united states and iran - settling their differences

UNITED STATES & IRAN Sett l i n g the i r d i ffe rences

Tobias Rune Caspersen, Department of Pol i t ical Science Universi ty of Copenhagen; August 5, 2010

List of Contents

1. Introduction 3

2. Analytical Approach 5

2.1 Historical consistency 5

2.2 Theoretical framework 6

2.3 Structuring the study 8

3. Iranʼs Foreign Policy Legacy 9

3.1 The Islamic Revolution; Khomeiniʼs legacy 9

3.2 The Gulf; from dogmatism to pragmatism 11

3.3 The Levant; not securitized 14

3.4 Central Asia; stability and coalition building 15

4. Iranʼs Incentive to Acquire Nuclear Weapons 18

5. Crafting a Diplomatic Solution 22

5.1 Settling their differences 22

5.2 Why Iran and the United States have not already joined hands 25

6. Conclusion 29

7. Literature 31

United States & Iran - Settling their differences Tobias Rune Caspersen

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1. Introduction

World headlines are frequently dominated by the dispute over Iranʼs nuclear program, with President Obama demanding that Iran meet its international obligations and the insubordinate responses of President Ahmadinejad. Iran consistently argues that its attempt to acquire access to nuclear technology is strictly for civilian energy consumption, while the United States has been steadfast in its argument that Iranʼs insistence on acquisition of heavy-water reactors and uranium enrichment, and its concealment of numerous nuclear facilities, adds to the suspicion of a nuclear weapons aspiration (Cook and Roshandel, 2009: 118). Due to Iranʼs failure to inform the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on its nuclear progress, the UN Security Council, beginning in 2006, passed resolutions including sanctions for non-compliance. Ahmadinejad retorted that Iran would not back away from uranium enrichment, and that the world must treat Iran as a nuclear power, stating that, "Our answer to those who are angry about Iran achieving the full nuclear fuel cycle is just one phrase. We say: Be angry at us and die of this anger" (Ahmadinejad, 2006). More prudent, Ayatollah Janniti has stated, “We do not welcome sanctions, but if we are threatened by sanctions, we will not give in” (Takeyh, 2006: 150).

As of August 2010, diplomatic solutions to the dispute over Iranʼs nuclear program appear blocked. The Security Council may impose sanctions on Iran, but few believe that such measures would actually sway Iran to change its position (Walt, 2010; Cook and Roshandel, 2009: 122). However, taking military action against Iranʼs nuclear program would likely have an impact that is contrary to Western interests in Iran and the region. First, in all likelihood Iran would response asymmetrically through increased paramilitary operations and support to proxies abroad in an attempt to counter the Western interests in both Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel-Palestine (Cook and Roshandel, 2009: 136). Second, destroying Iranʼs nuclear infrastructure may delay Iranʼs efforts, but is unlikely to end the nuclear program. Instead, Iran would probably remove its facilities from IAEA inspection, and rebuild them underground (ibid.).


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A diplomatic solution should therefore still be pursued, but the current stalemate calls for a new approach. The goal should not be to ensure that Iran cannot acquire nuclear weapons (because this is extremely difficult, as previous attempts indicate), but a diplomatic solution should strive to remove Iranʼs incentive to acquire nuclear weapons. In case Iran indeed is pursuing nuclear weapons, as some in the West argue, Iranʼs incentive to do so is linked to its general foreign policy strategy. I therefore argue, that a diplomatic solution needs to address a broader specter of issues, that reaches beyond the nuclear dispute, without ignoring it. Iranʼs geographic position at the intersection of the Middle East and Asia and the fact that Iran boundaries with seven states, gives it a strategic presence in much of the Greater Middle East. The ideological difference between Iran and the United States over the affairs of the Greater Middle East has fostered several disputes, that needs to be addressed in order to remove Iranʼs incentive to acquire nuclear weapons. This is of course a comprehensive approach, but it might be the only solution with a chance to succeed. I pursue this through the following question:

What is Iranʼs incentive to acquire nuclear weapons?

Answering this question makes it possible to craft a diplomatic solution, that settles the differences between the United States and Iran, which are causing Iran to seek nuclear weapons.


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2. Analytical Approach

To be able to determine Iranʼs incentive to acquire nuclear weapons, we need to have knowledge about Iranʼs general foreign policy rationale, including its ambitions, fears and its historical, cultural, political and geographic (regional and global) context. To grasp all these elements leading to Iranʼs incentive, we need to analyze Iranʼs foreign policy making retrospectively. Doing so, two preliminary questions stand before us: first, how can we be sure that the rationale of previous Iranian foreign policy is also employed today; and second, which theoretical framework is best suited to understand the rationale of the Iranian foreign policy. These questions will be answered consecutively followed by a structuring of the paper.

2.1 Historical consistency

Following the above, the analysis will scrutinize previous Iranian foreign policies in order to understand the incentive Iran would have in acquiring nuclear weapons. For the method to be a valid analytical approach we have to accept the argument of ʻpath dependencyʼ; that present decisions are affected by decisions taken in the past, even though past circumstances may no longer be relevant (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 9).

According to this argument, which is linked to the theory of Historical Institutionalism, “the choice of a course of action depends on the interpretation of the situation rather than on purely instrumental calculation” (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 8). However, Historical Institutionalism does not deny that human behavior is rational, but merely claims that rationality is limited by the actorsʼ interpretation of circumstances and past decisions (path dependency). Given this, change is therefore slow and incremental, unless a ʻcritical junctureʼ occurs that may change the ʻpathʼ. What constitutes a ʻcritical junctureʼ is ill defined, but “historical institutionalists generally stress the impact of economic crisis and military conflict” (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 10).

Applying the theory of Historical Institutionalism the analysis will strive to identify consistent policy-goals that can be said to have formed a ʻpathʼ in Iranian foreign policy


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making, and furthermore, the analysis will focus on how Iran reacts to external shocks understood as ʻcritical juncturesʼ.

A vital condition for the applicability of Historical Institutionalism is, that the institution directing the Iranian foreign policy is fairly stable. In the 1980s the foreign policy was directed almost singlehandedly by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini (Ehteshami, 2002: 291). Following Khomeiniʼs death in 1989 a constitutional reform established the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) with mandate over foreign policy decisions. However, the Supreme Leader, now Ayatollah Khamenei, in practice still dictates all matters of foreign policy, because SNSC-decisions have to be ratified by him (Iran Chamber, 2010). The nuclear facilities are run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which reports solely to the Supreme Leader, who directly establishes its budget (Cook and Roshandel, 2009: 53). Furthermore, the Supreme Leader is non-publicly elected, and his position has never been challenged (Iran Chamber, 2010). The consistency and power of the Supreme Leader justifies describing the institution directing the Iranian foreign policy as stable.

Having said that, the creation of the SNSC has broadened the specter of influence on foreign policy making. Regarding the nuclear program the Secretary of the SNSC functions as Iranʼs chief nuclear negotiator (Iran Chamber, 2010). The current Secretary, Saeed Jalili, has strong ties to both President Ahmadinejad, by being appointed by him, and Ayatollah Khameini, given his additional role as representative of the Supreme Leader in the SNSC (Bashardoust, 2009). The president therefore has a say in both general foreign policy and nuclear matters, but is subordinate to the Supreme Leader.

Even though Iranian foreign policy making is influenced by many institutions this analysis will not consider the negotiations between the contending institutions within the SNSC. The intention is to analyze the output of the foreign policy making process and not the input. What matters the most, following this analytical framework, is the path-dependent interpretation of circumstances, and not the individuals in charge.

2.2 Theoretical framework

To supplement the theory of Historical Institutionalism, I draw on the theoretical framework of Neoclassical Realism. The theoretical framework is chosen to be compatible with


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Historical Institutionalism by complying with its premises; that decisions are affected by external shocks (ʻcritical juncturesʼ) and depend on an interpretation of circumstances (that is path-dependent). Neoclassical Realism clarifies how the premises specifically affects foreign policy.

“[Neoclassical Realism] argue that the scope and ambition of a country's foreign

policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and

specifically by its relative material power capabilities. [...] They argue further,

however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and

complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level.” (Rose, 1998: 146)

Consequently Neoclassical Realism place the greatest emphasis on the systemic variables because “over the long run a state's foreign policy cannot transcend the limits and opportunities thrown up by the international environment” (Rose, 1998: 151). However, a stateʼs response to the systemic pressures is also affected by cognitive variables, meaning that a state will only strive to balance a power, if it is perceived as a threat (Hansen, 2009: 17). Furthermore, the magnitude of a threat is determined by domestic variables (Hansen, 2009: 19), such as cultural traits, ideological aspirations, demographic pressures, and religious convictions. This is due to the fact, that “states with rival ideologies [...] tend to disagree on more issues than states with similar

ideologies” (ibid.). Moreover, because “balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses” (Hansen, 2009: 17) states will balance hard against states with rival ideologies “because losing the conflict may force it to give up core values and possibly result in

regime change” (Hansen, 2009: 19).

According to neoclassical realism, when balancing a threat it is rational to initially perform

soft balancing (security alliances and limited arms buildup) and/or asymmetrical balancing (such as support for terrorist groups), to avoid preemptive attacks. Building on this, the strategy can evolve into hard balancing (increasing military capabilities, i.e. nuclear

weapons). (Hansen, 2009: 14)


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However, according to Neoclassical Realism, not all foreign policy areas pose a security

threat. It is therefore in some areas possible to place greater emphasis on ideological and

cultural interests.

Lastly, because a state only will balance a power, if it is perceived as a threat, Neoclassical Realism acknowledges that if the threat diminishes, the state will reconsider its balancing strategy. Following this theoretical standpoint, a diplomatic solution to the nuclear dispute is achievable: If the threats toward Iran would decrease, Iran would have no incentive to acquire nuclear weapons.

2.3 Structuring the study

The analysis will arrive at a suggestion for a diplomatic solution to the nuclear dispute that settles the differences between the Unites States and Iran.

Understanding the rationale of Iran's foreign policy is the key to crafting sensible and effective policies towards Iran. According to the analytical approach, it is necessary to analyze Iranʼs foreign policy legacy; to understand Iranʼs ambitions, fears, perceptions of other actors and how Iran reacts to external shocks. This makes for the following structure:

Review of Iranʼs foreign policy legacy by applying the theories of Historical Institutionalism and Neoclassical Realism; chapter 3.

Answering the problem of what constitute Iranʼs incentive to acquire nuclear weapons; chapter 4.

Discussion of a diplomatic solution to the nuclear dispute that tackles Iranʼs incentive to acquire nuclear weapons; chapter 5.

Explanation of why Iran and the United States have not already joined hands.

Conclusion on the content of the proposed diplomatic solution and the means to achieving it; chapter 6.


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3. Iranʼs Foreign Policy Legacy

The ambition of this chapter is not to provide a comprehensive review of the history of foreign policy making in Iran. Instead, the chapter will provide an abbreviated discussion of key historical foreign policies. This admittedly limited account of the history is appropriate given the focus on understanding the rationale of Iranʼs foreign policy strategies and how they have evolved.

The first section analyzes how the ideological aspirations of Iranʼs foreign policy were fostered during the Islamic Revolution. The geography of Iran and the systemic pressures provided that Iran subsequently adopted separate foreign policy strategies towards the subregions surrounding Iran; the Gulf, the Levant, and Central Asia1. The sections on these subregions will show how Iran developed its present foreign policy rationale by responding to critical junctures and adjusting its policy accordingly.

3.1 The Islamic Revolution; Khomeiniʼs legacy

Following the overthrow of the Shah Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi in 1979, the stage was set to reshape Iranʼs political system and its place in the regional and global order. The factions involved in the revolution were both conservative Shiʼite Islamists and secular liberals, who subsequently engaged in an all-out battle to shape the revolution in their own image. However, the hostage crisis following a group of Islamic students taking over the United Statesʼ embassy in Tehran in 1979, aroused the public in favor of Ayatollah Khomeiniʼs Islamic Ideology, that came to dominate the foreign policy of the new Islamic Republic (Takeyh, 2006: 97). For Khomeini the Islamic Revolution was not just a backlash against a mere tyrant but also an agent of Western imperialism, that was contaminating the indigenous culture of Iran (Takeyh, 2006: 15). The United Statesʼ embassy was referred to as the ʻden of spiesʼ that had been responsible for the coup dʼetat against the democratically elected government of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh that restored the


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1 The Gulf: Iran, Iraq, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait. The Levant: Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Syria, Jordan. Central Asia: Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbeskistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Western China and Southern Russia.

Pahlavi-regime as absolute monarch in 1953 (Takeyh, 2006: 101). It therefore became an ideological aspiration for Khomeini to seek political and economic independence from outside interference (Ehteshami, 2002: 285).

A second foreign policy aspiration promoted by Khomeiniʼs Islamic ideology was the rebirth of Iranʼs drive towards regional supremacy:

“Derived from Iranʼs long history and its geography, Iran sees itself as uniquely qualified to determine, at the very least, the destiny of the Gulf subregion. Furthermore, it sees itself as one of only a handful of ʻnaturalʼ states in the Middle East, which by virtue of being an old and territorially established civilization (based around the notion of ʻIran-zaminʼ) can and should have influence beyond its borders.” (Ehteshami, 2002: 286)

Ayatollah Khomeini added a religious aspect to the Persian heritage, and consequently saw himself as the leader of the entire Muslim community, seeking to emancipate the Islamic ummah from the transgressions of imperialism and the rule of despotism (Takeyh, 2006:4). Khomeini thereby sought to ʻexport the revolutionʼ:

“In this age, which is the age of oppression of the Muslim world at the hands of the U.S. and Russia and their puppets such as al-Sauds, those traitors to the great divine sanctuary must be forcefully cursed.” (Khomeini, in Takeyh, 2006: 64)

In essence the Islamic Revolution developed an Islamic foreign policy for Iran with the aspiration of effectively changing the regional balance of power. This strategy was to reject the Western and Communist bloc alliances in the Middle East and increase the influence of Islam and Iran. However, according to Neoclassical Realism, the highly ideologically driven foreign policy of Khomeini must in part be explained as a means of consolidating the Islamic Republic at home. Khomeini prolonged the hostage crisis with the United States and later Khomeini described the invasion by Iraq as “a blessing,” in the sense that it unified the public to defend the revolution (Takeyh, 2006: 26).


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3.2 The Gulf; from dogmatism to pragmatism

In the early 1980s, Khomeiniʼs first foreign policy strategy to ʻexport the revolutionʼ was to motivate the substantial Shiʼite minorities in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and the Shiʼite majority in Iraq to rise against their incumbent regimes. However, when the demonstrations turned out to be ineffective and without intention of emulating Iranʼs revolution, Khomeini abandoned the strategy and instead opted for a strategy of terrorism (Takeyh, 2006: 65). Likewise, terrorism did not succeed in overthrowing the regimes, but instead led them to solidify against Iran. Iraq invaded Iran September 1980 and in May 1981 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates established the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which main goal was to contain Iranʼs influence beyond its borders (ibid.). Furthermore, due to the oil plants in the Gulf, the United States had a security interest in stability in the Middle East, and the United States, for that reason, strengthened its security ties to the GCC countries, who jointly subsidized Saddam Hussein's military in its war against Iran (ibid.). Beyond Iraq, the war thereby also shaped Iranʼs perception of the international community. The fact that the United States embraced the tyrannical ruler of Saddam Hussein and the United Statesʼ indifference to Iraqʼs use of chemical weapons against Iran, let to the notion that Iran cannot rely on international conventions and treaties for its security (Takeyh, 2006: 176).

The war lasted until 1988, when Iran finally realized that the international community simply would not allow Iraq to lose the war. To escape direct military confrontation with the United States, Iran therefore unconditionally accepted UN Security Council Resolution 598 (Ehteshami, 2002: 298). The end of the war constituted a critical juncture for Iranʼs foreign policy. The war had devastated Iranʼs economy, and even though Iran in the first few years following the revolution tried to reduce its dependence on outside economic forces, due to the ideological aspiration of achieving independence, the war with Iraq made Iran dependent on oil export (Ehteshami, 2002, 288).

The end of the Cold War must be regarded as a second critical juncture. The systemic changes did not directly affect Iran, as post-revolutionary Iran was non-aligned during the Cold War, but the retreat of the Soviet Union from the Middle East made the United States an undisputed extraregional power in the Middle East (Hansen, 2009, 131).


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A third critical juncture that contributed to facilitate a change of foreign policy was the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. Subsequently, the formation of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) broadened the specter of influence on Iranʼs foreign policy making, and the new Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, proved to be more pragmatic than his predecessor (Ehteshami, 2002, 292).

Due to the three critical junctures around the end of the 1980s (the war with Iraq and the devastation of the economy, the United Statesʼ supremacy in world politics, and the domestic change of leadership), Iran not only changed its foreign policies but also its foreign policy aspirations. First, Iran realized that neither the Muslim population nor their incumbent regimes supported Iranʼs quest to unite the Islamic countries. Second, Iran realized that the United States would not allow Iran to become a regional leader by use of force. Third, Iran realized that to obtain the highest oil rents, Iran needed to cooperate with the other oil exporting countries in the Gulf and integrate itself in the international capitalist system (Ehteshami, 2002, 288).

Due to these lessons, the new and more pragmatic leadership abandoned the aspiration of changing any borders or regimes in the Middle East. Supreme Leader Khamenei declared that, “Iran poses no threat to any Islamic country” (Khamenei, in Takeyh, 2006: 68). However, Iran still aspired to regional hegemony and deflation of the United Statesʼ influence in the Middle East. The foreign policy strategy to achieve this goal was to cooperate with the Gulf countries both regarding economy and security. Iran perceived Iraqʼs diminishing regional power, following its eviction from Kuwait by the United States in 1991, as a unique opportunity. Iran supported the UN position and condemned Iraqʼs invasion of Kuwait, which improved Iranʼs relations to the other Gulf States. Iran suggested a regional security arrangement whereby stability in the Gulf would be ensured in collectivity instead of by the United States (Takeyh, 2006: 66). Unfortunately for Iran, giving up security relations with the United States proved unattractive to the other Gulf States. In fact, some Gulf States even significantly increased their level of security ties to the United States (Ehteshami, 2002, 301). Contrary to Iranʼs aspirations the result was a permanent United Statesʼ military presence in the Gulf and thus a weakening of Iranʼs ability to influence the Gulf States.


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After failed attempts of terrorism to get the United States to withdraw from the Middle East, like the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers, housing United States military personnel, Iran finally abandoned its ultimatum for cooperation, being that the Gulf States share its hostility towards the United States (Takeyh, 2006: 67). This paved the way for a range of trade and diplomatic agreements between Iran and the Gulf States, but Iranʼs influence was still greatly weakened due to its hostility towards the United Statesʼ presence in the Middle East. However, Iran “managed finally to transcend Khomeiniʼs legacy and to displace the ideological antagonisms with policies rooted in pragmatism and self-interest” (Takeyh, 2006: 69).

At the millennium the foreign policy aspirations formed by the critical junctures around the end of the 1980s were still present; regional hegemony and deflation of the United Statesʼ influence. When the United States launched ʻOperation Iraqi Freedomʼ in 2003, Iran sustained its new path of pragmatism. Iran has benefited significantly from the invasion of Iraq, because it essentially achieved Iranʼs goals for its own war with Iraq in the 1980s: The removal of a tyrannical leader suppressing Shiʼite Muslims, and the removal of Iranʼs greatest rival for regional hegemony. However, the invasion also further increased the presence of the United Statesʼ military in Iranʼs neighborhood, and the risk of Iraq becoming a ʻWesternʼ state (Cook and Roshandel, 2009: 76).

Iran has sought to take advantage of the fall of Saddam Hussein's Baʼthist regime and exert its influence over Iraqʼs new government and society. However, Iran has not sought to ʻexport the Islamic Revolutionʼ, but instead, through diplomacy and support for Shiʼite allies, Iran has advocated for a pluralistic democracy in Iraq (Takeyh, 2006: 183). The rationale behind this foreign policy is, first, that a “pluralistic Iraq is bound to be a fractious, divided state too preoccupied with its internal squabbles to contest Iranʼs aspirations in the Gulf” (Takeyh, 2006: 183). Second, a democratic Iraq is certain to empower a Shiʼite government, given that it is the majority religion in Iraq, which hopefully would be friendly to Iran. Third, Iran is aware that the United States will not leave Iraq prior to political and social stability (Cook and Roshandel, 2009: 76).

However, contrary to this rationale, Iran has been sending arms to friendly Iraqi militias, and supporting Shiʼite insurgents fighting against the United Statesʼ presence (Cook and Roshandel, 2009: 75). The rationale for this second strategy is that, due to Iranʼs


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classification as part of an ʻaxis of evilʼ and the United Statesʼ doctrine of ʻpreemptive warʼ and regime change, Iran is worried that it would be the next aim for the United Statesʼ machinery. By supporting Iraqi militias and Shiʼite insurgents Iran is keeping the United States preoccupied in Iraq, and thereby limiting the United Statesʼ ability for further military incursions (Takeyh, 2006: 131). Furthermore, in case the United States would attack Iran, Iran would be able to retaliate in Iraq (Takeyh, 2006: 184).

Iranʼs strategy toward Iraq is therefore twofold. Its short term interest it to keep the United States preoccupied, while its long term interest is to see a decentralized, stable and Shiʼite governed democracy. Summing up, this foreign policy is shaped by Iranʼs long-drawn-out interests in the Gulf of regional hegemony and deflation of the United Statesʼ influence. To achieve this strategy Iran has (since the critical junctures around the end of the 1980s), relied on soft and asymmetrical balancing against the United States.

3.3 The Levant; not securitized

Iranʼs foreign policy in the Levant is almost entirely shaped by its perception of Israel. According to Khomeiniʼs Islamic Ideology, Israel is an illegitimate entity and an agent of United States imperialism usurping sacred Islamic lands, and Iran therefore sees the eviction of Israel from the Middle East as its Islamic obligation (Takeyh, 2006: 190). However, the hostility towards Israel also serves Iranʼs strategic interests: While the Arab states gradually has conceded the legitimacy of Israel, Iran has remained resolute and defiant, which has garnered widespread popular approbation among the Arab population. This have paved the way for Iranʼs strategic interest of asserting its influence in the Levant and affirm its claims as a regional leader, by Islamizing the Arab struggle against Israel (Takeyh, 2006: 200).

Iranʼs opposition to Israel is expressed through ties to terrorist organizations plotting against Israel, such as the Islamic Jihad, Hamas and Hezbollah, with the latter essentially founded by Iran following the 1982 war in Lebanon (Takeyh, 2006: 202). Furthermore, Iran has made common cause with Syria, that shares Iranʼs antipathy, due to Israelʼs occupation of the Golan Hights (Takeyh, 2006: 70).


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Internationally, Iranʼs foreign policy strategy in the Levant has given Iran a reputation as an unsavory state, and it has been part of the reason for the imposition of the United Statesʼ sanctions. However, Iran has sustained its incendiary opposition to Israel ever since the Islamic Revolution, because no critical junctures have provided a clash between Iranʼs ideological position against Israel and Iranʼs strategic interests in the Levant (Takeyh, 2006: 190).

Despite Iranʼs increased influence, Iran is unlikely to ever become a truly significant actor in the Levant: “Ninety percent of Muslims are Sunni and Iran is Shiʼite; Persian is a distant second to Arabic as the language of Islam; and the relations between Persians and Arabs have historically been antagonistic” (Huntington, 2003: 178). Iranʼs strategic interest in the Levant is therefore limited to assisting the image of Iran as a regional leader. Israel poses no security threat to Iran; there has never been any direct military conflict between them, they have no territorial dispute, and Iran has no Palestinian refugee problem (Takeyh, 2006: 208). Consequently, Iran has no interest in direct military conflict with neither Israel nor any Arab State.

Summing up; first, Iranʼs interests in the Levant are second to its interests in the Gulf, which is geographically and culturally closer to Iran, and second, Iranʼs relations in the Levant are not securitized.

3.4 Central Asia; stability and coalition building

In sharp contrast to the Gulf and the Levant, Iranʼs foreign policy toward its northern and eastern neighbors in Central Asia has been one of sustained pragmatism.

To Iranʼs east lies Afghanistan and Pakistan. Iranʼs relations with these countries have historically been tense. As part of the Cold War, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Due to Iranʼs ideological antipathy of the Soviet Union, Iran actively assisted Shiʼite opposition groups in Afghanistan such as the Northern Alliance (Pant, 2009). Pakistan on the other hand, supported by the United States, assisted the Sunni Islamic resistance, that eventually established the Taliban regime after the Soviet Union left Afghanistan in 1989 (ibid.). In the 1990s Iran sustained its support for the Northern Alliance as a means of stabilizing its boarder to Afghanistan, as the Taliban regime routinely massacred Shiʼites,


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which provided a refuge problem for Iran (Takeyh, 2006: 80). Meanwhile, Iran and Pakistanʼs proxy fight over influence in Afghanistan and Iranʼs problems with the Pakistan-supported Taliban caused tense mistrust between Iran and Pakistan (ibid.).

However, the demise of the Taliban regime in 2001, formed a critical juncture, because it removed much of the tension between Iran and its two neighbors to the east. Iran now has close diplomatic ties to the government in Afghanistan, supporting reconstruction projects and Shiʼite minorities (Pant, 2009). Similarly relations to Pakistan have improved, though both countries are still influencing Afghanistan along sectarian lines (Shiʼite/Sunni) (ibid.). Pakistan, possessing nuclear weapons, has assisted Iran in its nuclear program (ibid.) and in June 2010 Pakistan signed a deal with Iran to build a $US7.6 billion gas pipeline connecting the two countries, despite going against United States sanctions on Iran (Kurama, 2010).

A further point to be made regarding the war in Afghanistan is, that “it could not have succeeded as easily as it did without Iranian support” (Takeyh, 2006: 122). Iran mediated between the United States and the Northern Alliance, to get the latter to accept the Bonn agreement that would establish a new broad-based government and diminish the United Statesʼ presence (Pant, 2009). In combination with the Kuwait crisis, this testifies for an Iranian perception of the United States, where Iran finds the United Statesʼ imperialism appalling, but even so can and will cooperate with the United States if it suits its national interests. That being said, there is reason to believe that Iran now percepts the United States as a greater threat than the Taliban, as reports since 2008 have indicated that Iran is now providing arms for the Taliban (Cook and Roshandel, 2009: 107).

Summing up; Iran has changed its perception of Afghanistan and Pakistan due to the 2001 war in Afghanistan. Iran is now trying to form a friendly relationship with the new Afghan government, and Iran now has an opportunistic relationship with Pakistan, despite their differences. Iran has, on the other hand, become disquieted by the United Statesʼ prolonged presence in Afghanistan.

To Iranʼs north lies the former Soviet states; many with a majority Muslim population. During the Cold War, Khomeini was as contemptuous of Soviet Union as he was of the United States, and the Soviet Union for that reason supplied arms for Iraq in its war with


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Iran (Takeyh, 2006: 77). However, following the critical juncture of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia and Iran formed an opportunistic relationship. Due to Iranʼs estrangement from the West and Iranʼs geographic proximity to Russia, Iran realized the need of Russia as an ally. Iran has therefore restrained from inflaming Islamic sentiments in Central Asia (Takeyh, 2006: 77) and largely ignored the Chechnya conflict, where Muslims have been massacred by Russian soldiers (Takeyh, 2006: 78). From its unofficial alliance with Russia, Iran has received the benefit of trade, significant arms deals, and both technical and diplomatic support for its nuclear program (Takeyh, 2006: 76-78).

A similar relationship with China has been developing since the 1990s. Trade of consumer goods has been steadily increasing, and, on a higher level, China has supplied Iran with weapons and nuclear technology in return for natural-resources, mainly oil (Cook and Roshandel, 2009: 82). Both countries have an interest in sustained friendship, and Iran has therefore not interfered in the 2009 Xinjiang crisis in northeast China, besides condemning the suppression of Muslims (Zambelis, 2009). Like Russia, China has supported Iranʼs nuclear program in international fora.

Since 2005 Iranʼs ties to Russia and China have become institutionalized, as Iran has become an ʻobserver stateʼ in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (Cook and Roshandel, 2009: 83). Besides China and Russia the SCO comprises Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The SCO has no agreement of mutual deterrence like NATO, but many observers believe that the undeclared goal of the SCO is to counterbalance NATO and the Unites States, particularly to prevent extensive interference in Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East (Najibullah, 2008). The fact that Iran strives to join the SCO, going against Khomeiniʼs non-alliance policy, must be seen as a necessary measure given the perceived threat from the United States. However, Iran is unlikely to become a full member of the SCO while Iranʼs nuclear program is disputed, as it would risk precipitating an open confrontation between the SCO and the West.

Summing up; Iran has downplayed its ideological aspirations in turn for stability on its eastern boarders, and an ʻanti-hegemonicʼ coalition with Russia and China, united not by ideology but by complementary interests and grievances.


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4. Iranʼs Incentive to Acquire Nuclear Weapons

In general, a countryʼs incentive to acquire nuclear weapons is either to balance hard against a threat or to fulfill offensive aspirations. Regarding the latter, Iran has an enduring aspiration for regional supremacy. Surely, the possession of nuclear weapons would provide Iran significant prestige and stature. However, it is hard to see how Iran should make use of nuclear weapons to fulfill its aspiration for regional supremacy. On the contrary, Iran would lose much credibility among the Islamic population in the event that Iran used nuclear weapons against another Islamic country. Furthermore, it would be unrealistic to assume that Iranʼs second foreign policy aspiration of decreasing the United Statesʼ influence and presence in the Middle East could be accomplished by using nuclear weapons. Attacking the United States (or Israel) would undoubtedly cause a fatal war for Iran. It should therefore be clear that Iranʼs incentive to acquire nuclear weapons is due to obtaining a deterrent capacity against a threat. According to Neoclassical Realism a power is only a threat if it is perceived as such. The fact that Iran has nuclear weapon states within its sphere of interest, such as Israel2 and Pakistan, and extra-regional nuclear powers, such as the United States, Russia and China, therefore poses no threat per se. Hence, to analyze whether or not these countries poses a threat to Iran, it is necessary to draw on the study of Iranʼs foreign policy legacy in the previous chapter. This provides an understanding of Iranʼs perceptions of these countries, and whether their foreign policies inflict on Iranʼs foreign policy aspirations.

Looking first at Israel, I have argued that Iranʼs relationship with Israel is not securitized. Indeed, Iranʼs animus against Israel has propelled Iran to support terrorism against Israel, but this foreign policy strategy is more an effort to gain prestige as a defender of Islam and a regional leader, than a genuine reflection of concern. Both Iran and Israel have no interest in direct military conflict, and Israelʼs presumed possession of nuclear weapons is for that reason of little concern for Iran.


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2 Israel has not publicly acknowledged that it possesses nuclear weapons, but it is widely assumed that they do (Takeyh, 2006: 141).

In Central Asia, it is clearly unfavorable having a nuclear armed Sunni-Islamic Pakistan next door. However, as I have argued, Iranʼs foreign policy aspiration of regional hegemony is not directed at Central Asia. On the contrary, Iranʼs long-term goal toward Central Asia is stability, and Iran has therefore accepted the new Afghan government, even though it is Sunni-dominated. Furthermore, Iran has largely come to terms with Pakistan since the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and Pakistanʼs possession of nuclear weapons is therefore no impediment to Iranʼs aspirations.

Looking at the extra-regional players to the East, Iran has established unofficial alliances with Russia and China; hence their immense material power does not worry Iran. Quite contrary, Russia and China are a source of security to Iran.

By way of this introduction, it should be clear that there are no major incentives for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons besides Iranʼs enduring contention with the United States, to which I now turn. From the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution Iran was, for ideological reasons, against United States imperialism in the Middle East. Consequently, the United States has sought to contain Iranʼs power and its influence beyond its borders to create stability, to further the United Statesʼ own interests in the Middle East, as for example making access to natural resources. This quest of the United States stands in the way of Iranʼs foreign policy aspiration of regional leadership, and, following Neoclassical Realism, their rival ideologies (capitalism/Islamism) has intensified the conflict. At first Iran strived to balance the threat of the United States by asymmetrical balancing (terrorism) and soft balancing (alliances with Russia, China and Syria and conventional arms buildup mainly acquired from China and Russia), but to balance the increased threat posed by the United Statesʼ since September 11, Iran has accelerated its nuclear program to perform hard balancing. This development in Iranʼs balancing strategy follows the theory of Neoclassical Realism, and indicates that Iranʼs quest for nuclear weapons is not irrational behavior.

In the late 1990s the relationship between Iran and the United States showed modest sings of improvement with Iran ending its terrorism toward the United Statesʼ presence in the Gulf and Iran supporting the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, but this trend changed promptly as Bush in 2002 named Iran as part of an ʻaxis of evilʼ3. The United States no


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3 Alongside Iraq and North Korea.

United States military

Iraq, Afghanistan, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Kuwait, Turkey, Israel, Arabian Sea, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan4

Nuclear weapons

China, Russia, India, Pakistan and Israel

Member of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan


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4 Uzbekistan and Kyrgystan are temporary due to the war in Afghanistan and the SCO has requested the United States to withdraw its military from central Asia.

Iranʼs geostrategic environment

longer sought merely to contain rogue states and to press for their disarmament through negotiations, but to actively alter the political culture of the Middle East by ushering in a democratic dawn through preemptive war. The regime-changes in Afghanistan and Iraq have been welcomed by Iran as the countries constituted a security issue to Iran. However, it has been accompanied by increased Iranian fear of being next on the United Statesʼ list for aggression and democratization. The intense presence of United States military in the Middle East, as the map on the previous page shows, and the United Statesʼ containment policy is an existential threat to Iran. In this context, the legacy from the war with Iraq provides Iran with incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. First, Iran learned the lesson of being lesser equipped than its counterpart. Second, by way of the United Statesʼ indifference to Iraqʼs use of chemical weapons, Iran realized that it cannot rely on international conventions and treaties for its security. Furthermore, it must have made an impression on Iran, that Iraq (without nuclear weapons) was invaded, while North Korea (with nuclear weapons) has sustained its integrity. Finally, the prospect of Afghanistan and Iraq emerging as close United States allies, policing the Middle East at the behest of the United States, is a threat to Iranʼs aspirations of regional supremacy, as it would isolate Iran.

Contrary to many Western assumptions, I have argued that Iran is a rational actor and that its incentive to acquire nuclear weapons is not to fulfill a religious mission of destroying Israel or cause massive death. On the contrary, Iranʼs quest for nuclear weapons is a judicious attempt to craft a viable deterrent posture against the United States.


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5. Crafting a Diplomatic Solution

Having identified Iranʼs incentive to acquire nuclear weapons, it is now possible to discuss how to craft a diplomatic solution that removes this incentive. In the chapter on Iranʼs foreign policy legacy I have argued that Iran is sensitive to critical junctures, e.g. systemic changes and others policy revisions, and that Iran today only acts according to its religious conviction when it does not inflict on Iranʼs national interest and security. According to Neoclassical Realism, Iran is therefore a rational actor, and would be expected to revise its foreign policy strategy in case the United States did the same.

However, there are two prerequisites for Iran and the United States to arrive at a diplomatic solution ending Iranʼs nuclear weapons aspiration: First, it should be possible for Iran and the United States to find common ground, where both countries gain more than they lose; and second, both Iran and the United States should be willing to engage with each other in such a diplomatic solution.

5.1 Settling their differences

Both Iran and the United States perceive each other as a threat, hence their policies toward each other are defensive: The United Statesʼ sanctions and containment policy, and Iranʼs nuclear weapons program and support for opposition-groups in Afghanistan and Iraq. These policies are of no value without the threat, indicating that if the United States and Iran were to join hands, they should be willing to leave these policies behind.

Having said that, it is debatable how much of its nuclear program Iran should discontinue to ease the United Statesʼ anxieties. Currently Iran is using technologies that are capable of producing weapons-grade materials; heavy water reactors and uranium enrichment. The UN Security Council has demanded that Iran halt further enrichment for four years, while Iran claims its right to uranium enrichment according to the treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and has domestically framed its enrichment program with nationalistic jargon as a struggle against an imperialistic dictate (Adib-Moghaddam, 2008: 77). Suspending enrichment (changing path) would therefore be


22

politically costly for the Iranian leaders, but there is room for negotiations in which a certain level of enrichment capability would be deemed tolerable to the United States and acceptable to Iran. In exchange, the United States should lift its sanctions and perhaps even provide Iran economic assistance, because even though sanctions have been unsuccessful in changing the path of Iranʼs nuclear program it has indeed been hurting Iranʼs economy (Berman, 2009).

However, more challenging is the fact that both Iran and the United States aspire to influence the Greater Middle East. This offensive aspiration initially produced the tension between the two, and caused the United States to contain Iranian influence, which has incentivized Iran to seek nuclear weapons and recently support opposition-groups in Afghanistan and Iraq. None of them should be expected to give up this aspiration, and it is therefore necessary to craft a diplomatic solution, that goes beyond the nuclear dispute and settles their differences over a broader specter of issues, if Iranʼs strategic anxieties should diminish, and Iran should be expected to give up acquisition of nuclear weapons.

That being said, it would be unnecessary and self-defeating to strive for a diplomatic solution settling all their differences. Instead it should tackle the issues, that from Iranʼs perspective are security related, which excludes the deep-rooted dispute over Israel. The United States should acknowledge this, instead of its all-or-nothing policy, demanding that Iran abandon all its policies deemed unfavorable by the United States, before normalization of relations can take place.

As previously discussed Iranʼs greatest contestation with the Unites States is over influence in the Gulf subregion. Iran sees itself as a natural leader of the Gulf by dint of its historical greatness and its rich civilization, and wants to exert an Islamic influence. This conflicts with the United Statesʼ interest in stability to secure a stable flow of oil, and due to Iranʼs historically radical and violent behavior the United States has sought to contain Iranʼs influence. This containment policy is not only threatening Iranʼs foreign policy aspirations but also its domestic integrity5.


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5 The United States has repeatedly called for regime change in Iran (Takeyh, 2006: 219).

However, I argue that Iran has matured, and that today it is possible for the United States and Iran to coexist and cooperate. As argued earlier, Iranʼs radical foreign policy of the 1980s was mainly due to consolidating the regime at home, and since then successive governments have tried to temper this legacy. Iran has gradually become pragmatic in its policies toward the Gulf and has consistently behaved pragmatically toward Central Asia. With the election of president Ahmadinejad, a hard-line conservative, and his proclaimed desire to ʻreturn to the roots of the revolutionʼ, the West has worried that Iran would revise its links to the Gulf terrorist organizations as a means of subverting its neighbors and exporting the revolution (Takeyh, 2006: 70). This does not seem to be the case. As I have argued, the critical juncture of September 11 increased Iranʼs anxieties of the United States, but no critical juncture has changed Iranʼs relations to the Middle Eastern countries in a negative direction. On the contrary, the legacy of Iranʼs foreign policy has taught the Iranian foreign policy makers, that the Middle Eastern countries are not inclined to emulate Iranʼs revolution, and that they would solidify against Iran, if Iran sought to impose an Islamic revolution elsewhere by use of force. Consequently, the Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi has explained that “no Iranian official has suggested the formation of Iranian style government in Iraq” (Kharrazi, in Cook and Roshandel, 2009: 76) and Iranʼs support for Iraqi insurgents and Taliban is not to counteract the democratic governments in Iraq and Afghanistan, but a means of balancing the United Statesʼ containment policy against Iran. As previously described, Iran would in fact support the United Statesʼ policies in Afghanistan and Iraq, were it not for the United Statesʼ containment of Iranian influence.

In case the United States acknowledged all this, it would be possible for Iran and the United States to cooperate on a new security architecture in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf. An obvious place to begin would be Iraq. The United States ought to learn from its success in bringing political order to Afghanistan, where Iran supported the United States. As the United States recedes its ʻhard powerʼ in Iraq, the United Statesʼ policies would benefit from being buttressed by Iranʼs ʻsoft powerʼ, even more so than in Afghanistan. Many of the Shiʼite members of Iraqʼs new government lived in exile in Iran during the Saddam Hussein reign, and Iraqʼs Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the leading religious authority, is a native of Iran (Cook and Roshandel, 2009: 76). Besides links to Iraqʼs leadership, close ties have also been developing between the Shiʼite populations in


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Iraq and Iran6, as they have a shared interest in downplaying pan-Arab notions (ibid.). The United States should acknowledge that Iran will wield substantial influence over the future of Iraq, and instead of competing for influence, the United States and Iraq could benefit from cooperating, as both want to see a stable and democratic Iraq.

Through the recognition of shared interests, it would be possible to settle their differences in a diplomatic solution. Following an acknowledgement that Iran has matured, the United States should end its containment policy against Iran, and assure Iran that its interests will be taken into account as the United States plots its strategy for the future of the Gulf. This should naturally begin with Iran and the United States harmonizing their interests in Iraq. This would diminish Iranʼs anxieties of isolation and invasion, and thereby remove Iranʼs incentive to acquire nuclear weapons. As a result, Iran should be willing to sign a deal restraining its nuclear program to peaceful purposes.

5.2 Why Iran and the United States have not already joined hands

Having identified the content of a diplomatic solution to the nuclear dispute, it is obvious to discuss what is holding the United States and Iran back form making such a deal.

Looking at their statements both Iran and the United States claim their willingness to cooperate. The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has proclaimed, that “We and the United States have many differences. But this does not mean that we cannot adopt a regular policy in view of our national interests” (Khamenei, in Takeyh, 2006: 121), and recently president Ahmadinejad stated, that "Iran has always been willing to resolve the nuclear dispute through negotiations" (Ahmadinejad, in Ramazani, 2009). Likewise president Obama has declared, that

“My administration is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us, and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran and the international community. This process will not be advanced by threats. We seek instead engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect.” (Obama, 2009)


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6 Both Iran and Iraq have a majority Shiʼite population, with 89 percent in Iran and 65 percent in Iraq.

Despite this, when it comes to their actual conduct, both seems more dedicated to achieving the othersʼ capitulation, than making a genuine effort toward cooperation. They continually dismiss each others proposals in harsh rhetoric, often before negotiations even begin. To understand why none of them have proposed the kind of diplomatic solution I suggest, we must interpret the nuclear dispute as the non-zero-sum game presented in the matrix below.

Iran cooperates Iran defects

U.S. cooperates Win - Win (Diplomatic solution) Lose much - Win a little

U.S. defects Win a little - Lose much Lose - Lose (Stalemate)

As described in the previous section, the diplomatic solution would benefit both, and therefore be a win-win situation; both would have to acknowledge some of the opponents demands, but the benefits of reducing the threat posed by the opponent would by far outweigh this cost. In the present stalemate both countries relies on defensive policies, hence it is a lose-lose situation. In case one country cooperates (by proposing the diplomatic solution) and the other defects (by turning it down), the cooperating country would ʻlose muchʼ, while the defecting country would ʻwin a littleʼ.

The payoffʼs in the last-mentioned situations are determined by the domestic oppositionʼs response, that a failed attempt to propose the diplomatic solution would entail. This follows the theory of Neoclassical Realism, that foreign policies are affected by domestic circumstances. By proposing the diplomatic solution, the cooperating country would have acknowledged the legitimacy of the defecting countryʼs demands, but would not receive the benefit of the diplomatic solution in the form of a reduced threat, because the other country defects. This would produce a domestic backlash for the government seeking cooperation, as the government would appear weak vis-a-vis the defecting country. In case Iran cooperates and the United States defects, the Khamenei/Ahmadinejad administration would face an enormous domestic opposition from the hardliners supporting the customary policy of balancing the United States. Likewise, in case the United States cooperates and Iran defects, the Obama administration would face an enormous domestic


26

opposition from the neoconservatives supporting the customary policy of sanctions and threats of military intervention. In this regard, Stephen Walt has written, that taking

“a hard line on Iran and defending our [the United Statesʼ] longstanding policy of confrontation is a very safe position to support. [...] By contrast, any government official who proposed taking the threat of force off the table, [...] or who recommended a much more far-reaching effort at finding common ground would be taking a significant career risk. And you'd be virtually certain to get smeared by unrepentant neocons...” (Walt, 2010)

Due to the inevitable domestic backlash in these situations, both Iran and the United States will not propose the kind of diplomatic solution I suggest, unless they are certain that the other country will cooperate, which makes the present stalemate a Nash equilibrium7. Unfortunately, following Historical Institutionalism, the legacy of their relations has generated a mistrust between the two. The United States believe that Iran is only pretending to be willing to find a diplomatic solution in order to gain time, as Iran relentlessly denies to stall its enrichment program during negotiations (Walt, 2010). Likewise, Iran do not believe that the United States has any intention of changing its policy toward Iran, having witnessed the Bush administration sustaining the containment policy despite Iranʼs cooperation regarding Afghanistan, and since the Obama administration continues the containment policy (Takeyh, 2006: 220).

To reach the Pareto optimal8 Nash equilibrium, being the diplomatic solution, it is therefore necessary to create mutual trust, witch is not established through speeches but through actual conduct. This view is also held by Stephen Walt, stating that

“a combination of friendly and threatening gestures may be worse than the latter alone, because tentative acts of accommodation will be seen as a trick and will reinforce the idea that the other side is irredeemably deceitful and can never be trusted.” (Walt, 2010)


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7 Nash equilibrium: A situation in which no player has anything to gain by changing its own strategy unilaterally.

8 Pareto obtimal: A situation in which it is impossible to make one player better off without making another player worse off.

Given this, if the United States and Iran are sincere about their statements of working to achieve a diplomatic solution settling their differences over a broad specter of issues, they ought to prove themselves trustworthy, by not increasing their threats. A place to start would be for Iran not to accelerate its enrichment program and the United States not to intensify sanctions. Building trust takes time, and we should not expect a grand diplomatic solution any time soon, despite its clear advantages for both Iran and the United States. However, even small steps in the right direction would be a great accomplishment, as it might become a critical juncture.


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6. Conclusion

The dispute over Iranʼs nuclear program is not an isolated issue. Instead it must be seen in a greater context, as an escalation of the historical animosity between Iran and the United States. This animosity dates back to the Islamic Revolution, where Iran developed its foreign policy aspiration of changing the regional order, by striving to become a regional leader, export the Islamic Revolution and counter United States imperialism. In reaction, the United States sought to contain Iranʼs power and its influence beyond its borders, in order to sustain its own hold on power in the Middle East, especially the Gulf. Their historical legacy includes the hostage-crisis, Iranian support for terrorism against the United States and allies, and the United States supporting Iraq in its destructive war against Iran.

Following the critical juncture of September 11, Iranʼs anxieties increased, as the United States brought about regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq, and labeled Iran as part of an ʻaxis of evilʼ. Iran has reacted in a rational way by increasing its alliances with China and Russia (soft balancing), supporting terrorism against the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq (asymmetrical balancing), and by seeking nuclear weapons as a deterrent capacity (hard balancing).

To end this downward spiral of animosity, I have argued that it is necessary to craft a diplomatic solution, that removes Iranʼs incentive to acquire nuclear weapons, by settling the differences between Iran and the United States. This is possible today, because Iran has abandoned its foreign policy aspiration of exporting the revolution, due to a range of critical junctures. Furthermore, Iran still aspire to decrease the United Statesʼ influence in the Middle East, but in the late 1990s Iran came to accept the inexorable presence of the United States. Iranʼs quest for regional leadership is therefore today not incompatible with the interests of the United States. Quite contrary, the United States and Iran have mutual interests in both Afghanistan and Iraq, where the United States would benefit form the support of Iranian ʻsoft powerʼ.


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To diminish Iranʼs anxieties of isolation and invasion, the United States need to acknowledge that Iran has matured, by ending its containment policy against Iran and incorporate Iranʼs interests in its strategy for the Middle East, beginning in Iraq. This would remove Iranʼs incentive to balance the United States, and make Iran willing to sign a deal restraining its nuclear program to peaceful purposes.

However, none of them dare to suggest such a diplomatic solution, because of the domestic backlash it would produce in case the other country turns it down. At the moment this is a likely outcome, as both are mischievous of each others intensions. Therefore, if they are as interested in finding a diplomatic solution as they state, they ought to show themselves trustworthy, by not continually increasing their threats vis-a-vis each other: The United States should stop intensifying sanctions, and Iran should stop accelerating uranium enrichment.

Today, the United Statesʼ and Iranʼs contestation over influence in the Greater Middle East has reached a point where both are in a defensive position. When a policy fails it is generally inappropriate to continue it, and both Iran and the United States ought to acknowledge that.


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7. Literature

Adib-Moghaddam, Arshin (2008): Iran in world politics: the question of the Islamic republic. Columbia University Press, New York.

Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud (2006). In: Fox News: Iran President: We Won't Retreat 'One Iota'. Located May 17, 2010 at: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,191588,00.html

Bashardoust, Soheil (2009). Supreme National Security Council. Located July 20, 2010 on WWW: http://iranballistic.blogspot.com/2009/08/supreme-national-security-council.html

Berman, Ilan (2009). How to Engage Iran (if you must). Located July 20, 2010 on WWW: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/08/how_to_engage_iran_if_you_must

Cook, Alethia H. and Roshandel, Jalil (2009): The United States and Iran. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan (2002): ʻThe Foreign Policy of Iranʼ. In Hinnebusch, Raymond, and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.) (2002): The Foreign Policies of Middle East States. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Hall, Peter A. and Tayler, Rosemary C. R. (1996). Political Science and the Three Institutionalisms. Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Köln.

Hansen, Birthe, Peter Toft and Anders Wivel (2009): Security Strategies in the American World Order – Lost Power. London: Routledge, pp. 1-25, 102-137, 138-153. (78 p.)

Huntington, Samuel P. (2003). The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order. Simon and Schuster, New York.

Iran Chamber (2010). The Structure of Power in Iran. Located July 20, 2010 on WWW: http://www.iranchamber.com/government/articles/structure_of_power.php

Kurama, Sarath (2010). US opposes Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. Located July 20, 2010 on WWW: http://www.wsws.org/articles/2010/jul2010/paks-j09.shtml

Leverett, Flynt (2006). Leverett: Bush Administration ʻNot Seriousʼ About Dealing With Iran. Located July 20, 2010 on WWW: http://www.cfr.org/publication/10326/leverett.html#


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Najibullah, Farangiz (2008). Iran: Russia, China Unlikely To Welcome Tehran Into SCO. Located July 20, 2010 on WWW: http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079706.html

Obama, Barack (2009). Videotaped Remarks by the President in Celebration of Nowruz. Located July 20, 2010 on WWW: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/VIDEOTAPED-REMARKS-BY-THE-PRESIDENT-IN-CELEBRATION-OF-NOWRUZ/

Pant, Harsh V. (2009). ʻPakistan and Iranʼs dysfunctional relationshipʼ. Middle East Quarterly, Volume XVI, number 2, 43-50

Ramazani, R. K. (2009). Understanding Iranian Foreign Policy. Located July 20, 2010 on WWW: http://payvand.com/news/09/feb/1009.html

Rose, Gideon (1998). ʻNeoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policyʼ. World Politics, vol. 51.1

Takeyh, Ray (2006). Hidden Iran. Henry Holt and Company, New York.

Walt, Stephen (2010). Sleepwalking with Iran. Located July 20, 2010 on WWW: http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/26/sleepwalking_with_iran

Zambelis, Chris (2009). Xinjiang Crackdown and Changing Perceptions of China in the Islamic World. Located July 20, 2010 on WWW: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35370&cHash=b04988e0ed


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http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079706.html

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