The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 15 | Issue 24 | Number 5 | Article ID 5098 | Dec 15, 2017

1

Two Faces of the Hate Korean Campaign in Japan

Ishibashi Gaku and Narusawa Muneo with an introduction by YoungmiLim translated by Satoko Oka Norimatsu and Joseph Essertier

Introduction by Youngmi Lim

The following two articles document the recentunfolding of hate demonstrations targetingJapan’s Korean minority population (hereafterZainichi Koreans). This introduction provideshistorical context for the organized expressionsof hate against Zainichi Koreans. Earlieranalyses of Japan’s far right have emphasizedhow internet communications, explicitexpressions of bigotry, and the frustrations ofthe “lost” generation,1 contributed to anemergent subcu l ture o f grassrootsconservatism. 2

More recent studies reveal that these post-Internet conservative movements build on aperspective widely shared across the Japaneseestablishment.3 Whether or not hateful remarksare tolerated in Japanese public space(including cyberspace), the fundamentalinterpretation of the legacy of Japan’s war andcolonization is virtually identical among ultra-right grassroots activists and some prominentmainstream public figures. Recent aggressivestreet campaigns could strengthen theseinfluences on the general public. Japan’sestabl ishment , inc luding both e l i teconservatives, and ultraconservatives, as wellas their grassroots counterparts, have recentlyreached a point in which they had a clearshared perspective. Once the Internet becameaccessible to millions of people in the past twodecades, such people were able to subtly instilltheir views on mainstream society.4

Zainichi Koreans are the migrants anddescendants of people who originated in

colonial Korea. Japan’s colonization of theKorean peninsula lasted for more than threedecades between 1910 and 1945, although onecan say that the Japanese Empire ’sencroachment on Korea began in 1876, whenJapan forced the opening of the country andimposed a unequal treaty on Yi Dynasty Korea(1392-1897).5 Japan’s two major wars againstChina (1894-1895) and Russia (1904-1905)were triggered by conflicts between Japan andother powers over the control of Korea andManchuria. As of 2016, conservative estimatesof the Korean minority population in Japan putthe total at 330,537. That number includes299,488 South Koreans and 31,049 statelessKoreans.6 In addition, between 1952 and 2016,365,530 Koreans were naturalized.7 ZainichiKoreans obtain Japanese nationality throughnaturalization or by having one legally-Japanese parent (i.e., cases in which nationalityis transmitted according to the principle of jussanguinis or “right of blood”).

During Japan’s colonial rule of Korea, largenumbers of Koreans migrated to Japan to fulfillthe demand for labor, and many more toManchuria and other parts of the Empire.Substantial numbers of Korean students alsomigrated to Japan seeking educationalopportunities. Both groups, however, wereconsidered threats to the social order by theJapanese authorities, who moved vigorously torepress labor disputes as well as socialist andcommunist activit ies and the KoreanIndependence Movement. The Koreanpopulation in Japan steadily increased and in1923, when the great Kanto earthquakedevastated downtown Tokyo, an estimated

APJ | JF 15 | 24 | 5

2

6,000 Koreans were killed by Japanesecivilians.8 Over 130,000 Koreans were living inJapan at that time.9

The Monument for Korean Victims,Yokoami-chō Park, Tokyo.

Photo by the author

The outdoor map of Yokoami-cho Park,Tokyo. The Monument for Korean Victimsis located to the right of the mainMemorial Hall. Photo by the author

Japan embarked on the Fifteen Year War inChina with the 1931 Manchurian Incident.Growing numbers of Korean laborers were thenmobilized to alleviate chronic labor shortagesin war-industry-related manufacturing,construction, and mining sectors. Conscriptedlabor migration dramatically increased thenumber of Koreans in Japan. By the end ofWorld War II there were more than 2 millionKoreans in the country. Although mostconscripted labor migrants returned to theKorean Peninsula following the 1945 collapseof the Japanese Empire, some 600,000, mainlylonger-term sojourners remained, especiallythose with children who had been born in thecountry. In 1945, the Korean Peninsula wasdivided across the 38th parallel, and occupiedby the USSR in the North and the US in theSouth. The increased political tension of thelate 1940s also discouraged the return of theremaining Koreans in Japan.10

In 1952, all Zainichi Koreans were deprived oftheir Japanese nationality as Japan regained itssovereignty. Zainichi Koreans were thentemporarily defined as Law-126 residents whowere permitted to stay in Japan “for the timebeing.”11 After 1965, those who opted for SouthKorean nationality were granted “treaty-basedpermanent residency” for two furthergenerations. Only in 1981 at the time of Japan’sratification of the Convention Relating to theStatus of Refugees, did stateless Koreans(those who did not declare allegiance to SouthKorea) gain a relatively stable permanentresidency called “exceptional permanentresidency.” In 1991, the residency status of all“former-Japanese” Koreans whose ancestorswere in Japan by 1952, was unified into andreplaced by a more stable type of “specialpermanent residency.” This special permanentresidency, which took nearly half a century toestablish and finally settled the legal limbo of

APJ | JF 15 | 24 | 5

3

those stateless people who originated fromcolonial Korea and their descendants, has beenunder vehement criticism by various grassrootsconservative activist groups since themid-2000s. These groups manifest theirpresence through street demonstrations andonline video-streaming. The fact that specialpermanent residency is more stable than othertypes of permanent residency is attacked as ifZainichi Koreans have unfairly received somekind of privilege. In this way, the fake-newsurban myth of “Zainichi Korean privilege”gained currency in ultranationalist networks inthe era of the Internet.

Collective memories are always contentiousdepending on crisscrossing positionalities. Thehistorical debate between the former colonizerand the colonized has far-reaching and long-term consequences. Narusawa Muneo’s reportbelow provides a detailed, behind-the-scenesview of the politics surrounding historicallycontentious matters about which Koike Yuriko,the outspoken conservative governor of Tokyo,has staked a position. Koike has abandoned theTokyo governor’s long-established practice offormally issuing a eulogy in memory of themassacre of Koreans that following the GreatKantō Earthquake in 1923. This occurs at atime when a conservative women’s group and aTokyo Assembly Member have launched aconcerted effort to remove a contentiousmonument commemorating the massacre.

The Memorial Hall for Earthquake victimsand Air-raid victims, Yokoami-chō Park,Tokyo. Downtown Tokyo was burnt downtwice in September 1923 and in March1945.

Photo by the author

At present, Japanese conservatives andprogressives express conflicting interpretationsof Japan’s past as a colonizer and aggressor inEast Asia.12 The three most contentious war-related memorial matters are probably the“comfort women,” conscripted labor migrationto Japan and the war front, and the overallassessment of Japanese colonial rule. Theserecurrent conflicts continue to roil diplomaticand civilian relationships between South Koreaand Japan. Conservative critics as well aspoliticians argue that the 1965 treatyestablishing diplomatic relations between Japanand South Korea stipulated that in exchangefor the Japanese economic aid package thatbenefited major business conglomerates inSouth Korea, no Korean individual couldreceive redress for damages inflicted on themduring Japan’s colonizat ion and warmobilization. Japanese conservatives and ultra-

APJ | JF 15 | 24 | 5

4

conservatives who defend Japan’s pre-warregime contest South Korean accusations of“wrong-doing” on the part of Japan. So-called“history disputes” remain landmines whichcould explode at any time and upset diplomaticand civilian relations between Japan and SouthKorea. And Zainichi Koreans forever remainforeigners in Japan, left awkwardly in-between,even as fourth-generation Japan-born ZainichiKoreans are coming of age. In addition, thefraught relationship between Japan and theDPRK (with no formal diplomatic relations)adds additional twists in the plight of ZainichiKoreans.13

The legal limbo aside, Zainichi Koreanscontinue to be placed in an historical limbo,being permanently excluded from the orthodoxnarratives of Japan’s “national” history. Thish i s to r i ca l l imbo exacerba tes ha tedemonstrations, as reported by Ishibashi Gaku.The new 2016 Hate Speech Act declares thathate speech against someone who is notoriginally from Japan shall not be tolerated, butIshibashi’s observations on the ground makeclear that the law is toothless. Anti-hateadvocacy groups, in which Japanese citizensand Zainichi Koreans work together, continueto urgently require more proactive andcomprehensive measures, such as theenactment of anti-discrimination laws thatspecify penalties for violators. Nevertheless,without any thorough-going solution to thehistorical plight of Zainichi Koreans whoremain in limbo, other means of hate andbigotry may appear, regardless of how lawenforcement authorit ies handle hatedemonstrations, on and off-line, as HiguchiNaoto insightfully predicts.14

Acknowledgement

The author thanks Joseph Essertier and MarkSelden for comments on earlier versions, aswell as Satoko Oka Norimatsu, and TomomiYamaguchi for making this project possible.

Behind Tokyo Governor Koike’s Refusal toSend a Eulogy to the ‘Memorial Service forKorean Victims of the Great KantoEarthquake’: a Rightist Women’s Groupand Nippon Kaigi

By Narusawa Muneo

Translated by Satoko Oka Norimatsu

On August 28, 2016 a number of elderly womenand men gathered in front of JR RyogokuStation in Tokyo with a big banner that read,“Do Not Tolerate the Memorial Stone forKoreans at Tokyo Metropolitan Yokoami-choPark. It Demeans Japanese People.” Onewoman took the microphone and said, “There isno scientific evidence of the massacre of sixthousand [Koreans]… given the politicalsituation at that time when terrorism wasoccurring frequently… Japanese people stoodup (in the wake of the Great Kanto Earthquake)in order to protect themselves. That was howthey came to form vigilante groups.”

This was a street campaign organized by aright-wing women’s group called Soyokaze[“Gentle Breeze”], which describes itself as “agroup of women that tries to improve Japaneven if only slightly!” Since last year, thisgroup has intensified its campaign for removalof the “Memorial Stone for Korean Victims ofthe Great Kanto Earthquake.” Located withinYokoami-cho Park (in Sumida Ward) fairly nearRyogoku Station, the Memorial is under thejurisdiction of the Tokyo MetropolitanGovernment.

APJ | JF 15 | 24 | 5

5

A right-wing rally at Yokoami-chō Park,surrounded by the police and bureacrats.Photo by Narusawa Muneo.

The reason for their protest, they say, is that acertain passage is “demeaning to Japanesepeople.” This is the part that says, “In theturmoil of the Great Kanto Earthquake, asmany as six thousand Korean people weredeprived of their precious lives because ofscheming and slanderous rumours, which werefalse.”

In the meantime, Tokyo Metropolitan GovernorKoike Yuriko this year indicated that she wouldbreak with the tradition of sending a eulogy forthe annual memorial service held in front of theMemorial on September 1, the anniversary ofthe 1923 earthquake that killed over onehundred thousand people. Koike did send aeulogy last year [the first quake anniversaryafter taking office]. This change in policy is notunrelated to the development of the Soyokazemovement.

On June 1, 2016, before the street-campaignspeeches, members of Soyokaze went to thePark Section of the Park and GreeneryDepartment in the Construction Bureau of theTokyo Metropolitan Government. According toSoyokaze’s blog of June 2, they got the Sectionto commit to the idea that the “TokyoMetropolitan Government is responsible for the

wording of the inscription on the MemorialStone since they own it and the land that itstands on.” They then followed that up withthis: “The inscription, including the statementthat ‘as many as six thousand Korean peoplewere deprived of their precious lives because offalse scheming and slanderous rumours, whichwere wrong,’ might forever be imprinted on theminds of Japanese children.”

Korean Riots?

Back in 2012, Soyokaze protested the MemorialStone To Mourn the Gunma Prefecture KoreanVictims of Forced Labour, located in TakasakiCity of Gunma Prefecture, attacking thewording “With heartfelt remorse, we inscribedeeply in our memory the historical fact thatour country caused tremendous damage andsuffering to Korean people,” claiming this to be“a fabricated history that Korea imposed onus.” This ignited subsequent right-wingmovements to demand its removal.

In 2014, the Gunma Prefectural Assemblypassed a resolution asking the prefecture not torenew the approval of the memorial stone, dueto the fact that “the memorial stone, locatedwithin a prefectural facility, is being used forpolitical purposes.” The prefecture demandedthat the group that installed the memorialstone remove it, and both parties are currentlydisputing the matter in the Maebashi DistrictCourt.

The goal of Soyokaze’s attack on the MemorialStone for Koreans at the Tokyo MetropolitanPark is its removal. Likewise regarding thememorial stone in Gunma. Governor Koike’srefusal to send a eulogy for the annualmemorial service may set the stage forachieving that goal. In fact, what directlytriggered this move was the meeting of eightmembers of Soyokaze with Koga Toshiaki, aMetropolitan Assembly member, on June 19,2016.

APJ | JF 15 | 24 | 5

6

Assembly Member Koga of the LiberalDemocratic Party is the Vice Chair of the LocalAssembly Members’ League of Nippon Kaigi(http://www.nipponkaigi.org/), one of thebiggest right-wing organizations in Japan, andan advisor to Shuken kaifuku wo mezasu kai(http://shukenkaifuku.com/) (“Group for theRestoration of Sovereignty”), a right-winggroup known for its racist remarks. Hisassociation with Soyokaze is clear enough. Attheir meeting with Koga, according to theirb l o g o f t h e s a m e d a t e(http://blog.livedoor.jp/soyokaze2009/archives/51870341.html), Soyokaze members “reportedto him on the issue of the inscription on theKorean memorial—its history and the currentsituation.” They also “reported that theinscription comes ‘under the responsibility ofthe Tokyo Metropolitan Government,’ and afterexchanging such information, ‘came upon asingle goal.’”

Koga took up the issue of the Korean memorialat the Metropolitan Assembly’s EducationC o m m i t t e e o n N o v e m b e r 8 , 2 0 1 6(http://www.gikai.metro.tokyo.jp/record/educational/2016-15.html), and said that “the partabout six thousand people does not accord withthe facts.” He mentioned author Kudo Miyoko’sbook Kanto Daishinsai “Chosenjin gyakusatsu”no shinjitsu (“The Great Kanto Earthquke – TheTruth About the ‘Massacre of Koreans’”),published by Sankei Shinbun Shuppan,claiming that “it was an undeniable fact thatKorean independence activists staged riots,”and that attributing the “killings and injuring ofKoreans” to “groundless rumours” … “defamesour grandfathers and forefathers through falseand malicious slander.”

A Book of Random Notes for Attacking theMemorials

Koga went further by saying, “Governor KoikeYuriko is sending a eulogy to the event held infront of the Memorial Stone,” and stated that

the “Governor must change her perception ofthe issue, too.” It is therefore possible that the“single goal” that Soyokaze and Koga agreedon in their June 19 meeting was Koike’swithdrawal of the governor’s annual eulogy tothe Korean memorial ceremony.

At the Metropolitan Assembly’s RegularMeeting on March 2 this year, Koga, againreferring to Kudo’s book, went a step furtherand demanded “measures for improvement,including removal” of the Memorial Stone. Inresponse, Governor Koike said that she would“handle this appropriately,” and with regard tothe eulogy said, “on future occasions, I willpersonally go through [the eulogy] and make anappropriate judgment.”

But Kudo Miyoko’s book Kanto Daishinsai“Chosenjin gyakusatsu” no shinjitsu (The GreatKanto Earthquake. The Truth About the“Massacre of Koreans”), the book that Kogaused as the basis of his complaint about theMemorial Stone, takes the widely reported“Korean riots” to be “facts,” while thenewspapers at the time, amid the chaos afterthe earthquake, reported the riots withoutproviding any actual evidence of them. Thereare numerous falsifications and distortions ofsources in the book, making it unworthy of anyserious expert review. This is one of thosebooks of hate, claiming that since we aretalking about “Korean terrorists,” killing themwould not be called a “massacre.”

Koike announced in a press conference onAugust 25 that she would attend the bigBuddhist memorial service organized by theMetropolitan Government’s MourningAssociation and said, “Since I will express mycondolences to all the victims (there), I will notcommemorate specific groups or individuals.”Concerning this, Kato Naoki, a journalist whowrote the book Kugatsu, Tokyo no rojo de (InSeptember, On the Streets of Tokyo, publishedby Korocolor Publishers), which covers in detailthe massacre of Koreans at the time of the

APJ | JF 15 | 24 | 5

7

Great Kanto Earthquake, pointed out that “It isa huge problem to treat people who died as aresult of the earthquake, and Koreansmassacred by Japanese, on an equal basislumping them all together with the word ‘all’.”He also said:

The Memorial Stone was erectedwith the determination never to dosomething like this again, preciselydue to the fact that administrativebodies such as the police werecompl ic i t in spreading thegroundless rumours that causedthe massacres. In spite of thatdetermination, Governor Koike’srefusal to send a eulogy there forthe annual memorial service isquite possibly the same as themassacre denialism of people likeKudo Miyoko. If nothing is done,this could escalate into a ban onthe memorial ceremonies in frontof the Memorial Stone, and evenits removal. Governor Koike oncespoke at an event organized bySoyokaze in 2010, when she servedas a member of the Lower House.This makes one feel uneasy aboutwhat will happen in the yearsahead.

This article appeared in the September 1, 2017Shukan Kinyobi, pp.16-17. Hyperlinks havebeen added by the translator.

A Japanese Hate Group that AttackedKorean Residents

By Ishibashi Gaku

Translated by Joseph Essertier

“A ring-the-doorbell-and-run demo (pin pondasshu demo).”1 Mr. Arita Yoshifu, a member ofthe House of Councillors (the upper house ofthe National Diet) from the Democratic Party(Minshinto) watched part of the demonstrationfrom beginning to end with his own eyes. Heseverely criticized the behavior of these absurdand therefore conspicuously hideous racists.

The participants numbered approximately 20,the distance they walked about 300 meters,and the time they spent a little more than 8minutes. Riding up in a microbus, they changedtheir starting point as if to poke fun at the fewhundred citizens countering them, waited forthe right moment to protest, jumped into thebus for refuge, and ran off. They certainlyresembled children full of naughty pranks,dashing off at full speed after ringing the bellat the door entrance.

“I’ve never seen such a clumsy demo.” Dietmember Arita is someone who has long been onthe front lines of those countering racists andwho put all his energy into the Hate Speech Actof 2016 (Heito Supiichi Kaishō Hō).2 He isoutraged by the reality that “pseudo demos”such as this are permitted. The spectacle of thehate demo that was carried out on 16 July inNakahara-ku, Kawasaki City brought to thesurface the limits of the Hate Speech Act, a lawthat contains no provisions for banning hatespeech.

The ringleaders are Tsuzaki Naomichi, who hasconducted 12 hate demos in Kawasaki, andSeto Hiroyuki, the true Nazi believer who is thetop adviser to the “Japan First Party” (NipponDaiichi tō), an extreme right-wing politicalorganization that was a successor to the“Association of Citizens against the SpecialPrivileges of the Zainichi” (Zainichi Tokken oYurusanai Shimin no Kai, or “Zaitokukai” forshort). It is unimaginable that a demoorganized by such luminaries of committeddiscriminationism would have any purpose

APJ | JF 15 | 24 | 5

8

other than racist agitation.

On the other hand, they were extremely carefulto disguise their maneuvering. In theirapplication for the demo they explained to theKawasaki Police and the Prefectural PublicSafety Commission (Ken kōan iinkai) that their“goal is to denounce the Japan CommunistParty” and said that they would “not engage inhate speech.” The unprecedented tactic ofchartering a bus was aimed at their opposition.The demo organizers, who had planned it lastyear, on 5 June, were surrounded by protestingcitizens, so they were forced to cancel.3 At thatpoint, they had labeled it the “Demo To Startthe Cleansing of Japan in Kawasaki,” evokingimages of ethnic cleansing. Certainly, it seemsto have become difficult to hold demos thatannounce hate speech openly and one can see acertain chilling effect brought about by theH a t e S p e e c h A c t , w h i c h s a y s t h a tdiscriminatory actions will not “be permitted.”

“Of course we say ‘kill them’”

Yes, but for racists who aim at discrimination,it does not matter how the demo is packaged,or how small the scale of the demo is. Theirtargets and their effectiveness were displayedin videos uploaded to YouTube. One sees anactual situation in which the person with thecamera runs up to the protestors and, speakingof citizens who are raising their voices againstdiscrimination, claims that “violent groups fromthe extreme left and terrorists are on therampage.” In a period of one month this videowas viewed over 80,000 times. The commentarea overflows with discriminatory posts.

“Hurry up and go home, you cockroachKoreans.” “Interfering Koreans make me sick.Hang in there, Japanese.”

It was twisted hatred to claim that all thepeople on the side protesting were Koreanswho were “anti-Japanese” and had to be

denounced. It was also twisted hatred for Mr.Tsuzak i to pour o i l on the f lames o fdiscrimination openly at a “Japan purificationdemo.” The participants, with loudspeakers inhand, put themselves in good spirits in thefollowing way.

“South Korea and North Korea are enemycountries. They spread groundless rumors andbad mouth Japan all over the world. Of course,we say kill those from the enemy country. Sodon’t be shy about it, let your voice be heard.Cockroach Koreans, get the hell out. Slaughterthe enemy.”

As these right-wing demo organizers andparticipants see it, the former “comfortwomen” are liars, Zainichi Korean residents areliars, and so we Japanese have been treatedunfairly and have been falsely accused. Aperversion in which victimizers justify theirdiscrimination by taking hold of the feelings ofvictims i.e., self-victimization.4 Fabrications ofhistory make this perversion possible and thisreflects the way in which such a circuit ofdiscrimination infiltrates this society.

This is why it did not matter that it was a“pseudo demo.” Under the pretext of raisingfunds for their activities, an account number isdisplayed on Mr. Tsuzaki and Mr. Seto’s blog.The Hate Speech Act, merely a law of principle,is powerless in the face of professionaldiscriminators who make money fromdiscrimination. What we need next is a law thatbans racial discrimination itself and provisionsfor local government enforcement. It must besomething that severs the roots of the historicaland structural discrimination against residentKoreans that began with colonial domination,domination that this country’s government haspreserved and continued.

This article originally appeared in ShukanKinyobi, September 1, 2017.

APJ | JF 15 | 24 | 5

9

References

Hashimoto, Akiko. 2015. The Long Defeat:Cultural Trauma, Memory, and Identity inJapan. Oxford University Press.

Hōmushō (Ministry of Justice, Japan). 2017a.Zairyū gaikokujin tōkei: Heisei 28 nendo 12g a t s u(http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001196143) (Resident Foreigner Statistics asof December 2016), accessed 8/31/2017.

2017b. Kika kyoka shinseisha sū, kika kyokashasū, oyobi k ika fukyokasha sū no sui i(http://moj.go.jp/content/001180510.pdf)(Naturalization: Numbers of applied, grantedand rejected cases 1952-2016), accessed9/23/2017.

Higuchi, Naoto. 2016. Japan's Ultra-Right. Tr.Castelvetere, Teresa. Melbourne: Trans PacificPress.

Jung, Yeang Hae. 2003. Sengo tsukuraretashokuminchishihai. (The post-war constructionof a colonial rule). Jung, Yeang Hae, Tamigayoseishō: Aidentitī, kokka, gendā (People’santhem: Identities, nation, and gender). Tokyo:Iwanami Shoten, pp. 105-150.

Klein, Adam. 2012. Slipping Racism into theMainstream: A Theory of InformationLaundering. Communication Theory 22(4):4 2 7 – 4 4 8 .doi:10.1111/j.1468-2885.2012.01415.x

Lie, John. 2008. Zainichi Recognitions: Japan’sKorean Residents’ Ideology and Its Discontents(https://apjjf.org/-John-Lie/2939/article.html).The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 6 (11)

Mun, Gyung-su. 2007. Zainichi chōsenjin ni

totteno sengo. (The post-war period for ZainichiKoreans . ) Mun , Gyung - su Za in i ch ichōsenjinmondai no kigen (The origin ofZainichi Korean problem) Tokyo: Kurein(Crane), pp.81-150.

Nishinarita, Yutaka. 1997. Zainichi chosenjinno “sekai” to “teikoku” kokka (ZainichiKoreans’ “world” and the “imperial” state).Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai (University ofTokyo Press).

Ryang, Sonia. 2016. The Rise and Fall ofChongryun—From Chōsenjin to Zainichi andbeyond (https://apjjf.org/2016/15/Ryang.html).The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 14(15-11)

_________. 2007. The Tongue That Divided Lifeand Death. The 1923 Tokyo Earthquake and theM a s s a c r e o f K o r e a n s .(https://apjjf.org/-Sonia-Ryang/2513/article.html) The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 5 (9)

Sakamoto, Rumi. 2011. ‘Koreans, Go Home!’Internet Nationalism in Contemporary Japan asa D i g i t a l l y M e d i a t e d S u b c u l t u r e .(https://apjjf.org/2011/9/10/Rumi-SAKAMOTO/3497/article.html) The Asia Pacific Journal:Japan Focus 9 (10-2)

Sōmushō (Ministry of Internal Affairs andCommunications). n.d. Shokan hōrei ichiran(http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_hourei/tokubetsu.html) (Laws within jurisdiction)

Yamaguchi, Tomomi. 2013. Xenophobia inAction: Ultranationalism, Hate Speech, and theInternet in Japan. Radical Historical Review117: 98-118. doi 10.1215/01636545-2210617

Yasuda, Koichi. 2012. Netto to aikoku:Zaitokukai no “yami” o oikakete. (Internet andpatriotism: Pinning down Zaitokukai’sdarkness.) Tokyo: Kōdansha.

APJ | JF 15 | 24 | 5

10

Youngmi Lim received a Ph.D. in Sociology from the City University of New York GraduateCenter, and currently teaches Sociology at Musashi University, Tokyo. Youngmi is writing abook on intermarriage between Zainichi Koreans and Japanese.

Narusawa Muneo is a journalist and editor and the author of books on the Obamaadministration and 9.11.

Satoko Oka NORIMATSU is Director of the Peace Philosophy Centre, a peace-educationorganization in Vancouver, Canada, with a widely-read Japanese-English blog(http://peacephilosophy.blogspot.com/) on topics such as peace and justice, war memory andeducation in East Asia, US-Japan relations, US military bases in Okinawa, nuclear issues, andmedia criticism. (View English-language posts only here(http://peacephilosophy.blogspot.ca/search/label/In%20English%20%E8%8B%B1%E8%AA%9E%E6%8A%95%E7%A8%BF).) She is co-author with Gavan McCormack of Resistant Islands:Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States (Rowman & Littlefield, 2012; an updatedpaperback version was published in the spring of 2018). The Japanese translation is 『沖縄の〈怒 〉－日米への抵抗』（法律文化社, 2013, the Korean translation is 저항하는 섬, 오끼나와:미국과 일본에 맞선 70년간의 기록（창비, 2014）and the Chinese translation is 沖縄之怒　美国同盟下的抗争　（社会科学文献出版社, 2015）. She is also co-author with Oliver Stone andPeter Kuznick of 『よし、戦争につい て話そう。戦争の本質について話をしようじゃないか！(Let's Talk About War. Let's Talk about What War Really Is!)』（金曜日, 2014）. She iseditor, author, and translator of 『正義への責任　世界から沖縄へ(Responsibility for Justice –From the World to Okinawa) Vol 1,2,3』 (Ryukyu Shimpo, 2015, 2016, 2017) and『沖縄は孤立していない　世界から沖縄への声、声、声。(Okinawa Is Not Alone – Voices for Okinawa from theWorld)』(Kinyobi, 2018). She is an Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus editor.

Ishibashi Gaku is a Kanagawa Shimbun journalist.

Joseph Essertier is an associate professor at the Nagoya Institute of Technology. He haswritten about debates over the use of the colloquial in Japanese writing and the Romanizationmovement in the Meiji period (1868-1912).

Notes1 The children of post-WWII baby boomers. “Rosujene” (the lost generation, abridged inkatakana transliteration) had undergone the most competitive college admission as well asjob placement (resulting in higher participation in irregular employment and lower marriagerates) due to Japan’s faltering economy since the collapse of the economic bubble in 1992.2 Yasuda, 2012; Sakamoto, 2011.3 Higuchi, 2014; Yamaguchi, 2013.4 See Klein, 2012 for “information laundering.”5 Reestablished as the Great Korean Empire (Daehan Jeguk 1897-1910).

APJ | JF 15 | 24 | 5

11

6 Hōmushō, 2017. Those who have “special permanent residency” are “former Japanesenationality holders” and their descendants; their migration took place during Japan’scolonization of the Korean Peninsula (1910-1945). When Japan first introduced AlienRegistration in 1947, these legally-Japanese Koreans were registered simply as “Koreans”(Chōsen) just to indicate their regional origin, prior to the 1948 foundation of two Koreanstates, the Republic of Korea (ROK) or “South Korea,” and the Democratic People’s Republicof Korea (DPRK), or “North Korea,” in 1948. Those who formally pledged allegiance to theROK gradually switched their registration to the ROK (Kankoku in Japanese). The ROKgovernment was formally recognized by Japan following the establishment of diplomaticrelations between Japan and South Korea in 1965. Those who continue to be registered asjust Koreans (Chōsenjin) are stateless Koreans. Not all such Koreans support the DPRKregime. 7 Calculated from Hōmushō 2017b. Once naturalized, Zainichi Koreans or any other formerforeigners, are counted simply as Japanese and are statistically lost.8 Ryang, 2007.9 Nishinarita, 1997, p.42, Table II-1.10 Mun, 2007, p. 87-88. The fighting in the years 1950 to 1953 that is conventionally referredto as the “Korean War” in the pro-US narrative was only one stage in this civil war. Thedivision of the Korean Peninsula into two territories, one Communist-controlled and the otherUS-controlled, at the 38th parallel in August 1945, as well as the undemocratic elections thatwere lent legitimacy by the newly-established-yet-still-weak United Nations in 1948exacerbated Korean-versus-Korean strife. With the dark clouds of a civil war on the horizonand intense guerrilla fighting in the late 1940s, e.g. the left wing and grassrootsindependence struggles in southwestern Korea and on Cheju Island, it is not surprising thatmany Koreans chose to remain in Japan rather than return immediately to their ancestralhomeland. I thank Joseph Essertier for pointing out this deeper context.11 Law-125 (Alien Registration Law) and 126 (Residency of Former Japanese Subjects), andLaw-127 (Compensation for Death and Injury associated with Military Duties), possesstremendous symbolic meaning in Japan’s re-establishment as a sovereign state. Law-125 and126 disconnected Zainichi Koreans from the new Japanese state, and Zainichi Korean warveterans receive no compensation. See Jung 2003. Only in 2001 did they receive temporaryremuneration, by which time, the vast majority of war veterans were already deceased andthe law itself expired in 2004 (Sōmushō n.d.).12 Hashimoto, 2015.13 See Ryang, 2016 for a range of issues surrounding Zainichi Koreans who are sympathetic tothe DPRK.14 Higuchi, 2016.15 A “ring-the-doorbell-and-run demo(https://twitter.com/mizuya55/status/886418346295545856)” (pin pon dasshu demo) is theway that Mr. Arita has described this hate demo that was held in the city of Kawasaki on 16July 2017.16 The Hate Speech Act of 2016 is a toothless law against hate speech that was enacted on 25May 2016 by Japan’s National Diet. It does not “legally ban hate speech and sets no penalty.”Tomohiro Osaki, “Diet passes Japan’s first law to curb hate speech

APJ | JF 15 | 24 | 5

12

(https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/24/national/social-issues/diet-passes-japans-first-law-curb-hate-speech/#.WeGkm0yB0_U),” Japan Times (24 May 2016)17 In other words, it appears that a decision to carry out the hate demo in Kawasaki was madeon 5 June 2016, almost two weeks after the Hate Speech Act was enacted and about 13months before the day of the demo, 16 July 2017. This supports the suggestion of IshibashiGaku, the author of the article, that this demo would be banned, if Japan had real laws againsthate speech.18 A term from psychology, “self-victimization” refers to a kind of deception in which theabuser plays the victim, deceiving others by portraying himself or herself as the victim inorder to elicit sympathy from others, divert attention away from his or her abusive acts, toplace responsibility for wrongdoing on his or her chosen scapegoat. This is what Ishibashiseems to intend to express with the word “perversion”—that this hate group twists the historyto such an extent that they make it look as if the people who are obvious victims and havelittle power, i.e., “comfort women” who have given testimony about how they were torturedand Zainichi Koreans who face discrimination in Japan, are, in fact, the ones in power anddoing the bullying. This contradicts the historical evidence and is a complete reversal of roles.