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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSEHEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO

U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBAAPO AE 09360

JTF-GTMO-CDR 2r Apil2007

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southem Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,Miami . FL33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) forGuantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000185DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S/NF) Personal Information:

o JDIMSA{DRC Reference Name: Turki Mish'awiZa'id ALi-Amri

o Aliases and Current/True Name: Turki Mash AwiZayid al-Asiri. Mutasim al-Mecci

o Place of Birth: Tabuk. Saudi Arabia (SA)o Date of Birth: 8 March 1975o Citizenship: Saudi Arabiao Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-000185DP

2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health.

3. (S/NF) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

^. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously assessed detainee as Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) on 20 March 2006.

b. (S/NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida whotraveled to Afghanistan (AF) to participate in jihad. Detainee stayed at al-Qaida facilities,received training at an al-Qaida camp, and served under al-Qaida leadership in Tora Bora,AF. Detainee's pocket litter links him to significant Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) personneland groups. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCESREASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)DECLASSIFY ON: 20320421

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JTF-GTMO-CDRSUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) forGuantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000185DP (S)

o A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.o A HIGH threat from a detention perspective.o Of MEDIUM intelligence value.

c. (U) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessmentsince the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by) next to the footnote.)

o (S/A{F) Detainee's intelligence value was elevated from LOW to MEDIUM. Afterfurther evaluation of available information on detainee, it is assessed detainee has moreinformation which has not been exploited about his activities, al-Qaida, and extremisttraining. Many of the telephone numbers in his pocket litter have been associated withmultiple ACM personnel, indicating he may have played a greater role in militantactivities than previously assessed.o (S/A{F) Noted that pocket litter had been translated. Previous assessment noted thatRFIs had been submitted for translation.

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account.These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S/NF) Prior History: Sometime between 1996 and 1998, detainee began religiousstudies at the Imam Muhammad Bin Sa'ud Islamic University in Riyadh, SA.' Between1998 and 2000, detainee left the university and worked as a book distributor for a bookstorein Riyadh until the spring of 2001.2

b. (S/NF) Recruitment and Travel: ln May 2001, detainee traveled through the UnitedArab Emirates (AE) and Karachi, Pakistan (PK) to Quetta, PK, in answer to afatwa(religious ruling) issued by Shaykh Hamu^d Bin Uqla al-Shuaibi calling on every Muslim toperform missionary work in Afghanistan.' While in Karachi, detainee met three Arab

t 000t8s KB 0I-FEB-2002, 000185 INITIAL SCREENNG 01-JAN-2002, Analyst Note: The initial screening sheetis mistakenly dated I January 2001. As detainee was transferred to JTF-GTMO in February 2002, the actualscreening date was probably 1 January 2002. Detainee stated he left school three years prior to the interview, thusthe approximate years for school attendance are based off of a 2002 date for the screening. Imam Muhammad BinSa'ud Islamic University has been linked to exffemist activities and personnel. See TD-314139920-03, TRRS 04 11

^0370, Nouakchott Embassy - 00599 - 03-AUG-2003" OOOI 85 INITIAL SCREENING O I -JAN-2002t ro4utoozg6-02, 000185 sIR 08-MAR-2002,000185 MFR 15-AUG-2002, Analyst Note: A variant of ShaykhHamud Bin Uqla al-Shuaibi is Sheikh Hamud Alaugua. Shaykh Hamud Bin Uqla al-Shuaibi is deceased. Al-

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members of Jama'at Tablighi (JT),4 Sufyan al-Hadrami, Abu Layth, and Abu Hija aka(Faysal al-Dosari), who detainee later met again at the al-Qaida sponsored al-Faruq TrainingCamp. Detainee traveled throughout Pakistan teaching the Koran to children and a fewadults at Hyderabad, Safar, and Baqar, PK. In late July 200I, detainee traveled to Kandahar,AF, to attend jihadist training at al-Faruq.'

c. (S/NF) -Training and Activities: In Kandahar, detainee stayed in an unidentifiedguesthouse.' While in the guesthouse, detainee turned over his passport, money, andpersonal belongings and was assigned the number uI69," with instructions to use the numberwhen he wanted his property returned.' Around the beginning of August 2001, near the endof his stay at the guesthouse, detainee traveled to al-Faruq with the three JT members he hadpreviously met in Pakistan. At al-Faruq, detainee received physical fitness training, as wellas training on the AK-47 assault rifle and Makarov pistol. As a result of asthma problems,detainee departed training in approximately early September 2001, and traveled to Jalalabad,AF, for treatment. Detainee remained at the hospital in Jalalabad for three weeks (duringwhich the events of 11 September 2001 occurred) before being released in early October200i. Upon release from the hospital, detainee traveled to a safe house in Jalalabad where hestayed for approximately one and a half months.8 Around mid-November 2001,e detaineeretreated to the surrounding mountains. Coincidentally, detainee met up once again with thethree JT members who were hiding in the mountains with Johan Almeni.lo

5. (U) Capture Information:

Shuaibi issuedfatawa which justified the l l September 2001 attacks on the US and asked Muslims to defend theirTaliban brethren.

a Analyst Note: JT is a Priority 2A Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 2A TSEs have demonstrated intent andwillingness to provide frnancial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, orprovide witting operational support to Priority 2,A, terrorist groups.

5 oootg5 302 29-APR-2003; IIR 6 034 0976 03, paragraph 2.b; IIR 6 034 1 143 }3;Analyst note: A variant ofSufyanis Sohan. A variant of Lavth is Lvth. Variants of Favsal are Faisel and Faisal. A variant of Dosari is Dosarv.

u IIR 6 034 og7 6o:. paragiaph 2.b'' I IR603+ o t42028 IIR 6 034 0976 03, paragraph 2.b; IIR 6 034 ll43 03;TD-314100296-02' Analyst Note: Jalalabad fell to coalition forces on 14 November 2001.to tn-3 t +/39 7 18-02, Analyst Note: Johan Almeni is assessed to be Abu Ayoub al-Emarati aka (Abu Juhaina), an al-

Faruq trainer and commander of Arab and Afghan troops in the Tora Bora mountain region in late 2001. AbuJuheina and detainee's three JT associates were all probably killed at Tora Bora. Abu Haija'a Faisal al-Dousari inthis TD is assessed to be detainee's companion Abu Hija aka (Faysal al-Dosari). Detainee's companion Abu Laythis possibly Abu al-Laith al-Najdi Adel al-Qaseer, whose name follows Dousari on the list. Sufyan al-Hadrami ispossibly Abu Sufyan al-Jazraw| whose name follows al-Qaseer on the list. Abu Juhaina may be Juhaina Saba'e al-Levl. whose name is two below al-Jazrawi on the list.

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^. (S/A{F) Detainee fled Afghanistan with a group of al-Qaida and Taliban fighters led byUBl-appointed military commander in Tora Bora, AF, Ali Muhammad Abdul Aziz al-Faldtiaka (Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi), ISN US9LY-000212DP (LY-212). The group crossed theAfghanistan-Pakistan border in the Nangarhar region on approximately 14 December 2001.The group felt safe in the hands of their Pakistani host, who convinced them to surrendertheir weapons. The host then gathered the group in a mosque where Pakistani forcesimmediately arrested them. During transit to prison, one of the prisoners attacked a guard,leading to a struggle in which six Pakistani guards were killed and some prisoners escaped.llPakistani authorities.recaptured detainee transferred him from Kohat, PK, to US custody on31 December 2001.''

b. (S) Property Held:

o 500 Saudi Arabian riyals (SAR)o Miscellaneous items, including an address book with phone numbers (translated),notebook paper with Arabic writing (translated), and a piece of paper with Arabic writing(translated)

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 17 January 2002

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on thefollowing:

o Pakistani and Afghan travel routeso Malek Haled al-Askari (King Haled) military districto Imam Muhammad Bin Sa'ud Islamic Universitv in Rivadh

6. (S/NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee's timeline is assessed to be a partialcover story. He failed to provide information on his activities between May and July 2001.Detainee admitted training at al-Faruq, but he denied completion of training due to allegedasthma. Detainee also failed to provide information on his activities immediately following the11 September 2001 attacks. Detainee has withheld information conceming significant extremistlinks, which are indicated by his pocket litter. It is assessed detainee, in an effort to protecthimself and others, only divulged the nanies and actions of his three associates killed at ToraBora (Sufyan al-Hadrami, Abu Layth, and Abu Hrja). Yasin Muhammad Salih MazeebBasardah, ISN US9YM-000252DP (YM-252), stated detainee had extensive medical training,

" IIR 7 739 3396 02, Analyst Note: Detainee is on list as Turki al-Asiri; Withdrawal from Tora Bora Analysis;.^ Analyst Note: In TD-314114605-04,LY-212 described Tora Bora and the egress route." TD-3 14100845 -02 paragraph 3.D.(6)

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and believed detainee might in fact be a doctor; however, detainee told YM-252 he did not wantanyone to know of detainee's education or skills, and detainee has never himself mentionedreceiving any medical training.l3

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threatto the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida who admitted to attending an al-Qaida supported training camp and transited throughknown al-Qaida guesthouses before occupying al-Qaida positions in Tora Bora. Detaineeadmitted to associations with the JT and his pocket litter contained several telephonenumbers linked to ACM-related individuals and groups.

o (S/AIF) Reporting identified detainee as a member of al-Qaida (NFI).ta Detaineereceived training at the al-Qaida sponsored al-Faruq Training Camp and stayed at al-Qaida affi liated guesthouses.

o (S/AIF) In late July 2001, detainee probably resided with al-Hadrami, Abu Layth,and Abu Hija at the Hajji Habash aka (al-Ansar) guesthouse.'t In August 2001, afterapproximately one week at the guesthouse, detainee, al-Hadrami, Abu Layth, AbuHija and approximately 30 additional men (20 Arabs and 10 others) traveled by bus tothe al-Faruq Training Camp.16

. (S/AIF) Detainee received small arms and physical training at al-Fa1gQ.17Detainee stated Abu Juheina al-Yemeni was the lead trainer at al-Faruq.'o. (S/A{F) Detainee stated he left training early and traveled to Jalalabadseeking medical attention for his alleged recurring asthma attacks.le (AnalystNote: Leaving training early for medical reasons is a common cover story amongmany detainees. Detainee's medical history indicates no known asthmaconditions. This is a strong indication the story is false. Detainee's actualtimeline from al-Faruq through Jalalabad to Tora Bora parallels Abu Juheina's

" 000252 FM40 05-JAN-2005 (Part two of two)' o. tD 3 t q I 27 689 -02, paragraph EE"IIR6 0340976 03,paragraph2.b;001457 SIR20-OCT-2004;AnalystNote: In000185 SIR08-MAR-2002,detainee stated the guesthouse was across the street from the Arabic Language Institute of Kandahar, confirming this

. - is the Hajji Habash guesthouse.'o IIR 6 034 0976 03, paragraph 2.b" IIR 6 034 0976 03, paragraph 2.b;TD-314-00296-02,000185 SIR 08-MAR-2002tt 000185 INITIAL ScREENING 01-JAN-2002, IIR 6 034 or42 02,IIR 6 034 1r43 03tt 00185 302 29-ApR-2003. 000185 sIR 08-MAR-2002

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movements as al-Qaida members abandoned al-Faruq and attempted to fleeAfghanistan after the 11 September 2001attacks on the US.)

o (S/A{F) Detainee admitted handing over his money and belongings while stayingat the guesthouse in Kandahar, stating he was given the number "169" to cite if hewanted to have his property returned.2o Detainee said the guesthouse was locatedacross the street from the Arabic Language Institute.2l The institute was operated bysenior al-Qaida member and religious advisor to llBL, Mahfouz Ould al-Walid aka(Abu Hafs al-Mauritani;.22 lenalyst Note: It is assessed the guesthouse wheredetainee stayed was the Hajji Habash Guesthouse, acknowledged by other detaineesas being located across the street from the Arabic Language Institute aka the (IslamicInstitute). This guesthouse was used as a stopping and preparation point for traineescoming or going to the al-Faruq and Abu Obeida aka (Tarnak Farm) training camps.)

. (S/Alrf; A variant of detainee's name was found on documents recoveredduring joint raids conducted with the Pakistani Inter-Services IntelligenceDirectorate (ISID) against al-Qaida associated safe houses in Karachi, PK, inSeptember 2}02,and in Rawalpindi, PK, in March 2003.23 The raids yieldedinformation about detainee's safety deposit box, which contained a passport and abank card. Detainee's box number was 357-6169, which contains the numberuI69" that detainee was given as the number to cite if he wanted to retrieve hisbelongings. (Analyst Note: Such lists are indicative of an individual's residencewithin al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purposeof training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Safetydeposit boxes, also referred to as safety boxes or trust accounts, were simplestorage compartments such as envelopes or folders guesthouse administratorsused to secure an individual's personal valuables, such as passports and planetickets. These items were entrusted to the guesthouse until completion of trainingor other activity.)

o (S/A{F) It is assessed detainee participated in hostilities in Tora Bora.o (S/AfD Detainee claimed after leaving Jalalabad, he hid with al-Hadrami, AbuLayth, Abu Hija, and Abu Juheina al-Yemeni, in a group of approximately 100Arabs and Afghans in the Tora Bora mountains. Detainee stated he spent three dayshiding before setting off for the Pakistani border.2a (Analyst Note: Detainee isassessed to have served under Abu Juheina al-Yemeni in Tora Bora. Juheina

'o IIR 6 034 or4z 02" ooor85 MFR 15-AUG-2002" > ooo757 DIR 17-ruL-2002" to-3t41+8336-03, paragraph JJ; Analyst Note:NFL TD-314142895-02, paragraph number 45.

Phone numbers associated with detainee in this document retumedTD -3 | 4 I 40 69 3 -02, par agr aph number 48. TD -3 | 4 I 47 68 3 -03,

paragraph number 452o IIR 6 034 0976 03, paragraph 2.b; Analyst Note: A variant of Abu Juheina al-Yemeni is Johain Almeni.

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reportedly commanded Juheina Mountain, identified as one of a series of sevenmountains or bunker areas Arab and Pakistanis defended in the Tora Bora mountainregion during November and December 2001.2s)o (S/AIF) Yaser Esam Himdy, ISN US9SA-000009DP (SA-009, transferred),reported detainee stated, "I was fighting against the US government and the NorthernAlliance. I do jihad against the unbelievers." SA-009 added detainee is openlyhostile.26o (S//NIF) Det?inee acknowledged answering afatwa from a radical Islamic shaykhin Saudi Arabia."' (Analyst Note: Detainee's hostile statements about the US,coupled with his acknowledged acceptance of the fatwa, point to the likelihood thatdetainee would continue to violently oppose the US if he were no longer in UScustody.)

o (S/A{F) Detainee was captured with a gro}p of individuals, including senior al-QaidacommanderLY-2I2, while fleeing Tora Bora.'o

o (S/A{F) Detainee's name is recorded on a document listing 84 captured Talibanand al-Qaida fighters, whom Pakistani forces captured after the fighters crossed theborder from Nangarhar Province, AF, into Pakistan on 14 Decemb er 200I.t"(Analyst Note: This is assessed to be the group led out of Tora Bora by LY-2l2,whowas captured with the group. This group was involved in the "bus incident," in whichone of the prisoners attacked a guard while the group was being transported in trucks,leading to a struggle in which six Pakistani guards were killed and some prisonersescaped.30 While several senior al-Qaida members claim LY-2I2 was not a memberof al-Qaida,LY-212 himself stated UBL personally appointed him as the militarycommander of Tora Bora.3l LY-212 had also previously served as a seniormujahideen trainer and the former manager of the Khaldan Training Cu-p.")

o (S/A{F) A phone book in detainee's pocket litter contained at least six telephonenumbers associated with extremist-related entities." (Analyst Note: Furtherinvestigation is required to fully identify the extent of detainee's association with thegroups or individuals associated with these numbers.)

25 iIR 2 340 6110 02, IIR 6 034 0066 02'u IIR 7 71 1 oo31 042t TD-3 14100296-02" IIR 7 739 3396 02 (Twki al-Asiri alias al-Moatasim al-Mecci), TD-314/00296-02, Withdrawal from Tora BoraAnalysis'n IIR 7 739 3268 02,pangraph2-44;TD-314109853-02,paragraph 29; IIR 7 739 3396 02 (Turki al-Asiri alias al-Moatasim al-Mecci)'o IIR 7 73g 3396 02, Analyst Note: Detainee is on list as Turki al-Asiri; Withdrawal from Tora Bora Analysis;

^.AnalystNote: InTD-314114605-04,LY-2l2describedToraBoraandtheegressroute."' TD-314114605-04" tD3rur5z6o9-05" >IIR 6 034 0043 07, 000185 MFR r5-AUG-2002

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o (S/A{F) Two phone numbers in detainee's phone book, 008821688824952 and008873762750835, belong to the Khan Agha Communications Company located inthe Paktika Province just south of Kabul, AF.34 (Analyst Note: Detainee reported hespent time in Khowst, AF, which is the capital of Paktika Province. It is possibledetainee associated with the Khan Agha tribe, known al-Qaida and Talibansympathizers, before attending training at al-Faruq, offering an explanation for the 3-month gap in detainee's timeline.)

. (S/AIF) Thuraya phone number 008821688824952 was discovered on aseized Taliban-associated Thuraya phone and in an ACM associated phonebook.3s The number was used by Pacha Khan Zadran,who is a Khan Agha tribeleader and Afghan People's Deputy. At time of detainee's capture, Zuty was asenior ACM leader linked to numerous attacks against Coalition forces.'o' (S/Nf; Satellite phone number 00873762750835 is listed with the nameSamir in detainee's phone book. It was also found in the possession of severalsuspected al-Qaida operatives OIFI).37 The number is linked to Amanullah KhanZadran, the former Afghan Interim Administration's Minister of Tribal andBorder Affairs and the brother of Pacha Khan Zadran.38 The number was alsofound in a document listing names and numbers of possible al-Qaida and Talibansympathizers or members in Afghanistan, Pakistan, South Korea, Singapore, andUnited Arab Emirates." The number was also associated with narcoticssmuggling activity between Pakistan and Afghanistan.a0

o (S/ {F) Thuraya number 008821688827607 was also discovered on a seizedTaliban-associated satellite phone and linked to Taliban member Matin Ustad, whoran a large narcotics lab south of Jalalabad.al lAnalyst Note: If detainee has anassociation with Matin Ustad, he might be able to provide information on narcoticstrafficking, which was the Taliban's and al-Qaida's primary means for raising moneyin Afghanistan.)o (S/AIF) Phone number 00873763021124 was also found in a phone bookassociated with currently active senior Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)a2 commander

'o >IIR 60447067 03tt >IIR 6 044 i ro5 03, IIR 2 340 617 6 02'u > TD-3 1 4/ 21 233 -02, TD -3 t4 I 32838-02'' >TD-314/27434-02,IIR 2 340 7502 02,IIR 2 340 6514 02" >11zenReN) IACHA KHAN (BIo)- oIENSRC 04-01-2003'n >IIR r 739 3226 02oo >tn-3t+/64556-03ot >IIR 2 340 6176 0z,TD-3r4n54r4-04a2 )Analyst Note: HIG is a Priority lB target. Priority lB targets are defined as terrorist groups, especially those withstate support, countries that sponsor tenorisrn, countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that havedemonstrated both intention and capability to attack US persons or interests.

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JTF.GTMO-CDRSUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) forGuantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000185DP (S)

Haji Gholam Mohammad Hotak. The number is also associated with Ahmad WaliKarzai, the brother of the current Afghan President Hamid Karzai.a3o (S//l{F) The phone number 6605472 was also seized from Yemeni mujahideenwho entered Croatia from Bosnia in January 1996, and is associated with known al-Qaida operative Yasin Ubayd Salim al-Sharif, who is assessed to be Salim al-Sharifaka (Yasin lJbayd al-Mari) who is currently in Saudi Arabian custody.aa Al-Sharifplayed a major role in smuggling SA-7 man-portable air-defense systems(MANPADS) into Saudi Arabia in support of UBL's plans to attack Saudi-based USmilitary aircraft.as (Analyst Note: The fulI number may be 0096626605472.Possible links to al-Sharif indicate detainee's possible extremist activities prior totraveling to Afghanistan.)o (S//l\fF) The London, United Kingdom (UK), phone number 00442075572623was discovered in numerous seized phone books and phones associated withextremist-linked individuals. The number is associated with the British BroadcastingCorporation (BBC).46 (Analyst Note: Numerous extremist links to this BBC numberindicates a possible propaganda media network connection. Network analysis mightprovide leads to individuals with either slmrpathetic ties to extremists or possiblypossessing information on ACM operations.)

c. (U//FOUO) Detaineeos Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a HIGH threat from adetention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been non-compliant and hostile to theguard force and staff. Detainee currently has 88 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed inDIMS, with the most recent occurring on24 December 2006, when he was reportedparticipating in a mass disturbance by kicking his bean hole. Detainee has 17 Reports ofDisciplinary Infractions for assault, with the last reported incident taking place on 1 August2005, when he was reported pushing a guard and attempting to move him out of the way inorder to shake hands with another detainee. Other incidents for which detainee has beendisciplined include inciting and participating in a mass disturbance, threatening harm towardthe guard force, possession of non-weapon type contraband, use of provoking words andgestures, damage to govemment property, medication misuse or misappropriation, failure tofollow instructions and camp rules, unauthorized communications, offenses requiring use ofthe FCE team, and tampering with the lock of his cell. Detainee has two incidents ofmedication misuse. On 6 March2006, detainee was reported to be in possession of 16 pillsof various sizes and colors. Detainee had nine Reports of Disciplinary Infraction in 2006,and none so far in2007.

o' >IIR 2300 5r3i 04, IIR 7 90r 9988 05, IIR 6 044 7008 03* >tD-314/t4469-02ot >000t32 RESEARCH suM 11-JflN-2002, DITSITM 093-02 25-ApR-2002 ,3-00-28922-02 (Tear Line)ou >tD-3 14173389-05, IIR 2 300 5 I 15 06, IIR 2 300 5588 05

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8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee'smost recent interrogation session occurred on26 February 2007.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee was urro.ru,rd with al-Qaida between Mayand December 2001. In August2}}I, detainee stayed at the Hajji Habash Guesthouse beforeattending al-Faruq. In October 200I, detainee probably stayed at an unidentified guesthousein Jalalabad. In late November through mid December 2001, detainee was at Tora Bora andwas captured with the group led by LY-212.

c. (S/NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee's time at al-Qaida guesthouses and trainingfacilities afforded him the opportunity to leam about facility leaders, residents, trainees,operations, and visitors. His residence at the guesthouses afforded him the chance to leamabout cross border operations to include egress routes, safe houses, and identities ofsupportpersonnel. Detainee's time in Tora Bora presented opportunity to learn tactical procedures,the identities of Taliban and al-Qaida personnel, local support mechanisms, and egressprocedures into Pakistan. Available information indicates detainee did not have direct accessto senior members of al-Qaida or Taliban, typical of the average mujahid; however, furtherexploitation or explanation of detainee's associated phone numbers in his pocket litter andgaps and inconsistencies in his account may provide a more accurate assessment of his rolein al-Qaida and intelligence value.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

o Hajji Habash Guesthouseo Al-Faruq trainers, trainees, visitors, and operational procedureso Paktika Province-related individuals and activities. JT support to al-Qaida operationso Tora Bora personnel, defensive and egress procedureso Recruitment from mosques in Saudi Arabia

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9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 18 October 2004 andhe remains an enemy combatant.

JR.Navy

' Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence CollegeOctober 2001 guide Intelligence Warning Terminolog,t.

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Rear Admiral

turki mish’awi za’id alj-amri

Documents

assessed detainee

jtfgtmo recommendation

snf jtfgtmo assessment

s recommendation

s e c r e t noforn

o citizenship

o jdimsa

isn us9sa