us-china relations: china policy on capitol hill

U.S.–China Relations

With China’s rapid ascendance to great power status, the U.S.–China rela-tionship has become one of the most important international relationships inthe world today. This book explores relations between the U.S. and China,focusing in particular on China policy-making in the U.S. Congress, whichhas been unusually active in the development of this relationship. Based ondetailed analysis of China bills introduced in Congress over the past threedecades, it provides detailed analysis of how Congressional policy-makingworks in practice, and explores the most controversial issues in U.S.–Chinarelations: Taiwan, trade and human rights. It considers the voting patternsand party divisions on these issues, showing that liberals and conservativesoften form an alliance concerning China because China’s authoritarianregime, human rights problems, soaring trade surplus with the U.S and risingmilitary power attract criticism from both camps. It also argues that congres-sional committees, bicameralism and presidential veto make it virtuallyimpossible for Congress to legislate on China, despite its intense preferences,and therefore Congress often turns to informal—but no less effective—meansto exert influence on China policy, such as framing public opinion and gener-ating situations that result in anticipated reactions by the executive branchor Beijing.

Tao Xie is Assistant Professor at the American Studies Centre, Beijing For-eign Studies University, China. He holds a Ph.D. in political science. Hisprimary research interests are U.S. Congress and American electoralbehavior.

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U.S.–China RelationsChina policy on Capitol HillTao Xie

U.S.–China RelationsChina Policy on Capitol Hill

Tao Xie

First published 2009 by Routledge2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canadaby Routledge270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group,an informa business

© 2009 Tao Xie

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted orreproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic,mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafterinvented, including photocopying and recording, or in anyinformation storage or retrieval system, without permission inwriting from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication DataTao, Xie, 1973–U.S.–China relations : China policy on Capitol Hill / Tao Xie.

p. cm—(Routledge contemporary China series)Includes bibliographical references and index.1. United States—Foreign relations—China. 2. China—Foreign

relations—United States. 3. United States—Foreign relations—1945–1989. 4. United States—Foreign relations—1989-. 5. United States.Congress—Decision making. 6. Taiwan—Strategic aspects.7. United States—Commerce—China. 8. China—Commerce—United States. 9. Human rights—China. I. Title. II. Title: UnitedStates—China relations.E183.8.C5T36 2008327.73051—dc222008014023

ISBN10: 0–415–77688–0 (hbk)ISBN10: 0–203–89014–0 (ebk)

ISBN13: 978–0–415–77688–2 (hbk)ISBN13: 978–0–203–89014–1 (ebk)

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008.

“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’scollection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

ISBN 0-203-89014-0 Master e-book ISBN

To Zhang Can

Contents

List of figures xiList of tables xiiiAcknowledgments xv

Introduction 1Congress and foreign policy 2Why China? 5Contributions of the book 9Structure of the book 10

1 The new institutionalism and legislative behavior 13The new institutionalism 13Determinants of roll call voting on foreign policy 19Methodology 23

2 Congressional efforts to punish China 26Collection of China bills 27Number and nature of China bills 29What influences the ebb and flow of China bills? 34

3 Effects of congressional activism on China policy 43Bicameralism 43Congressional committees 48Presidential veto 50More bark than bite? 52Why so many China bills? 54Does Congress matter in China policy? 55

4 Congress and U.S.–China trade relations 60Booming economic ties 60

Congress and U.S.–China Trade 63Legislative battle over PNTR 65

5 Congress and Taiwan 78Historical ties between Congress and Taiwan 79Congressional attempts to enhance U.S.–Taiwan relations 82

6 Congress and China’s human rights 100Before Tiananmen: China as the exception 101Tiananmen: the dividing line 104MFN renewal and congressional efforts to change human rights

in China 108

7 Beyond the case of China 122Selection of cases 123Theoretical expectations 129

8 Conclusion 142Legislative institutions and their impact on China policy 142The international environment and Congress’s China

policy 144Determinants of roll call voting on foreign policy 145Policy implications 149A look into the future 154

Appendix: Sources 157Source of China bills and coding scheme 157Sources of other quantitative data 157

Notes 161Bibliography 177Index 199

x Contents

List of figures

2.1 Classification of China bills (including amendments),1973–2006 32

2.2 Time trend of China bills (including amendments),1973–2006 33

2.3 Favorability ratings of China on 10-point scale, 1954–2001 372.4 Favorability ratings of China on four-category scale,

1977–2006 383.1 House–Senate ratios for China bills and bills in general

(excluding amendments), 93rd–109th Congresses 443.2 Number of China bills (excluding amendments) by

policy type and chamber, 1973–2006 455.1 Time trend of Taiwan bills introduced in each chamber,

1973–2006 826.1 Bills concerning China’s human rights, 1989–2006 1066.2 Time trend of bills relating to China’s MFN status,

1973–2006 1097.1 U.S. trade deficit with Japan, 1962–2006 125

List of tables

2.1 House China bills by policy and type, 1973–2006 292.2 Senate China bills by policy and type, 1973–2006 312.3 Determinants of the number of China bills (excluding

amendments) introduced in the House, 1973–2006 392.4 Determinants of the number of China bills (excluding

amendments) introduced in the Senate, 1973–2006 413.1 Frequency of the number of China bills (excluding

amendments) by chief sponsor and chamber, 1973–2006 463.2 Members of Congress who introduced ten or more

China bills (excluding amendments), 1973–2006 473.3 Freestanding China bills enacted into law, 1973–2006 534.1 U.S.–China trade in goods, 1973–2006 614.2 U.S. imports of selected commodities from China in

1989–2005 624.3 Logit analysis of the House vote on HR 4444 724.4 Increases in probabilities associated with one

standard deviation increase in independent variables(HR 4444) 73

5.1 House roll call votes on the Taiwan Relations Act 855.2 Senate roll call votes on the Taiwan Relations Act 865.3 U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and Taiwan’s ranking

among U.S. arms sales to foreign countries 895.4 Logit analysis of the House vote on HR 2386 925.5 Increases in probabilities associated with one

standard deviation increase in independent variables(HR 2386) 92

5.6 Logit analysis of the House vote on HR 1838 945.7 Increases in probabilities associated with one

standard deviation increase in independent variables (HR 1838) 956.1 House roll call votes on joint resolutions to

disapprove of China’s MFN, 1990–2001 1106.2 Logit analysis of House votes to disapprove of

China’s MFN under President Bush 115

6.3 Increases in probabilities associated with onestandard deviation increase in independent variables (votesunder Bush) 115

6.4 Logit analysis of House votes to disapprove ofChina’s MFN under President Clinton 117

6.5 Increases in probabilities associated with onestandard deviation increase in independent variables (votesunder Clinton) 118

7.1 Total U.S. trade and deficit with Japan, Canada, andMexico, 1985–2006 124

7.2 U.S.–Japan trade and automotive deficit, 1986–2006 1267.3 Total U.S. trade and deficit with Hungary, Romania,

and Vietnam 1307.4 House roll call votes on trade and MFN extension for

selected countries 1327.5 Logit analysis of House roll call votes on trade with

Japan, Canada, and Mexico 1337.6 Increases in probabilities associated with one

standard deviation increase in independent variables (votes onJapan, Canada, and Mexico) 134

7.7 Logit analysis of House votes on extension of MFNto Romania, Hungary, and Vietnam 138

7.8 Increases in probabilities associated with onestandard deviation increase in independent variables (votes onMFN extension to Romania, Hungary, and Vietnam) 139

A.1 Examples of coding of China bills 158

xiv List of tables

Acknowledgments

In the process of researching the book, I have accumulated an enormous debtto a number of individuals. Without their encouragement, support, advice,and critique, the book would never have evolved into what it is today.

Jeff Jenkins offered a number of penetrating comments. Without his input,the book would have been much less alert to the complexities of congres-sional structures and procedures. The book also benefited from Victor Shih’sextensive knowledge of U.S.–China relations and international relations.Dennis Chong generously supported my training in quantitative methods.More than that, had it not been for his unfailing encouragement, I wouldhave quit being a political scientist a long time ago. Sean Gailmard kindlyhelped me tackle many methodological questions. Each in his own way, JohnBennett and Chris Bray made my life at Northwestern University moreenjoyable.

To Benjamin I. Page, I owe the most intellectual debt. Without his support,I would probably have not embarked on the project in the first place. Hisenthusiasm has sustained me throughout research and writing. He supervisedthe project from the beginning to the end, bringing to bear his enormousknowledge of American politics and guiding me through the art of academicwriting. He certainly exemplifies the profound impact that a professor canhave on students.

Since we first met back in 2002, Jordan Jay Hillman has been an intellectualmentor and a fatherly figure to me. In addition to sharpening my thinking onmany topics over numerous lunches which he generously paid for, he alsoinvited me to have each Hanukkah and Passover dinner with his family. WhenI look back at the six years of doctoral study in the U.S., I am always gratefulto Jay and his family.

It was Professor Mei Renyi who inspired me to study American politicswhen I was a graduate student in Beijing ten years ago. Without his unwaver-ing support, I would not have decided to pursue a doctorate. His insights intoAmerican politics have been a constant source of research ideas.

Many former and current graduate students at Northwestern Universityhelped me in a number of ways. In addition to livening up my social life,Julia Rabinovich was a great source of research ideas. Conservations with

Jean-François Godbout often ended up producing some fascinating reflec-tions on my own research. Birol Baskan and I often discussed a wide range oftopics over a cup of coffee. Jiangnan Zhu, Kai Zeng, and Qi Zhang enrichedmy intellectual as well as culinary life.

Special thanks go to librarians at the Government Publications Section ofNorthwestern University Library, particularly Jiuping Chen, Beth Clausen,Ann Janda, Kathleen Murphy, Louis Takacs. Because of their smiles andpatience, digging through government documents became a more pleasantprocess. I especially want to thank Jiuping, who never complained about myfrequent and unannounced visits to his office.

The Graduate School at Northwestern University provided a GraduateResearch Grant, which helped cover the cost of collecting China bills. TheSchool of English and International Studies at Beijing Foreign Studies Uni-versity provides an ideal environment for a junior faculty. However, neither ofthe two institutions bears any responsibility for the views expressed in thebook.

Many thanks are also due the editorial staff at Routledge. Peter Sowdenconvinced me of the importance of the project and encouraged me to pursueit further. Tom Bates was instrumental in shaping the book as it standsnow. The two anonymous reviewers of the manuscript offered a number oftrenchant comments which improved the quality of the book.

A short version of Chapter 4 was published in American Politics Research,and a different version of Chapters 2–3 was published in Journal of Con-temporary China. I thank the two journals for granting me the right to reprintportions of the two articles.

My father was deprived of a good education, but insisted that his son getthe best education possible. Without his sacrifice, devotion, and love, I wouldnot have accomplished what I have.

Zhang Can has been a really good sport about being the wife of a juniorfaculty. Without her love, care, and sacrifice, I would not have been able tofinish the project on time. There is no better way to thank her than to dedicatemy first book to her.

xvi Acknowledgments

Introduction

Only in the case of Communist China has the Congress played a major roleover a long period of time to confine narrowly the president’s means ofmaneuver.

(Herbert Carroll 1965: 161)

While the executive branch is constitutionally charged with the managementof foreign policy, on several occasions the Congress has decisively intrudedinto the management of China policy. When the Congress has chosen toimmerse itself, its impact has proven profound and long-lasting.

(Michel Oksenberg 1986: 218)

The United States and our allies must recognize that in the upcoming “PacificCentury” no country will play a larger role in shaping the future of Asiathan China, and no single bilateral relationship in the region will be moreimportant to the US than the Sino–American one.

(Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) 1996)

The U.S.–China relationship is arguably the most important internationalrelationship in the world today. It involves one country that is the world’s fore-most economic and military power, and another country that has the largestpopulation and is enjoying rapid economic growth that could make it a greatpower in the near future. Hundreds of billions of dollars worth of annualtrade, thousands of students and scholars traveling across the Pacific each year,and issues related to Taiwan, China’s human rights, and non-proliferationmake the relationship “simultaneously extensive and contentious, mutuallybeneficial and profoundly controversial” (Harding 1995: 49).

The U.S. Congress has been unusually active in the development of thisimportant relationship. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the China AidAct of 1948, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, the annual congres-sional debates over the renewal of China’s Most Favored Nation trade status(MFN, now called Normal Trade Relations or NTR since 1998), and thelegislative battle over granting China Permanent Normal Trade Relations(PNTR) all attest to congressional activism in China policy.1 Since 2005,

Congress has launched a series of initiatives pressuring Beijing to appreciateits allegedly undervalued currency.

This record of legislative activism raises a number of crucial questions.Why is Congress so active in China policy? What are the causal factors thathave influenced the collective policy of Congress, and what has influenced thelegislative behavior of individual members? What overall impact has congres-sional activism had on U.S. China policy? Do the same dynamics that helpexplain congressional decision-making on U.S.–China relations also explaincongressional policy-making generally? These are questions that this bookattempts to answer. The first step toward answering these questions is to pro-vide a brief survey of the literature on Congress and foreign policy so as tosituate this study in proper context.

Congress and foreign policy2

The relationship between the president and Congress in foreign policy is “oneof the abiding mysteries of the American system of government” (Schlesingerand De Grazia 1967: 1). The founding fathers drafted a constitution thatpurportedly divides foreign policy powers between the president and Con-gress. In reality, what the framers created is a system of “separated institu-tions sharing [foreign policy] powers” (Neustadt 1990: 29). Powers shared arefrequently contested and jealously guarded. They are the source of endlessdisputes, accusations, and confrontations between the two branches. Corwin(1948: 200) famously wrote, “the Constitution, considered only for its affirma-tive grants of power which are capable of affecting the issue, is an invitationto struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.” Wilcox(1985: 38) concurred, “In some ways, our constitution is an invitation to dis-unity, for it divides the power in foreign policy between the two branches so asto give effect to our checks and balances system.” In Sundquist’s (1981: 16)words, the Constitution “put the two combatants [Congress and the president]in the ring and sounded the bell that sent them into endless battles.”

Scholarly research on Congress’s role in foreign and defense policy haspaid particular attention to three broad questions.3 What is the power ofCongress in relation to the president?4 Why do members of Congress act asthey do? How are decisions made in Congress? One school of thought con-tends that the president wins most of the battles against Congress. In propos-ing the two presidencies thesis, Wildavsky (1966: 7) asserted that “in the realmof foreign policy there has not been a single major issue on which Presidents,when they are serious and determined, have failed.” 5 To Spanier and Uslaner(1974: 69), “The President proposes, the President disposes.” Schlesinger’s(1973) condemnation of the imperial presidency also testifies to the dominanceof the president over Congress in foreign policy.6

A number of factors are believed to be responsible for presidential domin-ance in foreign policy: executive monopoly of intelligence, the unitary natureof the presidency, presidential power to commit troops, public readiness to

2 Introduction

rally around the flag, and the norm of deference among members of Con-gress (Corwin 1948; Crabb and Holt 1984; Dahl 1950; Robinson 1967;Spanier and Uslaner 1974; Wildavsky 1966). In a word, in this view, thepresident dominates foreign policy-making and Congress’s role is one of“legitimating, amending, or vetoing executive proposals” (Robinson 1967:14), or “accepting, modifying, or rejecting executive policies” (Spanier andUslaner 1974).

Some scholars disagree; they argue that patterns of executive–legislativeinteractions in foreign policy are cyclic, with the pendulum swinging in onebranch’s favor at one time and in the other branch’s favor at another. Peppers(1975: 462) contended that the two presidencies thesis “came at the end of thepropresidency swing,” suggesting that there would be a reverse swing back toCongress. In reassessing Wildavsky’s two presidencies thesis, Sigelman raisedan important question: “Are we witnessing a secular change or a momentaryfluctuation in the balance of power between President and Congress?” Hisanswer was unequivocal: “the pendulum of power often shifts. In crisisperiods, power tends to gravitate toward the Presidency, but eventually Con-gress has always moved to reassert its positions” (Sigelman 1979: 1204). Con-tinuing with his boxing metaphor, Sundquist (1981: 16) noted, “The presidentmay appear as the heftier contestant, he cannot win every round; the balancewill continue to shift back and forth.” Indeed, congressional assertivenessin foreign policy since the 1970s appears to support the pendulum thesis ofexecutive-legislative relationship (Abshire and Nurnberger 1981; Forsythe1988; Franck and Weisband 1979; Ripley and Lindsay 1993; Wildavsky1991).

Other scholars have proposed a contingency view of executive-legislativeinteractions in foreign policy.7 For them, the balance of power between thepresident and Congress is not fixed; instead it varies considerably from onepolicy area to another. Lindsay and Ripley (1993) are the most forceful advo-cates of the contingency view. Based on distinctions among policies made byprevious scholars (Huntington 1961: 3–4; Lowi 1967: 324–325; Ripley andFranklin 1980: 23–24), they contended that presidential power “is at a maxi-mum” in crisis policy, “less extensive” in strategic policy, but “at its weakest”in structural policy (Lindsay and Ripley 1993: 18–22).8 To put it a differentway, the power of Congress tends to be at its strongest in structural policy,at its weakest in crisis policy, and in between the two extremes in strategicpolicy.

Instead of ascertaining which branch prevails under what circumstancesand why, another line of research has focused on the causal factors under-lying foreign policy-related legislative behavior of individual members ofCongress, particularly roll call voting.9 Inspired by Miller and Stokes’ (1963)path-breaking study of constituency influence on members of Congress, thisline of research can be further divided into two major sections. The firstsection examines the determinants of members’ votes on defense spending,and the preponderance of evidence suggests that ideology, not constituency

Introduction 3

interests, is the best predictor of roll call votes (e.g., Bernstein and Anthony1974; Cobb 1969; Fleisher 1985; Lindsay 1990; McCormick and Black 1983;Moyer 1973; Ray 1981; Russett 1970; Wayman 1985). The second sectionconcentrates on foreign trade policy. Here one study after another havereported strong evidence that party and constituency interests are the majordeterminants of members’ roll call votes (e.g., Bailey 2001; Bailey and Brady1998; Conley 1999; Conybeare 1991; Gartzke and Wrighton 1998; McArthurand Marks 1988; Tosini and Tower 1987; Wink et al. 1996).

A few scholars have also examined the process of foreign policy decision-making in Congress. The process consists of two components: committeesand parties. Ray (1980) looked at the degree of responsiveness of the ArmedServices Committees to the parent chambers. McCormick (1993) examineddecision-making in the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the SenateForeign Relations Committee, Deering (1993) the Armed Services Commit-tees, and White (1993) the Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense andForeign Operations. Sinclair (1993) described the role of party leaders inforeign and defense policy, situating her analysis in the context of increasingintra-party homogeneity and inter-party heterogeneity since the 1970s andthe resulting rise of party leadership.

To sum up, students of Congress and foreign policy have conducted exten-sive research on the balance of power between the president and Congress,the causal factors that influence roll call votes, and the process of decision-making within Congress. These three issues will likely continue to animatescholarly debate on Congress and foreign policy. In fact, this book representsanother attempt to address the three issues. However, instead of analyzingeach of them separately, it combines the first and third into one broad ques-tion that asks how exogenous (e.g., constitutional rules) and endogenous(e.g., committees) structures and procedures influence Congress’s China pol-icy. As is apparent to many students of American politics, this approach isgrounded in the new institutionalism, which no scholar to my knowledge hasapplied to the study of U.S.–China relations. To address the second issue,I first examine roll call votes on three China-related issues, paying particularattention to the effects of partisanship, ideology, and constituency interests—the three factors that previous studies have reported as the major determin-ants of roll call behavior. Then I go beyond the case of China by analyzingroll call votes on six countries that are similar to China in relevant respects. Acomparison of findings from the China case and those from the six countriessuggests a general theory of roll call voting on foreign policy.

At this point, some readers may pause and ask, “Wait a second, why doyou choose China?” Answers to this important question are in the nextsection.

4 Introduction

Why China?

An active Congress

It is not too much exaggeration to say that of all the bilateral relationships theU.S. has with other countries, Congress has been most active in the relation-ship with China. One of Congress’s earliest actions was the Chinese ExclusionAct of 1882, which excluded all Chinese laborers from immigrating to the U.S.for ten years.10 Half a century later, under pressure from American silver pro-ducers Congress enacted the Silver Purchase Act of 1934 that had a devastat-ing impact on China’s economy by driving up the value of the silver-basedChinese currency (e.g., Ho et al. 2005; Roberts 1936).11 When China wasengulfed in a civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists in the late1940s, Congress passed the China Aid Act of 1948 in order to salvage theNationalist regime led by Chiang Kai-shek. After the Chinese Communists’victory, Congress vehemently opposed U.S. recognition of China and China’sadmission to the United Nations, delaying the former until 1979 and the latteruntil 1971.12 Meanwhile, Congress remained steadfast in its support for Chi-ang and the regime he established on Taiwan, passing the U.S.–Taiwan MutualDefense Treaty, the Formosa Resolution, and the Taiwan Relations Act.

Congress was conspicuously inactive in China policy in the decade afternormalization. American euphoria about China that had been buildingsince Nixon’s 1972 trip, which reached its zenith in the aftermath of DengXiaoping’s successful visit to the U.S. in 1979, plus the election of RonaldReagan, who was a staunch supporter of Taiwan, probably diminishedCongress’s interest in China policy.13 Yet this interlude of congressional reti-cence was cut short by the Tiananmen Incident. Since then, Congress has beenextremely active in nearly every aspect of China policy. As Mann wrote:

But especially after 1989, Congress’s involvement in China policy wasfar more pervasive. American decisions about Chinese students, grainsales, human rights, arms-control policies, business contracts and trans-fers of technology were not only influenced but, in some cases, initiatedby Congress.

(1999: 11)

Moreover, from the Chinese perspective, Congress’s China policy has almostalways been one of antagonism and punitive actions. The above review ofCongress’s involvement in U.S.–Taiwan policy amply illuminates this point.It is primarily because of staunch congressional support for Taiwan thatBeijing has not been able to regain control of the island. Another example ofcongressional antagonism involves MFN renewal. Congress first grantedChina MFN status in 1980 and had not objected to presidential renewal of ituntil 1989, the year of the Tiananmen Incident. Each year between 1990 and2001, Congress attempted to revoke MFN or to add various conditions to its

Introduction 5

renewal (Pregelj 2001). Twice (both in 1992), Congress was just one step awayfrom enacting legislation attaching human rights and other conditions to therenewal of China’s MFN.

More recently, Congress initiated a series of punitive actions against China:

• In May 2006, under pressure from Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA),chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Science–State–Justice–Commerce and a long-time critic of China, the State Departmentannounced that it would not use computers acquired from Lenovo, acomputer company partly owned by the Chinese government, for classi-fied work. The State Department initially planned to use 900 out of16,000 Lenovo computers it purchased for classified work (Blustein2006b; Kirchgaessner 2006; O’Neil 2006; Perez 2006).

• On June 30 2005, the House voted twice to block China National OffshoreOil Corporation (CNOOC for short) from acquiring the California-based Unocal Corporation. The first vote was on a provision to HR 3058that would prohibit the Treasury Department from using any funds tofavorably recommend the sale of Unocal to CNOOC. The provisionpassed 333–92. The second vote was on H.Res. 344 stating that U.S.national security would be jeopardized if the proposed Chinese takeovergoes through. The resolution passed 398–15 (CQWR 2005: 1833, 1906,1952–53). CNOOC eventually dropped its bid.

• On March 3 2005, confronted with mounting trade deficit with China,Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Charles Schumer (D-NY) intro-duced a bill (S 295) to impose a stiff 27.5 percent tariff on Chineseimports unless the Chinese government appreciated its allegedly under-valued currency, which is believed to be partly responsible for the com-petitiveness of Chinese imports (Andrews 2006; Blustein 2006a; MacLeod2006; Magnier and Lee 2006).

• Between February and July 2005, six resolutions were introduced inCongress, denouncing Beijing’s attempts to justify its use of force againstTaiwan by enacting an anti-secession law, which was eventually ratifiedby the People’s Congress on March 14 2005 (Culpan and Pan 2005; LosAngeles Times 2006; Pan 2005).

• On February 3 and March 17 2005, Congressman Henry Hyde (R-IL)and Senator Gordon Smith (R-OR) respectively introduced H.Res.57and S.Res.91, urging the European Union to maintain its arms embargoon China. The former passed 411–3 and the latter with unanimous con-sent. Partly because of strong opposition from Congress, the EuropeanUnion postponed the lifting of the embargo (CQWR 2005: 714; LosAngeles Times 2005).

Not surprisingly, Beijing has consistently viewed Congress as the “anti-Chinabastion” in the U.S. and frequently lashed out at it. “There are always peoplein Congress who oppose improvements in U.S.–China relations. Every time

6 Introduction

relations get better, they will go out of their way to create obstacles, buthistory will show this to be futile,” said the Chinese Foreign Ministry’sspokesman, referring to a series of China-related bills passed by the Houseimmediately after President Jiang Zemin’s visit to the U.S. in 1997 (quoted inThe Australian 1997). In 1999, a resolution was introduced in each chamber,attacking China’s human rights record and calling on the Chinese governmentto launch an official investigation of the Tiananmen Incident, and Beijingwas furious. “The attempt of those anti-China U.S. congressmen to interferein China’s internal affairs under the pretext of human rights is doomed tofailure,” said Zhu Bangzhao, the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson(quote in Laris 1999). In reaction to the Cox Report on alleged Chinese theftsof U.S. nuclear secrets, the Chinese blasted the Cox Committee, accusingmembers of the committee of “clinging to Cold-War mentality,” harboring“deep prejudice and hostility toward China,” and creating “a lot of rumors. . . to stir up anti-Chinese sentiments” (quoted in ibid.). During congres-sional debate over CNOOC’s proposed bid for Unocal, the Chinese ForeignMinistry issued a statement demanding that “the U.S. Congress correct itsmistaken ways of politicizing economic and trade issues and stop interferingin the normal commercial exchanges between enterprises of the two countries”(quoted in Harney and Roberts 2005).

Scholarly neglect

Yet despite congressional activism and antagonism, only a few scholars havepaid close attention to Congress’s role in China policy. This scholarly neglectappears to have something to do with the American constitutional structure.Though Congress, particularly the Senate, does have a number of foreignpolicy powers such as treaty ratification and approval of ambassadorialappointments, it is the executive branch that is constitutionally charged withthe management of U.S. foreign policy. In the case of China policy, it isPresident Nixon who initiated the normalization process; it is President Carterwho negotiated the terms of normalization; and it is President George H. W.Bush who almost single-handedly salvaged the relationship from a total break-down in the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident. As a result,some scholars of U.S.–China relations may have underestimated Congress’sinfluence in China policy. What Chang (1993) concluded about Congress’s rolein U.S.–China relations seems to be representative of the general impressionamong them:

For the most part, Congress and other non-administration sources areexcluded from the dialogue and discourse in the making of China policy.When their voices are heard sporadically over the course of Sino-American relations, they usually come out supporting the actions anddecisions taken by the White House.

(Chang 1993: 244)

Introduction 7

Thus most students of U.S.–China relations tend to focus on the executivebranch (e.g., Harding 1992; Lampton 2001; Mann 1999; Ross 1986; Ross1995; Suettinger 2003; Tucker 1983; Tucker 1994). Those who do pay particu-lar attention to Congress usually focus on the late 1940 up until the late 1950s,a period when Congress was unusually active and influential in China policy(e.g., Dulles 1972; Finkelstein 1993; Grasso 1987; Purifoy 1976; Tsou 1963;Tucker 1983). Some scholars also highlight Congress’s role in the normaliza-tion process, particularly the enactment of the TRA (Kraft 1991; Sutter 1983;Tan 1992). Only a handful of scholars have conducted exclusive analysis ofCongress’s China policy (Mann 2001; Oksenberg 1986; Sutter 2001; Xie 1993;Yang 2000; Zhang 1995).

Nor have students of American politics showed strong interest in Con-gress’s role in China policy, notwithstanding the voluminous literature onCongress’s role in U.S. foreign policy generally (e.g., Corwin 1948; Crabb andHolt 1984; Dahl 1950; Franck and Weisband 1979; Lindsay 1994; Ripley andLindsay 1993; Robinson 1967; Spanier and Uslaner 1974) and roll call votingon foreign policy (e.g., Bozeman and James 1975; Cronin and Fordham 1999;Fordham 1998; Lindsay and Ripley 1992; McCormick and Wittkopf 1990;McCormick and Wittkopf 1992). The discipline’s emphasis on rigoroustheorizing is partly responsible for the lack of interest. China is “merely onecase,” it is said, and no matter how important it is, you cannot build a goodtheory with one case. As a result, only a few students of American politics havepaid detailed attention to Congress’s involvement in China policy (Crabb andHolt 1984; Nokken 2003; Rourke 1983: 74–76, 130–145; Westerfield 1955:Chapter 12, Chapter 16).

However, it is not just scholars who have largely neglected Congress.Policy-makers in Beijing, after many years of frustration with and criticismof Congress’s China policy, have yet to make earnest and concerted efforts tounderstand the mysterious beast called Congress and to influence its behavior(see Harney and Roberts 2005; Ma 2006; Mufson 1998; Weisskopf 1993).“Some of the older [members of the Chinese] leadership don’t understandthat simply because a senator gets up on the floor of the Senate and sayssome uncomplimentary things about China that [sic] that’s not necessarilygovernment policy,” said James Sasser, former U.S. ambassador to China(quoted in Mufson 1998). When the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister sug-gested in a meeting that Congress not bring up something about China, animpatient Senator John Glenn (D-OH) snapped back: “You just don’tunderstand our form of government if you think anybody can tell a particu-lar Congressman or Senator not to bring up something about China”(quoted in Sciolino 1996). Says a public affairs director at a large U.S.manufacturer with considerable investment in China, “The Chinese mighthave got the hang of capitalism, but they don’t understand democracy andthe free press yet and that shows up in the way they misread the politicalmood here” (quoted in Harney and Roberts 2005). The former ChinesePresident Jiang Zemin himself candidly admitted in 1995 that the Chinese

8 Introduction

“haven’t done enough lobbying of U.S. Congress” (quoted in Sciolino1996).

Contributions of the book

This study attempts to make a number of significant contributions to schol-arly research on Congress’s role in China policy. First and foremost, whereasmost previous scholars have examined Congress’s China policy either at themacro level (Mann 2001; Oksenberg 1986; Sutter 2001) or at the micro level(Nokken 2003; Xie 1993; Xie 2006; Yang 2000), this study offers carefulanalyses at both levels. At the macro level, I examine the patterns of China-specific bills, resolutions, and amendments (hereafter referred to collectivelyas “China bills” unless otherwise specified) introduced in each chamber in1973–2006. No scholar to my knowledge has performed a similar study. Thisis the major contribution of this book. The purpose of this analysis is toprovide additional support for the new institutionalist claim that how legisla-tors’ preferences are aggregated also affects what policy outcomes are arrivedat. To my knowledge, no scholar has applied the new institutionalism to thestudy of U.S.–China relations. In particular, macro level analysis focuses onthe impact of congressional committees, bicameralism, and presidential vetoon Congress’s China policy.

Micro level analysis focuses on roll call votes. While previous studies examinedonly one or two issues in U.S.–China relations, this analysis will be the first toanalyze roll call votes on the three most controversial issues in U.S.–Chinarelations, namely, U.S.–Taiwan relations, U.S.–China trade, and China’shuman rights.14 Taiwan has been the central issue in the bilateral relationshipsince 1949. Human rights have been a constant source of dispute since 1989.As the U.S. trade deficit with China has skyrocketed since the mid-1990s,bilateral trade has become an immensely controversial topic on Capitol Hill.

Second, most previous studies of Congress’s China policy are qualitativeanalyses relying almost exclusively on observations, unstructured interviews,and/or anecdotal evidence (Crabb 1985; Mann 2001; Oksenberg 1986; Rourke1983; Sutter 2001; Westerfield 1955; Yang 2000), with only a few of themhaving both qualitative evidence and quantitative data (Nokken 2003; Xie1993; Zhang 1995). This study will combine both, but with far more andbetter quantitative data. For instance, particularly helpful is the dataset ofChina bills introduced in each chamber between 1973 and 2006. Some otherdata such as state exports to China, which were simply not available to previ-ous authors, are now available thanks to efforts by scholars and U.S. federalgovernment agencies.

Third, I also highlight the implications of my findings for policy-makers inboth Washington and Beijing as well as for organizations and individualsinterested in promoting friendly U.S.–China relations. Considering the impor-tance and complexity of the relationship, the controversy it has generated inboth societies, and congressional activism in China policy, it is highly desirable

Introduction 9

that the policy implications of this study be discussed. The aim is to helppolicy-makers as well as concerned organizations and individuals work for abetter U.S.–China relationship, one that is characterized by fewer disputes,conflicts, or confrontations and more dialogue, cooperation, and partnership.

Apart from its significant contributions to scholarly research on Congressand China policy, this study also marks a small but important step in buildinga general theory of congressional policy-making. To ascertain whether thesame dynamics that explains congressional policy-making on China-relatedissues also explains congressional policy-making in general, I compareChina with six similar countries: Japan, Canada, and Mexico on trade andHungary, Romania, and Vietnam on human rights. The findings from thiscomparative analysis lay the foundation for a general theory of congressionalpolicy-making.

Structure of the book

Chapter 1 spells out the theoretical foundation of my analysis of congressionalpolicy-making toward China. The first part reviews the new institutionalismas applied to the study of the U.S. Congress. While legislative scholars usuallyfocus on endogenous structures and rules such as committees and House spe-cial rules (e.g., Schickler 2000; Schickler and Rich 1997; Shepsle 1986; Shepsleand Weingast 1981, 1984, 1987; Sinclair 1994), I also examine exogenousstructures and rules imposed by the U.S. Constitution, i.e., bicameralism andpresidential veto. The most important prediction from the new institutional-ism is that these endogenous and exogenous institutions severely constrainthe ability of Congress to assert itself in foreign policy through legislativemeans. Thus it would be misleading to judge Congress’s influence in Chinapolicy by merely counting how many China bills were enacted into bindinglegislation that prescribes or proscribes presidential actions. The second partreviews past research on roll call voting, with particular attention to threefactors: party, ideology, and constituency interests.

Chapter 2 presents the general patterns of China bills introduced in 1973–2006. The first part describes the number, type, and nature of China bills ineach chamber and documents the time trend of China bills. The second partattempts to identify macro-level determinants of the number of China billsintroduced in each chamber. I report that far more China bills were introducedin each chamber after the Tiananmen Incident. Also, the first session of eachCongress witnessed more China bills than the second session. In addition,more China bills were introduced when Republicans were the majority in theHouse and when a Democratic president was in the White House.

Chapter 3 continues to analyze China bills in order to illustrate the impactof legislative rules and procedures on Congress’s China policy. I adduce evi-dence that congressional committees as gatekeepers have kept most Chinapolicy proposals from Congress’s legislative agenda, that the Senate has servedas a check on House activism in China policy, and that the supermajority

10 Introduction

requirement for overriding presidential veto has repeatedly thwarted congres-sional attempts to enact major changes to China policy.

The next three chapters are analyses of China-related roll call votes.Chapter 4 examines roll call voting on HR 4444, the bill that granted perma-nent normal trade relations (PNTR) to China. Party has the largest impact,with Democrats considerably more likely to vote against the bill (henceagainst their own president Bill Clinton). The ideological ends of both parties,instead of voting against each other, actually formed a coalition against thebill. Constituency interests generally have rather weak impact on the vote.

Chapter 5 analyzes House votes on two bills regarding U.S.–Taiwan rela-tions, namely, the U.S.–Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense CooperationAct of 1997 and the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act of 2000. Controllingfor other factors, the impact of constituency interests is far weaker than thatof party or ideology in both votes. Without controlling for hawkishness,party has the largest impact. Once hawkishness is controlled for, party nolonger has any significant impact and hawkishness turns out to have the big-gest impact. Though both liberals and conservatives seemed to be supportiveof the two bills, the former was much less so than the latter. Moreover, acomparison of findings from the two votes suggests that many members ofCongress voted strategically on the second one.

In Chapter 6, I first offer a detailed historical-comparative account ofcongressional involvement in China’s human rights. A central theme of thisaccount is that the Cold War had profoundly shaped Congress’s humanrights policy. In the latter part of the Cold War when the two countriesformed a strategic alliance against the former Soviet Union, Congress largelyturned a blind eye to China’s human rights problems. The demise of the formerSoviet Union, plus the Tiananmen Incident, liberated congressional criticsand resulted in unprecedented congressional activism in China’s humanrights. Next, I analyze the ten House votes on joint resolutions to disapproveof China’s MFN status in order to punish its alleged violation of human rights.During the Bush years, Republicans were consistently more likely to opposethese resolutions than Democrats. During the Clinton years, Democratsdemonstrated little party loyalty. Except for one year, the ideological ends ofboth parties formed an alliance on these resolutions. Moreover, the strengthof this alliance increased during the Clinton years.

Chapter 7 goes beyond the case of China by analyzing roll call votingon six other countries: Japan, Canada, and Mexico on trade and Hungary,Romania, and Vietnam on MFN extension. Constituency interests havebigger impact on trade votes involving Japan, Canada, and Mexico than onthe China trade vote (i.e., the vote on China’s PNTR). Whereas liberals andconservatives were almost always united on the two issues involving China,such a coalition appeared far less frequently on votes involving these sixcountries. Finally, loyalty to one’s president seems to be the most importantdeterminant of votes on MFN extension to the other three countries, but ithas much smaller impact on votes involving China.

Introduction 11

The final chapter concludes the book. In addition to summarizing the var-ious findings, I also discuss the implications of the findings for policy-makersin Beijing and Washington as well as for concerned organizations and indi-viduals who are interested in promoting friendly relations between the twocountries.

Two caveats are in order before I proceed. First, when I speak of “Congress’sChina policy,” I do not mean that Congress is a monolithic bloc speakingwith one coherent voice on how to deal with U.S.–China relations. To beginwith, Congress has two chambers—the House of Representatives and theSenate—and the two chambers do not always agree with each other on foreignpolicy. Second, the House has 435 members and the Senate 100 members, andeach member is independently elected by—and hence is individually account-able to—his or her constituents, not to other members or the president. Thiselectoral independence means that under many circumstances members arefree to disagree with each other or with the president, without fearing retribu-tion from fellow members or the White House. Thus, it is possible to have“435 secretaries of state” in the House and 100 more in the Senate (WashingtonPost 1978a). In a word, it would be naïve to expect uniformity of viewsand attitudes among members of Congress. Congressman Clement Zablocki(D-WI) aptly captured what this means for China policy:

When anyone refers to a “congressional view” on a matter such as this[U.S. policy toward China], there is not just a single view. Perhaps onecould say that there are 435 views in the House and 100 in the Senate, andthat these may not always be the same from one week to another.

(quoted in Yang 2000: 29)

Second, the very notion of China policy, as Oksenberg (1986: 208) cau-tioned, is “an intellectual abstraction” that, upon close examination, can loseits purported analytical clarity. China policy is the sum of official actionsproposed or implemented regarding U.S. relations with China. It encompassesmany issues: arms sales to Taiwan, textile quotas, military relations, culturaland educational exchanges, export control, IPR protection, and so on. Chinapolicy also includes “issues that primarily concern other countries but inwhich China is a significant, perhaps silent partner” (ibid.). U.S. policy towardNorth Korea stands out as a key example, since China is the single mostimportant ally of that country. U.S. policies toward Pakistan and some MiddleEast countries are also complicated by China’s involvement in those regions,mainly through its actual or alleged sales of weapons. Furthermore, all theseissues are not only part of China policy, but also part of broad U.S. foreignpolicy as well—non-proliferation, trade, human rights, etc. Thus there aresome problems related with the term “China policy,” though it continues tobe an analytically useful concept.

12 Introduction

1 The new institutionalism andlegislative behavior

By the mode of its election and the greater length of the term by which itsseats are held, the Senate is almost altogether removed from that temptationto servile obedience to the whims of popular constituencies to which theHouse is constantly subject, without as much courage as the Senate has toguard its virtue.

(Woodrow Wilson 2006: 153)

Just as the standing committees control legislative action, so the chairmen aremasters of their committees . . . In short, committee chairmen exercise crucialpowers over the legislative process.

(George Galloway 1953: 289)

Starting with Mayhew’s (1974) path-breaking work, the study of Congresshas taken on a decidedly rational choice flavor. That is, members of Congressare assumed to be utility-maximizing rational actors who have certain goalsand preferences, and these goals and preferences determine their behavior.Yet in pursuing the various goals, they are constrained by a multitude ofstructures and procedures that govern collective decision-making in Con-gress. These structures and procedures are the focus of a long line of researchcalled the new institutionalism. Yet to my knowledge no scholar has appliedthe new institutionalism to the study of U.S.–China relations.

Meanwhile, inspired by Miller and Stokes’s (1963) classic study, studentsof American politics have conducted voluminous research on roll call voting.A handful of students of U.S.–China relations have also examined China-related roll call votes (Xie 1993; Zhang 1995). With few exceptions, previousstudies of roll call voting tend to focus on the impact of three sets of factors,namely, party, constituency, and ideology.

The new institutionalism

The new institutionalism is a variant of the rational choice theory.1 Moreaccurately, it is a response to the rational theory that emphasizes the

institutional context in which rational individuals interact (for a review, seeShepsle 1989). Underlying the rational choice theory is the assumption—borrowed from homo economicus—that individuals are purposeful agentswho have preferences and try to maximize them. The rational choice theoryitself is a rejection of the sociological approach that explains individualbehavior on the basis of social norm, status, and learned responses. Yet inhailing the utility-maximizing individual, rational choice theorists seem tocare little about the context in which individual behavior takes place or thesources of preferences and beliefs. As a result, rational man becomes “anatom unconnected to the social structure in which he or she is embedded”(Shepsle 1989: 134). The new institutionalism attempts to address thisdifficulty by turning to institutions in which individuals are embedded.

Institutions include both structures and procedures. In the study oflegislative politics, structures refer to “the division and specialization oflabor (committees), leadership organization, staffing arrangements, partygroupings,” and procedures “rules of debate, amendment, and those regulat-ing other features of daily official life” (ibid.: 135). Legislative structures andprocedures govern how Congress conducts its legislative business. The U.S.Constitution does not provide for them. Instead, Article I, Section V reads:“Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings . . .” As a result, atthe beginning of each Congress, a simple majority decides on the kind ofstructures and procedures that will govern the flow of legislative business ineach chamber. Out of respect for precedents and because of the transactioncost involved in formulating, negotiating, and passing new ones, legislativestructures and procedures of one Congress are usually inherited from theprevious Congress with few modifications.2

In the theoretical literature on Congress, legislative structures and pro-cedures usually—if not always—mean committees and House special rules.But this is a rather narrow definition that includes only endogenous structuresand procedures. In this book I define legislative institutions more broadly toinclude two exogenous institutions: bicameralism and presidential veto. Thisbroad definition should not be controversial. First, no bill may be enactedinto law unless it is approved in identical form by both chambers. Second,Congress and the president share legislative powers in that the president mayveto a piece of legislation, but his veto is subject to override by a two-thirdsmajority in both chambers.

One of the most important insights from the new institutionalism is thatlegislative structures and procedures—particularly committees and specialrules—induce equilibrium. This is called structure-induced equilibrium, orSIE for short (e.g., Shepsle 1979, 1986, 1989; Shepsle and Weingast 1981).Thus, the new institutionalism provides an answer to the social choice prob-lem first identified by Arrow (1951) and further developed by other scholars(e.g., Black 1958; McKelvey 1976; Plott 1967; Riker 1988; Schofield 1978).To make a long story short, the social choice problem refers to the absenceof a stable outcome under simple majority rule or other decision-making

14 New institutionalism, legislative behavior

processes in multi-dimensional politics. The new institutionalist response isto set up structures and procedures that reduce multi-dimensional politics toone-dimensional politics. In the one-dimensional world, the median voterprevails and a stable outcome can be produced (Black 1958; Downs 1957).

Congressional committees

To understand Congress, one must understand its committees. For mostmembers of Congress, political life on Capitol Hill begins and ends withcommittees. Moreover, it is committees to which bills are referred; it is com-mittees that hold hearings on bills; and it is in committees where bills aremarked up. In a word, committees are where the bulk of legislative work getsdone. Woodrow Wilson (2006: 69) famously wrote, “Congress in session isCongress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in its committee-room isCongress at work.” Because of the central role of committees in the legis-lative process, they “have life-or-death control over legislative proposals”(Johnson et al. 1994: 450–451). As Bryce (1911: 157) vividly put it, “A billcomes before its committee with no presumption in its favor but rather as ashivering ghost stands before Minos in the nether world.”

Committees and rules of procedures lie at the heart of the theoreticalliterature on Congress (e.g., Shepsle 1979, 1986, 1989; Shepsle and Weingast1981, 1987, 1994; Weingast and Marshall 1988). While conceptually distinct,committees and rules of procedures are actually inseparable. For rules of pro-cedures give shape to the committee structure and constitute the major sourceof committee power. Wrote Woodrow Wilson (2006: 62), “The privileges ofthe Standing Committees are the beginning and the end of the rules.”

Under the committee structure, each committee can be viewed as respon-sible for one policy dimension. Each and every bill—with rare exceptions—must be referred to the committee(s) with proper jurisdiction over the policycontent of the bill. The chamber ordinarily may not vote on a bill unless it isapproved by the referred committee. Moreover, committees have ex post vetopower, i.e., the power to kill a piece of legislation at the conference stage(Shepsle and Weingast 1987).3 Last but not least, the germaneness rule, closedrule, and other special rules in the House impose severe restrictions onamendments offered by non-committee members on the floor. These specialrules empower committee to be monopoly supplier of policy alternatives tothe status quo (Denzau and Mackay 1983; Krehbiel 1991: Chapter 5). To putit a different way, they give committees gatekeeping rights.4

As a result of gatekeeping rights, majority cycling can be avoided andequilibrium induced because the chamber needs to consider only one issue ata time, instead of voting on a multitude of policy issues at the same time. Andin single-dimension politics, the median voter is where the equilibrium lies. Ina word, the committee structure transforms multi-dimensional politics intosingle-dimension politics and induces equilibrium.

In so far as substantive policy is concerned, gatekeeping rights enable

New institutionalism, legislative behavior 15

committee members to keep controversial or undesirable policy proposalsfrom reaching the floor, while at the same time proposing policy alternativesthat they prefer. To be sure, the full chamber does have certain tools—e.g., thedischarge rule—to force a committee to report a bill to the floor, but thesetools are rarely used and, even if they are used, almost always fail (Krehbielet al. 1987).5 Maltzman (1997: 65) thus asserted, “Undoubtedly, the mostimportant tool possessed by committee is their gatekeeping power.” WoodrowWilson, that astute student of American government and politics, describedin vivid language the power of committees over bills:

The fate of bills committed is generally not uncertain. As a rule, a billcommitted is a bill doomed. When it goes from the clerk’s desk to acommittee-room it crosses a parliamentary bridge of sighs to dim dun-geons of silence whence it will never return.

(Wilson 2006: 63)

Moreover, gatekeeping rights—along with possible committee-floor similar-ity in policy preferences—ensure that bills reported by committees almostalways prevail on the floor.6 For if a bill approved by a committee is voteddown on the floor, the committee—as a monopoly supplier of policy alterna-tives—can retaliate in the future by not reporting any bill favored by the floormajority. Fully aware of the gatekeeping rights of committees, a member willusually vote for bills that come to the floor. Thus Congressman Clem Miller(1962: 110) wrote, “Congress is a collection of committees that come togetherin a Chamber periodically to approve one another’s actions.”

Because of gatekeeping rights, committees can serve a variety of usefulpurposes. In the informational theory of legislative organization, gatekeepingrights encourage committee members to acquire policy expertise because theymake it difficult for non-committee members (i.e., non-experts) to challengethe policy proposals of committee members (Krehbiel 1991: Chapter 5). Inthe distributive theory, committees help members achieve their electoralgoals because they facilitate gains from trade (Mayhew 1974; Weingast andMarshall 1988). In the partisan theory, committees become tools of the ma-jority party to set the legislative agenda (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005).7

Aided by the gatekeeping rights of committees, members with intense policypreferences are expected to have significant impact on substantive policy. Ifthey also happen to be the chairmen of committees or subcommittees, thenalmost certainly they will exert disproportionate power in the policy areasabout which they have intense preferences. Janda et al. (1995: 380) wrote,“Government by committee vests a tremendous amount of power in thecommittees and subcommittees of Congress—especially in their leaders.” Inthe realm of foreign policy, chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-mittee have often held up ambassadorial appointments, and their counter-parts in the House have often stalled on foreign aid and State Departmentauthorization bills (McCormick 1993).


Bicameralism

The Senate, where each state is equally represented—as opposed to propor-tional representation on the basis of population in the House—was originallycreated as a political compromise between the smaller states and the largerstates at the Constitutional Convention (e.g., Madison 1969; Wood 1969;Wirls and Wirls 2004). In the arguments of James Madison, the father of theConstitution, what once was a political compromise became a necessary goodfor republican government.

In particular, the Senate can serve as a check on the more numerical andhence presumably more volatile House. “The necessity of a senate is not lessindicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies, to yield tothe impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factiousleaders, into intemperate and pernicious resolutions,” asserted Madison(1982d: 315). Woodrow Wilson (2006: 154) agreed with Madison, assertingthat being “less quickly sensitive to the hasty or impulsive movements ofpublic opinion constitute its [the Senate’s] value as a check, a steadyingweight, in our very democratic system.” Toward this end, the framersmade the Senate much smaller in size, stipulated special qualifications for andelection of Senators, and gave them a much longer tenure.8

In a word, the Senate as a separate and distinct body is expected to be a“cooling saucer” to the House.9 Wrote James Madison (1969: 83), “The useof the Senate is to consist in its proceeding with more coolness, with moresystem and with more wisdom, than the popular branch.” As Fenno (1982: 3)nicely pointed out, the founding fathers, suspicious of “certain infirmitiesendemic to large, popularly elected legislatures—tendencies to instability inaction, to impulsive, unpredictable, changeable decisions, and to a short-runview of good public policy,” set up the Senate as “a restraining, stabilizingcounterweight, as being a source of a more deliberate, more knowledgeable,longer-run view of good public policy.”

The single most important policy implication of bicameralism is that itsignificantly increases the difficulty of lawmaking. First, “structural differ-ences between House and Senate elections ensure that policy views will not bedistributed and aggregated identically in the two chambers” (Binder 2003:81). Second, it takes only one chamber—presumably the less numericalSenate—to scuttle a piece of legislation. A long line of research has producedevidence that bicameralism indeed increases the probability of legislativegridlock (e.g., Binder 2003; Krehbiel 1998; Brady and Volden 1998; Pattersonand Mughan 1999; Tsebelis and Money 1997).

Presidential veto

Presidential veto and the supermajority requirement for congressional over-ride clearly reflect the founding fathers’ deep suspicion of “accumulation ofall powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether


of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective”(Madison 1982a: 244). Two means were adopted to prevent the concentrationof powers. As Madison (1982c: 262) wrote, “A dependence on the people isno doubt the primary controul [sic] on the government; but experience hastaught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.” For Madison, the“auxiliary precautions” consist of a constitutional structure under which“the powers of government should be so divided and balanced among severalbodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their limits, withoutbeing effectually checked and restrained by the others” (Madison 1982b: 252).In Federalist Papers No. 51, he most forcefully and eloquently spelled out therationale behind such a constitutional structure:

But the general security against a graduate concentration of the severalpowers in the same department, consists in giving to those who adminis-ter each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personalmotives, to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defence[sic] must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to thedanger of attack. Ambition must be made to check ambition. The inter-est of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of theplace.

(Madison 1982c: 262)

The Constitution that was ratified in 1787 epitomizes Madison’s theory ofchecks and balances. In the realm of foreign policy, the president is theCommander-in-Chief, receives and appoints ambassadors, and negotiatestreaties, but he is also instructed to seek the “advice and consent” of theSenate on treaties and ambassadorial appointments. Moreover, only Congresscan declare war against a foreign country, and it is Congress that appropriatesmoney to raise and support the armed forces. Since the president and Con-gress share foreign policy powers, congressional participation in foreignpolicy-making becomes unavoidable. As a result, the two branches haveengaged in a perennial struggle for foreign policy prerogatives (e.g., Corwin1948; Crabb and Holt 1984; Lindsay 1994; Schlesinger 1972).

Above all, the founding fathers gave each branch a powerful institutionalweapon with which to guard its foreign policy powers. The president mayveto a piece of legislation passed by Congress, but the latter may override theveto with a two-thirds majority. Because of the veto and override, neitherbranch can absolutely dominate the other. Nonetheless, it is extremely dif-ficult to assemble the constitutionally required supermajority to override thepresident’s veto. Congress has two distinct chambers, 535 members, anddozens of committees. Each member (Senators in particular), committee, andchamber may be able to derail any veto-overriding battle. In fact, since 1973only one presidential veto in foreign policy has been overridden, and that isPresident Nixon’s veto of the War Powers Act.

Thus in the final analysis, the supermajority requirement gives the president


a decisive advantage vis-à-vis Congress, making it hard for the latter to passsubstantive legislation prescribing or proscribing policy actions for the for-mer. As a result, Congress often turns to other means of influence in foreignpolicy. The other means include procedural legislation, participation in dip-lomacy, framing public opinion, and creating situations that generate desiredreactions from the executive branch (see Franck and Weisband 1979; Lindsay1993; Lindsay and Ripley 1993).

Determinants of roll call voting on foreign policy

There is an enormous body of research on roll call voting on foreign anddefense policy (see Lindsay and Ripley 1992, for an excellent review). Yetprevious studies tend to focus almost exclusively on what I call “country-blind” issues such as defense spending (e.g., Bartels 1991; Clotfelter 1970;Cobb 1969; Lindsay 1990; Moyer 1973; Ray 1981; Russett 1970; Wayman1985) and foreign trade policy (e.g., Bailey and Brady 1998; Conley 1999;Gartzke and Wrighton 1998). Only a handful of scholars have examined rollcall votes concerning particular countries (Leogrande and Brenner 1993;McCormick and Black 1983; Nokken 2003; Xie 1993, 2006), This focus oncountry-blind issues may be attributable to the prevailing belief among manyscholars that any analysis of roll call votes concerning a particular country isa case study and thus has little theoretical value. Yet this theoretical challengecan be overcome by increasing the number of countries studied. In fact, thisis the task I set for myself in Chapter 7. In this section, I will briefly discussthe effects of three factors on roll call voting, namely, party, constituencyinterests, and ideology.

Before I proceed, however, I need to say a few words about the use of rollcall data. Voting on a roll call is merely one of the myriad legislative activitiesa member of Congress is routinely engaged in. Other legislative activitiesinclude sponsoring legislation, holding hearings, participating in floor debates,etc. Yet of all the legislative activities, scholars seem to be particularly inter-ested in roll call voting. Several factors may explain this special interestamong scholars (for the pros and cons of using roll call data, see Schneider1979: Chapter 4; Xie 1993: 12–14; Zhang 1995: 111–115). First, roll call votesare easily accessible. Second, roll call votes are almost free of measurementerrors. By contrast, interviews or surveys often have measurement errors dueto interview techniques, question wording, coding, or response rates, to namejust a few. Third, roll call votes are often good indicators of a member’spreferences. A member may support protectionism at a labor union gatheringand denounce it at a chamber of commerce meeting, but he or she can castonly one vote on a trade bill. When forced to go on record, members gener-ally cast votes in line with their preferences, whether those preferences derivefrom personal beliefs, constituency influence, or party leadership.

To be sure, roll call votes have their disadvantages too. First, though roll callvotes reveal preferences, they tell nothing about the intensity of preferences.


That is, no matter how much a member supports or opposes a bill, he or shehas only one vote to cast. Second, when members vote strategically, it wouldbe wrong to take a roll call vote at its face value. Thus a conservative may votefor a liberal amendment to a bill that would probably pass on its own, know-ing that the bill with the amendment would be voted down on the floor. ThePowell Amendment that killed federal aid to public schools is one of the bestexamples of strategic voting (see Stewart 2001: 33–35). Last but not least, rollcall votes are informative only on issues that reach the final stage of thelegislative process; they tell us nothing about issues that are excluded from thelegislative agenda. However, since I do not use roll call votes to study prefer-ence intensity or agenda setting, these shortcomings become largely irrele-vant. Strategic voting appears to be present in one vote that I examine, butI have taken it into account in the analysis.

Party

“[P]olitical parties created democracy, and . . . modern democracy is unthink-able save in terms of parties,” declared E.E. Schattschneider (1942: 1). Politicalparties can be viewed as endogenous institutions created by politicians toachieve certain goals (Aldrich 1995; Downs 1957). Wrote Aldrich (1995: 28):“A series of problems that necessarily arise in elections and in governancemake it possible for politicians to win more of what they seek to win, moreoften, and over a longer period by creating political parties.” The DemocraticParty and the Republican Party have dominated American electoral politicssince their emergence in the early nineteenth century. Because of the two-party system, party politics (or partisanship) has become an integral part ofAmerican politics.

Partisanship manifests itself in two fundamental ways in the halls of Con-gress. On the one hand, it means loyalty to the president of one’s own party,because the president is the leader of his party and his leadership extends tothe legislative arena. In behavioral terms, party loyalty entails, among otherthings, voting for the president’s policy agenda in spite of one’s own prefer-ences or constituent preferences. Indeed, Bond and Fleisher (1990) adducedevidence that the most important determinant of a president’s legislativesuccess is party loyalty. The demand for loyalty is particularly high when theopposition party has a majority in Congress, since the majority party hasstrong electoral incentives to embarrass the president, with a view towardwinning the presidency in the next election.

On the other hand, partisanship also means electorally-induced inter-partydifferences. Because of electoral competition and historical circumstances,the two parties have developed relatively stable and usually distinct positionson a number of issues that generally reflect the preferences of their respectiveelectoral bases. For example, since the 1940s, the Republican Party has tendedto be the party of free trade, whereas the Democratic Party has been the partyof protectionism (see Bailey and Brady 1998; Gibson 2000; O’Halloran


1994). When members take distinct positions along electoral lines, it can beviewed as partisanship. As Davidson and Oleszek (1990: 130) aptly put it,partisanship means “constituency differences translated into issues.”

However, it is sometimes difficult to empirically distinguish between thetwo aspects of partisanship. Again, take foreign trade as an example. WhenRepublicans vote for a free trade bill supported by a Republican president, itis likely that they do so not only because of their loyalty to the president, butalso because of their traditional support for free trade, and the latter may bemore important a factor than the former. However, it is hard to distinguishthe one from the other in this particular case. On the other hand, it is easier todistinguish the two aspects when a Democratic president sends to Congress afree trade bill. Given the Democrat Party’s traditional alliance with laborunions, a vote in support of the president can be a vote against labor unionsin light of the latter’s long-standing opposition to free trade.

In general, when a foreign policy issue has apparent and immediate impli-cations for the electoral bases of the two parties, the likelihood of inter-partyconflict significantly increases. Crabb thus wrote:

Nonetheless, when an issue in the foreign policy area has an evident andsubstantial bearing upon domestic policy—as with the issue of tariff ver-sus reciprocal trade, foreign aid spending, and the size and compositionof the armed forces—then the difficulty of arriving at bipartisan under-standings is greatly increased. Not only is the difficulty increased, but thedesirability of bipartisan co-operation may be greatly reduced, if notaltogether eliminated.

(1957: 174)

Ideology

Ideology is “a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements arebound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence”(Converse 1964: 207). Hinich and Munger (1994: 11) defined it as “an intern-ally consistent set of propositions that make both prescriptive and proscrip-tive demands on human behavior.” According to Hunt (1987: 12), ideology is“integrated and coherent systems of symbols, values, and beliefs.” What thesevarious definitions have in common is the coherence and consistency of one’sbeliefs. Translated into plain language, the ideological hat one wears enablesothers to predict—with reasonable accuracy—where one would stand on aparticular issue. For example, being a liberal generally means support forabortion and gun control, while being a conservative often means oppositionto abortion and gun control.

The other important attribute of ideology is stability. Once formed, ideo-logy tends to remain remarkably stable over time and across issues.10 AsPoole and Rosenthal (1997: 8) vividly noted, “Members of Congress come toWashington with a staked-out position on the [ideological] continuum, and


then, largely die with their ideological boots on.” In a word, coherence andstability are the defining characteristics of ideology. It is precisely because ofthese two attributes that a member’s roll call votes on a wide variety of issuesacross a long period of time can be arranged on a simple liberal-conservativecontinuum (ibid.). And empirical research has produced an impressiveamount of evidence that ideology usually has the biggest impact on members’votes on foreign and defense policy (e.g., Bozeman and James 1975; Cobb1969; Leogrande and Brenner 1993; Lindsay 1990; Ray 1981; Wayman 1985).

Usually members from the opposite ends of the ideological spectrum areexpected to take opposite positions on a particular issue. For example, aliberal is expected to oppose the war in Iraq while a conservative is supposedto support it. However, on certain occasions ideological foes may forma temporary alliance out of strategic considerations or genuine policyconcerns. For instance, a piece of legislation may be too conservative forliberals but too liberal for conservatives. Liberals may cast sincere votes to killit, while conservatives may vote strategically by joining the liberals, knowingthat they can introduce a more conservative alternative once the proposal athand is defeated (see Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Nokken 2003). As will beshown shortly, such a coalition of liberals and conservatives is frequentlyfound on China policy because of the peculiarities of U.S.–China relations.

Constituency influence

Constituency influence stems from the electoral connection (Fiorina 1974,1977; Mayhew 1974). If members of Congress are assumed to be “single-minded seekers of reelection” (ibid.: 5), they should be responsive to consti-tuency interests in order to get reelected. The electoral connection is relativelystrong for House members whose two-year term puts them on a short leashwith their constituents. The much longer tenure of Senators enables them tohave relatively more autonomy from constituency influence (see Fenno 1982).While not every member is single-mindedly in pursuit of reelection, othergoals such as power within Congress and good public policy are impossible toachieve without being elected (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974).

Regardless, reelection generally requires responsiveness to constituencyinterests, particularly but not exclusively economic interests. And a long lineof research has produced ample evidence that constituency economic inter-ests have significant impact on legislative behavior, particularly roll call vot-ing (e.g., Bailey 2001; Bailey and Brady 1998; Conley 1999; Gartzke andWrighton 1998). Indeed, even during the height of the Cold War when secur-ity issues seemed paramount, economic interests influenced Senators’ votingon foreign policy (Fordham 1998).

However, it is possible that constituency influence on foreign policy maynot be strong, or at least not as strong as it is on domestic policy. First andforemost, the American public is notorious for its poor knowledge of foreignpolicy issues (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) and is widely believed to have


no stable, meaningful, or coherent foreign policy preferences (see Page andShapiro 1992: chapter 1).11 As a result, they are not expected to pay muchattention to how their representatives in Congress vote on foreign policyissues. Moreover, most foreign policy decisions—with foreign trade being thesingle most important exception—do not have clear, immediate impact ondomestic constituents. Even on defense spending (e.g., weapons purchase andmilitary bases), an issue that presumably has huge constituency implications,responsiveness may be weak because the costs are diffuse and benefits arehighly concentrated.

Lindsay and Ripley aptly explained why constituency influence in foreignpolicy may be weak and it is worth quoting them in length:

[M]ost members of the House and Senate have great freedom in takingsubstantive positions on foreign policy issues. One reason is that mostconstituents are uninformed or unconcerned about specific issues. Voterscare mostly about pocket-book issues, and many foreign policy issueshave no heavy economic components . . . Even when voters do have opin-ions on a foreign policy issue, they often do not hold their opinions verystrongly, at least not strongly enough to punish errant legislators at thepolls. And the public’s memory of foreign policy developments typicallyfades quickly: witness the speed with which public anger over U.S. policytoward China after the 1989 crackdown dissipated.

(1992: 422)

To conclude, with the probable exception of foreign trade, most foreign pol-icy decisions do not have direct impact on domestic constituents. As a result,voters at home may not pay much attention to them. This enables members toenjoy a considerable degree of autonomy in foreign policy-making. Insteadof following constituency preferences, they are likely to follow their ownforeign policy preferences, the president’s plea for loyalty, or the dictates ofparty leadership. This may help explain why most previous studies have pro-duced little or no evidence of a significant relationship between defensespending and roll call voting (e.g., Bozeman and James 1975; Cobb 1969;Lindsay 1990; Ray 1981; Wayman 1985).

Methodology

Having laid out the theoretical foundation of my analysis of congressionalpolicy-making toward China, I will briefly discuss methodology. This studycombines both qualitative (i.e., historical-comparative analysis) and quanti-tative (i.e., statistical analysis) methods. Many scholarly works in Americanpolitics today employ only the latter, while most students of U.S.–Chinarelations choose the former. Such methodological pluralism is necessary forthree reasons. First, dry statistics will do little justice to the intense passionsthis controversial relationship evokes among many members of Congress. It


is one thing to tell readers how many China bills a member introduced in onesession or how he or she voted on a China bill, and it is quite another todescribe his or her feelings and attitudes toward China. Thus wheneverpossible and appropriate, I will let members speak for themselves throughextensive use of quotes.

Second, historical-comparative analysis provides important contextualbackground for quantitative analysis. Moreover, in some instances wherequantification is impossible or extremely difficult, historical-comparativeanalysis is perhaps the only tool available. For example, I rely on historical-comparative analysis to support my argument that the Cold War had a sig-nificant impact on Congress’s human rights policy toward China and thatdemocratization has been the primary source of congressional support forTaiwan since the 1990s.

Third, quantitative methods are useful in identifying general patterns ofcongressional behavior toward China. They can be very precise about theeffects of a particular factor, whereas qualitative analysis offers only impres-sionistic observations. More specifically, negative binomial regression isused to examine the determinants of the number of China bills introduced ineach chamber, and logit regression is utilized to analyze the effects of party,ideology, and constituency interests on roll call behavior.

In so far as roll call analyses are concerned, three methodological issuesdeserve special notice. First, since this study examines not only roll call voteson three China policy issues but also roll call votes on U.S. relations withother countries, it is imperative that the same set of independent variablesbe used across issues and countries. Otherwise, cross-issue or cross-countrycomparison becomes problematic.

Second, because constituency variables are usually highly correlated withparty and ideology due to the electoral connection, including all of themin the same equation can potentially dampen the effects of the former.Consequently, each regression has two models, the first with only consti-tuency variables and the second with party and ideology added. Thismethod allows me to ascertain the independent effects of constituency vari-ables and to identify instances where their effects are dampened by party andideology.

The third methodological issue concerns constituency opinion. Given thetheoretical and empirical significance of public opinion, it is desirable that Iexamine its effects on legislative behavior. Normative democratic theory pos-tulates that elected officials should be responsive to public opinion (Dahl1956, 1998), and rational choice models of democracy predict that self-interested politicians will respond to public opinion in order to be elected(Downs 1957). Empirically, research in American politics has produced ampleevidence that public opinion has some effects on public policy (e.g., Eriksonet al. 2002; Miller and Stokes 1963; Page and Shapiro 1983; Russett 1970;Sobel 2001). Moreover, numerous studies have produced evidence that con-stituency opinion has varying impact on roll call behavior (e.g., Bartels 1991;


Erikson 1981; Herrera et al. 1992; Holian et al. 1997; McDonagh 1993; Millerand Stokes 1963; Page et al. 1984).

Thus, it appears imperative that I include constituency opinion in myanalysis. And I do have an aggregate measure of public opinion when Iexamine the determinants of the number of China bills introduced in eachchamber. However, I do not include any direct measure of constituency opin-ion in roll call analyses because there simply is no district or state-level publicopinion data about China policy.12 It is beyond the scope of this study to offeran in-depth analysis of the effects of public opinion on Congress’s Chinapolicy at both the individual and the aggregate level. Such a research topicwould develop into a major project in and of itself.


2 Congressional efforts topunish China1

The thing, [sic] that angers me the most is I hear people saying let us not useMFN. There must be some other approach we can take. What other device isthere for Congress? This is the only game in town.

(Representative Joe Scarborough (R-FL), U.S. Congress 1997c: 97)

For four years the President has pursued a policy best described as “aggressiveappeasement,” rolling over on issue after issue like an obedient puppy deter-mined to receive the approval of a demanding master . . . [I]t amounts to thecontinuation and intensification of a tragic 25-year unrequited love affair withBeijing.

(Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ) 1997)

During his six-day state visit to the U.S. in 1997, the former Chinese PresidentJiang Zemin dropped by the Capitol Hill and had breakfast with 55 membersof Congress, including all the members of the leadership except for HouseRepublican Whip Tom DeLay (R-TX), who stayed away to protest China’salleged suppression of religious liberties. The lawmakers peppered Jiang withpointed questions on everything from religious persecution to forced abor-tion, from organ harvesting to Chinese transfer of nuclear technology to Iran(CQ Almanac 1997: 8: 39). Republicans “listened in stony silence” as Jiangfiercely defended China’s human rights practices (Campbell 1997). “Itreminded me of the old days of the Soviet Union,” Congressman Chris Smith(R-NJ) said after the breakfast. “He denied everything” (quoted in ibid.). Onthe Democratic side, House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO)said he told Jiang that “we could not have a normal relationship with acountry that trampled on the rights of its people” (quoted in Slavin andNichols 1997). Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) remained highly crit-ical after the exchange with Jiang. “In my view, the responses were evasive,”she said (quoted in Mitchell 1997).

In retrospect, Jiang’s meeting with the lawmakers—and his summit withClinton for that matter—would probably not have happened, had it notbeen for Republican restraint on China bashing. In late September, despite

strong reservations from several Democrats and Republicans, the HouseInternational Relations Committee marked up five bills critical of China.These bills were ready for floor action in early October, but under intensepressure from President Clinton, House Republican leadership agreed topostpone floor consideration until after the summit (CQ Almanac 1997:8: 38). Immediately after Jiang’s departure, the House launched a “legislativeblitzkrieg” on China (Campbell 1997). Within five days, that is, November 5–9,the Republican-controlled House passed nine bills, including the five billsalready approved by International Relations. Among other things, these billsaimed to do the following:

• Increase funding for human rights monitoring in China and extend con-gressional review of nuclear technology transfer to China (HR 2358).

• Deny U.S. visas to Chinese officials involved in religious persecution(HR 967).

• Require the Secretary of Defense to study the feasibility of constructinga theater missile defense for Taiwan (HR 2386).

• Impose sanctions on China for transferring cruise missiles to Iran(H.Res. 188).

• Appropriate funds to enforce the ban on Chinese prison labor products(HR 2195).

• Condemn forced abortion in China and propose a visa ban on Chineseofficials involved in forced abortion (HR 2570).

• Oppose international loans to China (HR 2605).

• Authorize the president to monitor, restrict, and seize the assets of andban companies in U.S. associated with the Chinese army (HR 2647).

• Increase broadcasting by Radio Free Asia to China (HR 2232).(CQ Almanac 1997: 8: 39–40; CQWR 1997: 1536–37, 2618–20)

Though none of the nine bills was enacted into law, the sheer number never-theless attests to congressional activism in China policy. Some readers maywonder whether this flood of China bills was unique due to Jiang’s visit. Aswill be demonstrated shortly, this is not an isolated episode, but reflects ageneral pattern of congressional activism and antagonism in China policy.

Collection of China bills

Admittedly, one can construct an indicator of congressional activism andantagonism in China policy from a variety of sources, including the numberand nature of congressional hearings or floor remarks. Bills are chosen forseveral reasons. First, it is relatively easy to locate and code bills. Thomas, theonline legislative database of the Library of Congress, allows search of bills,resolutions, and amendments (hereafter collectively referred to as bills unlessotherwise specified) introduced in each session and chamber since 1973. Italso lists the major sponsor(s) and co-sponsor(s) of these bills. In addition to

Congressional efforts to punish China 27

a one-sentence summary, Thomas also provides a more detailed summary ofeach bill prepared by the Congressional Research Service. These two types ofsummaries greatly facilitate bill coding.

Second, if passed by both chambers in identical form and signed by thepresident, a bill becomes law and is bound to have policy implications. Sinceone of the tasks of this study is to find out the impact of congressionalactivism and antagonism on China policy, it seems appropriate to study billsinstead of hearings or floor remarks. Last but not least, sponsoring a billgenerally requires much more legislative resources than holding a hearing orspeaking on the floor. To sponsor a bill, a member needs to not only devotestaff resources and legislative expertise, but also use political capital to influ-ence other lawmakers if the bill is to be reported out of committees andpassed on the floor. By contrast, holding a hearing or speaking on the floorusually demands far fewer legislative resources. In other words, sponsoring abill generally indicates more intense policy preferences than holding a hearingor speaking on the floor.

A China bill is defined as one that deals exclusively with China policy.“Exclusively” means that it addresses only China-related issues. Thus anauthorization or appropriations bill that has China-related riders is notincluded here.2 Also excluded are bills that target not only China, but alsoother countries or other policy issues. For example, an amendment to grantasylum to citizens of Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, and China who recover anAmerican POW is not counted as a China amendment.

China policy is defined broadly to include not only Congress’s policytoward Beijing, but also its policy toward Taiwan.3 This should not be acontroversial definition. Beijing has always considered Taiwan a renegadeprovince. Moreover, in the Washington–Taipei–Beijing triangle that hasexisted since 1949, Congress’s policy toward one has almost always hadimportant implications for its policy toward the other. For example, the Tai-wan Relations Act ostensibly governs U.S.–Taiwan relations, but few woulddeny that it also represents U.S. policy toward Beijing. It is a constantreminder to Beijing that the U.S. is firmly committed to Taiwan’s security andthat only peaceful means may be used to resolve disputes across the TaiwanStrait.

I use Thomas as the exclusive source of China bills. Two schemes are usedto code these bills. The first is the specific policy issue each bill addresses:U.S.–Taiwan relations, MFN renewal, China’s accession to the World TradeOrganization (WTO), generic trade issues, generic human rights issues, fund-ing to the United Nations Population Fund (UNPF), Tibet, the TiananmenIncident, export control, and foreign assistance.4 Bills that address any com-bination of the ten issues or issues that cannot be neatly classified into any ofthe ten categories are put into Other.

Second, each bill is coded according to its policy nature, that is, whetherit is punitive, neutral/technical, or favorable to China. Punitive bills criti-cize the Chinese government and propose certain punitive actions, such as

28 Congressional efforts to punish China

condemning China’s human rights practices, supporting strong U.S.–Taiwanrelations, or calling for tighter export control regarding China. Technical/neutral bills deal with technical issues in bilateral relations such as approvalof tax treaties or fishery agreements. Bills that address U.S.–Taiwan tradeor Taiwan’s human rights also belong to this category because they haveno explicitly positive or negative implications for U.S.–China relations.Favorable bills promote U.S.–China relations. Thus bills that establish stu-dent or parliamentary exchange programs, urge recognition of China, orrelax export control will be viewed as favorable ones. Details on data collec-tion and coding are contained in the Appendix.

Number and nature of China bills

Between 1973 and 2006, 543 China bills were introduced in the House and332 in the Senate. Table 2.1 classifies House bills by policy issue and bill type.There were 189 concurrent resolutions and 90 simple resolutions. Together,these two types of resolutions constitute 51 percent of the China bills intro-duced in the House. A concurrent resolution is used to express opinion onbehalf of both chambers; it is also used to set adjournment date or congres-sional budget. A simple resolution, by contrast, is used to take action onbehalf of only one chamber or to express its non-binding opinion. A simpleresolution is also used to modify or propose an internal rule or to create anew committee. Unlike bills, joint resolutions, or amendments, however, thesetwo types of resolutions do not make law. This raises an important questionthat will be answered in the next chapter: Why did members introduce somany non-binding resolutions?

House members were most likely to sponsor concurrent resolutions when

Table 2.1 House China bills by policy and type, 1973–2006

Concurrentresolution

Simpleresolution

Jointresolution

Bill Amendment Total

Taiwan 112 21 5 22 7 167Generic human

rights33 15 1 22 4 75

MFN 2 21 22 3 48Export control 3 5 4 11 22 45Generic trade 4 7 22 2 35Tibet 11 7 9 2 29Tiananmen 7 5 2 7 21UNPF 14 14WTO 1 9 10Foreign

assistance1 5 6

Other 18 27 4 34 10 93Total 189 90 37 163 64 543


they wanted to express their opinions about U.S.–Taiwan relations, as 112 outof a total of 167 Taiwan bills were concurrent resolutions. Meanwhile, theseTaiwan-related concurrent resolutions accounted for nearly 60 percent ofHouse concurrent resolutions on China policy. In a word, concurrent reso-lution seems to be the most popular legislative vehicle to express one’s prefer-ences about Taiwan policy. In 1975, for example, 15 concurrent resolutionsdeclaring congressional support for Taiwan were introduced in the House.

There were 37 joint resolutions, and 21 of them were related to the re-newal of China’s MFN status. Since Congress first granted MFN status toChina in 1980, it had not objected to its renewal until 1990. Outraged by theTiananmen Incident and determined to punish Beijing for its alleged humanrights violations, Congress repeatedly attempted to revoke China’s MFN sta-tus (for a comprehensive review of the legislative history regarding China’sMFN status, see Pregelj 2001). Under the Jackson–Vanik Amendment to the1974 Trade Act, Congress has to pass a joint resolution to disapprove ofpresidential renewal of MFN status and the joint resolution is subject topresidential veto. This is why the vast majority of joint resolutions wererelated to MFN renewal.

When it comes to funding to the UNPF, House members relied exclusivelyon amendments. Because this is an issue that involves funding and foreignpolicy, it is not surprising that all the 14 amendments were attached to foreignrelations authorization bills. In 1995, the House considered HR1561, whichappropriates funds for foreign operations for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, andthree amendments were introduced to prohibit or limit funding to the UNPFunless it ceased its activities in China. In 1998, President Clinton vetoed thefiscal year 1999 State Department authorization bill (HR 1757) because anti-abortion Republicans inserted two amendments that imposed stringentrestrictions on funding to international population programs in general andthose in China in particular (CQWR 1998: 2921).

House members also relied heavily on amendments to deal with exportcontrol policy toward China.5 Nearly half of legislative measures concerningexport control were amendments. Like MFN, export control did not becomea salient issue on Capitol Hill until after the Tiananmen Incident. In 1990,five amendments were sponsored in the House that imposed various restric-tions on the issuance of export license, particularly regarding U.S. satelliteexport. Amidst accusations of Chinese theft of U.S. nuclear secrets andClinton’s relaxation of export control in exchange for corporate campaigndonations, the House approved in 1998 four amendments to the defenseauthorization bill that would prohibit the transfer of missile technology andU.S.-made satellites to China (CQWR 1998: 1375–76, 1400–1403).

Table 2.2 presents the distribution of China bills in the Senate. There were57 concurrent resolutions and 74 simple resolutions; they combine to accountfor nearly 40 percent of the China bills introduced in the Senate. This isconsiderably smaller than that in the House (51 percent). Of 57 concurrentresolutions, 27 are related to Taiwan, and these concurrent resolutions make


up slightly more than 30 percent of the Taiwan bills introduced in the Senate,which is about half of the corresponding percentage in the House. However,Senators were more likely than their House counterparts to use simple resolu-tions to convey their opinions about Taiwan policy, as 21 out of 80 SenateTaiwan bills were simple resolutions, compared with 21 out of 167 in theHouse.

As in the House, the largest number of Senate joint resolutions—seven tobe exact—was related to MFN renewal. However, they account for onlyslightly more than 30 percent of all the Senate joint resolutions, as opposed to57 percent in the House. Thus in both absolute numbers and percentages,Senators were less likely to sponsor joint resolutions disapproving of presi-dential renewal of China’s MFN status.

The most striking difference between the two chambers lies in the numberof amendments. Even though the Senate is less than one fourth the sizeof the House, it has nearly twice the number of amendments. Except forexport control, there were more amendments in the Senate for each policyissue than in the House. Anyone who is familiar with the internal operationsof Congress knows that this inter-chamber difference in amendments resultsfrom different rules governing floor debate in each chamber.6

Having discussed the frequency of each type of bills, I will examine con-gressional activism in each policy issue. Excluding the Other category, threepolicy issues have the same ranking in each chamber. In descending order,they are Taiwan policy, generic human rights, and MFN renewal. There were167 Taiwan bills in the House and 80 in the Senate. When combined, thismeans that on average seven Taiwan bills were introduced in Congress annu-ally during the 34-year period, or more than one out of four China billsintroduced in Congress during this period pertained to Taiwan policy.

The number of generic human rights bills is 75 and 60 in the House and the

Table 2.2 Senate China bills by policy and type, 1973–2006

Concurrentresolution

Simpleresolution

Jointresolution

Bill Amendment Total

Taiwan 27 21 4 10 18 80Generic

human rights9 16 2 8 25 60

MFN 1 7 18 5 31Tiananmen 1 3 9 10 23Tibet 6 10 3 3 22Generic trade 2 6 2 4 3 17Export control 2 1 4 2 8 17WTO 6 3 9UNPF 1 1Other 9 17 1 18 27 72Total 57 74 20 78 103 332


Senate respectively. These bills pertain to such issues as religious freedom,political dissent, and labor rights. One can argue that bills respecting theTiananmen Incident, funding to the UNPF, and Tibet should also be countedas human rights bills. For many members of Congress, the Tiananmen Inci-dent exemplifies Chinese violation of human rights. The controversy overfunding to the UNPF arose amidst allegations of forced abortion in China,which was viewed by many members of Congress as violations of humanrights. Tibet attracted congressional attention due to alleged Chinese repres-sion of Tibetans. If these bills were counted, then the total number of humanrights bills would jump to 245. In addition, there were 79 bills related to MFNrenewal. Since the MFN debate was primarily about how to use trade toleverage human rights progress in China, these bills can also be viewed ashuman rights bills. If so, the number of human rights bills would be 324,surpassing that of Taiwan policy.

Export control does not attract as many headlines as China’s human rightsor the soaring U.S. trade deficit with China, but it is clearly an important partof Congress’s China policy, particularly in the House. As was briefly men-tioned in the Introduction, Congress not only makes sure that the U.S. main-tains a tight export control regime regarding China, but also successfullypressured the European Union to delay its lifting of arms embargo againstChina.

Bilateral trade seems to be another issue of major concern to members ofCongress, as 52 bills concerning issues like tariffs, textile quotas, and intel-lectual property rights (IPR) were introduced. Also, 19 bills specificallyaddressed issues concerning China’s entry into the World Trade Organization.With only six bills, foreign assistance (e.g., international loans to China) doesnot seem to be an issue of particular concern to Congress.

Figure 2.1 classifies China bills according to several general categories

Figure 2.1 Classification of China bills (including amendments), 1973–2006.


related to floor action, party of chief sponsor, session, and timing before orafter the Tiananmen Incident. The findings can be summarized as following:

• Far more China bills (665) were introduced in the 17 years after 1989(including 1989) than those introduced in the 17 years before it (210).This huge disparity strongly suggests that the 1989 Tiananmen Incidenthas been a major source of congressional activism in China policy.

• The total number of China bills introduced in the first session of eachCongress (578) is nearly twice that in the second session (297). This isstrikingly similar to the aggregate ratio for all bills introduced in Con-gress during the same period.7 One reason for inter-session differencemay be that members introduce bills in the first session so as to allowmore attention and time for committee and floor consideration of theirbills, knowing that the legislative agenda is crowded but time is limited.8

• Republicans sponsored 475 China bills and Democrats 394 bills, withIndependents contributing 6 bills (which are not presented in Figure 2.1).This inter-party difference is quite noteworthy because more Democratsheld office during this period than Republicans.

• Congress took floor action—voice vote or roll call vote—on 259 bills, orless than one-third of all China bills introduced. Since the full chambernormally may not debate and vote on a bill unless it is reported out of acommittee, it appears that committees failed to report the vast majorityof China bills to the floor.

The time trend of China bills is depicted in Figure 2.2. A tentative impression

Figure 2.2 Time trend of China bills (including amendments), 1973–2006.


from this graph is that the ebb and flow of these bills was largely determinedby the major events in bilateral relations. For example, the sudden surge ofChina bills in 1979—from 6 in 1978 to 37 in 1979—coincided with heatedcongressional debate over Carter’s decision to recognize China and overfuture U.S.–Taiwan relations. What resulted from the debate was the contro-versial Taiwan Relations Act. In 1989, 63 China bills were introduced, asopposed to 9 in the previous year. The Tiananmen Incident of 1989 wasalmost certainly responsible for this deluge of China bills on Capitol Hill.The huge spike in 1997–80 bills compared to 22 in 1996—may be attributedto a number of events such as the reversion of Hong Kong to Beijing, theformer Chinese President Jiang’s visit to Washington, and congressionalinvestigations of alleged illegal Chinese campaign contributions. The trendline seems to provide support for what Suettinger (2003: 434) called an“event-driven” relationship.

Next, I will show the nature of China bills. According to my codingscheme, there were 18 favorable and 57 neutral/technical China bills in theHouse, and the corresponding numbers in the Senate were 13 and 38 respect-ively. Most favorable bills pertain to export control, MFN, and Other. Thelargest number of neutral/technical bills is related to human rights in Taiwanand issues under Other. When these two types of bills are deducted from thetotal number of China bills, I arrive at the number of punitive bills: 468 in theHouse and 281 in the Senate. All the bills about generic human rights, Tibet,Tiananmen, and UNPF are punitive, so are most bills on U.S.–Taiwan rela-tions. Punitive bills accounted for 86 percent and 85 percent of all the Chinabills introduced in the House and the Senate respectively. In a word, when wetalk about Congress and China policy, we are really talking about a punitiveCongress.

To sum up, Congress has been extremely active in China policy, particu-larly U.S.–Taiwan relations, China’s human rights, MFN renewal, and exportcontrol. Moreover, Congress has been unambiguously antagonistic towardChina, calling for one punitive action after another. Also, the major events inbilateral relations—such as normalization and the Tiananmen Incident—seem to have determined the ebb and flow of China bills. Last but not least,the Tiananmen Incident almost single-handedly transformed Congress intoan active player in China policy.

What influences the ebb and flow of China bills?

Having examined the number and nature of China bills, I will conduct aquantitative analysis of macro-level factors that affected the number ofChina bills introduced in each chamber. It is worth reiterating that this is anaggregate analysis, not individual-level analysis such as one that examines rollcall behavior. As such, the findings and conclusions should not be construedas necessarily applicable to individual-level legislative behavior.


Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: More China bills will be introduced under divided gov-ernment than under unified government, other things being equal.

The two political parties have frequently used China policy to attack eachother, particularly in times of divided government, that is, the presidency andCongress are controlled by different parties. When Republicans regainedmajority control of Congress in 1947—the first time since 1933—congres-sional debate about what the U.S. should do respecting the Chinese civil warbecame much more partisan (e.g., Tsou 1963; Tucker 1983, 1994; Westerfield1955). Republicans intended to use the China issue to embarrass PresidentTruman, with an eye toward defeating him in the coming 1948 election.Rourke (1983: 6) wrote, “In control of Congress for the first time in almosttwo decades and confidently looking forward to capturing the White Housein 1948, Republican foreign policy activity became increasingly motivated bypartisan considerations.”

In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident, the Democratic majority inCongress launched harsh criticism of President Bush’s China policy andtheir criticism seemed to be largely motivated by partisanship. Ross (1992:290) claimed that the Democratic-controlled Congress used China policyas a “vehicle for both pursuing its foreign policy agenda and weakeningthe president’s domestic popularity.” Harding (1992: 244) asserted thatthe “deep division between the White House and Congress on Chinapolicy . . . reflect[s] simple partisan politics, with the Democrats seeing inChina one of the few foreign policy issues on which a popular newRepublican president might prove vulnerable.” Richard Bush (1995: 149–150)agreed: “China became subject to the dynamics of divided government. ADemocratic Congress, with support from some conservative Republicans,sought to use the China issue to embarrass a Republican administration forpolitical gain.”

Similarly, when Republicans took control of Congress in 1995, theybecame immediately active in China policy. They put enormous pressure onClinton and forced the latter to grant a visa to Lee Teng-hui, the formerTaiwanese president. Then the Republican-controlled House passed theU.S.–Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act in 1997 and theTaiwan Security Enhancement Act in 2000 (e.g., Bush 2004: Chapter 7; Mann2001; Yang 2000: Chapter 6). In the meantime, Republicans launched high-profile investigations of allegedly illegal Chinese campaign donations in the1996 presidential election (e.g., CQWR 1997: 1140, 1568, 1601, 1861). In1998, the Republican majority formed a Select Committee on U.S. NationalSecurity and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic ofChina, chaired by Congressman Christopher Cox (R-CA). In early 1999, thecommittee released the highly controversial Cox Report (CQWR 1998: 1375,1400–1402, 1886–1889).


Hypothesis 2: The number of China bills introduced should be positivelyassociated with the strength of anti-Communism in Congress, otherthings being equal.

Ideology has profoundly influenced U.S. policy toward China. Harding(1992: 17) wrote, “Ideological considerations have been a constant source ofambivalence and opposition to Sino-American relations in both societies formore than forty years.” The onset of the Cold War coincided with the out-break of the Chinese civil war, and the U.S. supported Chiang Kai-shekagainst the Chinese Communists primarily because of his flawless record ofanti-Communism. In particular, the China bloc in Congress—a group thatconsisted mostly of right-wing Republicans—successfully pressured theTruman administration to provide military and economic aid to Chiang evenwhen his cause seemed hopeless (Christensen 1996; Koen 1974; Rourke 1983;Tsou 1963; Tucker 1983; Yang 2000: Chapter 2). The eventual defeat ofChiang and the outbreak of the Korean War made anti-Communism an evenmore salient factor in China policy (Finkelstein 1993; Grasso 1987; Purifoy1976). Within Congress, anti-Communism manifested itself in steadfast con-gressional opposition to U.S. recognition of China and China’s admission tothe United Nations (Bachrack 1976).

Though the Cold War ended more than a decade ago, anti-Communismappears to be still alive on Capitol Hill today because China remains underCommunist rule. When he was in the Senate, Jesse Helms (R-NC) still usedsuch ideologically charged language as “Red China” or “communist China”(CQWR 1999: 2605). Commenting on a 1996 House resolution (H.Con.-Res.148) reaffirming U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security, a close observerof Congress wrote that support for the resolution reflected “the enduringstrength of anti-Communism in the unsettled post-Cold War era” (CQWR1996: 712). Also, using content analysis and survey responses, Chen (1992)identified two periods of strong impact of anti-Communism on U.S. Chinapolicy (1949–1953 and 1980–1982) and one period of weak impact (1969–1972). During the first two periods, China policy was “rigid and confronta-tional” (ibid.: 43), whereas in the third period China policy was “flexible andcooperative” (ibid.: 72).

Hypothesis 3: The number of China bills will be negatively associatedwith favorable public opinion about China, other things being equal.

A long tradition of research in American politics has produced ample evi-dence that public opinion exerts significant impact on public policy (e.g.,Erikson et al. 2002; Miller and Stokes 1963; Page and Shapiro 1983).Moreover, the effects of public opinion are not confined to domestic policies,but are reported in foreign policy as well (e.g., Mueller 1994; Page andShapiro 1983; Russett 1990; Sobel 2001). Some scholars also have reportedevidence that public opinion influenced China policy (Kusnitz 1984; Teles


1998). Though these studies did not examine specifically the relationshipbetween public opinion and Congress’s China policy, they lead to the expect-ation that Congress may also respond to public opinion in formulating Chinapolicy. More specifically, fewer China bills are expected when the Americanpeople have a more favorable opinion of China.

Three other factors could have impacted the number of China bills intro-duced in each chamber, namely, session, the Tiananmen Incident, and elapseof time. Because of crowded legislative agenda, members are expected tointroduce more China bills in the first session of each Congress just to givetheir bills more attention and time. The Tiananmen Incident is arguably thesingle most important event in U.S.–China relations since the two countriesnormalized their relations in 1979. It nearly destroyed all the good feelingstoward China that had been accumulating among Americans since Nixon’slandmark visit (see Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4). The time trend of China bills(see Figure 2.2) also indicates that Congress has become decidedly muchmore active and punitive since the Tiananmen Incident. Finally, it is highlylikely that the number of China bills increased over time as a result ofexpanding economic, cultural, and military ties between the two countries.That is, more issues require legislative actions as bilateral relations grow.

Methodology

Because there are two major political parties and three branches—the WhiteHouse, the House, and the Senate—party control of government can come inany of the following four forms: unified Republican control of White House

Figure 2.3 Favorability ratings of China on 10-point scale, 1954–2001.


and House (Senate), unified Democratic control of White House and House(Senate), Democratic President–Republican House (Senate), and RepublicanPresident–Democratic House (Senate). The first three forms are included inregression analysis, with the last form being treated as the baseline.

Favorable public opinion about China is measured as the percentage ofAmericans who reported having a favorable opinion of China in varioussurveys. Notwithstanding slight variations in question wording and responsecategories, these survey responses are generally good indicators of Americans’overall opinion of China (see the Appendix). For a year in which no suchquestion was asked, the average of the previous and following years is used.For years in which there were multiple surveys, the average is taken.

It is hard to construct an aggregate measure of anti-Communism inCongress. Instead, I use a rather crude measure, namely, the percentage ofRepublican membership in each chamber. Republicans in general have tradi-tionally been more vocal in anti-Communism than Democrats.9 To be sure,not every Republican adopts a hard-line approach to China. Furthermore,hard-liners often had to compromise with moderate Republicans likeDoug Bereuter (R-NE) (see CQWR 2000: 263). But, in general, the moreRepublicans there were in each chamber, the more punitive China bills wouldbe introduced due to their antipathy toward Communism.

The first session of each Congress is coded as 1 and the second session 0.Tiananmen is coded 0 for years before 1989 and 1 for years thereafter (includ-ing 1989). I include a time trend variable Year, which is expected to captureany autonomous change in the number of China bills that is independent of

Figure 2.4 Favorability ratings of China on four-category scale, 1977–2006.


other variables. Last but not least, since House rules make it much moredifficult to amend a bill on the floor than in the Senate, I exclude amendmentsin the following analysis.

Findings

I run two negative binomial regressions, one for each chamber.10 Results forthe House are presented in Table 2.3. Since the average number of China billsintroduced in the House between 1973 and 2006 is 14, this means that con-trolling for other factors, a Democratic president facing a Republican major-ity in the House witnessed an estimated 22.68 (1.62 × 14) more China bills, ascompared with a Republican president facing a Democratic-controlledHouse. This is clear indication of the important impact of divided govern-ment on China policy.

Notice that between 1973 and 2006, there was only one Democraticpresident who faced a Republican majority in the House, and that presidentwas Bill Clinton. As discussed shortly before, House Republicans were par-ticularly active in China policy after they regained House majority in 1995.

Table 2.3 Determinants of the number of China bills (excluding amendments) intro-duced in the House, 1973–2006

Independent variables Coefficients Estimated effects

Unified Republican 1.48**(.53)

20.72

Unified Democratic −.29(.22)

Democratic President–RepublicanHouse

1.62**(.46)

22.68

Tiananmen 1.34**(.40)

18.76

Session .62**(.14)

8.68

Favorability rating .007(.008)

Republican percentage −.09**(.03)

1.26

Year −.03(.03)

Constant 67.8(56.00)

Pseudo R2 .17Log likelihood −99.65Likelihood ratio test against α = 0 9.87N = 34

Notes: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses arestandard errors.** Significant at .01


Clinton’s situation was strikingly similar to that of President HarryTruman, whose China policy was subject to bitter attacks by the newlyinaugurated Republican majority. This statistical finding plus Truman’sexperience with the Republican-controlled Congress strongly suggests that aHouse Republican majority tends to use China policy as a partisan issue toattack Democratic presidents.

Unified Republican control of the House actually led to 20.72 more Chinabills than a Republican president facing a Democratic majority, controllingfor other factors. During the 34-year period, the House was under unifiedRepublican control only for six years (2001–6). Among other things, GeorgeW. Bush’s tough stance in dealing with the collision of a U.S. reconnaissanceplane with a Chinese fighter jet in early 2001, congressional frustration withthe astronomical trade deficit with China, and congressional opposition tothe European Union’s proposed lifting of arms embargo against Beijing maybe responsible for the increase of China bills under unified Republicancontrol of the House.

Consistent with my expectation, the first session of each Congress pro-duced 8.68 more China bills than the second session, when other factors arecontrolled for. Also, a post-Tiananmen House session had 18.76 more Chinabills than a pre-Tiananmen session, holding other factors constant. This pro-vides strong evidence that the Tiananmen Incident was primarily responsiblefor congressional activism and antagonism in China policy since 1989.

Republican membership appears to have significant impact, but it has awrong sign. That is, when other factors are held constant, increase inHouse Republican membership actually led to fewer China bills. Onepossible explanation is that during the studied period, significant increase inRepublican membership in the House occurred after two major events inU.S.–China relations, namely, the Taiwan Relations Act and the TiananmenIncident. And these two major events brought about a sharp increase inChina bills introduced in the House. Finally, contrary to my expectation,favorable public opinion does not appear to have any significant impact.

Table 2.4 reports regression results for the Senate. Now only three factorshave significant effects: session, Tiananmen, and favorability rating. Since theaverage number of China bills introduced in the Senate was 6.7, this means afirst session in the Senate witnessed on average 6.2 more punitive bills than asecond session. A post-Tiananmen Senate session produced 9.2 additionalChina bills, compared with a pre-Tiananmen one, controlling for other fac-tors. Thus in both chambers, significantly more China bills were introducedin the post-Tiananmen years. Suettinger thus wrote of the impact of theTiananmen Incident on U.S.–China relations:

The events of June 4 dealt an enormous setback to bilateral relations bet-ween the United States and China—a setback from which, in some ways,they have never recovered. Indeed, one could say that the Tiananmencrackdown set the U.S.–China relations on an entirely different course,


one that is far more contentious and hostile than at any time since thelate 1950s.

(2003: 85)

Contrary to my expectations, however, more favorable public opinionabout China is positively associated with the number of Senate China bills.Even though substantively insignificant—one point increase in favorabilityrating resulted in 0.1 more China bills—this finding nonetheless indicates thepossible existence of a gap between public opinion and Senators’ preferences.That is, as the American public gradually recovered from the initial shock ofthe Tiananmen Incident, Senators generally remained critical of Beijing andcontinued to introduce China bills. This finding seems to support Suettinger’s(ibid.: 426) claim that “post-Tiananmen congressional attitudes on China arelikely to change only slowly and at the margins.” Finally, that none of thedivided government variables are significant in the Senate suggests that theupper chamber as a whole has not demonstrated significant partisanship inits approaches to China policy.

Table 2.4 Determinants of the number of China bills (excluding amendments) intro-duced in the Senate, 1973–2006

Independent variables Coefficients Estimated effects

Unified Republican −.62(.48)

Unified Democratic −.08(.31)

Democratic President–RepublicanSenate

−.07(.50)

Tiananmen 1.38*(.52)

9.2

1st Session .93**(.18)

6.2

Favorability rating .02*(.10)

.1

Republican percentage .03(.05)

Year .02(.031)

Constant 42.47(56.04)

Pseudo R2 .21Log likelihood −78.61Likelihood ratio test against α = 0 4.38N = 34

Notes: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses arestandard errors.** Significant at .01; * significant at .05.


To sum up, quantitative analysis provides strong support for three conclu-sions. First, the first session of each Congress witnessed significantly moreChina bills than the second session. Thus the electoral institution as anexogenous force has had some impact on Congress’s China policy. Second, asperhaps the single most important event since normalization, the TiananmenIncident has cast an enduring shadow over Congress’s China policy. Third,House Republicans tend to use China policy as a political issue againstDemocratic presidents.


3 Effects of congressionalactivism on China policy

In both the American and Swiss Constitutions the Upper House has as muchauthority as the second; it could produce the maximum of impediment—adead-lock, if it liked.

(Walter Bagehot, quoted in Wilson 2006: 151)

Given an active subcommittee chairman working in a specialized field with astaff of his own, the parent committee can do no more than change thegrammar of a subcommittee report.

(Congressional staff member, quoted in Goodwin 1962: 596)

In the previous chapter, I adduced evidence that Congress has been extremelyactive in China policy. The next logical question is: What is the impact ofcongressional activism on U.S.–China policy? In answering this question, oneshould consider the institutional structure under which Congress makesChina policy. After all, Congress and its members do not make China policy(or any policy for that matter) in an institutional vacuum. If the institutionalstructure makes it extremely difficult for Congress to transform its collectivepreferences into policy outcomes, then Congress cannot have much impacton China policy, regardless of how active it is or how strong its policypreferences are. As will be shown in this chapter, bicameralism, the com-mittee structure, and presidential veto have combined to severely constrainCongress’s ability to assert itself in China policy.

Bicameralism

The founding fathers created a second and distinct chamber in the hope thatit would serve as a “cooling saucer” to the first and presumably more activistchamber. Thus, the first and most crucial step in assessing the policy impactof bicameralism is to find out whether the House is indeed more active thanthe Senate.

Figure 2.1 already shows that the number of China bills introduced in theHouse is larger than that of the Senate. However, this finding does not

necessarily constitute conclusive evidence of House activism in China policy.First, the House is more than four times larger than the Senate, which makesany inter-chamber comparison based on absolute numbers potentially prob-lematic. Second, one can argue that the inclusion of amendments can skewthe results because it is much easier to sponsor amendments in the Senatethan in the House. The first problem can be dealt with by examining inter-chamber ratios instead of absolute numbers and the second by excludingamendments.1

I first calculate the ratio of House China bills to Senate China bills for eachCongress, and then compare it with the ratio for bills in general (i.e., all billsintroduced in each Congress). The purpose of this exercise is to find out: (1)whether there is any inter-chamber difference in China policy; (2) whetherthat difference—if any at all—is consistent across each Congress; and (3)whether that difference is unique to China policy or exemplifies a generalpattern.

The House–Senate ratios for China bills and bills in general are depicted inFigure 3.1. With the exception of the 95th Congress (which has a ratio of 14),the inter-chamber ratio of China bills stabilizes around 2 (the mean is 2.2).The ratio for China bills is nearly identical to that for bills in general (themean is 2.3), and the correlation between the two ratios is 0.565 and signifi-cant at 0.05. All these statistics indicate that the House has indeed been

Figure 3.1 House–Senate ratios for China bills and bills in general (excludingamendments), 93rd–109th Congresses.

44 Effects of congressional activism

significantly and consistently more active in China policy than the Senate.More importantly, this pattern of inter-chamber difference is not unique toChina policy, but exemplifies House activism in congressional policy-makingin general.

Figure 3.2 depicts inter-chamber difference in the number of China bills ineach policy area. The most striking finding is that in each policy area thenumber of China bills in the House is consistently larger than that in theSenate. In terms of ratio, which is not reported here, the House–Senate ratiofor each policy area fluctuates closely around 2 (the mean is 1.97 if foreignassistance is excluded). This ratio is nearly identical to the average aggregateHouse–Senate ratio of China bills reported above (2.2). Thus, in the par-ticular case of China policy, what is true for aggregate level inter-chamberdifference also appears to be true when it comes to specific policies.

Table 3.1 provides additional evidence of House activism. It depicts thefrequency of the number of China bills (excluding amendments) by chiefsponsor in each chamber. Of the hundreds of members who served in Congressduring the 34-year period, only 174 representatives and 79 Senators everintroduced any China bill. Of those who did, 92 representatives and 37Senators introduced only one China bill. That is, more than half of represen-tatives and close to half of Senators who introduced any China bill at all

Figure 3.2 Number of China bills (excluding amendments) by policy type and cham-ber, 1973–2006.

Effects of congressional activism 45

introduced only one bill. The average is 2.7 (449 divided by 174) for eachrepresentative and 2.9 (229 divided by 79) for each Senator.

While the average number of bills introduced by representatives andSenators is strikingly similar, they mask the important fact that a handful ofHouse members were particularly active in China policy. Nine representativesintroduced ten or more China bills; together they introduced 148 China billsout of a total of 449. By contrast, only two Senators introduced ten or moreChina bills; together they introduced 33 out of a total of 229. It seems thatinter-chamber difference in China policy arises primarily because the Househas more members with more intense China policy preferences. Table 3.2 liststhe nine representatives and two Senators as well as the policy issues that wereaddressed in their bills.2

Up to this point, I have adduced strong evidence of House activism inChina policy. The next step is to establish that the Senate has checked Houseactivism in China policy. Two concrete examples will help illustrate the func-tion of the Senate. In response to the Tiananmen Incident, Congress pro-posed a number of sanctions against China, but these sanctions were neverenacted into law (Oberdorfer 1989; Phillips 1989). The House put the sanc-tions in a foreign aid authorization bill (HR 2655) that died in the Senate. TheSenate attached its own version of sanctions to the routine State Departmentauthorization bill (HR 1487) that President Bush vetoed for other reasons. A

Table 3.1 Frequency of the number of China bills(excluding amendments) by chief sponsor and chamber,1973–2006

Number of Chinabills

House Senate Total

1 92 37 1292 38 9 473 13 9 224 8 10 185 5 3 86 4 5 97 0 3 38 2 1 39 3 0 3

10 3 0 311 0 1 113 1 0 116 1 0 117 2 0 218 1 0 122 0 1 137 1 0 1

Total 174 79 253


Tab

le 3

.2M

embe

rs o

f C

ongr

ess

who

intr

oduc

ed t

en o

r m

ore

Chi

na b

ills

(exc

ludi

ng a

men

dmen

ts),

197

3–20

06

EX

PFA

HR

MF

NO

ther

TA

MT

ibet

Tra

deT

aiw

anT

otal

Hou

seG

eral

d So

lom

on (

R-N

Y)

64

411

11

1037

Tom

Lan

tos

(D-C

A)

64

32

318

Ben

jam

in G

ilman

(R

-NY

)1

41

61

21

117

Step

hen

Sola

rz (

D-N

Y)

11

12

1217

Chr

is S

mit

h (R

-NJ)

101

21

11

16D

ana

Roh

raba

cher

(R

-CA

)2

47

13C

hris

toph

er C

ox (

R-C

A)

14

14

10T

rent

Lot

t (R

-MO

)10

10D

awso

n M

athi

s (D

-GA

)1

910

Sena

teJe

sse

Hel

ms

(R-N

C)

310

34

222

Cla

ibor

ne P

ell (

D-R

I)1

73

11

substitute bill (HR 3792) was never reported out of the Senate due to juris-dictional dispute (CQ Almanac 1989: 1642, 3261).

The second example concerns Congress’s failed attempt to strip China ofits MFN status. Between 1990 and 2001, the House voted each year on a jointresolution to disapprove of presidential renewal of China’s MFN status. TheSenate, by contrast, voted only once on such a resolution. Meanwhile, theHouse twice passed bills conditioning MFN renewal on China’s humanrights progress, and twice it garnered enough votes to override presidentialvetoes. But because the Senate on both occasions sustained the vetoes, thetwo bills never became law.

In a word, bicameralism has had profound impact on Congress’s Chinapolicy. No matter how active the lower chamber was, its legislative initiativesregarding China would have had little chance of being enacted into bindinglegislation unless the upper chamber had been equally active and agreed withthese initiatives. Moreover, my findings about inter-chamber differences arenot unique to China policy, but reflect a general pattern of House activism incongressional policy-making. To the extent that the founding fathers werewary of an active House churning out one piece of legislation after another,my findings seem to justify their concerns and to vindicate their decision toset up a second chamber as a restraining force.

Congressional committees

To what extent has the committee structure affected Congress’s China policy?Part of the answer is shown in Figure 2.1, which shows that only 259 out of atotal of 875 China bills were reported out of committees to the floor. Itshould be noted that the numbers in Figure 2.1 include amendments, butHouse rules severely limit amendment opportunities.

Therefore, I retabulate the floor status of bills excluding amendments, andfind that 119 (or 16.8 percent) of the 708 China bills were reported out ofcommittees. It is worth noting that my estimate is not unique to China bills,but seems to be representative of bills in general. For example, Ripley (1983:145–146) found that only a nearly identical 16 percent of the 26,566 billsintroduced in the 89th Congress were ever reported out of committees. Myfinding plus Ripley’s illuminate the enormous power of committees as gate-keepers: on average, about 84 percent of bills introduced in Congress die incommittee rooms. It is no wonder that Woodrow Wilson (2006: 63) calledcommittees the “dim dungeons of silence” from which few bills will everreturn alive.

What about the final status of those 119 China bills reported out of com-mittees? According to the new institutionalism, committee-approved bills willalmost always prevail on the floor (e.g., Crombez et al. 2006; Denzau andMackay 1983; Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Weingast and Marshall 1988).Consistent with this perspective, it turns out that 105 China bills were passedand only 14 were rejected on the floor. That means the probability of a


committee-approved China bill being passed on the floor is close to 0.88(105 divided by 119). Ripley (1983: 200) reported that an average of 70 per-cent of committee-reported bills were passed unamended on the floor.3

Of the 14 rejected bills 13 (12 in the House and one in the Senate) were jointresolutions to disapprove of presidential renewal of China’s MFN status,and the remaining one was a House bill. The floor majority approved all theconcurrent resolutions and simple resolutions reported out of committees.Of the 64 House amendments, 51 were passed and 7 rejected; of the 103Senate amendments, 63 were approved and 19 voted down.

My analysis so far provides strong support for theoretical claims aboutcommittee power, that is, the power to block policy alternatives and thepower to prevail on the floor. In what follows, I will give a few concreteexamples of how committee members used gatekeeping rights to influenceChina policy.

Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), former chairman of the full Senate FinanceCommittee (2001–2003) and its Subcommittee on International Trade (1991–1994), has been a staunch supporter of free trade in general and U.S.–Chinatrade in particular (Baucus 1994a, 1994b, 1996; Gugliotta 1991). He playedan instrumental role in maintaining China’s unconditional MFN status.Since MFN legislation falls within the jurisdiction of International Trade,Baucus used the prerogative of his chairmanship to successfully block anyjoint resolution to disapprove of unconditional MFN from being reported tothe Senate floor. In addition to trade, Baucus was also actively involved inTaiwan policy. When the House passed HR 1838 to shore up U.S.–Taiwanmilitary relations, Baucus promised to put a hold on the bill. Since a hold isthe equivalent of a filibuster threat, the bill was doomed.4

Senator Craig Thomas (R-WY), former chairman of the Senate ForeignRelations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs (1995–2001), hasalso been a strong advocate of friendly U.S.–China relations (U.S. Congress1999, 2001d). Since 1995 he has played a role similar to that of Baucus,fending off efforts by religious conservatives in the Senate to attach humanrights conditions to MFN renewal. In 1998, he prevented the passage ofseveral anti-China resolutions in the Foreign Relations Committee beforeClinton’s state visit to China (CQWR 1998: 3206). Partly because of the twoSenators’ influence, the Senate never directly voted on a joint resolution todisapprove of MFN renewal. The Senate voted only once on the issue andthat was in 1999. By a vote of 12–87, it overwhelmingly rejected a motion todischarge from the Finance Committee S.J.Res.27 that would revoke China’sMFN for one year.

While these two Senators epitomize the power of committee chairmen toblock certain policies, Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) exemplifies the power ofcommittee chairmen to propose new policies. Being the chairman of theHouse International Relations Committee from 1995 to 2000 and a staunchsupporter of Taiwan, Gilman had profound impact on U.S.–Taiwan policy.Under his chairmanship, six resolutions reaffirming U.S. commitment to


Taiwan were reported out of the committee, and he managed to have them allapproved on the House floor under suspension of rules.5 In addition, thecommittee marked up six bills in 1997 that aimed to deny visas to Chineseofficials who are involved in religious persecution, increase the number ofhuman rights monitors stationed in China, authorize more funding for RadioFree Asia, punish China for alleged missile sales to Iran and push develop-ment of a missile defense system to protect Taiwan (CQ Almanac 1997:8–38). All six bills were passed in the House. Had Gilman refused to schedulehearings or committee votes on these bills, they probably would not have beenreported out of the committee and passed on the floor.

To conclude, the congressional committee structure has had profoundimpact on Congress’s China policy. From the perspective of Beijing, however,this impact has been mostly positive, as the vast majority of “anti-China”bills died in committees. Had it not been for committees serving as gate-keepers, many more China bills would undoubtedly have been passed (in onechamber or both chambers), and Congress’s China policy—and U.S.–Chinarelations for that matter—would probably have been quite different. Also, itshould be noted that my findings are not specific to congressional policy-making toward China, but conform to the general pattern of committeepower in congressional policy-making.

Presidential veto

There have been three presidential vetoes and three unsuccessful congres-sional overrides respecting China policy.6 The first took place in the immedi-ate aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident. Congress attempted to provideprotection for Chinese students who were then studying in the U.S., hence theEmergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act (HR 2712). The bill, sponsoredby Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), would waive for four years therequirement that they first return to China before applying for new visas orpermanent residency. The bill passed the House by a unanimous vote and theSenate by a voice vote. President Bush vetoed the Act on November 30 1989,on the grounds that the Chinese had threatened to cut off all educationalexchanges if the bill were enacted into law. In its stead, the president issued anexecutive order granting Chinese students similar protections. The Housevoted overwhelmingly (390–25) to override Bush’s veto, but the Senate failedby four votes (62–37) (see Yang 2000: 76–80; Mann 1999).

The other two vetoes took place in 1992. The first concerns HR 2212, orthe U.S.–China Act of 1991. Sponsored by Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi(D-CA), the bill attached strict human rights conditions for the extension ofMFN in 1992. It would bar the president from extending MFN in 1992 unlessBeijing accounted for and released all political prisoners arrested during theTiananmen Incident. It also required China to make “significant progress” inother human rights areas before it could be granted MFN. The bill passed theHouse 313–112 on July 10 and the Senate 55–44 on July 23 1991. The Senate


did not pass the conference report until February 1992, and Bush promptlyvetoed it on March 2. The House quickly voted 357–61 to override Bush’sveto on March 11, but the Senate failed by a vote of 60–38 (Yang 2000:90–107).

Several months later, Donald Pease (D-OH) and Nancy Pelosi introducedHR 5318, or the U.S.–China Act of 1992. It is similar to HR 2212 in that itrequires presidential certification of overall Chinese progress in human rightsbefore the granting of MFN. However, it is significantly different from HR2212 in one aspect: instead of imposing non-MFN tariffs on all Chinesegoods, it would target only goods made by China’s state-run enterprises. OnJuly 21 1992, the House passed HR 5318 by a vote of 339–62, and theSenate passed it by voice vote on September 14. Two weeks later, PresidentBush vetoed the bill. While the House voted 345–74 to override the veto onSeptember 30, the Senate upheld Bush’s veto the next day by a vote of 59–40(Yang 2000: 107–111).

Regardless of why the three vetoes were sustained, which will be discussedlater on, the three unsuccessful overriding attempts convey two importantpoints. First, the two-thirds majority requirement essentially guarantees thatthe president will prevail most of the time in his battles against Congress.Second, bicameralism further enhances presidential dominance. If there wereonly one chamber, then Bush’s three vetoes almost certainly would have beenoverridden. Yet the Senate consistently sustained Bush’s vetoes, nullifyingwhatever victory the House scored vis-à-vis the president.

The three veto fights also raise an important question: Why did PresidentBush’s China policy preferences differ sharply from those of many membersof Congress? Bush’s background as the former U.S. liaison officer in Beijingin 1974–1976 is often cited as a key factor behind his determination to pre-vent Congress—at almost any political cost—from inflicting irrevocabledamage to a relationship that had been carefully nurtured since 1972 (e.g.,CQ Almanac 1989: 1411–1414). That is, since Bush was personally andintimately involved in the normalization process, he is supposed to havestrong incentives to maintain and promote friendly U.S.–China relationsregardless of the policy preferences of Congress.

However, a close look at executive-legislative interactions in China policyreveals that Bush is merely one of the many presidents whose policy prefer-ences diverged from those of Congress. In the late 1940s, Congress insisted onproviding military and economic aid to Chiang Kai-shek despite Truman’sobjection (Tsou 1963; Westerfield 1955: Chapter 12, Chapter 16; Grasso 1987;Purifoy 1976; Rourke 1983: 130–145); Carter established diplomatic relationswith China despite strong congressional opposition (Sutter 1983; Tierney1979); and Clinton’s engagement policy was widely criticized on Capitol Hill(Lampton 2001; Mann 1999; Suettinger 2003). Thus a general question arises:Why does the president often disagree with Congress in China policy?

Party politics appears to be the major factor that induces executive-legislative disagreements in China policy. Inter-party electoral competition


often motivates members of the opposition party to attack the president’sChina policy for political gains, particularly when the president’s party has aminority in Congress. The new Republican majority in 1947 and 1995launched incessant criticism of Truman and Clinton’s China policy, and theDemocratic majority mercilessly attacked Bush’s China policy between 1990and 1992.

Another reason probably has something to do with institutional differ-ences. By constitutional design, members of Congress are expected to beresponsive to parochial interests within their districts, while the presidentfollows national interests. Moreover, the two institutions are electorallyindependent of each other. That is, the president does not owe his office toCongress, nor does he have the authority to appoint or remove a member ofCongress. Thus members of Congress frequently advocate foreign policiesthat are different from or contrary to those of the president’s. Take humanrights, for example. Congress initiated the human rights campaign in theearly 1970s, but the targets of the campaign were mostly U.S. allies. Out ofnational security or other strategic concerns, however, the executive branchwas unwilling to jump on the congressional bandwagon and criticize itsallies for human rights violations (e.g., Cohen 1979; Forsythe 1988; Hehir1992). In the case of China policy, Congress was most outspoken in itscondemnation of the Tiananmen Incident, but President Bush was deter-mined to maintain normal relations with China, a country in which theU.S. has a wide range of vital interests: cultural, economic, strategic, andpolitical.

In a word, because of partisan politics and institutional differences,Congress and the president often disagree with each other in China policyin particular and foreign policy in general.

More bark than bite?

In the end, primarily because of the various institutional constraints, Congresshas rarely been successful in enacting its policy preferences into binding legis-lation. Table 3.3 shows freestanding China bills that were enacted into lawbetween 1973 and 2006. A total of merely 15 China bills became bindinglegislation. A denominator is needed in order to calculate the proportion ofChina bills that were enacted into law. As I pointed out in Chapter 2, 410China bills were non-binding resolutions that would not have become laweven if they had passed. Then there were 167 amendments. Even if anamendment is passed, it is not freestanding legislation. If these two types ofbills are excluded, the total number of China bills that could have beenenacted into law is 298. Thus a mere 5 percent (15 divided by 298) of eligibleChina bills were fortunate enough to pass the two chambers and have theblessing of the president’s signature!

Of these 15 public laws, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) is arguably themost important. It has been the bedrock of U.S.–Taiwan relations since 1979;


Table 3.3 Freestanding China bills enacted into law, 1973–2006

Congress Year Bill Public law Purpose

93 1973 S1315 PL 93–22 Extend diplomatic privileges andimmunities to the Liaison Officeof People’s Republic of Chinaand to members thereof

93 1974 S3304 PL 93–287 Indemnification for any loss ordamage to archaeologicalobjects on exhibition in U.S.

96 1979 HR2479S245

PL 96–8 Taiwan Relations Act

96 1979 S1916 PL 96–327 Authorize OPIC operations inChina

96 1980 HR6440 PL 96–445 Establish priorities in thepayment of claims against China

99 1985 SJR238 PL 99–183 Approve and implement theagreement for nuclearcooperation between China andthe U.S.

101 1990 SJR275 PL 101–299 Designate May 13, 1990, as theNational Day in Support ofFreedom and Human Rights inChina and Tibet

102 1991 S1216 PL 102–404 Provide for adjustment ofimmigration status for certainChinese nationals

106 1999 HR1794 PL 106–137 Support Taiwan’s participationin international organizations,particularly the WHO

106 2000 HR4444 PL 106–286 Grant China permanent normaltrade relations

107 2001 HR428 PL 107–10 Endorse and obtain an observerstatus for Taiwan at the WHO

107 2001 HR2739 PL 107–158 Amend PL 107–10 to endorseand obtain an observer status forTaiwan at the WHO

108 2003 HR441S243

PL 108–28 Amend PL 107–10 to endorseand obtain an observer status forTaiwan at the WHO

108 2004 HR3793HR4019S2092

PL 108–235 Endorse and obtain an observerstatus for Taiwan at the WHO

109 2005 HR4562S2784

PL 109–287 Award a congressional goldmedal to Tenzin Gyatso, theFourteenth Dalai Lama


it has also been the primary source of major conflicts in U.S.–China relations,the most recent being the missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1995–1996.There were five public laws enacted between 1999 and 2004 that urged theexecutive branch to endorse and obtain an observer status for Taiwan in theWorld Health Organization. Compared with the TRA, however, these lawshave had little impact on the Washington–Taipei–Beijing triangle. Then therewere two public laws that declared congressional support for human rightsin Tibet. The other laws were either neutral/technical or favorable towardChina, such as authorizing the Overseas Private Investment Corporation(OPIC) to operate in China and granting China permanent normal traderelations status.

To conclude, the preponderance of evidence indicates that, despite its activ-ism and antagonism, Congress has had minimal success in transformingits policy preferences into binding legislative outcomes. To put it bluntly,Congress’s China policy appears to be more bark than bite. This findingraises two more questions. First, if most China bills were never enacted intolaw due to inter-chamber disputes, committee screening, and presidentialveto, why did members of Congress nonetheless introduce so many of them?Second, does Congress matter in China policy and how? While my answers tothese questions may appear to be China-specific, the logic underlying them isapplicable to congressional policy-making in general.

Why so many China bills?

Short of becoming binding legislation, these bills serve a variety of usefulpurposes. First, they allow members to stake out positions on issues ofpotential interest to their constituents, campaign donors, and interestgroups (e.g., Mayhew 1974). Consequently, the significance of these billsdepends less on their fate on the floor and more on the political signals theysend out.

For example, Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), one of the harshest critics of China’shuman rights on Capitol Hill, sponsored a number of bills conditioningMFN renewal on China’s human rights. Fully aware that she was fighting anuphill battle against pro-trade moderates and the president, Pelosi neverthe-less introduced these bills because they made her look good among Asianimmigrants and Bay Area liberals (Yang 2000: 88). “The fight for humanrights is an ethic in San Francisco, make no mistake about that,” she asserted(quoted in Sandalow 1994). Partly because of her relentless crusade forhuman rights in China, Pelosi had become a rising political star in the early1990s, which paved the way for her eventual rise to the House Democraticleadership.

Second, even if it is a non-binding resolution passed in only one chamber(or both chambers), it nonetheless conveys to the outside world the collectivepreferences of Congress. If the vote margin is big—overwhelming or unani-mous—then other policy-makers in Washington and Beijing should be fully


aware of the potential cost of acting against the collective will of Congress. Inother words, though most bills do not appear to have teeth in them, they caninduce desirable actions from relevant political actors. This is the law ofanticipated reactions (Friedrich 1941). In May 1995, the House unanimouslypassed a concurrent resolution (H.Con.Res.53) urging President Clinton togrant a visa to Lee Teng-hui, the former Taiwanese president. Two monthsearlier, the Senate passed the same resolution with only one dissenting vote.In anticipation of even stronger congressional action—mandatory legislationand a successful override if it is vetoed—President Clinton reneged on hispromise to the Chinese government and decided to issue a visa to Lee (seeMann 1999: 320–326).

Last but not least, though most China bills were never reported out ofcommittees or enacted into law, addressing merely a small number of themcould exhaust the administration. As Lampton incisively pointed out:

Even if most of the proposed bills stand little chance of becominglaw, the administration must devote so much scarce human resourcesand leadership attention to putting out the bushfires that in its exhaus-tion it gives in somewhere simply to extinguish the most damagingproposals.

(2001: 338)

In 1993, President Clinton had to expend a considerable amount time lobby-ing against the Murkowski Amendment declaring that the TRA supersedesthe 1982 Communiqué governing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan (Yang 2000: 189–190). In 1997, in the midst of congressional debate about MFN renewal andprior to Clinton’s summit meeting with the former Chinese President JiangZeming, Christopher Cox (R-CA) initiated 11 separate pieces of legislationon China (CQWR 1997: 2865, 2777). Faced with such a legislative flood,Clinton had no choice but to compromise by increasing funding for RadioFree Asia and stationing more U.S. diplomats in China to monitor humanrights, the two options that were least damaging to U.S.–China relations(Lampton 2001: 338).

Does Congress matter in China policy?

Since Congress is a legislative body, one is tempted to assess its influence inforeign policy by counting the number of substantive laws it passes. Yetbinding legislation is merely one indicator of congressional influence.Through other and less formal means such as creating situations that gener-ate desired reactions from the executive branch, enacting procedural legisla-tion, and framing public opinion, Congress has firmly established itself as aformidable player in China policy. What Lindsay and Ripley wrote about howCongress influences U.S. foreign policy in general also applies to U.S. Chinapolicy in particular:


But fixating on substantive legislation obscures the fact that Congressinfluences policy by various indirect means: by setting up situations thatgenerate desired reactions by the executive, by changing the waydecisions are made in the executive branch, and by framing public andelite opinion about foreign policy.

(Lindsay and Ripley 1993: 18)

The “rule of anticipated reactions” predicts that rational actors will behavestrategically, adjusting their actions in anticipation of reactions from otheractors (Friedrich 1941). Because of strategic behavior, it is misleading tojudge the relative influence of the president or Congress by merely what meetsthe eye. The president may deter Congress from taking certain actions bymaking known his policy preferences (e.g., his intention to use the veto).Conversely, Congress can deter the president from taking certain actions bysignaling its collective preferences through actual or promised passage oflegislation. Thus, Lindsay and Ripley (ibid.: 25) wrote, “The existence of suchstrategic behavior has important implications for the study of defense andforeign policy: the relative power of Congress and the president cannot bejudged solely on the basis of observed behavior.”

Examples of anticipated reactions abound in Congress’s China policy.Lee Tenghui’s visit to the U.S., which was discussed shortly before, is agood example of anticipated reactions. Another example comes from U.S.sales of advanced weapons to Taiwan. In 1999, the Clinton administrationseemed reluctant to approve sales of long-range early warning radars toTaiwan. Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), then chairman of the House InternationalRelations Committee, wrote to President Clinton to urge his approval. Healso wrote to Secretary of State Madeline Albright, threatening to introducelegislation approving such sales. In the end, the administration agreed inprinciple to sell early warning radars to Taiwan (Kan 2002: 5). Meanwhile,Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) co-sponsored S 693 (the Taiwan SecurityEnhancement Act), a bill that was two months later introduced in the Houseas HR1838 and which eventually passed the House in 2000. Though thebill never became public law because of stiff opposition from a number ofSenators, it created an environment in which it became hard for Clinton toreject Taiwan’s arms purchase requests (CQWR 1999: 2605–2607; CQWR2000: 262, 953; Lampton 2001: 333–334).

It is worthwhile saying a few more words about Senator Jesse Helms, whoexercised enormous influence on China policy during his tenure as chairmanof the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1995–2000 (see Berke andMyers 1997). His preferences on China policy and his toughness were so wellknown on Capitol Hill that he often exercised influence by doing nothing(e.g., U.S. Congress 1997b, 1998c, 2000a, 2000c).7 As Lampton (2001: 339,italics original) pointed out, “In politics as well as in life, fear can be apowerful force; simply being tough and dedicated deters both the executivebranch and other legislators from even attempting to pursue certain courses


of action.” In the 1999 search for a U.S. ambassador to China, for example,several candidates were ruled out simply because they were presumablyunacceptable to Helms. In a word, because of strategic behavior resultingfrom anticipated reactions, “[t]he influence of legislators like Helms . . . oftenis measured as much by what did not happen as by the legislation they eventu-ally shepherd into law” (ibid.: 339, italics original).

Instead of prescribing (or proscribing) policy actions for the executivebranch, as substantive legislation does, procedural legislation establishes theprocesses by which policy decisions are made within the executive branch(Lindsay and Ripley 1993). Through procedural legislation like reportingrequirements or the creation of new agencies, Congress has firmly put itsimprint on many aspects of China policy. The annual State Departmentreport on China’s human rights, which was first mandated by Congress in1980, forces the administration to include human rights as an importantaspect of U.S. China policy. Because the report always offers unflatteringassessments of the overall human rights situation in China, the Chinesegovernment has never failed to rebut the report (e.g., BBC Chinese 2004,2005, 2006). In fact, starting from 1999 Beijing began to issue an annualreport on U.S. human rights. As a result of Congress’s procedural legisla-tion, the annual State Department report and the Chinese report havebecome the symbol and a major source of U.S.–China confrontations onhuman rights.

Another example of procedural legislation is the creation of the Office ofthe Special Coordinator for Tibetan Affairs within the State Departmentunder Public Law 107–228. A number of legislators, including some of theheavyweights on Capitol Hill like Jesse Helms, Bob Dole, and Daniel PatrickMoynihan, have been strong supporters of human rights in Tibet.8 Congresshas also held a number of hearings on alleged Chinese human rights viola-tions in Tibet (e.g., U.S. Congress 1988, 1997a, 2001b, 2002). The executivebranch, by contrast, has been largely quiescent on the issue, except when theState Department issues its annual report on human rights China, whichincludes human rights in Tibet. To ensure that the executive branch includesTibet in its overall China policy and to provide access to human rights groupsand Tibetans, Congress created the Office in 1997. Since Beijing has claimedsovereignty over Tibet since 1949, it condemns the creation of the Office asanother instance of U.S. interference in Chinese domestic affairs (e.g., BBCChinese 2001; People’s Daily 1997).

Probably the best example of procedural legislation is the Jackson–VanikAmendment that prohibits the president from granting MFN to Communistcountries unless he waives the requirement. Originally enacted to punishthe former Soviet Union for its restrictions on Jewish emigration, theAmendment became the statutory tool with which a frustrated Congress triedto shape China policy in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident. Becauseof this procedural requirement, the president and Congress locked hornsover China policy each year between 1990 and 2000, and twice the president


had to use his veto power to save unconditional MFN for China. While thepresident always managed to renew unconditional MFN for China, theannual debate nonetheless caused many uncertainties in and considerabledamage to U.S.–China relations. Moreover, the annual debates on MFNrenewal forced the administration to treat human rights as a top priority inChina policy.

By holding public hearings in which legislators as well as outside groupsand experts testify on relevant policy issues, members of Congress can greatlyshape public preferences, which in turn can influence the president’s policyoptions. As Lampton (2001: 336) aptly pointed out, “Often televised, hear-ings can cumulatively help shape media, congressional, and ultimately popu-lar discourse and create boundaries that the executive branch will itselfdecide not to transgress.” In a series of high-profile hearings held in 1966,Congress discussed the state of U.S.–China relations and came to the conclu-sion that the U.S. should readjust its foreign policy by reaching out to China(CQ Almanac 1966: 424–429). These hearings laid the critical foundation ofpublic support for a normalized relationship with China, which in turnencouraged and facilitated the Kissinger–Nixon initiatives to form a strategicalliance with China.

One reason that human rights has remained a top priority in U.S. Chinapolicy since 1989 is frequent congressional hearings. Christopher Smith(R-NJ), former chairman of the House International Relations Subcommit-tee on International Operations and currently chairman of the Subcommitteeon Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations, is one ofthe most vocal critics of Chinese human rights on Capitol Hill. He hasheld the largest number of hearings on human rights in China (e.g., U.S.Congress 1998a, 1998b, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2006a, 2006b). According toLampton (2001: 336), Smith held at least five sets of hearings on China’shuman rights in 1995, the first year of his chairmanship. In a February 2006hearing, Smith blasted the top executives of U.S. internet companies forallegedly aiding the Chinese government in cracking down on political dis-sent (U.S. Congress 2006b) He even invited Chinese officials to testifybefore his hearings. Each time the Chinese would refuse, and Smith wouldview it as Chinese unwillingness to cooperate on human rights issues, hencemore hearings on Chinese human rights (Lampton 2001: 336–337). Thesehearings undoubtedly have contributed to the salience of the issue amongAmerican people and their support for a strong human rights policy towardChina.

In a word, it is misleading to judge Congress’s impact on China policy bysimply counting the number of bills enacted into law. Congress has signifi-cantly influenced China policy through procedural legislation, creating situ-ations that generate desired reactions by the executive branch, and by framingpublic opinion. On balance, then, Congress’s influence lies not so much intelling the executive branch what to do as in setting up road blocks in U.S.–China relations. Sutter thus wrote:


The overall effect of such strong congressional criticism has been to actas a drag on forward movements in U.S.–China relations. The constantcritiques divert administration policy-makers from other tasks, forcingthem to defend and justify their China policies before skeptical andsometimes hostile Congress.

(2001: 108)


4 Congress and U.S.–Chinatrade relations1

Congress, of course, is oriented not to academic theory but constituencies—where voices, financial contributions, and votes carry decisive weight in elec-tions. In trade matters, as a result, it tends to listen to well-organized groupsthat have a clear focus of concern, strong local support, and a situation sus-ceptible to ready emotional understanding: the loss of jobs of automakers inDetroit or steel workers in Pennsylvania or garment and apparel workers inNorth Carolina.

(Mark Bisnow 1990: 283)

When we trade with other countries, we export more than farm equipment,soybeans, or computer chips. We export part of our society. Part of our Amer-ican values and ideals [sic]. This is good for the WTO. It is good for China.It is good for the United States. And I believe it will help keep the peace.

(Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Congressional Record 2000: S791)

Do my colleagues know that . . . China has still not accounted for thosemissing or detained in connection with the 1989 Tiananmen Square demon-strators? Eleven years . . . And this administration and this Congress wants[sic] to grant China permanent trade status? Shame.

(Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA), Congressional Record 2000: H514)

Booming economic ties

While strategic cooperation formed the foundation of U.S.–China relationsduring the latter part of the Cold War, today economic ties are the bedrock ofthe bilateral relationship. Some statistics on bilateral trade will illuminate thegrowing interdependence between the two economies. China is the third larg-est trading partner of the U.S. and the U.S. is China’s top trading partner.Total bilateral trade has grown at an exponential rate, from $2.3 billion in1979 to $343 billion in 2006 (see Table 4.1). U.S. exports to China haveincreased from $1.7 billion to $55.2 billion, with an estimated 199,000 high-paying American jobs dependent on exports to China (Scott 2005: 4).

Meanwhile, U.S. imports from China have increased at an even higher rate,from $592 million in 1979 to $287.8 billion in 2006 (see Table 4.1). The

U.S. alone absorbs about one-third of all Chinese exports to the world. Forexample, China has been the top supplier of footwear and toys to Americanconsumers since 1991; in 2005, Chinese imports alone accounted for 71 per-cent of total U.S. footwear imports and 78 percent of total U.S. toys imports.Since 2003, China has been the leading source of American apparelimports—both knit and not-knit (see Table 4.2).

As a result, the U.S. has been running an enormous trade deficit withChina. In fact, the last time the U.S. had trade surplus was back in 1982.Between 1983 and 2006, U.S. trade deficit with China increased from aninsignificant $68 million to $232.5 billion (see Table 4.1). The influx of

Table 4.1 U.S.–China trade in goods, 1973–2006 (millions of dollars)

Year U.S. exports U.S. imports Total trade U.S. balance

1973 689 63 752 6261974 806 114 920 6921975 303 157 460 1461976 134 201 335 −671977 171 200 371 −291978 820 324 1,144 4961979 1,724 592 2,316 1,1321980 3,754 1,058 4,812 2,6961981 3,602 1,865 5,467 1,7371982 2,912 2,283 5,195 6291983 2,176 2,244 4,420 −681984 3,004 3,064 6,068 −601985 3,855 3,861 7,716 −61986 3,106 4,771 7,877 −1,6651987 3,497 6,293 9,790 −2,7961988 5,021 8,510 13,531 −3,4891989 5,755 11,989 17,744 −6,2341990 4,806 15,237 20,043 −10,4311991 6,278 18,969 25,247 −12,6911992 7,418 25,727 33,145 −18,3091993 8,762 31,539 40,301 −22,7771994 9,281 38,786 48,067 −29,5051995 11,754 45,543 57,297 −33,7891996 11,992 51,512 63,504 −39,5201997 12,862 62,557 75,419 −49,6951998 14,241 71,168 85,409 −56,9271999 13,111 81,788 94,899 −68,6772000 16,185 100,018 116,203 −83,8332001 19,182 102,278 121,460 −83,0962002 22,127 125,192 147,319 −103,0652003 28,367 152,436 180,803 −124,0692004 34,721 196,699 231,420 −161,9782005 41,925 243,470 285,395 −201,5452006 55,224 287,773 342,997 −232,549

Source: 1973–1984, Harding (1992: Table A-2); 1985–2004, U.S. Census Bureau.

Congress and U.S.–China trade relations 61

Tab

le 4

.2U

.S. i

mpo

rts

of s

elec

ted

com

mod

itie

s fr

om C

hina

in 1

989–

2005

(bi

llion

s of

dol

lars

)

Yea

r19

8919

9019

9119

9219

9319

9419

9519

9619

9719

9819

9920

0020

0120

0220

0320

0420

05

Foot

wea

r, g

aite

rs e

tc. a

nd p

arts

ther

eof

US

Tota

l8.

399.

589.

5610

.17

11.1

811

.72

12.1

112

.75

14.0

213

.88

14.0

714

.85

15.2

415

.39

15.6

016

.51

17.9

3F

rom

Chi

na0.

721.

482.

533.

404.

525.

265.

826.

397.

418.

018.

439.

199.

7610

.23

10.5

711

.35

12.7

2C

hina

%U

S To

tal

915

2633

4045

4850

5358

6062

6466

6869

71

Ran

king

53

11

11

11

11

11

11

11

1

Toys

, gam

es a

nd s

port

equ

ipm

ent;

par

ts a

nd a

cces

sori

esU

S To

tal

7.80

8.47

8.18

10.0

910

.94

11.1

012

.29

13.9

616

.58

17.8

418

.23

19.2

520

.27

21.4

421

.04

21.9

624

.45

Fro

m C

hina

1.73

2.14

2.61

3.69

4.17

5.15

6.22

7.50

9.36

10.5

511

.08

12.3

812

.22

14.4

416

.10

17.2

219

.14

Chi

na %

US

Tota

l22

2532

3738

4651

5456

5961

6460

6777

7878

Ran

king

22

11

11

11

11

11

11

11

1

App

arel

art

icle

s an

d ac

cess

orie

s, k

nit o

r cr

oche

tU

S To

tal

8.58

8.62

8.85

10.2

910

.63

12.1

913

.89

15.0

618

.65

21.6

523

.71

26.4

126

.86

27.8

229

.72

31.5

833

.29

Fro

m C

hina

1.07

1.09

1.13

1.40

1.51

1.57

1.38

1.51

1.84

1.86

2.02

2.03

2.28

2.62

3.20

4.10

6.58

Chi

na %

US

Tota

l12

1313

1414

1310

1010

99

88

911

1319

Ran

king

42

32

22

22

33

33

22

11

1

App

arel

art

icle

s an

d ac

cess

orie

s, n

ot k

nit e

tc.

US

Tota

l13

.36

14.3

614

.89

17.9

719

.86

21.0

622

.22

22.8

725

.99

28.1

428

.69

32.8

031

.69

30.9

033

.19

35.2

937

.51

Fro

m C

hina

1.59

2.11

2.30

3.07

3.79

3.51

3.28

3.51

4.16

3.81

3.75

4.17

4.15

4.48

5.49

6.62

10.2

3C

hina

%U

S To

tal

1215

1517

1917

1515

1614

1313

1314

1719

27

Ran

king

22

11

11

11

12

22

22

11

1

Sou

rce:

Offi

ce o

f T

rade

and

Ind

ustr

y In

form

atio

n (O

TII

), M

anuf

actu

ring

and

Ser

vice

s, I

nter

nati

onal

Tra

de A

dmin

istr

atio

n, U

.S. D

epar

tmen

t of

Com

mer

ce.

Chinese products arguably have had tremendous negative impact on Americanjobs and wages. Unable to compete with cheap Chinese imports, manyAmerican manufacturing businesses were forced to close, resulting in the lossof thousands of jobs. According to one estimate, U.S. trade with Chinaeliminated a net 1,460,000 jobs in 1989–2003 (Scott 2005: 4).

The astronomical trade deficit with China has put both the White Houseand Congress under political heat, but for two reasons the political heat hasbeen particularly intense for Congress.2 First, of the three branches of gov-ernment, only Congress has the constitutional authority to regulate foreigntrade. Second, because of the electoral connection, constituents adverselyaffected by Chinese imports—mostly blue-collar workers and labor unions—have put increasing pressure on members of Congress to address skyrocket-ing trade deficit (see Sostek 2006; Trumka and Hughes 2006). And Congresshas indeed been actively pursuing various legislative measures aimedat reducing trade deficit. In 2005, Senators Charles Schumer (D-NY) andLindsey Graham (R-SC) co-sponsored a bill that would impose a 27.5 percenttariff on Chinese imports unless Beijing appreciates its allegedly undervaluedcurrency, which is believed to be partly responsible for the huge trade deficit(see MacLeod 2006; Marquand 2006). In the House, representatives from themanufacturing belt like Tim Ryan (D-OH), Mike Rogers (R-MI), and PhilEnglish (R-PA) also introduced similar bills.

Congress and U.S.–China trade

Even before the two countries had diplomatic relations, bilateral trade wason the mind of a handful of members of Congress. As early as 1973, Sen-ator Thomas J. McIntyre (D-NH) sponsored a joint resolution requiringSecretaries of Agriculture and Commerce to report on proposed grain salesto China, including the possible effects of such sales on U.S. domestic grainmarket, consumers, and farmers. In 1974, Senator Mike Mansfield (D-MT)introduced a bill calling on the president to grant Most Favored Nation(MFN) trade status to China.3 In the following year, Senator Richard Stone(D-FL) introduced a resolution calling for conclusion of trade agreementsbetween the two countries. In 1977, Congressman Les Aucoin (D-OR) spon-sored four bills authorizing the Export–Import Bank to extend credit toChina.

No sooner had the two countries exchanged diplomatic recognition thanCongress began to consider legislation on trade with China. On December 131979, the House Ways and Means Committee, by a 24–8 vote, approveda three-year trade agreement negotiated between the Carter administrationand the Chinese government. The full House approved the agreement by a294–88 vote on January 24 1980, and the Senate approved it the same daywith a 74–8 vote. In addition to granting China MFN, the trade agreementalso encouraged business relations between the two countries (including theestablishment of consulates and the promotion of visits by business groups),


committed each country to protect the patents, trademarks, and copyrightsof the other country, and provided for timely consultations to resolve issueslike market disruptions caused by imports (CQ Almanac 1980: 356–357; CQAlmanac 1979: 160).

In the decade after normalization of relations, Congress appeared to beuninterested in regulating bilateral trade, conceding most initiatives to theexecutive branch and the business community. The handful of bills andamendments (five in total) introduced during this period were mostly aimedat accelerating the flow of goods across the Pacific. In 1981, RepresentativeSam Gibbons (D-FL) introduced a bill permitting the importation ofChinese fur, and Representative Ralph Regula (R-OH) introduced in 1984an amendment designating China as a friendly country in a program thatsells dairy products acquired by the Commodity Credit Corporation.Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) sponsored an amendment in 1985 that urgedCommerce and State to increase U.S.–China trade, with a view towardcreating more American jobs and increasing the American share of theChinese import market. The exceptions were two bills—introduced byRepresentatives Richard Schulze (R-PA) and Philip Crane (R-IL) respect-ively in 1982 and 1983—that disapproved of presidential renewal of China’sMFN status.

Just as U.S.–China trade was heading into a period of unprecedentedgrowth, the Tiananmen Incident took place. Outrage against Beijing plusfrustration with President Bush’s policy of “business as usual” promptedCongress to reexamine its trade policy toward China. If Congress had theauthority to approve MFN for China, then it apparently had the authorityto disapprove it or to attach conditions to its renewal. What ensued was a ten-year battle between the White House and Congress over MFN renewal inparticular and China policy in general that, as President Clinton lamented,“divided our foreign policy and weakened our approach over China” (PublicPapers of the Presidents 1993: 770).

Amidst the annual ritual of congressional-executive skirmish over MFN,the U.S. and China signed an agreement on China’s accession to the WorldTrade Organization (WTO) on November 15 1999. Failure to reach a tradeagreement with the U.S.—due to a host of issues such as market access, IPR,and export subsidy—had been the major barrier to China’s efforts to rejointhe WTO.4 Things started to speed up when the Chinese premier Zhu Rongjivisited Washington in April 1999 and offered an attractive package of con-cessions. However, against the backdrop of Republican-led investigations ofalleged Chinese theft of U.S. nuclear weapons secrets and illegal Chinesecampaign contributions, President Clinton turned down Zhu’s offer (CQAlmanac 1999: 23: 3–7; Mufson and Blustein 1999). But the barrage ofcriticism from supporters of Clinton’s engagement policy, in particular thepro-trade moderates in Congress and the business community, coupled withthe administration’s concern about sending China’s preeminent reformerhome empty-handed, forced Clinton to reverse his initial decision and to

64 Congress and U.S.–China trade relations

pledge quick resumption of the WTO talks (Blustein 1999a, 1999b). Toughnegotiations resumed, but it was not until November 15 that the two coun-tries reached the landmark agreement.

Now it was up to Congress to approve the trade agreement. More specific-ally, Congress needed to remove China from the Jackson–Vanik Amendmentand grant it permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) if the two countrieswanted to reap the full benefits of China’s WTO membership.5 The Houseapproved China’s PNTR by a narrow vote of 237–197 on May 24 2000,with better than one-third of Democrats (73–138) voting alongside nearlythree-quarters of Republicans (164–57).6 The bill encountered much lessopposition in the Senate, and attempts by the bill’s opponents to amend thebill failed. The full chamber approved it 83–15 on September 19 (Republican46–8, Democrat 37–7) (CQ Almanac 2000: 20: 3–24).

Legislative battle over PNTR

This brief review of congressional involvement in U.S.–China trade relationsraises an important question: Why did some members support trade withChina while others oppose it? To answer this question, I examine the 2000House vote on PNTR. It is arguably the only China-related House vote thatdealt with issues primarily concerning U.S.–China trade relations such astariffs, market access, and special import protection. HR 4444 originally con-tained certain provisions concerning monitoring human rights in China,Taiwan’s accession to the WTO, and Chinese forced labor products, but noneof these provisions were enacted into law (see CQ Almanac 2000: 20: 12). TheSenate also voted on PNTR, but the vote was too lopsided (83–15) to besuitable for statistical analysis.

Apart from the PNTR vote, there were dozens of votes on the renewal ofChina’s MFN status. However, one can argue that these votes were primarilyconcerned with China’s human rights and only secondarily with U.S.–Chinatrade. Since it had first approved MFN for China in 1980, Congress had neverobjected to presidential renewal until 1990, one year after the Chinese crack-down on pro-democracy demonstrators on the Tiananmen Square. Outragedby Beijing’s actions and frustrated by the Bush administration’s China policy(e.g., the two secret missions to reestablish relationship with Beijing immedi-ately after the Tiananmen Incident), Congress turned to MFN renewal in anattempt to bring about Chinese human rights progress in particular and toshape U.S.–China policy in general (see Harding 1992; Lilley and Willkie1994; Mann 1999; Yang 2000). Thus the whole MFN debate should beviewed in the context of congressional attempts to change China’s humanrights practices in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident.

Moreover, as Nokken (2003) forcefully argued, the MFN votes and thePNTR vote were probably different because the rules and procedures govern-ing them were different. Under the rules governing MFN, presidential successis virtually guaranteed from the outset, since a joint resolution to disapprove


of presidential renewal must be passed in both chambers and—even ifpassed—is subject to presidential veto. Faced with such an institutional struc-ture, members nonetheless scheduled these recorded votes because these votes“provided them with the opportunity to secure publicity for their cause [espe-cially human rights] and to garner ‘position-taking’ points with voters backhome” (ibid.: 155). What resulted was a coalition of ideological ends votingagainst the middle, or what he called EATM voting. The PNTR, he argued, isa normal piece of legislation that requires majority approval in Congress aswell as White House support to be enacted into law. Nokken found that whenit came up for a vote, many members changed positions, with Republicansswitching to support and Democrats to opposition. The result was lessEATM distribution on the vote. Nokken thus concluded, “When the outcomewas uncertain, and when the matter facing the House was a straightforwardpolicy vote that would be dealt with by the Senate and president, the EATMdistribution subsides noticeably” (ibid.: 165).

Excluding these MFN votes, there were merely six House votes on tradeissues relating to China. Three of them were unanimous.7 The other threevotes (all in 1997) were contested votes, but a close look indicates that theywere not pure trade votes. The first of the three votes was on an amendmentthat directed the Export–Import Bank to give preferences to U.S. companiesin China that had voluntarily adopted a code of conduct consistent withinternational human rights. The remaining two votes appeared to be parlia-mentary tactics, as both of them were on motions to table the appeal of theruling of the Chair of the Ways and Means that a motion to recommit wasirrelevant.8

As a result of these considerations, I treat the MFN votes as votes onhuman rights and analyze them in Chapter 6. In this chapter, I examine onlythe PNTR vote.

Hypotheses

After the two countries signed the trade agreement on China’s accession tothe WTO in late 1999, the Clinton White House immediately started a well-organized and high profile campaign for its approval by Congress (CQWR2000: 1121; Smith 2000). “China is not simply agreeing to import more of ourproducts. It is agreeing to import one of democracy’s most cherished values,economic freedom,” said the president (quoted in CQWR 2000: 552). Heappointed Commerce Secretary William M. Daley and Deputy White HouseChief of Staff Steve Ricchetti to launch an all-out campaign. Clinton’s cam-paign on Capitol Hill focused on House Democrats who appeared to bereluctant to support a trade deal opposed by labor unions. In order to woowavering members, Clinton also arranged trips to China so that thesemembers could see with their own eyes the positive changes that had occurredin that country since 1989 (Smith 2000). Two weeks before the scheduledHouse vote, Clinton arranged a star-studded ceremony to tout the benefits of


U.S.–China trade. The guests included former presidents Gerald Ford andJimmy Carter, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and Minnesota’sIndependent governor Jesse Ventura (CQWR 2000: 1121).

Hypothesis 1: Because of pressure from President Clinton, Democratswill be more likely to vote for PNTR than Republicans, other thingsbeing equal.

Since constituency interests are arguably most clearly defined on trade issues,I expect significant constituency influence on the PNTR vote. In particular,the interests of farmers, big retailers and wholesalers, and labor unions areexpected to have significant impact on the vote.

The U.S. has been the world’s leading exporter of agricultural products.In the early 1980s, it alone accounted for nearly one-third (32 percent to beexact) of the world’s agricultural export market, and its share in 1999 was18 percent (Economic Research Service 2001b: 1). In the same year, the over-all export share of U.S. agricultural production was 15 percent (EconomicResearch Service 2000: 1). In 2000, the U.S. exported $51.6 billion worth ofagricultural products, which generated 740,000 full-time civilian jobs (includ-ing 444,000 jobs in non-farm sectors), and a third of U.S. cropland went intoexport channels (Economic Research Service 2001a).

China has been a leading market for American farmers since the twocountries established diplomatic relations in 1979. It was the seventh largestforeign market for U.S. farm products between 1997 and 2001; if Hong Kongis included, then China became the fourth largest (Becker and Hanrahan2002: 1). The U.S. is the largest supplier of agricultural products to China,accounting for an average of 24 percent of China’s agricultural importmarket between 1997 and 1999. In 1999, U.S. share of China’s imports ofsoybean, soy oil, hides, and poultry meat was 58 percent, 39 percent, 44percent, and 64 percent respectively (Foreign Agricultural Service 2001: 14).With significantly reduced tariffs—hence more market access for Americanfarmers—once it was admitted into the WTO, China was expected to importmore U.S. agricultural products, raising average U.S. farm prices from0.5 percent to 3 percent over the 2002–2009 baseline. And U.S. exports andnet farm income could increase by US$900 million and US$800 million,respectively, by 2009 (Becker and Hanrahan 2002: 2).

Given the high stakes American farmers have in U.S.–China trade, it is notsurprising that members from farm districts seemed to be particularly sup-portive of PNTR. For example, Greg Walden (R-OR) supported PNTRbecause the Oregon Potato Commission estimated that Chinese imports offrozen French fries would increase from 15,000 metric tons in 1997 to 250,000metric tons in 2005 (U.S. Congress 2001c: 13). Fully aware of the importanceof Chinese consumers for Iowa soybean growers, Senator Chuck Grassley(R-IA) also championed China’s WTO membership (Congressional Record2000: S791).


Hypothesis 2: Support for PNTR will be positively associated with farmemployment in a congressional district.

In addition to agriculture, other export-competitive industries have alsobenefited from the China market. The Boeing Company is an illuminatingcase. By the end of the first quarter of 2006, 61 percent of China’s passengeraircrafts were Boeing-made. And the China market is still growing, as anestimated 2,600 new passenger aircrafts worth US$213 billion will be neededfor the next two decades (Boeing Company 2006). Other big companies likeGE and Microsoft have also reaped enormous profits from the China market.Thus, generally speaking, the more a district exports to China, the more likelyits representative is expected to vote for PNTR.

Hypothesis 3: The magnitude of a district’s exports to China will bepositively associated with support for PNTR, holding other variablesconstant.

American retailers and wholesalers also have enormous stakes in U.S.–Chinatrade. According to Zakaria (2005), Wal-Mart—the largest retailer in theworld—alone imports US$18 billion worth of goods from China annually.Eighty percent of Wal-Mart’s suppliers—6,000 in total—are located inChina. Cheap Chinese products like footwear, toys, and apparel (see Table4.2) have saved American consumers more than US$600 billion in the pastdecade (ibid.: 29). In his testimony before Congress, Robert Hall, VicePresident of the National Retail Association, cited estimates from the TradePartnership that “U.S. imports of consumer goods alone from China in 1996supported more than 2.4 million American jobs in such high-paying sectorsas manufacturing (cash registers and trucks to transport the goods to store),finance and insurance, transportation, wholesaling, and retailing” (U.S. Con-gress 1997c: 185). Admittedly, what is good for retailers and wholesalers maynot be good for their employees. For example, criticism of Wal-Mart’s allegedexploitation of workers—low wages, no health benefits, etc.—attests to con-flicting interests between employers and employees. Nonetheless, employ-ment in retail/wholesale industries is a relatively good, indirect measure of thepolitical influence of retail/wholesale industries in a particular congressionaldistrict.

Hypothesis 4: Employment in retail/wholesale industries will be posi-tively associated with support for PNTR, controlling for other factors.

While American farmers and retailers/wholesalers have generally benefitedfrom trade with China, labor unions seemed to have been most adverselyaffected by it and hence were most vocal in their opposition to PNTR(Connolly 2000; CQWR 2000: 907–11; Greenhouse 2000; Kahn 2000b).According to one estimate, nearly 1.5 million jobs were eliminated due to U.S.


trade with China in 1989–2003 and many of these lost jobs were in the heavilyunionized manufacturing industry (Scott 2005: 4).

The plight of the textile and apparel industry perhaps best illustrates theadverse impact of Chinese imports on American jobs. In 2004, Chinese textileand apparel exports to the U.S. were valued at about $17 billion, or about 20percent of all American clothing imports (Barboza 2005). Between 1989 and2003, 59,577 textile jobs and 91,617 apparel jobs were allegedly lost due toChinese imports; they accounted for 13.4 percent of all manufacturingjobs lost to China trade (Scott 2005: 15). In the first three months of 2005,Chinese exports increased by more than 63 percent over a year ago, largelydue to the abolition of the global textile quota in January 2005. As a result,an additional 17,000 jobs were reportedly displaced in the first three monthsof 2005 due to the closure of 11 textile and apparel plants (Barboza 2005;Iritani and Lee 2005).

Consequently, labor union leaders were steadfastly opposed to PNTR. Thetop three union leaders—John J. Sweeney of A.F.L.-C.I.O, Jay Mazur ofUnited, and Lenore Miller of Retail, Wholesale and Department StoreUnion—resigned from a presidential panel on PNTR out of frustration withthe administration’s China trade policy (Kahn 2000a). John Sweeney calledit “disgustingly hypocritical for the White House to posture for workers’rights in the global economy at the same time it prostrates itself for a dealwith China that treats human rights as a disposable nuisance” (quoted inKaiser 1999).9 Labor unions organized massive grassroots campaigns andbrought nearly 13,000 members to Capitol Hill in April 2000 to put pressureon Congress (CQWR 2000: 907–11).10 Some union leaders even threatenedto campaign against Democrats who voted for the trade bill (Jordan 2000).For some Democrats, the threat was not a bluff but a real one, as laborPACs significantly reduced campaign contributions to Democrats whovoted for the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1993 (Engel andJackson 1998).

Hypothesis 5: The higher the percentage of unionized labor in a district,the more likely a member from that district is to vote against PNTR,other things being equal.

Moreover, the Democratic Party is expected to be more responsive to theinterests of labor unions than the Republican Party.11 Given the high stakesof constituency interests involved in trade policy, the two parties have trad-itionally adopted rather distinct positions roughly corresponding to thebroad interests of their respective electoral bases. Republicans tend to bemore attentive to business interests and more supportive of free trade,whereas Democrats are more inclined to support labor unions and henceprotectionist policies (Gartzke and Wrighton 1998; Gibson 2000; O’Halloran1994). This is what Bailey and Brady (1998: 528) called “interparty hetero-geneity of electoral strategies.” Thus, in the final analysis, partisanship can be


viewed as “constituency differences translated into issues” (Davidson andOleszek 1990: 130).

Hypothesis 6: Since Democrats are expected to be more likely to opposePNTR due to pressure from labor unions, the coefficient for the inter-action term Democrat × Union Strength should be significant andnegative.

Also, it should be noted that both parties had a hard time forming a unifiedfront on PNTR. On the Democratic side, opponents of PNTR were mostlyhuman rights activists and environmentalists from the liberal wing of theparty, and on the Republican side, social conservatives and defense hawksfrom the conservative wing of the GOP (CQWR 2000: 89; CQ Almanac 1998:23: 3). As a result, pro-trade Republicans and Democrats found themselvesin opposition to the ideological wings of both parties on the PNTR debate.A CQ Weekly Report staff writer vividly captured the political scene:

In any other context, it might have seemed surreal, as long-time politicalenemies from the political left and right chatted amiably. Rep. Christo-pher H. Smith, R-N.J., who is best known for his anti-abortion activism,complimented his frequent opponent on that issue but ally against theChina bill, Rep. Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif . . . But all had a belief in com-mon: that their adversaries would sell out America’s moral standing—itsdesire to export basic freedoms, decent working conditions and environ-mental protection—to make a buck.

(CQWR 2000: 910)

Hypothesis 7: The ideological wings of both parties will be more likely tovote against PNTR than moderates, controlling for other factors.

Finally, it is worth noting that many members opposed PNTR because theybelieved that the annual review of MFN gave Congress crucial leverage onhuman rights in China. Chris Smith (R-NJ), a strong critic of China’s humanrights, argued that “the annual debate and the possibility of MFN revocationare arguably the most important leverage the U.S. still has to influence humanrights situation in China” and that “the permanent surrender of our MFNleverage ought to be unthinkable at this point” (U.S. Congress 2000b: 3,2001c: 24). Minority Leader Dick Gephardt (D-MO) also felt “uncomfort-able with just taking away a process that is in place, that does provide somepressure on China, and leaving nothing to replace it” (CQWR 2000: 850).David Bonior (D-MI) said, “If you reward China with permanent trade status,you lose all leverage” (quoted in Shesgreen 2000).


Data and methodology

Due to the lack of district-level data, I use state-level data for two variables:Union Strength and Exports to China. Union Strength is the percentageof unionized workers, and Exports to China is the proportion of exports toChina out of a state’s total exports. Data for the other two constituencyvariables are district-level and come from the 2000 census. Farm Employmentis the total number of farmers and farmer managers divided by civilian laborforce. Similarly, Retail/Wholesale Employment is the percentage of retail andwholesale workers in civilian labor force. President’s Party is coded 1 if amember belongs to the president’s party and 0 otherwise.

To test the hypothesis that the ideological wings of both parties are morelikely to vote against PNTR than pro-trade moderates, I use the absolutevalue of the commonly used DW-NOMINATE score (hereafter referredto as DW score) (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Since the original value of DWscore almost always ranges from −1 to 1, its absolute value ranges from 0 to 1.Because both liberals (negative scores) and conservatives (positive scores) areexpected to vote against pro-trade moderates, high absolute DW scoresshould be positively associated with nay votes. In other words, the absolutevalue of DW score is expected to have a negative sign.

Given the usually high correlation between party and ideology, on the onehand, and constituency variables, on the other hand, including both in thesame regression may dampen the effects of one or the other.12 Thus I firstrun a regression with only Union Strength, Farm Employment, and Retail/Wholesale Employment. Then I add party and ideology, the interaction term,and Exports to China sequentially. I treat Exports to China differently fromthe other three constituency variables because data on state exports are avail-able only after 1999, which means that when I analyze roll call votes on U.S.–Japan trade in the 1980s in Chapter 7, I will not be able to include stateexports to Japan. Yet it is essential to have the same set of variables if I wantto compare congressional roll voting on trade across different countries. Onthe other hand, it is also important that I use the best available data to explainroll call behavior. As a result, I include Exports to China here, but only afterI have run regressions with the other three constituency variables that will beincluded in regression analyses in later chapters. Data sources are containedin the Appendix.

Since the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that takes on onlybinary values (1 or 0), I use logit regression. The coefficients of a logit regres-sion represent logarithm of odds, not probabilities. To convert them intoprobabilities, I use the SPost module in STATA developed by Long andFreese (2003). More specifically, I use the post-estimation command“prchange” to arrive at the changes in probabilities when the value ofan independent variable increases by one standard deviation, holding othervariables at their means. This is the method that will be used in laterchapters too.


Statistical findings

Table 4.3 reports the coefficients of logit regression and Table 4.4 reportsprobabilities converted from these coefficients. Model 1 is the basic modelwith three constituency variables. Members from farm districts seemed to beaware of the potential benefits of an even more open China market for theirconstituents, as the probability of voting for PNTR increases by 0.122 if adistrict’s farming employment increases by one standard deviation, holdingother variables at their means.

However, neither Union Strength nor Retail/Wholesale Employment isstatistically significant, even though both of them are in the hypothesizeddirection. This is a rather surprising finding, particularly in light of stronglabor pressure on members of Congress. State-level data might be responsiblefor the poor performance of Union Strength. More important, perhaps, is thepossibility that many Democrats—those who believed that China did notdeserve PNTR due to its human rights and environmental problems and thatfree trade would do more harm than good to America—would have votedagainst PNTR without pressure from labor unions. Also notice that theexplanatory power of Model 1 is rather weak, as indicated by the low pseudoR2 (0.043). This suggests that constituency interests as measured by the threevariables did not have much impact on the PNTR vote.

Party and ideology are added to Model 2. The first thing to notice is thatwith the addition of these two variables, pseudo R2 increases considerably to

Table 4.3 Logit analysis of the House vote on HR 4444

Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Union strength −.024(.017)

−.023(.018)

.013(.028)

.013(.028)

Retail/wholesaleemployment

.083(.065)

−.098(.077)

−.091(.077)

−.096(.077)

Farm employment .244**(.068)

.165*(.068)

.162*(.068)

.156*(.069)

President’s party(Democrat)

−1.914**(.244)

−1.001(.578)

−1.051(.584)

Absolute DW score −3.342**(.765)

−2.910**(.804)

−3.039**(.812)

Democrat × unionstrength

−.066(.039)

−.067(.039)

Exports to China .247*(.110)

Log likelihood −286.082 −244.223 −242.740 −240.065Pseudo R2 .043 .179 .184 .193N 434 432 432 432

Notes: Cell entries are logit coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.** Significant at 0.01; * Significant at 0.05.


0.179, as opposed to 0.043 in Model 1. It appears that party and ideology, notconstituency interests, exerted the primary influence on members’ votes.

Contrary to my expectation, the president’s party has a negative sign. Thismeans that being a Democrat actually decreases the probability of votingfor PNTR by a hefty 0.44, when other variables are held at their means. Theenormous pressure from labor unions might have caused the defection ofnearly two-thirds of Democrats despite an all-out campaign by their presi-dent. Yet this explanation is problematic because Union Strength is con-trolled for and is not statistically significant in either Model 1 or Model 2.Also, the correlation between Union Strength and President’s Party is merely0.172 (significant at 0.01), which rules out the possibility that high correlationbetween the two variables washed out the effects of Union Strength.

Furthermore, Bailey and Brady (1998) reported evidence that controllingfor ideology and other variables, Senate Democrats were more likely thanRepublicans to vote for NAFTA and GATT under the Clinton presidency.They argued that this finding “might reflect efforts by President Clinton toeither persuade or move Democrats on trade votes” (ibid.: 534). Gartzke andWrighton also found that House Democrats were more likely to vote forGATT than Republicans, controlling for ideology and constituency interests.They thus wrote:

Democrats were more interested in bolstering the legislative record of apresident from their own party than they were in maintaining a trad-itional opposition to free trade agreements. Republicans tended tooppose legislation from the opposition, rather than supporting a billadvancing long-held principles.13

(1998: 47)

So why did House Democrats support Clinton on GATT but abandon himon PNTR? Two factors appear to be responsible for the Democrats’ differentpositions on the two votes. First, the House voted on GATT in the immediateaftermath of Democratic loss to Republicans in the 1994 mid-term election.

Table 4.4 Increases in probabilities associated with one standard deviation increase inindependent variables (HR 4444)

Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Union strengthRetail/wholesale employmentFarm employment .122 .083 .081 .078President’s party (Democrat) −.440Absolute DW score −.126 −.110 −.114Democrat × union strengthExports to China .067

Note: Only significant coefficients are reported.


Foreseeing Republican challenges to their president, who was just two yearsinto his first term, many Democrats may have decided to rally around Clintonby voting for GATT. By contrast, the PNTR vote took place in 2000, the lastyear of Clinton’s presidency. Thus there was less urgency for Democrats torally around their president. Second, the GATT deals with internationaltrade in general, whereas the PNTR bill addresses U.S. trade with one parti-cular country. By 2000, U.S. trade deficit with China had grown to US$83.8billion from US$29.5 billion in 1994 and China had replaced Japan as thelargest deficit-trading partner of the U.S. The high salience of China—theastronomical U.S. trade deficit plus human rights, weapons proliferation,etc.—may have induced many House Democrats to vote against a bill cham-pioned by Clinton.

Absolute DW score is highly significant and has the correct sign. If itincreases by one standard deviation, that is, as a member becomes moreliberal or conservative, the probability of voting for PNTR decreases byabout 0.13, holding other variables at their means. This evidence suggests thatthe ideological wings of both parties were indeed united in their oppositionto PNTR, while the pro-trade moderates of each party joined hands in theirsupport for the trade deal. As in Model 1, Farm Employment is statisticallysignificant. One standard deviation increase in farm employment is associ-ated with an increase of 0.08 in the probability of voting for PNTR, holdingother variables at their means.

Model 3 tests the hypothesis of inter-party heterogeneity in electoral strat-egies. The interaction term Democrat × Union Strength is not statisticallysignificant, nor is party. On the one hand, this should not be a surprisingfinding, given that interaction terms are usually highly correlated with theoriginal variables. In my case, the correlation between party and the inter-action term is 0.864 and significant at 0.01. On the other hand, this is asurprising finding because it is inconsistent with evidence produced by Baileyand Brady (1998).

One explanation for this discrepancy, which was discussed above, is thatmany Democrats would have voted against PNTR without labor pressure.This explanation has two further implications. First, inter-party hetero-geneity in electoral strategies may exist, but only on general trade policy, noton country-specific trade legislation, as Bailey and Brady (1998) analyzedvotes on GATT and NAFTA. Alternatively, such electoral heterogeneity mayexist on trade policy toward some countries, but not on trade policy towardChina—a country against which many Democrats seemed to have a numberof grievances: human rights, forced labor, environmental problems, etc.Another explanation is simply that Bailey and Brady (1998) analyzed Senatevotes. In other words, it is possible that inter-party electoral heterogeneityexists in the Senate, but not in the House, which suggests inter-chamberdifference in foreign trade voting.

With the addition of the interaction term, only Farm Employment andAbsolute DW Score are statistically significant, and they both have the


hypothesized sign. More specifically, one standard deviation increase in theformer increases the probability of voting for PNTR by 0.08, but a similarincrease in the latter decreases the probability by 0.11, holding other variablesat their means.

Model 4 includes an additional constituency variable, namely, Exports toChina, which turns out to be statistically significant and in the hypothesizeddirection. One standard deviation increase in Exports to China leads to anincrease of 0.067 in the probability of voting for PNTR. Again, Farmingemployment and Absolute DW are both statistically significant and have thecorrect sign.

Discussion

My analysis adduced evidence that party was the most important determin-ant of the PNTR vote. Republicans tended to be much more supportive ofPNTR than Democrats. On the one hand, this finding is consistent with manyprevious studies that have examined the relationship between party affiliationand support for free trade (e.g., Baldwin 1985; Coughlin 1985; McArthur andMarks 1988; Tosini and Tower 1987; Wink et al. 1996). On the other hand, itis inconsistent with my expectation that Democrats—out of loyalty to andpressure from Clinton—would be more likely to vote for PNTR than Repub-licans (or more likely to vote for it than if they faced a Republican president).Moreover, a few scholars have adduced evidence that Democrats were morelikely to support free trade agreements during the Clinton years (Bailey andBrady 1998; Gartzke and Wrighton 1998). These seemingly conflicting find-ings suggest that the relationship between party affiliation and support forfree trade is not fixed but varies according to the political and electoralcontext as well as the particular country that is involved in a trade bill.

As far as ideology is concerned, the absolute value of DW score is consist-ently significant and—except in Model 2—has the largest impact. Thus lib-erals and conservatives, instead of voting against each other as they normallydo, were closely united in opposition against pro-trade moderates on thePNTR vote. My findings thus provide further support for Nokken’s (2003)thesis of EATM voting.

My study does not provide support for Bailey and Brady’s (1998) theory ofinter-party heterogeneity of electoral strategies, as the interaction termDemocrat × Union Strength is not statistically significant in any of themodels. This is a rather surprising finding in light of the electoral ties betweenlabor unions and the Democratic Party in general and intense lobbying ofDemocrats by labor groups before the vote. The high correlation betweenparty and the interaction term may be partly responsible for this finding. Itis also possible that inter-party heterogeneity of electoral strategies exists inthe Senate, but not in the House, as all the five votes (two on NAFTA andthree on GATT) analyzed by Bailey and Brady were Senate votes.

Perhaps the most plausible explanation is that many Democrats would


have voted against PNTR because of other considerations, regardless ofwhether labor unions launched massive campaign against it. These Demo-crats may have subscribed to the view that China does not deserve PNTRbecause of its poor human rights record and environmental problems, thattrade with China was responsible for the loss of American jobs, or that freetrade in general has done more harm than good to America. That UnionStrength does not have any significant impact in any of the regressions seemsto support this explanation. To be sure, state-level data could have resultedin the poor performance of this variable, but scholars have usually relied onstate-level data due to the lack of district-level data and they have reportedevidence that Union Strength had significant negative impact on support forfree trade (e.g., Bailey and Brady 1998; Conley 1999; Gartzke and Wrighton1998). In a word, that neither Union Strength nor the interaction termis statistically significant strongly suggests that many Democrats opposedPNTR because of their own preferences.

Of the three basic constituency variables, Farm Employment is the onlyone that is statistically significant in all four regressions. This is strongevidence that members of Congress were especially responsive to the eco-nomic interests of American farmers. Since the U.S. is the largest supplierof agricultural products to China and since China’s WTO membership prom-ises an even bigger and more lucrative China market, it is no wonder thatthe electoral connection appears to be particularly strong in the vote. Thefourth constituency variable, that is, Exports to China, also has significantimpact on members’ votes. Together these findings suggest that members ofCongress were particularly responsive to export interests.

Also notice that Retail/Wholesale Employment does not reach statisticalsignificance in any of the four models. Moreover, except in Model 1, it has anegative sign. What this suggests is that controlling for party and ideology,retail and wholesale workers are actually more likely to oppose PNTR. Inother words, Retail/Wholesale Employment should probably be viewed as ameasure of constituency opposition to—not support for—trade with China.

Though I did not analyze the Senate vote on PNTR, its lopsided natureindicates that there was a strong consensus among Senators on the desir-ability of free trade with China. In fact, “passage [of PNTR] by the moreinternationalist Senate was never in doubt, and both sides expected an exped-itious vote there” (CQ Almanac 2000: 20). That the Senate passed PNTR bylandslide margins, compared with the narrow margin of victory in the House,illustrates sharp inter-chamber difference on trade policy toward China.Moreover, recall that a few years before the PNTR vote, the Senate alsoeasily passed two important trade bills: NAFTA (61–38) and GATT (76–24).The relative ease with which the three important trade bills sailed throughthe Senate and the intense opposition they encountered in the House stronglysuggest that the upper chamber is in general more pro-trade than thelower chamber. Just as the House has become increasingly opposed to freetrade agreements and renewal of fast track authority (Bailey 2001; Conley


1999; Gibson 2000), the Senate has transformed itself into a bastion of freetrade.14

The Senate’s distinct pro-trade stance can be attributed to several factors.First, Senators usually come from much larger and hence more hetero-geneous districts than House members. The need to serve a greater numberand variety of constituency interests makes them less likely to be swayed bynarrow interests. In other words, a House member may be more responsive tothe immediate concerns of his/her constituents adversely affected by freetrade and vote against it, but a Senator may decide that his/her constituencyin the whole—exporters, importers, labor unions, and blue-collar workers,etc.—will in the long run benefit from free trade and hence vote for it.

Second, the longer tenure of Senators enables them to be somewhat tem-porarily insulated from constituent pressure, whereas House members areperennially on a short leash because of their two-year term. Third, Senatorsmay be more acquiescent to presidential initiatives in foreign trade thanHouse members. This is so because, with multiple committee assignments,larger number of constituents, and sometimes the pursuit of the presidency,Senators have much less time to acquire policy expertise than House membersand hence are “more dependent on executive guidance” (Kernell 1973: 341,see also Pressman 1966). Last but not least, the Senate may have been morepro-trade than the House simply because there were more Republicans thanDemocrats.15 Republicans have been strong supporters of free trade and theyhave been the majority in the Senate since 1994.

Finally, the passage of PNTR merely means that Congress cleared a majorhurdle to unfettered trade between the two countries. It does not mean thatCongress henceforth would wash its hands of matters relating to bilateraltrade. Since 2003, some members have been pressuring Beijing to appreciateits currency in the hope of slowing down the growth of U.S. trade deficit withChina. The Schumer–Graham iniative in 2005 is a case in point. Because ofthe enormous stakes of constituency interests in U.S.–China trade, on the onehand, and the strength of the electoral connection on trade issues, on theother, more congressional initiatives on U.S.–China trade should be expected.Moreover, even without the astronomical trade deficit, many members ofCongress still have a variety of reasons to oppose trade with China: humanrights, weapons proliferation, environmental issues, Taiwan, religious free-dom, abortion, etc. In a word, due to a number of factors, trade with Chinawill remain a highly controversial topic on Capitol Hill. The good news forthose promoting U.S.–China trade is that they can almost always count onthe White House and—to a lesser extent—the Senate to neutralize attemptsto set roadblocks in the development of one of the world’s most bilateraltrade relationships.


5 Congress and Taiwan

It seems to me that our administration . . . merits criticism for continuing anunprincipled and spineless policy towards our friends on Taiwan. I think it islong overdue that we stop kowtowing to the Communist butchers in Beijing,and to stand on our own principles.

(Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA) Congressional Record 1995: H4451)

I ask that the President take every measure necessary to ensure that the pur-suit of democracy and democratic practices [in Taiwan] are not fettered byChinese intimidation and aggression.

(Senator Dirk Kempthorne (R-ID), Congressional Record 1996: S2626)

The upper chamber, with its tradition of careful deliberation more insulatedfrom the winds of populist enthusiasm, should conclude that, yes, Americanslove Taiwan, but this legislation [HR 1838] needlessly stirs up trouble. TheHouse has had its fun, but to continue this dangerous game would becounterproductive.

(Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 2000)

The U.S.–Taiwan relationship is not only a unique relationship, but also oneof the most controversial relationships in the world today. It is uniquebecause

perhaps for the first time in the history of modern foreign affairs, a statehad broken relations with another, only to create a new legal arrange-ment [the Taiwan Relations Act] so as to maintain virtually all the rela-tionships that had existed before.

(Myers 1989: 13)

It is controversial because the relationship has been a constant source ofdisputes and conflicts in the Washington–Taipei–Beijing triangle. Moreover,the relationship is an emotional one that is “unlike U.S. relations with mostother countries,” wrote Feldman (1989: 42). “Only the U.S. relationship withIsrael contains as much emotional resonance.”

Despite the unofficial nature of the relationship, U.S.–Taiwan economic,cultural, political, and military ties are extremely extensive and strong. Taiwanis the eighth largest trading partner of the U.S., and the latter is the toptrading partner of Taiwan. In 2006, total bilateral trade was US$61.2billion, of which U.S. imports were US$38.2 billion and exports US$23 bil-lion (U.S. Census Bureau 2007). In 2004/2005, Taiwan was ranked sixth with25,914 students studying in U.S. institutions of higher learning (Institute ofInternational Education 2006). Taiwan has established sister state relation-ship with 42 U.S. states (Taiwan Provincial Consultative Council). The U.S.has been Taiwan’s most important political and military ally, supportingits membership in international organizations, repeatedly reaffirming U.S.commitment to its security, and providing it with advanced weapons on anannual basis.

The U.S.–Taiwan relationship has its origin in the Chinese civil war in the1940s when the U.S. supported the Nationalists against the ChineseCommunists. In late 1949, the defeated Nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-shek,fled to Taiwan and established a political regime. Plagued by corruption,inefficiency, and cronyism, the Nationalist regime was not expected to lastlong, nor did the Truman administration intend to continue its support ofChiang.1 Yet just as Chiang’s fate seemed to be sealed and the U.S. relation-ship with the Chinese Communists would likely have embarked on a differentcourse, the North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel.2 In response, the U.S.interposed the seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait. Since then, Taiwan hasremained an entity separate from China and has developed strong politicaland military ties with the U.S., as embodied in the U.S.–Taiwan MutualDefense Treaty, the Formosa Resolution, and the Taiwan Relations Act(TRA).

This chapter offers an in-depth analysis of Congress’s Taiwan policy. Thefirst section offers a brief review of congressional involvement in Taiwanpolicy, and the second section analyzes two House roll call votes related toU.S.–Taiwan relations. Despite congressional activism and influence in U.S.–Taiwan relations, it is rather surprising that no study to my knowledge hasexamined roll call voting on Taiwan. That the overwhelming majority ofTaiwan votes were lop-sided or unanimous is perhaps the most importantdisincentive. Yet there were indeed a few contested votes, and quantitativeanalysis of them may shed important light on why members voted as they didon Taiwan policy.

Historical ties between Congress and Taiwan

Congress has been the most powerful and most active supporter of Taiwan.In fact, it is not too much exaggeration to say that any study of U.S.–Taiwanrelations is essentially incomplete without considering the crucial roleCongress has played in the formulation and implementation of U.S.–Taiwanpolicy. And to study Congress’s role in Taiwan policy, it is necessary to

Congress and Taiwan 79

examine Congress’s China policy before the Nationalists fled to the island,since Congress’s support for Taiwan stemmed largely from its support for theNationalist regime on Mainland China prior to 1949.

For starters, there was the World War II alliance between the U.S andChina (Feis 1953; Schaller 1979; Tsou 1963; Tuchman 1970). Regardless ofChiang’s actual contribution to the Pacific Theatre, the alliance and Chianghimself enjoyed immense popularity on Capitol Hill. Congressman MikeMansfield (D-MT) proclaimed in 1945:

Chiang is the one man who can make Chinese unity and independence areality. His faults can be understood when the complexities of the Chinesepuzzle are studied and they are no more uncommon than the faults ofother leaders of the United Nations. We are committed to Chiang and wewill help him to the best of our ability. He alone can untangle the presentsituation because in spite of the things he has done, he is China.

(quoted in Purifoy 1976: 13)

Second, Madame Chiang, the Wellesley-educated wife of Chiang Kai-shekand the symbol of China’s heroic sacrifices in the war, was extremely popularand influential on Capitol Hill. On 18 February 1943, she became the firstChinese and the second woman to address a joint session of Congress. Heraddress “electrified Washington, winning billions of dollars in aid” (Faison2003). Third, a number of congressmen, Representative Walter Judd (R-MN)being one of the notables, had prior experiences (missionary or otherwise) inChina that enhanced the personal and emotional ties between Congressand China (see Bachrack 1976; Edwards 1990). Last but not least, Chianghad been fighting the Chinese Communists since 1927. His flawless record ofanti-Communism proved pivotal in securing congressional support for theNationalists in the Chinese civil war that resumed immediately after thedefeat of Japan.

The Truman administration’s approach to the Chinese civil war, however,diverged from that of Congress, particularly after the failure of the MarshallMission and the beginning of the Nationalist debacle (see Finkelstein 1993;Grasso 1987; Purifoy 1976; Tsou 1963). Basically, the administration per-ceived Chiang’s cause to be hopeless and intended to gradually detach theU.S. from the Chinese civil war, with an eye toward eventually havingaccommodation with the Chinese Communists. The China bloc in Congress,a group composed mostly of right-wing Republicans, launched bitter attackson Truman’s China policy and insisted on an all-out effort to save Chiang(Kraft 1991; Rourke 1983; Tsou 1963; Tucker 1983).3 Since the China blochad the potential to hold hostage the administration’s European programs(i.e., the Marshall Plan), President Truman compromised by submitting aChina aid program, hence the China Aid Act of 1948 (see Tucker 1983;Westerfield 1955: 262–266).

The flow of economic and military aid could not prevent the total collapse


of Chiang, however. Keenly aware of the political fallout of Chiang’s defeat,the State Department published the China White Paper, a chronological col-lection of official documents aimed at exonerating the administration fromthe defeat of Chiang. As Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared in theletter of transmittal, “The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the omin-ous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the UnitedStates” (U.S. Department of State 1967: xvi). Instead of warding off domesticcriticism, the China White Paper inadvertently provided ammunition to theChina bloc for the rancorous debate about “who lost China,” a debate thateffectively made it impossible for the Truman administration (Bachrack 1976;Finkelstein 1993; Koen 1974; Tucker 1983) and his successors (Bueler 1971;Kraft 1991; Rourke 1983) to initiate a new China policy until 1971. In themeantime, Congress remained steadfast in its support of Chiang and theregime he established on Taiwan. In 1955, Congress ratified the U.S.–TaiwanMutual Defense Treaty and passed the Formosa Resolution, thus formallyestablishing a military alliance with Taiwan.

When President Carter decided to sever ties with Taiwan in order tonormalize relations with Beijing, Congress—angered by Carter’s secret dip-lomacy and determined not to abandon a long-time ally—responded byenacting the TRA (Copper 1992; Crabb 1985; Javits 1981; Kraft 1991; Sutter1983; Tan 1992). As Congressman Thomas Manton (D-NY) noted, the TRA“gives the Congress a well-defined statutory role in conducting United Statesforeign policy toward Taiwan” (quoted in Yang 2000: 63). “By revising theTaiwan legislation submitted by the executive [Congress] established its roleas a China policymaker,” wrote Tan (1992: 25). In a word, the TRA estab-lishes Congress as a legitimate and important guardian of Taiwan’s interestsfrom either administration negligence or Chinese intimidation.

The decade following the passage of the TRA witnessed a relativelyinactive Congress in Taiwan policy, but congressional inaction turned out tobe short-lived. As Mann (2001: 201) wrote, “One of the most distinctivephenomena of American China policy in the 1990s has been the renewedstrength and importance of congressional support for Taiwan.” Congressforcefully reasserted itself in Taiwan policy by attempting to strengthen U.S.political and military ties with Taiwan, endorsing Taiwan’s membership ininternational organizations, urging high-level official visits, and pushing forsales of advanced weapons (e.g., Bush 2001; Mann 2001).

The number of Taiwan bills introduced in Congress testifies to congres-sional activism in Taiwan policy (see Figure 5.1). As mentioned in Chapter2, a total of 247 Taiwan bills (including amendments) were introduced inCongress between 1973 and 2006, with 167 in the House and 80 in the Senate.That amounts to an annual average of 4.9 and 2.4 bills respectively in eachchamber. Of the 247 bills, only 11—all introduced by liberal Democrats in theearly 1980s—were critical of Taiwan, that is, its human rights problems.4 Theother bills invariably declared U.S. support for Taiwan or attempted tostrengthen U.S.–Taiwan military and political ties.


Congressional attempts to enhance U.S.–Taiwan relations

Why has Congress been so supportive of Taiwan? To answer this question, Ianalyze two House votes related to U.S.–Taiwan relations. I could not exer-cise much discretion in selecting which votes to analyze because they werethe only non-unanimous, substantive votes between 1980 and 2006. TheSenate did have two more contested Taiwan votes during the same period(both in the mid-1980s). Since data on many variables are not available untilthe late 1990s, I decide against analyzing the two Senate votes. The samedata problem prevents me from examining some contested votes on Taiwanpolicy that occurred before 1980, such as votes on the TRA in bothchambers.

The first vote was on passage of the U.S.–Taiwan Anti-Ballistic MissileDefense Cooperation Act in 1997. The purpose of the bill, which passed 301–117 on 6 November, was to consider developing an anti-ballistic missiledefense system to protect Taiwan from potential missile attacks by Beijing.The second vote was on passage of HR 1838, or the Taiwan SecurityEnhancement Act, sponsored by House Majority leader Tom DeLay (R-TX)in 1999. The bill requires, among other things, the Secretary of Defenseto establish direct military communication with Taiwan’s military forcesand to increase the number of Taiwanese military officials trained at U.S.

Figure 5.1 Time trend of Taiwan bills introduced in each chamber, 1973–2006.


military academies (CQ Almanac 2000: H-4). It passed the House 341–70 onFebruary 1 2000.

In addition to the two substantive votes, there were two contested proce-dural votes in the House. The first was on Doug Bereuter’s (R-NE) motion totable the Frank Pallone (D-NJ) motion to reconsider the vote on HR 2386.5

Pallone’s motion was tabled 245–175. The second was on David Bonior’s (D-MI) motion to recommit HR 4444—the bill that grants PNTR to China—tothe House Ways and Means and International Relations with instructions toadd language revoking China’s PNTR if China invades, blockades, or attacksTaiwan.6 The motion was defeated 176–258 on May 24 2000.

Admittedly, the distinction between procedural and substantive votes ismore conceptual than practical, as most votes involve both procedural andsubstantive questions. Even a motion to adjourn, for example, can be a sub-stantive maneuver if it is intended to delay action on a bill. And recommittalmotions are “almost wholly substantive in intent” (Froman and Ripley 1965:57). In fact, “[o]nly at the extremes are issues either purely procedural orpurely and identifiably substantive” (ibid.: 56). The same can be said of thesetwo procedural votes, which could have substantive policy implications.7

However, according to the idea of parties as procedural coalitions, parties aremonoliths when it comes to procedural votes, hence high party unity in mostprocedural votes (Froman and Ripley 1965: Table V; Jones 1964: 5; Schicklerand Rich 1997: Table 1).8 Indeed, controlling for other factors, party hasdecisive impact on the two votes.9 Since procedural votes amount to nothingbut a show of party discipline, I exclude them.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Other things being equal, a Republican is more likely thana Democrat to support strong U.S.–Taiwan relations.

Scholars who studied U.S.–China relations in the late 1940s and early 1950susually single out partisanship as the most important factor behind congres-sional support for China (and Taiwan after Chiang Kai-shek’s defeat in 1949)and criticism of Truman’s China policy.10 Exiled from the White House since1932, the Republicans desperately needed a campaign issue to beat the seem-ingly unbeatable Democrats. Moreover, the 1946 mid-term election putRepublicans in control of Congress, greatly boosting their confidence indefeating Truman in the upcoming 1948 election. Tucker (1983: 162–163)wrote, “The largest number in Congress participated in the China contro-versy for partisan reasons.” These Republicans “lacked genuine interest inChina but needed a campaign issue to defeat the seemingly unbeatableDemocrats who had monopolized the White House since 1932,” addedTucker (1994: 31).

However, Truman scored a surprise win at the polls. Truman’s reelectioncoincided with the beginning of Chiang’s debacle and congressional


Republicans “increasingly saw the deteriorating China situation as a poten-tial issue and arena of attack of Truman’s foreign policy” (Rourke 1983: 74).By 1949, the China bloc “consisted largely of Republicans for whom theChina question was primarily a matter of party politics [and who adopted a]gloves-off approach and promoted the Nationalist cause for their own polit-ical purposes” (Borg 1980: 174).11

Nearly three decades later, partisan passions flared up again, and this timethe center of contention was the TRA.12 The Republicans in general weremore vociferous than Democrats in their criticism of Carter’s decision toabrogate the U.S.–Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty (see CQ Almanac 1979:112–113; Sutter 1983).13 Senator Jake Garn (R-UT) (1979: 20) called it “con-stitutionally and morally objectionable” to abandon “a staunch and faithfulally,” denouncing Carter’s decision as “an ignominious act.” Senator BarryGoldwater (R-AZ) (1979: 23) condemned Carter’s normalization announce-ment as “a short speech . . . which history may well record as ten minutes thatlived in infamy.” Goldwater even filed a case in a federal court, claiming thatCarter’s unilateral decision to abrogate the defense treaty was unconsti-tutional (CQ Almanac 1979: 100).

Just have a glance at party line-up on the 22 roll call votes, and one can tellthe extent to which the two parties were divided on the details, if not thefundamentals, of the TRA (see Table 5.1 and Table 5.2). Eleven of the thirteenvotes in the House and six of the nine votes in the Senate were party votes,that is, votes in which the majority of the two parties voted against eachother. Furthermore, the intensity of party division was extraordinary. In theHouse, seven of the eleven party votes witnessed at least 75 percent of oneparty voting against at least 75 percent of the other party; in the Senate, fourof the six party votes were so divided. Notice that all but one partisan votewere on amendments or motions that were sponsored mainly by Republicansand which contained language that would have restored U.S.–Taiwan militaryalliance under the Mutual Defense Treaty. Such language would almost cer-tainly have delayed normalization because of Beijing’s objection. In a word,despite the broad bipartisan consensus on the desirability of continuingU.S.–Taiwan relations, as reflected in the smooth passage of the TRA in bothchambers, the two parties disagreed sharply over the exact nature of futureU.S. relations with Taiwan.

In the decade after normalization, Republicans largely deferred to theWhite House on Taiwan policy. For President Reagan did not need to beprodded by Congress to be a staunch supporter of Taiwan (see Butterfield1980; MacDonald and Kaiser 1980).14 President George H. W. Bush alsoencountered little pressure from Congress on Taiwan.15 However, Republicansbecame much more active in Taiwan policy during the Clinton years. In July1993, Senator Frank MurKowski (R-AK) introduced an amendment tothe annual Foreign Relations Authorization Act, declaring that the TRAshould supersede the 1982 Shanghai Communiqué on U.S. arms sales toTaiwan (Congressional Record 1994: S 2943–2944, S 5024). Despite the


Tab

le 5

.1H

ouse

rol

l cal

l vot

es o

n th

e T

aiw

an R

elat

ions

Act

Vot

eco

unt

Rep

ublic

ans

Dem

ocra

tsP

resi

dent

’spo

siti

onV

ote

outc

ome

Bill

sum

mar

y

Yea

Nay

Yea

Nay

149–

221

107

2742

194

Nay

Rej

ecte

dK

ram

er a

men

dmen

t to

ret

ain

lang

uage

fro

m t

he 1

955

mut

ual

defe

nse

trea

ty w

ith

Tai

wan

reg

ardi

ng U

.S. r

espo

nse

to h

osti

leac

tion

tow

ard

Tai

wan

.16

9–19

712

014

4918

3N

ayR

ejec

ted

Lag

omar

sino

am

endm

ent

to s

tate

tha

t th

e U

.S. w

ould

con

side

rw

ithd

raw

ing

reco

gnit

ion

of C

hina

if it

wer

e to

att

ack

Tai

wan

.17

2–18

111

313

5916

8N

ayR

ejec

ted

Qua

yle

amen

dmen

t to

con

duct

rel

atio

ns w

ith

Tai

wan

thr

ough

ago

vern

men

t “l

iais

on o

ffice

,” r

athe

r th

an t

hrou

gh t

he u

noffi

cial

Am

eric

an I

nsti

tute

on

Tai

wan

.17

1–23

913

514

3622

5N

ayR

ejec

ted

Ash

broo

k am

endm

ent

to m

ake

empl

oyee

s of

the

Am

eric

anIn

stit

ute

on T

aiw

an e

mpl

oyee

s of

the

U.S

. gov

ernm

ent.

146–

256

100

4446

212

Nay

Rej

ecte

dE

dwar

ds a

men

dmen

t to

add

the

isla

nds

of Q

uem

oy a

nd M

atsu

to

the

defi

niti

on o

f T

aiw

an.

179–

225

124

2155

204

Nay

Rej

ecte

dSo

lom

on a

men

dmen

t to

est

ablis

h re

lati

ons

wit

h T

aiw

an o

n a

cons

ular

bas

is.

204–

193

1413

219

061

Agr

eed

Zab

lock

i mot

ion

to e

nd a

ll de

bate

on

the

bill

at 5

p.m

. in

anat

tem

pt t

o cu

t off

fur

ther

am

endm

ents

.11

0–29

598

5112

244

Nay

Rej

ecte

dB

aum

an m

otio

n to

str

ike

the

enac

ting

cla

use

(thu

s ki

lling

the

bill

)18

2–22

113

416

4820

5N

ayR

ejec

ted

Dan

nem

eyer

am

endm

ent

to c

ondu

ct r

elat

ions

wit

h T

aiw

anth

roug

h a

quas

i-go

vern

men

tal a

genc

y en

titl

ed “

U.S

. Com

mis

sion

in T

aiw

an.”

141–

264

118

3223

232

Nay

Rej

ecte

dE

dwar

ds a

men

dmen

t to

req

uire

app

rova

l by

both

hou

ses

befo

reth

e pr

esid

ent

coul

d no

tify

Tai

wan

tha

t a

trea

ty o

r ag

reem

ent

wit

hT

aiw

an w

ould

be

term

inat

ed.

226–

174

144

482

170

Ado

pted

Ash

broo

k am

endm

ent

to r

equi

re t

he a

utho

riza

tion

and

appr

opri

atio

n by

Con

gres

s of

any

U.S

. gov

ernm

ent

fund

s fo

r th

eA

mer

ican

Ins

titu

te o

n T

aiw

an.

345–

5510

441

241

14Y

eaP

asse

dP

assa

ge o

f th

e bi

ll.33

9–50

105

3723

413

Yea

Ado

pted

Ado

ptio

n of

the

con

fere

nce

repo

rt.

Sou

rce:

CQ

Alm

anac

(19

79).

Tab

le 5

.2Se

nate

rol

l cal

l vot

es o

n th

e T

aiw

an R

elat

ions

Act

Vot

eco

unt

Rep

ublic

ans

Dem

ocra

ts

Pre

side

nt’s

posi

tion

Vot

eou

tcom

eB

ill s

umm

ary

Yea

Nay

Yea

Nay

33–6

228

125

50N

ayR

ejec

ted

Dol

e am

endm

ent

to p

rovi

de fo

r un

offici

al U

nite

d St

ates

rela

tion

s w

ith

“Tai

wan

” ra

ther

tha

n w

ith

the

“peo

ple

ofT

aiw

an,”

whi

ch w

as t

he p

hras

ing

soug

ht b

y P

resi

dent

Car

ter.

57–3

810

3047

8Y

eaA

gree

dG

lenn

mot

ion

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administration’s objection, a watered-down version of the amendment waspassed by the conference committee and signed into law by Clinton in April1994 (Yang 2000: 189–190). Republicans became even more assertive inTaiwan policy after the 1994 mid-term election. By threatening mandatorylegislation, the new Republican majority in 1995 successfully forced PresidentClinton to grant a visa to Lee Teng-Hui for his visit to Cornell University(Mann 1999: Chapter 17; Mann 2001; Yang 2000: Chapter 6).

A close look at Figure 5.1 also suggests that Congress’s Taiwan policy wasinfluenced by partisan politics. While there were only a few Taiwan bills duringthe 1980s and early 1990s, there was a conspicuous and sudden rise in thenumber of Taiwan bills since the mid-1990s. And this surge was simultaneouswith the inauguration of the new Republican majority. Also, by my count,during the Reagan and Bush years there was no recorded vote on Taiwan inthe House and only two votes in the Senate, yet the House voted twelve timesand the Senate four times on Taiwan policy during the Clinton years.

Hypothesis 2: Liberals and conservatives will be more supportive ofTaiwan than moderates, other things being equal.

Nokken’s (2003) study and my findings in Chapter 4 adduced strong evidencethat a coalition of ideological wings existed in roll call voting on trade withChina. This seemingly strange coalition could also exist on Taiwan policy.Before the 1990s, the most vocal supporters of Chiang and Taiwan weregenerally conservatives such as members of the China bloc in the Trumanyears and Goldwater-type Republicans during Carter’s presidency. Liberals,by contrast, were far more critical of the authoritarian regime on Taiwan.Since the mid-1970s, liberals began to scrutinize Taiwan’s human rightsrecord. When the TRA was under floor debate, Congressmen James Leach(R-IA), Donald Pease (D-OH), and Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI) managedto insert language on human rights into the TRA, which gives Congress thestatutory power to oversee human rights progress in Taiwan (Bush 2004:Chapter 6; U.S. Congress 1987).16

The 1980s witnessed the peak of liberal criticism of and pressure onTaiwan’s authoritarian regime, led by Steve Solarz (D-NY), chairman of theHouse Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific from 1981–1992(see Bush 2004: Chapter 6). In 1986, Senators Edward Kennedy (D-MA),Claiborne Pell (D-RI), Carl Levin (D-MI) and congressmen Steve Solarz (D-NY) and Jim Leach (R-IA) formed the Committee for Democracy on Taiwan(Congressional Record 1987: S9935). Partly because of congressional pres-sure, Taiwan began to implement political reform in the late 1980s. By themid-1990s, Taiwan had successfully transformed itself from an authoritarianregime into a burgeoning democracy. In 1996, Taiwan held its first competi-tive, multi-party presidential election.

Since many liberals were personally involved in Taiwan’s political reforms,they had added incentives to support Taiwan when it became a fledgling


democracy. Indeed, liberals almost always cited Taiwan’s democracy as a keyreason for their support. Senator Joe Lieberman (D-CT) supported Taiwan’sadmission to the United Nations because Taiwan “has made significant pro-gress in developing democratic representative institutions” (CongressionalRecord 1992: S13655). “That Taiwan has come so far [in political reform] insuch a short time is truly impressive and is a great compliment to the peopleof Taiwan and to their current leaders,” said Senator Pell (D-RI) (Congres-sional Record 1996: S11422). During congressional debate over Lee’s 1995visit to Cornell, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) pointedly asked,“Why . . . the President, the democratically elected President of Taiwan . . . isnot allowed to come?” (Congressional Record 1995: H4452).

Conservatives also touted political reform in Taiwan. “Taiwan is a dem-ocracy, yet its President cannot visit our Nation,” said an outraged BenjaminGilman (R-NY) (Congressional Record 1995: H4451). Gerald Solomon(R-NY) denounced Clinton’s refusal to permit Lee’s visit as “an assaultagainst his [Lee’s] dignity and our morality [and] a blatant contradiction ofour efforts to promote democracy around the world.” He added, “Here is oneimportant instance in which American interests and American morality gohand in hand” (ibid.: H4451–52). After the House passed the resolutionregarding Lee’s visit, Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) observed:

Today we are extending a hand of friendship to President Lee of theRepublic of China . . . because his government on Taiwan has liberal-ized, has reached out to the opposition and permitted rights [that] we asAmericans believe should be the rights of citizens of everywhere.

(ibid.: H4452)

Frank Murkowski (1996), an unwavering supporter of Taiwan, declared,“Congress should congratulate the people of Taiwan for their continued stepsto democracy.” Tom DeLay also praised Taiwan as “a shining example offreedom and democracy in a part of the world sorely in need of role models”(Congressional Record 1998: H5888).

These remarks by liberals and conservatives suggest that they were unitedin their support for Taiwan because of the latter’s democratic transition. Bycontrast, the business-minded moderates adopted a more cautious approachlest disputes with Beijing over Taiwan would disrupt U.S.–China economicties. Doug Bereuter (R-NE), then chairman of the House International Rela-tions Asia and Pacific Subcommittee, mounted serious opposition to HR1838 and succeeded in securing some concessions on the bill (see CQWR1999: 2605–2606).

Hypothesis 3: Controlling for other factors, hawks will be more likely tovote for strong U.S.–Taiwan relations than doves.

Previous scholars have adduced strong evidence that hawkishness has


significant impact on foreign policy voting (e.g., Lindsay 1990; Ray 1981;Cobb 1969). Cobb (1969: 360–361) defined hawkishness as a “jingoism scale”that reflects “components of compulsive ‘anti-Kommunism [sic],’ aggressive-ness and belligerency, and a willingness to intervene in the affairs of othernations.” In general, hawks tend to be more supportive of a militant foreignpolicy than doves. In the case of Taiwan policy, hawks are expected to bemore supportive of strong U.S.–Taiwan relations than doves.

Hypothesis 4: The more dependent a district is on the military-industrialcomplex, the more likely its representative will cast a pro-Taiwan vote,other things being equal.

Past research on foreign policy voting almost exclusively focuses on the influ-ence of a particular constituency, namely, the military-industrial complex. AsPatrick Morgan (quoted in Ray 1981: 439) pointed out, a huge military estab-lishment “inevitably breeds . . . civilian institutions and numerous citizens[who] prosper on the manna of massive defense expenditures,” which in turn“produces a political component—a corps of local, regional, and nationalpoliticians whose political self-interests now dictate promotion of or at leastacquiesce in such spending on behalf of constituents.” In a word, the military-industrial complex model leads to the expectation that a positive relationshipexists between constituency dependence on the military-industrial complexand support for military spending (or hawkish foreign policy for that matter).

The military-industrial complex has important economic stakes in U.S.–Taiwan relations because Taiwan has been a leading market for U.S. weap-ons manufactures (see Table 5.3). Moreover, defense contractors and their

Table 5.3 U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and Taiwan’sranking among U.S. arms sales to foreigncountries

Year Value (millions ofdollars)

Ranking

1950–1990 4,939 71990 455 41991 549 41992 711 51993 816 41994 845 41995 1,347 31996 834 31997 2,555 21998 1,487 21999 2,526 22000 923 4

Source: U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency.


subcontractors are usually among the largest employers in local com-munities.17 Consequently, one shouldn’t be surprised to see local residentsand their representatives in Congress push for U.S. arms sales to Taiwanbecause of the jobs and profits at stake. That the Texas delegation wasactively lobbying for the sales of 150 F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan on the eve ofthe 1992 election illuminates the intimate connections between defense con-tractors (General Dynamics), constituency interests (an estimated 6,000jobs), and Taiwan policy (Bush 2001; Bush 2004; Friedman 1992; Mann1999; Schmitt 1992).

Hypothesis 5: Exports to China will be negatively associated with thelikelihood of casting a pro-Taiwan vote, controlling for other factors.

It is crucial to bear in mind that in the Washington–Taipei–Beijing triangle,U.S. policy toward Taiwan is inevitably and intimately connected with itspolicy toward China. That is, congressional (in)action in one policy area willalmost certainly have some repercussions in the other. If Congress had votedto restore official relations with Taiwan, for example, Beijing would mostcertainly have terminated its diplomatic ties with Washington. On the otherhand, if Congress had repealed the TRA, then China would in all likelihoodhave pursued a more aggressive policy of reunification. Thus members ofCongress are expected to balance the consequences of alternative policiesregarding Taiwan and Beijing. It is possible that those whose constituencieshave huge stakes in U.S.–China relations—particularly in bilateral trade—will be less willing to antagonize Beijing by voting for strong U.S.–Taiwanrelations. For example, since China has been a crucial market for Boeing,members from the state of Washington should be less likely to vote forpro-Taiwan bills, other things being equal.

Hypothesis 6: Exports to Taiwan will be positively associated with thelikelihood of casting a pro-Taiwan vote, when other factors are con-trolled for.

Last but not least, though U.S.–Taiwan relations are primarily strategic andpolitical in nature, there are also significant constituency economic interestsat stake. To begin with, Taiwan is the eighth largest trading partner of theU.S. and the latter is the top trading partner of Taiwan. Though U.S.–Taiwantrade is only about one-fifth of U.S.–China trade today, back in the 1980s theformer was much larger than the latter.18 Only after 1994 did U.S.–Chinatrade surpass U.S.–Taiwan trade. Moreover, Taiwan has been an importantexport market for U.S. companies, and American exports to Taiwan werelarger than its exports to China until 2001. Even after 2001, Americanexports to China have been only slightly bigger. Thus many members mayhave incentives to support U.S.–Taiwan relations out of pure constituencyeconomic interests.19


Data and methodology

I use voting scores compiled by the Center for Security Policy (CSP) tooperationalize hawkishness.20 The CSP’s mission is to “promote internationalpeace through American strength.” As such, it selects votes on critical defenseand foreign policy issues. The higher the score, the more pro-national securityand hence more hawkish a member is. Because the CSP combines the votesfor 1998–2000, I use this aggregate voting score for the 2000 vote.21 CSPcompiles a separate voting index for 1997 and that is used for the 1997 vote.

To test the hypothesis that both liberals and conservatives tend to votefor strong U.S.–Taiwan relations, I use the absolute value of the DW-NOMINATE score, as I did in Chapter 4. Also, I expect the coefficient for theabsolute value of DW score to be statistically significant and positive. That is,high absolute value of DW score will be associated with pro-Taiwan votes,since both liberals (negative scores) and conservatives (positive scores) areexpected to cast such votes.

Constituency dependence on the military-industrial complex is oper-ationalized as the amount of military awards for supplies, services, and con-struction with a net value of over US $25,000 within each state in a fiscalyear.22 I use state-level data because there is no district-level breakdown ofmilitary awards. Granted that oftentimes a state in which a prime contractoris located is not the same state where subcontract work is done, this measureis still a good indicator of the economic importance of defense contracts to aparticular state. For without such awards, the prime contractors would prob-ably shut down. Constituency interests in U.S.–China (Taiwan) trade are thepercentages of exports to China (Taiwan) out of total state exports. I use the1999 data for the 1997 vote because that it is the earliest year for which stateexport data is available. In addition to these constituency variables, I alsoinclude three basic constituency variables, namely, Union Strength, FarmEmployment, and Retail/Wholesale Employment.

For the two votes, a yea vote is treated as a pro-Taiwan vote and coded 1,and a nay vote is coded 0. For each vote, I first run a regression with the threebasic constituency variables, and then add party and absolute DW score.Subsequently, I add exports to China, exports to Taiwan, and military awards,followed by hawkishness.


Logit regression results for the vote on HR 2386 are presented in Table 5.4,and the probabilities calculated from logit coefficients are presented in Table5.5. Surprisingly, none of the three variables in Model 1 is statistically signifi-cant, suggesting that constituency interests measured by these variables didnot have any impact on the vote. In Model 2, the three constituency variablesstill fail to reach statistical significance, but the two added variables are highlysignificant. Consistent with my expectation, being a Republican increases the



Independentvariables

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Union strength −.023(.014)

.007(.018)

.027(.019)

.062**(.022)


.018(.045)

−.004(.060)

−.067(.060)

−.063(.067)

Farm employment .068(.052)

.088(.066)

.088(.069)

.139(.076)

Republican 3.874**(.425)

4.352**(.490)

1.116(.654)

Absolute DW score −4.188**(.941)

−4.863**(1.030)

−2.249*(1.1.5)

Exports to China −.408*(.187)

−.513**(.188)

Exports to Taiwan .157(.164)

.259(.183)

Military awards −.000(.000)

−.000(.000)

Hawkishness .066**(.012)


Notes: Cell entries are logit coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.** Significant at 0.01; * significant at 0.05.




Union strength .057Retail/wholesale

employmentFarm employmentRepublican .549 .597Absolute DW score −.082 −.093 −.040Exports to China −.050 −.058Exports to TaiwanMilitary awardsHawkishness .238



probability of voting for HR 2386 by a remarkable 0.549, holding othervariables at their means. Contrary to my expectation, however, Absolute DWScore has a negative sign. As one becomes ideologically more extreme, one isless likely to support strong U.S.–Taiwan relations. To be exact, if AbsoluteDW Score increases by one standard deviation, the probability of voting forHR 2386 decreases by 0.082.

My explanation for this surprising finding about Absolute DW Score isthat controlling for other factors and in spite of a pro-Taiwan consensusacross the ideological spectrum, liberals were still less likely than conservativesto support a bill that aimed to strengthen U.S.–Taiwan military relations. Inother words, increase in Absolute DW Score leads to more nay votes amongliberals than among conservatives. To find out if this is indeed the case, Icompare vote distribution among liberals and conservatives. I define liberalsloosely as those whose raw DW scores are above 0, and conservatives below 0.Of the 222 conservatives, only 7 voted against the bill. By contrast, of the199 liberals, 110 voted against the bill. The vote distribution strongly suggeststhat liberal opposition was responsible for the negative sign of Absolute DWScore. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that 80 liberals voted for the bill.If only a handful of liberals had done so, then Absolute DW Score would notbe statistically significant because high scores would be associated with bothyea and nay votes.

Model 3 includes three more constituency variables, but only Exports toChina is statistically significant and has the hypothesized sign. With onestandard deviation increase in a state’s exports to China, the probability ofcasting a yea vote decreases by 0.050. Republican and Absolute DW Scoreremain highly significant and have the same sign as in Model 2. Moreover, themagnitude of their respective impact is largely the same as that in Model 3.

Model 4 includes the other measure of ideology—hawkishness. Notice thatwith the addition of hawkishess, party is no longer statistically significant. Thehigh correlation between the two variables (r = 0.853 and significant at 0.01)must have dampened the estimated effects of party.23 Also, Union Strengthnow reaches statistical significance. That is, controlling for hawkishness andother variables, a member is more likely to support strong U.S.–Taiwanrelations if the percentage of unionized workers increases in his district. Theinclusion of hawkishness does not affect Exports to China, which remainshighly significant and has about the same impact as it does in Model 3.

Hawkishness itself is statistically significant and has the correct sign. Onestandard deviation increase in hawkishness is associated with an increase of asolid 0.238 in the probability of voting for HR 2386, holding other variablesat their means. Since the dovish–hawkish continuum generally overlaps withthe liberal–conservative spectrum, that is, liberals tend to be dovish andconservatives hawkish, this finding suggests that controlling for party andother variables, liberals were less supportive of the bill than conservatives.24

Thus it provides further support for my explanation for the negative sign ofAbsolute DW Score.


Finally, it should be noted that the inclusion of party and Absolute DWScore in Model 2 increase pseudo R2 by an enormous 0.347, and the inclusionof hawkishness in Model 4 by 0.073. By contrast, the addition of three moreconstituency variables in Model 3 increases pseudo R2 by merely 0.035. Thusparty and ideology—not constituency interests—appear to be the mostimportant determinants of the vote. Moreover, a comparison of Model 2 andModel 3 suggests that party has much bigger impact than ideology.

Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 present the results for the vote on HR 1838.Though Union Strength and Retail/Wholesale Employment are statisticallysignificant in Model 1, neither of them is statistically significant in the otherthree models where party, ideology, and other constituency variables arecontrolled for. Besides, the overall explanatory power of Model 1 is ratherweak, as indicated by the rather small pseudo R2 (0.052).

With the addition of party and Absolute DW score in Model 2, pseudo R2

increases markedly to 0.205. Being a Republican increases the probability ofcasting a yea vote by 0.253, whereas one standard deviation increase in Abso-lute DW Score decreases the probability by 0.060. As in the case of HR 2386,




Union strength −.049*(.023)

−.037(.026)

−.050(.028)

−.048(.029)


.268**(.086)

.071(.096)

.105(.104)

.023(.105)

Farm employment −.117(.061)

−.231**(.080)

−.240**(.086)

−.219*(.092)

Republican 2.378**(.406)

2.277**(.417)

.098(.572)

Absolute DW score −3.973**(1.039)

−3.659**(1.133)

−1.211(1.210)

Exports to China .503*(.236)

.598*(.258)

Exports to Taiwan −.221(.149)

−.173(.157)

Military awards .000(.000)

−.000(.000)

Hawkishness .053**(.011)


Notes: Cell entries are logit coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.** Significant at 0.01; * significant at 0.05.


liberal opposition seems to be responsible for the negative sign of AbsoluteDW Score. Following my loose definition of liberals and conservatives, I findthat 202 out of 211 conservatives voted for the bill, while 138 liberals out of atotal of 198 did so. In a word, even though support for HR 1838 was generallystrong across the ideological spectrum, liberals were still less supportive of itthan conservatives.

After controlling for party and the absolute DW score, Farm Employmentreaches statistical significance, and if it increases by one standard deviation,the probability of voting for HR 1838 decreases by 0.044. Members fromfarm districts appear to be unwilling to support a bill that would likely disruptaccess to a leading market for American farmers.

The inclusion of three more constituency variables in Model 3 increasespseudo R2 only marginally from 0.205 to 0.212. As in Model 2, Republican,Absolute DW Score, and Farm Employment are all statistically significantand have the same sign. Moreover, their respective impact is nearly identicalto that in Model 2. Surprisingly, Exports to China now has a positive sign,and it continues to have a positive sign in Model 4. That is, members whoseconstituencies were more dependent on the China market were actually moresupportive of a bill that, if enacted into law, almost certainly would antagonizeBeijing and disrupt American access to the China market. One might thinkthat districts relatively dependent on exports to China also tend to electconservative or Republican members who are usually strong supporters ofTaiwan.25 But this explanation becomes problematic in light of the fact thatExports to China consistently has a negative sign in the vote on HR 2386.

Three factors appear to be responsible for this puzzling finding. First, sincethe bill was introduced against the backdrop of U.S.–China negotiations forthe latter’s accession to the WTO, many pro-trade members were determinedto delay its passage lest Beijing retaliated by refusing to sign the WTO deal.




Union strength −.040 .057Retail/wholesale

employment.056

Farm employment −.044 −.047 −.037Republican .252 .236Absolute DW score −.060 −.055Exports to China .056 .057Exports to TaiwanMilitary awardsHawkishness .120



Doug Bereuter (R-NE), chairman of the House Asia and Pacific Subcommit-tee of the International Relations Committee (CQWR 1999: 2607) said:

I did everything I could to delay this legislation [because] I did not wantto give the Chinese an excuse for not reviving an agreement with the U.S.on WTO accession, or give Clinton a reason for striking a WTO deal.

As a result of stiff opposition from pro-trade members, the bill was strippedof its most controversial language, including authorization to sell Taiwanadvanced weapons such as missile defense systems, air-to-air missiles, anddiesel-powered submarines. Thus members from states with large exports toChina may have hoped that the passage of a largely innocuous bill wouldappease Taiwan supporters and induce them to vote for the trade deal withChina. In other words, for these members a vote for HR 1838 was actually astrategic vote for PNTR.

By the same token, the vote could be “an empty gesture, designed to protectRepublicans from attacks by party conservatives who see China as a militarythreat” (CQWR 2000: 262). That is, many Republicans may have treated thevote as one on which to stake out their pro-Taiwan position. “We’ve had ourvote here,” said House Rules Committee Chairman David Dreier (R-CA).“Now let’s get on to dealing with permanent [normal trade relations], whichis the important thing” (ibid.). Furthermore, strong opposition from theSenate to the original bill and its watered-down version, plus Clinton’s threatof veto, doomed the bill from the outset. This provides further incentives formembers to view the vote as a position-taking vote. In a word, the variousfactors could have induced many members—including those whose constitu-ents were heavily dependent on the China market—to vote for HR 1838,hence the positive sign of Exports to China.

Finally, the high correlation between party and hawkishness (r = 0.748 andsignificant at 0.01) must have dampened the estimated effects of party, whichis no longer statistically significant in Model 4. Farm Employment remainssignificant. With the inclusion of hawkishness, pseudo R2 increases consider-ably from 0.212 to 0.284.

Discussion

Since no Senate votes on U.S.–Taiwan relations could be analyzed, I cannotexplore inter-chamber similarities and differences in roll call voting on Taiwan.Moreover, the lack of data for many variables prior to the 1990s makes itimpossible to find out whether there has been any change over time in Taiwanpolicy voting. Finally, since both votes took place under divided government,it is hard to know whether members would have voted differently underunified government. These shortcomings aside, my analysis still sheds someimportant light on roll call voting on U.S. Taiwan policy in particular, andforeign policy voting in general.


The military-industrial complex has no impact at all. Previous studies havesimilarly reported little or no relationship between constituency dependenceon military spending and members’ votes on foreign/defense policy (e.g.,Bozeman and James 1975; Cobb 1969; Lindsay 1990; Ray 1981; Wayman1985).26 Thus it seems that “constituency constraint [on foreign policy] isquite loose” (Lindsay 1990: 956). Several reasons may be responsible for theminimal impact of constituency interests on roll call voting. Since manyforeign policy issues are not salient to most Americans (e.g., Delli Carpiniand Keeter 1996), legislators enjoy a significant degree of freedom in roll callvoting. Also, people tend to be more deferential to politicians when nationalinterests are invoked than when parochial, domestic interests are involved.Moreover, “When members agree with their constituents on most issues butdisagree with them on some,” wrote Lindsay (1990: 951), “a vote contrary toconstituent opinion often does not pose great costs.” Last but not least, sincea legislator’s reelection constituency can be different from the geographicconstituency (see Fenno 1978; Kingdon 1973; Wright 1989), he/she may moreactively shape and reflect the preferences of the former but not the preferencesof the latter. This can lead to non-significant findings about the influence ofgeographic constituency.

Meanwhile, two constituency variables perform relatively better. Exportsto China and Farm Employment are negatively associated with support forHR 2386 and HR 1838 respectively. Thus some members of Congressappeared to be mindful of the possible negative repercussions of a pro-Taiwanpolicy for U.S.–China relations, in particular U.S.–China trade. If so, as eco-nomic ties between the U.S. and China continue to grow, more members willperhaps be more cautious in their approach to U.S.–Taiwan relations. How-ever, this electoral connection should not be blown out of proportion. It doesnot mean that members will sacrifice Taiwan’s security on the altar ofU.S.–China economic ties. Moreover the potential threat to Taiwan fromChina’s growing military power will in all likelihood reinforce lawmakers’determination to safeguard Taiwan’s security.

Above all, Taiwan’s democratic transition has changed its bond withCongress, from one based on anti-Communism in the Cold War to oneunderpinned by shared democratic values and institutions. A China hand atthe State Department observed,

As Taiwan’s economic prosperity has advanced and its democratizationhas proceeded, it has had an easier and easier task of selling itself in theUnited States, since it has, in fact, become increasingly admirable as asociety, and its natural affinities with Americans have grown, rather thandiminished.

(quoted in Tucker 2001: 399)

The former director of the American Institute on Taiwan, Nat Bellocchi, alsosaid, “[They] are a democracy, and they have turned their human rights thing


around so completely, so they have a very broad spectrum of support up onthe Hill” (quoted in Bush 2004: 479). As Bush (2004: 223) predicted, “Thisnew consensus in favor of Taiwan as a fellow democracy would become asignificant factor in future policy debate.” In a word, regardless of growingeconomic interdependence between Beijing and Washington, there willprobably be strong, bipartisan support for Taiwan in the foreseeable future.

I will conclude this chapter by saying a few words about the legendaryChina lobby and its successor, the Taiwan lobby. Scholarly studies of U.S.–China relations in the late 1940s and early 1950s generally agree that the Chinalobby, which included the powerful China bloc in Congress, significantlyshaped U.S.–China policy, as evidenced by the China Aid Act of 1948 andvehement congressional opposition to the recognition of China and itsadmission to the United Nations (Bachrack 1976; Koen 1974; Tsou 1963;Tucker 1980, 1983, 1994).27 As Tucker (1994: 3) wrote, “The Nationalistsmight not have practiced democracy at home but found it expedient andrewarding to exploit Washington’s division of powers and sensitivity topublic opinion.”

Since Taiwan was expelled from the UN in 1971 and particularly after thedust had settled over normalization and the TRA, the China lobby graduallyfaded from public attention. In the 1990s, the Taiwan lobby, as opposed tothe old China lobby, attracted extensive attention, as it was widely believed tobe the driving force behind the sudden surge of congressional support forTaiwan on a wide range of issues, notably Lee’s visit to Cornell in 1995(Pomfret 2002; Sciolino 1996; Shenon 2000). According to one former ForeignService official involved in China policy, “They [Taiwan] have by far the mostprofessional and skilled congressional-relations staff of any foreign regimerepresented here” (quoted in Tucker 2001: 338). Mann’s (2001) study alsorevealed the “sophistication, strong message, and long history” of the Taiwanlobby. Thus a critical question arises: To what extent has the Taiwan lobbyinfluenced congressional support for Taiwan since the 1990s?

It appears that the influence of the Taiwan lobby on Capitol Hill derivesprimarily from Taiwan’s democratic transition, and only secondarily fromCongress’s historical ties with China and Chiang Kai-shek (i.e., the old Chinalobby). To put it in a different way, being a democracy itself is the necessarycondition for the Taiwan lobby’s political clout. Nancy Tucker (quoted inLanday 1997) made this point crystal clear: “What [mainland Chinese] don’tunderstand about the success that Taiwan has had with lobbying is thatTaiwan’s lobbying became much more successful as Taiwan’s political systemchanged.”

Remarks by officials involved in the executive-legislative skirmish overLee’s 1995 visit appear to corroborate Tucker’s claim. “I don’t think they[Taiwan lobbyists] would be making a dent if Taiwan were not such a successstory,” one senior administration official observed (quoted in Mann 2001:209). Stanley Roth, who was then on the National Security Council, rejectedthe argument that Cassidy, a Washington lobby firm hired by Taiwan, played


a major role in drumming up congressional support for Lee’s visit. “Taiwanhad enormous support in the U.S. Congress to begin with,” he asserted. “Thenature of the event, combined with the perception of Taiwan as good, as arole model, I think was more than enough to shore up congressional support,and I would say Cassidy’s role in the Congress was marginal” (quoted inibid.). In a word, an undemocratic Taiwan would probably not have enjoyedso much support on Capitol Hill since the 1990s regardless of how powerfulits lobbies were.

Nevertheless, the Taiwan lobby should not be dismissed as politicallyinsignificant. It helps Taiwan’s cause by bringing Taiwan-related issues to theattention of members of Congress. There are myriad issues crying for amember’s attention. In most cases, it is incumbent upon alert interest groupsto bring a particular issue—such as arms sales to Taiwan or Lee’s visit—tohis attention. In some cases a member may keep a close eye on an issue due tostrong personal or policy interest (see Sutter 2001).28 Moreover, a member’sattention often shifts to another issue once certain legislative action—hearing,resolution, or bill—has been taken. In order to make the issue constantlysalient to the member, he/she has to be reminded of the issue from time totime. The Taiwan lobby has performed the two tasks extremely well throughinstitutionalized lobbying, as embodied in endowed professorships, donationsto universities, Taiwan-related research institutes, and sister-city networks.These institutions ensure that Taiwan policy will remain a topic in Americanacademic and political discourse and a salient one if circumstances require.


6 Congress and China’shuman rights

If the United States refusal to recognize the PRC after 1949 was one of thegreat blunders of our time, so too must be the exemption of China from theinternational human rights standards applicable to other nations.

(Roberta Cohen 1987: 451)

In practical terms, conditioning MFN is like putting a hair trigger on aneconomic nuclear bomb. When it goes off, it will vaporize not only commercebut also our leverage with China on security, the environment, and humanrights.

(Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) 1994a)

Had it not been for Congress, the advancement of human rights would nothave become a top priority in U.S. foreign policy. The human rights move-ment originated in the early 1970s, when Congress was frustrated by animperial president in the Vietnam War and a defiant Secretary of State prac-ticing realpolitik in Chile (Cohen 1979; Fraser 1979; Hehir 1992). Since thepower of the purse is “the surest way for Congress to gain a point of leveragein the foreign policy process” (Hehir 1992: 237), Congress’s central strategywas to pass legislation that linked human rights to the provision of U.S.economic and/or military assistance (Fraser 1979: 248–250; Forsythe 1988:Chapters 4 and 5). President Jimmy Carter took the human rights mantlefrom Congress and made it a central tenet of his foreign policy. Since then,human rights has remained an integral and important element of U.S. foreignpolicy. In a word, Congress fundamentally transformed U.S. foreign policy byincorporating the promotion of human rights.

In so far as China is concerned, two aspects of Congress’s human rightspolicy stand out. First, the Tiananmen Incident is the dividing line. BeforeTiananmen, China’s human rights record was largely exempt from congres-sional scrutiny (Cohen 1987; Shirk 1977). Tiananmen abruptly ended con-gressional silence and since then Congress has become the most outspokencritic of China’s human rights practices. Second, while Congress enacted somegeneral and country-specific human rights laws in the 1970s (see Forsythe

1988: Chapters 3–5), it has not been able to pass any similar laws respectingChina. Thus Congress’s human rights policy toward China appears to bemore bark than bite.

In this chapter, I analyze Congress’s human rights policy toward China. Inthe process I attempt to answer three questions. First, why had Congress,in its worldwide campaign for human rights, largely neglected China up until1989? Second, why has Congress been extremely active in promoting humanrights in China since 1989? Third, what factors have influenced roll call voteson legislation targeting China’s human rights?

I argue that the international environment holds the key to the first ques-tion. U.S. weakness vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union and hence the need toform a strategic alliance with China necessarily constrained Congress fromscrutinizing China’s human rights prior to 1989. As to the second question,the Tiananmen Incident certainly spurred Congress into action, but it alonewas insufficient to explain sustained congressional activism in China’s humanrights since 1989. The other two important factors are the internationalenvironment and partisan politics. The end of the Cold War reduced China’sstrategic importance and enabled members of Congress to criticize its humanrights practices without fearing strategic consequences. The Democraticmajority in Congress used China’s human rights to club a Republican presi-dent who was determined to salvage U.S.–China relations from the deadlyblow of Tiananmen. To answer the third question, I analyze roll call voteson a set of bills that aimed to punish China’s human rights violations byrevoking its Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status.

Before Tiananmen: China as the exception

If there was any U.S. human rights policy toward China in the years before1989, it was the glaring exemption of China from the otherwise strict humanrights standards that the U.S. applied to many other countries. Henry Kiss-inger, Secretary of State under President Nixon, refused to discuss humanrights even when Chinese officials brought up the topic, asserting that theywere “China’s internal affairs” (Kissinger 1994: 750–751). Despite the Carteradministration’s high-profile human rights campaign, it treated China gin-gerly. Richard Holbrooke, Carter’s Assistant Secretary of State for EastAsian and Pacific Affairs, later told Congress, “We could not, and did not,raise Western concepts such as due process of law in . . . the People’s Republicof China” (U.S. Congress 1983a: 12). When officials from the Bureau ofHuman Rights gave unflattering testimonies about China’s human rights,Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John Negroponte and Holbrooke rushedto China’s defense (Cohen 1987: 478, fn. 122; U.S. Congress 1981: 37–38, 43).

The Reagan administration pursued the same policy of exemption. “Wedon’t necessarily see a great advantage in banging them [Chinese] over thehead with it [human rights], they are very sensitive people,” said James Lilley,then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,

Congress and China’s human rights 101

in a 1985 congressional hearing on political developments and human rightsin China (U.S. Congress 1986: 179).

Congress was no more assertive than the executive branch. It was not until1977—four years after Congress started its worldwide human rights cam-paign—that the first resolution on China’s human rights (H.Con.Res.395)was introduced. Sponsored by Representative Dawson Mathis (D-GA), theresolution denounced the Chinese government’s suppression of the expres-sion of political thought and its violation of the rights of the individual, andurged the president to take effective measures. At a series of congressionalhearings on human rights and U.S. foreign policy held in 1979, members paidparticular attention to human rights in South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan,and Sri Lanka, but mentioned China only in passing (U.S. Congress 1979).One year later, Congress held its first hearing on human rights in China(U.S. Congress 1981). In the same year, Congress began to require the StateDepartment to submit an annual human rights report on China. Two morerounds of hearings were held in 1982 and 1985 respectively, but there wasno harsh condemnation of Chinese human rights nor discussion of specificlegislation targeting China (U.S. Congress 1983a, 1986).

Executive and legislative inaction on China’s human rights did not escapethe attention of scholars and journalists. “Hardly a word has been said aboutChina in recent discussions of human rights and American foreign policy,”deplored Shirk (1977: 109) on the eve of normalization. “Despite a strongstand promoting human rights globally, the administration has beenexceptionally reserved about criticizing the Chinese,” lamented the Washing-ton Post (1978b). “The defense of human rights was one of the signatureelements in the Carter administration’s foreign policy elsewhere in the world,but not when it came to China,” noted Mann (1999: 100). “Indeed, Carterand his aides gave China virtually a blanket exemption from the human rightspolicies that they so readily applied everywhere.” Another scholar arrived ata similar conclusion: “Human rights concerns were seen as only one elementin American policy toward China, and a subsidiary one at that” (Harding1992: 200).

A number of factors contributed to Congress’s glaring silence on Chinesehuman rights, but two of them stand out as arguably the most significant.1

The first has something to do with Congress’s strategy to promote humanrights. Since “[h]uman rights initiatives are assumed to depend on diplomaticleverage and the amount of foreign assistance available” (Cohen 1987: 472),Congress paid most attention to human rights in countries that were recipi-ents of U.S. military and/or economic aid. It enacted several laws prohibitingsuch aid to countries engaged in consistent patterns of human rights viola-tions (Forsythe 1988: Chapter 3). Congress also adopted legislation targetingspecific countries (ibid.: Chapters 4 and 5; Fraser 1979).2

However, this strategy becomes problematic in the case of China, whichwas not a recipient of U.S. military or economic aid. In fact, the two coun-tries did not have diplomatic ties until 1979. Because Congress did not have

102 Congress and China’s human rights

any economic or political leverage over China, it largely left out China inits worldwide human rights campaign. Donald Fraser (D-OH), one of thearchitects of Congress’s human rights policy, openly admitted this dilemma:“We don’t really have leverage on countries such as those in the CommunistWorld because we rarely have any relationships which give us leverage” (U.S.Congress 1979: 304).

The second and perhaps most important constraint on congressional activ-ism in Chinese human rights appears to be the international environment. Onthe one hand, bogged down in Vietnam and faced with the Soviet offensivearound the world, the U.S. found itself in an increasingly unfavorable stra-tegic position. On the other hand, the sharp deterioration in Sino–Sovietrelations in the 1960s—as evidenced by a series of border clashes in 1969—provided the U.S. with a golden opportunity to form an alliance with Chinaagainst the former Soviet Union (e.g., Ross 1986, 1995). Confronted with thenew international strategic environment, Washington began to adjust itsforeign policy by reaching out to China. Nixon’s landmark visit to Beijingrepresented the beginning of a temporary strategic alliance between twocountries that had heretofore been avowed enemies.

Because the U.S.–China relationship was premised almost exclusively onstrategic cooperation, there was little room for non-strategic concerns such ashuman rights. “Where human rights policy conflicts with incontrovertiblymore compelling security interests, the human rights policy must give way,”editorialized the International Herald Tribune (1980). “China is pivotal in theworld power balance . . . the People’s Republic is, de facto, the most import-ant single ally of the United States,” the editorial continued, implying thatChina’s strategic importance should override all other concerns, humanrights included. Even though U.S.–China relations witnessed rapid develop-ment after Nixon’s visit, “policy makers, mindful of the fragility of U.S.relations with the leadership of the People’s Republic, are loath to raise issues[like human rights] that might jeopardize the progress made in the last sixyears” (Shirk 1977: 109). Particularly during the Carter administration, thedesire for normalization “put on ice any impulse to protest China’s humanrights violations” (Cohen 1987: 461).

Now that the U.S. and China were strategic allies, Congress adjusted itsChina policy accordingly. Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA) best illustratesCongress’s human rights policy toward China in the new strategic environ-ment. A “staunch anti-Communist and leading proponent of human rights,”the Senator was best known for the Jackson–Vanik amendment that estab-lishes annual review of MFN status for Communist countries (Willkie 1994:121). Because of the amendment, the former Soviet Union was never grantedMFN status.3

Yet when it came to China, Jackson adopted a completely different stand-ard. As early as November 1969, he was calling for full normalization ofrelations with China. He visited the country four times between 1971 and1983, which “deepened his commitment to the realization of a dynamic and


prosperous China with close ties to the United States” (ibid.: 125). He wasinstrumental in the passage of the Carter administration’s trade agreementwith China that includes, among other things, the extension of MFN. Jacksonthus explained why he opposed MFN for the former Soviet Union butsupported MFN for China:

China and the Soviet Union are two very different countries at differentstages of development, with different interests and ambitions, differentassociates and allies, and different relations with this country. Theyshould be treated on separate tracks and, in our own national interest,they cannot be treated alike.4

(quoted in ibid.: 126)

Nonetheless, not every member of Congress was ready to buy the strategicargument and to turn a blind eye to China’s human rights. “Why is there thistolerant attitude toward the obvious defects of the PRC? Why is it that theyseem to enjoy tolerance from academics as well as diplomatic and journalisticsources on their many defects?” asked an exasperated congressman EdwardDerwinski (R-IL) (U.S. Congress 1981: 149). “If we don’t apply some humanrights standards to China, even if . . . it will perhaps have a marginal, neg-ligible effect, or no effect at all—it makes us hypocritical when we applypressure to any place else in the world,” warned Robert Dornan (R-CA) (U.S.Congress 1983a: 360). Some members denounced the unwarranted sensitiv-ities to Chinese culture and traditions. “We are so much more careful andthoughtful and sensitive when we deal with the subject of human rights inChina than we are with other countries in Asia who also have traditionsand customs,” said Representative Joel Pritchard (R-WA) (U.S. Congress1983a: 344).5

These few dissenting voices aside, most members of Congress remainedsilent on Chinese human rights. A more specific indicator of congressionalreticence is the number of bills respecting human rights in China that wereintroduced in Congress prior to 1989. By my count, in the 16 years between1973 and 1988, a total of only 35 such bills were introduced. Of these bills,19 were about generic human rights topics such as political dissent andreligious freedom, 8 about human rights in Tibet, 8 about China’s familyplanning policy and U.S. funding to the UNPF. This number is only a smallfraction of the 289 human rights bills (including generic human rights,UNPF, MFN, Tiananmen, and human rights in Tibet) introduced in the16 years between 1989 and 2006.

Tiananmen: the dividing line

The Tiananmen Incident in the summer of 1989 fundamentally changedU.S.–China relations. “The optimistic decade of the 1980s in U.S.–Chinarelations ended in one of the most dramatic crises in China’s history, a crisis


that produced equally sharp repercussions for Chinese-American under-standing,” observed a senior foreign service official (quoted in Tucker 2001).A close observer of Congress wrote, “A carefully staged process of improvingrelations between the United States and China, built during the last twodecades, has been frozen and may have been permanently damaged by theChinese government’s brutal repression of mass dissent” (CQWR 1989:1411). Winston Lord, ambassador to China from November 1985 throughApril 1989, later observed:

For two decades, through five administrations, the United States enjoyedbroad bipartisan consensus on dealing with China, that important com-plex nation, but the slaughter of innocent patriots in Beijing last springand the subsequent repression have led to the first heated debate onChina since the early 1970s.

(quoted in U.S. Congress 1990: 7)

Perhaps nowhere was the impact of Tiananmen more keenly felt than in thehalls of Congress. The Tiananmen Incident destroyed the reservoir of goodfeelings toward China that had been accumulating among members ofCongress, particularly since the beginning of China’s economic reform in1978 and after Deng’s popular visit to the Capitol Hill in 1979. Congress’sreaction was swift and emotional. “The American honeymoon and love festwith China started in 1971 by Richard Nixon is over,” declared CongressmanBill Richardson (D-NM) (Congressional Record 1989: 10787). “No danglingof strategic advantage, or effort to invoke geopolitical calculations will deterthe Government of this country from expressing its revulsion at their [Chi-nese] actions,” said an outraged Congressman Barney Frank (D-MA) (ibid.).A deeply disappointed Les AuCoin (D-OR), who was proud of having taken“a constructive approach to China,” was on the first trade delegation toChina, and was opposed to two-China policy, said that China “has disgraceditself” (Congressional Record 1989: 10804). Congressman Dave McCurdy(D-OK) denounced the violence against students as “an act of desperation bytyrants out of touch with reality,” and Leon Panetta (D-CA) called it “anoffense against humanity” (ibid.: 10805).

Congressional outrage naturally found its outlet in legislative actions. OnJune 6 1989, each chamber unanimously adopted a resolution—H.Con-.Res.136 and S.Res.142 respectively—to condemn the crackdown. Frustratedby Bush’s slow and cautious approach, the House unanimously voted onJune 29 for sanctions against China that were more stringent than thosealready announced by the president (CQWR 1989: 1642, 1800). “Someonein this government—and today it’s the House—must take a more forcefulaction,” said House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO) after thevote (quoted in Phillips 1989). The Tiananmen Incident also spurred congres-sional scrutiny of a plethora of human rights problems in China that other-wise had been ignored or downplayed in the past, such as forced abortion


(e.g., U.S. Congress 1995, 2005b) and prison labor (e.g., U.S. Congress 1992,1994, 1998a).

Figure 6.1 illustrates legislative activism in human rights policy in theaftermath of Tiananmen. As I mentioned above, only 35 human rights billswere introduced between 1973 and 1988. In 1989 alone, 33 bills directlyrelated to Tiananmen (e.g., condemning the crackdown or proposing sanc-tions) were introduced in Congress. But after 1989, Tiananmen disappearedfrom the radar screen of Congress, as only 11 bills relating to the Incidentwere introduced between 1990 and 2006. Meanwhile, generic human rights,human rights in Tibet, and funding to the UNPF became the prime targets oflegislative actions, and the total number of bills for each issue is 118, 41, and11 respectively.

Moreover, the various NGOs like Human Rights Watch and AmnestyInternational, which had been quiescent about China’s human rights prior to1989, now became extremely active. They began to keep close track of humanrights violations in China, publish regular reports, and testify frequently atcongressional hearings (e.g., Human Rights Watch 1993; Amnesty Inter-national USA 1990). Joining these NGOs were Chinese human rights lobbiesin the U.S. that were formed after Tiananmen. They became immensely

Figure 6.1 Bills concerning China’s human rights, 1989–2006.


influential on Capitol Hill. For example, the National Committee on ChineseStudents Affairs, led by Zhao Haiching, a post-doctoral fellow at HarvardUniversity, was instrumental in devising the strategy to link human rightswith MFN (Mann 1999: 229–233).6 These NGOs and Chinese human rightslobbies have played an important role in sustaining Congress’s interest inChina’s human rights even when the images of Tiananmen are no longer onthe front pages.

Nevertheless, the impact of Tiananmen should not be overestimated. Itcertainly triggered off congressional activism, but it is merely one of theseveral factors that are responsible for congressional activism. Another cru-cial factor is the international environment. Tiananmen took place againstthe backdrop of political turmoil in Eastern Europe and the breakup of theformer Soviet Union in 1991. In the new international environment the U.S.no longer needed the China card against the Soviet Bloc. As a result, Con-gress could be tough on China’s human rights without worrying about thestrategic consequences of such criticism.

Remarks by some members indicate that they were keenly aware of theimplications of the Soviet demise for China policy. Senator DeConcini(D-AZ) said that President Bush would be “sadly mistaken” if he intendedto play the China card in the new world order (Congressional Record 1992:S 3847). Senator Harris Wofford (D-PA) voiced similar sentiment: “The col-lapse of the Soviet Union rendered the ‘China Card,’ the notion that we needto support China as a balance to the Soviet Union, obsolete” (ibid.: 7495).“Now, in the 1990s when we turn over the China card, it is a deuce,” assertedrepresentative Edward Markey (D-MA) (Congressional Record 1990: H10507). While conceding that the U.S. had played the China card in the ColdWar, Gerald Solomon (R-NY) contended that the China card was over.“Now it is time to stand up to this rogue regime in Beijing and let them knowthat we are not going to take it anymore,” he urged (Congressional Record1997: H 4245). “We no longer need ‘the China Card’ as leverage against abelligerent Communist enemy in the Soviet Union,” declared representativeDana Rohrabacher (R-CA) (Congressional Record 1993: E 2005).

Another factor that contributed to congressional activism in China’shuman rights was partisan politics, especially during the Bush years whenDemocrats controlled both chambers. Knowing that the president wasdetermined to continue normal relations with China in spite of what hap-pened in Tiananmen Square, the Democratic majority persistently pushedhuman rights to the frontlines, with the aim of making the president look badbefore the public. The three failed congressional attempts to override Bush’sthree vetoes, for example, illuminate the likely partisan motives behindDemocratic activism in human rights. “The Democratic leadership relishedthe veto fights; even if its side lost legislatively, it might win big politically,”wrote Richard Bush (1995: 151). “This was a victory for President Bush andthe Chinese leadership that was responsible for Tiananmen Square,” said abitter Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) after Bush’s veto of HR 2712, the


Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act. “It was a defeat for humanrights” (quoted in Friedman 1990). Senator Alan Dixon (D-IL) said he hopedthe vote “will be discussed” in the 1990 mid-term election (CQWR 1990:245). As Mann pointed out:

China was an issue where the Democrats in Congress could oppose theRepublican administration and know, with certainty, that they hadpublic opinion on their side . . . If George Bush wasn’t going to conveythe country’s outrage over Chinese repression, then the Democrats inCongress would happily volunteer.

(1999: 199)

To sum up, the shock of Tiananmen, China’s reduced strategic importance inthe post-Cold War world, the activities of human rights groups, and partisanpolitics have all combined to contribute to congressional activism since 1989.More specifically, Tiananmen triggered off congressional activism, butCongress would almost certainly have been active in China’s human rightswithout the shock of Tiananmen. For the demise of the former Soviet Unionremoved the strategic straitjacket that had prevented most members of Con-gress—and human rights groups to a lesser extent—from openly criticizingChina’s human rights. Nonetheless, the intensity and timing of congressionalactivism would probably have been different if Tiananmen had not happened.Meanwhile, partisan politics under a divided government gave the Democratsadded incentives to be actively involved in human rights policy toward China,in the hope that they could weaken Bush by portraying him as being softon human rights. Finally, Tiananmen also brought about unprecedented andsustained involvement of human rights groups in Chinese human rights,which helps keep China as a salient issue on Capitol Hill.

MFN renewal and congressional efforts to change humanrights in China

Renewal of China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status lies at theheart of Congress’s human rights policy toward China since 1989. SinceChina was not a recipient of U.S. economic or military assistance that couldbe suspended or terminated, Congress had to devise a new strategy to dealwith China’s human rights. Among the tools available, the Jackson–VanikAmendment to the 1974 Trade Act appears to be the most effective. Theamendment prohibits a president from granting MFN to a Communist coun-try unless he waives a requirement that denies MFN to any Communistcountry that restricts free emigration.7 Congress can pass a joint resolution todisapprove of MFN renewal, subject to presidential veto. While the Jackson–Vanik Amendment ostensibly sets free emigration as the only condition forMFN renewal, Congress has adopted a broader interpretation of the law toinclude human rights in general.


Executive-legislative skirmishes over China’s MFN

Figure 6.2 illustrates congressional activism in China’s MFN. Between 1973and 1988, only four bills relating to China’s MFN were introduced. By con-trast, the 16 years after 1989 witnessed a total of 75 such bills, with 46 in theHouse and 29 in the Senate. Not surprisingly, the two years after Tiananmenwitnessed the largest number of such bills—18 and 16 respectively. AsTiananmen gradually faded from public and congressional debate, thenumber of bills also decreased markedly. Since 1995, on average about twoMFN bills were introduced annually. Of these bills, Congress voted on morethan one-third of them (27 to be exact). For example, each year between 1990and 2001, the House voted on a joint resolution to disapprove of MFNrenewal and, with three exceptions, the resolutions were all defeated (seeTable 6.1).

The White House wanted to engage China in spite of the TiananmenIncident and therefore opposed revocation of or conditional MFN. As Presi-dent George H. W. Bush argued in his veto message attached to the U.S.–China Act of 1992, engagement with China “through democratic, economic,and educational institutions instead of confrontation offers the best hopefor reform in China” and “MFN is the foundation we need to engage theChinese” (quoted in CQ Almanac 1992: 159). While sharing the goals ofconditional MFN—“to see greater Chinese adherence to internationalstandards of human rights, free and fair trade practices, and internationalnon-proliferation norms”—President Bush nonetheless believed that “addingbroad conditions to China’s MFN renewal would not lead to faster progress

Figure 6.2 Time trend of bills relating to China’s MFN status, 1973–2006.


Table 6.1 House roll call votes on joint resolutions to disapprove of China’s MFN,1990–2001

Bill Totalsa Democrats Republicans

H.J.R.467, October 18 1990Yea 247 166 81Nay 174 84 90

H.J.R.263, July 10 1991Yea 223 171 51Nay 204 92 112

H.J.R.502, July 21 1992Yea 258 181 76Nay 135 56 79

H.J.R.208, July 21 1993Yea 105 41 63Nay 318 210 108

H.J.R.373, August 9 1994Yea 75 38 36Nay 356 215 141

To Table H.J.R.96, July 20 1995b

Yea 321 143 178Nay 107 54 52

H.J.R.182, June 27 1996Yea 141 75 65Nay 286 119 167

H.J.R.79, July 3 1997Yea 173 93 79Nay 259 112 147

H.J.R.121, July 22 1998 Yea 166 87 78Nay 264 115 149H.J.R.57, July 27 1999Yea 170 98 71Nay 260 110 150H.J.R.103, July 18 2000Yea 147 91 54Nay 281 117 164H.J.R.50, July 19 2001Yea 169 105 62Nay 259 102 157

Notes: a: Totals included Representative Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and Virgil Goode (I-VA in 2000).b: A yea vote is a vote in support of MFN renewal.

Source: CQ Almanac.


in advancing our goals,” but instead “would severely damage the Western-oriented, modernizing elements in China, weaken Hong Kong, andstrengthen opposition to democratic and economic reform” (quoted inibid.: 158).

Notwithstanding his campaign rhetoric accusing Bush of kowtowingto Beijing and his 1993 executive order linking MFN renewal to humanrights progress, President Clinton largely continued his predecessor’s policy.“Revoking MFN and, in effect, severing our economic ties to China, woulddrive us back into a period of mutual isolation and recrimination that wouldharm America’s interests, not advance them,” he said. “MFN renewal is not areferendum on all China’s policies, it is a vote for America’s interests” (PublicPapers of the Presidents 1996: 778). For both Bush and Clinton, then, tradeis the primary vehicle of engagement, “a force for change in China, exposingChina to our ideas and our ideals and integrating China into the globaleconomy” (Public Papers of the Presidents 1998: 871).

Many members of Congress from both parties were strongly opposedto unconditional MFN because they wanted to punish Beijing for its humanrights violations. Representative Richard Schulze (R-PA) best characterizedthe prevailing mood in Congress: “I want the outrage that is ringing through-out the world to ring through the halls of Congress” (CQWR 1990: 2570).Senator Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) denounced Bush’s decision to renewMFN as “a hideously wrong message to send to the world” (ibid.: 1686).Representative Christopher Smith (R-NJ) characterized unconditional MFNas “a base hunger for cheap electronics and inexpensive consumer goods” atthe price of “America’s historic thirst for liberty and justice” (U.S. Congress1997c: 22).

For some members, antipathy toward Communism reinforced their moraloutrage against Beijing and their determination to oppose unconditionalMFN. Gerald Solomon (R-NY) regarded the policy of “unlinked granting ofMFN” as tantamount to “appeasement to Communist China” (CQWR1990: 9). Frank Wolf (R-VA) opposed MFN renewal because “They [China]are the evil empire” (CQ Almanac 1999: 23: 7). Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC)characterized Clinton’s China policy as “painstaking efforts . . . to cater toRed China’s every whim and wish” (CQWR 1999: 2605).

From the opponents’ perspective, revoking or putting conditions onChina’s MFN status seemed to be the easiest and most effective unilateralpunishment of China. Without MFN, Chinese exports to the U.S. would besubject to much higher tariffs and hence would decrease precipitously. Theaverage tariff on Chinese products would rise from 3.5 percent to an averageof nearly 40 percent. The 6 percent tariff on apparel and footwear wouldjump to 60 percent and 35 percent respectively (CQWR 1990: 1775; CQWR1994: 1055). Considering that the U.S. is the destination of nearly one-thirdof Chinese exports, revocation of MFN would have had a disastrous impacton the Chinese economy.

Other members supported MFN for a variety of reasons. First, some of


them shared the opponents’ concerns about China’s human rights, butbelieved that engagement through trade was the best way to influence Chinesebehavior and to help the democratic forces in China. “The more trade, themore democratization,” asserted Congressman Robert T. Matsui (D-CA), aleading pro-trade Democrat (CQWR 1990: 2571). To these members, thealternative would be an isolated China with ill will toward the U.S. “Thechoice is clear,” said Representative Tim Roemer (D-IN). “Are we going tohave a constructive engagement policy with China or a new evil empire?”(CQWR 1999: 1898).

Second, many members were worried that revocation of MFN would hurtAmerican businesses, particularly the big exporters and importers. SenatorBob Dole (R-KS) made it crystal clear in 1990: “The Chinese consume about20% of wheat exports—a commodity in which I and many other senatorshave a special interest” (CQWR 1996: 1232).8 In 1991, Senator Max Baucus(D-MT), along with five Democratic senators from farm states, signed a letterto President Bush urging him to take actions in other areas so as to lessencongressional pressure on MFN (CQWR 1991: 1737; Gugliotta 1991). IfMFN were cut off, China would probably retaliate by stopping its purchaseof wheat—the major export of these states—and the price of wheat wouldcollapse. Finally, some members simply didn’t believe that the various condi-tions attached to MFN were attainable. “We will end up with a bill that willbe popular in the U.S. Congress but will harden the Chinese government’sresolve,” warned Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL)(CQWR 1991: 1739).

Each year since 1990, the president and Congress locked horns overChina’s MFN. Initially, Congress attempted outright revocation, whichrequires approval by both chambers of a joint resolution denying presidentialrenewal. The threat of presidential veto and Senate reluctance to take actionforced House advocates of outright revocation to change their tactics andadopted conditional MFN. As Nancy Pelosi (1994) put it, “ConditioningMFN for China provides the US with the best leverage to improve humanrights because preferential access to the US market is critical to China’sauthoritarian regime.” Besides, conditional MFN could win “support fromthose in Congress who might be afraid of the consequences of outright revo-cation, but who wanted to do something about repression in China” (Mann1999: 232).

However, the unintended but inevitable consequence of such an approachis that “almost every group and organization with an interest in China policywanted to be part of the action in drafting the specific MFN conditions”(Mann 1999: 232). In addition to human rights, which was initially the pri-mary concern of MFN opponents, other issues such as weapons prolifer-ation, Taiwan, Tibet, intellectual property rights (IPR), and unfair tradepractices were also added, making MFN renewal the “institutionalizedvehicle by which China policy, in all of its dimensions, was discussed eachyear” (Lampton 1994: 15). As Representative Sam Gibbons (D-FL), then


chairman of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade, said of thePelosi bill (HR 2212), “I guess Pelosi is just becoming a garbage truck.Everybody throws in everything they can think of” (CQWR 1991: 1739).

Allied with the White House were big exporters and importers such asBoeing and Wal-Mart that had reaped huge profits from the China market(Zakaria 2005; Zeng 2004: 96–114). Joining congressional critics of Chinawere labor unions, religious groups, human rights groups, and environmental-ists (CQWR 1997: 1390; CQWR 2000: 90). Labor unions opposed MFNbecause of the thousands of jobs allegedly displaced by Chinese imports(Shorrock 1994, 1996; U.S. Congress 1997c: 186–189; Behr 1994). Religiousgroups had grievances against China’s family planning policy and the lack ofreligious freedom (CQWR 1997: 1206, 1390; Devroy 1997). The MFN debate,Gilbert (1997) wrote, created “a peculiar political stew of labor unions, pro-tectionists, religious activists, some liberals, some conservatives . . . fightingan uphill battle” against a coalition of exporters, retailers, pro-trade membersof Congress, and the White House.9

House votes to disapprove of MFN

In this section, I conduct quantitative analysis of the determinants of the tenHouse votes between 1990 and 1999 on joint resolutions to disapprove ofpresidential renewal of MFN (see Table 6.1). The two votes in 2000 and 2001are excluded because they took place after the House had voted to removeChina from annual review of MFN.

There are three major reasons why I decided on the ten votes.10 First, all thesupposedly pure human rights votes were almost always unanimous.11 Thesebills usually condemned the Chinese government for its gross violation ofhuman rights, urged the executive branch to raise human rights issues withChinese officials, or called on the Chinese government to release individuals.While unsuitable for statistical analysis, these lopsided votes nonetheless con-stitute convincing evidence that members of Congress had little disagreementover whether to promote human rights in China.

Second, Congress’s human rights policy has essentially been a linkage pol-icy whereby it uses U.S. economic, military, or diplomatic leverage to bringabout human rights progress in a particular country. In the case of China,withdrawing MFN or putting conditions on its renewal appeared to be themost effective leverage Congress had, given that China was not a recipient ofU.S. military or economic aid. Moreover, votes on these joint resolutionsturned out to be highly contested, suggesting that members disagreed witheach other on how to promote human rights in China.

Finally, I will analyze the same type of votes related to other countries inChapter 7. Congress also voted on the extension of MFN to Romania, Hun-gary, and Vietnam. This provides a good opportunity to find out if the causalfactors underlying roll call voting on China’s MFN are unique or represent ageneral pattern of roll call voting on MFN extension.


Hypotheses

Since the hypotheses to be tested were already alluded to in the varioussections of this chapter or earlier chapters, I simply list them here:

Hypothesis 1: Members of the president’s party should be more likely tooppose revocation of MFN than members of the opposition party, otherthings being equal.

Hypothesis 2: Since both liberals and conservatives should be more likelyto vote for MFN revocation, the absolute value of DW score should havea positive sign.

Hypothesis 3: Employment in farming and retail/wholesale should benegatively associated with support for MFN revocation, controlling forother factors.

Hypothesis 4: The strength of labor unions will be positively correlatedwith support for MFN revocation, other things being equal.


Since the ten votes took place under two presidents, I present the resultsseparately for the three votes under President Bush and the seven votes underPresident Clinton. For each vote I first run a model with Union Strength,Farm Employment, and Retail/Wholesale Employment. After that, I addparty and Absolute DW Score. Table 6.2 presents logit coefficients for thethree votes under President Bush, and the probabilities calculated from thesecoefficients are presented in Table 6.3.

Despite intense campaigns by labor unions against MFN renewal,Union Strength is not statistically significant in any of the regressions. Theother two constituency variables are consistently significant and have thecorrect sign in all models. If Farm Employment increases by one standarddeviation, the probability of voting for MFN revocation decreases con-siderably by about 0.12 across the six models, holding other variables attheir means. Similarly, such an increase in Retail/Wholesale Employmentleads to a decrease of roughly 0.09 in the probability of supporting MFNrevocation.

Being a Republican is consistently and negatively associated with supportfor MFN revocation. To be exact, being a member of the president’s partydecreases the probability of casting a yea vote (i.e., a vote in support ofrevoking MFN) by a solid 0.165 in 1990, a remarkable 0.333 in 1991, and animpressive 0.252 in 1992. These numbers constitute strong evidence of partyloyalty. However, as I cautioned in Chapter 1, it is hard to clearly distinguishloyalty to one’s president from electorally-induced inter-party difference on


trade, because for many Republicans, a vote in support of Bush was also avote consistent with their traditional pro-trade stance.

Notice that the estimated impact of party was at its lowest in the 1990 vote.The vote took place one year after the Tiananmen Incident, and manyRepublicans (81 out of a total of 171) may have decided to vote for the bill(hence against Bush) because their outrage against Beijing had not subsided.The vote outcomes of two China bills in 1990 provide further indication

Table 6.2 Logit analysis of House votes to disapprove of China’s MFN under Presi-dent Bush


1990 1991 1992

Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2

Union strength .009(.013)

.009(.013)

−.000(.013)

−.002(.014)

−.026(.014)

−.027(.015)

Farm employment −.144**(.038)

−.122**(.039)

−.225**(.045)

−.185**(.047)

−.184**(.041)

−.156**(.042)


−.151**(.049)

−.135**(.051)

−.171**(.049)

−.161**(.054)

−.216**(.056)

−.215**(.061)

Republican −.684**(.215)

−1.386**(.230)

−1.142**(.239)

Absolute DW score .988(.651)

2.695**(.702)

2.155**(.753)

Log likelihood −270.091 −264.584 −272.190 −246.694 −232.974 −218.453Pseudo R2 .053 .073 .079 .163 .078 .134N 421 421 427 426 393 392

Notes: Cell entries are logit coefficients. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.** Significant at 0.01; * significant at 0.05.

Table 6.3 Increases in probabilities associated with one standard deviation increase inindependent variables (votes under Bush)


1990 1991 1992

Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2

Union strengthFarm employment −.102 −.086 −.163 −.134 −.120 −.100Retail/wholesale

employment−.082 −.073 −.094 −.089 −.104 −.102

Republican −.165 −.333 −.252Absolute DW score .114 .078



about the prevailing sentiment among Republicans. On January 24, theHouse voted 390–25 to override President Bush’s veto of the EmergencyChinese Immigration Relief Act. Only 25 Republicans voted against the over-ride. By a 384–30 vote, the House passed HR 4939 on October 18, a bill thatset strict conditions for MFN renewal for 1991. Only 19 Republicans votedagain the bill.

Absolute DW Score is statistically significant and has the hypothesizedsign in two votes. If it increases by one standard deviation, then the prob-ability of voting for MFN revocation increases by 0.114 in 1991 and 0.078 in1992. For these two votes at least, there was indeed a coalition of the ideo-logical ends against the middle. However, Absolute DW Score appears tohave no impact on the 1990 vote. My explanation is similar to the one Ioffered above about the reduced impact of party. That is, because passionsabout the Tiananmen Incident were probably still running high when mem-bers cast their votes in 1990, many moderates also decided to support the billin spite of their general inclination to oppose such bills.

Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 present results for the seven votes under PresidentClinton. As in the case of the three votes under Bush, Union Strength is notstatistically significant in any of the regression. Of the other two constituencyvariables, Farm Employment consistently has the correct sign, but it is notstatistically significant in the two votes in 1997 and 1998. Also, when partyand ideology are controlled for, it loses statistical significance in the 1995 voteand the 1999 vote. Even though Farm Employment does not perform as wellas it did in the three votes under Bush, the findings nonetheless indicate thatmembers of Congress were generally opposed to any bill that would affectaccess to China, a leading market for American agricultural products. To beexact, on average, one standard deviation increase in Farm Employment isassociated with a decrease of about 0.07 in the probability of voting for MFNrevocation. Retail/Wholesale Employment performs rather poorly, as itreaches statistical significance only in Model 2 of the 1998 vote.

Party is statistically significant in the 1993 vote and has the correct sign.That is, being a member of the president’s party decreases the probability ofcasting a yea note (hence a vote against Clinton’s position) by a solid 0.137.Recall that under President Bush, being a Democratic actually increased thelikelihood of casting such a vote. That House Democrats voted differently onthe same issue under Bush and Clinton is a strong indication that they usedMFN renewal as a political issue to beat Bush. Once Bush was out of officeand a president of the same party was elected, Democrats immediatelychanged their votes so as not to embarrass their own president who wasopposed to MFN revocation.

Nevertheless, Democratic loyalty to their president did not extend beyond1993, as party does not have any significant impact on the three votes in 1994,1995, and 1996. Furthermore, in 1997 and 1999, House Democrats were actu-ally more likely to vote against their president than Republicans, controllingfor other factors. To be exact, being a Democrat increases the probability of


Tab

le 6

.4L

ogit

ana

lysi

s of

Hou

se v

otes

to

disa

ppro

ve o

f C

hina

’s M

FN

und

er P

resi

dent

Clin

ton

Inde

pend

ent

vari

able

s19

9319

9419

9519

9619

9719

9819

99

Mod

el1

Mod

el2

Mod

el1

Mod

el2

Mod

el1

Mod

el2

Mod

el1

Mod

el2

Mod

el1

Mod

el2

Mod

el1

Mod

el2

Mod

el1

Mod

el2

Uni

on s

tren

gth

−.00

8(.

014)

−.00

5(.

014)

−.00

9(.

016)

−.01

3(.

017)

−.02

6(.

014)

−.02

8(.

015)

.000

(.01

3).0

00(.

014)

−.01

1(.

012)

−.01

4(.

013)

−.01

0(.

013)

−.01

3(.

013)

−.01

0(.

012)

−.01

6(.

013)

Far

m e

mpl

oym

ent

−.18

5**

(.06

4)−.

218*

*(.

069)

−.18

0*(.

080)

−.17

2*(.

082)

−.13

3*(.

063)

−.10

9(.

064)

−.14

3*(.

058)

−.11

8*(.

059)

−.08

0(.

047)

−.08

3(.

050)

−.08

5(.

049)

−.09

1(.

052)

−.09

8*(.

049)

−.09

6(.

050)

Ret

ail a

ndw

hole

sale

−.01

0(.

041)

−.04

0(.

045)

−.01

7(.

049)

−.02

6(.

051)

−.03

5(.

044)

−.02

3(.

043)

−.07

8(.

044)

−.05

7(.

043)

−.06

3(.

041)

−.08

3(.

044)

−.07

6(.

043)

−.01

0*(.

046)

−.05

8(.

042)

−.07

7(.

045)

Dem

ocra

t−.

681*

*(.

231)

−.36

5(.

273)

.352

(.24

8).4

29(.

227)

.503

*(.

210)

.468

*(.

213)

.836

**(.

220)

Abs

olut

e D

W s

core

−1.3

22(.

704)

1.99

4*(.

838)

3.74

5**

(.77

5)3.

364*

*(.

720)

3.46

2**

(.71

3)3.

640*

*(.

722)

4.18

9**

(.73

2)

Log

like

lihoo

d−2

47.7

8−2

40.6

41−.

195.

69−1

89.6

5−2

36.4

0−2

21.8

8−2

64.0

8−2

49.9

1−2

88.2

8−2

72.8

5−2

82.7

8−2

66.5

2−2

84.7

5−2

60.6

9

Pse

udo

R2

.002

.045

.018

.040

.018

.073

.025

.073

.011

.061

.014

.068

.013

.094

N42

342

243

143

042

842

742

742

643

243

143

042

943

042

9

Not

es:

Cel

l ent

ries

are

logi

t co

effici

ents

. Num

bers

in p

aren

thes

es a

re s

tand

ard

erro

rs.

** S

igni

fica

nt a

t .0

1; *

sig

nifi

cant

at

.05.

Tab

le 6

.5In

crea

ses

in p

roba

bilit

ies

asso

ciat

ed w

ith

one

stan

dard

dev

iati

on in

crea

se in

inde

pend

ent

vari

able

s (v

otes

und

er C

linto

n)

Inde

pend

ent

vari

able

s19

9319

9419

9519

9619

9719

9819

99

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Uni

on s

tren

gth

Far

m empl

oym

ent

−.08

7−.

101

−.05

9−.

054

−.05

8−.

073

−.05

9−.

055

Ret

ail a

ndw

hole

sale

−.06

3

Dem

ocra

t−.

137

.120

.109

.195

Abs

olut

e D

Wsc

ore

.043

.106

.115

.126

.130

.154

Not

e: O

nly

sign

ifica

nt c

oeffi

cien

ts a

re r

epor

ted.

casting a yea vote by 0.120, 0.109, and 0.195 respectively for the three years.Accusations of illegal Chinese campaign donations in the 1996 presidentialelection, Clinton’s alleged relaxing of satellite export license in exchange forChinese donations, and investigations of alleged Chinese thefts of U.S.nuclear secrets, among other things, were probably responsible for the posi-tive sign that party has in the three votes between 1997 and 1999. Eventhough Republicans initiated these allegations and investigations, they prob-ably had converted many Democrats into opponents of Clinton’s engage-ment policy, for which unconditional MFN was the foundation.

Finally, Absolute DW Score is consistently significant and has the correctsign in all but one vote. Clinton’s executive order linking MFN and humanrights probably reduced the incentives for the ideological wings of both par-ties to form a coalition on the 1993 vote. After Clinton repealed the executiveorder in 1994 and became a supporter of unconditional MFN, the ideologicalwings banded together again. As a result, increase in Absolute DW score isassociated with increased probability of supporting MFN revocation in allvotes but the 1993 vote.

What is most striking is that the effects of Absolute DW Score were on asteady rise during this seven-year period, from a marginal 0.043 in 1994 to asolid 0.154 in 1999. In other words, the strength of what Nokken (2003)called EATM voting (i.e., the ideological ends against the middle) actuallyincreased over time. Recall that in the 2000 vote on HR 4444 that removedChina from annual review of MFN and granted it permanent normal traderelations (PNTR), Absolute DW Score has a negative sign. If it increasesby one standard deviation increase, the probability of voting for PNTRdecreases by 0.126 (see Table 4.4, Model 2). It seems that the strength ofEATM voting slightly decreased between the 1999 vote on MFN renewal andthe 2000 vote on PNTR.

This finding of decreasing EATM appears to support Nokken’s (2003)argument that rules and procedures affect legislative behavior. Because of thespecial rules governing MFN renewal, policy outcome (i.e., MFN renewal)became certain. Consequently, legislators treated these votes as opportunitiesto garner position-taking points with voters at home, which in turn led tostrong EATM voting. Once these special rules were removed in the PNTRvote, policy outcome became uncertain and legislators were more likely tovote sincerely than to stake positions, hence decreased EATM voting.

On the other hand, increasing EATM voting between 1994 and 1999 alsoseems to support my contention that the source of this seemingly strangeideological coalition lies in the peculiar nature of China policy, not in thedifferent rules governing the two types of votes. Over the years, China’shuman rights problems, its rapidly growing economic and military power andhence the potential threat to U.S. interests in Asia (e.g., Taiwan), the soaringU.S. trade deficit with China, and Beijing’s alleged proliferation of missiletechnology have provided increasing ammunition to critics from both ends ofthe ideological spectrum.


Discussion

Since the early 1970s, a central question facing U.S. policy-makers has beenhow to balance human rights with other foreign policy goals. As RichardSolomon, Assistant Secretary of State under Bush senior, pointed out, U.S.foreign policy has been an effort to “balance the competing demands of hard-nosed national interests and our national values, aspirations and ideals” (U.S.Congress 1990: 225). Don Bonker (D-WA), former chairman of the HouseInternational Relations Subcommittee on International Organizations,commented, “I really find it very frustrating in trying to implement thehuman rights policy in view of its fundamental conflict with our othernational security and foreign policy values” (ibid.: 30). Bill Clinton aptlysummarized this challenge in China policy: “I believe the question, therefore,is not whether we continue to support human rights in China, but how we canbest support human rights in China and advance our other very significantissues and interests (quoted in Lampton 1994: 603).

In the struggle to promote human right and simultaneously advance otherforeign policy goals, the U.S. has been accused of adopting a double stand-ard. The case of China aptly illustrates the double standard. During the latterpart of the Cold War, because of the U.S.–China strategic alliance against theformer Soviet Union, the U.S. largely exempted China from the otherwisestrict human rights standards applied to the Soviet bloc. In the aftermath ofTiananmen and after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. did not push hard forhuman rights progress in China either, partly because of the latter’s economicimportance. This is what Neier (1996) called “the new double standard,” asopposed to the old double standard in the Cold War. In the clash betweeneconomic interests and human rights, the former usually prevailed, prompt-ing some critics to assert that U.S. China policy has “reached the point . . .where the most ardent defenders of Chinese communism are U.S. capitalists”(U.S. Congress 1997c: 148).

Yet due to the electoral connection, it is utterly unrealistic to expect manymembers of Congress to sacrifice constituency economic interests on thealtar of human rights. Indeed, my analysis of the ten votes on joint resolu-tions to disapprove of MFN produced evidence that many members votedagainst MFN revocation partly because of constituency influence, particu-larly influence from farmers, retailers, and wholesalers. This should not comeas a surprise, because China has been a leading destination for Americanagricultural products and the major source of cheap products for Americanretailers and wholesalers.

However, had Congress indeed revoked China’s MFN, it would have facedanother dilemma, that is, it would have no leverage to extract human rightsconcessions from China. On the other hand, if Congress has the leverage butnever uses it, then it is not leverage any more. Thus Congress is caught in aCatch-22 situation. As Holly Burkhalter of Asia Watch noted, “Unless theCongress really means it and has the votes then to deprive China of MFN


and accept all of those consequences at such as they [sic]—were not to havemet your conditions, then it is a bluff” (U.S. Congress 1990: 106). Beijingdidn’t have a chance to call Congress’s bluff because Congress never passed alaw conditioning MFN on human rights, but it did call Clinton’s bluff in1994, and Clinton retreated from his 1993 executive order linking MFN withhuman rights.

There is one more problem with Congress’s linkage policy. Even if the U.S.is prepared for the economic consequences of trade sanctions against China,the sanctions themselves, in order to be effective, have to be almost uni-versally enforced. Otherwise, as Dittmer (2001: 433–434) pointed out, “thesacrifices endured by the enforcer become profits to be enjoyed by nonobserv-ers of the sanctions (‘free riders,’ who may endorse sanctions rhetorically),while the deviant suffers only the minor inconvenience of shifting trade part-ners.” Steve Solarz (D-NY) admitted, “The prospect of any other countryjoining us are probably somewhere between nil and negligible” (U.S. Con-gress 1990: 120). Winston Lord agreed: “One of our biggest problems inChina is that our friends in Europe and Japan hold our coats while we take onthe Chinese and they gobble up the contracts” (U.S. Congress 1997c: 64).

Indeed, fully aware of the non-enforceability of U.S. trade sanction, Chinahas not hesitated to use market access and purchase orders to play one coun-try off against another. For example, China has manipulated the competitionbetween Airbus and Boeing to its advantage, attempting to silence Europeanand American critics. “China has been able to turn the tables: It now useseconomic pressure against those who venture to criticize hits human rightspractices,” said an outraged Neier (1996: 97).

In the end, using a double-edged weapon such as trade sanctions to pro-mote human rights has largely failed in the case of China.12 And, in 2000,Congress ultimately decided to give up such a policy by voting to grant Chinapermanent normal trade relations. Dittmer summarized the lesson for U.S.policy-makers:

Whereas realist means [trade sanctions] can be used in support of realistends (such as trade or, in the case of the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis,security issues), the use of such means in support of idealist ends islogically contradictory and inherently self-defeating. Paradoxically, thefree play of domestic interests makes pluralist systems perhaps least ableto enforce human rights effectively. When mutually beneficial materialinterests are fully engaged, only idealist means [such as moral condemna-tion or international forums] may be employed to implement idealistends.

(2001: 459)


7 Beyond the case of China

Congress’s approach to foreign affairs is heavily colored by local and domesticconsiderations vis-à-vis a commitment to the national interest.

(Cecil Crabb and Pat Holt 1984: 249)

Like a vast picture thronged with figures of equal prominence and crowdedwith elaborate and obtrusive details, Congress is hard to see satisfactorily andappreciatively at a single view and from a single stand-point.

(Woodrow Wilson 2006: 57)

So far, I have presented a comprehensive analysis of Congress’s China policy.I examined not only the impact of legislative rules and procedures on policyoutcomes, but also the determinants of roll call voting on U.S.–China traderelations, U.S.–Taiwan relations, and China’s human rights. The various find-ings shed some important light on the dynamics underlying congressionalpolicy toward China.

Nevertheless, some readers may not be satisfied because as important asthe case of China may be, they would contend it does not sufficientlyilluminate congressional foreign policy-making in general. In other words,since my study examines only the case of China, it is hard to ascertainwhether the same dynamics that help explain congressional policy-making onChina-related issues also explains congressional policy-making toward othercountries generally. Without a relevant set of comparison cases, I cannotanswer this question; instead I can only make statements about what factorsare relevant for the U.S.–China case. This chapter addresses this challenge. Ianalyze roll call votes on two issues involving six countries similar to China inrelevant aspects, and compare findings from these six countries with thosefindings from China. Such a comparative analysis marks the first step inbuilding a general theory of roll call voting on different countries.

It should be noted that scholarly research on foreign policy voting tendsto neglect country-specific legislation and instead focuses on general legisla-tion such as GATT (e.g., Bailey and Brady 1998; Gartzke and Wrighton1998), renewal of fast track authority (e.g., Conley 1999), and human rights

(e.g., Avery and Forsythe 1979). This scholarly neglect is understandablebecause regardless of how important a piece of country-specific legislation is,the findings may not be generalized to other countries. But with a sufficientnumber of cases, studying such legislation can help us go beyond country-specific variables and identify systematic patterns in congressional policy-making. After all, Congress routinely legislates on similar issues involvingmany countries, and these countries differ from each other in many respects:political regime, relations with the U.S., economic strength, and strategicimportance, etc. Thus it would be both theoretically and empirically desirableto find out whether there is systematic variation in congressional policy-making across different countries on similar issues.

Selection of cases

Which cases are selected partly depends on the specific issues that I intend toexamine. I have examined roll call voting on three issues: trade, Taiwan, andhuman rights. Because of the highly unusual nature of U.S.–Taiwan relation-ship, I decide not to pursue any comparative analysis of it. First, even thoughthe U.S. and Taiwan do not have diplomatic relations, their relationship con-stitutes a de facto diplomatic relationship. Second, since 1949, China hasregarded Taiwan as a renegade province over which it claims sovereignty, andthis claim of sovereignty is almost universally recognized. No country orentity in the world today has such a relationship with the U.S.

In so far as U.S.–China trade is concerned, two characteristics stand out asforming the primary criteria for case selection. First, the two countries haveextremely extensive trade relations. Second, bilateral trade is extremely unbal-anced, as U.S. imports from China are much larger than its exports to China(see Table 4.1). Only Canada, Mexico, and Japan are somewhat similar toChina in terms of the two characteristics. Each of the three countries hasbeen a top trade partner of the U.S. and each of them has been running ahuge trade surplus with the U.S. (see Table 7.1).

My analysis of Congress’s human rights policy toward China focusedexclusively on congressional attempts to revoke China’s MFN trade status.Consequently, it is most appropriate to focus on MFN in comparative analysis.Because the Jackson–Vanik Amendment applies to all Communist countries,Congress also voted on the MFN status of many other countries like Albaniaand Mongolia. Frequently Congress inserted in a general trade bill provisionsrespecting MFN status for some countries. For example, the Trade andDevelopment Act of 2000 (HR 434) contained provisions authorizing thepresident to extend MFN to Albania and Kyrgyzstan, and the MiscellaneousTrade and Technical Corrections Act of 1999 (HR 435) authorized thepresident to grant MFN to Mongolia by proclamation (Pregelj 2000). Idecided not to analyze votes on these general bills because it is hard to ascer-tain whether a member’s vote on these bills was affected by MFN provisionsor non-MFN provisions. On a few occasions, Congress did consider

Beyond the case of China 123

free-standing legislation targeting a particular country’s MFN status. To myknowledge, Hungary, Romania, and Vietnam are the only three countrieswhose MFN status was considered under free-standing legislation.1 Hencethey are selected for comparison with China.

Trade

Japan

While the U.S. trade deficit with China dominates headlines and politicaldebates these days (see Chapter 4), U.S. trade deficit with Japan was on thefront burner from the late 1970s through the 1980s (e.g., Cohen 1985; U.S.Congress 1980a, 1980b, 1982, 1983b) (Figure 7.1). Then as now, the largestcomponent of U.S. deficit with Japan involves automotive products. Table 7.2depicts total U.S. deficit with Japan in automotive trade and its share of totalU.S.–world deficit and U.S.–Japan trade deficit between 1986 and 2006. Thenumbers are quite astonishing. Total U.S. automotive deficit with Japan

Table 7.1 Total U.S. trade and deficit with Japan, Canada, and Mexico, 1985–2006(billions of dollars)

Japan Canada Mexico

Year Total Balance Total Balance Total Balance

1985 91.4 −46.2 116.3 −21.8 32.8 −5.51986 108.8 −55.0 113.6 −22.9 29.7 −4.91987 112.8 −56.3 130.9 −11.3 34.9 −5.71988 127.2 −51.8 153.0 −9.8 43.9 −2.61989 138.0 −49.1 −166.8 −9.1 52.1 −2.21990 138.3 −41.1 175.1 −7.7 58.4 −1.91991 139.6 −43.4 176.2 −5.9 64.4 2.11992 145.2 −49.6 189.2 −8.0 75.8 5.41993 155.1 −59.4 211.7 −10.8 81.5 1.71994 172.6 −65.7 242.8 −14.0 100.3 1.31995 187.8 −59.1 271.6 −17.1 108.4 −15.81996 182.8 −47.6 290.1 −21.7 131.1 −17.51997 187.2 −56.1 319.0 −15.5 157.3 −14.51998 179.7 −64.0 329.9 −16.7 173.4 −15.91999 188.3 −73.4 365.3 −32.1 196.6 −22.82000 211.4 −81.6 409.8 −51.9 247.3 −24.62001 183.9 −69.0 379.7 −52.8 232.6 −30.02002 172.9 −70.0 370.0 −48.2 232.1 −37.12003 170.0 −66.0 391.5 −51.7 235.5 −40.62004 184.0 −75.6 446.2 −66.5 266.7 −45.12005 193.5 −82.5 502.3 −78.5 290.5 −49.72006 207.7 −88.4 534.0 −72.8 332.4 −64.1

Source: U.S. Census Bureau.


averaged US$37.7 billion per year during the 21-year period, accounting foron average 60.8 percent of total U.S. trade deficit with Japan. Notice thateven though total U.S. automotive deficit has increased from US$32.6 billionin 1986 to US$56.8 billion in 2006, its share of total U.S.–world deficithas undergone a sharp decline from the record-high of 47.6 percent in 1991 to6.9 percent in 2006. The rise of China as a leading international exporter,which replaced Japan as the largest deficit-trading partner of the U.S. in 2000,was almost certainly a major factor behind the precipitous decline of U.S.–Japan automotive deficit’s share of total U.S.–world trade deficit becauseChinese automotive exports were largely negligible during this period.

Under increasing pressure from the Big Three and United Auto Workers(UAW) union, Congress began to take a series of legislative actions to curbauto imports from Japan. On December 15 1980, by a vote of 317–57 theHouse passed H.J.R. 598 authorizing the president to negotiate an agreementlimiting sales of foreign (chiefly Japanese) cars and trucks in the U.S. But themeasure didn’t go anywhere because the Senate did not take any action on it(CQ Almanac 1980: 303–304). Two years later, the House passed HR 5133 ona 215–188 vote. The bill would have set domestic content ratios for foreignautomakers based on their sales in the U.S. For example, Toyota and Nissanwould have been required to have 70–75 percent domestic content in theircars by 1985 (CQ Almanac 1982: 55–56). The following year, the Housepassed a similar bill (HR 1234) by a vote of 219–199. The bill would have set

Figure 7.1 U.S. trade deficit with Japan, 1962–2006 (billions of dollars)

Source: 1962–1984, available from http://comtrade.un.org/db/; 1985–2006, U.S. Census Bureau,available from www.census.gov.


a maximum of 90 percent domestic content on companies selling more than900,000 autos in 1987 and beyond. The House approved the bill despite anannouncement by the Japanese that they would voluntarily restrict U.S.exports to 1.85 million cars for the year beginning in April 1984 (CQAlmanac 1983: 257–259).

Canada

Canada has been the largest trading partner of the U.S. for at least twodecades. Yet unlike Japan, the U.S. trade deficit with Canada has generallybeen much smaller. The annual U.S. trade deficit with Japan in 1985–2006was on average 3.35 times larger than its deficit with Canada. For the sevenyears between 1987 and 1993, the average ratio was as high as 5.72. Becauseof the much smaller deficit, U.S.–Canada trade has rarely generated as muchcontroversy as U.S. trade with China or Japan. When Congress voted onU.S.–Canada Free Trade Agreement in 1988, for example, there was littleobjection in either chamber. The bill passed 366–40 in the House and 83–9 inthe Senate.

One of the rare occasions on which Congress debated U.S.–Canada trade

Table 7.2 U.S.–Japan trade and automotive deficit, 1986–2006 (billions of dollars)

Year Total U.S.–World tradedeficit

Total U.S.–Japan tradedeficit

U.S.–Japanautomotivedeficit

Share of totalU.S.–World

deficit (%)

Share ofU.S.–Japandeficit (%)

1986 138.2 58.6 32.6 23.60 55.601987 152.1 59.8 33.3 21.90 55.701988 118.7 51.8 32 26.90 61.701989 109.4 49.1 32.4 29.60 66.001990 101.7 41.1 30.8 30.30 75.001991 66.7 43.4 31.8 47.60 73.201992 84.5 49.6 31.2 37.00 63.001993 115.6 59.4 33.4 28.90 56.301994 150.6 65.7 36.8 24.40 56.001995 158.8 59.1 32.9 20.70 55.601996 170.2 47.6 29.6 17.40 62.201997 180.5 56.1 31.5 17.40 56.101998 229.8 64.1 33.8 14.70 52.801999 330 73.9 39.9 12.10 54.002000 434.3 81.3 44.2 10.20 54.302001 411.4 69 42 10.20 61.002002 468.3 70 46.2 9.90 66.102003 532.4 66 43.9 8.20 66.502004 650.8 75.2 46.4 7.10 61.702005 766.8 82.5 50.2 6.50 60.802006 818.1 88.4 56.8 6.90 64.20

Source: Office of Aerospace and Automotive Industries, U.S. Department of Commerce.


involved the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965 (HR 9042) that wasdesigned to implement an agreement signed by President Lyndon Johnsonand Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson on January 16 1965. Theagreement called for the removal of U.S. and Canadian tariff duties on carsand car parts. As a corollary of the agreement, U.S. car manufacturers promi-sed to increase their production in Canada, which in turn promised to elimi-nate its tariffs on U.S. cars. The bill had the support of U.S. automakers andthe UAW, but was opposed by many independent parts manufacturers whoargued that that the bill would encourage U.S. automakers to shift produc-tion—hence jobs—to Canada. Despite a heated debate in both chambers,particularly in the Senate, the bill won House approval on June 21 by avote of 280–113, and it passed the Senate on September 27 by a 54–18 vote(CQ Almanac 1965: 509–512).

Mexico

Before the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effectin 1994, U.S.–Mexico trade was significantly smaller than U.S. trade withCanada or Japan. Between 1985 and 1993, total U.S.–Mexico trade was onaverage about one-third of U.S. trade with Canada and half of U.S.–Japantrade. The U.S. trade deficit with Mexico was even smaller, averaging aboutone-fourth of its deficit with Canada and one-sixteenth of its deficit withJapan between 1985 and 1990. For the three years between 1991 and 1994, theU.S. actually ran a small surplus with Mexico. Since 1995, the U.S. has beenrunning a growing deficit with Mexico, which appears to be catching up withits deficit with Canada and Japan.

Because of the much smaller volume of U.S. trade and deficit with Mexicoprior to NAFTA, Congress did not act on any trade measure concerning thatcountry. But the enactment of NAFTA put Mexico on the front burner.Because the U.S. had already signed a free trade agreement with Canada in1988, the whole controversy surrounding NAFTA focused primarily on U.S.trade with Mexico and only secondarily on U.S.–Canada trade. Labor groupswere most vocal and persistent in their opposition to NAFTA because theyfeared the influx of cheap Mexican products, coupled with probable reloca-tion of many American companies to Mexico to take advantage of cheapMexican labor, would displace thousands of American jobs. While it isbeyond the scope of this chapter to detail the legislative battle aboutNAFTA, suffice it to say that it was one of the most controversial debatesabout America’s trade policy in the twentieth century. In the end, Congressnarrowly approved the trade agreement (i.e., HR 3450) on November 181993. The vote was 234–200 in the House and 61–38 in the Senate.


Human rights

Romania

MFN status was first granted to Romania in 1975 and had been renewed bythe president without congressional objection until 1979. In that year, theHouse voted on a resolution (H.Res.317) to disapprove of it. RepresentativeRichard Schulze (R-PA), sponsor of the resolution, accused Romania ofrepeatedly violating the requirements of the Jackson–Vanik Amendment byabusing the Hungarian minority within its borders, running labor camps forpolitical dissidents and religious activists, restricting emigration to Israel, anderecting new barriers to emigration. Opponents of the resolution, on theother hand, argued that MFN had brought about more emigration and thatcontinuing MFN would encourage Romania to be more independent fromthe former Soviet Union. The full House rejected the resolution on July 25 bya 126–271 vote (CQ Almanac 1979: 161).

The House voted twice more on Romania’s MFN status.2 In 1986, PhilipCrane (R-IL) introduced H.Res.475 opposing President Reagan’s decision tocontinue MFN for Romania, but the resolution was not reported out of Waysand Means. Crane filed a motion to discharge it from Ways and Means, but amotion by Sam Gibbons (D-FL) to table Crane’s discharge motion passed ona 216–190 vote, thus killing Crane’s attempt to overturn Reagan’s decision.Crane and others opposed MFN renewal on the ground that Romania wasguilty of human rights violations, including restrictive emigration practices(CQ Almanac 1986: 350–351). In 1987, Frank Wolf (R-WV) introducedan amendment to the Omnibus Trade Bill (HR 3) to deny MFN status toRomania for six months and to require a review of Romania’s compliancewith the Jackson–Vanik Amendment every six months. The amendment wasadopted 232–183 (CQ Almanac 1987: 642).

Hungary

Congress voted twice on Hungary’s MFN status in 1989. In response toPresident George H.W. Bush’s decision to extend MFN status to Hungary forfive years, Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) filed a motion to approve the president’sdecision under suspension of rules. His motion was defeated on June 27 by a242–172 vote (a two-thirds majority of those present and voting is requiredfor passage under suspension of rules). In the end, by a 221–169 vote theHouse passed HR 1594 granting three years of MFN to Hungary (CQAlmanac 1989: 40-H, 74-H).

Vietnam

The U.S. did not have diplomatic relations with Vietnam until 1995. Threeyears later, President Clinton issued an executive order extending MFN


status to Vietnam (U.S. Congress 2001a). Congress first acted on Vietnam’sMFN status in 1999, when the House failed by a 130–297 vote to passH.J.R.58 to disapprove of Clinton’s decision to renew it. In 2000, the lowerchamber again failed to pass a similar resolution (H.J.R.99) by a vote of91–331. In 2006, the House failed by a 228–161 vote to pass—under suspen-sion of rules—HR 5602 to authorize one more year of MFN for Vietnam.

Theoretical expectations

Without theoretical guidance, comparing China with six countries on twodistinct issues could be a confusing process full of ad hoc explanations.Instead, I seek a clearly defined analytical approach that can facilitate sys-tematic explanations with broad applicability. In this section, I propose threebroad theoretical expectations that will guide my analysis.

Hypothesis 1: Constituency interests will generally have a bigger impacton trade votes involving Japan, Canada, and Mexico than on thoseinvolving China, because the former are democratic countries and alliesof the U.S.

Even though Japan, Canada, and Mexico are quite similar to China in termsof their extensive economic ties with the U.S., they differ from China in twokey aspects, that is, they are all democratic countries as well as allies of theU.S. As a result, congressional debates about trade with these countries areexpected to focus almost exclusively on the economic dimension, particularlythe potential gain or loss of American jobs resulting from trade with thesecountries. China, by contrast, is an authoritarian regime under Communistcontrol. The Tiananmen Incident, which is arguably the single most import-ant event in bilateral relations since Nixon’s 1972 visit, has reinforcedantipathy toward China among many members of Congress. Besides, Chinais not an ally of the U.S. Rather, due to its rising economic and militarypower, China is widely perceived to be a potential threat to the U.S. Con-sequently, anti-Communism, human rights, and strategic concerns are alllikely to affect voting on trade with China, which in turn may dampen thepotential impact of constituency interests.

Hypothesis 2: In roll call voting on granting MFN status to Hungary,Romania, and Vietnam, constituency interests should have smallerimpact, compared with roll call voting on the extension of MFN toChina, because the former are not economic powers and do not haveextensive economic relations with the U.S.

Like China, Hungary, Romania, and Vietnam used to be or still are underCommunist rule. Yet unlike China, none of them is—or has ever been—aneconomic power, nor does any one of them have as extensive economic


relations with the U.S. as China does. This helps explain why MFN renewalfor these three countries never caused much stir on Capitol Hill. Table 7.3shows total trade and deficit between the three countries and the U.S. In 2006,U.S. trade with Hungary, Romania, and Vietnam totaled US$3.8 billion,US$1.7 billion, and US$9.7 billion respectively, and the U.S. deficit with themwas US$1.4 billion, US$.57 billion, and US$7.5 billion respectively. By con-trast, the U.S. trade deficit with China stood at US$232 billion in 2006. Interms of trade relations with the U.S., these countries are dwarfs compared tothe China giant. Because constituency economic interests in U.S. relationswith these three countries are quite small, they are not expected to have muchimpact on roll call voting.

Hypothesis 3: The ideological ends will not form a coalition against mod-erates in votes involving the six countries. In other words, the absolutevalue of DW score will not be a significant predictor of roll call votes.

Japan, Canada, and Mexico are all democratic countries and U.S. allies. Thusthe ideological factors of human rights, anti-Communism, and strategic

Table 7.3 Total U.S. trade and deficit with Hungary, Romania, and Vietnam (millionsof dollars)

Hungary Romania Vietnam

Year Total Balance Total Balance Total Balance

1985 312.8 −123.8 – – – –1986 323.2 −127 – – – –1987 374.1 −183.7 – – – –1988 369.1 −216.9 – – – –1989 449.8 −206.6 – – – –1990 504 −191.2 – – – –1991 623.3 −110.7 – – – –1992 642 −52 335.7 160.9 4.6 4.61993 835.3 34.3 392.7 254.3 7 71994 779.5 −161.3 534.3 144.9 223.4 122.41995 842.2 −251.8 475.5 30.9 451.3 53.31996 1006.8 −345.2 514.2 17 948.4 284.81997 1564.2 −593.6 657.8 −141.8 675.1 −101.71998 2049.2 −1084 729.9 −56.5 828 −280.21999 2396.6 −1388.6 618.5 −266.3 899.9 −316.92000 3284.4 −2145.8 705.5 −239.9 1188.8 −453.82001 3650.2 −2279 894.2 −145.6 1513.6 −592.82002 3325.5 −1949.5 943.4 −447 2974.8 −1814.82003 3634 −1767.4 1097.1 −363.3 5878.6 −32312004 3715.2 −1430 1378.4 −327.6 6439.6 −41112005 3584.5 −1537.9 1816.5 −598.7 7824.4 −54382006 3769.3 −1392.9 1669 −568.8 9666.5 −7466.1

Source: U.S. Census Bureau.


concerns, which are so important with China, are expected to be largelyabsent from a member’s calculus when he or she votes on U.S. trade relationswith these three countries. When it comes to Hungary, Romania, and Viet-nam, none of them was or is a geopolitical power, nor has any one of themhad close economic ties with the U.S. Consequently, strategic concerns andeconomic considerations are expected to have little impact on members’ voteson MFN extension to these countries. Instead, only ideological and humanrights concerns are expected to impact members’ votes. In a word, congres-sional voting on these six countries is expected to focus primarily on onedimension—jobs in the case of trade and anti-Communism (or humanrights) in the case of MFN extension. In a one-dimensional world, liberalsand conservatives are not expected to be bedfellows.

China, by contrast, has a laundry list of issues that attract criticism fromboth ends of the ideological spectrum. Its poor human rights record andenvironmental problems have energized hard-core liberals, while its one-childpolicy and restrictions on religious freedom have been a constant source ofcomplaints among conservatives. Meanwhile, the soaring trade deficit hasmade China a primary target for some liberals with close ties with laborunions, and its growing military capabilities have unsettled many conserva-tives. Thus liberals and conservatives have many reasons to unite on issuesinvolving China.

Table 7.4 lists the House votes that will be used to test the three hypotheses.All these votes were mentioned earlier in my brief discussion of each case. HereI explain why some votes were excluded. Congress voted on the U.S.–CanadaFree Trade Agreement in 1988, but that vote was too lopsided (366–40) to besuitable for statistical analysis. For the same reason, I exclude the 2000 voteon H.J.R.99 to disapprove of MFN for Vietnam (91–331). I exclude the 1986vote on Gibbons’ motion to table Crane’s motion to discharge from the Waysand Means H.Res.475, because discharge motions as parliamentary tacticsare routinely defeated. Of the two votes on Hungary’s MFN status, the firstvote was on Rostenkowski’s motion to pass HR 1594 (which granted fiveyears of MFN) under suspension of rules and the second vote was on passageof the final version of HR 1594 that granted only three years of MFN. Iselect the second vote on passage of the final version of the bill.

As in the previous three chapters, I run two logit regressions for each vote.The first regression has only three constituency variables: Union Strength,Farm Employment, and Retail/Wholesale Employment. The second regres-sion includes President’s Party and Absolute DW Score. This method allowsme to compare voting across issues and different countries. All the variablesare coded exactly the same way they were in the previous three chapters.

Findings

The first thing to notice in Table 7.5 and Table 7.6 is that Union Strengthperforms quite well, as it is statistically significant and in the correct direction


Tab

le 7

.4H

ouse

rol

l cal

l vot

es o

n tr

ade

and

MF

N e

xten

sion

for

sele

cted

cou

ntri

es

Yea

rB

illC

ount

Bill

sum

mar

y

Tra

deJa

pan

1982

HR

513

321

5–18

8R

equi

re a

utom

aker

s to

use

set

per

cent

ages

of

U.S

. lab

or a

nd p

arts

in a

utom

obile

s th

ey s

ell i

n th

eU

nite

d St

ates

1983

HR

123

421

9–19

9R

equi

re fi

xed

leve

ls o

f U

.S. l

abor

and

par

ts in

aut

omob

iles

sold

in t

he U

.S.;

phas

e in

dom

esti

cco

nten

t le

vels

beg

inni

ng in

198

5 an

d re

achi

ng m

axim

um le

vels

in 1

987

Can

ada

1965

HR

904

228

0–11

3R

emov

e ta

riff

dut

ies

on C

anad

ian

auto

mob

iles

and

part

s fo

r or

igin

al e

quip

men

tM

exic

o19

93H

R 3

450

234–

200

App

rove

the

Nor

th A

mer

ican

Fre

e T

rade

Agr

eem

ent

and

mak

e th

e ne

cess

ary

chan

ges

to U

.S.

stat

utor

y la

w t

o im

plem

ent

it

MF

NR

oman

ia19

79H

.Res

.317

126–

271

Dis

appr

ove

the

pres

iden

t’s

requ

est

to e

xten

t fo

r 12

mon

ths

a w

aive

r of

the

Jac

kon–

Van

ikA

men

dmen

t w

ith

resp

ect

to R

oman

ia19

87H

R 3

232–

283

Fra

nk W

olf a

men

dmen

t to

deny

to R

oman

ia M

FN

sta

tus

for

six

mon

ths

and

to r

equi

re r

evie

w o

f its

com

plia

nce

wit

h Ja

ckso

n–V

anik

Am

endm

ent

ever

y si

x m

onth

sH

unga

ry19

89H

R 1

594

221–

169

App

rove

for

thre

e ye

ars

mos

t-fa

vore

d-na

tion

sta

tus

to t

he p

rodu

cts

of H

unga

ryV

ietn

am19

99H

.J.R

.58

130–

297

Dis

appr

ove

pres

iden

tial

wai

ver

of t

he J

acks

on–V

anik

Am

endm

ent

for

Vie

tnam

2006

HR

560

222

8–16

1Su

spen

d th

e ru

les

and

pass

the

bill

to

auth

oriz

e th

e ex

tens

ion

of M

FN

to

Vie

tnam

.

Sou

rce:

CQ

Alm

anac

.

Tab

le 7

.5L

ogit

ana

lysi

s of

Hou

se r

oll c

all v

otes

on

trad

e w

ith

Japa

n, C

anad

a, a

nd M

exic

o

Inde

pend

ent

vari

able

sJa

pan

1982

Japa

n 19

83C

anad

a 19

65M

exic

o 19

93

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Uni

on s

tren

gth

.054

**(.

011)

.095

**(.

015)

6.70

7**

(1.3

98)

10.5

08**

(1.8

02)

−.00

8(.

011)

.008

(.01

3)−3

.841

**(1

.263

)−4

.258

**(1

.367

)F

arm

em

ploy

men

t−1

0.59

9**

(3.1

84)

−7.9

78*

(3.7

01)

−25.

772*

*(5

.021

)−2

0.80

0**

(5.6

38)

−3.8

16(2

.212

)−2

.241

(2.3

31)

9.43

1*(4

.675

)8.

346

(4.8

79)

Ret

ail/w

hole

sale

empl

oym

ent

−8.2

33(4

.691

)−8

.616

(5.4

61)

−18.

747*

*(5

.300

)−1

8.12

8**

(6.3

31)

3.96

6(5

.371

)6.

360

(5.5

96)

7.51

5(4

.161

)2.

207

(4.0

99)

Pre

side

nt’s

par

ty−2

.735

**(.

296)

−2.7

96**

(.29

7)1.

121*

*(.

243)

−1.6

13**

(.22

9)A

bsol

ute

DW

−.53

8(.

751)

1.10

4(.

797)

−1.1

19(.

779)

−1.3

48*

(.66

6)L

og li

kelih

ood

−251

.318

−191

.959

−249

.103

−189

.482

−232

.071

−220

.810

−287

.073

−257

.694

Pse

udo

R2

.097

.309

.155

.357

.008

.056

.041

.137

N40

340

242

642

639

339

343

443

3

Not

es:

Cel

l ent

ries

are

logi

t co

effici

ents

. Num

bers

in p

aren

thes

es a

re s

tand

ard

erro

rs.

**Si

gnifi

cant

at

.01;

* s

igni

fica

nt a

t .0

5.

Tab

le 7

.6In

crea

ses

in p

roba

bilit

ies

asso

ciat

ed w

ith

one

stan

dard

dev

iati

on i

ncre

ase

in i

ndep

ende

nt v

aria

bles

(vo

tes

on J

apan

, C

anad

a, a

ndM

exic

o)

Inde

pend

ent

vari

able

sJa

pan

1982

Japa

n 19

83C

anad

aM

exic

o

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Uni

on s

tren

gth

.133

.232

.136

.210

−.07

8−.

086

Far

m e

mpl

oym

ent

−.10

3−.

077

−.18

3−.

148

.055

Ret

ail/w

hole

sale

empl

oym

ent

−.10

3−.

099

Pre

side

nt’s

par

ty−.

594

−.60

1.2

35−.

373

Abs

olut

e D

W−.

055

Not

e: O

nly

sign

ifica

nt c

oeffi

cien

ts a

re r

epor

ted

here

.

in all but the Canada vote.3 One standard deviation increase in UnionStrength increases the probability of voting for the two bills on automobiledomestic content by 0.133 and 0.136 respectively in Model 1. Once party andideology are controlled for in Model 2, the magnitude of Union Strengthactually increases to 0.232 in the 1982 vote and 0.210 in the 1983 vote. Asimilar increase in Union Strength decreases the probability of voting forNAFTA by 0.078 in Model 1 and 0.086 in Model 2, controlling for othervariables. Moreover, except in one regression (Model 1 of the 1983 vote onJapan), Union Strength has the second largest impact.

Farm Employment performs fairly well. If it increases by one standarddeviation, the probability of voting for the two domestic auto content billsdecreases by 0.103 and 0.183 respectively in Model 1. Once party and ideol-ogy are controlled for, the impact of Farm Employment decreases slightly. Asimilar increase in Farm Employment increases the probability of voting forNAFTA by 0.055 in Model 1. Retail/Wholesale Employment does not per-form as well as the other two constituency variables, as it is statistically sig-nificant only in the 1983 Japan vote. One standard deviation increase leads toa decrease of 0.103 and 0.099 respectively in Model 1 and Model 2.

All in all, constituency interests, particularly labor unions and farmers, hadconsiderable influence on these four trade votes. Recall that in my analysis ofthe House vote on HR 4444 that granted permanent normal trade relations(PNTR) to China, neither Union Strength nor Retail/Wholesale Employ-ment is statistically significant. A comparison of these findings seems tosupport my prediction that constituency interests will generally have a biggerimpact on trade votes concerning Japan, Canada, and Mexico than on tradevotes involving China.

The above findings about Union Strength also call into question my ori-ginal explanation about why it is not statistically significant in the vote on HR4444. I suggested that state-level data might be responsible for the statisticalinsignificance of this variable. Now it seems that it is not so much state-leveldata as the nature of U.S. relations with a particular country that affects theperformance of this variable. Members of Congress may focus mostly oneconomic issues when they vote on trade legislation involving countries thatare U.S. allies and democratic countries, hence the much better performanceof Union Strength, a variable that captures constituency interests in foreigntrade. If a country is not an ally of the U.S. or a democratic one, then otherconsiderations like human rights, national security, and ideology (e.g., anti-Communism) may also influence voting decisions and hence dampen theeffects of Union Strength.

One is tempted to argue that the varying intensity of labor opposition toU.S. trade with these countries also affects the performance of UnionStrength. In other words, it is possible that labor unions were especiallyopposed to Japanese auto imports and NAFTA, but not to trade with China.This argument on its surface seems plausible, but a close examinationof congressional documents, journalistic accounts, and scholarly research


strongly indicates that it cannot hold water. As I described in some detail inChapter 4, labor unions were vehemently opposed to PNTR and launchedmassive campaigns to defeat HR 4444. In the case of Japan, the United AutoWorkers (UAW) union played a critical role in drafting and passing the twobills. In 1982, lobbyists for the UAW “lined the halls outside the Housechamber throughout the debate.” The bill’s passage “could be attributedalmost solely to the UAW, which had pushed tirelessly for the measure since1981” (CQ Almanac 1982: 56). The 1983 bill was again “a creation” of theUAW, which lobbied heavily for its passage (CQ Almanac 1983: 258). Due tothe constraint of space, I will not document labor opposition to NAFTA, butsuffice it to say that labor unions were as much—if not more—opposed toNAFTA as to PNTR for China (e.g., Balz and Cooper 1993; Conley 1999;Engel and Jackson 1998; Mintz 1993; Vaillancourt 1993; Wink et al. 1996;U.S. Congress 1993). Thus the evidence does not appear to support the con-tention that the impact of Union Strength varies by the intensity of laboropposition to a particular trade bill.

President’s Party is statistically significant in each of the four trade votes.Besides, it has the correct sign in all but one vote (the NAFTA vote). To beexact, being a Republican decreases the probability of voting for the two autodomestic content bills by 0.594 and 0.601 respectively, controlling for otherfactors. Given President Reagan’s opposition to the two bills and the generaltendency to support free trade among Republicans, the remarkable impact ofparty does not seem surprising. Similarly, being a Democrat increases thelikelihood of voting for the 1965 trade agreement by a solid 0.235. However,being a Democrat actually decreases the probability of voting for NAFTA byan impressive 0.372. Recall that in the case of China, being a Democrat isalso negatively associated with support for PNTR. And these findings aboutparty hold true even when Union Strength is controlled for. Thus Democratsappear to be generally much less supportive of free trade than Republicans.

Finally, except for the NAFTA vote, Absolute DW Score is not statisticallysignificant. This finding is highly consistent with my expectation that theideological ends will not form a coalition on trade issues involving thesecountries. Still, the finding about NAFTA is puzzling. Why did the ideo-logical ends unite on this particular vote? A paragraph from the CQ Almanacseems to provide the answer.

The issue [NAFTA] scrambled political alliances in ways rarely seen.Perot joined with conservative Republican Pat Buchanan and liberal cru-sader Ralph Nader in opposing the agreement. Organized labor andsome environmental groups, which rarely agreed on anything, opposed itas well. Farmers in the Midwest were avidly for it, but growers in Florida,California and North Dakota were against it.

(CQ Almanac 1993: 172)

Even though only outside forces involved in the NAFTA debate are depicted


in the paragraph, it is reasonable to surmise, on the basis of the electoralconnection, that similar alliances probably also existed within Congress,which in turn helps explain why Absolute DW Score is statistically significantand has a negative sign.

It should be pointed out that the configuration of political forces in theNAFTA battle is quite similar to that in the legislative battle over China’sPNTR. This similarity raises a question: Should Mexico be viewed differ-ently from Japan and Canada and, if so, on what ground? One might arguethat Mexico has more in common with China than with Japan or Canadabecause both Mexico and China are developing countries that have manyproblems with environmental protection and labor standards. On the otherhand, one might argue, as I did, that Mexico is quite different from Chinabecause it is a democratic country and a U.S. ally. Consequently, many issues(e.g., human rights and strategic concerns) that can potentially affect con-gressional policy-making toward China may not affect congressional policy-making toward Mexico. One way to answer this question is to examine rollcall voting on U.S. trade with developing countries and compare it with rollcall voting on trade with industrialized countries. If the absolute value ofDW score has a statistically significant impact and a negative sign in theformer but not in the latter, then Mexico should perhaps be viewed as similarto China.

The results for the five votes on MFN extension are presented in Table 7.7and Table 7.8. Neither Farm Employment nor Retail/Wholesale Employmentis statistically significant in any of the regressions. Yet in the case of China’sMFN status, Farm Employment reaches statistical significance and has thecorrect sign in eight out of ten votes, and Retail/Wholesale Employment infour votes (see Table 6.2 through Table 6.5). Union Strength is not statistic-ally significant in any of the ten votes on China’s MFN, but it is in the 1987Romania vote and the 1989 Hungary vote. On balance, then, the findingsprovide some support for my prediction that constituency variables will gen-erally have smaller impact on MFN votes involving these three countries.

Though I did not expect a coalition of ideological ends against the middle(i.e., EATM) to emerge on any of these votes, it actually appeared on three ofthem. If Absolute DW Score increases by one standard deviation, the prob-ability of supporting temporary suspension of Romania’s MFN status (i.e.,the Wolf Amendment) actually decreases by 0.071. My explanation for thispuzzling finding is that the ideological ends might have voted strategically onthis vote. That is, they might have voted against the Wolf Amendment inorder to propose a bill or amendment that would either permanently suspendRomania’s MFN or attach conditions to its renewal. The other puzzlingfinding concerns the two votes on Vietnam’s MFN status. While AbsoluteDW Score does not have any significant impact on the 1999 vote, it does onthe 2006 vote.

Increase in Absolute DW Score is actually positively associated with sup-port for a three-year extension of MFN status to Hungary. Because the bill


Tab

le 7

.7L

ogit

ana

lysi

s of

Hou

se v

otes

on

exte

nsio

n of

MF

N t

o R

oman

ia, H

unga

ry, a

nd V

ietn

am

Inde

pend

ent

vari

able

sR

oman

ia 1

979

Rom

ania

198

7H

unga

ry 1

989

Vie

tnam

199

9V

ietn

am 2

006

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Uni

on s

tren

gth

.576

(1.1

63)

−.76

0(1

.417

)−4

.928

**(1

.295

)−6

.239

**(1

.485

)2.

489

(1.3

11)

4.19

8*(1

.626

)−1

.149

(1.3

21)

.006

(1.4

15)

.008

(.01

3).0

16(.

014)

Far

m e

mpl

oym

ent

4.91

6(2

.679

)1.

778

(3.2

62)

4.82

6(3

.698

)−2

.387

(4.0

38)

−6.3

10(3

.713

)1.

463

(4.3

65)

−3.6

46(4

.832

)−8

.130

(5.5

29)

.070

(.05

2).0

64(.

054)

Ret

ail/w

hole

sale

empl

oym

ent

8.43

6(4

.903

)6.

222

(5.8

53)

4.51

1(4

.676

)−2

.196

(5.2

48)

−5.5

89(4

.770

)4.

946

(5.8

76)

2.77

7(3

.957

)−2

.117

(4.2

74)

−.02

3(.

039)

−.03

2(.

040)

Pre

side

nt’s

par

ty−2

.588

**(.

265)

1.94

3**

(.25

1)−2

.682

**(.

273)

−1.4

15**

(.24

9)1.

037*

*(.

234)

DW

Abs

olut

e1.

286

(.78

9)−1

.763

*(.

709)

1.94

6*(.

777)

1.32

4(.

731)

−2.0

78**

(.66

9)L

og li

kelih

ood

−244

.806

−186

.618

−274

.273

−237

.727

−262

.369

−199

.902

−261

.897

−238

.842

−262

.711

−249

.838

Pse

udo

R2

.013

.248

.039

.167

.020

.253

.003

.087

.004

.050

N39

739

741

641

639

139

142

842

738

938

8

Not

es:

Cel

l ent

ries

are

logi

t co

effici

ents

. Num

bers

in p

aren

thes

es a

re s

tand

ard

erro

rs.

**Si

gnifi

cant

at

.01;

* s

igni

fica

nt a

t .0

5.

Tab

le 7

.8In

crea

ses

in p

roba

bilit

ies

asso

ciat

ed w

ith

one

stan

dard

dev

iati

on i

ncre

ase

in i

ndep

ende

nt v

aria

bles

(vo

tes

on M

FN

ext

ensi

on t

oR

oman

ia, H

unga

ry, a

nd V

ietn

am)

Inde

pend

ent

vari

able

sR

oman

ia 1

979

Rom

ania

198

7H

unga

ry 1

989

Vie

tnam

199

9V

ietn

am 2

006

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Uni

on s

tren

gth

−.09

9−.

125

.083

Far

m e

mpl

oym

ent

Ret

ail/w

hole

sale

empl

oym

ent

Pre

side

nt’s

par

ty−.

527

.432

−.58

4−.

277

.246

DW

Abs

olut

e−.

071

.079

−.08

6

Not

es:

Onl

y si

gnifi

cant

coe

ffici

ents

are

rep

orte

d he

re.

granted only three years—as opposed to five years requested by PresidentBush—of MFN status to Hungary, a yea vote in this particular case can beviewed as a vote against MFN extension. Taken together, my findings aboutAbsolute DW Score in the five votes appear to provide rather weak supportfor my expectation that it will not have any significant impact on MFN votesinvolving these countries.

Party is consistently significant and has the largest impact in all five votes.Moreover, except for one vote (the 1987 vote on Romania), members of thepresident’s party are more likely to support their president’s position onMFN extension. Being a Democrat decreases the probability of voting forH.Res.317 (first Romania vote) and H.J.R.58 (Vietnam) by 0.527 and 0.277respectively. Being a Republican decreases the probability by 0.584 on theHungary vote but increases the probability by 0.217 on the 2006 Vietnamvote. As discussed shortly before, President George H. W. Bush originallyasked for five years of MFN extension for Hungary, but the final version ofHR 1594 granted only three years. Hence many Republicans may have votedagainst the final version of the bill out of loyalty to their president.

In the second Romania vote (i.e., Wolf Amendment), however, being aRepublican is actually positively associated with support for suspension ofthat country’s MFN status for six months. Many Republicans decided tooppose Reagan on this vote because of continuing human rights violations inRomania. That the amendment was introduced by a Republican (FrankWolf) speaks much about the prevailing sentiment among some Republicans.In fact, another Republican, Philip Crane, tried in vain in 1986 to reverseReagan’s decision to renew MFN status for Romania (CQ Almanac 1986:350–351).

By contrast, party has significant impact on seven of the ten China votes.Besides, members of the president’s party were actually more likely to voteagainst the president’s position on MFN in three China votes. Furthermore,only in the three years under Bush and the two years under Clinton (1993 and1999) did party have the largest impact. However, the impact of party onthese China votes is generally much smaller. Only in two China votes did themagnitude of party surpass 0.200 (in terms of probabilities), whereas themagnitude of party was bigger than 0.200 in all the five votes involvingHungary, Romania, and Vietnam. This comparison strongly suggests thatparty loyalty was stronger on MFN votes involving these three countries thanon MFN votes involving China.

To sum up, whereas the ideological ends were almost always united againstthe ideological middle when it comes to China, this coalition appeared lessfrequently in so far as the other six countries are concerned. Furthermore,constituency variables, particularly Union Strength, performed better intrade votes involving Japan, Canada, and Mexico than in those involvingChina. Finally, when it comes to extension of MFN, constituency variables—with the exception of Union Strength—often had much bigger impact onChina votes than on votes involving Hungary, Romania, and Vietnam. Even


though these findings provide only mixed support for my expectations, theynonetheless point to several key elements to be considered in a general theoryof congressional policy-making.

The first is the nature of political regime of a particular country. Being oneof the oldest democracies in the world and having been arguably the mostconsistent and powerful promoter of democracy, the U.S. has always had anatural affinity with democratic countries, but often animosity toward non-democratic ones. Congress, in particular, has often been regarded as theguardian of values-based U.S. foreign policy. Thus when members of Con-gress vote on trade legislation involving democratic countries (which oftenturn out to be U.S. allies), they are expected to focus almost exclusively oneconomic issues (e.g., jobs). By contrast, when a piece of trade legislationtargets a non-democratic country, particularly if it is a Communist one likeChina, additional considerations like human rights and anti-Communismmay enter into their voting decisions. Consequently, the impact of constitu-ency variables may be dampened in the latter case.

The second element is closely related to the first. When a single issue-dimension (economic or otherwise) dominates voting decisions, liberals andconservatives are expected to vote in opposite ways, as predicted by theconventional model of spatial voting. However, as the number of issuesincreases, as in the case of China, the opportunities for liberals and conserva-tives to form a coalition against the middle also increase. The former mayoppose trade with a foreign country on the ground of human rights orenvironmental concerns, and the latter on the ground of anti-Communism ornational security. In a word, it seems that an increase in the number of issuesin U.S. relations with a particular country will tend to increase the probabilityand intensity of what Nokken (2003) called EATM voting.

Finally, the nature and number of issues involved in U.S. relations withanother country can also affect the impact of party. Out of electoral con-siderations, members of the president’s party generally tend to be more sup-portive of his policy agenda than members of the opposition party, otherthings being equal. However, when a piece of legislation involves significantconstituency interests and when a president’s preferences differ significantlyfrom those of their constituents, members of Congress may be tempted todefect from their own president, as many Democrats did in the case of China.On the other hand, in the absence of clearly defined and immediate constitu-ency interests, as in the case of MFN extension to Hungary, Romania, andVietnam, members may be more likely to rally around their own president.


8 Conclusion

In every relationship between nations there is a horse and a rider, Bismarckonce noted, and one should endeavor to be the rider. American policy towardChina today almost guarantees that we will be the horse.

(Robert Kagan 1996)

Our separation of powers system, the powers that the Constitution confers onCongress, the campaign financing “system,” the existence of immigrant com-munities, and a variety of other factors guarantee that the legislative branchwill play a role on any major foreign policy issue and a number of minor onesas well.

(Richard Bush 2004: 220)

It is convenient when writing about Congress to treat the institution as amonolith. Yet Congress does not speak with a single voice, for its every actiontestifies to the ideological, partisan, regional, and personal divisions within it.Thus . . . it is worth remembering that any significant foreign policy debate onCapitol Hill features the clash of myriad ideas, interests, and perspectives.Congress is truly a they not an it.

(James Lindsay and Randall Ripley 1993: 18, italics original)

No scholar to my knowledge has applied the new institutionalism to thestudy of congressional policy-making toward China. Moreover, a few scholarshave conducted analyses of roll call voting on U.S.–China relations, but thescope and depth of these studies are rather limited. Last but not least, insteadof comparing roll call voting across different countries and issues, previousstudies tend to focus on what I called “country-blind” general legislation.This book is an attempt to make significant contributions to the three aspectsof research on congressional foreign policy-making.

Legislative institutions and their impact on China policy

Legislators are rational actors who have goals and preferences. Policy out-comes depend not only on what their goals and preferences are, but also how

these goals and preferences are aggregated into policy outcomes. I adducedample evidence that as processes of preference aggregation, committee struc-ture, bicameralism, and presidential veto have had profound impact onCongress’s China policy.

Because of gatekeeping rights, committees become monopoly supplier ofpolicy alternatives. That the vast majority of China bills died in committeesattests to the latter’s power to set the legislative agenda. The combination ofintense policy preferences and agenda-setting power enabled the chairmenof a number of committees and subcommittees—such as Craig Thomas,Benjamin Gilman, Max Baucus—to single-handedly decide the life-or-deathof China bills. Since most China bills contained punitive actions targetingChina, committees have served—at least from the perspective of those whoare interested in promoting friendly relations between the two countries—thepositive role of reducing potential disputes, conflicts, and confrontations inbilateral relations.

Structural differences between the two chambers guarantee that they moreoften than not disagree with each. And under bicameralism, it takes only onechamber to stall or kill a piece of legislation. In particular, the foundingfathers expected the Senate to be the counterweight to the more numericaland presumably more activist House. In the case of China policy, far moreChina bills were introduced and voted on in the House than in the Senate.Regardless of how active the lower chamber is, legislative productivity (e.g.,more binding legislation regarding China) will not increase unless the upperchamber becomes equally active and simultaneously agrees with policyproposals initiated by it.

The presidential veto poses another formidable obstacle to lawmaking.Fearful of the concentration of all powers within one branch, the consti-tutional framers set up a delicate system of separate branches sharing powers.To guarantee the institutional independence of each branch, they providedfor presidential veto and congressional override. However, the supermajorityrequirement for congressional override determines that the president as aunitary actor will almost always prevail against a lawmaking body composedof two chambers and 535 members. That President Bush’s three vetoes inChina policy were all sustained illuminates the impact of supermajorityrequirement on the legislative process.

It should be noted that the findings about the impact of legislative institu-tions are not unique to China—a country about which many membersof Congress have intense preferences—but represent the general patternsof congressional policy-making. That is, most bills are never reported out ofcommittees; the House is legislatively more active than the Senate; andpresidential vetoes are almost always sustained. While each of these threelegislative institutions constitutes a formidable hurdle to lawmaking, theycombine to make it extremely difficult, if not altogether impossible, for legis-lators to transform their policy preferences (domestic or foreign) into desiredpolicy outcomes. This is true even in the case of China, which provides fertile

Conclusion 143

ground for legislative action due to the myriad issues like Tiananmen, humanrights, weapons proliferations, and astronomical trade deficit.

The international environment and Congress’s China policy

Even though the international environment—broadly defined to include bothinternational balance of power at a particular moment and discrete inter-national events—is not the focus of this study, it apparently had decisiveimpact on certain aspects of Congress’s China policy. During the latter partof the Cold War, the U.S. forged a temporary, strategic alliance with Chinaagainst the former Soviet Union. Primarily out of strategic concerns, Congresslargely exempted China from its worldwide campaign for human rights, des-pite widespread reports of human rights violations in that country. As Kagan(1996) put it: “In such a world, the strategic value of American rapprochementand then partnership with a Communist China seemed to outweigh the sacri-fice of American ideals such a relationship required.”

Two events fundamentally changed the strategic relationship between theU.S. and China. The first was the Tiananmen Incident, which plunged therelationship into an abyss. It dashed any hope members of Congress mayhave had about a politically reformed China. It also significantly reduced thestrategic value of China to the U.S., because China now became a strategicliability in a world characterized by increasing democratization. Above all, ithanded Congress a carte blanche to rewrite U.S. China policy, particularlyhuman rights policy that had heretofore been subordinated to strategicconsiderations.

The second event was the demise of the former Soviet Union, whichdeprived the U.S.–China relationship of its strategic rationale. “The collapse ofthe Soviet Union and its Communist empire swept away the original founda-tion on which the Sino-American rapprochement was built in the early1970s,” declared Kagan (1996). For members of Congress, the end of theCold War means that they no longer made China policy in a straitjacket andhence could legislate on a number of issues—human rights being the mostprominent—that were otherwise ignored during the strategic marriage.

The Cold War also affected U.S.–Taiwan policy. From the 1970s until the1980s, when the strategic alliance with China was deemed crucial, Congressdownplayed the military, political, and historical ties between the U.S. andTaiwan. When the U.S. decided to recognize China and to terminate itsdiplomatic relationship with Taiwan, Congress did make earnest attempts tokeep U.S.–Taiwan relationship intact, as evidenced by the Taiwan RelationsAct (Javits 1981; Sutter 1983; Tierney 1979). Nonetheless, it is not a dis-tortion of history to say that Congress opposed not so much U.S. recognitionof China as the cost of recognition. And in the 1980s, Congress largelyexcluded itself from Taiwan policy, raising little objection to the 1982 armssales communiqué.

If the U.S.–China alliance against the Soviet Union necessitated setting

144 Conclusion

aside the sentimental ties between the U.S. and Taiwan, the disappearance ofthe common enemy entailed readjustment of Taiwan policy. Bush’s decisionto sell 150 F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan in 1992 despite Beijing’s vehementopposition can be viewed as part of the readjustment. As Mann (1999: 269)observed, “It [sales of F-16] illustrated, more than any other event of theearly 1990s, how the end of the Cold War had altered the relationshipbetween the United States and China.” Meanwhile, Taiwan’s transformationfrom an authoritarian regime to a prosperous democracy also called forreadjustment of U.S. policy. In so far as Congress is concerned, the readjust-ment is embodied, among other things, in the Murkowski Amendment, LeeTeng-hui’s visit to Cornell, the U.S.–Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile MutualDefense Act, and the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (see Bush 2001,2004; Mann 2001).

Determinants of roll call voting on foreign policy

Partisanship

Partisanship in Congress has two dimensions. On the one hand, partisanshipmeans loyalty to the president of one’s own party, for the president is bydefault the leader of his party and his leadership extends to the legislativearena. Party loyalty entails supporting the president’s policy agenda regardlessof one’s own preferences. On the other hand, partisanship also meanselectorally-induced inter-party differences. Because of electoral competitionand historical circumstances, the two parties have developed relatively stableand usually distinct positions on a number of issues, and these party positionsgenerally reflect the preferences of their respective electoral bases. Whenmembers take positions along party lines defined by electoral competition, itcan also be viewed as partisanship.

My analysis indicates that both dimensions of partisanship influencedCongress’s China policy. The three failed attempts to override Bush’s vetoesvividly illustrate Republican loyalty to President Bush. While Democratsoverwhelmingly voted for the override, most Republicans voted against itdespite their serious misgivings about Bush’s China policy (see CQWR 1990:245; CQWR 1992: 1594; Friedman 1990; Yang 2000: 90–111). In fact, manyRepublicans first voted for the three bills that Bush later vetoed. I alsoreported evidence that Republicans were significantly more likely to voteagainst MFN revocation during the Bush years. Democrats rallied aroundClinton during his first year in office. After that, they showed little loyalty totheir president. Between 1997 and 1999, they were actually more likely to voteagainst their president on the MFN issue. In 2000, they were again morelikely to vote against Clinton on the PNTR issue. On balance, then, partyloyalty appeared to be stronger among Republicans than among Democrats.

The flip side of rallying around one’s president is that the majority partyhas political incentives to embarrass the president of the minority party. I

Conclusion 145

reported evidence that Democrats were significantly more likely to vote forMFN revocation under Bush. I also found that more China bills were intro-duced when a Republican majority in the House faced a Democratic Presi-dent. Meanwhile, scholars who studied U.S.–China relations in the late 1940sadduced evidence that the Republican majority criticized President Truman’sChina policy primarily because of partisan considerations (Grasso 1987;Rourke 1983: 74–76, 13–45; Tsou 1963; Tucker 1983, 1994; Westerfield 1955:Chapter 12, Chapter 16). Thus for both Republicans and Democrats, purepartisanship appears to have influenced their approaches to China policy.

When members voted in 2000 on the bill to grant China PNTR, inter-partydifference in trade policy, not loyalty to one’s president, seemed to be thedecisive factor, since Democrats were actually more likely to vote against thebill (hence against their own president) than Republicans. Yet a few yearsbefore the PNTR vote, Democrats in both chambers were more supportive ofGATT than their Republican counterparts (Bailey and Brady 1998; Gartzkeand Wrighton 1998). The context of the PNTR vote (i.e., the last year of theClinton presidency) and the soaring trade deficit with China help explain whymany Democrats decided to abandon their president and instead vote accord-ing to their party’s traditional stance on trade.

It is hard to distinguish the two dimensions of partisanship in roll call voteson the two bills that aimed to strengthen U.S.–Taiwan relations. On the onehand, since the late 1940s, Republicans in general have been steadfast intheir support for Taiwan. Democrats, by contrast, have generally been morecautious in their approach to U.S.–Taiwan relations. In fact, they were highlycritical of Taiwan’s authoritarian regime and played an important role inbringing about political reform on the island in the 1980s. Even thoughTaiwan’s appeal to Democrats has increased considerably since it trans-formed itself into a fledgling democracy in the 1990s, Republicans still appearto be more supportive of the island. On the other hand, Republicans becameextremely active in Taiwan policy after they secured majority party status inCongress in 1994. It seems likely that Republicans used the Taiwan issue as apolitical weapon to beat President Clinton.

Ideology

Because the commonly used measures of ideology (e.g., hawkishness or DW-NOMINATE score) usually have high correlation with party, I did notinclude any of them in my analysis, except in the case of Taiwan policy whereI included hawkishness. Not surprisingly, hawkishness turned out to be highlysignificant while party had no impact at all. Since most previous studiesincluded both party and a similar measure of ideology, this may explain whythey reported ideology to be the best predictor of foreign policy voting (e.g.,Bozeman and James 1975; Cobb 1969; Leogrande and Brenner 1993; Lindsay1990; Ray 1981; Wayman 1985).

Instead, I used the absolute value of DW-NOMINATE score. My expectation

146 Conclusion

was that since both liberals and conservatives had good reasons to be criticalof China, they should be united on China policy. As expected, the ideologicalends were more likely to vote against PNTR and to support revocation ofChina’s MFN status. What’s more, the strength of this coalition steadilyincreased over time on the MFN issue. I contended that China’s growingmilitary and economic power, its potential threat to Taiwan, and the soaringU.S. trade deficit with China, among other factors, made both liberals andconservatives increasingly uneasy about U.S.–China relations, thence thegrowing strength of the coalition.

My findings provide further support for Nokken’s (2003) thesis of EATMvoting (i.e., the ideological ends against the middle). However, Nokkenattributed EATM voting to the special rules governing MFN renewal, and hereported decreasing EATM voting in the case of the PNTR vote where thespecial rules were removed. By contrast, I argued that the peculiar nature ofU.S.–China relations was responsible for the emergence of such a coalition,and I reported evidence of increasing EATM voting between 1994 and 1999on the MFN votes. But I did find decreasing EATM voting between the 1999MFN vote and the 2000 PNTR vote.

Constituency interests

Despite the strong economic ties between the U.S. and China, constituencyinterests generally had only weak impact on members’ votes. Union Strengthhad significant impact in only one model, and Retail/Wholesale Employmentin only four of the ten MFN votes. Two constituency variables performedrather well. Exports to China was negatively associated with support forstrong U.S.–Taiwan relations but positively associated with support forPNTR. Farm Employment was positively associated with support for PNTRbut negatively associated with support for strong U.S.–Taiwan relations. Ineight out of the ten MFN votes, Farm Employment was negatively associatedwith support for MFN revocation.

My findings about Farm Employment illuminates a key challenge toCongress in its campaign for human rights, namely, how to balance humanrights with competing interests. The record of Congress’s human rights policyclearly suggests that with few exceptions, human rights has been subordinatedto other interests (Avery and Forsythe 1979; Cohen 1987; Dittmer 2001;Forsythe 1988; Neier 1996). Whereas during the Cold War strategic andsecurity concerns effectively killed most congressional initiatives in humanrights, since the end of the Cold War human rights has often been down-played or sacrificed by many members for the sake of economic benefits(Neier 1996).

Despite strong economic ties between the U.S. and Taiwan since the late1970s and the millions (and sometimes billions) of dollars worth of annualweapons sales to the island, neither Exports to Taiwan nor Military Awardshad any impact on members’ votes. It seems probable that the dominance of

Conclusion 147

strategic and ideological considerations in U.S.–Taiwan relations have over-shadowed economic ties. On the other hand, this finding is entirely consistentwith previous studies, most of which reported little or no evidence of con-stituency influence on defense policy (e.g., Bozeman and James 1975; Cobb1969; Lindsay 1990; Ray 1981; Wayman 1985).

In order to find out whether these findings are unique to China or representa general pattern of congressional roll call voting on foreign policy, I alsoanalyzed roll call votes on six countries that are similar to China in relevantrespects: trade for Japan, Canada, and Mexico, and MFN extension forRomania, Hungary, and Vietnam. A comparison of findings from these sixcountries with those from China suggests a theory of roll call voting ondifferent countries.

One component of this theory is the political regime of a particular country.Being a democracy itself, the U.S. usually has close diplomatic, political, andmilitary ties with democratic countries. Consequently, when members ofCongress vote on trade legislation involving democratic countries, they tendto focus on a single dimension—i.e., the economic impact—of the pend-ing legislation. In one-dimensional politics, liberals and conservatives arenot expected to form a coalition. By contrast, when members consider tradelegislation involving non-democratic countries like China, they are likely toconsider not only economic issues, but also ideological and/or strategicissues. As the number of issues increases, the opportunities for liberals andconservatives to form a coalition also increase. For a liberal may oppose thelegislation from one perspective and a conservative from another perspective.In other words, in a multi-dimensional world the conventional model ofspatial voting may not work. And statistical findings provide support for thisexpectation. Whereas the ideological ends were almost always united inChina policy, this coalition appeared far less frequently on votes involving thesix countries.

Second, the nature of political regime may also affect the impact of con-stituency interests. When a trade bill targets a democratic country, membersare expected to focus on economic issues. As a result, constituency interestsshould be particularly salient to them. When deciding on trade legislationinvolving non-democratic countries, they will likely consider not only theeconomic dimension, but also the ideological and/or strategic dimension ofthat legislation, and the latter may well dampen the effects of the former. Iadduced evidence that Union Strength, which is a measure of constituencyinterests in foreign trade, did not have any significant impact on the vote onChina’s PNTR, but it had significant impact on the two votes on U.S.–Japantrade and the vote on U.S.–Mexico trade.

Finally, the magnitude of constituency interests can also affect party loyalty.Out of electoral considerations, the president’s fellow partisans generallytend to be more supportive of his policy agenda than members of the oppo-sition party, other things being equal. However, when a piece of legislationinvolves significant constituency interests and when a president’s preferences

148 Conclusion

differ significantly from those of their constituents, members of Congressmay be tempted to defect from their own president, as many Democrats didin the case of China. On the other hand, in the absence of clearly defined andsignificant constituency interests, as in the case of MFN extension to Hungary,Romania, and Vietnam, members may be more likely to rally around theirown president. In fact, except for the 1987 vote on Romania’s MFN status,members of the president’s party were consistently more likely to support hisposition than members of the opposition party, controlling for other factors.

Yet it should be pointed out that it is impossible to control for politicalregime in roll call analysis. Besides, it is very difficult to measure the numberof issues involved in a piece of legislation or in U.S. relations with anothercountry. Even if this is plausible, the various measures may be so highlycorrelated as to make statistical inference problematic. Historical-comparativeanalysis based on qualitative evidence offers one potential solution to the twoproblems. Regardless, my analysis makes a small but important step in buildinga theory of congressional policy-making.

Policy implications

Now what are the implications of my study for policy-makers in Beijing andWashington? More specifically, what they should and should not do withrespect to Congress in order to successfully manage and promote this import-ant but highly controversial relationship?

Focus on the Senate

First and foremost, American and Chinese policy-makers interested in pro-moting friendly U.S.–China relations should perhaps deemphasize the Houseand instead focus their efforts on the Senate. Under bicameralism, it takesonly one chamber to paralyze the legislative process. While it may seemlogical to work on the more activist House, such an endeavor is inherentlymuch more difficult given the size of the House. The Senate, by contrast, ismuch smaller in size and hence more manageable. More importantly, becauseof the important foreign policy powers granted by the Constitution (e.g.,ambassadorial appointments and treaty ratification), the six-year tenure, andlarger constituency, Senators tend to have a broader view of U.S. foreignpolicy than their House counterparts. As a result, the Senate can be arestraining force against the more activist and parochially-oriented House.

Indeed, by refusing to act on House-passed bills, the Senate has effectivelyprevented many China bills from becoming binding legislation that wouldhave either caused disputes in U.S.–China relations or embroiled the presidentand Congress in a tussle over China policy. However, as Fenno (1982: 5)pointed out, “The Senate is as likely to initiate heatedly as the House; theHouse is as likely to be the cooling saucer as the Senate.” Indeed, a handful ofSenators like Jesse Helms were among the most vocal critics of China and

Conclusion 149

were unusually active in China policy. Most recently, Senators LindseyGraham and Charles Schumer have introduced bills to impose stiff tariff onChinese imports unless the latter appreciates its allegedly undervalued cur-rency (see Andrews 2006; Blustein 2006a, 2006b; MacLeod 2006; Magnierand Lee 2006). But in general, senators have been much less active than theHouse in China policy. Therefore, American and Chinese officials interestedin promoting friendly bilateral relations should spend more time cultivatinggood will among Senators so as to check House activism and punitivism.

Don’t overreact to partisan bickering over China policy

The Chinese should recognize that electoral dynamics in a competitive two-party system will inevitably have some impact on foreign policy. Indeed,throughout the history of U.S.–China relations both parties have used Chinapolicy on various occasions as a partisan club to beat the other. Back in the late1940s, the newly empowered Republican majority launched bitter criticism ofTruman’s China policy in the hope of defeating him in 1948. In the aftermathof Tiananmen, Democrats mercilessly attacked George H. W. Bush’s Chinapolicy and voted overwhelmingly to override his three vetoes.1 When Clintontook office, the majority of Democrats immediately switched position andvoted for unconditional MFN renewal. After Republicans became the major-ity in 1995, they launched incessant criticism of Clinton’s engagement policy.With its rising economic and military power and the myriad potential chal-lenges that China’s rise poses to U.S. strategic interests, China is likely to be afavorite topic for partisan politics, especially when there are high-impactevents such as the 1995–1996 missile crisis and the plane collision in 2001.

Yet the key thing to bear in mind is that partisan politics, by definition, isdriven primarily by electoral competition—to embarrass and defeat theincumbent president or the majority party—and only secondarily by genuinepolicy concerns. This is true for China policy as well. Democrats attackedBush in 1992, but they voiced little criticism of Clinton whose China policywas not much different from that of his predecessor. Republicans tried todismantle Clinton’s engagement policy through high-profile investigations ofalleged Chinese campaign donations, nuclear thefts, and threats to Taiwan,yet they did not challenge George W. Bush who followed largely the samepolicy of engagement. The two examples also illuminate an important point:regardless of their campaign speeches, presidents eventually adopt a policy ofengagement with China, and his fellow partisans in Congress almost alwaysdefer to him out of party loyalty.

In conclusion, it is not only futile but also counterproductive for the Chineseto launch a diatribe against each and every China policy initiative motivatedby party politics. It is futile because partisan politics is inherent to theAmerican two-party system. It is counterproductive because members ofCongress will probably regard such rhetorical aggressiveness as further proofof Chinese intransigence and ill will.

150 Conclusion

Keep low key on Taiwan

Taiwan has been the central issue in U.S.–China relations, and Congress hasbeen most outspoken in its support for Taiwan due to historical ties, ideo-logical beliefs, partisan motives, and genuine policy concerns. The strength ofcongressional support for Taiwan will likely increase as the island becomes aprosperous democracy and China remains under Communist one-party rule.Moreover, it seems very unlikely that Congress will sacrifice Taiwan on thealtar of U.S.–China economic relations, despite the growing importance ofthe latter. This is especially true for Republicans who have been consistentlysupportive of strong U.S.–Taiwan relations (and hawkish foreign policy forthat matter) and close U.S.–China economic ties (and free trade in general) atthe same time. Consequently, the Chinese should not use bilateral economicrelations to leverage congressional concessions on Taiwan policy.

In a word, the Chinese should never underestimate Congress’s commitmentto Taiwan. It appears that the best strategy for the Chinese is to keep a lowkey on Taiwan policy and wait for the U.S. executive branch to rein in thepro-Taiwan Congress. So far the executive branch has been largely successfulin getting Congress on board a policy that accommodates most of China’sdemands on Taiwan, e.g., the three communiqués and Clinton’s “Three Nos.”When China was openly belligerent in its Taiwan policy, as it was in themissile exercises in 1995–1996 and the passage of the Anti-Secession Law in2006, Congress became even more adamant in its support for Taiwan.

For their part, members of Congress should never underestimate theimportance of the Taiwan issue in Chinese domestic politics and henceBeijing’s determination to use whatever means necessary to keep the islandfrom becoming an independent entity. Since one of the cornerstones of theChinese Communist Party’s legitimacy is national reunification, any move byTaiwan toward de facto or de jure independence will be resolutely counteredby the Communist Party. Moreover, Taiwan has become the single issuearound which almost all Chinese are unified, and Chinese nationalism,whether spontaneous or manipulated by the government, has grown in pro-portion with China’s economic and military power. The immense popularityof books advocating hard-line foreign policy toward the U.S. illuminates, tosome degree, popular support for reunification of Taiwan (e.g., Peng 1996;Song 1996, 1997). Thus Congress should be cautious in its approach to Taiwanif it does not intend to involve the U.S. in an armed conflict in the TaiwanStrait.

Non-confrontational approaches to human rights

Human rights, particularly when it is narrowly defined to include onlypolitical rights like freedom of speech, freedom of press, and religious free-dom, lies at the heart of the American creed; it is what Americans fought forin the Independence War and what America stands for. As such, members of

Conclusion 151

Congress have strong incentives to be viewed as champions of Americanpolitical values. On the other hand, unless there are major human rights criseslike the Tiananmen Incident or pressure from ethnic groups, human rightswill not be a salient issue to most Americans most of the time.2 The twofactors together suggest that human rights is a position-taking issue for mostmembers. It never hurts to speak in support of human rights or to vote forbills criticizing authoritarian regimes.3

What this means is that the Chinese, with their myriad human rights prob-lems, should expect incessant criticism from members of Congress. If theywant to avoid such criticism, then they should implement more politicalreform and, whenever possible, should engage congressional critics in humanrights talks. VIP visits of congressional delegations to China, whether organ-ized by Beijing or U.S. domestic groups, are not likely to have much impacton members’ human rights stances.4 These visits have so far “reinforcedcongressional support for continued trade relations and other economicexchanges with China,” but have had “less effect on congressional criticismof China regarding human rights” (Sutter 2001: 92).

On the other hand, the good news is that rhetoric aside, many membershave subscribed to the view, either out of constituency economic stakes inU.S.–China relations or out of policy beliefs, that the best way to promotehuman rights in China is through trade. These members (e.g., Max Baucusand Craig Thomas) played a pivotal role in keeping China’s MFN status andin the passage of HR 4444. Outright denial of human rights problems, theuse of political prisoners as bargaining chips, or denunciation of Americanhypocrisy will in all likelihood alienate these key members supportive ofengagement with China and harden the animosity of China critics. In a word,the Chinese should improve their own human rights conditions, engagein constructive talks with congressional critics, and remain optimistic thatCongress will not sacrifice economic relations on the altar of human rights.

In so far as Congress is concerned, the best strategy to promote humanrights in China should be one of private and soft talk, not public confrontationor economic sanctions. The Dalai Lama, widely regarded as the symbol ofChinese human rights oppression in Tibet, made this point quite clear:

I feel that on issues such as human rights and religious freedom, it isbetter to engage Chinese leaders directly, without public condemna-tion. . . . Once you state a critical view publicly, then the Chinese gov-ernment, even if it wants to change, would find it more difficult.

(quoted in Lampton 2001: 111)

Senator Max Baucus (1994a) also supported “non-confrontational ways topromote human rights.” He wrote, “Angry speeches and stormy meetingsget headline. But working at local levels—teaching individuals about law,communications, foreign languages, helping them understand the worldbetter—does much more.”

152 Conclusion

The failure of conditional MFN proves the futility of economic sanctionsto achieve human rights goals. “Economic levers were often effective tools toachieve economic ends and sanctions sometimes were useful in achievingnonproliferation objectives; however, such measures were least effective inthe domain of individual rights,” concluded Lampton (2001: 112). Thereluctance of American allies like Japan and the European Union to jump onthe bandwagon makes economic sanctions an ineffective tool. To quoteLampton (ibid.: 154) again, “using economic threats to achieve human rightsobjectives can create so much collateral damage to allies and nationalisticbacklash among those you are seeking to assist that sanctions become dem-onstrably counterproductive.”

Play the constituency card

Policy-makers in Beijing should recognize that since the end of the Cold Warera, bilateral relationship has been built primarily upon mutual economicbenefits and only secondarily on strategic cooperation. And on economicissues, U.S. politicians are usually highly responsive to constituency demandsdue to the electoral connection. As Nivola (1997: 255) wrote, “The nation’seconomic fortunes, or those of particular firms and workers, were seldomvery far from the minds of politicians, even during the darkest days of theCold War, and surely no realistic observer can expect them to be ‘subordin-ated’ today.”

As bilateral trade keeps expanding and mutual investment continues togrow, the Chinese should learn to play the constituency card. That is, theyshould highlight the economic benefits of bilateral relations to the Americanpeople in general and members’ constituents in particular. It is one thing toplace billions of dollars worth of purchase orders as gestures of good willevery time the top Chinese leadership visits the U.S., and it is quite another toorganize PR campaigns to tout the benefits of such orders to certain members’districts. If the Taiwanese, despite the much smaller volume of their tradewith the U.S., have gone to great lengths to publicize constituency benefitsfrom trade with Taiwan, then the Chinese have no excuse to be sluggish insuch PR campaigns.5

Yet the Chinese should not only learn to play the constituency card, butalso beef up lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill in general. The influence of theTaiwan lobby should have long since galvanized the Chinese into action. AsSciolino (1996) pointed out, “On this battlefield, however, even a nuclearpower of 1.2 billion people and the fastest-growing economy in the world isno match for a small island of 20 million inhabitants that has assiduouslyworked Washington for decades.” “It’s hard to think of anybody who doesthis kind of thing [lobbying] worse,” said Stanley Roth, a former senior Asiaspecialist during Clinton years (quoted in ibid.). “The fact that China doesnot have an active lobby in this town or does not have a lobby is a ter-rible oversight,” lamented Charles Freeman, a former assistant U.S. Trade

Conclusion 153

Representative (quoted in Ma 2006). “The lack of active lobbying had madeit hard for Beijing to counter the rise of China-bashing ahead of the mid-termelections,” he added.

These Washington insiders’ comments indicate the urgency for the Chineseto develop and maintain an effective lobby on Capitol Hill, especially con-sidering that American businesses stopped lobbying on China’s behalf afterthe latter’s accession to the WTO in 2000. In addition to organizing VIP tripsor lobbying on a case-by-case basis, the Chinese should do what Stanley Rothsuggested: “compete in the realm of ideas . . . [and] recognize that the key tolobbying is education over time” (quoted in Sciolino 1996). In light of theideological and political divide between the two countries, the myriad disputeson a wide range of issues, and the prevailing attitude toward China on CapitolHill, the Chinese should be well prepared for the amount of time andresources needed to cultivate good will among members of Congress. Lastbut not least, the Chinese should avoid another Donorgate and instead lobbywithin the American legal boundaries. Otherwise, their lobbying will beviewed as invidious efforts by a foreign government to buy influence inWashington, which in turn could add fuel to congressional activism in Chinapolicy.

A look into the future

Having analyzed the past, it is time to pause for a moment and look ahead atthe future of U.S.–China relations and the prospective role Congress will playin China policy. A number of factors determine that Congress will almostcertainly continue to be an active and influential player in the development ofan important relationship that is fraught with controversies and challenges.

The end of the Cold War has had and will continue to have significantimpact on U.S.–China relations. During the latter part of the Cold War, theU.S. and China “were drawn together almost exclusively for strategic neces-sity,” despite the crucial fact that the two countries “didn’t possess a commonideology, or similar political or economic systems, or shared cultural tradi-tions” (Ross 1998: viii). As Mann (1999: 8) perceptively wrote, “The relation-ship between the United States and China established by Nixon, Kissinger,and their successors [was] a strategic marriage of convenience and the classicexample of Kissinger’s obsession with geopolitics.” The end of the Cold Warand the overwhelming dominance of the U.S. in the post-Cold War worldlargely eliminated the strategic rationale underlying U.S.–China relationship.To be sure, the U.S. still needs Chinese cooperation on a variety of issues ofgrave concern to Americans—stability in Asia, nuclear non-proliferation,environmental protection, and the war on terrorism—but Chinese cooper-ation is by no means as urgent as it was back in the Cold War. As a result, theU.S. is much less likely to compromise—on Taiwan or human rights—for thesake of Chinese cooperation.

More importantly, with its fast-growing economy, enormous population,

154 Conclusion

and increasingly modernized military, China has become, in the eyes of manyAmerican scholars and policy-makers, the major rival of the U.S. in theimmediate future (e.g., Bernstein and Munro 1997; Gertz 2000; Kaplan 2005;U.S. Department of Defense 2006).6 The soaring U.S. trade deficit withChina, the 1995–1996 missile crisis, the airplane collision in 2001 all appear tojustify the thesis of China threat. As a result, in the foreseeable futureU.S.–China relations will probably be characterized by mutual suspicion andoccasional open confrontation on the one hand, and mutual cooperation on anumber of issues on the other.

In so far as Congress is concerned, the absence of overriding nationalsecurity concerns and the dominance of non-security issues like trade inU.S.–China relations in the post-Cold War world give it a much bigger role toplay in China policy. Congress is more likely to start its own China policyinitiatives or to challenge the president’s policies. Lampton thus described thechanging executive-legislative dynamics in the post-Cold War world:

The U.S. Constitution vests Congress with significant powers in the tradearea (e.g., to set tariff levels). In contrast, when security is the dominantconcern, as it was during the cold war, constitutional prerogatives andthe need for quick response favor presidential dominance. Thus, movingfrom a security-centered to an economics-centered relationship withBeijing put the relationship more substantially into the congressionaldomain.

(Lampton 2001: 116)

More specifically, as the breadth and depth of economic cooperation betweenthe two countries keep growing, Congress will in all likelihood be moreinvolved in trade policy due to constituent influence. On the one hand, thereprobably will be more Graham-Schumer-type initiatives to address the eco-nomic woes of certain constituencies. On the other hand, the beneficiaries ofgrowing economic interdependence will almost certainly fight to maintainand promote their interests. If the past is any indication of the future, freetrade supporters, backed by the White House, may successfully preventCongress from taking any major legislative action restricting the flow ofgoods, technology, and people across the Pacific.

Human rights will undoubtedly remain a major source of disputes inbilateral relations. Wrote former Congressman Lee Hamilton (1996),“Human rights will remain, for the immediate future, a problem of specialurgency in our relations with China.” For one thing, the Tiananmen Incident,as the enduring symbol of China’s human rights, will continue to motivatemany members of Congress to champion human rights progress in China. AsSuettinger (2003: 414) noted, “Tiananmen will endure as a subject of conten-tion between the United States and China, at least as a subtext of otherissues, particularly human rights.” For another, there are still many humanrights problems in China that need to be addressed (e.g., U.S. Department of

Conclusion 155

State 2005, 2006). Unless there is solid evidence indicating significant progressin human rights in China, congressional attitudes toward China will remainhighly critical.

In so far as Taiwan is concerned, Congress will almost certainly continue tobe its most powerful and most reliable supporter. China’s growing militarypower and its potential threat to U.S. interests in East Asia will be a majorfactor behind congressional support for strong U.S.–Taiwan relations. Anequally, if not more, important factor is Taiwan’s democratic system. As longas Taiwan remains a prosperous democracy, Congress has little reason toquestion or suspend its long-time commitment to the island. On the otherhand, Taiwan’s democratization can also be a liability to Congress. Domesticpolitics in Taiwan may force Taiwanese leaders to adopt certain policies thatare unpalatable to Beijing, and if Congress throws itself firmly behind suchleaders, confrontations between Beijing and Washington will likely ensue.The 1995–1996 missile crises illuminate the real danger of unconditionalcongressional support for Taiwan.

Thus it seems that Congress will most likely remain active and influential inChina policy in the foreseeable future. However, institutional structures andprocedures as well as the electoral connection almost guarantee that Congressmay not succeed in bringing about major policy shifts in China policy.Instead, it will probably be most successful in influencing the agenda of U.S.China policy. That is, members of Congress will be mostly concerned with

highlighting the misdeeds, falsehoods, and shortcomings of the PRCregime, faulting the president’s policies for not being able to changeChina’s behavior patterns, preventing significant improvement in bilateralties without certain conditions being met, and forcing the administration’sattention on Taiwan or Tibet.

(Suettinger 2003, 328–329)

156 Conclusion

AppendixSources

Source of China bills and coding scheme

I identified China bills from Thomas, the online database of legislative infor-mation from the Library of Congress (http://www.thomas.loc.gov). All theChina bills were retrieved between December 17 and 19, 2006. Thomas allowssearches for bill summary and status from the 93rd Congress (1973–1974)until the most recent Congress. For each bill, Thomas lists its chief sponsor(s)and co-sponsor(s), the committee(s) to which the bill was referred, the latestlegislative action on the bill, and a summary of the bill by the CongressionalResearch Service.

I checked the accuracy of Thomas using statistics on legislative activitypublished in Congress and the Nation. Thomas reports the number of concur-rent resolutions, resolutions, joint resolutions, bills, and amendments (start-ing from the 97th Congress) introduced in each Congress. I added up all typesof bills (except amendments because Congress and the Nation does not reportamendments) to arrive at a total number of bills for each Congress. Then Icompared them with statistics from Congress and the Nation. For nine Con-gresses, the two sources do not comport with each other, but the discrepancyis so small as to be insignificant. That is, for eight Congresses the discrepancyis less than 10 bills, and only 101st Congress has a discrepancy of 37 bills.Meanwhile, the average number of bills in each Congress is around 13,600. Ina word, it seems safe for me to use Thomas as the sole source of China bills.

Using keyword search (i.e., China, Chinese, Taiwan, Taiwanese), I identi-fied 875 China bills between 1973 and 2006. Table A.1 illustrates my codingscheme. The cells are by no means exhaustive; they merely illustrate the majorissues that these China bills address.

Sources of other quantitative data

Favorability rating

Favorability rating has probably the longest time series in surveys. The majorsurvey houses across the nation have fielded such questions with slightly

Table A.1 Examples of coding of China bills

Policy type Specific issues

Taiwan 1. Support Taiwan’s membership in international organizations2. Urge arms sales to Taiwan3. Demand peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue4. Declare U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security and democracy5. Allow Taiwanese officials to visit the U.S.6. Advocate official relations with Taiwan7. Authorize negotiation or conclusion of commercial treaties with

Taiwan8. Repeal the Formosa Resolution9. Criticize Taiwan’s human rights

Generictrade

1. Prohibit importation of certain goods from China2. Prohibit Export-Import Bank from extending credit to exports to

China3. Impose quota on Chinese products4. Authorize negotiation or conclusion of trade agreements with China5. Establish agencies to promote U.S.–China trade6. Reduce tariffs on certain Chinese exports

MFN 1. Deny MFN to China2. Attach conditions to MFN renewal3. Extend MFN to China

WTO 1. Attach conditions to China’s WTO2. Withdraw China’s WTO membership if it attacks Taiwan3. Call for U.S. approval of China’s admission to WTO

GenericHumanRights

1. Call for release of religious prisoners2. Call for release of political prisoners3. Demand progress in human rights4. Sponsor resolutions criticizing China’s human rights at the UN

Tibet 1. Criticize China’s Tibet policy2. Support Dalai Lama3. Establish agencies for Tibetan affairs

UNPFfunding

Prohibit or withdraw funding for UNPF unless it ceases its operationsin China

Tiananmen 1. Condemn Tiananmen crackdown2. Support student activists3. Commemorate Tiananmen4. Give Chinese students special immigration status

Exportcontrol

1. Prohibit U.S. satellites from being launched on Chinese vehicles2. Deny licenses to exports to China3. Prohibit the transfer of certain technologies4. Place arms embargo on China5. Criticize China’s alleged transfer of missile and nuclear technology

to Middle East countries6. Prescribe punishment if China violates non-proliferation regimes7. Treat China more favorably than other “controlled countries”8. Shorten review period for license application9. Allow third countries to export high-tech products to China

158 Appendix: Sources

different wording and response categories. The questions usually have eitherfour response categories—“very favorable,” “mostly favorable,” “mostlyunfavorable,” and “very unfavorable,” or a 10-point-scale running from +5to −5. A third type of questions has three categories—“generally favorable,”“generally unfavorable,” and “neutral.” Hirshberg (1993) was among the firstto collect and organize data on American public’s favorability rating ofChina. His data covered 1954–1991, and most of the questions in his datahave 10-point-scale response categories.

I selected the first two types of questions, i.e., four-category and 10-pointscale questions. I collapsed “very favorable” and “mostly favorable” into“favorable,” and “very unfavorable” and “mostly unfavorable” into“unfavorable.” For those 10-point scale questions, I collapsed + 1 to +5 into“favorable” and −1 to −5 into “unfavorable.” I used the percentage of Ameri-cans having favorable opinion of China as the measure of favorability. Foryears in which multiple survey houses asked the same questions, I take theaverage of the percentages. For missing years, I take the average of the previ-ous and following year’s percentages. I updated Hirshberg’s data by includingmore recent data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research avail-able online at www.lexisnexis.com. For exact question wording, see T. Xie(2004: Appendix 1) and Hirshberg (1993: 249–250).

Ideology

DW-NOMINATE score: www.voteview.com.Hawkishness: The Center for Security Policy.

Constituency variables

Union Strength, Farm Employment, and Retail/Wholesale Employment(before 1998): Adler, E. Scott. “Congressional District Data File, [congres-sional term].” University of Colorado, Boulder, CO.

Farm Employment and Retail/Wholesale Employment (after 1999): I usedthe 2000 Census CDs at the Government Section of Northwestern UniversityLibrary to arrive at the percentages.

Foreignassistance

1. Deny or reduce foreign assistance to China2. Prohibit international institutions from giving loans to China3. Authorize foreign assistance to China by U.S. or international

agencies

Other 1. Any combination of the above policies2. Establish agencies or commissions to carry out China policy3. Appropriate funds for these agencies4. Establish exchange programs5. Furnish assistance to express condolence to Chinese victims of

natural disasters6. Deny visas to Chinese officials

Appendix: Sources 159

Union Strength (after 1999): Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson,“Union Membership and Coverage Database from the Current PopulationSurvey: Note,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 56, No. 2, January2003, pp. 349–354.

State Export to China: Office of Trade and Industry Information, Manu-facturing and Services, International Trade Administration, U.S. Departmentof Commerce.

Military Awards: U.S. Department of Defense, Atlas/Data Abstract for theUnited States.

160 Appendix: Sources

Notes

Introduction

1 Though Congress passed legislation (HR 2676) in 1998 changing MFN toNTR, MFN is still commonly used in international trade negotiations. Besides,MFN is the term used in most congressional documents, scholarly works, andjournalistic accounts. Thus MFN instead of NTR will be used throughout thebook.

2 Scholars sometimes draw a distinction between foreign policy and defense policy(Lindsay and Ripley 1992; Ripley and Lindsay 1993). The former generallyincludes diplomatic and strategic relations with other countries and trade policy,whereas the latter refers exclusively to defense spending like military bases,weapons purchase, and payment for military personnel. Thus defined, the threepolicy issues in U.S.–China relations that will be examined in this study belong toforeign policy.

3 To be sure, there are many other—and perhaps equally important—questionsabout Congress’s role in foreign and defense policy, such as who decides the con-gressional agenda, the role of interest groups, the impact of constituency opinion,and the consequences of congressional activism (for the most comprehensivereview of the literature, see Lindsay and Ripley 1992). Nonetheless, answersto the three questions form the foundations on which other questions can bepursued. For example, one cannot adequately address the question of who decidesCongress’s foreign policy agenda without first addressing executive-legislativeinteractions in foreign policy or the decision-making process in Congress.

4 Many studies approach Congress’s relative power vis-à-vis the president inforeign policy from the legal-constitutional perspective. They focus on Congress’sconstitutional prerogatives, particularly the war powers (e.g., Adler 1988; Crovitzand Rabkin 1989; Deering 1991; Fisher 1985; Fisher 1988; Fisher 1991; Franklin1987; Schlesinger 1989).

5 Since it was published, the two presidencies thesis has been at the center ofscholarly debate. For a review of the debate, see Fleisher and Bond (1988); Shulland LeLoup (1981); Sigelman (1979); and Wildavsky (1975).

6 In the final analysis, Schlesinger seems to be reluctant to completely reject presi-dential dominance in foreign policy. “To restore the constitutional balance, it isnecessary in this period to rebuke presidential pretensions, as it has been necessaryin other periods to rebuke congressional pretensions,” he cautioned (1972: 108).“But in demythologizing the presidency we must take care not to remythologizethe Congress,” he hastily added (ibid.: 109).

7 I borrowed the term “contingency” from public opinion research. Based oninterviews with a representative sample of House members, Cook (1992) con-tended that congressional responsiveness to public preferences on welfare policy is

contingent upon the particular issue. See Manza and Cook (2002) for a review ofthe literature on the contingency view.

8 According to Lindsay and Ripley (1993: 19), crisis policy is characterized by “theperception of an imminent threat to the U.S. national interests, usually one involv-ing the use or potential use of force.” Strategic policy “specifies the goals andtactics of defense and foreign policy.” It includes what is commonly called foreignpolicy plus “those aspects of defense policy that specify the basic mix and missionof military forces.” Finally, structural policy “governs how resources are used andmostly clearly resemble decision making on domestic, distributive politics.”

9 To my knowledge, Burgin (1991) is the only scholar who has systematically stud-ied the extent of legislative participation in foreign policy. She constructed a scaleof participation and then divided members into four different categories based onthe participation scale: leaders, activists, position-takers, and voters. She examinedthe impact of constituent interests on whether to participate in a foreign policyissue and the extent of participation. Hall (1996) offers the most comprehensivestudy of legislative participation in Congress, but his focus is participation ingeneral, not foreign policy issues in particular.

10 The Act was repealed in 1943 by the Magnuson Act, but large-scale Chineseimmigration didn’t occur until after the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965.For the most recent account of the history of Chinese immigration, see Lee (2003).

11 Since almost all bank notes in China were backed by silver, large-scale purchase bythe U.S. depleted China’s silver reserve and led to sharp appreciation of the cur-rency. As the Chinese currency appreciated, exports became more expensive andimports cheaper, resulting in more outflow of silver. Meanwhile, banks began towithdraw notes from circulation, which resulted in credit stringency and deflation.The Silver Purchase Act appeared to be the major cause of the financial crisis inChina in the 1930s.

12 Three sentences from the 1971 CQ Almanac best summarize the intensity ofcongressional opposition to China’s admission to the UN. “From 1950 to 1970,Congress expressed its opposition to the seating of Communist China in theUnited Nations at least 30 times. Every year, statements expressing this oppositionhave been attached to appropriations bills and enacted into law. Every year, that is,until 1971” (CQ Almanac 1971: 364).

13 When Deng visited Washington, 85 Senators and 70 House members met withhim, with another dozen accompanying him to Atlanta, Houston, and Seattle.Many House members “avidly sought invitation” for a meeting with Deng andmembers of both chambers “stood in line to shake Teng’s [sic] hand and even toget his autograph.” Senator Henry Jackson was so impressed by Deng that hepredicated that Deng “would be kissing a lot of babies here” (CQ Almanac 1979:207–208).

14 For example, Mann (2001) and Crabb (1985) examined congressional support forTaiwan. Nokken (2003) analyzed roll call votes on MFN renewal. Yang (2000)offered a detail account of MFN renewal and Taiwan policy in the Bush andClinton years. Xie (1993) conducted an in-depth analysis of roll call voting on theTaiwan Relations Act and the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of1989.

1 The new institutionalism and legislative behavior

1 The rational choice theory is a broad name that subsumes a variety of theoriesbuilt upon the assumption of individual rationality. Social choice theory, theoryof collective action, and principal-agent theory all belong to the rational choicetheory. For a review of scholarly debate about the rational choice theory, see(Barry 1978; Chong 2000: Chapter 1; Friedman 1996; Green and Shapiro 1994).

162 Notes

2 Admittedly, the number of committees, committee jurisdiction, chamber rules,party rules, and committee rules may be considerably different from one Congressto another, as in the case of House reforms in the 1970s and Republican reformafter 1995. Nevertheless, the fundamental structures and procedures such as billreferral, seniority, the filibuster, and the germaneness rule have largely remainedintact since they were first instituted (see Deering and Smith 1997).

3 For a different view about the committee’s ex post veto power, see Crombez et al.(2006) and Krehbiel et al. (1987).

4 In addition to gatekeeping, other terms commonly used to describe committeepower include veto power, proposal power, and agenda-setting power. Accordingto Crombez et al. (2006: 323):

an early-acting individual or group of individuals is said to possess a gate-keeping right if the governing procedures of the body allow the individual orgroup not to act on specific proposals, and if the certain consequence of suchinaction is that an exogenously determined status quo policy remains ineffect.

They offered a distinction between gatekeeping right and gatekeeping power, argu-ing the former is a necessary condition for the latter.

5 For example, in 1999 the Senate voted on a motion to discharge from the FinanceCommittee S.J.Res.27 that would revoke China’s MFN for one year. The motionwas overwhelmingly rejected by a vote of 12–87.

6 The three dominant theories of legislative organization have different predictionsabout committee–floor relationship. The informational theory predicts thatcommittees should be representative of the floor majority (Krehbiel 1991). Thedistributive theory contends that committees should be composed of preferenceoutliers (Weingast and Marshall 1988). Finally, the partisan theory argues thatcommittee preferences should be similar to those of the majority party (Cox andMcCubbins 1993).

7 Cox and McCubbins (1993: 260–262) reported evidence that bills sponsored bymajority party members were most likely to be reported out of committee.

8 For some scholars, it is not so much structural differences—and the resultingdifferences in policy preferences—as sequential actions that enable the Senate toserve as a check to the House. Fenno (1982: 4–5) thus wrote,

By setting up two distinct and different bodies, they made it necessary that theSenate and the House take separate action. . . . Separate action means, at aminimum, sequential action, and sequential action very likely means differentactions. That is because sequential action implies the passage of time andwith it the changing of relevant contexts. Different contexts very likely lead todifferent behavior.

9 The “cooling saucer” originates from an anecdote about the Senate. ThomasJefferson, who was absent at the constitutional convention due to his mission toFrance, asked George Washington why he had consented to a second chamber.“Why did you pour that coffee into your saucer?” asked Washington. “To cool it,”said Jefferson. “Even so, we pour legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool it,”said Washington (quoted in Fenno 1982: 5). Under the original arrangement ofbicameralism, the Senate may have been more likely to cool down the legislativeprocess by blocking or amending House-passed bills because Senators were electedindirectly by state legislatures. But the 17th Amendment brought about a newbicameralism under which Senators, like their House counterparts, are electeddirectly by the people (Binder 1996: Chapter 2; Fenno 1982). For more recentassessments of the impact of 17th amendment on legislative behavior, see Crookand Hibbing (1997) and Bernhard and Sala (2006).

Notes 163

10 Cronin and Fordham’s (1999) analysis of Senate voting on foreign policy between1947 and 1993 produced evidence that challenges the notion of ideological coher-ence and stability. They concluded:

Above all, a successful treatment of ideology must not assume that issuelinkages can be traced to a logically coherent and unchanging set of prin-ciples. Preferences on a wide range of issues may be linked to the cleavagebetween liberals and conservatives, but the content of these ideologies is notconsistent over time. Something other than enduring principles determineswhat it means to be a liberal or conservative in American politics.

(ibid.: 987–988)

11 This appears to be true only at the individual level, however. There is convincingevidence that aggregate or collective opinion is remarkably stable, coherent, andmeaningful (Page 2006; Page and Shapiro 1992).

12 Students of American politics have constructed various measures of constituencyopinion, including demographic variables, small-sample estimates, presidentialelection results, and referenda voting (for a review, see Ardoin and Garand 2003;McDonagh 1993; Stone 1979), but none of these directly concern China policy.


1 A modified version of this chapter and Chapter 3, entitled “Congress and ChinaPolicy: An Analysis of China Bills,” were originally published in Journal ofContemporary China, 2008, 17: 54, 141–165.

2 Members attach riders to non-China-specific bills such as authorization billsbecause these bills are more likely to pass than freestanding China bills. Forexample, those opposed to China’s abortion policy often turn to foreign oper-ations authorization bills, adding language that prohibits U.S. contribution to anyinternational agency—particularly the UNPF—that is involved in family planningprograms in China. These bills are more likely to pass than independent legislationbarring U.S. contribution to international agencies because they deal with routineauthorization of funds necessary for the implementation of U.S. foreign policy.Some of the most controversial congressional policies are found in these author-ization bills. In 1995, Jesse Helms introduced a state department authorization billto which he added language that the Taiwan Relations Act should supersede the1982 joint communiqué regarding arms sales to Taiwan.

3 Following my logic, Congress’s policy toward Hong Kong and Macao shouldalso be included as part of its China policy, since both Hong Kong and Macao arenow special administrative zones under Chinese sovereignty. I do not includeChina bills respecting the two entities because the numbers are rather small: 26bills respecting Hong Kong and three bills respecting Macao.

4 The controversy over funding to the UNPF arose because UNPF was allegedlyinvolved in coercive abortion in China. Given the intense passions evoked byabortion in U.S. domestic politics, it is not surprising that the battle over appropri-ations for the UNPF has repeated itself each year since 1985, when Congressadopted the “Kemp–Inouye–Helms” amendment that prohibits U.S. funding toany organization that “supports or participates in the management of a programof coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization.” One year before the passage ofthe amendment, the Reagan administration announced a new policy at the SecondUnited Nations International Conference on Population in Mexico City, whichdenies assistance to any foreign, non-governmental organization that “performs oractively promotes abortion as a method of family planning.” This became knownas the “Mexico City” policy (CQWR 2001: 236). Because UNPF funding is

164 Notes

usually attached to the annual State Department authorization bill, the battleoftentimes stalled the passage of the authorization bill, creating chaos on CapitolHill, at the State Department, and in the White House (CQWR 1998: 579; CQWR1999: 563, 2326; CQWR 2002: 197). Crane and Finkle (1989) offer the bestanalysis of the domestic politics linking UNPF funding with China’s populationcontrol programs.

5 U.S. companies must obtain a license before they can export high-power com-puters, missile technology, or satellite technology to China. Export control respect-ing China became a high-profile issue in 1998 amidst allegations of Chinese theftsof U.S. nuclear secrets and Republican accusation of Clinton issuing exportlicenses in exchange for Chinese campaign donations. Later that year Congressformed a Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/CommercialConcerns with the People’s Republic of China, chaired by Republican Christo-pher Cox, and the Committee issued the highly controversial Cox Report in early1999 (e.g., CQWR 1998: 1375, 1400, 1402, 1886–1889).

6 In the House, no member may offer an amendment to a bill under floor consider-ation unless the bill is granted an open rule or the amendment is pre-approved bythe Rules Committee. More importantly, a particular rule of the House—effectivesince April 1789—requires that amendments be germane to the bill under con-sideration. A ruling of non-germaneness can be—and frequently is—challengedon the floor, but it is “virtually unprecedented for the membership to overrule itspresiding office in order to consider a proposition that has been ruled nonger-mane” (Bach 1982: 343). Unlike the House, the Senate does not have any generalrequirement of germaneness, unless an amendment is offered to an appropriationsbill, a budget bill, or a measure on which cloture has been invoked. As a result,Senators have much greater latitude than their House counterparts in amendinga bill.

7 The numbers in Figure 2.1 include amendments. Some official sources of legislativeactivities like Congress and the Nation report only bills (i.e., bills, concurrent reso-lutions, simple resolutions, and joint resolutions). With amendments excluded,then the total number of China bills introduced in the first session of each Con-gress is 481, and the figure for the second session is 227. This results in an aggre-gate inter-session ratio of 2.12. Based on statistics from Thomas, between 1973and 2006 the total number of bills introduced in the first session is 153,695 andthat for the second session is 78,203. This leads to an aggregate inter-session ratioof 1.97, which is strikingly similar to that for China bills. However, unlike the ratiofor bills in general, which stabilizes around 2 from one Congress to another, theratio for China bills has considerable variations.

8 Another reason may be that all House members and one-third of Senators haveto campaign in their home districts for reelection in the second session of eachCongress and hence spend less time on Capitol Hill. A third reason is that ifvoters tend to pay more attention to their representatives immediately after anelection—and the first session is temporally closer to the election than the secondsession—then members have incentives to be seen as legislatively active.

9 Back in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Republicans made up the overwhelmingmajority of the China bloc that supported Chiang and opposed recognition ofChina and China’s admission to the UN (Bachrack 1976; Koen 1974; Tsou 1963;Tucker 1983). In the 1990s, Republicans like Gerald Solomon (NY), Tom DeLay(TX), and Benjamin Gilman (NY), to name just a few, were among the most vocalsupporters of Taiwan and critics of China because they “still bear animus towardthe last outposts of global communism” (CQWR 1996: 712).

10 Since the dependent variable is the number of times a specific event (i.e., a Chinabill is introduced) in each chamber each year, it can only take values that are non-negative integers. Moreover, the event occurs at most a few dozen times per year. A

Notes 165

very flexible modeling approach often used for dependent variables with thesecharacteristics is to assume that they follow a negative binomial probability distri-bution. Unlike the classical regression model (e.g., ordinary least squares), thenegative binomial model explicitly builds the special characteristics of the depend-ent variable into the analysis. As such, it can make better use of the availableinformation than classical techniques, and will not make invalid use of informa-tion in the data (e.g., the lack of negative observations), as classical procedureswould. The parameter estimates in a negative binomial model govern the rate atwhich the expected number of events changes in response to a change in any givenindependent variable, but (unlike in the classical regression model) are not them-selves estimates of the slope of a line. More specifically, in event count models theeffect of an independent variable with coefficient β is βθ, where θ is the expectedvalue of the dependent variable (King 1988: 857; Mayer 1999: 199; Shields andHuang 1995: 567).

3 Effects of congressional activism on China policy

1 Another way to control for chamber size is to compare the ratio of China bills toall bills in each chamber, but the major problem with this method is that thedenominator is so big as to make the ratio close to zero. The mean of all bills(excluding amendments) introduced in the House in each Congress during thestudied period is 9596.8 and the mean for China bills (excluding amendments) is28.2. The corresponding figures for the Senate are 4041.9 and 13.5.

2 Apparently, Table 3.2 does not answer why a member is active in a particularpolicy issue. For example, why is Chris Smith active in human rights but not inMFN or Taiwan policy? To answer this question, one would need to conductin-depth analysis of each member’s personal background, constituents, and thecircumstances under which he or she served in Congress.

3 It is possible that some China bills were amended on the floor before their passage,and the inclusion of these bills may be responsible for the higher estimate Iarrived at.

4 The tradition of individualism and extended debate in the Senate greatly empowerindividual Senators to influence the legislative process. One common practice is tofile an objection to unanimous consent agreement (UCA) request regarding apiece of legislation pending floor debate. This is called a “hold.” Since most Senatelegislative business is done through UCA, putting a hold is in effect a threat tofilibuster. Unless the Senator who puts the hold is satisfied, the bill is likely to stayin the committee (see Sinclair 2006: 204–211).

5 The six resolutions are: H.Con.Res.148 in 1996, H.Con.Res.270 and 301 in 1998,H.Con.Res.56 and H.Res.297 in 1999, and H.Con.Res.292 in 2000.

6 President Jimmy Carter used the fourth veto. In 1977, both houses passed HR2521, a bill that provides for mandatory federal inspection of rabbit meat. Cartervetoed it on the ground that “[r]equirements for on-site inspection of foreignprocessing facilities by Department of Agriculture employees would strain rela-tions with the People’s Republic of China, a major exporter of domesticatedrabbit meat to the United States” (Carter 1977). Congress did not attempt tooverride Carter’s veto.

7 According to former Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole (R-KS), “They are afraidof him. Jesse runs a pretty tight ship” (quoted in Berke and Myers 1997). SenatorJoseph Biden (D-DE), the ranking Democrat on the Committee, said, “He’s pre-pared to be mean. He’s prepared to be disliked. He’s prepared to be ostracized”(quoted in ibid.).

8 Supporters of human rights in Tibet come in different party labels and ideologicalhats. In a reception held in the honor of the Dalai Lama in Washington, D.C., the

166 Notes

guests present included senators John Kerry, Jesse Helms, Bob Dole, and DanielPatrick Moynihan as well as representatives Benjamin Gilman, Charlie Rose, TomLantos, and John Porter (Glassman 1991).


1 A shorter version of this chapter, entitled “Congressional Roll Call Voting onChina Trade Policy: MFN and PNTR,” was published in American PoliticsResearch, 2006, 34: 6, 732–758.

2 For example, the AFL-CIO filed a petition to the Bush administration in April2006, the second since 2004, urging the U.S. Trade Representative’s office tolaunch probes into China’s suppression of labor rights, which was believed tobe a major factor behind the cheap prices of Chinese imports that have resultedin soaring trade deficit and the displacement of hundreds of thousands ofAmericans jobs (see Greenhouse 2006; Reuters 2006).

3 It should be noted that in the early years of U.S.–China trade, it was the UnitedStates that demanded MFN status from China. Following China’s defeat in theOpium War in 1840, the Chinese government signed the infamous Nanking Treatyin 1842 with Britain that granted the latter many trade privileges. Two years later,the U.S. signed the Wanghia Treaty with China, securing MFN status from theChinese government. Despite its name, MFN does not offer preferential treat-ment. The U.S. grants MFN to nearly all its trading partners. Moreover, MFN isnot the lowest tariff status. More than 125 developing countries pay even lowertariff under the Generalized System of Preference (CQ Almanac 1992: 157;CQWR 1990: 1774–76). Under the Jackson–Vanik amendment to the 1974 TradeAct, an amendment that has the former Soviet Union as its prime target, thepresident cannot grant MFN to a Communist country unless he waives a require-ment that denies MFN to any Communist country that prohibits free emigration.MFN status expires July 3 each year, and if the president wants to renew it, hemust notify Congress by June 3. Congress has until September 3 to pass a jointresolution to disapprove of the renewal, subject to presidential veto.

4 China was one of the 23 contracting members of the General Agreement onTrade and Tariff (GATT), founded in 1948 and the predecessor of the WorldTrade Organization. The nationalist regime on Taiwan, the official representativeof China in the UN until 1971, withdrew from the GATT in 1950. In 1982, Chinawas granted observer status in the GATT. In July 1986, the Chinese governmentrequested resumption of its contracting party status on the ground that the with-drawal from the GATT by Taiwan was null and void. The GATT established theWorking Party on China’s Status in the following year, which began China’s15-year process to rejoin the international trade organization. In 1994, the GATTconcluded its eighth round of multilateral negotiations—the Uruguay Round—and created the World Trade Organization the next year.

5 China can join the WTO without congressional approval of PNTR. However, ifChina is not removed from the Jackson–Vanik amendment, the U.S. will be inviolation of Article II of the GATT, which requires unconditional MFN for mem-bers, and hence subject to trade sanctions. Meanwhile, the U.S. has to invoke non-application of the GATT, which means China would be able to withhold benefitsof the 1999 trade agreement from the U.S., such as market access, special importprotection, and the right to enforce China’s commitments through WTO disputesettlement (U.S. Congress 2001c: 3).

6 Two factors stand out as contributing to the better-than-expected vote outcome.First, the Levin–Bereuter provisions, which addressed members’ concerns abouthuman rights, labor abuses, compliance, etc., made the vote much easier for manymembers. It is estimated that the Levin–Bereuter provisions secured as many as

Notes 167

40 votes (CQ Almanac 2000: 20: 4–8). Second, Charles Rangel (D-NY) switchedfrom No to Yes, “the single most important pro-permanent NTR event of the lastmonth” (ibid.: 20:8). Rangel’s conversion had the most impact on the New Yorkdelegation, in the Congressional Black Caucus, and among Ways and Meansmembers.

7 The first vote was on passage of HR 2195 in 1997 that authorized US$2 millionfor the U.S. Customs Service and the State Department to enforce a U.S. ban onChinese prison labor products. The bill passed 419–2. The second vote, which tookplace in 2003, was on adoption of a resolution (H.Res.414) under suspension ofrules that encouraged China to fulfill its international trade commitments. Thevote count was 411–1. The third vote occurred in 2004, and again it was onadoption of a resolution (H.Res.576) under suspension of rules that urged Chinato improve its protection of intellectual property rights. The resolution passed416–3.

8 The recommitting motions would ask Ways and Means to report the bill (HR2195 and HR 2605 respectively) back with an amendment to require that the totalamount of tariffs paid to China for U.S. exports be adjusted quarterly to equal thetotal amount China pays to the U.S. for Chinese exports.

9 Frutiger (2002) offered a different perspective on AFL-CIO’s opposition toChina’s PNTR. He argued that AFL-CIO’s China policy amounts to nothingless than “a revival of . . . [u]nconstrained economic nationalism [and] an anti-Communist agenda” that had guided AFL-CIO’s policy agenda through the ColdWar up until John Sweeney’s election in 1995” (ibid.: 72).

10 Labor union’s vehement opposition to PNTR potentially threatened Al Gore’spresidential campaign, as Gore firmly endorsed China’s accession to the WTO. Onthe other hand, union leaders knew that it was in their interest to have a Democratin the White House, and a Democratic majority in Congress if possible. Thus thechallenge for John Sweeney was to devise a strategy that would simultaneouslydefeat PNTR and put Gore in the White House (Connolly 2000; Edsall 2000;Mufson 2000).

11 To help colleagues who planned to vote for the China bill in spite of labor unionopposition, a group of moderate House Democrats organized fundraisers andraised $160,000 from the business community in two months. Boeing, AmericaOnline, and Microsoft were among the donators at the fundraisers (CQWR 2000:907).

12 This does not seem to be a big problem in my case because I use the absolute valueof DW score. Party has the highest correlation with retail/wholesale (−0.259,significant at 0.01), and the absolute value of DW score has the highest correlationwith farming employment (−0.124, significant at 0.01). The correlation betweenparty and the absolute value of DW score is −0.134 and significant at 0 .01.

13 However, Garzke and Wrighton (1998) also found that Senate Republicans weremore supportive of GATT than Democrats, and Wink et al. (1996) reported evi-dence that House Republicans were more likely to vote for NAFTA than Demo-crats. Thus it appears that there is no conclusive evidence on the direction ofpartisanship on trade votes.

14 For example, in 1997 President Clinton asked for renewal of fast track authority,but over 80 percent of House Democrats opposed it. In the end, Clinton suffered a“stinging blow” to his prestige when the House Republican leadership canceledthe vote on fast track authority (Conley 1999: 786).

15 This point is based on Kernell’s (1973) finding that party composition of eachchamber was the central determinant of inter-chamber difference in policy liberal-ism. It is also possible that there is something special about the Senate as aninstitution that makes it more liberal than the House. Grofman et al. (1991) exam-ined Senators and representatives who have identical constituencies, that is, they

168 Notes

come from states that have only one representative in the House. It turns out thatSenators were still a little more liberal than representatives despite the fact thatthey have identical constituency.


1 On January 5 1950, President Truman made it clear that the U.S. would notintervene militarily on Chiang’s behalf. This hands-off policy amounted toabandonment of Chiang. A week later, Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivereda speech to the National Press Club, reiterating Truman’s China policy (seeFinkelstein 1993: 272–74; Grasso 1987: 123).

2 Before the outbreak of the Korean War, Secretary of State Dean Achesonseemed to be optimistic about U.S. relations with Communist China. He believedthat Chinese Communism was of a different strain from Stalinist Communism,hence his hopes for the emergence of a Chinese Tito. Even after the interpositionof the Seventh Fleet, Acheson wanted to signal to the Communists that theU.S. had no intention of grabbing Taiwan (see Finkelstein 1993: 334–336).

3 The China bloc is not a formal organization within Congress. Rather, it is a looseconglomeration of members who were instrumental in China policy in the late1940s and early 1950s. It is part of the legendary China lobby. The China bloc,wrote Koen (1974: 29) in his classic study of the China lobby, “merely used theChina issue as an aid in their battle against the Roosevelt and Truman Administra-tions or the Democratic party.” Tucker (1983: Chapter 5) also studied the role ofthe China bloc in U.S. China policy. After the founding of the People’s Republicof China, the China bloc opened another front: opposing China’s admission tothe United Nations and U.S. recognition of China (see Bachrack 1976).

4 I will not examine in detail Congress’s role in Taiwan’s human rights. First, onlya handful of members were actively involved in the issue and only for a relativelyshort period of time. Second, the issue is of minor importance in U.S.–Taiwanrelations. Suffice it to say, policy-makers in Washington had long been cognizantof the authoritarian nature of the Taiwan regime, but the strategy of containmentin the Cold War resulted in a policy that “valued the strategic potential of Taiwantoo highly to risk undermining mutual confidence by insisting upon the kind ofliberalization that America’s principles and traditions in theory demanded”(Tucker 1994: 77). The year 1977 marked the beginning of earnest efforts by liberalmembers to address Taiwan’s human rights. In June, Congress held its first publichearing on human rights in Taiwan, convened by Representative Donald Fraser(D-MN) (U.S. Congress 1977). In retrospect, Congress, particularly the handfulof liberal Democrats, “played an important role in persuading Taiwan to dem-ocratize” (Mann 2001: 204). For a detailed account of Congress’s human rightsinitiatives regarding Taiwan and a different assessment of Congress’s influence onTaiwan, see Bush (2004: Chapter 6).

5 If adopted within two days in the House (or three days in the Senate), a motion toreconsider requires the original vote to be held again. Members seek to reconsidera vote because they want to change a close outcome in a vote. They also file such amotion as a delaying tactic to use up floor time. In daily practices, however, themotion to reconsider is routinely tabled or killed (C-SPAN 2006).

6 A motion to recommit returns a bill to committee. Recommittal motions can taketwo forms: a simple motion to recommit or a motion to recommit with instruc-tions. A simple recommittal motion gives the minority party a final opportunityto kill the bill. When adopted, the bill goes back to committee and is considered tohave been rejected. Motion to recommit with instructions provides the minority alast opportunity to amend a bill. If adopted, the bill goes back to committee withbinding directions to the committee which is required to report the bill back with

Notes 169

an amendment specified in the instructions. Most recommittal motions containinstructions. The right to offer the motion to recommit is the prerogative of aminority party representative who is opposed to a bill (Mulvihill 1997).

7 If the motion to reconsider had been agreed to, members would have had to voteon HR 2386 again and the bill could have been defeated. In and of itself, therejection of the bill does not entail any fundamental change in Taiwan policy, butits failure does signify that Congress as a collective decision-making body was notwilling to consider such a missile defense system for Taiwan. This would be badnews for Taiwan’s supporters in Congress and for the political leadership in Tai-wan. Similarly, if the motion to recommit HR 4444 had been agreed to, the billwould have been returned to committee and reported back to the House floor withlanguage conditioning China’s PNTR on its promise not to attack Taiwan. Beijingwould almost certainly have protested against such language and withdrawn itselffrom the trade agreement. Meanwhile, given their objections to placing conditionson U.S.–China trade, pro-trade members would likely have voted against the bill,delaying if not killing China’s bid to rejoin the WTO. Thus it seems likely that thisrecommitting motion was a parliamentary tactic used by opponents of HR 4444to stop its passage. Because the bill is expected to pass, albeit with narrow margins,the opponents filed the motion in order to add a new dimension to the bill, adimension on which they expected to win, knowing that there was a strongbipartisan consensus in support of Taiwan in Congress.

8 Party leadership demands strong party loyalty on procedural issues such as elec-tion of the Speaker of the House and the majority leader, committee jurisdictions,rules governing floor debate, and committee assignments. There is a huge literatureon procedures and rules in Congress, their influence on legislative behavior andlegislative outcomes, and the forces underlying changes in rules and procedures(e.g., Cox 2000; Evans 1999; Shepsle and Weingast 1984; Shepsle and Weingast1994). The biggest controversy in the current scholarly debate surrounds when,how, and why rules and procedures change. One school argues that procedures arestacked in favor of the majority party (e.g., Binder 1996; Cox and McCubbins1993; Sinclair 1994). Another school contends that rule changes are decided byfloor majority (e.g., Schickler 2000; Schickler and Rich 1997).

9 The probability of a Republican voting against the Pallone motion was 0.791higher than that of a Democrat, holding other variables at their means. By con-trast, being a Republican decreases the probability of voting for the Boniorrecommitting motion by 0.80.

10 Scholars also identified other factors that contributed to partisan disputes overChina policy during this period. The growing illness of Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI),the pillar of postwar bipartisanship, contributed to party polarization over Chinapolicy, according to Crabb (1957: 110). But “the decisive factor in the situation,”contended Westerfield (1955: 245), “was that the administration failed to associateprominent Republicans with its conduct of Chinese–American relations, on abasis either of ‘educational’ indoctrination or of mutual compromise.”

11 According to Bachrack (1976: 38–39), Tsou (1963) mentioned six Senators andfive Representatives in his assessment of the China bloc’s influence in Congress:Senators William Knowland (R-CA), H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ), Pat McCarran(D-NV), Kenneth S. Wherry (R-NE), Owen Brewster (R-ME), Styles H. Bridges(R-NH), and Representatives Walter Judd (R-MN), John M. Vorys (R-OH),James G. Fulton (R-PA), Robert B. Chiperfield (R-IL), and Donald L. Jackson(R-CA). Judd, Vorys, and Bridges were instrumental in the passage of the ChinaAid Act of 1948. Conspicuously, there was only one Democrat in Tsou’s list.Dulles’s (1972: 73–74) list included not only Judd, Vorys, Knowland, Bridges, andMcCarran, but four more Republican Senators: Ferguson (MI), Jenner (IN),Wiley (WI), and Butler (MD).

170 Notes

12 Few scholars have paid sufficient attention to the role of partisanship in congres-sional debate about the TRA. Even those who did often ended up claiming thatthe TRA was the result of bipartisan cooperation. For example, Ripley (1985: 99)contended that the TRA “stands as an outstanding example of ‘bipartisan’collaboration in the foreign policy field.”

13 There appears to be a significant element of institutional struggle for power in theexecutive-legislative skirmish over the TRA. The struggle has something to do withthe Dole–Stone amendment to the International Security Assistance Act thatwas adopted five months before Carter’s announcement of normalization. Theamendment stated, “It is the sense of Congress that there should be prior consult-ation between the Congress and the executive branch on any proposed policychanges affecting the continuation in force of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954.”Apparently, President Carter paid only lip service to the amendment. As SenatorJohn Glenn said, “Calling a few of us in one hour before he goes on televisiondoesn’t seem like much consultation” (quoted in Gayner 1979: 334). Senator JacobJavits (D-NY) (1981: 55), a key member involved in the TRA, lamented that“Neither on the manner and timing of the decision or on the substance of theunderstandings reached had there been effective consultation.” These complaintsindicate that congressional assertiveness was directly attributable to the lack ofconsultation by the Carter administration (see also Sutter 1983). However, underthe American constitutional structure, it is extremely difficult to clearly distinguishthe institutional from the partisan. As Crabb (1957: 6–7, italics original) observed,

Relations between the presidency and the Congress as institutions are boundto have a direct and often decisive bearing upon the relations between theparty in power and the opposition, if for no other reason than that thePresident is automatically the leader of his party and that his leadershipextends into the sphere of legislation.

14 During his campaign, candidate Reagan sent his running mate, George H. W.Bush, to Beijing to reassure the Chinese that he did not intend to make anychanges in U.S.–Taiwan relations. On August 25, 1980, the day Bush returnedfrom China, Reagan held a news conference at which he issued a major statementon U.S.–China relations. After affirming his interest in developing U.S.–Chinarelations, he declared, “I would not pretend, as Carter does, that the relationshipwe now have with Taiwan, enacted by our Congress, is not official” (quoted inWashington Post 1980). After he was sworn in, Reagan began to discuss sales ofFX fighter jets to Taiwan. With strong warnings from Beijing, however, Reaganbacked down and signed a communiqué with Beijing on August 17, 1982, whichpapered over disagreements over arms sales to Taiwan for the time being but didnot solve the issue to the satisfaction of either side (see Barnett 1981; Harding1992: 108–19; McClaran 2000). The communiqué also became a sore in the eyes ofdie-hard Taiwan supporters on Capitol Hill who have since repeatedly tried in vainto introduce legislation declaring that the TRA supersedes the communiqué onarms sales to Taiwan.

15 Bush’s 1992 decision to sell Taiwan 150 F-16 fighter jets had something to do withcongressional pressure, but Congress’s role in the sales appeared to be marginal(Mann 1999: 264–268; Yang 2000: 176–185). Mann (2001: 207) pointed out thatCongress “was not the driving force behind the sale” and that “legislative involve-ment was limited almost exclusively to the Texas delegation.” Texas legislators,most notably Senator Lloyd Bentsen and Representative Joe Barton, lobbied hardfor the sales after Bush announced his decision, because thousands of jobs atTexas-based General Dynamics would be saved. However, the primary reasonbehind Bush’s decision seems to be Taiwan’s deteriorating security vis-à-visChina, with the latter having acquired advanced Su-27 fighter jets (Bush 2004:

Notes 171

184). Nonetheless, the timing of the sales was largely determined by the pressureof Bush’s 1992 presidential campaign (Friedman 1992; Schmitt 1992), as Texas isBush’s home state with a large number of electoral votes. In the final analysis,then, Bush’s decision appears to be a mix of security concerns, constituency inter-ests, and electoral politics.

16 The language in the TRA reads as follows:

Nothing contained in this Act shall contravene the interest of the UnitedStates in human rights, especially with respect to the human rights of all theapproximately eighteen million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation andenhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are herebyreaffirmed as objectives of the U.S.

17 Wichita, Kansas, is perhaps the best example of local dependence on the military-industrial complex. Known as the Air Capitol, Wichita is home to four majoraircraft manufacturers: Boeing, Cessna, Raytheon, and Bombardier-Learjet. Theyturned out be among the ten largest employers in Wichita in 2004, with Boeingtopping the list. Together, the four manufacturers employed 30,000 people,or more than 10 percent of non-agricultural labor force in Wichita (Frank 2004:55–56; Thomson 2006; Wikipedia 2006).

18 Back in the 1980s, the U.S. ran a huge trade deficit with Taiwan, which reached arecord high of US$17 billion in 1987. Among Taiwan’s exports to the U.S., textileproducts made up a large proportion—17 percent of the total at the peak year of1982. Under pressure from textile industries, some members began to proposetough measures to address their woes, and Taiwan, along with the other threeAsian Tigers, was often singled out in legislation aimed at curbing textile imports(CQ Almanac 1985: 256; CQ Almanac 1987; 640–641).

19 However, not all constituency economic interests will lead to congressional supportfor Taiwan, as illuminated by congressional actions respecting a seemingly peri-pheral issue: driftnet fishing. Running as deep as 30 feet and as long as 40 miles perstretch, driftnet poses serious dangers to marine life as well as navigation. Taiwan,among others, had a large driftnet fishing fleet. Fishermen from Alaska, Washing-ton, Oregon, and California complained that their salmon were pirated by thesedriftnets and pressured Congress to take actions. Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska,albeit a strong Taiwan supporter, introduced an amendment to the NationalDefense Authorization Act of 1991 that would suspend U.S. military sales toTaiwan until the driftnet issue was resolved. The other Senator from Alaska,Frank Murkowski, who was also a staunch supporter of Taiwan, expressed hissupport for the Stevens amendment because of constituency interests (Yang 2000:159–161). As insignificant as this episode may appear in U.S.–Taiwan relations, itclearly shows the extent of constituency influence on members of Congress, evenon those who otherwise have been long-time supporters of Taiwan.

20 Scholars have used a variety of interest group ratings such as National Journal’sforeign policy scale (Leogrande and Brenner 1993) and American Security Coun-cil’s (ASC) National Security Index (Lindsay 1990; Ray 1981). The published ASCratings go back to 1998 (Sharp 2000) and the ASC’s website has only ratings forthe 108th Congress.

21 The aggregate voting score for 1998–2000 is based on 25 selected votes in theHouse. They include the vote on HR 1838, which is also one of the two Taiwanvotes I examine. For this reason, I recalculated the voting score excluding the voteon HR 1838. This does not change the statistical findings.

22 Scholars have used a wide variety of measures of the military–industrial complex(Clotfelter 1970; Cobb 1969; Gray and Gregory 1968; Ray 1981; Wayman 1985). Itried federal defense expenditure in each state and federal expenditure for salariesof civilian and military personnel, and the results remain the same.

172 Notes

23 This explains why in most previous studies of defense policy voting, hawkishnessor similar measures of ideology (e.g., jingoism or ADA scores) have the largestestimated impact, whereas party usually has marginal or no impact at all (e.g.,Bozeman and James 1975; Cobb 1969; Leogrande and Brenner 1993; Lindsay1990; Ray 1981; Wayman 1985).

24 The correlation between raw DW score and hawkishness is 0.894 and significant at0.01. This is strong evidence that liberals tend to be doves and conservatives to behawks. This also explains why I do not include the two variables in the sameequation.

25 There is evidence for this speculation. I construct an aggregate voting index foreach state delegation in the House on the basis of the two votes and the PNTRvote. It turns out that the most consistent and strongest supporters of free tradewith China and U.S.–Taiwan relations are IA, KS, LA, MT, NE, SD, TX, and WY,all of which are strongholds of the Republican Party and rely significantly onChina for their agricultural exports.

26 One explanation for the weak effects of the military-industrial complex is thatmilitary spending is deliberately steered away from states with dovish congressmento states with hawkish representatives. Another explanation is that voters in stateswith significant stakes in military spending may elect hawkish members. Lindsay(1990: 944–945) offered persuasive rebuttal of the two arguments.

27 For example, the Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Commun-ist China to the United Nations, an influential China lobby organization, hadits headquarters on Capitol Hill and a number of Congressmen including Repre-sentatives Walter Judd (R-MN) and Francis Walter (D-PA) and Senators PaulDouglas (D-IL) and Kenneth Keating (R-NY) served on its Steering Committee(see Bachrack 1976).

28 Senator William Knowland (R-CA) and Representative Walter Judd (R-MN) areperhaps the best examples. Knowland is known as the senator from Formosa dueto his staunch support of Taiwan, and Judd devoted his life to a crusade for Chinaand Taiwan because of his missionary years in China (see Bachrack 1976; Edwards1990).


1 Cohen (1987) offers the best and most comprehensive analysis of U.S. humanrights policy toward China in the 1970s and 1980s and her focus is on the executivebranch, not Congress. She singled out “the information gap,” “sheer numbers,”“absence of a lobby,” and “prejudices in China’s favor” as the primary factors forthe exemption of China from U.S. human rights policy. Under “the prejudices infavor of China,” she included strategic cooperation between the two countries,which muted congressional criticism of China’s human rights. Another factor,which at that time was emphasized more by administration officials than by mem-bers of Congress but which will have decisive impact on congressional debate onMFN renewal after 1989, is the potential loss of trade resulting from an aggressivehuman rights policy.

2 For example, in 1975, a one-year ceiling was placed on military aid to SouthKorea. Since 1975, ceilings had been placed on economic aid to Chile and militaryaid was prohibited. Military aid to Uruguay was prohibited in 1976. Congressprohibited all military aid, including military training, to Argentina in the earlyperiod of the Carter administration. Military aid to Guatemala, El Salvador, andBrazil was also prohibited after the three countries voiced objection to congres-sional criticism of their human rights practices. Congress also cut back militarygrant aid to the Philippines and prohibited military aid to Nicaragua.

3 The U.S. and the former Soviet Union signed a trade agreement on October 18,

Notes 173

1972, that would have granted MFN status to the latter. Shortly before the tradeagreement was concluded, the Soviets imposed a prohibitively expensive “exit tax”on emigration. Since most Soviet emigrants were Jews, this exit tax became aformidable restriction on Jewish emigration. In reaction, Senator Jacksonlaunched a relentless campaign against granting MFN to the Soviets, hence theJackson–Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Omnibus Trade Bill. In January 1975, theSoviets notified Washington that they would reject the trade agreement, includingMFN status. It was not until June 1990 that the Soviet Union was granted MFN(see Willkie 1994: 119–124).

4 According to Willkie (1994), geopolitical considerations were only part of Jackson’sdifferential treatment of China. Jackson repeatedly expressed his concerns aboutusing China for short-term strategic advantages vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union.He seemed to have a long-term version of China, a potentially powerful countrywith which the U.S. should establish a “constructive, and enduring . . . relation-ship” (quoted in ibid.: 126).

5 Congress did take some actions. For example, the Congressional Friends ofHuman Rights Monitors took up the case of a Chinese dissident in 1984. In thesame year a member of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus introduced aresolution respecting Chinese persecution of Christians (Cohen 1987: 525).

6 According to Mann (1999), it was the Chinese students studying in the U.S., notmembers of Congress, who first came up with the idea of revoking China’sMFN. No student at that time would have realized that they were “starting aseries of annual legislative battles that would continue through most of the decadeand would prove far more enduring than the Chinese student movement itself ”(ibid.: 231).

7 Emigration has never been a major issue for China in the MFN debate. When itwas first brought up during Deng’s 1979 visit to Washington, D.C., Deng said toPresident Carter, “If you want me to release ten million Chinese to come to theUnited States, I’d be glad to do so”(quoted in Cohen 1987: 458). That effectivelyended any further discussion about China’s emigration policy. In fact, givenChina’s enormous population, many administration officials were wary of a literalinterpretation of the Jackson–Vanik amendment.

8 Senator Bob Dole is arguably the most famous supporter of China’s MFN. He“has consistently extolled the commercial benefits of extending MFN for China,particularly for his home state of Kansas” (CQWR 1996: 1232).

9 It should be noted that the Chinese government also adopted various tactics tokeep its MFN status. On the one hand, Beijing signed a six-month contract withHill and Knowlton, a Washington-based PR firm, to “boost its images amonglawmakers” (Lee 1991). On the other hand, China initiated a series of buyingsprees to demonstrate the importance of the Chinese market. For example, in early1993 the Chinese purchased nearly US$1 billion worth of planes, cars, and oilequipment (Southerland 1993). The ultimate purpose of dangling large contractsin front of American businesses is to motivate American business community toexert political influence over their own government. This is the so-called strategyof “play barbarians off against barbarians,” used by the Chinese back in thecolonial times. And the strategy has proven very effective, as reflected in the emer-gence of a new China lobby on Capitol Hill representing Boeing, GE, Wal-Mart,wheat growers and the like and in the lobby’s success in keeping China’s MFNstatus (Weisskopf 1993).

10 In addition to the 12 votes on joint resolutions to revoke MFN, there were 11House votes on three bills that set conditions for MFN renewal: three votes onHR 4939 in 1990, four votes on HR 2212 in 1991 and 1992, two votes on HR 5318in 1992, and two votes on HR 4590 in 1994. The Senate had nine MFN-relatedvotes. I will not give details about the Senate votes because I analyze only House

174 Notes

votes. Readers who are interested in the determinants of roll call voting on HR2212 are encouraged to see my article in American Politics Research (Xie 2006).

11 There were 32 House votes on China’s human rights in the House. With theexception of the six votes on funding to the United Nations Population Fund,three votes on denying visas to Chinese officials involved in religious persecutionor forced abortion, and one vote on inter-chamber difference on the EmergencyChinese Immigration Relief Act (HR 2712), all the votes were unanimous ornearly unanimous.

12 Andrew Nathan (1994) had a different assessment of the usefulness of MFNlinkage, based on the fact that the Chinese strongly protested against conditionalMFN or outright revocation, made concessions like release of political prisonersdays before presidential renewal of MFN, and used various lobbying tactics tomaintain unconditional MFN, including hiring PR firms (Lee 1991) and placinghigh-profile purchase orders (Southerland 1993). He thus concluded, “But thevigor of Chinese rhetoric and lobbying against MFN withdrawal and the timingof major Chinese concessions show that the MFN threat has been the single mostimportant element in the effectiveness of Western policy” (Nathan 1994: 89).


1 In 2005, Congress passed HR 1053 authorizing presidential extension of MFN toUkraine, but the vote was a nearly unanimous 417–2, which leaves no room foranalysis of variation in voting. Hence I do not include the case of Ukraine.

2 In 1983, Congress postponed indefinitely—thus killing—resolutions to denyReagan’s renewal of MFN status for China, Hungary, and Romania. The Housepostponed H.Res.256 rejecting MFN for Romania by a vote of 279–126 and post-poned resolutions on China and Hungary (H.Res.257 and H.Res.258 respectively)by voice votes (CQ Almanac 1983: 264–265).

3 The UAW, as well as U.S. automobile companies, supported the U.S.–CanadaAutomotive Products Trade Act of 1965, while independent parts manufacturersopposed the trade bill on the ground that it would increase the dominance of theBig Three (CQ Almanac 1965: 510). This may explain why Union Strength is notstatistically significant in this vote.

8 Conclusion

1 In retrospect, there appears to be more to it than merely partisan motivations inDemocratic criticism of Bush’s China policy. Some Democrats, notably GeorgeMitchell, Nancy Pelosi, and Dick Gephart stuck to the same position on Chinapolicy even after Clinton took office. Take George Mitchell, for example. “Mitchellwould later become nearly as much of a problem for a Democratic president, BillClinton, as he had been for the Republicans,” Mann observed (1999: 199). “Hewas genuinely outraged by the Chinese repression; he believed in what he wasdoing.” But for many others Democrats, “the conclusion seems inescapable that. . . the MFN disputes of the Bush years had been primarily an issue of partisanpolitics.”

2 The case of Taiwanese-Americans is one example of ethnic pressure. While thenumber of Taiwanese-Americans is very small, they are well organized and haveeasy access to Congress because of the historical ties between Taiwan and the U.S.In the 1980s, a number of Taiwanese groups lobbied Congress to pay more atten-tion to Taiwan’s human rights conditions and they were successful in bringingCongress to bear on the political regime on the island (Bush 2004: Chapter 6).

3 There are some members who pursue human rights for personal or partisanreasons. Steven Solarz and George Mitchell are examples of the former, while

Notes 175

Ron Brown and other Democrats in the Bush years are examples of the latter.Moreover, Congress’s human rights crusade in the 1970s was also partly motivatedby a desire to rein in the runaway executive branch in Vietnam and Latin America.As Forsythe (1988: 26) wrote,

In short, what an observer may fairly and properly call a human rights votemay not be seen as a purely human rights vote by any given member ofCongress. A member may view it as a test of power between Congress and thepresident, or of national versus international jurisdiction, or of economicversus idealistic considerations, or of security versus morality, and so on.

Nevertheless, these various motivations do not refute the observation that it is inthe interest of members to take a pro-human rights position.

4 Keller (1997a; 1997b) offered some journalistic accounts of Chinese lobbying byorganizing congressional delegations.

5 Commenting on the strength and sophistication of the Taiwan lobby, CharlesFreeman (quoted in Tucker 2001: 338) described how Taiwan skillfully played theconstituency card. Even if it was a Q-Tip cotton swab, according to Freeman, theTaiwanese made sure that the congressman from the district where cotton wasgrown knew Taiwan bought the cotton swab. By contrast, in 1980, the Chinesewere buying one out of seven bales of cotton produced in the U.S. but no one wasaware of this, except the Board of Trade at Chicago and the cotton traders.

6 For a good review of the arguments about the China threat, see Roy (1996). For amore benign view of the rise of China, see Spence (2005) and Zakaria (2005). Fora critical view of how the China threat is played up by the neoconservatives, seeKlare (2005). Pei (2005) is much more pessimistic about the rise of China, arguinginstead that China’s political system prevents it from becoming a real superpower.

176 Notes

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Index

Acheson, Dean 81, 169AFL-CIO 167–168Albright, Madeline 56American Institute on Taiwan 85–86, 97anti-Communism: Chiang Kai-shek’s

record of 80; impact on roll call voting129–131, 135, 141; measure of 38;Taiwan’s bond with Congress 97

anti-secession 6, 151arms embargo 6, 32, 40, 158Asia and Pacific, Subcommittee on

87–88, 96AuCoin, Les 63, 105

Baucus, Max 49, 100, 112, 143, 152Bellocchi, Nat 97Bereuter, Doug 38, 83, 88, 96, 167bicameralism 9, 10, 14, 43, 48, 51, 149;

cooling saucer 163; policy implicationsof 17; presidential dominance 51;structural differences 17, 143

Biden, Joseph 86, 166Bonior, David 70, 83, 170Bonker, Don 120Bush, George H.W.: Democratic

criticism of 150; kowtowing to Beijing111; MFN extension to Hungary 128,140; policy of “business as usual”64–65; pressure from Congress onTaiwan policy 84; renewal of China’sMFN 109, 111–112, 145–146, 162;Republican loyalty to 145; sales of F-16 jetfighters to Taiwan 145, 171–172;veto and override, 46, 50–52, 107, 114,116, 143, 145

Bush, George W. 40, 150, 167Byrd, Robert 64

Canada: roll call votes on 132; U.S. trade

with 124, 126–127Capitol Hill 15, 30, 34; anti-Communism

36; Chiang Kai-shek 80; China’shuman rights 58, 108; China’s PNTR66, 69; Chinese human rights lobbies106–107; Chinese lobby 154, 174;criticism of engagement policy 51;critics of China’s human rights 54, 58;Deng Xiaoping’s visit to 105; JiangZemin’s visit to 26; Madame ChiangKai-shek 80; MFN renewal for China30, 130; Taiwan lobby 98–99, 153, 171,173; trade with China 9, 77

Carter, Jimmy: establishment ofdiplomatic relations with China 34, 51,84, 171; human rights policy towardChina 100–104; meeting with DengXiaoping 174; promotion of PNTR67; secret diplomacy 81, 171; U.S.-China trade agreement 63; veto of HR2521 166

Cassidy 98–99Center for Security Policy 91, 159Chiang Kai-shek: military and economic

aid to 51; wife of 80China Aid Act 1, 5, 80, 98, 170China bloc 36, 80–81, 84, 87, 98, 165, 169China card 107China lobby 98, 169, 173–174China White Paper 81Chinese Exclusion Act 1Chinese Foreign Ministry 7Clinton, Bill: arms sales to Taiwan 56;

campaign for China’s PNTR 64–67,96; engagement with China 64, 111,119, 150; executive order linking MFNand China’s human rights 119, 121,128; illegal Chinese campaigndonations 30, 119, 165; lobbying

against Murkowski amendment 55,86–87; MFN renewal for China 64,150; MFN renewal for Vietnam 129;renewal of fast track authority 168;summit with Jiang Zemin 26–27, 49,55; Taiwan policy 84–87; Three-Nos151; visa to Lee Teng-hui 35, 55,87–88; votes on China’s MFN renewal114, 116–119, 140, 145; votes onChina’s PNTR 73–75, 145

Committee for Democracy on Taiwan 87Committee of One Million against the

Admission of Communist China tothe United Nations 173

Constituency influence 3, 19, 22; defensepolicy 148; foreign policy 22–23; seealso electoral connection

Constituency interests 10, 67 129, 135,147–149; congressional responsivenessto 22; foreign trade 69, 77; impact onroll call voting 4, 11, 19, 24, 72–73, 94,97; measures of 72, 91; Taiwan policy90, 172; U.S.-China trade 91

Constituency opinion: impact on rollcall voting 24–25, 161; measures of164; methodological issues concerning24

Cox, Christopher 35, 47, 55, 165Cox Committee 7Cox Report 7, 35, 165Craig, Thomas 49, 143, 152Crane, Philip 64, 128, 131, 140, 165

Dalai Lama 53, 152, 158, 166DeConcini, Dennis 107deficit, U.S. trade: Canada 126; China 9,

32, 61–63, 74, 77, 119, 130, 147; Japan125–126; Mexico 127; Taiwan 172; theworld 126

DeLay, Tom 26, 82, 165Democratic Party 20, 69, 75, 169Deng Xiaoping 5, 105, 162, 174Derwinski, Edward 104divided government 35, 39, 41, 96, 108Dixon, Alan 108Dole, Bob 57, 112, 166–167, 174;

amendment by 86Dole-Stone amendment 171Dornan, Robert 104Dreier, David 96

electoral connection: House-Senatedifference 22; human rights 120;Taiwan policy 97; trade issues 77

Emergency Chinese Immigration ReliefAct 50, 108, 116, 162, 175

English, Phil 63European Union 6, 32, 40, 153evil empire 111–112export control 12, 28, 158, 165; bills

regarding 29–31, 34Export-Import Bank 63, 66, 158

fast track authority 76, 122, 168filibuster 49, 163, 166Finance, Committee on 49, 68, 163forced abortion 26–27, 32, 105, 175forced labor 65, 74foreign assistance 28, 32, 45, 102,

159Formosa Resolution 5, 79, 81, 158Frank, Barney 105Fraser, Donald 103, 169free trade: constituency interests 77; fast

track authority 76; House-Senatedifference 76–77; impact on Americanjobs 76; labor union 21, 69; MaxBaucus 49; opposition to 76; partydivision over 20–21, 69, 73, 136, 151;support for 49, 75–77, 155

Freeman, Charles 153, 176

Garn, Jake 84gatekeeping rights 15–16, 49, 143, 163GATT (General Agreement on Trade

and Tariff): China’s membership in167; party division over 73–74, 168;roll call votes on 75

Gephardt, Richard 26, 70, 105Gibbons, Sam 64, 112, 118, 131Gilman, Benjamin 47, 49–50, 56, 88, 143,

165, 167Glenn, John 8, 86, 171Goldwater, Barry 84, 87Gore, Al 168Graham, Lindsey 6, 63, 77, 150, 155Grassley, Chuck 60, 67

Hamilton, Lee 155hearings 15, 19, 27–28, 50; on China’s

human rights 57–58, 102Helms, Jesse 36, 47, 56–57, 111, 149, 164,

167Holbrooke, Richard 101Hong Kong 34, 67, 111, 164human rights: bills regarding 29, 31, 104;

campaign for 52, 101–103, 176;Chinese violation of 30, 57, 101, 103,

200 Index

106, 128; conflict with other policies120, 147; double standards 121;exemption of China from 101–104;impact on roll call voting 135, 137,141; Jimmy Carter 101; lobbies106–107; Richard Nixon 101; roll callvotes on 113, 175; Romanianviolation of 128, 140; strategies topromote 102, 113, 152; Taiwan 29, 34,87, 158, 168–169, 175; Tibet 54, 57,104, 166

Hungary: MFN renewal for 128,148–149; roll call votes on 128,131–132; U.S. trade with 130

Hyde, Henry 6

ideology: attributes of 21–22, 164;correlation with party 24, 71; impacton roll call voting 3–4, 11–12, 24, 73,94, 173; measure of 93, 146, 173;predictor of foreign policy voting 146;sources of data on 159

Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 12, 21,32, 64, 112

interest group 54, 99, 161, 172International Operations, Subcommittee

on 58, 120International Relations, Committee on

27, 49, 56, 83

Jackson, Henry 103, 162, 174Jackson-Vanik Amendment: emigration

requirement 57, 108, 128, 174; formerSoviet Union 103, 173–174;procedures of 167; removal of Chinafrom 65, 167

Japan: economic sanctions against China153; roll call votes on 132; U.S. tradewith 124–127; UAW 136

Javits, Jacob 171Jiang Zemin: meeting with members of

Congress 26; summit with Bill Clinton55; visit to the U.S. 7, 27, 34

Johnson, Lyndon 127

Kemp–Inouye–Helms amendment 164;see also Mexico City policy

Kennedy, Edward 87, 107Kissinger, Henry 58, 67, 101, 154Knowland, William 170, 173Korean War 36, 169

labor union: China’s MFN renewal113–114; Democratic Party 21, 69, 75;

impact on roll call voting 67, 135;NAFTA 135–136; PNTR 66, 68–69,76, 136, 168

Lantos, Tom 47, 78, 167Leach, James 87Lee Teng-hui 35, 55, 87Lenovo 6Levin, Carl 87, 167Lieberman, Joe 88Lilley, James 101Lord, Winston 105, 121Lott, Trent 47

Macao 164majority cycling 15Mansfield, Mike 63, 80Manton, Thomas 81Markey, Edward 107Mathis, Dawson 47, 102Matsui, Robert 112McCurdy, Dave 105McIntyre, Thomas 63Mexico: comparison with China 137; roll

call votes on 132; U.S. trade with 124,127

Mexico City policy 164; see alsoKemp–Inouye–Helms amendment

MFN: bills regarding 29–32; executiveorder 111, 119, 121, 128; Hungary128–30; joint resolutions to disapproveof 11, 30–31, 109–110, 113, 120, 174;linkage with human rights 48–49, 54,111–112, 119, 121, 153; opposition to111, 128; presidential veto 48, 50–52,108–109, 112; Romania 128, 132, 137;unconditional renewal of 49, 58, 111,119, 150, 175; Vietnam 128–129,131–132

military-industrial complex 89, 91, 97,172–173

Miller, Clem 16missile technology 30, 119, 165Mitchell, George 175Moynihan, Patrick 57, 111, 167Murkowski, Frank 84, 88, 172Murkowski Amendment 55 145

NAFTA (North America Free TradeAgreement): congressional debateabout 127, 136; labor union oppositionto 135–136; Mexico 127; party divisionover 73; roll call votes on 74–75;Senate passage of 76

Nanking Treaty 167

Index 201

National Offshore Oil Corporation(NOOC) 6

Negroponte, John 101new institutionalism 12, 13, 48;

application of 4, 9, 10, 142; insightsfrom 14; prediction of 10

Nixon, Richard: visit to China 5, 37, 103,129

normalization 5, 34, 42, 64, 84, 102–103;Bush’s involvement in 51; Congress’srole in 8

North Korea 12, 79nuclear secrets: Chinese theft of 7, 30,

119, 165nuclear technology: Chinese transfer to

Iran 26; Chinese transfer to MiddleEast countries 158; transfer to China27

OPICO (Overseas Private InvestmentCorporation) 53–54

Pallone, Frank 83, 170Panetta, Leon 105party leadership 4, 19, 23, 170Pease, Donald 51 87Pell, Claiborne 47, 87–88,Pelosi, Nancy 26, 70, 112–113, 175;

sponsor of China bills 50–51, 54;Taiwan 88

PNTR (Permanent Normal TradeRelations): Bill Clinton 64, 73; linkagewith Taiwan policy 83; opposition to69–70, 76, 136, 168; support for 67–68,136, 147; votes on 65

Porter, John 167Pritchard, Joel 104procedural legislation 19, 55, 57–58public opinion 17, 108, 161; favorable

toward China 36, 38, 40–41; framingof 19, 55, 58; impact on China policy25, 36–37; impact on public policy 24,36; measure of 25; responsiveness to24, 37, 98; significance of 24

Radio Free Asia 27, 50, 55Rangel, Charlie 168Reagan, Ronald: human rights policy

toward China 101; Mexico City policy164; opposition to auto domesticcontent bills 136; renewal of MFNstatus for Romania 128, 140, 175;support for Taiwan 5, 84, 171

Regula, Ralph 64

Republican Party 20, 69, 173Richardson, Bill 105Roemer, Tim 112Rogers, Mike 63Rohrabacher, Dana 47, 88, 107Romania: MFN renewal for 128, 137;

roll call votes on 132, 140; U.S. tradewith 130

Rose, Charlie 167Rostenkowski, Dan 112, 128, 131Roth, Stanley 98, 153–154rule of anticipated reactions 55–57Ryan, Tim 63

sanctions 27, 46, 105–106, 121, 152–153,167

Sasser, James 8Scarborough, Joe 26Schulze, Richard 64, 111, 128Schumer, Charles 6, 63, 77, 150, 155Shanghai Communiqué 55Silver Purchase Act 21, 162Smith, Chris 26, 47, 70, 111, 166;

hearings on China’s human rights 58Smith, Gordon 6Solarz, Stephen 47, 87, 121, 175Solomon, Gerald 47, 85, 88, 107, 111,

165Solomon, Richard 120Soviet Union (former) 2, 101; demise of

11, 107–108; MFN status for 57,103–104, 167, 173–174; strategicalliance against 11, 103, 120, 128, 144

Stevens, Ted 172Stone, Richard 63substantive legislation 19, 56–57

Taiwan: anti-secession law 6; arms salesto 12, 55, 84, 144, 89–90, 99, 164, 171;bills regarding 30–32, 34, 47; 82;congressional support for 5, 24, 30, 98,151, 156; 162, 172; constituencyinterests 91, 172, 176; democratization24, 97, 156; Frank Murkowski 55, 84,88 145, 172; human rights 29, 34, 87,169, 175; Lee Teng-hui 35, 55, 87;lobby 98–99, 153, 176; roll call voteson 82–83, 85–86; U.S. militaryrelations with 49, 81, 84, 93; U.S. tradewith 29, 90, 172; Walter Judd 80, 173;William Knowland 170, 173

Taiwan Relations Act: arms sales under55, 164; bipartisan support for 84, 171;congressional debate of 34, 87;

202 Index

executive-legislative skirmish over 81,84, 171; Jesse Helms 164; language onhuman rights 87, 172; partisan divisionover 84; roll call votes on 85–86;significance of 81

Taiwan Security Enhancement Act 11,35, 56, 82, 145

tariff: Generalized System of Preference167; on Chinese products 6, 51, 63,111, 150, 158

Three Nos 151Tiananmen Incident: bills introduced

before and after 10, 32–33; impact onCongress 5, 11, 33–34, 36–37, 40,105–106; 144; passions about 116;symbol of Chinese human rights 152,155

Tibet: bills regarding 29, 31–32, 34, 47,53; Dalai Lama 152; human rights 54,57, 104, 106, 152, 166

Truman, Harry: aid to Chiang Kai-shek36, 51, 80, 169; comparison withClinton 52; reelection of 83;Republican criticism of 35, 40, 52, 80,83–84, 146, 150, 169

UAW (United Auto Workers) 125, 127,136, 175

Unified government 35, 96United Nations: China’s admission to 5,

36, 98, 169; Taiwan’s admission to 88Unocal Corporation 6UNPF (United Nations Population

Fund): bills regarding 29–31, origin ofthe controversy 164–165

U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement 126,131

U.S.-China Act: of 1991 50; of 1992 51

U.S.-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic MissileDefense Cooperation Act 11, 35, 82

U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty 79,81, 84

Vandenberg, Arthur 170veto 9–11, 14, 17–18, 42, 163; George

H.W. Bush, 50–52; impact on Chinapolicy 112, 143; Jimmy Carter 166

Vietnam: MFN renewal for 128–129,131; roll call votes on 132, 137, 140;U.S. trade with 130

Walden, Greg 67Walter, Judd 80, 170, 173Wanghia Treaty 167War Powers Act 18Ways and Means, Committee on 63, 66,

83, 112–113, 128, 131, 168weapons proliferation 74, 77, 112, 144White House: alliance with free trade

supporters 113, 155; disagreementswith Congress on China policy 35, 64;engagement with China 109; partycontrol of 37–38

WHO (World Health Organization) 54Wilson, Woodrow 13, 15–17, 43, 48, 122Wofford, Harris 107Wolf, Frank 6, 60, 111, 128, 140;

amendment by 132, 137, 140WTO (World Trade Organization):

China’s accession to 28, 64–67, 76,95–96, 154, 158, 168; Taiwan’saccession to 65; withdrawal of 158; seealso PNTR

Zablocki, Clement 28, 85Zhu Rongji 64

Index 203

us-china relations: china policy on capitol hill

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