vci:. ~.fvf- 6e .. j'' -?~ ./;~){ · yc., ~ leidf_oflhe u.s .• tam ~~!he lit i n...

14
-·· •. · PAGE 11114 Sub.i: PubUc Alfaln Guidance - ewe Moc:lt IDspections 1. The public affairs guidallc$ i$ foJ USCI by all acldiCSSCC$ during Qemlcnl Woapoa.s (CWC) mocl:. inspection• c:onciucred p:lor to entry into ffll!le of the-, .. 2. 'l11c publie affairs pos11110 Is paslhte, response 10 qlljl1. 911lf) . . . A. $!Aliment toquo:t;y: Quoto. (NameD! illsWiatioo} IJ training for possible' future visits by ir.speaon ft'OIP the 01plnizadoa for rhe Prohlbldoo of ChenlicaJ Weapons.-Durins this pmolllld will CCIIIduct a mnn•l•rv.f vl .. dt by an ensure lhC illn complllllce wilb the n:lcvut pmvlafoas of til• Weapons ConvCIItk>n. :s. no qucsdoas an:IJIIWY'd forJUpOJIIC to czacey: Wbat ls.the..tJ. S. polltloa Oil dlemlealwarfaret The "Qu,iled Sialcs will Mt 01111 chemil:a1 weapoos cnpge in any llliUtar)' prepanlionl to. weltplmS. 1bc United Sta_. is abo committed to tho }I'Ohlbilion of aB f'onlll af r.bcmlcal weapons (i.e. development, production, llloc:ltpilins, 115e, rdenlion, acqaisltloo, or . j trnn$1"er). Vci:. 6e .. j'<J>' ;/q'Zflt!lll Q2. wbat wllnhe Chemical Weap001 C111wenlicm prohibit? .. . . A1. to the Convention IUlderlake nova-,llllder ur. . - develop, 9fhawire acqunr aoekpilc or main chemical weapoas, or mJit.fct, . .- -.- cb=IRJ weapons. - cnpgc 1a 10 UIC c:bcmk:al \VI!apCIII. - cr illduc:c, In any way, iln)'QIIC to eopp in llllivi1ia prdlib\1cd by tho Convention. I I '!.

Upload: buithuan

Post on 11-Sep-2018

212 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

-·· •. · PAGE • 11114

-~

Sub.i: PubUc Alfaln Guidance - ewe Moc:lt IDspections

1. The f'~& public affairs guidallc$ i$ a~ foJ USCI by all acldiCSSCC$ during Qemlcnl Woapoa.s Coove~~tion (CWC) mocl:. inspection• c:onciucred p:lor to entry into ffll!le of the-, .. 2. 'l11c publie affairs pos11110 Is paslhte, response 10 qlljl1. 911lf) .

~lt>('ti.- . . A. 111cf~ $!Aliment may~ ~fcif'~ toquo:t;y: Quoto. (NameD!

illsWiatioo} IJ ~~ training for possible' future visits by ir.speaon ft'OIP the 01plnizadoa for rhe Prohlbldoo of ChenlicaJ Weapons.-Durins this trainin~o pmolllld will CCIIIduct a mnn•l•rv.f vl .. dt by an ~ctioiiii!CIIto ensure lhC lnstallati~ illn complllllce wilb the n:lcvut pmvlafoas of til• 01~ Weapons ConvCIItk>n.

:s. no ~ng qucsdoas and~ an:IJIIWY'd forJUpOJIIC to czacey:

Q~ Wbat ls.the..tJ. S. polltloa Oil dlemlealwarfaret

L~. The "Qu,iled Sialcs will Mt 01111 chemil:a1 weapoos ~ cnpge in any llliUtar)' prepanlionl to. US!>~ weltplmS. 1bc United Sta_. is abo committed to tho }I'Ohlbilion of aB f'onlll af r.bcmlcal weapons (i.e. development, production, llloc:ltpilins, 115e, rdenlion, acqaisltloo, or . j

trnn$1"er). Vci:. ~.fvf- 6e .. j'<J>' o!wfJfWj~ ;/q'Zflt!lll -?~ ./;~){

Q2. Spedn~:~uy, wbat wllnhe Chemical Weap001 C111wenlicm prohibit? .. . .

A1. .Speclfically;-~ to the Convention IUlderlake nova-,llllder any~ ur.

. - develop, prvd~~<:e, 9fhawire acqunr aoekpilc or main chemical weapoas, or mJit.fct, . .- ~yor~y.cbemlcalweapcmstoanyone.

-.-cb=IRJ weapons.

- cnpgc 1a oymililat)'~ 10 UIC c:bcmk:al \VI!apCIII.

- ~--ae cr illduc:c, In any way, iln)'QIIC to eopp in llllivi1ia prdlib\1cd by tho Convention.

I

I '!.

'• .. ,.

PFlGE.Cil05

":"'~il:oy ~ chemical weapons IIIey OWII or possess or diet arc localed illiD)" place under llleir jlllisdiecion.

- demo)' all ~berical weapons h llballclolled. 011 th~ ta:litoty of lllOlllcr par( 10 tile ueaty.

" - dfilllDY lillY p.ohibited dlcmiQtl weapons p!Odudicm fdili" il OWilll orJIQiSe!m o·

that are lo:ated in any place ~ilsjuritcliction or c:oalrOl

Q:'J, Wlml t)'Jif!S (/t inspections wiU b~ CCIIIduc:ted under tile ChemiQI W•poas Convention!

A3. 'I'o easwe complimce. the~~ Weapons Convallioa bant!Jid ~ n:&ime consisting of101111M in$p8CIIona and/«ecmlinuolls 111011illlriug of dcciiiRd faoilitiel P4 eballt.Dge ~of Ill)' !)lace liJidu thejurisdiclion of a mcpany whrA tbete is a c:ompliaDce Cl'DC:;;J! ••

.. ~~ ~~~:.pcJiodic, sy.~tcmatk; abmt-oollce iuspecl:iofll ofbxb !,DVioualy. ~ ehcmk:al weapous fdhie.s aDd n *Iii!~ cbembl flcllldes

. · . t!ll:l ~~chemicals tbar could be IIJfd or~ 10 mab chcmk:a1 weapms.

: - ~'lllen&e ~ n intrusive. ~-IIOilco in8pol:liolla of aay fJI:ilily where e. !JIIl'tyiO.lh~ 1n:a1y ~~~~ Wepl ~ weapa~~sacli.Yit~ds lllldDJpllce. Any patty t.o. the-IIU!y may nquesta ehalleop inspcclion, wblch is~ by the lntematlonal Tochnical-Seacwial of the OPCW with a teport offilldillga to the OPCW'a ExCClllive CouncU. ·

- MoniKirillg ot munidons delrruelion opera~• will bo aulhcrbed llllllliUc:IJ . opemlons am compleiOCL

~. ·WIIJ me4la "pA~~~Rtlldvoa ~:~ dlowed' to aeco~npany OPCW fniPectora durina tbelt b,!l!dlcms?

A<!.. No. Media~ wlU 11ot bo alloWed to accompa11y inspecdoq ,_dminB tb, ~m 111 ~ 10 ensmc 111c inspecdoD pnx:mtsJIOtdbnlpced. ~to~ mr;pecton prior to. or followilla ~ c:1111 bo Sllbmiued llld will bo ...m.a!dmd oo a cm..~ebul&

•; .. _. ~ ........ PAGE,8il!S

Q5. Wlllllle OPCW InsPectors II! nw:bbteto ~ quesiiOilllnmi medm repreaeotlltlws? What allout extended lndl\llduallntel"'''etvvl? -

AS. PleaH l!lbmit )'OlD' nquest to the loaal illstallalioa publie affaiq ofDci:r. '>'ho will ClCOft!lr..r.t> )'OUr nquosr wilh 1J.1e leader or the U. S. tealll t¢COIIIpallyiaglbc OPCW l.llli(ICCiioll ~

QG. WID a "· S. represmatatlve be aV!Iflable to &~~~Mr questlolll from media represimfatlves?. Wb!at about extended llldlvlduatlntervlews'l

A6. Yc., ~ leidF_oflhe U.S .• tam ~~!he lit I n iaspeetion team will bnVIIIlable forintirvlewi either beAn ur roUowinc the inspecdQD. If enouab media In_ II expa c d to lhe local inllllladqn Jlllbli~; affairs ofl\oe, a JGis ~ may ~ sdltdu1cd lll•llart of &he visit, aru:llll.}he ~ of the visit. Rcquesu for C'Jitemied iamviewc shclaJd be cuhmlllf4to tbc local. insta)latlon public affairs office or the media center •

. Q7, W~J'·.areO~ lnspeetOI'$ visltln1 (NAME OF JNSTALLAn0~7

A7. As-~ slplary .to, me CwC, the Uni!Cd Swes bas dedared ill cl>e@i 111 weapc~~~~ flldlidell. ~ hQ)jd~ arc Sl!l>j!'R 10 routine, vrrecunin& Wpecliom by IJI1ema1iGnal OPCW irllpecloi'& 1'1111 OPCW iaipccls dies. facilit!es,likf c punp.gfinstaJ!aJjop 1 in order to COIIfitm tho U.S. -d~lioD.

Qlt Wllld are the costs.tor u.s; partldpallon In the ewe Prepmltor)' Comrulalon? Wbat 'Will-be tbe ccm or our parddpatlolliD the Organlzatlou for tile Prohlbltlon of Chend~Weapii!U.(OPCW) aller the CWC erlten Into fon.'eT

AS. ':l'J!c ~ toed~tc panyortbc O"lCW w_lll becalcWalcdon the 1J!!sis otthe U.N.acateof. ~ adjlllted to take into acc:o~~~~t ditfereaca in IIIODlllersldp. Tho u.s. C»DUibbldon iJ eapoctiKIIO' &e lbo!it zs pen:en1 or 111e 0vora11 co~~. Tllf conlribuclolls or lhc ewe 10 _. nadona!<sccurUy make it-well worth illmadcsc price.

01m11t eslimatcs of the CO$I: for the fin! tun )'eat Qt operation of tile O.PCW are aboiJt $70 Jni1!km. 1hk includes all opcrati~~& CO$IS, im:ludin& but not limircd 10 Slaftinc aDd 11111111nc ~01\L ~the U.S.essessmentfor the Ol'CW will be aboat$17.S milliooclurlng lbc first year after t~~~ry. into r- -

Jn.dle tiBW ~ slneo lhc Pleparalllry ~WI$ establishocl.aa ~r~~nPofP' pm:em of die budget~ bu been pald ~ yc& 1bls is consi4erably better lban me tate of . ,

J

•,

PAGE.9B7

payment to othef fntematiOAal OI'S&nizations, indicaliDg enormous buematloollllll}lPQI't and c:ommitnlent to lhe ewe.

Q9. wm the ewe c:onliRUt die ti&bt aplnat ~tal terrorism? Would the ewe lla-.. ln!IJ)M If It had been fa filrce last~ wileD thl dlemlcal attadc oc:cvrnd ou IJJeJapa~:J subway?

/'.9. ~ewe is both an Ul!lS c:ontrol and 11011~ Ileal)' that 'balls the developmeDc, ~ ecqmsiti011, r.tockpiliDs. :tetenlion ud ll'lll$l'er of ebt<nical weapou. Althoup 1h3 ewe was not deslgDIId to prevent chemical tet10rism. certaill aspect& of the Ccaveation. !nc:ludina ill law e!lfoteedllllt~ IIIII llOIIplV!it'cntiOn ptMaignl. will bollu:rC'.'Iisdag

' ofi'Cl'IS to~ chemical tmarlsm.

. !mplc:meaJins,leJislat!oa Rq~ by the ewe will~ leglllllllhor:ity 10 iJm:alipte ~ ~tlsoa who~ to acq~cbelnical weapoos befcn such weapons~ axe llted. as in Totyoio·Marcb 1m. ; , .

TJ1e A 11m Sh~ eue illusnated that a dcmrmined 1crmist JIOliP IDlY 8lill be able to obtain ~ cbetn\pahi needed to produce chelolcal weapQIJ$. NevcnllelCIS, the DOJipro1lfcmiOJI

r.nMsiQns of !be CWC·will make leJfOrist ac:coss to dlemicalwcapons - difliclllt by nqai!ln: paries to.eliminate·~lionals\Oekpiles and by corurollillg inlallatiollal IIIIlS( as of c:ataln ch=icals rhatc&a~ used ro IDalce dlemical weapoa$.

Q~O, .. Will the CWO lead to '"uced procludlon or use or chemical weapons'!' Or Will -.tria that W8J1t thea Wl8piiiiS dl rmd 8 W8fl0 pl. them? WID tilt CWC loeJp.our

. aqnprollteration alrOIU! Row? .

A10. Panies wW have toellmln•te ltOCkpilcs IIIII )X'DdUcllon capeblllry and ead lrii2Sfels a£ cc:rado qco~~11111 precmiDI'S to- pmdcs. n. ~ t11JbDG wm iDclu8e the risk or detection and tho ~lltical prico ar DOilCotDpllange. Thus, by clclelriDJ cw propams, the ewe will rea5l1ll't ~in liiiSiable repPJia thatthairneiabbcn areoot pvnuiDr~ ~,, so dJey c;an IJI!dy 1\Wfd &Uc:h propams ollbcir OWD. Othas may dcd4e dlat my. marginal llrllll'lile plnfmm"c:healin& does 1101 WIDJIIIII tba hei&fneued risk and QpeDSII. Sm. pazlla VJ!1l 1llso have to WOO)' rhat clandesi!Do CW propms wuaJd be maled beclllse otlocaeased pub!Jc a')Wli'ODess ud ill<:cntives to make such proarams !mown.

'I)le ew-e wilt also~ ourablllly to deal wllb a problem 11111 wc~arrywaywith or without the-treaty - discoYerins wbicll$1&101 are de~&aad pmchlcia& CW 11111 so IDight

·.

~~ .

1brci\ICJ1. OlD' fon:es at t1l8ir nei;bbor's. ( ,declaratioll and verificaUoD ~ of the CWC J demand ~ ttanJpvency, ~~otherwise unavailabl~informatioa thai wiD lmJ!f~\'.3 . our ~ty 10 detect clandWine CW progrru,ns.

Qll:.. Whetlf~2 eouDtms~~,JSPeCl«< orf". 'naoueetlnJto paaea claemleal we~~ pons do not join tbe ret!itne'l Won't this seriO'JSI7 damap ICs dfedlftlltSB ftnd credi~Ulf)l'l · ·

All. TbG CWCputS new prc:ssu~ on coulllrics tbal RmalD oliiSidc. They will be subjcciiO polilical ~ and,inrensificd SCIUtin)' for siSJIS of CW acdvlty. The CWC trade restrictions also ban or !inlit lradG in cenaih importalll inchlsttial cbemWals with coon~ OUl$ide tho regime.

.'r,le cwc·s-~na llld vcrificadco tequiremellts will suengtbeu oW itlility 10 cJisoovcr IUid · QOU!tor-CW ~.even in I:Olllllries dw do \lDl 'bcl:omc parties. .

. ~ ~-wiD t11e ewe help lhouutries Join the ewe 111111 dleat1

.,uz. ccam. cariJmW be- cb1:y wm CYido dclecCioll. For example, cwc decllaadca · Wonucdoa,dw b ~~with U.S.IIItalliJODCO c:ould flaJ orlJelp sa~ llOJIOr!DIJ

about possibk IIOOQOIIIpllance. Re&U)8r IDOilltorini aaivities at ebemical iDdusiiJ facilitb will· force vt~ to COIISid.er either abandonina.cw JIIOBI'8IIIS onelocalinJlbem 10 l:lanclestllle situ,~ the cost and also rislclna de!ection. ·

.!n 111m, t;OIII:Cins ~bout possible nonr:omplianec can be pursued tbrouab dJallcaao illspccdOII!.. as well.u. "blllllcn1 consulladons and multilatetaliiCtions of rhc OPCW Exccudvo Cloundllllld uld!DIIIdy,lbc U.N. Security CounciL The U.S. ~ b$ ptepand to 11SCI any or all of the.e mcehanism, u·~ to addreu~ abom possible IIOIICOIDpllillce.

. . . QU.. Bow 'Will -ft pi'Uhel aplnJl dltmlcal weaJ)OIIS In die event~ art: 111ec1 aplnst om· · troopf? l'fon't·t!lt ewe~ false leCUrltJ, causing our prvtecdve capabJIItr to erode?

AlS; 'Jbo.Depaallneill of Defense willmalatain arcbuatchemkal weapiXII dckaaiwcepebilhy -s.;rpponod b)' awoaaiw iniCIIigeDQO collcetioa cflQna. Thill GOIIIIIIiiiiXIIl to~ our fmoBs, ~ w1111111 aWity npidly 10 bllni to belrU. CMl'Wbt:lmlll& pov.uotow miJIIay capabil1tioa, will fOlDI tbo baclibonc or mililll)' dCIUIJalllC apinst uy ~ill die: ewe ~- Nothing in the lmltyreatricuoltnl:livilies in thinepm.

" .

- PA6E.01!J9 ' .

j tr'

Ql<l• .WUllhe Q.S. destroy our chem!ctl wtapoiiS within tile CWC timetable? Isn't It pG3Slble tbat.IIOllle Elalelm111 f>lo::!l. tllo: COIIIInJdkm or dlltnllltlon 1at:Bitls and delay t..~:J proc:ess7

A14. The CWCrequircs~ of aU Cldslinl C::W 11ocb within a 10-ycar paiod after en!Jl' into force. We haw already bep ~under Public Law 99-145... We fuUy in=d10 deslroy,lhe U.S.Sf9Ckplle as requlrlllf by tbe Convendon. Ourc:unear.CW deltt1K:tion PlQIJIDI

.Will en~ )bat :we meet this Yllal obliplion.

. Q~,.Tile~C·JITOblblbparde& from usi11g riot (OIItrol ap~~taaa"metbod ofwatfare." 'fbls.pllra~ Is not defined In tile tM.ty. Wllat is tile Admlalstratloa'81nterpretatioD otth:!a .provlslpa?, Dldtfle Joillt Cldefs ol StaiT oppGR d1e Convendoa•sl111ilts 011 riot eoatnJt

... .1.&1,11~ w~~Jn'"" .

r;y.t:. <)IJ'J.;,;Al5• As~Cliluoohldlcated ln·aleUSrtothoSellate inJ-1994,thcAdminisftlivn \ ~otf~ 'lQ· • ~puslbcCW~pltlbibiliOI\oatbnseotrlot~aaeatsilliMr••ri=•h,.leu1'1181•med 1 ~.t'f'P Osfi's ~~~IISCSofRCAs.sucbasiiOmllll~lopelalioaJ.Jaw 1)-F cf• ,A"- "''"'fl!f(lfCCUQit O)Klia&-,luullallltariaJ aad diwtl:r ld1c:f opcmloas. countertcmllist lllld ~

, .. 1.-~1' ~ opetallOm, lllld JIOI!QO.Gibatam :=ue opc:ralkms COIICIIIC1ed OUIIk1c sw:b cxmf!ICII are

ll"~vJI':'~ r.,cf"1111l!ffc:claJt.ulbeConvendon.) . 17"' • · CIJ..rv • • "'~ ·: · · .

p.r<('O -.kCWCdoet·!JOtapplytoa11 usesai'RCAsin tlmeohrmed«=fflci. U•ofltCAs roldy aga!DslDOJII'D"'l?'rants for Jaw eaf'-t, riot COilii'Ol, or Olhel' JIOIICOI!IbaJint pwpoae& VIOtlkl JIOt.~ ~ u a "uled!od of.WIIfare" aad .-rcn VIOIIId DOC be problbiled. AccordlaalY. ·!be CWC does not p!dribil!he UK Dl RCA$ in~ llOIII!VlliiUallons in ll'CISIIPda' du.et U.S. mililaty ~II'Ol.laeludlng aplnsutodns priiODcn of war, and 10 protea llOIIvoy& Jrom c:!Vil ~ k:mlrisu !llld pmmililll)' orpllizalloas in R8t .-a outside the zoneotismucd!aw combat.

\ \

(. I ·>,o,\

lj ~' f ,,.-r; . \~lh .

. "''''"' I "

r

~ ~· -co~.,;.. ,'>n,.•>!.t~71fw'r rHt- ,~.., .. ,:,,., u' 7'rh' ~ .. t ~-;J..>14...,.' »fc~ A••t··~j,...«' <:F= .~~~ .... -. . ~ ... ,..tt ,,.~ lltfls ,,. »~o'\0· ®s,_.lJM>-/at;y.l-l•~J...- llk'P~~ 'k;t:;~~·}"-.mn~-

1i. ~lloul""'' ·W. J!eep IIOI!Jt chemical weapons tJ our ltac:kplle for al'llllllataq -.., .• 'IT'~ · apainllt:t !It-comeCOUIItrfea clleet or ICily oulllde the nglme?

A16: Ocncnl·Sbalikasbvili, OIIIIJmu of die Jolnt 01iefs of 518ft, tclliliccl "Deeat Sl«m JIR)VC(l !hat ~li•rion in 1jllcl it IIQI Kq_11in:d 10 c1c1w the 1110 of cheulical weapons." As lie gpl""'ed.

.. •.. PA6E.BIB

"tho U.S.~'sability 10dtlercbemieal weapons in apoaCWCworld will bepredica1cdon both ~ robult dlerllieal weapons detense capability IJld 1he llbility 10 111piclly brJDs 10 tar Sl>pl!l'iiJr and ovezwhelllling milliiiiY fOI'Qe In retaliation aaainSt a cbemic:al a11lll:k."

'f.he.<;:w~pmllibits all CW use, includin& tmllat!on Ul Jdnd. However, lbe CWC'aDOW!i patties 10 ~-C'N dcfcmlvc PJ03I'IIliS aDd docs 110t constraia non-CWC milillay Il:IJlllllre& to CW attack. 'l'be Uaillld States' 1111paior !Ddividual ptotectlcoled lraiDiu~: FllJr&lll, clelcclloo capabilities and medical suppon, f\D1hermllKlC bo1h lbe ctrecliv-of a CW auac::k mt lliJ o~'s incentivts 10 use ciii'Dlil:al weapons qalml U.S. folccs,

. ~U7• ·~-·doc$ dle ewe eo~~tribute 10 u.s. aeurit7'1

A~1- Ila1umeroos ways. By rc:quiriaalllal o11ter1 eliminate lheiTcbemicalwcaJICIIIS u we-n ~~now, tbo Convenlion tal~ the likcllhoochbat OIII'IIOOpa will~ 10face C!W IJIIuls.Jn iiltr.t, l'llll't.

The .ewe w:l!l-u a basis for lntemaliOJIIII ac;Jion aplDst those who II)' 10 acquh'e ;;t>mlical ~ !he ewe makes them compktely illept The 1923 OaJeva P.ococol only :cs~~ ~II!C.

'I'M CWC'1 ~.vcrltlcat!otl rt&iflle, wbich rcqaircs !CpOl'IS 011 COillllleiCial pmductioa. md 1n111o 1D ecNIII ~s as wdl as iDspell'dons of military lllld oolliiDiii'Cial. '.w:!Udcs. wl1l IIIU~ offwil to monillll' CW IIOIIviliea wcrldwidc:o, iuc:lading eff'ons to llllCJUIIe CW whellu:r inside or oullidc the J:1111me.

F!Dallf, the ewe will bolslief effons 10 fiaht ebemlcal termrlsm. In 1apan Jut year. we Ell'll !he first tetrOlist-of c:bemica1 weapons lpiast llulooalt civilianL 'll1rou&b ill IIOIIPJQliferat!or. ' provisloas antlils ~llfordomcltlc lmplomenliDJJoaislatlon. die CWCwill~ 'Jlilet.anliJeH;Oiist ~

. Ql!l. :mn tbe Orpnlza6on for the Pnlblbltlon, ot Cllemkal Weapo~~~ detect dleaten In u . timely fashloB p'(t& ,.. large DUmber alftadlldes to lie laspemd. thllr da-uture ~ tbe ease ot COIICI!IIlmeRt vt prohibited adl.tlies7 ID fact, lllll't tbe CWC llll'l'erll1able1

.. I I

· . .. PAGE. Bll

?llc ~~ 4:imllllns 1bc nmt ~1\Wivo and inlnlsive wrificalioarealmc IMI'11380:itttc·.:" cowrinC l'inually C\'l:ty aspocr of n C:W pl'O&I'aln, from ciGYdopmcnt through produc1loD :mel . StOCkpiling. The ConYCIIdon 's tmMsions provide -=ss to clcclarcd and ~ ftu:!Jltles, lhus maldng ~ cw prod~ii0.1 lllld liiOdtpiliD& more difficult, risky. w~moe.

. 'Ibe ~P.IIkln has also deulmillld lhalllle ewe provisions wiU 4elecl aipificant violation& aJid tbat.the U.$. doN not lloed CW to deler CW usc agailut 0111' forces. bec:lule ~:~~perior u.s. militaly r~ coupled wilh a 1nodcm defCIIsive JllVIliUlo Is qllltoadequa~e 10 deter or~d 10 CW usc.

Q~. !!] the ewe (IUft'ldently lntl'llllve to provide efl'eeti~ verit'oeatlon? . . ""..,.~ - .

( t:<'~ .e::. l\.19. Yo:;: '1'lle CWC'a vaifioaliol,l ptOYi$ionl ~ COIDpeliac lalei'OII$ - oar DOCd 10 prota..'l:

11~-;~-' ••·~ •• ) masfliveuco-CW DUollll SCC;Urity lnfom1alia&l, oonsritlltional 'fi&hls 8lld IIQll-CW popziewy \ .. ~ r· ~,onlile~lwld;on lbcocber,OID'dairefor1bc.IICCCSI__,-to-ctfealml (v' \, . . ~.llll&llkccm:IICO. . i ~ "llht<t... . ... ~ S~:CCC~slw Mmlols!lldaas 11avo cxmc:luded t11a1 t11o .ewe aldka lho u&b' balulco tm:l

m::t the: cwc1s ~ anclpromu~e~ v.s.lllllional cocarieyialal:sts.

. ·-~'llliM·iDspe!:dons wiD Cllhallce dtileueace end~~~ of illid' producdca by IIIDIIit!.l!i!l~i IICI!v'.dc:$ a cbemlc!;l tndusUy facilities. Thae lnspecdons will ke vio1arors 10 QODsider abandolllliJ 1llelr CW pcoarams or going to lhc cffon 111111 alSt ot uyiiiJIO ~It lhemto

· tJaliC!eaanc ti~.

,

. Qla!lenp ~~will further Cllbr.nce clclemDce lllld dclcctloa of prohibited activit!e&b;r alloWiJII pu:lies 10 reQIItSIIII inspeaion-10 resolve a Clllllplllmca caacem. The patc:rlhe ~~ .and size of 111 illlc:h ~ lhe more li!:cly It will te deleCieli

~9. Js It lkeiJ tlltt·U.S. will be subJect to cballeDaelllspecllonT Are tlltre11113' quat~& .~tin& tilt~ ofcblllenft ~ weiiiiiSl reed~

Aio; Thcl\llt 110 q1101a on.llle nlllllller of cllaJJeaae illlpcCiioas dJIIt a pany IIIIISl ~ Of -,.lt,fl1mpoNlblc to lftdlcl·bow oftelllibaDcap inlplll:lloal will CKX:ilrlllll, Ill pullcular, whelhet die, U.S.~ be subjce110 a ~hlspeelloll. .

... PA6E.012

JJi 1be C\'all a ~&e lnspcdcm cloea OCCilr In 1be U.S., the CWC ~OWIU to c:oD#Ol . . access.to fllmli• iD a ~ay dW p!OTCCIJ ICII$hlvc -.cw lnfOI1JIIIIloD u Well u COII&IIIIIIIona1 rlaJlls. 'I'beiO "manapl at:«M" provisiolll n:quft that we tllW C'ittyiC I&Oiilb!C dfOd to provide allt;qJalive _,to llltisfy couccms about ClClriiJP)iaDce

Q2L Doell tile ewe prtll'id3 adeqw;:e 'jii'Otedlon against .11 frlvolllllll OJ' UDJullllied c:ballen&e 1115pecdoo?

A21. The "manaacd ac:cess" provision$ in the Convcmlon pmv!demcnlban adequate~ op.in,sr unjusdfied '01' frivolous challcnsc lnspcctlon R~q~~ests.

MozCoycr, a cballengc lnspectlon can be bloeked, if three-fourths of the 4l·JUC~DberE=ulivc Coud vorc wilhiP 1.2 houll or the RqUestlhalltls frivolous cr unjdSiified. 111 eddldon, after a ~~lion.~ J;xecwive Council can adcllesc coacems as to wbetllerthe dpt to ~~a eballenge.IPspecdon liu bccll abused. H abuse hiS~ thfl!xeeullvc Coanel1 C!ll! eo~tsicler wl:eiher the ~uestins party should 114,. to 11eat cost$ alaiOd to!the inapeodaa.

Q2Z. .Ccbf!flbe·f:;WC enter Into f'or(!e without U.S. ratlftcatlon'l What wlllbappea !ttb U.S. !iiJelllllll·ratlry tile CWe 10 wvrldwlde dlemlcalweapoas prollteratlon? to tile 1pread ilfGUt«.~p,s..ot~·cleltnacdoa?

PREiE .IU3

Q23, How 10111 bas tbe U.S. stgm~ chemk:alaaents and wiiJ can't It cilntloue'l

/>23. The Ulliled SillieS hal 111o:ecl chemical weapcmslinee Wwld War 1 whca modem cbemioal warfare slai1Cd. The U.S. SIOPPedmanufacmringlhemio 1968. Some oflboSIOIIdlllllllitlons hllvc ~ to leak. p.niculuty lllc MS' 1WkcU 5llod willllllc ncrvo agent OB (also lalol"lil. as aarin), SI!Jdics show that the risk of conlimled ltlftiC la slp6c;onrly JI'C&tc:r than !be risk ot disposaL

Q24. Wbat Jdud.of cllembl wapuoiJ ai'eered al the Dlbe U.S. .wetpUe locallans IIIIC! 110\Y claugcious an tlaole chmalcllls?

A24. Tbaren lWO·lYJlllll oflolhahhcmil:al apnlliDtbtJU. S.IUII!kp&:; -agcmsud blister a,aepu. tbe11Deuerve apms' an: GA. whieb also-is eaiJed Tabull; QJ,S. wllicb ~-also j;l)led Satin; and vx. Tho w. accms lnRodc 1bc IIIII5DIJd..dcr ag=u H. HD, and UT,as 'II'Olles JAwislto 0,.). Bolli lbc IICII'O IS"IIIIICI bllstct apus me bazardous to J:umall$ and Ill animalL The ~. litDIS let' by poisonln& tile Jlei'VOUS System; ~posule to tl>e ~ ~ISCIDQ'*' ~~skin blllle'll, mjuries to !he eye&. and damage to lhcresplra!Oty U1ICI by inhaiJtioo of vapon. Nerve a~t is a fm-aeiiDJlolhal &JCIII, while the blistC'Z apnt$ ~p;, primarily disabJin& agetliS. Wilb iarF CIIOIIIb dose!, ury of lllesc cbl:llllcal &gCIIIS m 1elbaL

Thcs6 chemicals CUI1CIIdy ere SIOied in 11ueo basic type19f coafigurarloal:

- ~~ Clll1ridac:s,.mlm:l,.and tackell c:olltlininJ propcllaJit IIIIVor caplosivc

~

... ~ Qlml. also withollt ~losive compiJDenls, SIIXed iD 1*1 one-tea c:oqiJiJien IIIII bombs. .

. <lU. ~an lbese dltmkalapma prtR~atlf stored?

~- ~ U. s. :lclbal el)cmleal stoCkpile is divideclllllDII& eigbt Army lnpltarigpa (1111 illlbc amdilentallJobed SUites) IDd on 1alm$lcm Island m tbo cmual h:ific ()cean ~ 720 mlln ~est or: Honolulu. Hawaii. ~ eiibt sires iD lhc Unlled Sc.rcs lllC:

' PAGE.014

! o A~ Proving OmandEdgcwoc;laJQ, uear Edgewood. Maryland (stola about !i

· ~by wcil!lu) • .<\auJ!clOJI Amly.Depot, nur Awli$toa, Alabama (abov' 7 pcc:ent) • ~Iue Grass Army Depoc, near Lexh1S10J!,:Kellluc:ky (about2 peree~tt) , o Newport Army Ammunlllon Plant. near Newport, llldilmll (about 4 petee:nt) • Pine Bluff Anenll, oear Piao Blu!T, ArbnJaJ (about 12 pat:CIIt) o ~bloDepoc Ac:dvily, near Pueblo, COlorado (Uoln 10 pen:c~~l) o Tooele Amry Depoe. ncar Tooele. Utah (abool42 percent) • Uma!illa Dl:poi.Am!ty, near Hennlsron, Otqon (about 12 pezceot)

QU. WhY Is destruetlon of the U. S. Cbelnleal Stockpile IKCI!IISIII'7'l :

A26.. _Cong%ess.. eaa=d Public Law 99-12l,lfin!:lii!S deslniCiioo of lba emlre U. S. SloCkpl1e of Jet!1a1 UJII"lary O.c.. a!Dp CCADpOildot apt} cbcmk:lil WUJIOIIS iD CODjum:don wllb tile 11Cq11isiUOD of' binary cbomic:al wcapcms. Nonuf'tbe PDk!aY IJlllllillcas ~ m S~D~aphaw beeo lllllllllfaplurecl sip 1969. In 1992. Conpess ~ Public Law l02-484i which •iillufxes die ~IIUCiion of .ell blmay ~cal-weapona, fmncr~ fileililie., •ew•acd tpnnld~s 11111 miscellaneEIDS equipmcnL Tbe eJ11ire U.S. cbemjca1 weapc:1IIS sudpile is :teqvhed 10 be cfemlyW by Decembc:r31,·2(»t -Many of'lil= lllllnillDIII111-.c!bsolcte WJd liiiRnlceable. 1bo ~"B ~on ofthe$e WQpCms overdme lnc:zeases the riskofaccldongJ Jdc:ucof2e:t:1 c:i~Ollllcal_liSCIIts. .

. · Ulldct die Qlemi~ Weapons Convemion, die Ulllted swa will join Olba'~ill a COIImliiincaa to dcc':-llld ~aD ~ wespons munitiolls and aaenu (both. 1lllilary llld blnarJ) ~ prodiiCPon facililic:5 wllhln 10 ~ riCIIIl)' into force. SignawrieswBl al3o lllOnl!oi tile cbemicallllduslry for Jlloclucliou, COIISlllllplion, or -or cbtllllcal$ of conc:em.

Q27. Plcln't tilt Army preyioully ase other metliocls 10 41spo&e of llmbar dlemlcal apalll? ' •' I •

AZ/, Bcsw=D Wodd War I and 1969, the Arm'/ disposed of~ IJI!IIIS andmUDitlODS by V&,riQUS ~ snell as open-ph bumiJI& IIIIIIDSphi!dc dilutiGI. biu:la1, lllld OC>elil ~ Sud! llltlhcds ot~ dbposa1 ODwlviollllllll)' ~bUll DOW deftlled D . ~ous W.u:d .,,, ~also •:u"""'nlypaotieed by iDdusli)''cloriila ~-pa1ac1 ~~. iD 1969,-m 1elpOIISO U>!DIDY COJ.oaos. tbeADDJ at.ncJoned lllclcpragdcel iD '*"oro!_ -~~-lfhkh walOIIlOI'IJanvbonmemally IOIIIId.

PAGE.Bl5 .

..

~ .WO,J't. olhtr .modes ot otr-elte freJ~~Jportaf.ICIII COIISh:iercd? Wllat about mdHC:llc 11~3 ottr.lck or air Jransport?

.A2a. Bodl!nlek llllli alr ~-~ l;ut M3 rcjccled IIIID earlJ point k>::iiltl' o! saf~ l'Oillims and dlle 10 lite SCYm llmltatiorl ofttausport oprn11oPs. The sheer nlllllbl% u1 CpK:b IPd/or plano~ 10 IIIO'ICI!Ie em1te mckpi.lo 10 citllcr a a•ll0111l dlaposal OCDII:r or to regionallli$posal CMtm would create OYaWhelmlug IP~ pro\'Hml. A llmluld vertioll of nir Vansport -~ai.dliiCI! "Y.IIIe fllrmy, bat tbat al~ IDvolved onlytwockpoq whb -n inveDtoties ot c!*.uieal apats Uld lliWiiciGas. HOWCVG", m:albls Sllllll-scalo llllmlllelli by llr · w~ ljueuDhled 10 !law unacceptable risks. lll adilidoa, scvcraJ tbou&alld fligllls would bo !Cqlliml,.

(11'.: Wlll tbe Army -do uythlng to assist loeaJ collllllllllilles ill reprO· to )ll'I!JIIIliDg for ot!lr. ccddeata or. unplalllled nenlll?.

A'l9. The .Anny ill wmmllttd to worldn& wilh Joc:II,·SUIIe and Fedaal oflldals 10CIIbaJIQe off-site e~ncy ~ Sue·specitic emers-yRIJIODRplaas ero-beia& ciGvcklpedill coa:diDalion with lhe Jocal commullllies llfeacb ot die elgltt lfDrqe shes. 'lbe Anny iteuncntl" waridn; ~ JieCien1 Emciaaq Mar~agemeatAJCD~;Y n.pzd!IIJI!Ie~ lllld • fmp~on for the Emerpacy Reaponsa Plop-am.

Q30.. ~ tJae. U.S. Army's ~ cllcnclealwee!IOII* lllo ba destroJed llllda' llle·Cfleua!te! Weapons CoJmatlou? ·

A30. Yes.

Qll.· Wlto pmldelltlle lll'Ciraaeu fluoride?

~-~ ltraJy ~ght IbiS malerial fl\1m lllllltiple COIDIIIIICialwan:es. nil aclxmbt availabb ~e cow.daltnalbL

. I

PAGE.Illl6

Q33. Did Combuslioa l:qineerJns complete ti:Je DC pint Ia Pille Blutrl It so, when? ~ aot, wily not? DfcJ the U. 8. ever run tests on ft?

A34. CombuS1ioll Engineering C<!JDpletod tile plant in Dc=Dbcr 1990. Eoglneerina tests wen:. peri\nmed during 1111lll8l}'-Pcbnlary 1!1!11. 11Jt plllllt waslhcu plai:l:d Ia liiiUld·by statUS.

,.. -\.~~~( _..,_'/. .... '"'.f).

Q34. Did~ on tile DF plaDt In Pine Jllaft', Ark. ner pneeedJIIIIt Pbue I? If eo,· how far dldltp?

t\34 J?bwi.WU the Dfplant, PM31 m, tbe Ml.RS plant, i1 dj~ in questiool 10:1'1.

Ql!. What Is the W.yomlag Mtmoramlum or Understaadlac?

. A3!1. The 1!189 Wyoming Memorandum of Undencandiag (MOO) piOVidad far a dcaJied e3rehanp vf: tnf'ormadon on tho 11=, localioll, ami ~lion of die dlcmlcal SIOCkplle, production faQ!ilics. 8lld delldopmenlll facililics in die U.S. and the Soviet UD1011 (110\V RDSSia). !tlll:o Jirgvkkd tor inspecdQII& a1 si~e~ in eadl QOuJUry. Bolli Cowurics completecl the filial in'l!)r.·::ri~ns UDder lhe MOU in December 19?4.

! Qa5; w~ c:llemlelll munttlons retrognuJed rrom ... ~~European ltodlplleaeeideatally . 1 · ~roupUmo lhe UDlted-Stetea when worken at JolnutOD Atdl falled·to Ulllold one ottli~ 1 r-...,."O!!dlt17.1teelamta1Ders? 1

A36. 9n~S.·l"l, 'MIIkasuthoNaval Weapcm ~. CoiiC11111, QJifgrnla wero : unpaCldiJg C111J11Y lllilitary Wl1 0011lllincn ami -1arYIDI!lc:oatalDeJs (SSC) which bad b:so;1 usedlO ~ tho ElllOpCall ebeiiiK:allllllllltlol\S stockpile dusiD& !he teUOJrlldc opemio1110 . 1obmlon AIOU lD Clio Pacific;, 'lbc. WOltm found wbll IIIey dJou&ht 'III'QIIli¥e plqjectlles inside oae oldie SSC.. All explosive Otdnan:c Disposal Team waalllllleclaadclel=miued ths projcc:dlC$ 'WCie Inert 1lllln!Dg rounds used on Jdmsl<m Alol1 illll'aiDIDg ICiivilies prior 10 lhs ~operation. Tho Army has poailivdy-sm.d !hat aU SSCs CCIIIIaiaingli\'11 chrmbl munflioas WC~eccnified as C1DJ11Y prior 10 shipment off or the Island. Alllll\lllltials JDDmS Bom lluJ:upc-ha4·beml ac:ounled for at Johnston Atoll. {it WUID ~in CW bilaJI:nll · ~ vcrifieedon and c1a1a exchanp cordia purpos• Dffaelllllllln& 111e ewe~ <.. p;t u;-lfe~ ~sed opcnnes$On CW c:apabiti~ ami ga1niDa cxpaiesR ooverificallon . procedures. ) mo

Q31. How will thll Army clis!-o?w~es eenerated by the Jolmston Atoll Cllemfa:! A&eut Dlspllllll S,)'$(<.'111?

AYI. Tbrcc typeS of waste will ~ pncr.:ted b}' 1hc JACADS,liquid ~ was1e, so1icJ wurt~ with yalue, ancl solid waM witbout valuo. The types of waste Include 6.S Jllillioq plJou of brim ftoc1 the poUudon abal011111111 system Oiquid process waste); about 6,650 tons of sc:rap 1111111 (solld W8Slll will! vallle); and asJt alld other int:incrator Rllducs (solid was1e without value).

'f.l,le AqDy's Jnfenecl alternative •• ocean cllsposal of the brine - could DDt bo ~~~ wllh lhepassapC!fthe OccanDwnpinaBuof 1988, an IIDelldmcnt tolhcMarloePmteclioa, RIISCIII'!:h 8tl,d Sanc!Uuies Ace. The Army selected a second alternalivc: - d!y the brine, conJaineri.zo It, and mlp It I!> a hawdoua -laodflllln !be continental United Sllltc$. For solid wasiO with ulue. the Army sdec1ed $ale of !he scmp melll after it is =dfied 11811ll·free. For aoUd wiiStC without~ lhll Army sclci:~ lb1pp1DJ the ash and iudm:mor RSidaoJ to a bazardous waste laDdlill in the c:ominenlll Ulllted SWta.

11Wugh dlese.lllllhoda,lbc Amy can dispose Of all procesa wasiC gcnented by lA CADS ..-;o:!lh minima) lwm 10 lhll~ .

.; ; .

'.