turkishandiranianforeign!policies! towardsthe2003wariniraq ...! 1!...

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4th ECPR Graduate Student Conference Jacobs University, Bremen 04 July 2012 - 06 July 2012

Turkish and Iranian foreign policies towards the 2003 war in Iraq: the impact

of religion

Dr. Alberto Gasparetto

Phd candidate – University of Turin, Italy

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This paper will be about the impact of religion in Turkish and Iranian foreign

policies towards the 2003 war in Iraq. It is part of my broader and forthcoming Phd

work on Turkish and Iranian foreign policies towards Iraq and Israel from 1997 to the

present day.

As far as Turkey is concerned, the focus will be mainly on two important decisions

taken by the TGNA (Turkish Grand National Assembly) on March 2003 related to the

United States’ request to gain support from Turkey for the invasion of the Iraqi soil

aimed at the toppling of the Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein. An analysis of Turkey’s

approach to the post-‐war Iraq, i.e. the problem of institutional reconstruction and its

relations with minority groups, will be also taken into account. Instead, the chapter

regarding Iran will not focus on any specific decision taken by the Iranian Parliament

(Majlis), but it will rather investigate the Khatami government’s stance towards both the

imminent war and the post-‐Saddam context in Iraq. To assess the impact of religion in

Iranian foreign policy towards Iraq, the following issues will be addressed: a) the

Khatami government’s attitude towards the 2003 war in Iraq; b) the future of Iraq and

its unfolding political situation; c) the Khatami government’s relations with the ethnic-‐

religious groups of the neighboring country.

Framework of analysis

In spite of the weighty influence of Islamist elites intervening in the foreign

policymaking of both Turkey and Iran, I will not assume that religion has a decisive (that

is crucial) nature in shaping Turkey and Iran’s foreign policies – at least as far as the two

cases here analyzed. According to the most prominent studies about the role of religion

in international relations, religion has assumed an increasingly influent role in the

recent decades. Jonathan Fox clearly states: «there are few, if any, important political

events that are purely motivated by religion. Most are motivated by complex factors»

[Fox 2001: 53-‐54]». Likewise, other scholars who stress on the importance of the return

of religion claim that focusing on religion does not entail that religion is the only factor

either in explaining international politics or the only relevant one in international

relations [see for instance: Hatzopoulos and Petito, 2003; Fox and Sandler 2004; Scott

Thomas 2005].

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Jonathan Fox’s perspective is really interesting as well as helpful for the below

presented study. He states that religion can influence foreign policy in three ways: «first,

foreign policies are influenced by the religious views and beliefs of policymakers and

their constituents. Second, religion is a source of legitimacy for both supporting and

criticizing government behavior locally and internationally. Third, many local religious

issues and phenomena, including religious conflicts, spread across borders or otherwise

become international issues»1. I draw on Fox’s insights about the relations between

religion and foreign policy and then build a cognitive model following the one developed

by the prominent British scholar Michael Brecher2. He considers a group of ten variables

belonging to what he calls the operational environment. Five of them belong to the

domestic sphere; the rest to the external one (either regional or international). I do not

apply Brecher’s model in its entirety because a lot of shifts occurred on the international

sphere from the time he wrote to the present day, first of all the fact that the

international system is no longer divided into two opposing camps. Moreover, I am

much more interested in evaluating which perspectives affect the foreign policy makers’

decisions and, among those, I am interested in the role of religion. The present analysis

will focus on what Brecher calls the «psycological environment» that is formed of both

the «images» and the «attitudinal prism» [Brecher and others 1969, 86].

The variables on which I will focus are the following. As regards the external

environment: 1) the global system (G); 2) the subordinate system (S); 3) the relevant

bilateral relations (BR), as well as the constituencies of the country that undergoes the

decision, according to Fox’s emphasis on the three ways religion can influence foreign

policy. As regards the domestic environment, they are: 4) the political structure (PS),

within which I will consider also the role of the competing elites (CE); 5) the interest

groups (IG), among which a great importance is given to public opinion and to the

constituencies of the country in question, according, even in this case, to Fox’s

suggestions about relations between religion and foreign policy. Unlike Brecher, who

tends to consider both the military (M) and the economic capabilities (E) as belonging to

the internal environment, I prefer to consider them as straddling both the domestic and

1 Jonathan Fox, Religion as an overlooked element of international relations, International studies review, 2001, p. 59. 2 I just suggest one of his several work on foreign policy analysis that is: Brecher Michael, Steinberg Blema, Stein Janice, A framework for research on foreign policy behvior, The journal of conflict resolution, vol. 13, n. 1 (March 1969), pp. 75-‐101

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the international arena because of the several connections between those two spheres;

however I will not put them to the test in the present paper for reasons of simplification.

Beyond Fox’s very useful insights, it can be argued that generally religion may be

either a foreign policy goal or a foreign policy tool. However, in the former case, religion

is seen as the very aim of the decision; that is why in that sense it does not seem to work,

since social and human phenomena are never motivated by only one factor, as the

above-‐reported quotation by Fox shows. In the latter case, religion is seen as an

instrument to pursue other goals. This dimension is more useful for my purposes, since I

can assess to what extent it influences the foreign policy decision-‐making. In particular,

drawing by Walter Coralluzzo’s work about the Italian post-‐War foreign policy [2000], I

will consider three degree of influence: a) not relevant, that is when it is not useful and it

it does not intervene in the foreign policy making; b) relevant, that is when it is merely a

facilitator – however powerful – to pursue foreign policy goals, even if not necessary; c)

decisive or crucial, that is when its presence in the formation of the foreign policy

decision it is necessary, i.e. that without a specific foreign policy goal could not

otherwise be reached.

At this point it is compulsory to convey two further conceptual definitions. As far

as the elites are concerned, I will take into account a restrictive definition of foreign

policy, as suggested by scholars such as Walter Carlsnaes and Jonathan Wilkenfield3. So,

I will mainly focus on statements, declarations and actions by chiefs of government,

Presidents of the two Republics and Foreign Ministers. To be more precise, as far as the

case of Iran is concerned, I will take into account the prominent figures of the Rahbar

(Leadership of the Revolution in the person of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei), the President of

the Republic (Mohammed Khatami), the Head of the Discerniment Council (Ali Akbar

Rafsanjiani), the Foreign Minister (Kamal Kharrazi) and the Minister of the Intelligence

and the National Security (Ali Younesi)4. As regards the case of Turkey, I will also

consider whether high figures belonging to the general staff of the Military (such as

General Hilmi Ozkok, the Chief of the Armed Forces) have intervened through their

actions or pressures in the foreign policy-‐making.

3 Quoted in Coralluzzo, La Politica Estera dell’Italia Repubblicana (1946-1992). Modello di Analisi e Studio di Casi, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2000, p. 18. 4 See Abbas Maleki, Decision making in Iran’s foreign policy: a heuristic approach, p. 9 and see also the Iranian Constitution.

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The evaluations will be done on a case by case basis; however, the TAF will be of a

secondary importance because what I’m interested mostly is the Islamist elite group at

that time (indeed, currently) in power. As the foreign policy process generally involves a

plurality of actors, such as the Parliament (and, as a consequence of that, its members), I

will assess statements by particular figures as well.

Speaking about the Islamic world, it often happens that the dominating religion

within this area, extending well beyond what academics call the Middle East, is

considered as a monolithic. One of the most noteworthy aspects political scientists are

used to acknowledging to Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations is its restoring of

religion from the exile [Petito and Hatzopoulos, 2003] to which it had been left since the

foundation of the modern system of states (conventionally, the Treatises of Westfalia in

1648) and because of the prevailing theories of modernization and secularizaton

developed within the social sciences. Notwithstanding, even Huntington deals with the

concept of religion as if it was a stable and unchanging issue, i.e. in an essentialist way. In

his mind, the near future of international relations would be dominated by a period of

conflict between the main civilizations (which religion is a fundamental trait of) and

especially between the West from one side and Islam and China from the other.

In the present study, religion and Islam are not treated as if they were monolithics.

It is evident that, in some cases, Islam had been used by some political elite to gain

consensus across national borders (for example in the case of Iran, whose one of the

main purposes and principles was to export the revolution abroad). But, I am conscious

that there are historically deep differences and rifts within the Islamic world. In

particular, referring to Iran I will consider the Twelver Imam doctrine and the notion of

the velayat-e faqih (rule of the jureconsult); while, as far as Turkey is concerned, I will

take into account the particular version of religion developed through the centuries and

basically founded on a mixture of Sunni sufism and Turkish nationalism (that, for

instance, legitimized the politics of exclusion of Kurds and Alevis from the national

political community): that is the very interpretation drawn by the AK Parti and by its

historical inspirer, the Gulen movement.

Given all these preliminary, fundamental and operative definitions, it is now

possible to go deeper in the two cases here dealt with.

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The Turkish case

At the dawn of the Third Gulf War, Turkey had just experienced a government

change. On November 3, 2003 the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or Justice and

Development Party) won a landslide victory and got the right to set up the first single

party government in the previous 15 years5. The new executive elite, characterized by

its recalling to Islamic identity, was ready to declare its goodwill towards the U.S.. It is

noteworthy Turkey has been a staunch ally of America for most of its existence and

benefited of its support against communist Soviet Union during the Cold war.

The burgeoning political situation and the new balance of power in Turkey

prompted the AKP to show good disposition towards its longstanding friend. Erdogan

and the new Islamist elite were aware that they had to look for the American support in

order to politically survive in the secular-‐based Turkish state. They were prudent to

publicly declare before as well as after the election date their commitment not to change

Turkish historical pro-‐Western orientation. «We included in our program that we're not

a religious-‐oriented party... Our future practices will show it clearly. We are fed up with

such questions and giving answers», declared the AK Parti leader Recep Tayyip

Erdogan6.

Before the AKP came to power, Turkish and American officials held an important

meeting in Ankara on July 14, 2002, in which they had premliminary discussions about

the renovations of some airbases and harbors installed on the Turkish soil. They also

discussed the possibility of having some 80.000 U.S. troops passed through Turkey in

the likely case of an American invasion of Iraq aimed at either preventing Saddam

Hussein from using WMD he was suspected to hold and fighting against Al-‐Qaeda

terrorism [Olson 2004, 166]. Several meetings after that occurred both in the U.S. and in

Turkey because of Washington’s determination to ensure that Ankara would provide all

nedded assistance to ease their military operation against Baghdad’s regime.

Turkish officials have been prudent throughout the period before the war avoiding

to make binding promises, as proved for instance by some declarations by the AKP

5 The AK Party could rely upon a large majority worth of 363 of 550 seats in the new Parliament. 6 AK Parti faces challenge from military after elections, Hurriyet Daily News, November 6, 2002, at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ak-‐party-‐faces-‐challenge-‐from-‐military-‐after-‐elections.aspx?pageID=438&n=ak-‐party-‐faces-‐challenge-‐from-‐military-‐after-‐elections-‐2002-‐11-‐06. Accessed. June 9, 2012.

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deputy chairman Abdullah Gül – who had been Prime Minister till March 14, 2003 to

become then Foreign Minister. During the months preceding the war, Turkey had been

promoting concrete efforts looking for alternatives with other neighboring and

prominent Middle East states such as Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria. As for its

geographical contiguity with Iraq, Turkey was frightened by political, economic as well

as security-‐related consequences of a military conflict. Turkish officials were mostly

concerned of a possible disintegration of the country that would bring to economic

losses, to the fleeding of hundred-‐thousands of Iraqi refugees and to the allaying

aspirations for independence shared by the Kurdish populations living in the northern

part of Iraq. As stated by Gul, «accepting disintegration of Iraq would destabilize the

entire geography. It would lead to unforeseen risks emerging in the long run»7.

Turkish prudence is best underlined on the one side by its continuing search for

alternative, i.e. peaceful, solutions to the growing crisis and on the other by its open

declaration to give the U.S. fully cooperation if the war becomes inevitable. Erdogan had

the chance to convey such a double-‐line idea during his meeting with U.S. President

George W. Bush in early December 2002. Turkish Daily News reports that he stated:

«naturally Turkey's preference is for war to be the last resort […] However, if Saddam's

administration continued to protect developments that threaten world peace, then

Turkey will give the necessary support for the last U.N. resolution»8. Gul was of like

mind too on late December, when he declared: «we do not act upon orders from anyone

or a fait accompli. Our decision will aim at protecting interests of our country and people.

We will do our best for peace in our region»9. The AKP was thus completely aware that

Turkey still needed the U.S. support and friendship but they were all the same conscious

of the dangerous risks related to such a conflict.

The major concern for Turkish officials was the possibility of disintegration of Iraq

and, as a consequence of this: a) the boost of the political aspirations of independence

7 Yusuf Canli and Ozgur Eksi, Exclusive interview with Abdullah Gul, the foreign policy expert of the AK Parti, Hurryiet Daily News, September 2, 2002 at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/exclusive-‐interview-‐with-‐abdullah-‐gul-‐the-‐foreign-‐policy-‐expert-‐of-‐the-‐ak-‐party.aspx?pageID=438&n=exclusive-‐interview-‐with-‐abdullah-‐gul-‐the-‐foreign-‐policy-‐expert-‐of-‐the-‐ak-‐party-‐2002-‐09-‐02. Accessed June 7, 2012. 8 Turkey to cooperate with US on Iraq, Hurriyet Daily News, December 11, 2002, at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-‐to-‐cooperate-‐with-‐us-‐on-‐iraq.aspx?pageID=438&n=turkey-‐to-‐cooperate-‐with-‐us-‐on-‐iraq-‐2002-‐12-‐11. Accessed June 7, 2012. 9 Gul issues warning to US: we won’t receive orders, accept fait accompli, Hurriyet Daily News, Debember 25, 2002, at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/gul-‐issues-‐warning-‐to-‐us-‐we-‐wont-‐receive-‐orders-‐accept-‐fait-‐accompli.aspx?pageID=438&n=gul-‐issues-‐warning-‐to-‐us-‐we-‐wont-‐receive-‐orders-‐accept-‐fait-‐accompli-‐2002-‐12-‐25. Accessed June 7, 2012

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claimed by the huge Kurdish population living within the economically underdeveloped

southeastern part of Turkey; b) the future status of the oil rich region of Mosul and

Kirkuk; c) a flow of Iraqi refugees and d) the likely economic sufferings resulting from

such a devastation, as likewise occurred after the 1991 NATO intervention in Iraq.

The Kurdish issue had been worriyng the Turkish political elite for the past

decades and has been a major source of anxiety as far as the integrity and the politcal

unity of the country is concerned. The afterwards of the Second World war and the

subsequent Western-‐managed setting of a new geography in the Middle East have been

conditioning the ruling elites’ perspective till the present day. Such an image is best

known as the Sevres10 syndrome, that is the deep fear for the partitioning of the territory

of the country as a consequence of the Western domination. That is why, althought the

engagement with western powers – and especially the U.S. – was a matter of necessity,

Turkish politicians have always been mistrustful of the West as well as of the Western

power projection, seen as an attempt to dominate the world and to cripple Turkish

sovereignty.

A Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) was established in 1992 under the

leadership of Massoud Barzani, chief of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), one of the

two prominent political actors along with Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of

Kurdistan (PUK). Since then, an ethnically based federation in Iraq represented the main

political goal both the KDP and the PUK had been haunting; the KRG power over its zone

would be enforced and Kirkuk would be the capital; the future Kurdish state would

retain control of the peshmerga (the Kurdish Armed forces); and, moreover, they

envisaged the right to secede from the Iraqi state. All those provisions had been taken

into account within a draft of constitution the two Kurdish parties sent in 2002 to the

Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) that totally refused [Park 2004, 20].

As put it by Abdullah Gul, «I reiterated it many times we are in favor of Iraq's

territorial integrity, this is our state policy. Iraq's territorial integrity should be

protected, to ensure stability and security in the region's economic relations in the

region». He went on: «but we also should take some measures to prevent a refugee crisis.

We had 500,000 refugees in one night in the Gulf War»11. Even if U.S. Deputy Secretary

10 Sevres is the name of the French city located a few kilometers far away from Paris where the first agreement between the remnants of the Ottoman Empire and the Western powes had taken place. 11 Gul: Middle Eastern leaders concerned for chaos and postwar conditions, Hurriyet Daily News, January 8, 2003, at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/gul-‐middle-‐east-‐leaders-‐concern-‐for-‐chaos-‐and-‐postwar-‐

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of Defence Paul Wolfowitz admitted that «some degree of federalism or federation is

probably going to be inevitable»12 and, as a matter of consequence, it should be accepted,

Turkey was blatantly eager to take insurances from the U.S. that the Kurdish populated

area of Kirkuk and Mosul would be under strict control of a strong Iraqi state13.

Economic concerns were also taken into account in evaluating the upcoming of the

crisis. Turkey was disappointed because of the aftermath of the 1991 intervention in

Iraq. As argued by Ferruh Demirmen,

«estimates of Turkey's cumulative economic loss in the aftermath of the 1991

Gulf War are between $40-‐$60 billion, including indirect costs. Higher

estimates have been quoted. There is no knowing what Turkey's next loss

would be, but a figure of $38 billion has been mentioned by Government

officials. Thus the $3.5 billion that the U.S. has reportedly promised for aid is

little cause for comfort for Turkey. Most of this amount would be destined for

military purposes and the rest would be a low-‐interest credit. Turkey has

asked for a $20 billion aid package and expunging of its military debt»14.

Turkish officials were worried that after a conflict their country would not be

compensated for economic sufferings as, they claimed, had occurred in the aftermath of

the 1991 war. By the way, Abdullah Gul argued:

«Turkey and Iraq have economic, trade interests. The last Gulf Crisis cost

Turkey more than $40 billion for which we have not been compensated for

despite all the pledges. Egypt and Syria have been compensated for their loss,

but not Turkey. Besides other factors, the Gulf War losses of Turkey

contributed as well to the current economic crisis in the country»15.

conditions.aspx?pageID=438&n=gul-‐middle-‐east-‐leaders-‐concern-‐for-‐chaos-‐and-‐postwar-‐conditions-‐2003-‐01-‐08. Accessed: June 11, 2012. 12 Quoted in Bill Park, Iraq’s Kurds and Turkey: challenges for U.S. policy, Parameters, Autumn 2004, p. 23. 13 For further prominent accounts, see Willam Hale, Turkey, the U.S. and Iraq, London, Middle East Institute at Soas, 2007, p. 96. 14 Ferruh Demirmen, War on Iraq: U.S. pressures on turks carries risks, Hurriyet Daily News, December 14, 2002, at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/war-‐on-‐iraq-‐us-‐pressure-‐on-‐turkey-‐carries-‐risks.aspx?pageID=438&n=war-‐on-‐iraq-‐us-‐pressure-‐on-‐turkey-‐carries-‐risks-‐2002-‐12-‐14. Accessed: June 11, 2012. 15 Yusuf Canli and Ozgur Eksi, Exclusive interview with Abdullah Gul, the foreign policy expert of the AK Parti, cit.

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Another factor the AKP elite had to take into account with regards to the evolving

situation were the public opinion’s perspectives. The increasing role of public opinion

throughout the years of the AKP governments testifies the progresses Turkey has been

making as far as pluralism and democracy are concenred. This was part of a calculated

strategy that, especially during the initial phase of the AKP’s rulership (i.e. till late 2005),

proved the goodwill of the burgoening moderate Islamist-‐conservative party to engage

the European Union in order to open formal negotiations for effective access. However,

the AKP establishment seems to have paid somewhat attention to the moods coming

from their own constituency and from the masses in general. A study published on

MERIA in September 2005 shows that Turkish public opinion was broadly against the

war16. Turkish people far and away preferred their government would look for peaceful

solutions showing major concerns that a war ahgainst Iraq would bring to a possible

disintegration of the country. Abdullah Gul efforts to search an accommodation

involving all the most prominent countries of the area were largely hailed. Turkish

people’s perspective had been changing throughout the period taken into account (from

December 2002 to September 2003). For example, although they were generally against

a war, «in March 2003, the majority (54.3 percent) were in favor of sending military

forces to Northern Iraq, but the rate of those who did not approve the proposal was still

considerably high (40.5 percent)»17.

As the scholars who conducted the survey in question agrue, the Turkish public

showed a little bit of contradiction, but the most convincing explanation is that even if

they were broadly against the war, they would not have accepted America stole the

show without any role for Turkey. The Turkish people would be definitely in favour of a

Turkish presence if the war was inevitable18, as «over half (53.6 percent) believed that a

U.S. occupation of northern Iraq would result in the establishment of a Kurdish state»19.

A only-‐sponsored by America war would be seen as a policy of hegemony not respectful

16 Nasuh Uslu, Metin Toprak, Ibrahim Dalmis and Ertan Aydin, Turkish public opinion toward the United States in the context of the Iraq question, MERIA (Middle East Review of International Affairs), vol. 9. N. 3. September 2005, pp. 75-‐107. Robert Olson in Turkey-Iran relations 1979-‐2004, cit., p. 189, also reports that «plus 90 percent of Turks were against the war». 17 Ibidem, p. 80 18 Ibidem, p. 80. 19 Ibidem, p. 77.

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for the internal affairs of the other countries. There were widespread feelings to be

impotent vis-‐a-‐vis the American power.

Against any expectations and to the bitter disappointment of American officials, on

March 1, 2003 the TGNA voted against the deployment of 62,000 American troops on

the Turkish soil, impeding America to open a second front for its military operation

against Saddam’s regime. Something went wrong with the calculations of both Erdogan

and American officals. The AKP showed a huge rift within it probably due to those MPs

elected in the Kurdish mostly-‐populated areas who feared a backlash from their

constituency. The final result was of «264 deputies supporting the motion, 250 opposing,

19 abstentions and thirteen absentees», with some «68 AKP members voted with the

opposition with another 31 casting abstentions or absenting themselves»20. A second

vote occurred on March 20. Although it turned the tide of the previous vote, it was

substantially different in that it did not envisage any permission for American troops to

settle in Turkish bases and, even if it allowed the U.S. to use its airspace, it moreover

authorised Turkish troops to enter Iraq, something that was initially staunchly opposed

by America. It was clear that Erdogan’s main concerns were both not to damage the

historical relationship with the U.S. and to have an influence in the post-‐invasion Iraq.

The Parliament’s outcome of March 2003 mirrored the widespread conviction in

Turkey that Iraq and its future were just Turkey’s own business, because of deep

historical links that Western Powers did not recognize when they decided to partition

the Ottoman empire off, separating the Anatolian peninsula from Mosul and Kirkuk. In

Defense Minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu’s words, it was also clear that Turkey would

not admit any foreign countries’ interference. As he stated on October 2002: «Turkey

considers northern Iraq to be under its direct care and Ankara would not tolerate the

region’s beign subjugated to the interest of others»21.

A further issue the AKP had to face was its relations with the military. The Islamist-‐

secular question has always been one of the deepest cleavages in Turkey. The decision to

take part to the war in Iraq soon became the gruond between the two competing forces

Especially from the point of view of the AKP’s elite, at stake there was just either the

legitimacy before both the public opinion and the U.S. and the gaining of further power

at home. The decision of Erdogan to postpone the Parliamentary vote on March 1, after a 20 All quotations by Willam Hale, Turkey, the U.S. and Iraq, cit., p. 113. 21 Quoted in Robert Olson, Turkey-Iran relations 1979-2004. Revolution, ideology, war, coups and geopolitics, Mazda Publishers, Costa Mesa, California, 2004, p. 176.

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NSC (national Security Council) meeting, was aimed at passing the buck to the military22.

But the military itself was pursuing the same strategy, as proved by the stance taken by

Turkish Chief-‐of-‐staff Hilmi Ozkok who, after a few days after the TGNA rejection of the

motion publicly stated that the military was staunchly in favor with the deployment of

the American troops on domestic soil23. With this, it was clear that his aim was to blame

the AKP and the next Prime Minister Erdogan to be the only responsible of that political

failure.

The Iranian case

The Anglo-‐American war against Iraq came at a time when the Islamist regime

settled in Tehran had just seen a threatening, rival and contiguous neighbor had been

thrown down by another Western-‐led coalition of countries under the banner of NATO.

The Taliban regime of Afghanistan was swept away in Autumn 2001 after the 9/11

attacks on New York and Washington. A dangerous rogue state that had been

threatening Iran for the past years and had been competing for the hegemony on the

religious message within the region was now replaced. Hence, in the space of just one

year and a half, Tehran witnessed the breakdown of two of its most serious threats, the

religious one and the military one, coming from its immediate neighborhood.

From the standpoint of the establishment, a new situation was going to unfold, as it

seemed that Tehran’s leeway was the loosest since the 1979 Revolution. The Shia

character of the Iranian population could finally be exploited to build new relations with

the huge minorities living in the neighboring Muslim countries. Iraq was obviously the

best chance Iran could take to start projecting its own power abroad and, trying to

influence the future of new Iraq, to look for overcoming a political as well as economic

isolation that had been lasting for almost the past 25 years. Indeed, almost two thirds

(60-‐65 percent) of the Iraqi population follows the Shia and even if Iraq is not so much a

populated country (about 30 millions), the vast majority of it shares the same religious

identity with the Iranians.

22 Willam Hale, Turkey, the U.S. and Iraq, cit., p. 112. 23 Robert Olson, Turkey-Iran relations 1979-2004, cit., p. 190.

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It was only from the downfall of the Ba’athist regime that Iran faced new

possibilities to bridge Shia groups in Iraq, since Saddam had always been discriminating

and harassing them, preventing them from the power-‐sharing. Saddam also exploited at

best the Arab-‐Persian rivalry during the First Gulf war (the 1980-‐88 Iran-‐Iraq war) 24.

Actually, as Kayhan Barzegar reminds us, the term Shia crescent appeared for the first

time in 2004 when «King Abdullah of Jordan warned about the emergence of an

ideological Shiite crescent from Beirut to the Persian Gulf»25. That is to say that it was

from an external, non-‐Iranian perspective that this concept was built up, as a process

foreign elites – specifically the Arabs as well as the Americans – were perceiving as

menacing their power and legitimacy after the removal of Saddam. Thus, several

questions arise: was the Shia crescent a real new political goal Iran was going to pursue

in post-‐invasion Iraq or is it rather an image constructed by foreign powers in order to

prevent Iran from exploiting the new situation? Was the building of a Shia crescent a

feasible policy or, rather, were there any other constraint, such as intra-‐Arab rivalries or,

moreover, the Persian-‐Arab rivalry? Was the religious factor – and especially the Shia

identity with the majority of Arab Iraqis – the main driver of Iran’s Iraq policy or, on the

contrary, was it only a factor among the others, such as political, security-‐related and

economic?

«For us, Iraq is the most important country in the world»26. Such a claim was made

by Hojjatoleslam Ali Younesi, former Minister of Intelligence and Security from

December 2000 to August 2005. Besides political rethoric, it objectively underlines the

relevance of Iran-‐Iraq relations for the clerical establishment in Tehran as well as the

connectedness between the security situations in both countries. Among Tehran’s major

preoccupations was the search of political stability in Iraq. It was absolutely necessary

to prevent its neighboring country from becoming a theater of increasing violence

among competing groups as well as a safe haven for al-‐Qaeda militants. Such a scenario

could threaten Tehran since violence could spillover across the common border and be

directed to the Iranian regime itself. The struggle for power and the institution-‐building

process were further important sources of concern. Iran was also worried by the U.S.

24 Kayhan Barzegar, The Shia factor, in The Pakistani Boomerang, Heartland, n.1/2008, p. 78. 25 Kayhan Barzegar, Iran and the Shiite crescent: myths and realities, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Fall/Winter 2008, volume XV, Issue 1, p. 87. 26 Younesi’s statement dates back to the late Summer 2004. Quoted by Taremi Kamran, Iranian foreign policy towards occupied Iraq, 2003-2005, Middle East policy, Vol. XII, n.4, Winter 2005, p. 28.

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presence near its boundaries, not to mention that American troops had been already

hugely settling on the Eastern neighboring country, Afghanistan.

Commenting on the ongoing situation in the neighboring country, Ali Akbar

Rafsanjani argued in August 2003 that «the Iraqi situation is becoming like a puzzle,

which has very bad repercussions for the world»27. He called for the intervention of the

United Nations in order to end the terrible «disaster» the U.S.-‐led intervention brought

about. In turn, the President of the Republic Mohammed Khatami was staunchly

convinced that the state of affairs was going to get out of hand, warning that the U.S.

were the only responsible actor for the increasing of terrorism and he also called for the

intervention of the UN28. If from the one side Iran could hail the toppling of two real

threats in its immediate neighborhood, from the other side the presence of the U.S. to its

immediate borders was welcomed with fear and apprehension. Pressed by a feeling of

encirclement, the Iranian establishment had been calling for the departure of the U.S.

troops. Notwithstanding, as reported by the Jerusalem Post, a rift between two camps

was clearly evident in Iran.

The two factions, one referring to Khatami and the other one bound to Rafsanjani

are divided upon the assessment of the presence of the U.S. in Iraq. Khatami's chief

strategist Saeed Hajjarian stated that «change in Iraq has become inevitable […] and it is

clear that we can neither stop nor go against it. We must thus go along with it and seek

two things: a guarantee that the next regime in Baghdad will not be hostile to Iran, and a

guarantee that we are not [Washington's] next target» 29 . This, indeed, confirms

Khatami’s opinion that Iran must not show muscles against America but rather it should

build bridges towards its arch-‐foe in order to end the chronical isolation the country had

been suffering for years. Nevertheless, this «accomodationist» stance is not in

accordance with Rafsanjiani’s position that mirrors the foreign policy perspectives of the

more «confrontationist» group depending upon the Leader of the Revolution (Rahbar),

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Former foreign minister Ali Akhbar Velayati (1989-‐1997), close

confidant of Khamenei, claimed that «the American Great Satan will never accept an

Islamic system. It is coming to Iraq to complete its encirclement of our Islamic Republic

27 UN must come to Iraq’s rescue: Rasfanjiani, Arab News, Agence France Presse, August 23, 2003, at: http://www.aljazeerah.info/News%20archives/2003%20News%20archives/August/23%20n/UN%20Must%20Come%20to%20Iraq's%20Rescue,%20Rafsanjani.htm. Accessed: June 14, 2012. 28 Ibidem. 29 Amir Taheri, Meanwhile in Tehran, Jerusalem Post, March 21, 2003, at: http://rafsanjani-‐watch.blogspot.com/2004/12/khatami-‐blowup-‐at-‐rafsanjani-‐in-‐2003.html. Accessed: June 14, 2012.

15

before it moves against us. To help the Americans conquer Iraq easily would be suicidal

for our revolution»30. He also added that the presence of American troops in Middle East

is aimed both at preventing the wrecking of Israel and at taking control of the natural

resources.

The two camps were also divided upon which political-‐religious group to support

in the new Iraq. The Khatami’s front is more prone to back the Supreme Council of the

Islamic Revolution (SCIRI), a religiously-‐inspired organization that is against velayat-e

faqih, the founding principle proclaimed by Ayatollah Ruollah Khomeini that legitimizes

the clerical rule of Khamenei and his grab on power. On the contrary, Khamenei’s faction

is more in favour of the Da’wa party, a more radical group.

The Kurdish issue and the heterogeneous character of the Iraqi society were also a

source of concern for Tehran that by the way had always been keeping good relations

with the PUK led by Jalal Talabani, future President of the Iraqi Republic. As showed

above, there were claim, especially in the U.S. and in several Arab countries that Iran

was seeking for the establishment of a Shiite crescent throughout the Middle East and

that the toppling of Saddam Hussein associated with a vast majority of Shia population

could be a major opportunity for the clerical establishment to project power abroad in

order to increase their sphere of influence. Even if many Arab elites were scared of such

a scenario and even if such a possibility was perceived as tantalizing by Tehran, the

Iranian political elite had to bear in mind that a strategy based only and merely on the

backing of the Shia groups could be dangerous for its own security and integrity. That is

why, although links with the Shia groups had been highly exploited as well as deepened,

Iran’s official stance was to favor a strong state rather than a federation based on

ehtnical or religious linkages – as, on the contrary, Kurds were claiming – and «to work

with all groups and to support the balance of power in Baghdad»31. To this end, a really

menaingful statement made by Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi took place at Columbia

university in New York on September 29, 2003: «National security of Iran is closely

linked with the developments of Iraq. We view the restoration of normalcy and stability

in our neighboring country not only in the interest of the Iraqi people but also in

conformity with our vested national interests. […] The most urgent task facing the

occupying forces is to accelerate the process of empowering Iraqi people as an 30 Ibidem. 31 Kayhan Barzegar, Understanding the roots of Iranian foreign policy in the new Iraq, Middle east policy, vol. XII, n. 2, Summer 2005, p. 55.

16

important and initial step toward restoring their full sovereignty and political

independence. To make the transitional period less unpredictable and costly, we firmly

believe that the United Nations should take a lead and play a central role in this

respect»32.

Iran was opposed to a U.S. intervention (either in the person of Khatami, and

Rasfanjiani and also Khamenei) primarily because of security concerns. Iranian officials

repeated continuously that they would not tolerate any U.S. intervention in Iraq. On the

other hand, just to escalate the tension, they were blamed by the U.S. to meddle Iraqi

affairs. Even if Iran had effectively established strong links either with Shia factions and

with Kurds (Talabani’s PUK more than all33), it always acted as a prudent actor avoiding

to undertake daring initiatives that could threaten its security34. This position is

officially epitomized through the expression of active neutrality35. Iran was scared of

encirclement and that’s the reason for which it wanted to have a say in the future of Iraq.

This explains the accommodationist above-‐mentioned stance promoted by Khatami36. By

engaging America on the Iraqi issue – just as it unsuccessfully tried through the opening

on the Geneva talks started in 2002 after the invasion of Afghanistan – Iran looked for a

loosening of the international pressure. Tehran suffered especially from a feeling of

threat caused by the presence of several neighboring countries friendly to the U.S., not

least by the good relationship between Turkey and Israel37.

The deep theological differences between the Iraqi Shiite factions and the Iranian

establishment would be a potential strong constraint to the so-‐called strategy of

establishing a Shiite crescent. As put it by Anoush Ehteshami, «with Iraq liberated there

is every chance that the pendulum will slowly byt surely begin to swing toward Najaf

(and Karbala) at the expense of Qom. […] The Iraqi Shi’a community is unlikely to take

kindly to Iranian dictats. An indiscrete Iranian attempt to assert authority in Shi’a Iraq,

therefore, could easily cost Tehran and Qom prestige as well as influence in Shi’a 32 Statement by H.E. Dr. Kamal Kharrazi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran On "Post-‐War Iraq and Iran-‐US Relations", Columbia University-‐New York, September 29, 2003. At: http://www.iran-‐un.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=506:sep29-‐2003-‐statement-‐by-‐he-‐dr-‐kamal-‐kharrazi-‐minister-‐for-‐foreign-‐affairs-‐of-‐the-‐islamic-‐republic-‐of-‐iran-‐on-‐qpost-‐war-‐iraq-‐and-‐iran-‐us-‐relations&catid=50:other&Itemid=63. Accessed June 4, 2012. 33 See Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Iran’s international posture after the fall of Baghdad, The Middle East Journal, vol. 58, n. 2, Fall 2004, pp. 179-‐194. 34 Robert Olson, Turkey-Iran relations 1979-2004, cit., p. 162. 35 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Iran-Iraq relations after Saddam, The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2003, p. 125. 36 For further insight, ivi, p. 164. 37 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Iran’s international posture after the fall of Baghdad, cit., p. 188.

17

communities in the wider Arab World, suffering a backlash from the very forces it aims

to rally. […] Saddam’s fall will thus affect factional rivalries in Iran»38.

Comparative analysis and assessment of the impact of religion

The present analysis proves that the main concerns both for the Iranian and

Turkish foreign policy makers were related to political-‐security issues. In particular, as

far as the global system is concerned, the Turkish government was concerned that a

negative vote by the TGNA could damage Turkish historical relations with America. With

respect to this layer, religion did not affect foreign policy perspectives. As far as the

Iranian foreign policy makers are concerned, they were also concerned with the role

America would play along Iran’s borders and their primary concern was related to the

possibility of an imminent invasion of the country after the fall of Saddam. So, in this

case religion did not played any role yet.

As regards either the subordinate system and the relevant bilateral relations (in

both cases with Iraq, a neighboring country), either Turkey and Iran were primarily

concerned by the role any ethnic and religious Iraqi groups could play in the future of

Iraq. Turkey tried to establish good relations with the KDP, adopting a security-‐related

strategy in which religion did not play any role. The ethnic factor was much relevant, or

even crucial, in Ankara’s evaluations, considering the huge populations of Kurdish

identity located in the South-‐eastern part of the country. However, religion has

facilitated Ankara’s efforts to pursue the establishment of a negotiating table with

important Middle eastern as well as Muslim states in order to find an alternative

solution to war. In turn, Iran tried to establish good relations both with Talabani’s PUK

and also with the different Shia groups, exploiting to a huge extent the religious factor.

Nevertheless, religion was both a facilitator in Iranian’s approach to the Iraqi issue, but

also a strong constraint. Since Iran’s primary concern was both to keep safe its own

national security and to ensure stability in Iraq, a strategy aiming exclusively at favoring

Shia groups might only prove counterproductive, since it could feed Kurdish’s

aspirations to look for independence. That could also cause the dangerous result of

38 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Iran-Iraq relations after Saddam, cit., p. 125.

18

escalating tension and violence that could spillover the common borders and affect the

Kurdish minority within its territory.

As far as the internal arena is concerned, in Turkey the AKP was prudent not to

arouse neither the military – its main competing actor within the domestic sphere,

watchdog of secularism versus threatening religious-‐inspired groups – nor the

electorate and within it its own constituency. Religion, in the form of ties with part of the

AKP constituency, has played a crucial role for those MPs who decided to vote against

the March 1 motion at the TGNA; however, religion was not the main factor affecting

that event, since both the Kurdish issue (an ethnic one) and the government’s will to

exert influence on the post-‐invasion Iraq played a major role. That fact is best explained

by the favourable vote given to the March 20 motion that envisaged at the same time the

undertaking of a military conflict envisaging, on the contrary, to a prominent Turkish

role in managing the military operations.

As far as Iran is concerned, the Iranian government was divided upon which Shia

groups to support. Rifts over the velayat-e faqih as well as to what extent clerics must be

involved in political affairs dominated competing alliances with competing Iraqi Shia

groups. The Western-‐led war against Iraq was continuously depicted before the public

opinion as an act of «imperialism» and «expansionism» attained by «the arrogant

powers» in order to subdue and dominate «the Muslim nation»39. If from the one hand,

religion has played a facilitating role in Iran’s foreign policy approach, from the other

hand, since its government was also primarily concerned with the Iraqi security

situation, a more balanced stance was needed. This explains Khatami government’s

support for unity rather than for a federation granting the Shia groups all the power.

39 See Leader's Speech to a Group of People from Qom, January 9, 2003, at: http://english.khamenei.ir//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=143&Itemid=31, but also Leader's Address to a Group of People from East Azarbaijan Province, January 15, 2003, at http://english.khamenei.ir//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=140&Itemid=31. It is worthwhile to note that this stance underlines the clerical institutions’ – in the hand of the Leader Khamenei – grab for the executive power, irrespective to the regularly elected government held by Khatami. It is also impoprtant to add that in Iran religion and nationalism match each other in an extraordinary way and that Iranian foreign policy is dominated by a particular version os Islamism that is panislamism, the attempt to cross and bridge the historical differences between Sunni and Shia

19

Table 1

country G S BR PS / CE IG / PO total

TURKEY Not relevant relevant Not relevant Not relevant crucial RELEVANT

IRAN Not relevant Not relevant relevant relevant relevant RELEVANT

As conclusive remarks, it can be argued that religion has played an average

relevant role in the attitudinal prism of both the Turkish and the Iranian elites in their

approach towards 2003 war in Iraq, but it was neither the only factor, nor the crucial

one. Security-‐related concerns played a more prominent role in the strategic evaluations

of the foreign policy makers of both countries and the relevance of religion is visible only

as a more or less facilitator factor in the broader context of foreign policy determinants.

20

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