ReadingHumanitarianIntervention,34.418Ibid.,10.419JeremyMoses,“MoralTriumphalism,”25-26.420 Resolution 1272was established under Chapter VII of theUNCharter, it decreed that UNTAETwould be“endowedwithoverallresponsibilityfortheadministrationofEastTimorandwillbeempoweredtoexercisealllegislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice.” United Nations Security Council,“Resolution 1272, 25 October, 1999,” The United Nations, accessed 23 August, 2016,http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/docs/9931277E.htm.421JaratChopra,“BuildingStateFailureinEastTimor,”inStateFailure,CollapseandReconstruction,ed.JenniferMilliken(Oxford:BlackwellPublishing,2003),227.422LouiseFrechette,ascited inRalphWilde, InternationalTerritorialAdministration:HowTrusteeshipandtheCivilisingMissionNeverWentAway(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2010),32.

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environment, therewasa strong revivalof the idea that liberaldemocraticprinciplesandinstitutions should be transplanted onto conflict ridden societies, in order to bring aboutinternationalpeaceandsecurity. In this regard, thespreadingofdemocracywasacrucialelementofthesecuritypoliciesformanypowerfulstates,particularlytheUnitedStates.Thiswasbasedheavilyon thepremise that liberaldemocraciesdonotwagewaragainsteachother, so the spread of liberalism and democracy inevitably leads to a more peacefulinternationalenvironment.423Inthisregard,therewasareconceptualizationofhowbesttodealwithstatecollapse,orstatefailure.424Theassumptionwasmadebymanypolicymakersthat‘failed’or‘failing’statesrequiredtheinterventionofoutsideforces,inorderforthemtobe ‘rebuilt’ inthe imageofwestern liberaldemocraciesandtoensurethat ‘humanitarian’sufferingwasaddressed.425Insomecases,itwasarguedthatstateshadtheresponsibilitytointervene incaseswerestateswere failing toprotect theirowncitizens.426 In this regard,‘Westphalian’ notions of state sovereignty could be suspended, or sovereignty could beshared, for an indefinite period.427 Sovereignty, in this context, would be held in aconservatorship,byenlightenedadvancedstates,untilthefailedorfailingstatehadreachedanadequatelevelof‘internationallyrecognised’statehood.

Itbecamewidelypromotedthatmilitaryintervention,inordertorebuildfailingstatesandprovidehumanitarianassistance,wasalegitimateandjustifiableexerciseinthepostColdWar-era. Themanner inwhich interventionwas legitimised so closely resembled theUNtrusteeshipsystemforthecolonialterritoriesafterWorldWarII,thatsomescholarsactuallyexplicitlycalledforneo-trusteeshipinthecaseofEastTimor.428 WhilePeterLyonconcededthat theattempt to resurrect theUN trusteeship systemwouldpromoteabacklash fromsomeobservers,giventhe“unhappymemoriesofcolonialism,”heargued,nonetheless,that“theweakanddisadvantagedpeopleoftheworld”wouldbein“improvedconditions”underanewsystemofUNtrusteeships.429FromtheperspectiveofElsinaWainwright,thesecurity

423 This is otherwise down as the ‘Democratic Peace Theory,’ and is based on the ideas first promoted byenlightenment-era theorist ImmanuelKant. SeeToPerpetualPeace:APhilosophical Sketch [1795], trans.TedHumphrey(Indianapolis:HackettPublishing,2003).424JamesCotton,Timor-LesteandtheDiscourseofStateFailure,457.425 While outside of the bounds of this thesis, there is clearly a strong conceptual link with the spread ofdemocracy,thewaronterror,andthepoliciessurroundingfailingandfailedstates.SeeGregFry,“OurPatch:TheWaronTerrorandtheNewInterventionism,”inInterventionandState-BuildinginthePacific:TheLegitimacyof'Cooperative Intervention,’eds. Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka andGreg Fry (Manchester:Manchester UniversityPress,2008),79.426 See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “The Responsibility to Protect,December,2001”ReportoftheInternationalCommissiononInterventionandStateSovereignty,accessed02July,2016,http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.427 StephenD. Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed,” International Security29, no.2(2004):89.428 JamesD. FearonandDavidD. LatinexplicitlymentionEastTimoras a state thathasbenefited fromneo-trusteeship.See“NeotrusteeshipandtheProblemofWeakStates,”InternationalSecurity28,no.4(2004):7.Forabroaderargumentonneo-trusteeshipseealsoStephenD.Krasner,“SharingSovereignty:NewInstitutionsforCollapsed,”85;andStevenRatnerandGeraldHelman,“SavingFailedStates,”ForeignPolicy89,no.4(1992):4.429PeterLyon,“TheRiseandFallandPossibleRevivalofInternationalTrusteeship,”TheJournalofCommonwealthandComparativePolitics31no.1(1993):105-107.

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challengesoffailedstates,suchasthatinEastTimor,hadforcedthehandsofpolicymakersto“overcomemanypost-colonialhang-ups.”430Itisherstrongassertionthatstate-buildingdoesnotneedtoequatetoneo-colonialism,andinthisregardshespecificallyreferencestheUN trusteeship systemas amodelwhich should be employed.431 It appears that theUN,awareofthelikelihoodoftheneo-colonialtagbeingappliedtoUNTAET,madethecarefuldecisiontotermita‘TransitionalAdministration,’avoidingaltogetherthe‘trusteeship’label.However, ifonecomparesUNTAETwiththeprevioustrusteeshipsystem,itbecomesclearthattheybothservesimilarpurposesandhavenegativeeffectsonthepopulationstheyareemployedagainst.

Ashasbeenpreviouslyoutlined,theunderlyingassumptionoftheLeagueofNationsmandatesystemandUNtrusteeshipsystemwasthebeliefthatsovereigntyissomethingthatcanbeheldinsuspension,whilecivilisednationstutorandnurturetheuncivilisedtowardsastandardofadvancedcivilisation.InthecaseofUNTAET,thisrationaleisverymuchapparent.The fundamental assumption was made that the bringing of liberal principles, such asdemocracy and good governance,would further the Timoresemarch towards aWesternconceptionofcivilisation. Indeed,ashasbeenpreviouslyoutlined, itwasoftenarguedbyWestern leaders involved in the crisis that the transmission of liberal principles was thespecialresponsibilityofwesternnations,andintheenditwouldbringabouttheliberationoftheTimorese,thebettermentoftheirwelfare,andtheentrenchmentoftheirfundamentalhumanrights.432InthecaseofUNTAET,itcertainlyappearsthatitassumedapositionofneo-trusteeship, inallbutname.Supremeauthoritywasvestedandexercisedonlyby theUNadministrators“inanexceedinglycentralizedfashion,tothedetrimentofthefuturepoliticalandcivic leadersof independentTimor-Leste.”433 Indeed, sixmonthsafterarriving inEastTimor,JaratChopraquestionedwhenthetransitionalperiodofthemissionwouldactuallybegin.434

TheUN’sCrisisofLegitimacy

By2000,therewasagrowingsensethatthevastpowersintrustedtoUNTAETandSpecialRepresentativedeMello,wereactuallycreatingacrisisoflegitimacy.435Indeed,theUNended 430 ElsinaWainwright,Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Solomon Islands (Barton, Australia:AustralianStrategicPolicyInstitute,2003),30.431Ibid.432SeeforexampleJohnHoward,“TranscriptofPrimeMinistertheHonJohnHowardMPontheOfficialLaunchingoftheMenzies200ClubandtheCelebrationofthe50thAnniversaryofSirRobertMenziesbeingElectedPrimeMinisterofAustralia,”AustralianGovernment:TheDepartmentofthePrimeMinisterandCabinet,accessed01August2016.https://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/release/transcript-11394.433Michael J.Butler, “TenYearsAfter: (Re)AssessingNeo-TrusteeshipandUNState-building inTimor-Leste,”InternationalStudiesPerspectives13,no.1(2012):99.434JaratChopra,“TheUN’sKingdomofEastTimor,”Survival42,no.3(2000):34.435At thebeginningof theMission,deMello tried justify the lackofTimoreseparticipation in the rebuildingprocessasanattempt toensure that theUNdidnot favouroneemergingpoliticalpartyoveranother: “Theinclinationof theUN is thus tobecautiousaboutdelegatingpower in the interestofavoiding furtheringanyparticularpoliticalparty.Thereisconsultation,butallessentialdecisionmakingandexecutiveauthorityremains

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upwieldingsuchahighlevelofcontroloverEastTimorthatJamesTraubassertsthatitwasnotsimplyhelpingformanewgovernment,itwasthenewgovernment.436InhisdescriptionofthelevelofcontroltheUNwielded,Traubstates:“UNTAETissuespostageandUNTAETsignstreaties.AttheairportinDili,aTimoreseinaU.N.uniformputsan“UNTAET”stampineachpassport.”437Inthiscontext,UNTAET’sreluctancetoshareanycontroloverthecountrywith the Timorese fuelled intense resentment and unhappiness with the UN staff.438AccordingtoChopra,whoservedinEastTimorundertheUN,foreignstaffexhibitedcolonialbehaviourandweredisposedtowieldasenseofsuperiorityovertheTimorese.439Choprareportedthatmanyinthemissionhadexpressedtheirbeliefthat:“theTimoresecouldnotbe reliedon, that they lacked skills andwerenot ready for self-government, that theUNshouldstayanditspersonnelcouldkeeptheirjobsforlonger.”440AccordingtoChopra,hewitnessedsomeofficialsattemptingtomethodicallypreventtheparticipationofTimoreseinthetransitionalgovernmentoftheirowncountry.441ThissentimentwasstronglysupportedbyFRETILIN leader,XananaGusmão,whocommentedthat internationalstaffwereof theopinionthat:“theEastTimoresesimplylackcapacity.442

NationalreactionagainstUNTAET’sfailuretoconsultandinvolvethepeopleofEastTimor in thedecision-makingprocessesof theirowncountrygrewover thecourseof themissioninEastTimor.AsGusmãoputit:“Wedon’tfeelverycomfortablewithsomepeopleactinglikekingsofEastTimor,comingheretoimposetheirmodels.”443InanovertthreattodeMelloandtheUN,Gusmãocontended:“wearestrongenoughtoexpelanyonefromEastTimor.”444WithsuchalimitedinfluenceoverthedevelopmentofpoliciesbytheTimorese,ChopracommentedthatthestatusoftheUNinEastTimorwas“comparablewiththatofapre-constitutionalmonarch in a sovereign kingdom.”445 The intense criticismofUNTAET’sactionsledtothemembersoftheTimoresecabinettowritetodeMello,andthefollowingexcerptprovidesanoverviewoftheir frustrationsoverthe lackof influenceTimoresehadovertherunningoftheirowncountry:

withtheUN.”AscitedinJoelC.Beauvais,BenevolentDespotism:ACritiqueofU.N.State-BuildinginEastTimorInternationalLawandPolitics33,no.110(2001):1120.436JamesTraub,“InventingEastTimor,”74.437Anumberof ‘in vogue’ termswere invoked toexplain and justify this level of control over theTimorese,including (but not limited to) neo-trusteeship, subordinate sovereignty, dissolved sovereignty, and sharedsovereignty.438ThisisinspiteofthefactthattheUnitedNationsSecurityResolution1242hadstressedtheneedforUNTAETto“consultandcooperatecloselywiththeEastTimoresepeopleinordertocarryoutitsmandateeffectivelywithaviewtothedevelopmentoflocaldemocraticinstitutions.”439JaratChopra,“BuildingStateFailureinEastTimor,”225.440Ibid.441Ibid.442 Xanana Gusmão, “New Year’s Message, 31 December, 2000,” ETAN, accessed on 05 January, 2016,http://www.etan.org/et2001a/january/01-06/01xanan.htm.443XananaGusmão,ascitedinIrenaCristalis,EastTimor:ANation’sBitterDawn,250-251.444Ibid.445JaratChopra,“TheUN’sKingdomofEastTimor,”30.

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Wecontinuetobeusedasajustificationforthedelaysandconfusioninaprocesswhichisoutsideour control. The East TimoreseCabinetmembers are caricatures ofministers in agovernmentofabananarepublic.Theyhavenopower,noduties,norresourcestofunctionadequately.446

Ithasbeen reported that someof themembersof thecabinethadcalled foractsof civildisobedience against the UN, with some going as far as to suggest declaring unilateralindependencefromyetanothergroupof“invaders.”447Thisturnofeventsendedupbeingthecatalystforapurported‘reorientation’oftheUN’sapproachtothepoliticalauthorityandparticipation of the Timorese in the reconstruction of East Timor.448 Indeed, soon afterreceivingtheletter,deMelloannouncedhisintentiontomovetowards‘co-government’withthe Timorese, with the end objective being the transfer of full authority.449 This widelybecameknownasaprocessof“Timorisation”oftheciviladministrationofthecountry,andledtothecreationofaNationalConsultativeCouncilofTimorese,whichwouldpurportedlycreatemoreopportunitiesforthepeopleofEastTimortobecomeinvolvedinthedecisionmakingprocessesforthereconstructionofthecountry.

The disillusionment and dissatisfaction with the UN’s performance did not abatefollowingtheemptypromisesofa‘Timorisation’process.Indeed,ChopranotesthattheCNRTwasprovidedwith little trueauthorityordecision-makingpower,and itappearedthatdeMellowasunwillingtoshareanycontroloverhiskingdom.450ItwasChopra’sstrongbeliefthatUNTAETdraggeditsfeetwithrespecttotruepowersharingwiththeTimorese.451ForJoel C. Beauvais, Timorisation was largely symbolic and “unaccompanied by adequatecapacity-building.”452Inthiscontext,ithasbeensuggestedthatstaffingdecisionsregardingtheappointmentofEastTimoresevergedon“tokenism.”453Asaresult,itappearedthattherhetoricof‘Timorisation,’wasemptydiscourse,withitlosingallcredibilitywhenitspurportedobjectivesdidnotmatch the reality. Indeed, inhis reflectionson theUNTAETmission,deMelloadmittedthatheneverhadaclearconceptionofhowto“exercisefairgovernancewithabsolutepower,”andhisonlychoicewastoseekamodelof“benevolentdespotism.”454

TheprimaryfocusofthisstudyhasbeenonthenumberofinterventionsconductedinEastTimor,inordertoascertainifcivilisationallanguageandpracticehaveoccurredinthecountry. It is important to note, however, that the country today has finally gained itindependence.On20May,2002,theUnitedNationscededcontroloverthecountryandthe

446AscitedinJoelC.Beauvais,“BenevolentDespotism:ACritique,”1130.447JoannaJolly,ascitedinJaratChopra,“TheUN’sKingdomofEastTimor,”34.448JoelC.Beauvais,“BenevolentDespotism:ACritique,”1127.449Ibid.450JaratChopra,“TheUN’sKingdomofEastTimor,”32.451JoelC.Beauvais,“BenevolentDespotism:ACritique,”1130.452Ibid.453AscitedinJaratChopra,“TheUN’sKingdomofEastTimor,”33.454SergiodeMello,ascitedinIrenaCristalis,EastTimor:ANation’sBitterDawn,250.

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EastTimoresefinallygainedsovereignstatusandbecametheDemocraticRepublicofEastTimor.Most recently, in 2012, parliamentary elections were deemed “free and fair” by“internationallyrecognisedstandards.”455Somecommentatorshaveexpressedtheviewof“cautiousoptimism”thatthenascentdemocraticinstitutionswillcontinuetoadvanceinthecountry.456TheimpactthatcenturiesofoccupationanddominationhavehadonTimor-Lesteareconsiderable,however.Futureresearchonthecontinuedimpactofintervention,whichisbeyondtheboundsofthisstudy,onthecurrentsituationinTimor-Leste,wouldgreatlyaddtotheunderstandingofthenegativeanddestructiveconsequencesofcivilisationlanguageandpractices.

Conclusion

AcrossallofthecasesofinterventionandoccupationinEastTimoranalysedinthischapter,therewasaconsistentperpetuationoftheideathattheintervenersweretheenlightenedbringersofcivilisation.Indeed,languageonthestandardofcivilisationfeaturedheavilyacrossall of the cases examined. In the case of Portuguese colonialism, therewas a systematicprocessofcreatingacleardemarcationinthecivilisationalstatusofEastTimoresepeople.Intheir demonstration that uncivilised people existed in East Timor, and at the same timeshowingaprogressiontoadvancedcivilisationalstatuswasapossibility,Portugalwasabletoclaim that their continued intervention in Timor was warranted and legitimate. TheidentificationofthepeopleofEastTimorasbeinginferior,barbarians,savages,animals,orevensubhuman,addedweighttothetheorytheywereuncivilised,andthattheyrequiredtutelage.UntilsuchtimethattheTimoresehadreachedasuitablestandardofcivilisationitwasessential,fromLisbon’sperspective,thatthePortugueseretainsupremecontrol,sotheycould‘nurture’theTimorese.

WithPortugal’shastyexitfromEastTimor,Indonesiaquicklyenteredthevacuum.ForIndonesia,therewasastrongsensethatitsinvasionandcontinuedoccupationofEastTimorneeded to be justified in civilisational terms. Particularly in relation to the initial invasionperiod,JakartawaskeentopromotetheimageoftheIndonesian’sasthe‘protectors’andoftenspoketothe‘moralobligation’thatithadtoprotectthepeopleofEastTimor.Thisroleas a protector was absolutely at odds with the brutal campaign of violence required tosubjugateanddominatetheTimoresepopulation.Theviolencenecessitatedthepositioningof the Timorese as being utterly different to the Indonesians. In this regard, Indonesia’sviolentrecolonisationprojectreliedontheuseofcivilisationallanguagetodepictthepeopleof East Timor as backward, primitive, sub-humans. Reports by Indonesian officials on the‘condition’ of the Timorese attempted to reinforce the stereotype that theyhada feeblementality and low social, economic, and mental conditions, which resulted in their

455NancyBermeo,“Foreword,”inDynamicsofDemocracyinTimor-Leste:TheBirthofaDemocraticNation,1999-2012,byRuiGraçaFeijó(Amsterdam:AmsterdamUniversityPress,2016),11.456NancyBermeo,“Foreword,”inDynamicsofDemocracyinTimor-Leste:TheBirthofaDemocraticNation,1999-2012,byRuiGraçaFeijó(Amsterdam:AmsterdamUniversityPress,2016),11.

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inappropriate actions. Itwould be the task, therefore, of the enlightened Indonesian’s to‘direct’them,inallspheresoflife.

InordertojustifytheirinactioninthefaceofthebrutallyviolentoccupationofEastTimor, the Australian andNew Zealand governments continued this repetitive pattern ofstereotyping the Timorese people. It was deemed to be in the national interest of bothgovernments for East Timor to become integrated into Indonesia, and therefore officialsattemptedtoenforcetheimpressionthattheywereill-suitedforindependence.Commentsonthe‘condition’oftheTimoresewereused,again,todismisstheirabilitytotakepartinanactofself-determination,andtheydenigratedthepeopleofEastTimoraspoor,small,andprimitive.ThislanguagewassimultaneouslyemployedtoreinforcetheimpressionthattheTimoresewere inherentlydifferent. If thepeopleofEastTimorwereconsidered ‘like’ theAustraliansandNewZealanders,itwouldhavebeenmoredifficultforthegovernmentstoexplaintheirlackofactioninthefaceofthebrutalrepressionandviolence.Inthiscontext,itappearsthattheuseofcivilisationallanguagecanhaveadualeffect:itcanbeusedasatooltolegitimiseandjustifyviolentinterventiononthepartoftheintervener,whileatthesametimeitcanbeemployedbyexternalactorsinanattempttodistancethemselvesfromthesituation.

Whenanalysed in lightof theactionsofprevious interveners, thereappears tobenothingnewaboutthemannerinwhichINTERFETandUNTAETwentabouttheirinterventionandoccupationofEastTimor.The initialpeacekeepingmissionand the laterpost-conflictreconstructioneffortsmirroredtheprocessesofcolonialisationandthecivilisingmissionsofpreviousinterventions.Indeed,thelegitimacyissuesthatUNTAETexperiencedinEastTimorarebestunderstoodwhenexaminedinreferencetoearlierexamplesoftheconqueringandcolonisationofthecountry.ItwasintheconstantperpetuationoftheinferiorandbackwardnatureoftheTimoresethatUNTAETstafffelttheycouldjustifytheirunwillingnesstocedeanymeaningfulcontrolandpoweroverthecountry.Withstrikingsimilaritiestothecivilisingmissions,and theearlierUN trusteeship system, thepopulationofEastTimorwasplacedunderthetutelageandcontroloftheUN,inordertofacilitatethenurturinginthewaysofadvanced western civilisation. Indeed, contemporary nation and state-building efforts inplacessuchasEastTimorappearedtoreinvigoratetheideathatenlightenednationscoulddetermineanddefinetheinternationalstandardsofacceptablestatebehaviourandtakeoverastatessovereigntyinordertoimplanttheseacceptablestandardsandnorms.Inthisregard,ChristopherHobsonarguesthat“democracyhastakenontheconceptualcharacteristicsof‘civilisation,’associatedwithnotionsofprogress,development,modernisationandahostofotherlaudabletraits.”457

Inordertolegitimiseandjustifyalloftheseinterventions,thelogicofexclusionandinclusionwasheavilyrelieduponandtheTimoresewerecontinuouslycastastheprimitive,

457ChristopherHobson,“DemocracyasCivilisation,”GlobalSociety22,no.1(2008):85.

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backward, inferior, others. The ingrained stereotyping of the people of East Timor, firstpromoted by the Portuguese,was employed time and again, and proved very difficult toovercome.Ashasbeenpreviouslyoutlined,thesestereotypesaremostsuccessfullywieldedwhentheyareleveragedoffpreviouslyheld impressionsandopinions. Inthiscontext,thepeople of East Timor have suffered at the hands of continuous and repetitive efforts toengrainthesestereotypes.Thishas,inturn,facilitatedviolentinterventionagainstthem,aswellas constantperiodsof subjugationanddominationbyexternal forces. In this regard,there isastrongargumenttobemadethateffusivehumanitarianand liberalrhetorichasdone little to protect the people of East Timor from the neo-colonial and neo-imperialambitionsofmorepowerfulstates.Indeed,itappearsthatliberaldiscoursehasbeenwieldedbythosepowerfulstatesinordertomakeconflictintheinternationalsystemmorepossibleandperhapsmoredangerous.

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Conclusion

This thesis has argued that a form of the standard of civilisation, and its accompanyingcivilisingmissions,areevidentincontemporaryinternationalrelations.Whileattimestheyhavebeenreproducedandrebrandedunderdifferentlabels,thewayinwhichthediscourseon civilisation is employed to create a hierarchical international system, is enduring. Byidentifyingandunderstandingthenatureandcharacteristicsofthestandardofcivilisation,itishopedthatwecanattempttoendthepractice,ratherthanthealternativewhichisthecontinuationoftherepetitivecycleofdenigratingentiresocietiesofpeoples,inanattempttolegitimiseviolenceandforceagainstthem.InthecaseofEastTimor,ithasbeenshownthatthepositioningoftheEastTimoresepeopleasinferior,backwardandprimitive,hadtheeffect of making intervention against them more dangerous and violent. Indeed, thediscourseonthestandardofcivilisation,withitspurporteduniversalvaluesandliberalnorms,hasdemonstrateditspropensitytogeneratedestructiveandviolentconsequences,instarkcontrasttoitspromised‘civilising’role.

Theinvestigationintothehistoryofthediscourseonthestandardofcivilisationhasrevealedthatitemergedfromalongtraditionofnaturallawtheorising.BothPopeInnocentIVandFranciscodeVitoriaprovidedearlyunderstandingsofthenaturalrightsofmanandtheresultingprotectionsthattheLawofNationsprovided.Inthecasesofbothphilosophers,this study found that their commentary sanctioned the continued intervention in thedomesticaffairsofnon-Europeanpopulationsbyhypothesisinganumberofexceptionstotheir understanding that ‘uncivilised’ peoples possessed natural rights.458 In this context,Vitoriaalsoprovidedoneoftheearliestexpressionsoftheideathatcivilisednationshadaduty of ‘brotherly correction’ of the ‘natives,’ whereby civilised nations were bound andobligatedtoadministerpropergovernanceovertheuncivilised,andteachandnurturetheminthewaysofadvancedcivilisation.459

It has been argued that this positioningof certain societies as being different andinferiorprovidedEuropeancoloniserswith thenormativeand legalbasis toconduct theirconquestandcolonisationofnon-Europeansocieties. Inthisregard,civilisational languagegavethemanexpansivelegitimisingmandateforviolenceandconflict.Ratherthanprovidea‘civilising hand,’ the reality of those living under colonial rule was often brutally violentregimesofdominationandexploitation.460Thisearlyhistoricaluseofthediscourseonthe

458PopeInnocentIV,“CommentariaDoctissimainQuinqueLibrosDecretalium,”inTheExpansionofEurope:TheFirst Phase,ed. and trans. JamesMuldoon (Pennsylvania: PennsylvaniaUniversity Press, 1977), 191-192; andFrancisco de Victoria, “On the Indians Discovered Lately,” in Francisco de Vitoria: De Indis et De Ivre BelliRelectiones,ed.ErnestNysandtrans.JohnPawleyBate(Washington:CarnegieInstitutionofWashington,1917),54.459Ibid.,160-161.460RolandParis,“InternationalPeacebuildingandtheMissionCivilisatrice,”ReviewofInternationalStudies29,no.4(2002):651.

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standard of civilisation has been argued to have had a profound impact on legalunderstandingsofindigenouspopulationstatusandrights,forcenturiestocome.

During theeighteenthcentury ithasbeenexplained that therewasanattempt toreconceptualisetherightsofman.Ithasbeenarguedthatinthedominantdiscourseofthisera was an understanding that all men were created equal, and there existed universalprinciplesofhumanitarianismandhumanrights.461Itwasunderstood,therefore,thatmanshouldbeaffordedthesameprotectionsfromthewagingofwaragainstthem.However,aswasevidentinthenaturallawtheoriespromotedbyInnocentandVitoria,exceptionstothepromoted ‘universal’ ideals became the dominant occurrence. These ‘exceptions’ inenlightenmentdiscoursedirectlycontradictedany‘universality’totheprinciples.Asaresult,ithasbeenarguedtheactualimpactofthiseffusivelanguagewasfoundtobenearlynon-existent for thepeopleunder colonial rule. Purporteduniversal principlesof equality andhumanity were superseded, in order to allow for the continued intervention against‘uncivilised’peoples.

Duetothediscourseonhumanitarianismandequality,therewasanacceptancebythecolonisingnations that itwouldappear improper tonotacknowledgethese ‘universalprinciples’ in the practice of intervention.462 It has been argued that it became widelyrecognised that it was necessary to promote civilisation as the duty or responsibility ofadvancedEuropeannationstospread.Ifthecolonisersexpressedthattheirinterventionsinthecolonieswereinordertoimprovethestandardsandconditionsofthenativepopulations,thentheiractionsgainedlegitimacy.Ithasbeendemonstrated,inthisregard,thatinorderto do so, civilisational language had to be employed to position those living in the non-Europeanworldasbeinguncivilised,inferior,subhumanandanimals.ThisstudyhasshownthataswiththeearlierconquestsintheNewWorld,thislanguageprovidedcoverforbrutalrepressionandviolenceagainstnon-Europeanpopulations,duringcolonisationprocessesintheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturies.

Asa resultof theunprecedentedtotalwarsofWorldWar IandWorldWar II, thisstudyhasfoundthattherewerechallengestotheunderstandingofwhointheinternationalsystemcouldbedeemed ‘civilised,’andwhowerethe ‘barbarians’.Civilisational languagewasheavilyinterwovenintothepropagandaofbothsidesofthewars,inordertodemoniseanddehumanisetheenemy.463However,becausethesewarswerefoughtinEurope,againstEuropeans, itmeant that ‘enlightened civilisers,’ could necessarily become the ‘barbarianother.’ This arguably changed the way that Europeans saw themselves, and also had animpactontheirunderstandingofthenatureofpeopleoutsideofEurope.

461LeonardWoolf,ImperialismandCivilisation(London:L.andV.Woolf,1933),31.462RolandParis,“InternationalPeacebuilding,”651.463DanielPick,WarMachine:TheRationalisationofSlaughterintheModernAge(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1993),153

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WhentheLeagueofNationswascreated inthepostWorldWarI-era,therewasaconcerted attempt to create a peaceful international environment, based heavily on theenlightenmentprinciplesoftheeighteenthcentury.464Inwhatbecameknownas‘Wilsonianidealism,’liberalandidealisticbeliefsinacommonhumanity,universalhumanrights,andaharmonyofinterestsamongstateswerepromoted.465Forthesomeofthecolonialterritories,a new system of internationalised control was installed. Under the League of Nationsmandatesystem,external statesweregranted formal legal controlandguardianshipoverterritories, in a “sacred trustof civilisation.”466 Thenewly formed international institutionwould have oversight over the tutelage by external states, in order to ensure that theinterestsofthecolonieswerebeingrespected.467

AfterWorldWarII,therewasasecondattemptatcreatinganinternationalinstitutiontopromoteinternationalpeaceandsecurity.UndertheUnitedNations,theuniversalliberalprinciples,previouslyfirmlypromotedbyenlightenmentthinkersandthenlaterbyWilsonianutopianism, were upheld.468 Again, this new international institution attempted tointernationalisethecontrolofcolonialterritories.469Likethemandatesystembeforeit,ithasbeenarguedthatthenewtrusteeshipsystem,embracedthelegaluseofforeigntutelageasamethodforthe‘enlightenment’ofcolonialterritories.Itwasfoundthatwhilethedirectuseofrhetoricsuchas‘civilised,’‘uncivilised,’andthe‘sacredtrustofcivilisation’isabsentfromthe trusteeship system, the effects of the trusteeship system largelymirrored that of itspredecessor.Boththemandateandtrusteeshipsystemscontinuedthepatternofpositioningpowerful states as theenlightened civilisers,with those considered tobeuncivilised keptundertheirtutelage.Ofkeyinteresttothethesiswashowthelanguageandpracticesofthestandardofcivilisationwereusedthroughinternationalinstitutions,andininternationallaw,asatooltoexcludeanddisciplinesocietiesconsideredoutsidethecomityofnations.

Classical realism has provided an important critical analysis of the standard ofcivilisation,civilisingmissions,andthecolonialactivitiesofwesternEuropeannations.Eachof the realist theorists examined in the thesishaveprovideddamning criticismsof liberalimperialism of universal moralistic language and practices. Carl Schmitt forewarned thatrealismwouldnotbewithoutitsowncritiques,whowouldattempttorefutethe“politicalphenomena and truths,” of realism, and would instead call it “amoral, uneconomical,

464E.HCarr,TheTwentyYearsCrisis1919-1939:AnIntroductiontotheStudyofInternationalRelations.2nded(London:MacMillan&Co.Ltd,1946),24-25.465SeeforexampleWoodrowWilson,“PresidentWoodrowWilson’sFourteenPoints:January,1918,”YaleLawSchool:TheAvalonProject,accessedJune15,2016,http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp.466TheLeagueofNations,“Article22oftheCovenantoftheLeagueofNations,”YaleLawSchool,accessed01April,2016,http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp.467WoodrowWilson,ascitedinWilliamBain,BetweenAnarchyandSociety:TrusteeshipandtheObligationsofPower(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2003),101.468TheUnitedNations,“PreambleoftheCharteroftheUnitedNations,”TheUnitedNations,accessed04July,2015,http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/index.html.469 United Nations, “Article 76 of the United Nations Charter,” United Nations, accessed 01 July, 2016,http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/index.html.

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unscientificandabovealldeclarethisadevilryworthyofbeingcombated.”470Instead,ithasbeen argued that classical realism provides an undervalued and understudied critique ofcolonialismandstandardofcivilisationdiscourse.

E.HCarr,CarlSchmitt,andHansMorgenthauallstronglywarnedagainsttheuseoflanguage which had all encompassing and universal appeal, as it has dangerous andunintendedconsequences.Ithasbeenarguedthatthislanguagehastheeffectofcreatingatroubling friend versus enemy dichotomy,471 or dangerous distinctions between so-called“peace-lovingnations”versusthe“forcesofevil.”472

The thesishasexaminedandanalyseda rangeof interventions in thecaseofEastTimor. It has been argued there has been a continuous pattern of violent actions andsubjugation against the country of East Timor. In order to legitimise and justify theseinterventions,civilisationallanguagehasbeenemployed,timeandagain,tocasttheentireEastTimoresesocietyasbeingbackward,primitive,anddifferent.Ineachofthecasesthatwereexploredinthisstudy,theintervenershaveattemptedtopositionthemselvesastheenlightenedcivilisers,byusingemotiveandeffusivelanguagewhichportraystheir‘civilising’roleinthecountry.

ThestandardofcivilisationdidnotdisappearwiththecreationoftheUnitedNations,norwiththeUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights.Itdidnotdisappearwiththeadventofthedecolonisationprocess.Therecontinuestobeahierarchicaldivisionof theworld intothosewhocanbeintervenedagainst,andthosewhocannot.Thesedivisionscontinuetobein accordancewithwestern standards of civilisation. The interventions conducted in EastTimorwereneverbasedonthealtruisticnotionsofacommonhumanity,oruniversalhumanright. Rather, in each case intervention was symptomatic of calculated assessments ofnationalinterest,ortheinterestofstatesshieldedbehindinternationallawandinstitutions.

Ashasbeen argued throughout this thesis, irrespectiveof the time inhistory, thediscourseofthestandardofcivilisationanditspracticeshavebeenemployed.Itisevidentthatthereisapatternoflanguageandjustificationsusedinordertoconductbothhistoricalandcontemporaryinterventions.Whilesomeofthespecificrhetoricusedhasevolvedovertime, the effect of classify entire societies of people as being inferior and different hasendured.IthasbeenarguedthatthecaseofEastTimorprovesthatcivilisationallanguageanditsassociatedpracticescontinuetoexistincontemporaryinternationalrelations.

470CarlSchmitt,TheConceptof thePolitical [1932], trans.GeorgeSchwab(Chicago:ChicagoUniversityPress,2008),65-66.471Ibid.,49.472HansMorgenthau,InDefenseoftheNationalInterest:ACriticalExaminationofAmericanForeignPolicy(NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1951),94.

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Thisresearchstronglysuggeststhatcivilisationallanguageanditsassociatedpracticesgenerate destructive consequences for the states it is wielded against and for thewiderinternationalcommunity.Theobjectiveofthestudywastobringattentiontothedangersofemployingcivilisationallanguageinordertojustifyandlegitimiseintervention.Inthisregard,the ongoing significance of the research is that is can be used to challenge the use ofcivilisationallanguageandpracticesinothercases.Ifcivilisationlanguageemergesinothercontexts,itcanbeidentifiedmorereadilyandthedangersofitsusecanbeadvised.

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