theory of mechanism design

279
8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/theory-of-mechanism-design 1/279 An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design      

Upload: goulysj

Post on 02-Jun-2018

226 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    1/279

    An Introduction to the Theory

    of Mechanism Design

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    2/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    3/279

    Acknowledgments

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    4/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    5/279

    Contents

    Acknowledgments ii

    Preface ix

    1 Introduction 1

    2 Screening 6

    3 Bayesian Mechanism Design: Examples 33

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    6/279

    4 Dominant Strategy Mechanisms: Examples 82

    5 Incentive Compatibility 103

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    7/279

    6 Bayesian Mechanism Design 122

    7 Dominant Strategy Mechanisms 141

    8 Non-Transferrable Utility 153

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    8/279

    9 Informational Interdependence 169

    10 Robust Mechanism Design 180

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    9/279

    11 Dynamic Mechanism Design 226

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    10/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    11/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    12/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    13/279

    http:

    //www-personal.umich.edu/~tborgers/

    http://www-personal.umich.edu/~tborgers/http://www-personal.umich.edu/~tborgers/http://www-personal.umich.edu/~tborgers/http://www-personal.umich.edu/~tborgers/http://www-personal.umich.edu/~tborgers/http://www-personal.umich.edu/~tborgers/http://www-personal.umich.edu/~tborgers/mailto:%[email protected]:%[email protected]
  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    14/279

    Chapter 1

    Introduction

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    15/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    16/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    17/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    18/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    19/279

    Chapter 2

    Screening

    2.1 Introduction

    2.2 Pricing a Single Indivisible Good

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    20/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    21/279

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    22/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    23/279

    R

    Proposition 2.1 .

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    24/279

    Definition 2.2.

    Definition 2.3.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    25/279

    Lemma 2.1.

    Lemma 2.2.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    26/279

    Lemma 2.3 .

    Lemma 2.4 .

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    27/279

    Proposition 2.2.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    28/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    29/279

    R

    R

    Lemma 2.6.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    30/279

    Definition 2.4.

    Proposition 2.4.

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    31/279

    Lemma 2.7.

    Proposition 2.5.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    32/279

    2.3 Nonlinear Pricing

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    33/279

    Definition 2.5.

    R

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    34/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    35/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    36/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    37/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    38/279

    Assumption 2.1.

    Proposition 2.6.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    39/279

    Example 2.1.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    40/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    41/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    42/279

    2.4 Bundling

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    43/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    44/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    45/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    46/279

    Chapter 3

    Bayesian Mechanism Design:

    Examples

    3.1 Introduction

    3.2 Single Unit Auctions

    3.2.1 Set-Up

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    47/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    48/279

    3.2.2 Mechanisms, Direct Mechanisms, and the Revelation

    Principle

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    49/279

    Definition 3.1.

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    50/279

    Proposition 3.1 .

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    51/279

    R

    Definition 3.2.

    Definition 3.3.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    52/279

    3.2.3 Characterizing Incentive Compatibility and Individual

    Rationality

    Lemma 3.1.

    Lemma 3.2.

    Lemma 3.3 .

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    53/279

    Lemma 3.4 .

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    54/279

    Proposition 3.2.

    Proposition 3.3.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    55/279

    3.2.4 Expected Revenue Maximization

    Lemma 3.5.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    56/279

    Assumption 3.1.

    Proposition 3.4 .

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    57/279

    3.2.5 Welfare Maximization

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    58/279

    Proposition 3.5.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    59/279

    3.2.6 Numerical Examples

    Example 3.1.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    60/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    61/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    62/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    63/279

    3.3.2 Incentive-Compatible and Individually Rational Direct

    Mechanisms

    Definition 3.4.

    R

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    64/279

    3.3.3 Ex ante and Ex post Budget Balance

    Definition 3.5.

    Definition 3.6.

    Definition 3.7.

    Proposition 3.6.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    65/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    66/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    67/279

    Proposition 3.7.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    68/279

    Definition 3.8.

    Lemma 3.6.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    69/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    70/279

    Lemma 3.8.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    71/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    72/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    73/279

    Assumption 3.2.

    Proposition 3.8.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    74/279

    3.3.5 Profit Maximization

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    75/279

    Proposition 3.9.

    3.3.6 A Numerical Example

    Example 3.3.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    76/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    77/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    78/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    79/279

    Proposition 3.10.

    Proposition 3.11.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    80/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    81/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    82/279

    3.4.2 Direct Mechanisms

    Definition 3.9.

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    83/279

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    84/279

    3.4.3 Welfare Maximization

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    85/279

    Proposition 3.12 .

    Definition 3.10.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    86/279

    Lemma 3.9.

    Lemma 3.10.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    87/279

    Lemma 3.11.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    88/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    89/279

    Assumption 3.3.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    90/279

    Proposition 3.13.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    91/279

    3.4.4 Profit Maximization

    Proposition 3.14.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    92/279

    3.4.5 A Numerical Example

    Example 3.4.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    93/279

    Proposition 3.15.

    Proposition 3.16.

    3.5 Remarks on the Literature

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    94/279

    3.6 Problems

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    95/279

    Chapter 4

    Dominant Strategy

    Mechanisms: Examples

    4.1 Introduction

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    96/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    97/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    98/279

    4.2 Single Unit Auctions

    4.2.1 Set-Up

    R

    4.2.2 Mechanisms, Direct Mechanisms, and the Revelation

    Principle

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    99/279

    Proposition 4.1 .

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    100/279

    Definition 4.1.

    Definition 4.2.

    4.2.3 Characterizing Dominant Strategy Incentive Compat-

    ibility and Ex Post Individual Rationality

    Proposition 4.2.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    101/279

    Proposition 4.3.

    4.2.4 Canonical Auctions

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    102/279

    Definition 4.3.

    R

    Proposition 4.4.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    103/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    104/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    105/279

    4.3.2 Direct Mechanisms

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    106/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    107/279

    Proposition 4.6.

    4.3.4 Canonical Mechanisms

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    108/279

    Definition 4.4.

    R

    Proposition 4.7.

    4.3.5 Ex Post Exact Budget Balance

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    109/279

    Proposition 4.8.

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    110/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    111/279

    4.4 Bilateral Trade

    4.4.1 Set-Up

    4.4.2 Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible and Ex Post

    Individually Rational Direct Mechanisms

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    112/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    113/279

    4.4.3 Canonical Mechanisms

    Definition 4.5.

    R

    Proposition 4.11.

    4.4.4 Ex Post Exact Budget Balance

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    114/279

    Proposition 4.12.

    4.5 Remarks on the Literature

    4.6 Problems

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    115/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    116/279

    Chapter 5

    Incentive Compatibility

    5.1 Introduction

    5.2 Set-Up

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    117/279

    Definition 5.1.

    R

    Definition 5.2.

    5.3 Weak Monotonicity

    Definition 5.3.

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    118/279

    Definition 5.4.

    Proposition 5.1.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    119/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    120/279

    5.4 Cyclical Monotonicity

    N

    Definition 5.5.

    N

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    121/279

    Proposition 5.2.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    122/279

    N

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    123/279

    5.5 Cyclical Monotonicity When Outcomes Are

    Lotteries

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    124/279

    R

    Proposition 5.3.

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    125/279

    5.6 One-Dimensional Type Spaces

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    126/279

    Definition 5.6.

    Definition 5.7.

    Proposition 5.4.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    127/279

    Definition 5.8.

    R

    Proposition 5.5.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    128/279

    Definition 5.9.

    Proposition 5.6.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    129/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    130/279

    5.7 Rich Type Spaces

    Definition 5.10.

    R

    Proposition 5.7.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    131/279

    5.8 Revenue Equivalence

    Proposition 5.8.

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    132/279

    5.9 Individual Rationality

    Definition 5.11.

    Proposition 5.9.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    133/279

    5.10 Remarks on the Literature

    5.11 Problems

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    134/279

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    135/279

    Chapter 6

    Bayesian Mechanism Design

    6.1 Introduction

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    136/279

    6.2 Set-Up

    Definition 6.1.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    137/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    138/279

    6.3 Independent Types

    Proposition 6.1.

    N

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    139/279

    Proposition 6.2.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    140/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    141/279

    Proposition 6.3.

    6.4 Correlated Types

    6.4.1 Framework

    6.4.2 Failure of Revenue Equivalence

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    142/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    143/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    144/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    145/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    146/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    147/279

    6.4.4 A Numerical Example

    Example 6.1.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    148/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    149/279

    6.4.5 Individual Rationality and Budget Balance

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    150/279

    Definition 6.8.

    Proposition 6.6.

    6.4.6 Discussion

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    151/279

    6.5 Remarks on the Literature

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    152/279

    6.6 Problems

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    153/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    154/279

    Chapter 7

    Dominant Strategy

    Mechanisms

    7.1 Introduction

    7.2 Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    155/279

    Definition 7.1.

    R

    Definition 7.2.

    Proposition 7.1.

    N

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    156/279

    Proposition 7.2.

    Proposition 7.3.

    R

    7.3 Implementing Efficient Decision Rules

    Definition 7.3.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    157/279

    Definition 7.4.

    R

    Proposition 7.4.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    158/279

    Corollary 7.1.

    7.4 Positive Association of Differences

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    159/279

    Definition 7.5.

    Proposition 7.5.

    Definition 7.6.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    160/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    161/279

    Proposition 7.8.

    7.5 Individual Rationality and Budget Balance

    Definition 7.7.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    162/279

    Proposition 7.9.

    Definition 7.8.

    Proposition 7.10.

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    163/279

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    164/279

    7.6 Remarks on the Literature

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    165/279

    7.7 Problems

    R

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    166/279

    Chapter 8

    Non-Transferrable Utility

    8.1 Introduction

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    167/279

    8.2 The Gibbard Satterthwaite Theorem

    8.2.1 Set Up

    Definition 8.1.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    168/279

    Definition 8.2.

    8.2.2 Statement of the Result and Outline of the Proof

    Definition 8.3.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    169/279

    Proposition 8.1.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    170/279

    Definition 8.4.

    Proposition 8.2.

    Definition 8.5.

    Proposition 8.3.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    171/279

    Definition 8.6.

    Proposition 8.4.

    8.2.3 Every monotone direct mechanism is dictatorial

    Proposition 8.5.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    172/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    173/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    174/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    175/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    176/279

    Proposition 8.6.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    177/279

    8.4 Bayesian Incentive Compatibility

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    178/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    179/279

    8.5 Remarks on the Literature

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    180/279

    8.6 Problems

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    181/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    182/279

    Chapter 9

    Informational

    Interdependence

    9.1 Introduction

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    183/279

    9.2 An Example

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    184/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    185/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    186/279

    R

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    187/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    188/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    189/279

    9.4 Characterizing All Incentive Compatible

    Mechanisms

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    190/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    191/279

    9.5 Remarks on the Literature

    9.6 Problems

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    192/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    193/279

    Chapter 10

    Robust Mechanism Design

    10.1 Introduction

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    194/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    195/279

    10.2 An Example

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    196/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    197/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    198/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    199/279

    10.3 Modeling Incomplete Information

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    200/279

    10.3.1 Hierarchies of Beliefs

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    201/279

    Definition 10.1.

    N

    N

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    202/279

    10.3.2 Type spaces

    Definition 10.2.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    203/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    204/279

    10.3.3 Common Prior Type Spaces

    Definition 10.4.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    205/279

    Proposition 10.1.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    206/279

    10.4 The Mechanism Designers Uncertainty

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    207/279

    Definition 10.5.

    Definition 10.6.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    208/279

    Definition 10.7.

    10.5 Mechanisms

    Definition 10.8.

    Definition 10.9.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    209/279

    Definition 10.10.

    10.6 Bayesian Equilibria and the Revelation Prin-

    ciple

    Definition 10.11.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    210/279

    Proposition 10.2.

    Definition 10.12.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    211/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    212/279

    Proposition 10.4.

    Proposition 10.5.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    213/279

    N

    10.7 What Can be Implemented?

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    214/279

    10.7.1 Belief Revelation

    Proposition 10.6.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    215/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    216/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    217/279

    10.7.2 Betting

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    218/279

    Proposition 10.7.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    219/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    220/279

    10.7.3 Equilibrium Outcomes and Payoff Types

    Proposition 10.8.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    221/279

    R

    Proposition 10.9.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    222/279

    10.8 Robust Mechanism Design With a Common

    Prior

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    223/279

    10.9 Robust Mechanism Design Without a Com-

    mon Prior

    10.9.1 The Mechanism Designers Objectives

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    224/279

    Definition 10.14.

    R

    R

    R

    Definition 10.15.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    225/279

    10.9.2 Undominated Mechanisms

    Definition 10.16.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    226/279

    10.10 Conceptual Problems in the Quasi-Linear

    Case

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    227/279

    Proposition 10.10.

    Proposition 10.11.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    228/279

    10.11 Voting Revisited

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    229/279

    Definition 10.17.

    Definition 10.18.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    230/279

    Proposition 10.12.

    Definition 10.19.

    Definition 10.20.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    231/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    232/279

    Proposition 10.13.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    233/279

    Proposition 10.14.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    234/279

    Definition 10.21.

    Proposition 10.15.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    235/279

    10.12 Remarks on the Literature

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    236/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    237/279

    10.13 Problems

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    238/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    239/279

    Chapter 11

    Dynamic Mechanism Design

    by Daniel Krahmer and Roland Strausz

    11.1 Introduction

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    240/279

    11.2 Dynamic Private Information

    11.2.1 Sequential Screening

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    241/279

    Definition 11.1.

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    242/279

    Proposition 11.1.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    243/279

    Definition 11.2.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    244/279

    Definition 11.3.

    Proposition 11.2.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    245/279

    Proposition 11.3.

    Proposition 11.4.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    246/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    247/279

    Proposition 11.5.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    248/279

    Proposition 11.6.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    249/279

    Proposition 11.7.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    250/279

    Assumption 11.1.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    251/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    252/279

    11.2.2 The role of private information

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    253/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    254/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    255/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    256/279

    Proposition 11.10.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    257/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    258/279

    11.2.3 Sequential Mechanism Design

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    259/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    260/279

    Assumption 11.2.

    Proposition 11.11.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    261/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    262/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    263/279

    Definition 11.4.

    R

    Definition 11.5.

    Definition 11.6.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    264/279

    Proposition 11.12.

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    265/279

    11.4 Remarks on the Literature

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    266/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    267/279

    11.5 Problems

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    268/279

    R

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    269/279

    R

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    270/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    271/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    272/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    273/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    274/279

    http:

    //faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/

    http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/
  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    275/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    276/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    277/279

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    278/279

    Index

  • 8/10/2019 Theory of Mechanism Design

    279/279