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RUSSIAS

NUCLEAR AND

MISSILE COMPLEX

The Human Factor

in Proliferation

Valentin Tikhonov

A Report by the Non Proliferation Project


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2001 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

1779 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

202-483-7600, Fax 202-483-1840

www.ceip.org

All rights reserved.The Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project invites the liberal use of the infor-

mation in this report for educational purposes, requiring only that the reproduced material

clearly state: From Valentin Tikhonov, Russias Nuclear and Missile Complex:The Human Factor

in Proliferation, 2001, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Copies of this report can be obtained in several ways:

ENGLISH-LANGUAGE VERSION

Download from www.ceip.org/npp

or

Order a print copy by contacting:

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Non-Proliferation Project

1779 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

202-939-2296

[email protected]

RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE VERSION

Order a print copy by contacting:

The Carnegie Moscow Center

16/2,Tverskaya str.

Moscow, 103009, Russia

Tel.: +7(095) 935-89-04

Fax: +7(095) 935-89-06

Email: [email protected]

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace normally does not take institutional positions

on public policy issues; the views and recommendations presented in this publication do not

necessarily represent the views of the Carnegie Endowment, its officers, staff, or trustees.


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R U S S I A S N U C L E A R A N D M I S S I L E C O M P L E X

FOREWORDThis report on the Russian nuclear and missile complex presents the results of a study com-

missioned by the Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project, the Carnegie International Migration

Program, and the Carnegie Moscow Center.The study was performed under the supervision

of author Valentin Tikhonov, a well-known Russian sociologist specializing in migration

problems. During the 1990s he conducted several studies of this nature on the closed nuclear

cities (including one for the Rand Corporation), which made it possible to examine in greater

detail the development of the situation there.

This research project was made possible through the generous support of the John Merck

Fund, for which the author and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace are grateful.

The report was originally written in Russian and subsequently translated into English.

Any errors or conflicts resulting from the translation are the responsibility of the Carnegie

Non-Proliferation Project and not the author.

Alexander Pikayev

Scholar in Residence, Carnegie Moscow Center

Jon Wolfsthal

Associate, Non-Proliferation Project

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace


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R U S S I A S N U C L E A R A N D M I S S I L E C O M P L E X v

CONTENTSINTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... vi i

PART 1: THE STUDY

Overview ..................................................................................................................................... 2

Findings ...................................................................................................................................... 7

PART 2: THE SURVEYS

List of Figures .............................................................................................................................. 18

List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ 20

Nuclear Cities

1. Changes in Specialist Recruitment ....................................................................................... 242. Changes in the Qualitative Composition

of Specialists Working in Closed Cities ................................................................................. 29

3. Living Standards in Closed Cities ......................................................................................... 36

4. Moonlighting ....................................................................................................................... 42

5. Specialists Financial Situation .............................................................................................. 50

6. Potential and Actual Emigration ........................................................................................... 52

7. Personnel Shift toward Private Business ............................................................................... 67

8. Personnel Training for the Nuclear Industry ........................................................................ 72

9. Nuclear Security and Personnel ............................................................................................ 74

Missile Cities10. Migration as a Factor in the Evolution of Missile Cities ....................................................... 77

11. Specialists Qualifications ...................................................................................................... 83

12. Wages and Salaries ................................................................................................................ 93

13. Income and Housing ............................................................................................................ 99

14. Moonlighting ....................................................................................................................... 103

15. Financial Situation ................................................................................................................ 106

16. Potential Emigration ............................................................................................................. 108

17. Actual Emigration ................................................................................................................. 113

18. Personnel Shift toward Private Business ............................................................................... 117

19. Personnel Training for the Missile Industry .......................................................................... 120

20. Missile Security and Personnel ............................................................................................. 121


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R U S S I A S N U C L E A R A N D M I S S I L E C O M P L E X v

INTRODUCTIONAlexander PikayevJon B.Wolfsthal

This report examines the situation facing the inhabitants of the Russian nuclear weapons

and missile complex. Russia inherited this sprawling network of cities and production

facilities after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In its inherited form, this complex represents

a serious burden for the troubled Russian economy, is vastly oversized given the current

international situation, and is a potential source of nuclear and missile proliferation

and instability. Across the entire Russian landmass, hundreds of thousands of previously

pampered scientists and technicians face dire economic conditions.Their economic

hardship dramatically increases the risk that they will be forced to sell their skills or

materials at hand to the highest bidder, and also increases the difficulty Russia will have

recruiting new scientists and technicians to join its military work force.

The potential threats of migrating experts and materials diverted to proliferators have

been a major source of concern for the United States and other countries throughout the

1990s.The disturbing demographic trends discussed in this report, however, reveal another

growing concern: that it will be increasingly difficult for Russia to train, recruit, and maintain

the type of experts it needs to ensure a safe, secure, and reliable strategic nuclear deterrent.

This less widely acknowledged problem raises long-term security questions for Russia, the

United States, and their strategic partners.

BACKGROUND

After World War II, the Soviet Union applied enormous effort to the development of its

nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, which was viewed at the timeand even today

as a key component of its political and military status. Tens, if not hundreds, of enterprises

were built, making it possible for Moscow to achieve nuclear parity with the United States

by the early 1970s, but at the price of significant overtaxing of the nations resources.

During the 1940s and 1950s, the closed nuclear cities were developed far away from

major cities and were almost totally isolated from the surrounding areas. It was possible tovisit or relocate there only with specially issued passes, and the residents of the cities had

to get official permission to leave these sites.The cities were not shown on maps, had no


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postal code; for example: Chelyabinsk-45 or Krasnoyarsk-26. As a practical matter, however,

they had nothing in common with these centers and often were located tens or even hundreds

of kilometers from them.

As compensation for their remote location, the populations of the closed cities enjoyed

significant privileges and advantages.A much better selection of foods and consumer goodswas available than around the country as a whole, and at reasonable prices. Workers received

higher pay and generally received free housing.This higher standard of living made it possible

for the nuclear and missile enterprises to attract highly qualified specialists, including the

top graduates from the countrys most prestigious universities. As a result, the nuclear cities

were islands of relative well-being located, as a rule, in the midst of poor, underdeveloped

regions, where the standard of living in the last years of the USSR was steadily declining.

The situation was similar in the missile cities, although these developed in or near open

cities and had fewer restrictions imposed on them.They were not so geographically isolated

from the surrounding areas and, in most cases, could be found on a map.

CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union put an end to the relatively

comfortable existence of those in the nuclear-missile complex and raised the specter of

nuclear and missile brain drain from the former Soviet Union. A sharp reduction in govern-

ment funding substantially reduced the standard of living in the nuclear and missile cities.

Nuclear experts went months or longer without receiving any pay. Work orders declined,

decreasing job satisfaction, and the relative benefits that city residents once enjoyed all but

vanished, without any real prospect for finding new jobs in their current locations.

These circumstances create two potential security concerns.

First, they give rise to fears that these highly trained and now disenfranchised workersmight be tempted or even compelled to sell whatever was close at hand, or themselves, in

order to make ends meet. Despite this potential, there has been only one known attempt at

crossing the border by a large group of missile experts from the missile city of Miass in

1992. At the last minute, they were taken from an airplane setting out for Pyongyang, North

Korea, from the Moscow international airport Sheremetievo-2.There is some information

to indicate that representatives of the group had visited North Korea previously to look into

the working and living conditions there. No concrete evidence of additional or individual

emigration has come forward.

It is known, however, that nuclear physicists have been invited to work in a number of

developing countries of proliferation concern.There were unconfirmed reports in mid-2000

that three experts from one of the countries of the former USSR had defected to the Taliban

Movement. Moreover, the information revolution means that expertise can travel even if the

expert stays put, with transfer of information taking place through computer, fax and phone

networkstransfers that would be hard to identify and to stop.

The threat of the unauthorized use of nuclear materials attracted most of the attention

during the nineties; there were several recorded cases of theft, which led to a significant but

arguably underfunded effort to improve the security of and accounting for nuclear materials

throughout the former Soviet Union.

Second, Russias economic and strategic hard times have long-term implications for

its ability to keep the human and technical capabilities necessary to maintain a modern

nuclear arsenal. Just as the United States is facing potential problems as its nuclear workforce agesand fewer top experts are interested in entering the fieldRussia is already

facing a degradation in the skills of its nuclear experts Without the needed investment


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in facilities, education, and living standards, Russia might face serious problems with the

safety and reliability of its nuclear arsenal in the years ahead. Any insecurity in this area

has serious implications for Russias perceived security and for international strategic stability.

Maintaining systems as complex as nuclear weapons and long-range missiles requires

a skilled, experienced, and motivated cadre of experts and technicians. Russia expects tomaintain thousands of nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. To ensure that its weapons

are safe and operate as expected, it will need to address the changes taking place within its

weapons complex.The first step, to which this report contributes, is to help understand the

nature and causes of those changes.

The risk that a brain drain could lead to additional global proliferation sparked early

attention from the United States and its international partners, but was largely overshad-

owed by concerns over nuclear weapons and materials. In 1991 and 1992, Western coun-

tries moved to engage and employ the elite of the ex-Soviet nuclear, chemical, biological

weapon and ballistic missile complex through the International Science and Technology

Centers, which were described at this time as technical dating services between Western

government grants and ex-Soviet experts.The expectation was that the Russian economy

would, within a reasonable amount of time, develop to the point where it could provide

alternative employment for these experts.

This expectation proved very wrong and, almost a decade later, the Russian economy is

still unable to provide the necessary conditions for job creation to adequately employ this

vast network of experts. Although the science centers and a variety of other unilateral and

multilateral projects have made important progress toward employing ex-Soviet experts,

the situation in the cities remains a serious concern and a threat to international peace and

security.Without concerted and prolonged assistance to these locations, the situation is likely

to get worse before it gets better.The sponsors of this report hope that this study will be

the first step in a broader effort to better understand the changes going on in the Russianmilitary complex and to develop effective responses to deal with the serious security

challenges posed by those developments.


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PART 1The Study


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OVERVIEWDespite international concern over the potential risks posed by the state of the Russiannuclear and missile complex, little hard evidence has been available to assess actual migration

rates and their possible impact on prospects for international proliferation. In 1999 the

Carnegie Moscow Center undertook to fill the gap in the study of migration from the

nuclear-missile centers by commissioning this sociological field study, which was conducted

in three nuclear and three missile cities. In particular, the migration potential of the cities

in question was studied.

The results presented here stem from a number of surveys done as part of a larger project

that analyzes the effects of migration on national and international nuclear security. It

continues research begun in 1992 on potential and real migration of nuclear and missile

scientists and specialists.1

This report provides heretofore unavailable information on and analysis of the problems

confronted by Russian high-tech industries. The onset of concerns over the brain drain

coincided with the transformation of the Russian political and economic system, including

the reorganization of the Russian defense industry. Our study focuses on the migration of

personnel in nuclear and missile industries and its detrimental consequences on national

and international security.

The study is based on official statistics and detailed surveys. It analyzes several aspects of

migration patterns, including:

s How and why people in these industries migrate;

s Migration of specialists to closed and open cities where nuclear and missile

facilities are located;

s The potential and actual emigration of weapons specialists out of Russia;

s The private sectors absorption of nuclear and missile experts; and

s The training of incoming personnel by nuclear and missile industries.

2 C A R N E G I E E N D O W M E N T F O R I N T E R N A T I O N A L P E A C E


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STUDY RESULTS

The study produced some surprising results. On one hand, the subjects expressed less desire

to emigrate from Russia to other countries than in the early 1990s.The bulk of acknowledged

migration during this time was to Israel, Germany and the United States, countries that do

not represent a threat to Western security interests. The study did not discover a singleinstance of a departure for such problem countries as Iraq or Iran. On the other hand, the

emigration potential in the nuclear-missile complex remains dangerously high.The situation

is exacerbated by the fact that there was no significant improvement in the overall conditions

in the enterprises during the 1990s.As a result, while many of the experts were hoping at the

start of the decade that the bad times would soon pass and the situation would improve, those

hopes had been all but extinguished by the end of the decade.This state of affairs objectively

has to push people in the direction of accepting offers of work, regardless of the source.

Therefore, it would be a mistake to take the absence of documented brain drain cases to

states of proliferation concern during the previous decade as a guarantee that there will be no

such problem in the future. In a certain sense, the prevailing disappointment and hopelessnessin the nuclear and missile centers more likely points to a growing risk of proliferation, even

though a number of formal statistical measures might indicate the reverse.

Why should the migration of nuclear and missile experts from the cities be a cause for

concern? And why are concerted state policies needed to address these issues? There are a

number of reasons:

s The abundance of nuclear materials in the closed cities is at risk of being unlawfully sold

on the open market, thereby exacerbating the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation;

s Under current conditions there is an equally disturbing possibility that nuclear and

missile specialists could be exploited by countries seeking expertise to develop their

own nuclear weapons and missiles;

s Nuclear missiles still exist, and specialists are required to maintain and improve their

safety and security;

s The dismantling of nuclear weapons is a time-consuming and demanding process

requiring the mastery of those specialists who were involved in the weapons develop-

ment and production.

In short, the distinctive services and expertise of specialists in the nuclear and missile cities

will be in demand for many years, and their potential migration poses numerous security

problems for Russia and the global community.Sources within the industrial cities maintain that, for the time being, the impact of expert

migration is under control.Yet the best remedy for missile- and nuclear-related transfers and

emigration of specialists to aspiring nuclear countries is to increase salaries and improve job

satisfaction, neither of which the Russian system can currently do. According to our study, the

attitude of specialists toward their work is changing. In 1992, 20 percent of the specialists

surveyed said they were proud of their work in the defense industry; in 1993, this figure had

fallen to 15 percent. Certainly the figure is even lower by now. Sense of pride in work as a

guard against the leakage of classified missile and nuclear know-how, including manpower

and materials, is no longer reliable.

The missile and nuclear infrastructures will continue to exist for the foreseeable future,

although possibly modified in size and scope.Well into this decade and beyond, hundredsof thousands of Russian citizens will depend on this facet of the military-industrial complex.

C l h d d h b l


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understand the particular social and economic problems that beset these specialists at a time

when Russian reforms are evolving.The better these trends are understood, the more effective

targeted programs to address current circumstances will be.

Balance of Migration. In order to maintain their capabilities, nuclear and missile industries

require a balanced inflow of a highly skilled and specialized work force to match the skillsand numbers of people leaving the centers.The missile and nuclear cities are unable by

themselves to provide the number of specialists required to support their large-scale civilian

and military activities. Inevitably, some of the manpower must be trained and hired from

outside the cities, a common practice in the past. As the departure of skilled specialists

threatens the efficient operation of the nuclear and missile complexes, ensuring an inflow

of experts into the affected cities becomes a matter of Russian national security.Yet at the

very time that current economic circumstances are fueling migration out of the cities, the

qualities that formerly attracted new talent to the cities have all but disappeared.

In the interest of national and international security, it is imperative to strike a balance

between the migration into and out of the nuclear and missile cities. This balance must take

into account both the number and level of expertise of the personnel.The right balance

will be one that maintains the security of the nuclear and missile facilities while retaining

adequate defense capabilities.This study aims to identify the predominant factors determining

the migration of nuclear and missile specialists.

PLAN OF THE STUDY

In addition to studying the actual and potential migration to and from nuclear and missile

centers, this study analyzes the general situation of labor markets in the subject cities and in

Russia as a whole, as well as the dynamics of living conditions in nuclear and missile cities.

Furthermore, the study examines the transfer of specialists from the private sector and thechallenges involved in training new employees at the nuclear and missile complexes.

The problem of personnel formation and personnel mobility within the missile and nuclear

complex was also reviewed to evaluate its impact on the safety of the Russian military capabilities

and to examine potential and real emigration of missile and nuclear complex experts.

In support of this project, the study also relies on official statistical data in a comprehensive

database.The sources of the official data are the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom),

the Federal Employment Service, the State Statistical Committee of Russia, and the results of

specially commissioned sociological surveys conducted in the nuclear and missile industries

in 1992 and 1999.These surveys were carried out through the auspices of the Russian

Academy of Sciences on the ground at nuclear and missile enterprises throughout Russia.

The objectives of the study are:

s To examine the mobility trends of personnel in the Russian missile and nuclear com-

plex and to define the negative trends in the hiring of new employees.These topics

cover the following:

1.overall professional qualifications;

2.age and gender of personnel;

3.professional characteristics of those applying for jobs and those leaving the industry;

4. sources of employee inflow and quality of newly hired staff;

5.reasons for employee dismissals.



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The sampling method for the study was applied in each category of city (scientific research

center, plant producing nuclear munitions, chemical center).The final set included Sarov and

Snezhinsk (scientific research centers), Seversk (chemical center), and Zarechniy and

Trekhgorniy (production centers).

The survey was conducted among one hundred working specialists at each major enterpriselocated in the selected cities.All received higher education and occupy managerial positions

in scientific research and engineering.The study also surveyed twenty employees who had

either left or joined the five enterprises in 1999.

Table 2.Working and surveyed specialists in selected closed nuclear cities

P O R T I O N O F

T OW N U N I V E R S E S A M P L E S A M P L E , %

Sarov 10000 100 1.0

Snezhinsk 5700 100 1.8

Seversk 4500 100 2.2

Zarechniy 4200 100 2.4

Trekhgorniy 2000 100 5.0

Total 26400 500 1.9

In addition, a survey was conducted among thirty final-year students at each of five

institutions of higher education that specialize in training personnel for the atomic industry:

in the Moscow region, Moscow Physical Technical Institute in Dolgoprudniy; in Tula,Tula

State University; in Chelyabinsk, South Ural State University; in Sarov, Sarov Physical Technical

Institute; in Obninsk, Obninsk Institute of Atomic Power Engineering.

SAMPLE SURVEY: MISSILE SITES

The sample represents the major enterprises of the missile industry, including both those

researching and implementing peaceful uses of outer space and those manufacturing strategic

missiles and designing submarine-launched missiles.

Our survey included eighty working specialists at each major enterprise located in the

three selected towns. All have a specialized higher degree and occupy positions in scientific

research, engineering, and administration.The survey also covered twenty employees who

had either left or joined the three enterprises in 1999 (table 3). In addition, a survey wasconducted among thirty final-year students at each of three institutions of higher education

that specialize in training personnel for the missile industry: in Moscow, Moscow State

Technical University in Bauman and the Forestry Technical University in the Mytischi; in

St. Petersburg, the Mechanical Institute.


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Table 3.Working and surveyed specialists in the missile industry

E N T E R P R I S E P O R T I O N O F

C I T Y E N T E R P R I S E S P E C I A L I Z AT I O N U N I V E R S E S A M P L E S A M P L E , %

Miass Rocket Center: Designing

Makeev Design submarine-Bureau launched missiles 500 80 17

Votkinsk Votkinsk Machine Production of

Building Plant Topol ballistic

missiles 1700 80 5

Korolev Korolev Rocket and Outer space

Space Corporation systems, orbiting

stations 10000 80 0.8

Total 12200 240 2

FINDINGS

NUCLEAR CITIES

The Russian nuclear complex is made up of ten closed nuclear cities spread across the Asian

landmass.The skills of the estimated 120,000 workers in these cities were essential to the

development of Russias nuclear arsenal, and would be very useful to other would-be nuclear-

weapon states. Almost 2 percent of the work force in five of these cities were surveyed forthis report, and the major findings are as follows:

Overall Migration

s Between 1989 and 1999, the estimated overall migration inflow to closed cities

amounted to seventy-nine thousand people, or nearly eight thousand people a year.

There is a marked reduction both in the absolute value and in the rates of migration

inflow to closed cities.This indicates that, while closed cities remain attractive to

migrants, the attraction is diminishing rapidly.There are reasons to believe that in two

or three years migration to closed cities will reach a zero value, and then quite probably

an outflow of population will begin.

s Migration of specialists to closed cities reached its peak in the early 1980s, and then

began to decrease.The decrease was accompanied by an increase in the number of

permanent residents among the specialists who began to work in closed cities, and this

growth noticeably accelerated in the 1990s.The 1990s saw an explosion in the share of

closed cities permanent residents taking jobs at the enterprises, from 24 percent in the

1980s to 65 percent in the 1990s.

s The pattern of migration flow is changing. Before 1990, residents of open cities

accounted for more than 80 percent of migrants, and in 1990 residents of closed cities

who had studied in open cities formed two-thirds of the migration flow. In the 1990s,there was relatively little migration from open cities. Those who formerly had moved

to closed cities to work are being gradually and of late ever more rapidly replaced by


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Specialists Recruitment

s The 1990s marked a turning point in the pattern of personnel recruitment in closed

cities.Today nearly 90 percent of specialists working in closed cities are local residents.

This represents a sharp contrast with the 1970s and 1980s, when only about one-third

of specialists starting work in closed cities were local residents.

s The closed cities own demographic potential grew sharply (nearly 4.5 times) in the

1990s over the 1980s. Such substantial growth in the cities own labor resources has

been a decisive factor in reducing migration inflow into closed cities.This process was

further intensified in the 1990s by a substantial reduction in demand for specialists by

state enterprises.

s The reduction in state enterprises demand for specialists, combined with a demo-

graphic explosion, has led to the present situation in which unemployment among

working-age residents of closed cities is 10 percent.The expected continuation of the

demographic explosion in the first decade of the twenty-first century means that eitherthe state enterprises take advantage of the favorable situation and carry out a substantial

rejuvenation of their personnel or the cities will be faced with high numbers of unem-

ployed youth and with all the ensuing negative consequences of that turn of events.

Qualifications of Specialists

s The 1990s saw very serious negative changes in key personnel. Not only was there a

reduction in the percentage of staff members holding an academic degree, but the

source of their degrees also changed. Before 1990, practically everyone holding an

academic degree earned it while working at the enterprises. Peoples work at the

enterprises provided them with material for a dissertation. In the 1990s, practically nodissertations were defended at the enterprises, and persons with academic degrees had

to be recruited to the enterprises.This is an indication of the gradual disappearance of

scientific life at the surveyed enterprises.

s In an overwhelming majority of cases, specialists for closed cities were trained at

educational institutions in Russia. The disintegration of the USSR has not affected the

system of personnel training. All major educational institutions offering instruction

in the atomic fields have remained in Russia. In the 1990s there was a sharp increase

in an adverse trenda rapid growth in the share of specialists receiving an education

in closed cities themselves or in the regions where closed cities are located. There was

a particularly marked drop in the share of specialists who obtained an education inMoscow and the Moscow Region, where the leading educational institutions are located.

This adversely affects the professional standards of specialists. Among graduates holding

academic degrees from institutions of higher education, the share of those from schools

located in Moscow and the Moscow Region is about five times greater than those who

graduated from institutes in closed cities, and three and a half times greater than those

who obtained a higher education in the regions where closed cities are situated.


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Age of Specialists

s Current trends in personnel movement are unfavorable to state enterprises. If they

persist in the future, the average age of employees in the work force will increase even

more.This will happen through an increase in the share of persons of near-retirement

age and an equal reduction in the share of people between the ages of forty and

forty-nine. Current patterns of specialist employment and disemployment prevent the

rejuvenation of the work force and will result in a failure to maintain the stability of

the present age pattern.

Income Levels and Sources

s The level and structure of pay (in US dollars) received today is practically the same as

in 1992, although the cost of living has risen considerably since then.About 60 per-

cent of surveyed specialists receive monthly pay equivalent to less than US$50, and

only 3 percent receive US$100 to US$125.

s Differentiation of pay by position held is minimal and to a relatively small degree

depends on a citys primary activity.

s Average income per family member amounts to about US$46 and is nearly the same

in all types of cities.

s Regular pay has ceased to be the main source of livelihood, giving way to money made

by moonlighting. Sixty percent of specialists supplement their salaries by outside work.

In most cases incomes earned through outside work are either comparable to or higher

than regular pay.This explains why per capita incomes are higher in locations where

the share of specialists doing outside work is greater (research and production centers)

than in locations where regular pay is higher (chemical centers). In nearly two-thirds

of all cases, money made on the side is earned outside a specialists profession.The

average monthly income of specialists who do outside work is US$74 as against US$43

earned by those who do not. The average pay that specialists working in closed cities

regard as sufficient to ensure themselves of a reasonable subsistence is US$160 a month.

This is four times greater than their regular pay and a little more than twice as much as

earnings that include money made on the side.

s An upsurge in the number of specialists who were moonlighting began in 19891992,

and spiked in 1993. A combination of increasingly deteriorating economic conditions

at state enterprises and the development in closed cities of a locus for outside work

the private sectorled to this situation. In all, commercial activities rank first at the

surveyed enterprises, followed by work done under foreign research grants and contracts,

and then by work done under domestic research grants and contracts.

Living Standards of Specialists

s The vast majority of people at the enterprises are provided with housing. Nearly 90 per-

cent of surveyed specialists live in separate apartments. To leave a closed city today means,

in effect, to lose ones housing, for the opportunities to sell it are at best limited by a low

effective demand, and, in addition, in most cases housing belongs to local enterprises.

This circumstance is a major restraint on the outflow from closed cities.


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1 0 C A R N E G I E E N D O W M E N T F O R I N T E R N A T I O N A L P E A C E

s Between 4 percent and 15 percent of respondents in different types of cities believe

that their financial situation has remained unchanged or has improved over the period

of reforms (19921999).About 85 percent to 96 percent of respondents in the surveyed

cities are of the opinion that their financial situation has deteriorated, and 41 percent

to 61 percent note that it has deteriorated sharply. If stated in terms of win andloss, then specialists working in closed cities are among those who have suffered

losses during the reforms.

s Engineers and research workers, who account for four-fifths of the total number of spe-

cialists, give the most negative evaluation of their financial situation: between 83 percent

and 88 percent regard it as difficult or very difficult, and only 1 percent to 2 percent as

good. Heads of section are more optimistic: nearly three times as many of them regard

their situation as normal, and four to five times fewer regard it as very difficult.

Attitudes toward Migration

s Fourteen percent of surveyed employees would like to work abroad.This number has

fallen to between one-fifth and one-sixth of what it was in 1992.The drop is a result

of the fact that low incomes and administrative restrictions make it virtually impossible

for residents of closed cities to leave the country on their own.

s Eighty percent of surveyed experts would be willing to work in the military industry

of a foreign country.

s Only 16 percent of respondents have a negative attitude toward those who are going

to emigrate from Russia and therefore cannot be, in principle, regarded as potential

emigrants. Nearly 60 percent are neutral (havent given emigration much thought or

view it as a personal affair) and 21 percent approve of them or even envy them.Therefore, emigration potential is much greater than appears from the answer to the

question about specialists intentions to work abroad.

s Emigration flow from closed cities started approximately in 1991 and reached its peak

in 1996, following which it began to decrease. In the 1990s, about 1 percent of the

total number of specialists working at the surveyed enterprises went abroad each year.

Moves to Private Enterprises

s It is not emigration but specialists taking jobs with private businesses and launching

their own businesses that pose the most serious damage to the enterprises by depleting

their personnel. In the 1990s, the intensity of the outflow from enterprises to private

businesses was five to six times greater than emigration. Specialists who quit their jobs

at state enterprises are playing a major part in shaping the new economic entities. Forty

percent of them are running their own businesses, and 60 percent are continuing to

work for hire.


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MISSILE CITIES

Russias missile complex is well-developed and has produced a wide range of civilian and

military rockets. The skills of the specialists employed in these cities would be valuable for

those states interested in developing long-range ballistic missile capabilities. Unlike the nuclear

complex, the missile cities were never closed, providing residents with greater access to theoutside world and other employment opportunities. Three major missile enterprises were

surveyed for this study, and the major findings are as follows:

Overall Migration

s Migrants have played a seminal role in providing specialist personnel for the missile

industry.Their influence is greatest in Miass, where they account for 95 percent of

currently employed specialists. In Votkinsk and Korolev, migrants make up 50 percent

of all specialists.

s

The number of migrants employed by the missile enterprises rose until the 1980s.Thereafter, the number of migrants has rapidly fallen, reflecting the general situation

of creeping stagnation and degradation in the industry.

s The bulk of migrants (from 88 percent in Korolev to 49 percent in Votkinsk) are adult

outsiders who deliberately decided to move to missile cities.

s Over the past ten years, the missile industry enterprises have been experiencing a

reduction in employment.

s As the enterprises demand for specialists nose-dived, there was a change in the hiring

pattern in the 1990s in favor of local residents.This has radically reduced migration to

the missile cities.s In the 1990s, migrants came mostly from residential localities within the missile

city regions.

Qualifications of Specialists

s Most holders of postgraduate degrees are migrants who moved to missile cities from

beyond the regions where the cities are located.Those born outside Russia are the

second largest group in this category of migrants.

s In the missile industry, those with the highest qualifications consist mostly of persons

born around Russias periphery, including ex-USSR Republics.Therefore, the 1990sslump in migratory inflow of specialists to the missile enterprises actually diminished

the overall quality of specialists in the missile cities.

s Educational institutions located in ex-USSR Republics, with a 1 percent to 2 percent

share, play a very minor role in training missile industry specialists.The USSRs collapse

has had no impact on the personnel training system for research and development

establishments or manufacturing enterprises of the missile industry.

s Moscows educational institutions play a significant role in the training of missile

industry specialists in Korolev only. In Votkinsk and Miass, two-thirds of all specialists

were educated either in the cities themselves or within the local regions.


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s The composition of newly hired personnel at missile enterprises demonstrates a

continuous replacement of migrants with permanent residents of missile cities who hold

diplomas from institutions of higher learning located in the missile cities themselves.

The missile industry, which in its prime used to extensively employ personnel from

the entire country and used to rely on a broad network of colleges and universities,currently meets its modest demands for specialist personnel mostly by hiring graduates

of local colleges and universities who reside in the missile city regions.

Age of Specialists

s Thus, in the 1990s, the economic crisis and dramatic reduction in missile industry

employment helped normalize the specialists age profile. Forced to retrench, the enter-

prises fired older employees first, while hiring mostly young people. But for

the need to retrench, the continuation of negative trends in personnel mix seen in

the early 1990s would have meant that an overwhelming share of specialists would

be of preretirement and postretirement ages. Such a development could have crippledthe industry.

Income Levels and Sources

s In Votkinsk, 80 percent of all specialists have monthly wages in the range of US$25 to

US$50 per month; 50 percent of Miass specialists earn incomes that fall in that range.

The average monthly wage levels in Votkinsk and Miass amount to US$40 and US$50,

respectively. In Korolev, 40 percent of all specialists make between US$100 and US$150,

while 35 percent make between US$50 and US$100 per month. The average monthly

wage in Korolev is US$115.

s In Miass, wage delays average six months virtually across all specialists. In Votkinsk,

50 percent of specialists are owed back wages, and the delay in payment of wages is

under one month. Korolev experiences no wage delays.

s Average wages that, according to specialists themselves, would be commensurate with

their occupation and qualifications are as follows: in Votkinsk and Miass, US$170 and

US$225, respectively; in Korolev, US$420.These figures are about four times as high

as actual wages in these cities.

s In fact, the salaries that specialists consider presently commensurate with their occupation

and qualifications are unrelated to occupation and qualifications; rather, the desired

salary levels depend on the enterprises economic situation and actual wage levels.

s Average monthly income of the specialists families is low and strongly differentiated

across various cities. In Miass and Votkinsk, it equals about US$33, while it is about US$80

in Korolev. Average amounts of desired family income per capita are three to four times

higher: US$214 in Korolev, and US$123 and US$110 in Miass and Votkinsk, respectively.

Living Standards of Specialists

s Over 80 percent of specialists live in individual apartments.There is no difference in

housing standards between missile cities located in outlying regions (Miass and Votkinsk)

and those immediately outside Moscow (Korolev).

s In order to supplement their low salaries, specialists have to hold second jobs. Overall,

28 percent of specialists in the surveyed cities moonlight


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s Most specialists began moonlighting between 1990 and 1997.This development

was driven both by the progressively worsening economic positions of government

enterprises and by an expanding base of moonlighting jobs, that is, the sector of the

economy not related to government enterprises expanded in the missile cities.

s Forty percent of moonlighters in Miass have incomes from their second jobs comparable

to their regular wage; the rest claim lower moonlighting incomes. In Korolev, about

70 percent of all moonlighters have earnings from their second jobs that are either

comparable to their regular wage or twice as high. The most difficult situation prevails

in Votkinsk, where the overwhelming majority of moonlighters make only 30 percent

to 70 percent of the lowest wage among the cities surveyed.

s Missile city specialists have lost out in the reforms. A large majority (66 percent to

86 percent) find themselves worse off financially; this figure includes 48 percent in

Korolev, 72 percent in Miass, and 79 percent in Votkinsk of respondents who saw a

dramatic fall in living standards.

s None of the respondents consider their current financial situation to be very good.

Virtually no one refers to it as being good. Only between 8 percent and 21 percent

view it as normal, whereas the rest mostly consider it difficult or desperate.

Attitudes toward Migration

s The percentages of persons willing to work abroad varies from 12 percent at the strategic

missile plant in Votkinsk to 28 percent and 32 percent in Korolev and Miass, respectively.

s Between 1992 and 1999, the number of people who wanted to work abroad fell by a

factor of 2.5.Those willing to emigrate in 1999 have virtually the same age distribution

as in 1992, only their desire is presently 2.5 times less intense.

s Only one person in five who is willing to emigrate does something to realize that

desire. Only 5 percent of those wishing to work abroad (that is, 2 percent of persons

presently employed) take any concrete action by approaching foreign companies.

Generally speaking, most persons willing to emigrate merely dream about it.

s Therefore, emigrating independently from missile cities in order to work abroad is

presently next to impossible. People are not ready to take independent action.Their

emigration must be properly arranged.Thus, in principle, emigration from missile

cities may occur only through an arrangement established by someone other than the

person wanting to emigrate, not through individual efforts.

s Less than one-half of respondents said no in reply to the question whether they would

work in the military industry of another nation. One person in five would agree to do

that kind of work, while the rest are either undecided or gave a qualified response.

s Specialists do not consistently reject working in countries normally referred to as

aggressive regimes. Sixty percent of them failed to mention at least one such country

among those to which they would refuse to go.

s Only 16 percent of respondents have negative views of people who leave Russia and

therefore may not be regarded as potential emigrants. Almost 40 percent are indifferent,

having never given emigration much thought or viewing it as a personal matter, and anequal number approve of emigrants or even envy them.Therefore, emigration potential

is much higher than the answers regarding intentions to work abroad might suggest


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s Eighteen percent of respondents at the surveyed enterprises indicate that some of their

former coworkers have gone abroad since working at the enterprise.This figure is highest

in Miass, at 21 percent, and lowest in Votkinsk, at 8 percent.

s Emigration started in 1967, peaked in 1997, and began to decline thereafter. Over the

period in question, emigration averaged about 1 percent of all specialists employed by

the enterprises surveyed.

s Eighty percent of those who emigrate are men. Of these, 60 percent are ethnic

Russian, and the rest are mostly Jewish.

s Economic considerations are the main reason for emigration. One person in three left

for family reasons, while one in five had political motives.

s Specialists from missile cities have no history as yet of going to countries with aggressive

regimes. Forty-three percent of all emigrants went to North America, 15 percent to Israel,

one person in three to Western Europe, and the rest to Australia and New Zealand.

Four-fifths of all emigrants left for good; the rest went abroad to work temporarily.

Moves to Private Enterprises

s Emigration is not the worst problem to hit the enterprises human resources. Migration

of specialists to private business and to self-employment has been even more detrimental

to the pool of specialists available.The ratio of emigrants to those moving to private

businesses and self-employment is 1:6.

s Specialists leaving missile enterprises play an important role in the development of

new economic structures.Thus 48 percent to 53 percent of these specialists have their

own business, while the rest remain hired employees, though now in the private, asopposed to the public, sector.

s As a rule, migration to a business entity involves a change of profession. Only 6 percent

to 24 percent of persons taking business jobs have the same profession they had at the

public enterprise.The rest have had to change their trade. Professional change does not

deter specialists from joining business entities, however. Ninety percent of specialists

who have joined business entities are happy to have left the government enterprise.

Education of New Specialists

s Most young specialists who will become employed in missile cities in the next few years

were admitted to college and university at a time of low competition for admittance

two to three persons per vacancy or even less. A low competition rate translates into low

admittance standards for newly admitted students and consequently into a generally

poor quality of graduate.

s Over half of all students chose their occupation deliberately, in the belief that it is an

interesting field.The share of students selecting their occupation randomly has fallen.

Simultaneously, in another development, there is a rise in the share of students attach-

ing a higher importance to advanced education for its own sake, rather than for its

value in preparing one for a specific occupation.

s Deliberate occupational choices are closely related to the academic achievements ofwould-be specialists. Respondents with an excellent academic record include only

students who on admittance believed the chosen occupation to be promising


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s In principle, compared to private businesses, government enterprises have a better chance

of hiring mostly B and A students over average ones. It is important that government

enterprises not miss this chance while it exists.

s Research findings show that, according to respondents, major adverse developments

affecting the human resource profile include an aging work force (61 percent), and

an inadequate inflow of young workers to missile enterprises (48 percent).

s For the most part, the reasons for the aging of the work force are unrelated to the

natural generational change, which has seen older workers retire while fewer younger

workers replace them. It is primarily caused by an inadequate inflow of young workers.

The latter is due to an ongoing decline in the levels of employment at missile enterprises.

s Missile enterprise employment has fallen not only because of pre-planned retrenchments,

but also because promising specialists have left to join private enterprises.The share of

specialists in the most productive age bracket, thirty to forty years, among those moving

to business entities is almost four times higher than any other age group among allemployees. Specialists under thirty are half as likely as those between thirty and forty

to leave for jobs in private business.

s The few young workers hired by missile enterprises have poor engineering training.

On the other hand, there are no incentivesfor example, work involving creative self-

development, career prospects, or adequate wagesfor well-trained young specialists

to join.

s Among the adverse developments affecting the employee composition at missile

enterprises, 37 percent of respondents cite a slowdown in scientific research, while

62 percent mention a dearth of new ideas and overreliance on earlier research and

development projects.

Security Implications

s Forty-one percent of respondents believe that adverse developments in the makeup of

specialist personnel have already affected nuclear security, while 42 percent expect such

negative consequences in the near term or longer term. One in four is either undecided

or believes that current changes will not affect Russias nuclear security.

s Most respondents (81 percent) believe that the situation in missile cities, because it

affects the countrys defense, endangers Russia. Only 10 percent of respondents refer

to a global threat in terms of missile technology proliferation.


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MISSILE CITIES

10. MIGRATION AS A FACTOR IN THE EVOLUTION OF MISSILE CITIES

10.1. Migrant1 Specialists in Missile Cities: Changing Numbers

The evolution of the Russian missile industry has been anything but uniform. Its development

included a period of gestation and rapid growth from the late 1940s to the early 1970s.As

international tensions eased in the 1970s and arms control agreements influenced the rates

of missile production, growth in the missile industries slowed.The industry entered an

unprecedented period in the 1990s, however, with the collapse of the USSR and the related

economic depression, the effects of which persist to this day. In the 1990s, the industrys

employment fell drastically, owing to both insufficient government funding and retrenchments

and to the creation of new opportunities in private enterprises in which specialists could

earn much more than in government projects.

1. As in our analysis of migratory processes in closed cities, we divide all specialists into migrants and permanent

residents of missile cities. Migrants moving into missile cities are those specialists who graduated from colleges

and universities outside the missile city and made a deliberate, independent decision to work in missile cities.

Migrants include local residents who studied outside the missile cities and outsiders. Local residents include

those born in missile cities plus those born outside who moved to missile cities as children with their parents,

that is, never selected their present residence in a deliberate, independent manner. By outsiders, we mean thoseborn outside missile cities who moved in after graduation. Permanent residents of missile cities are local

residents who graduated from colleges and universities in the missile cities themselves. Such categorization

h d l h f d b h d d d l b


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This developmental history of the missile industry is manifest in its hiring profile (figure 10-1).

Thus migration of specialists into missile cities peaked in the 1980s and then started to

decline.As the number of migrants working in the missile cities began to decline, the number

of permanent resident specialists being hired there increased. Growth in resident hiringslowed noticeably in the 1990s, which witnessed a dramatic overall drop in the number of

specialists employed at the surveyed enterprises, reversing the trend of the 1980s.Thus, the

1990s represented a profound crisis in the civilian and military rocket industries alike.

10.2. Migrants vs. Permanent Residents of Missile Cities

The impact of migration on the profile of specialists hired is most obvious in the changing

ratio of permanent residents to migrants throughout the development of the missile cities

(table 10-1).

Table 10-1. Migrants vs. permanent residents of missile cities, time profile, %

Y E A R E M P L OY E D I N A L L

M I S S I L E C I T Y J O B S P E C I A L I S T G RO U P S S P E C I A L I S T S

Permanent

residents Migrants

1990-99 81 19 100

1980-89 47 53 100

1970-79 57 43 100

1960-69 30 70 100

Total sampling 49 51 100

0%

15%

30%

45%

Figure 10-1. Migrants vs. permanent residents taking jobs in missile cities, % of the survey sample

Before 1960 196069 1990-991970-79 1980-89

All specialists Permanent populationMigrants

Year employed


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Currently, there is virtual parity in the number of migrants and permanent resident specialists

employed by missile city enterprises, although one can see a trend toward a growing share

of permanent residents among new employees.

Figure 10-2 depicts this process in greater detail, illustrating the generally downward trend

in the number of migrants employed.

In addition to fluctuations in hiring patterns throughout the missile industry, research has

uncovered divergent hiring patterns in different cities (figures 10-3 and 10-4).

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

Year employed

Figure 10-3. Korolev: permanent residents vs. migrants, %

199599 198084 197579 197074 196569 196064199095 198589

Permanent populationLinear (permanentpopulation)

Linear (migrants) Migrants

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

Year employed

Figure 10-2. Migrants vs. permanent residents of missile cities, %

199599 198084 197579199095 198589 196569197074 196064




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In Korolev (fig. 10-3) and Votkinsk, there was a persistent upward trend in the percentage

of permanent residents hired over time. In Miass (pronounced me-Us), by contrast, the

overwhelming majority of specialists are migrants (fig. 10-4).

10.3. Structure of Migratory Inflows to Missile CitiesAccording to our definition, specialist migration into missile cities is composed of two groups:

local residents and outsiders (table 10-2).

Table 10-2. Specialists migration flow for surveyed cities, time profile,%

Y E A R E M P L OY E D I N M I S S I L E C I T Y J O B L O C A L R E S I D E N T S O U T S I D E R S

1990-99 29 71

1980-89 6 94

1970-79 6 94

1960-69 14 86Total sampling 8 92

In addition to the dramatically lower percentage of migrants taking jobs in missile cities

in the 1990s, changes are also affecting migration flow.Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s the

percentage of returning local residents working in the cities remained effectively stable at

5 percent, in the 1990s local residents accounted for almost one-third of total migration to

the missile cities.

Figure 10-5 details the shift in balance from outsider to local residents in migration to

the missile cities. Moreover, the figures show that the trend toward a higher share of local

residents is accelerating, the most significant changes taking place in the 1990s.

Year employed

Figure 10-4. Miass: Permanent residents vs. migrants, %



0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

199599 198084 197579 197074 196569 196064199095 198589


28/134


The lower share of outsiders in the migration flow may be due in part to the unavailability

of proper housing in the missile enterprises.At best, outsiders moving to the cities can expect

to find housing in hostel facilities, as wages at enterprises are simply too low to cover the cost

of renting a house.This inconvenience substantially dissuades many outsiders from accepting

employment in the missile enterprises.

Because local residents are divided into migrants and permanent residents dependingon where they were educated, it is useful to consider the changing mix of local residents

(fig. 10-6).

Year employed

Figure 10-5. Migration to missile cities: Local residents vs. outsiders, %

199599 198084 197579 197074 196569 196064199095 198589

Local residentsLinear (localresidents)

Linear (outsiders) Outsiders

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Year employed

Figure 10-6. Local residents: Permanent residents vs. migrants, %

199599 198084 197579 197074 196569 196064199095 198589

Permanent residentsLinear (permanentresidents)



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As the figure illustrates, a small number of local residents return to find employment in the

missile cities after receiving their education elsewhere. Moreover, this percentage is decreasing.

This suggests that local residents, forgoing an opportunity to study elsewhere, are increasingly

choosing to pursue their education in the missile cities.This decision may have something to do

with cost considerations, as the costs of an education outside missile cities can be prohibitive.Expenses, including travel, room and board, and tuition, are generally beyond the economic

means of most families in the missile cities.Therefore, fewer local residents leave missile cities

to obtain specialized education.

10.4. Local Residents Role in Providing Specialist Personnel to Missile Cities

We have already seen that local residents are playing an increasingly significant role in the

cities employment patterns.Table 10-3 shows the outcome of such a process, that is, the

makeup of newly hired personnel in terms of local residents versus outsiders.

Table 10-3. Specialists taking jobs in missile cities: Local residents vs. outsiders, %

Y E A R E M P L OY E D L O C A L R E S I D E N T S O U T S I D E R S

1990-99 87 13

1980-89 50 50

1970-79 60 40

1960-69 40 60

Total sampling 53 47

Thus, the 1990s witnessed a sea change in the makeup of specialist personnel in missile

cities.Today, almost 90 percent of newly hired specialists are local residents, contrastingwith the 1970s and the 1980s, when local residents accounted for only 50 percent to

60 percent of all new specialists hired.This trend is also manifest in individual cities

(figs. 10-7, 10-8, 10-9).

Year employed

Figure 10-7. Korolev: Newly hired personnel: Local residents vs. outsiders, %

199599 198084 197579 197074 196569 196064199095 198589



0%

25%

50%

75%

100%


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1 1 . SP EC IALISTS QUALIFICATIONS

11.1. Changes Affecting Highly Trained Personnel

In the 1990s, some adverse developments affected the best-qualified personnel, and

consequently interest in missile-related graduate degree programs has been declining.

Only one-fourth of those with postgraduate degrees obtained those degrees in the past

decade, mostly prior to 1995. In addition, the average age at which students acquire

advanced degrees has been increasing. Whereas prior to 1990, 45 percent of those with

advanced degrees obtained them before the age of thirty-nine, only 25 percent fell in

Year employed

Figure 10-8. Miass: Newly hired personnel: Local residents vs. outsiders, %

199599 198084 197579 197074 196569 196064199095 198589



0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

Year employed

Figure 10-9. Votkinsk: Newly hired personnel: Local residents vs. outsiders, %

199599 198084 197579 197074 196569 196064199095 198589



0%

25%

50%

75%

100%


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Interestingly, all of those in the survey who hold a postgraduate degree are outsiders (table

11-1).Table 11-1 illustrates that most of those with postgraduate degrees have moved to the

missile cities from Russia, but from a region other than that of the missile cities.Those born

in non-Russian former Soviet Republics come in second in the provision of graduate degree

holders, while the missile cities lag far behind. Of those holding advance degrees, only one

in seven was born locally.

Table 11-1.Birthplace of advanced degree holders, %

T O T A LB I R T H P L A C E P O S T G R A D U AT E D E G R E E S A M P L I N G

Yes No

Missile city 0 34 31

Missile citys region (Oblast) 15 32 31

Other Russian region 56 28 30

Ex-USSR Republics 29 6 7


In fact, the greatest percentage of advanced degree holders is found among those arriving

from outside Russia (30 percent).They are followed by persons born in Russian regions that

have no missile cities (table 11-2). The share of postgraduate degree holders among persons

born in ex-Soviet Republics is four times above the average and two times above the share of

persons born in Russian regions that have no missile cities.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Age

Figure 11-1. Age of specialists with advanced degrees at the time of thesis defense, %

Under 30 30-39 40-49 50-59

Before 199019901999


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Table 11-2. Percentage of advanced degree holders among persons born in various regions,%

T O T A LB I R T H P L A C E P O S T G R A D U AT E D E G R E E S A M P L I N G

Yes No

Missile city 0 100 100Missile citys region (Oblast) 4 96 100

Other Russian regions 14 86 100

Ex-USSR Republics 30 70 100


Ninety percent of all advanced degree holders in the missile cities surveyed work in

Korolev, the remainder in Miass.Table 11-2 indicates that individuals born in Moscow and

the Moscow Region contribute only a very small number of highly qualified personnel. In

the missile industry, most highly qualified employees are from Russias periphery, includingformer Soviet Republics.Therefore, the shift in employment pattern from outsiders to local

residents has adversely affected the quality of specialists in the cities because outsiders are

more likely to have postgraduate degrees.

11.2.The Changing Geography of Specialist Training

Table 11-3 shows that 59 percent of all specialists working in Miass and 81 percent of those

working in Korolev graduated from colleges and universities located either in the missile city

itself or in the region where such cities are located.The role of Moscow-area institutes in

educating missile industry specialists is significant only in Korolev, which is located in the

Moscow Region. Only 1 percent of those working in Votkinsk and 6 percent of thoseemployed in Miass graduated from colleges and universities in Moscow or the Moscow

Region. In Votkinsk and Miass, one-third of all specialists were educated in Russian regions

other than the Chelyabinsk Region, Moscow Region, and the Republic of Udmurtia.

Accounting for only 1 or 2 percent of the share of specialists in missile cities, educational

institutions in ex-USSR Republics play a very minor role in training missile industry specialists.

From this, one might conclude that the collapse of the Soviet Union has had little impact

on the system of specialist training for research and development, manufacturing enterprises,

and even for the missile industry.

Table 11-3. Location of colleges and universities attended by specialists, %

C O L L E G E / U N I V E R S I T Y T OTA LL O C AT I O N C I T Y S A M P L I N G

Korolev Miass Votkinsk

Missile city and its

local region 81 59 65 78

Moscow and

Moscow Region 81 6 1 67

Other Russian regions 18 33 33 20

Ex-USSR Republics 1 2 0 1

Total sampling 100 100 100 100


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Let us consider the changes experienced during the 1990s in the geographical pattern of

higher education, as compared with previous periods. Clearly, in the 1990s, as the populations

financial capabilities were dramatically reduced, an increasing number of students could pursue

their education only close to home because they could not afford the expense of going

elsewhere. In Korolev, where 85 percent of all currently employed specialists studied in theGreater Moscow Region, including Moscow City, the share of those educated in the Moscow

Region shows a steady upward trend.Thus, while 69 percent of all specialists were educated

in Moscow and the Moscow Region in the 1970s, the figure increases to 100 percent in the

1990s. Simultaneously, the share of specialists educated in other Russian regions dropped

from 27 percent to zero. Specialists educated outside Russia were hired only during the

1970s, and their share remains insignificant (table 11-4).

Table 11-4. Korolev:Location of college/university attended by specialists joining the enterprise

in various years,%

C O L L E G E / U N I V E R S I T Y T OTA L

L O C AT I O N Y E A R E M P L OY E D S A M P L I N G

1990-99 1980-89 1970-79 1960-69

Missile city 12 7 10 8 8

Missile city region 88 79 80 69 77

Moscow and

Moscow Region 100 86 90 77 85

Other Russian

regions 0 14 5 23 14

Ex-USSR Republics 0 0 5 0 1

Total sampling 100 100 100 100 100

In Votkinsk, 75 percent of all specialists presently employed were educated either in the

city itself or in the Republic of Udmurtia, where the city is located, while 20 percent were

educated in other Russian regions.The role of Moscow and the Moscow Region in personnel

training is relatively insignificant.The enterprise employs virtually no graduates of colleges

and universities located outside Russia proper. In Votkinsk, the personnel training profile has

remained rather stable over a long period, with an obvious trend toward an increasing reliance

on Udmurtia. This trend began in the 1970s and 1980s and gathered momentum to a point

where, in the 1990s, Udmurtia graduates accounted for 89 percent of new employees. Priorto 1970 they made up only 58 percent of new employees.


34/134


Table 11-5.Votkinsk:Location of college/university attended by specialists joining the enterprise

in various years,%

C O L L E G E / U N I V E R S I T Y T O T A LL O C AT I O N Y E A R E M P L OY E D S A M P L I N G

1990-99 1980-89 1970-79 1960-69



Moscow and


Other Russian

regions 11 21 18 42 22

Ex-USSR

Republics 0 4 0 0 1

Total sampling 100 100 100 100 100

In Miass, graduates of colleges and universities located in the city and the local Chelyabinsk

Region account for 66 percent of new employees. Six percent of all employees studied in

Moscow and the Moscow Region, whereas only 2 percent were educated outside Russia proper.

The trend toward a drastic decrease in the share of those educated in the countrys regions

(other than the Chelyabinsk Region) is most noticeable in Miass.While prior to 1970, 35 per-

cent of new hires were educated in Russias regions (except for the Chelyabinsk Region), the

figure dropped to a mere 13 percent during the 1990s.

Table 11-6. Miass: Location of college/university attended by specialists joining the enterprise in various years,%

C O L L E G E / U N I V E R S I T Y T O T A LL O C AT I O N Y E A R E M P L OY E D S A M P L I N G

1990-99 1980-89 1970-79 1960-69



Moscow and


Other Russian

regions 13 30 35 32 32Ex-USSR Republics 0 0 8 0 2

Total sampling 100 100 100 100 100

11.3.Trends in Migrants Education Profile

In Korolev, 69 percent of all migrants employed by the enterprise were educated in Moscow

and the Moscow Region.The percentage of those trained in the region where Korolev is

located displays a clear upward trend, whereas the other two cities show the opposite trend.

Whereas prior to 1970, two-thirds of all migrants were educated in Moscow and the

Moscow Region, this figure grew to 100 percent in the 1990s.


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Table 11-7. Korolev:Location of college/university attended by migrants joining the enterprise in various years,%

C O L L E G E / U N I V E R S I T Y T OTA LL O C AT I O N D E C A D E E M P L OY E D S A M P L I N G

1990-99 1980-89 1970-79 1960-69

Missile cityregion 100 73 75 67 69

Moscow and


Other Russian

regions 0 27 12 33 28

Ex-USSR

Republics 0 0 12 0 3

Total sampling 100 100 100 100 100

In Votkinsk, 45 percent of all migrants were educated in the Republic of Udmurtia. The

rest studied outside the Republic. Of these, Moscow/Moscow Region and the former Soviet

Republics each account for only 3 percent of qualified employees.Votkinsk shows a clear

trend toward a greater number of migrants being educated in Udmurtia.The share of migrants

educated in Udmurtia rose from 17 percent in the 1970s to 67 percent in the 1990s.

Table 11-8.Votkinsk:Location of college/university attended by migrants joining the enterprise in various years, %

C O L L E G E / U N I V E R S I T Y T OTA LL O C AT I O N D E C A D E E M P L OY E D S A M P L I N G

1990-99 1980-89 1970-79 1960-69


Moscow and


Other Russian regions 33 42 50 83 52

Ex-USSR Republics 0 8 0 0 3

Total sampling 100 100 100 100 100

In Miass, 62 percent of all migrants were educated in the Chelyabinsk Region, 7 percent

in the Moscow region, and 3 percent outside Russia.The shift of personnel training to theChelyabinsk Region was seen for the first time in the 1980s. Meanwhile, the falling share of

graduates from other Russian regions, including Moscow and the Moscow Region, is another

visible trend. Prior to 1970, 35 percent of all migrants were educated in Russias regions

outside Chelyabinsk. In the 1980s this figure dropped to 30 percent, falling further in the

1990s to a mere 14 percent.


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Table 11-9. Miass: Location of college/university attended by migrants joining the enterprise in various years,%

C O L L E G E / U N I V E R S I T Y TO TA LL O C AT I O N D E C A D E E M P L OY E D S A M P L I N G

1990-99 1980-89 1970-79 1960-69

Missile city

region 86 70 50 65 62

Moscow and


Other Russian

regions 14 30 41 35 35

Ex-USSR

Republics 0 0 9 0 3

Total sampling 100 100 100 100 100

The composition of newly hired personnel in the missile enterprises has shown a

continuous replacement of migrants with permanent residents of missile cities. These

experts generally hold diplomas from locally established institutions of higher education.

The missile industry, which in its prime used to employ personnel from the entire country,

relying on a broad network of educational institutions, now meets its modest demands for

specialist personnel mostly by hiring graduates of local colleges and universities who

reside in the missile city regions. Throughout the 1990s, employment at missile industry

enterprises has been visibly declining.

11.4. Demand for Specialists

The following section reviews the specialist mix in terms of length of service at the missile-

related enterprises (table 11-10).

Table 11-10. Specialists length of service at the enterprises, %

Y E A R L E N G T H O F TO TA LE M P L OY E D S E R V I C E , Y E A R S C I T Y S A M P L I N G

Korolev Miass Votkinsk

1990-99 Under 10 12 11 14 12

1980-89 10-19 37 26 33 36

1970-79 20-29 28 31 33 29

1960-69 30-39 23 33 19 24

Total sampling 100 100 100 100

If the total number of personnel at an enterprise remains stable, each subsequent length-

of-service group should be smaller than the previous one.At the enterprises we surveyed,

this holds true only for employee groups with ten or more years of service. Specialists with

length of service under ten years (that is, hired in the 1990s) number three times fewer than

specialists joining the enterprises in the 1980s.This reflects the fact that the enterprises had

fewer employees in the 1990s than in the 1980s.


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Overall, the enterprises have an annual personnel attrition rate of 20 percent during an

employees first decade on the job.Therefore, the probability of an employee staying with

the company after a year on the job equals 80 percent.With a 20 percent annual attrition

rate, in ten years only eleven employees of the original one hundred employed would

remain on the job.During the 1990s the annual rate of attrition at the enterprises we surveyed was estimated

at about 12 percent. In order to prevent a decline in the overall number of employees, enter-

prises have had to hire new employees at a rate of 12 percent a year. Given that only 80 per-

cent of those originally employed will stay on the job with every passing year and presuming

the enterprises employment has remained stable throughout the 1990s, a 12 percent annual

recruiting rate would bring about the projected length-of-service mix shown in figure 11-2.

In fact, the actual length-of-service mix, which includes employees hired in the 1990s,

differs greatly from the projected length-of-service mix that would have occurred if employ-

ment rates had stayed stable throughout the 1990s.The fact that the actual employee length

of service is well below our projections clearly demonstrates a rapid decline in the number

of specialists working at the enterprises.

A drastic fall in the demand for specialists at these enterprises has tilted the hiring profile

of the 1990s in favor of local residents, reflecting a consequently dramatically reduced rate of

migration to the missile cities.

11.5.Age Mix

Figure 11-3 presents data on the age mix of those surveyed in individual cities.There is a

clear similarity in the age mix in Korolev and Miass and in both cities the age profiles are

bell-shaped.The modal age interval is forty to forty-nine years.About 40 percent of all

specialists fall in this age group, while a considerable number are either younger or older

than this group.

Year employed

Figure 11-2. Actual vs. hypothetical length-of-service profiles, %

1998 1995 1994 1993 1992 19911997 1996

Actual Hypothetical

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

1990


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In Votkinsk, the specialists age profile is parabolic.The modal interval here is the same,

forty to forty-nine years; it accounts for almost as many specialists as in Miass.There are no

specialists in Votkinsk over sixty, whereas in Miass and Korolev about 15 percent of specialists

fall in that age range. On the other hand, Miass and Korolev have twice as many specialists

under thirty as Votkinsk, and half as many specialists as Votkinsk who fall in the thirty to thirty-

nine age group.

The 1992 and 1999 age profiles of Energia Corporation employees (fig. 11-4) providesome indication of the changes in age profiles in missile enterprises during the 1990s. In

the early 1990s, the average age was much higher than it is today. In 1992, 40 percent of all

specialists belonged to the fifty to fifty-nine age group.Today, this age bracket accounts for

only 20 percent of all specialists. In the absence of active recruitment policies during that

period, 1999 would have had the age profile shown in figure 11-5. If that had occurred,

70 percent of all specialists would have been fifty and older.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

Figure 11-3. Age of specialists presently employed in various cities, %

Under 30 5059 60 and over3039 4049

MiassKorolev Votkinsk

Age groups

Figure 11-4. Korolev: Age profiles of specialists in 1992 vs. 1999, %

Under 30 5059 60 and over3039 4049

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

Age groups


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tikhonov, valentín russia´s nuclear and m

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