web viewmiller, warren e. and j. merril shanks. 1996. the new american voter. cambridge, ... ed....

Owning the National Question in Quebec

Richard Nadeau

Department of Political Science

Université de Montréal

Paper prepared for the annual conference of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties

(EPOP), Edinburg, Scotland, September 12th-14th.

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This paper seeks to determine to what extent the “Quebec question” is at the heart of

political dynamics in Quebec. By this, we mean the debates surrounding not only the

political status of the province in the Canadian federation, but also surrounding the

protection and promotion of the identity and culture of the province’s Francophone

majority population. By “political dynamics”, we mean the link between Quebecers’

opinions on the future of their province and the protection of their culture and support for

one of the four big political parties in Quebec.

There has been much work done on the relation between Quebecers’ constitutional

preferences and the political choices they have made over the past few decades (see

Bélanger and Nadeau 2009a for an overview). We intend to contribute to this body of

academic literature by pushing theoretical reflection and empirical analysis a little farther

with regard to the meaning of the “national question” in Quebec and its impact on

partisan dynamics within the province. First, we will present our theoretical framework.

Then, we will examine the link between Quebecers’ constitutional preferences and their

vote choice during the April 7 2014 elections. The results of these analyses clearly show

that the national question is very much at the heart of the political game in Quebec and

that all parties must position themselves with regard to this issue if they wish to be

electorally competitive in the province.

The National Question in Quebec

The first question is to establish whether the national question in Quebec, in all of its

forms, constitutes a niche issue for just one party in particular or a central issue that

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structures the party system. An essential distinction has to be made from this perspective

concerning the nature of this issue in federal and provincial elections in Quebec. In the

case of federal elections, this issue clearly has the characteristics of a niche issue

(Bélanger and Nadeau 2006, 2009b). One political party, the Bloc québécois, has made

defending the interests of Quebec and promoting the province’s political independence its

central (if not only) goal. The slogans used by this party, which has never run candidates

outside of Quebec, are in and of themselves revealing. In 1993, when it first contested

federal elections, the Bloc québécois asked voters to give themselves “true power” (le

vrai pouvoir). A decade later, thanks to a whimsical play on words in French, this same

party ran in an election dominated by the issue of corruption under the slogan of “a parti

propre au Québec”.

The political positioning of the other parties on the federal scene is revealing. The

Conservative Party, the Liberal Party, the New Democratic Party, and the Green Party all

present themselves as “national” parties, as opposed to the Bloc québécois, which

presents itself as a regional party. The statewide parties field candidates in all provinces

including Quebec and also present themselves as parties with a comprehensive political

platform. This includes, most notably, relations between the federal government and the

provinces.

The parallels between Quebec and the prevailing situation in the United Kingdom are

quite clear. Like the Bloc québécois, the Scottish National Party has also used the

Scottish “national question” as a niche issue during national elections. It has only

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presented candidates in Scotland and its role has essentially consisted of making

Scotland’s concerns known at Westminster. In this case, as with the Lega Nord in Italy,

the national question, or even the interests of a particular region within a country, is

exploited as a niche issue that allows a party to occupy a specific niche and win votes by

defining itself as the party that defends the interests of a particular nation or region.

The political dynamics play out differently at the sub-national level, where questions of

regional identity and interests are much more important. In these regions, this question,

far from a mere niche issue, often becomes the fundamental political cleavage around

which all political parties position themselves. In moving from the national to the

regional level, this issue evolves from being niche to one of the mainstream pillars of

electoral politics; on the regional level, it is an inevitable question and all parties must

have an official stance on it (Bélanger and Nadeau 2009a; Bechhoffer and McCrone

2010; Hepburn 2014). This situation is clear in the case of Quebec. The Quebec question

is clearly a niche issue when it is debated on the national scene, but at the same time is

also the dominant cleavage in Quebec provincial elections.

A second key question is to ask if this issue has the characteristics of a “valence issue”,

that is, an issue around which public opinion is massively in agreement (Stokes 1963;

Stokes and Dilulio 1993). The question of the economy is often presented as the valence

issue par excellence in that all (or almost all) voters can agree on lowering

unemployment and maintaining price stability. Can we say in the same vein that the

national question in Quebec is a valence issue? In the eyes of Quebec voters, do all

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provincial political parties have to defend the region’s interests, identity, and language?

Are all provincial parties judged with regard to whether they are working towards these

goals or their ability to do so? Past research has shown that parties that want to

differentiate themselves on a valence issue must show that they are the most determined

and competent party to reach these goals (Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Walgrave,

Lefevere and Tresch 2012). Is this useful to understand Quebec public opinion and the

factors that are the most important in Quebec voters’ political choices?

The answer to this question is complex. In order to understand the answer, we must first

turn to work that has shown that the issue of the “national question” consists of many

dimensions. One of these dimensions has to do with the idea that any government in

power in the regional capital, be it Québec City or Edinburgh, must vigorously defend the

interests of this region. This defense can take several forms. It can consist of simply

defending the prerogatives of the regional parliament against any encroachment by the

national parliament. It can also mean ensuring that the region obtains its fair share of the

national wealth through equalization payments or other mechanisms of fiscal federalism.

Defending regional interests can also mean demanding that some powers be transferred

from the central government to the regional government in order to allow regional-level

elected representatives to better respond to the needs of their population. Finally, it can

consist of defending the region’s distinct economic and social model. It is along this

objective of defending regional interests that the national question truly takes on the

characteristics of a valence issue. All regional-level political parties must have a clear

stance on this question and show that they will vehemently and effectively defend the

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interests of their region (Nadeau et al 2000; Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Bélanger and

Nadeau 2009b).

A second dimension to the issue of the national question has to do with promoting the

specific identity of a particular region. This question is particularly relevant in Quebec,

due to the precariousness of the French language on the North American continent (Blais,

Martin and Nadeau 1995; Nadeau and Fleury 1995). That Quebecers believe they have a

distinct identity that should be protected and promoted by their regional government is

largely undisputed (Blais and Nadeau 1992; Martin and Nadeau 2001; Bélanger and

Perrella 2008). Thus, the question of protecting and promoting Quebecer identity is

largely consensual and all parties must subscribe to this objective. That said, political

parties in Quebec, while supporting this general goal, can sometimes disagree on the

means necessary to arrive at these ends. This was particularly apparent during past

debates over language laws in Quebec and more recently during the debate over the

adoption of the Quebec Charter of Values, a proposal which would have affirmed the

secular nature of Quebec society.

If it seems that there is a consensus among all parties in the province regarding the

defense of Quebec’s interests and identity, this is not the case for promoting different

constitutional options for Quebec. One could even say that this issue has the

characteristics of a “positional” issue. The case of Quebec is very telling in this regard.

For the past forty years, Quebecers have been divided along two constitutional options.

The first option is political independence and is spearheaded by the Parti québécois, but

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also endorsed by Québec solidaire. The second option is keeping Quebec in the Canadian

federation and the Quebec Liberal Party has been the most outspoken for this option (the

fourth most important party in Quebec, the Coalition Avenir Québec also supports a

federalist position, but is more nationalist than the Quebec Liberal Party).

The opposition between federalists and sovereignists (or independentists) is the dominant

cleavage in Quebec political life. All political parties in the province must have a clear

position on this question (i.e. federalist or sovereignist) and those who decide to take a

middle-of-the-road position are often accused of either eluding the question or being

confused about their own stance. This dividing line with regard to constitutional options

is often more important than the line between left and right (Nadeau, Guérin and Martin

1995). From this point of view, the dynamics of Quebec politics are unique in the

Canadian federation.

Hypotheses

What can we conclude from this brief overview of the role that the national question

plays on electoral dynamics in Quebec? The first conclusion is that this question is a

“super issue” in Quebec. More so than left-right divides or partisan identification, it is the

main factor that structures political dynamics in Quebec (Bélanger and Nadeau 2009a).

The second conclusion is that the national question is in and of itself multidimensional,

having both “valence” and “positional” characteristics. Defending regional interests and

affirming a distinct identity are dimensions around which there largely exists a consensus

and political parties differentiate themselves not by taking radically different positions,

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but rather by showing a more or less levels of engagement and determination to achieve

these objectives. The logic that prevails in these two cases brings in issues of spatial

voting. As such, the Quebec Liberal Party, which is the most federalist party in Quebec,

will declare its willingness to defend Quebec and its culture, but will generally do so with

less vigour than the other parties (and less than the Parti québécois, in particular). Thus,

each party should subscribe to the consensus surrounding these questions without

straying too far from the position of the median voter in Quebec, who has nationalist

tendencies. Thus, the political game in Quebec on these dimensions of the national

question is clear. It is in the strategic interest of the most nationalist party in Quebec that

questions of identity and language remain at the forefront during an election and it is in

the interest of the other parties that these same concerns take up less space on the political

agenda.

The political dynamic is entirely different for the third dimension of the national

question: constitutional preferences. For the past few years, Quebec public opinion has

been on the side of the federalists. It is for this reason that the Quebec Liberal Party,

otherwise discreet on the question of defending Quebec’s interests and identity, has put

constitutional issues at the heart of its electoral campaigns. It is also for this same reason

that the Parti québécois, who often brandishes defending Quebec’s interests and identity

during electoral campaigns, has said relatively little about sovereignty. The other parties,

less engaged in the opposition between federalism and sovereignty, would benefit from

this question being removed from the political debate all together and voters’ attention

being drawn to other issues.

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The preceding section allows us to suggest some hypotheses that will be tested using data

from an online survey carried out in Quebec in the weeks before the April 7, 2014

elections that brought the Quebec Liberal Party into power (details about the survey are

in the Appendix). The hypotheses are the following:

1. The most nationalist party in Quebec, the Parti québécois, is perceived as being the

most adept at defending Quebec’s interests, language, and culture. This advantage is due

to the fact that the majority of the population has nationalist sensibilities and will be

especially marked among Francophone voters.

2. The party most opposed to Quebec independence, the Quebec Liberal Party, will

dominate the constitutional preferences dimension of the national question. This

advantage is due to the fact that the majority of the population favours keeping the

province within the Canadian federation.

3. Support for parties dominating one of the dimensions of the national question, the Parti

québécois or the Quebec Liberal Party, is linked to this issue more so than it is support

for any other party. Thus, support for the Parti québécois and the Quebec Liberal Party is

tied to a) the importance voters themselves give to the national question, b) their feelings

of attachment and identification towards Quebec and Canada, c) their evaluations of the

costs and benefits of the various constitutional options, and d) their own constitutional

preferences.

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4. Given its importance in Quebec, the national question dominates over all over

cleavages, including that of traditional left-right.

5. The contagion effect of the national question is more marked in Quebec on the left.

This said, the motivations of people voting for right-wing parties are not centered on the

national question.

Quebec Voters and the National Question

The hypotheses will be tested via an online survey carried out during the weeks before

the April 7, 2014 Quebec provincial election. The context of this election lends itself

quite well to a study of the electoral impact of the national question. The Parti québécois

minority government called the elections on the basis of favourable polls amidst the

debate surrounding the adoption of the Quebec Charter of Values, which aimed to affirm

the secular nature of Quebec society. However, the electoral campaign quickly became

centered around the theme of Quebec independence after the addition of notable

businessman Pierre-Karl Péladeau to the ranks of the Parti québécois candidates. Upon

announcing his candidature, Péladeau unequivocally expressed his support for Quebec

sovereignty. This unintentionally derailed the campaign from its focus on issues

favourable for the Parti québécois, such as defending Quebec identity, to ground that was

more favourable for the Quebec Liberal Party, such as constitutional preferences.

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We will first examine in a descriptive way Quebec’s political landscape before testing our

various hypotheses with the help of bivariate and multivariate analyses.

Nationalist Sensibilities

The first thing we need to establish is the importance of the national question in Quebec.

Quebec is the only province in Canada where a majority of the population is French-

speaking. Debates over the place of Quebec within the Canadian federation and the status

of the French language have dotted its history. As a result, partisan divisions are largely a

function of individuals’ attitudes on these questions.

In order to shed light on how central the national question plays into constitutional

preferences, we first asked the following three questions to survey participants: “When

you voted during the last provincial elections on April 7, how important were each of the

following factors in your decision? The ability of the party to defend the current and

future interests of Quebec? The ability of the party to understand Quebec’s history and

culture? The party’s constitutional preferences?”

The figures in Table 1 clearly show that a large majority of voters attribute great

importance to these questions. 93% of respondents see defending Quebec’s interests as

important; on this issue, there is a general consensus and political parties position

themselves accordingly. That a party can defend Quebec’s culture and history is also

important for 3 out of every 4 respondents (75%). A similar level of importance is given

to the constitutional positioning of the party, at 77% of the respondents. In this regard, it

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is not surprising to see that voters for the two parties most engaged in this debate, the

Quebec Liberal Party and the Parti québécois, give more importance to this question

(87% for the PLQ and 83% for the PQ) than supporters of other parties such as Québec

solidaire (65%) or Coalition Avenir Québec (59%). These third parties seek to move the

political debate in Quebec towards economic and social questions. However, the

importance of the national question, in spite of these differences, is still very evident.

Table 1. Importance attached to various issues in the 2014 Election in Quebec

All PQ QS CAQ PLQ

Party stands up for Quebec interests 93 97 92 93 90

Party understands Quebec history and culture 75 90 88 66 65

Party constitutional position 77 83 65 59 87

Question: How is it important are the following questions in your decision to vote for this party in the

provincial election of April the 7th in Quebec? Don't knows, refusals excluded. For more details, see the

appendix.

The second important element for understanding the effect of the national question has to

do with the state of public opinion in Quebec. Quebecers’ nationalist sensibilities show

themselves in two ways. The first, as shown in Table 2, is seen in their greater attachment

to Quebec than to Canada. While 91% of Quebecers report being “very” or “somewhat”

attached to their province, this proportion is only 66% for attachment to Canada. This gap

is even wider among Francophones, who make up about 80% of Quebec’s population.

Among Francophones, 94% report being attached to Quebec versus 60% for being

attached to Canada (75% of non-Francophones report being attached to Quebec versus

92% of them report being attached to Canada).

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Table 2. Level of attachment of Quebec and Canada

Quebec Canada

Very 59 36

Somewhat 32 30

Not very 8 23

Not at all 2 11

Question: Would you say that you are very attached, somewhat attached, not very

attached or not attached at all to Quebec? Canada? Don’t know and refusals excluded.

See the appendix for details.

A look at the distribution of these feelings along partisan lines is revealing. The Liberal

clientele, largely due to the larger proportion of non-Francophones in its ranks, shows a

higher level attachment to Canada and a lower level of attachment to Quebec than other

partisan groups. The difference between Liberal voters’ degree of attachment to Quebec

and Canada, along with the levels of attachment observed in the population overall,

explain the relative discomfort of the Quebec Liberal Party on language and identity

matters. Stuck between a less nationalist electoral base and a more nationalist general

population, the Quebec Liberal Party, unlike the Parti québécois, tends to avoid these

questions, even if the party subscribes to the general goals of preserving and promoting

Quebec identity.

The third aspect of Quebec public opinion on the national question stems from the

second. To the extent which Quebecers are more attached to Quebec than to Canada, they

also give particular importance to the role that their provincial government plays. For

many Quebecers, their provincial government should have more powers within the

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Canadian federation. In order to measure the pervasiveness of this attitude, we asked the

following question, “If a referendum were held asking if you want the Quebec National

Assembly to have more powers from the federal government, would you vote YES or

NO?”

Table 3. Opinions about transferring more powers to the

Quebec government

All PQ QS CAQ PLQ

Favorable 64 83 80 57 25

Opposed 36 17 20 43 75

Question: If a referendum was held asking you if you want that Quebec

National Assembly gets more powers from the Federal government,

would you vote YES or NO? See the appendix for more details.

The responses to this question are revealing. Approximately two-thirds of Quebecers

(64%) would vote in favour of this option. Furthermore, the separation of respondents

along partisan lines is quite informative. Support for this option either reaches or

surpasses 80% among Parti québécois and Québec solidaire voters, receives majority

support from the mostly federalist supporters of the Coalition Avenir Québec (57%), and

is backed by only one in four Quebec Liberal Party supporters. Therefore, the question of

repatriating powers is a delicate matter for the Quebec Liberal Party. It is also a touchy

subject for the Parti québécois, as the most hardcore supporters would not be happy that

their party of choice would seemingly abandon its raison d’être to limit itself to merely

pursuing more powers within the federation.

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The perspective changes completely when one measures support for Quebec

independence. While it is certain that support for independence is now at a low when

compared to decades past, it seems that independence never really had clear and

widespread support within the population (with the exception of a few points in history).

The figures in Table 4 show that during the 2014 provincial elections, barely one in three

voters would support Quebec independence. Interestingly, this choice is also rejected by

about one in four Parti québécois voters (25%) and almost one out of every two Québec

solidaire voters, both of which are sovereignist political parties. Unsurprisingly,

supporters of federalist parties reject independence in even greater proportions. 82% of

Coalition Avenir Québec and no less than 97% of Quebec Liberal Party voters would

vote against Quebec independence.

Table 4. Opinions about the independence of Quebec

All PQ QS CAQ PLQ

Favorable 34 75 52 18 3

Opposed 66 25 48 82 97

Question: If a referendum was held asking you if you want that Quebec

becomes an independent country, would you vote YES or NO? See the

appendix for more details.

Thus, the picture is clear. Quebec voters have nationalist sensibilities while being in

favour of keeping Quebec within the Canadian federation. These voters want their

provincial government to defend Quebec’s interests and protect its identity and culture.

Along these questions, it would seem natural that voters have confidence in a nationalist

party such as the Parti québécois. However, although nationalists, Quebecers also favored

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the federalist option. Thus, it would also seem natural that they have confidence in the

most federalist party, the Quebec Liberal Party, in order to keep Quebec within Canada.

To test our hypotheses, we asked respondents which party they thought was the best at

handling certain issues such as defending Quebec’s interests, protecting Quebec’s

language and culture, the economy, taxes, and poverty. The figures in Table 5 confirm

our first hypothesis and show that the most nationalist party, the Parti québécois, has the

advantage when it comes to “valence” dimensions of the national question (i.e. defending

Quebec’s interests and protecting its identity and culture). This advantage is even clearer

among Francophone respondents. Within this group, the Parti québécois is perceived as

being the most adept at protecting Quebec identity (49% of respondents versus 11% for

the Quebec Liberal Party, 10% for Québec solidaire and 9% for Coalition Avenir

Québec). These figures, along with the data showing weak support for Quebec

independence, confirms that the Parti québécois dominates the “valence” dimensions of

the national question in Quebec and that the Quebec Liberal Party has a clear advantage

when it comes to the “positional” aspects of this question (e.g. the choice between

independence or remaining within Canada).

Moreover, it is interesting to note that there is a certain degree of coherence to voters’

perceptions of parties on issues. Québec solidaire, the most leftist party, is most highly

ranked for tackling poverty; Coalition Avenir Québec, the most rightist party, is ranked

most highly for taxes; and the Quebec Liberal Party scores highly on the economy, which

has been the party’s trademark issue for a while. This coherence shows that the data we

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have on how the parties are viewed by the Quebec electorate paints an adequately

accurate portrait of issue ownership in Quebec, notably on the dimensions of the national

question.

Table 5. Party images in Quebec

Best party: PQ QS CAQ PLQ

To defend Quebec's identity and culture 43 7 8 16

To defend Quebec' interest 33 7 14 25

To manage the economy 14 3 22 32

To cut taxes 7 5 30 15

To fight poverty 12 26 11 18

Question: Which party is best able to handle the following issues? See the appendix for more details.

Multivariate analyses of support for the four biggest political parties in Quebec will allow

us to test more rigorously and more thoroughly our hypotheses about issue ownership of

the national question in Quebec. They will also allow us to state that the national question

in Quebec is a “super issue” whose influence is greater than that of any other political

cleavage.

A Multivariate Analysis of Support for Quebec Political Parties

We will continue our analysis of the impact of the national question on electoral choices

by looking at the determinants of vote choice in Quebec during provincial elections. To

do this, we will examine the explanatory factors behind voter support for the four main

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political parties in Quebec: the Parti québécois, the Quebec Liberal Party, the Coalition

Avenir Québec, and Québec solidaire. These four parties won 41.5%, 25%, 23%, and 7%

of the votes during the April 7, 2014 election. In the end, the Quebec Liberal Party won a

majority of seats in the Quebec National Assembly (i.e. 70 seats), followed by the Parti

québécois, who formed the official opposition with 30 seats. Finally, the Coalition Avenir

Québec and Québec solidaire won 22 and 3 seats, respectively.

The dependent variable take a value of 1 when a survey respondent reports having voted

for a party and 0 otherwise (non-responses are excluded). We use a recursive block

approach (Miller and Shanks 1996; Blais et al 2002; Nadeau et al 2012), which means

that the independent variables will be introduced into the model in successive blocks. The

first block contains long-term factors (other than the national question) that weigh on

political choices in Quebec, such as sociodemographic variables (age, gender, language,

education, income) and political attitudes (ideological positioning on a left-right axis,

moral conservatism, political cynicism; a more detailed presentation of the variables and

their coding is presented in the Appendix). The second block consists of just one variable:

the importance given by the respondent to the constitutional position of the parties during

the April 7 elections. The third block includes measures of attachment to both Quebec

and Canada, and also includes a variable on identification (dominant, exclusive, or

shared) with both Quebec and Canada. The fourth block contains two variables. The first

takes its maximum value when the respondent says that Quebec society’s values are

different as those of the rest of Canada. The second measures how respondents view the

tradeoffs between political sovereignty (even if it means belonging to a smaller market)

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and the benefits of belonging to a bigger market (even if it means a loss of political

independence). Finally, the fifth block measures the effect of constitutional preferences

(independence or more powers) on vote choice in Quebec.

Long-Term Factors

The effect of long-term factors on political choices is presented both in the Appendix and

in Table 6 (we present changes in probabilities in the text, but provide the results of the

regression analyses in the Appendix). The sociodemographic variable that has the biggest

impact on vote choice is that of language. The probability of voting for the Quebec

Liberal Party drops 49 percentage points when a respondent is Francophone, while their

probability of voting for the Parti québécois, Coalition Avenir Québec, or Québec

solidaire rises by 43, 37, and 11 percentage points, respectively. In fact, this linguistic

cleavage translates into constitutional preferences among linguistic communities in

Quebec. Non-Francophones, tending to be federalist, massively support the Quebec

Liberal Party and Francophones, more nationalist, tend to split their votes between the

four big parties in Quebec. The other significant cleavage is age; the Parti québécois

receives more support from older voters and Québec solidaire, an emerging party, draw

upon younger and more educated voters for their support.

The effect of political attitudes is also significant. The Parti québécois and Québec

solidaire, both centre-left parties, receive more support from respondents who position

themselves on the left and who have more liberal opinions on morality questions. The

opposite trend is observed for rightist parties such as the Coalition Avenir Québec and the

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Quebec Liberal Party. Interestingly, respondents who are more cynical towards politics

tend to support emergent parties such as Québec solidaire and the Coalition Avenir

Québec rather than traditional parties such as the Quebec Liberal Party and the Parti

québécois.

Table 6. Change in probabilities for voting models in Quebec: Socio-

demographic and attitudinal variables

PQ QS CAQ PLQ

Age 0.24*** -0.17*** -0.08 0.07

Gender -0.02 0.00 -0.05** 0.07***

Language 0.43*** 0.11*** 0.37*** -0.49***

Education -0.15*** 0.12*** -0.08 0.08

Income -0.13*** -0.01 0.10** 0.05

Left-right -0.34*** -0.20*** 0.15** 0.36***

Moral liberalism 0.15*** 0.13*** -0.13*** -0.11***

Cynicism -0.10** 0.06** 0.15*** -0.13***

N 1127 1127 1127 1127

***p≤0.01; **p≤0.05; *p≤0.10 (two-tailed tests). Entries are change in probabilities.

The results show that vote choice in Quebec is structured by two important determinants:

voters’ language and their positioning on ideological and moral questions. But as we will

see in the next sections, these cleavages overlap to a large extent with the respondents’

constitutional preferences. Non-Francophones largely support the Quebec Liberal Party

and respondents who are more conservative economically and socially are more favorable

to maintaining the constitutional status quo.

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The Saliency Effect

The saliency effect can be seen in two ways. The first mechanism is additive and is the

most simple. A party that projects a proactive image with regard to a certain issue will

receive increased support among voters who view this issue as important (Bélanger and

Meguid 2008). The second mechanism is interactive and stipulates that opinion on an

issue will have more weight among people who attach a greater importance to this issue.

We examine the additive effect of voters’ priorities on their electoral choices. To do this,

we have added to the preceding model a variable that measures how important a

respondent believes a party’s constitutional preferences is to their vote choice. The results

of including this variable are shown in the Appendix (Table A2) and in Table 7. The

results are telling. They allow us to see that the two parties that profit largely from the

constitutional cleavage in Quebec are the Quebec Liberal Party and the Parti Québécois.

These are also the two parties that have the most diametrically opposed positions on the

constitutional question. Parties that give less importance to the issue, such as Québec

solidaire and especially the Coalition Avenir Québec, get significantly less support from

voters who view the national question as being very important.

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Table 7. Change in probabilities for voting models in Quebec: Saliency

PQ QS CAQ PLQ

Age 0.25*** -0.16*** -0.11** 0.08

Gender -0.03 0.00 -0.05* 0.08***

Language 0.44*** 0.09** 0.32*** -0.45***

Education -0.15*** 0.13*** -0.11** 0.10*

Income -0.10** -0.03 0.08 0.06

Left-right -0.32*** -0.21*** 0.13** 0.35***

Moral liberalism 0.17*** 0.12*** -0.15*** -0.12***

Cynicism -0.08* 0.06** 0.13*** -0.12***

IMPCONST 0.19*** -0.08*** -0.27*** 0.21***

N 1101 1101 1101 1101


These results confirm and nuance the bivariate analyses in the previous section. They

clearly show that attributing the issue of the national question to the most nationalist

parties is a far too simple hypothesis to correspond to reality. In fact, the two parties most

radically opposed to each other, the Parti québécois, the most nationalist party in Quebec,

and the Quebec Liberal Party, the least nationalist party, both benefit from this issue. The

Parti québécois wins votes because it is sovereignist, but also because voters view it as

being the most determined to defend the province’s interests and identity. The Quebec

Liberal Party largely profits from the national question because it is perceived as being

the best protector of the status quo.

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Thus, the Quebec Liberal Party and the Parti québécois are both protagonists in the

constitutional debate. The more this debate is heated, the more both parties benefit. If the

debate centers more on Quebec’s interests or Quebec identity, the Parti québécois will

come out on top. However, if the debate is more about Quebec independence, such as the

previous election campaign in Quebec was, then the Quebec Liberal Party will come out

ahead. The other parties excluded from this dynamic must somehow insert themselves

into the debate. The leftist party, Québec solidaire, decided to portray itself as a party

favourable to Quebec independence. The Coalition Avenir Québec decided to take a

middle-ground position by claiming to be nationalist party but not in favor of going so far

as sovereignty.

The gains made by the Quebec Liberal Party and the Parti québécois with regard to the

constitutional debate show how both parties, for different reasons, benefit from keeping

this issue at the top of the agenda. The positions adopted by the other parties show a

contagion effect, whereby each political party in a sub-national party system where the

national question is important is forced to take a stance on the issue. As seen in

Hypothesis 5 from the previous section, we argue that the contagion effect is more

evident for the leftist Québec solidaire (favourable to independence) than for the rightist

Coalition Avenir Québec (favourable to federalism). However, the results in Table 6

bring nuances to this characterization. If it is true that the contagion effect can be seen

with regard to the official positions of the parties, this same effect cannot be seen among

voters who choose the parties at the periphery of the national debate, such as Québec

solidaire. In this case, the data show, contrarily, that voters for this party are less

24

interested in the national question (see Table 1) and that their support for Québec

solidaire stems from the desire to see the political debate focus on other issues. Thus, the

contagion effect can be seen at the level of the party leadership, but has not penetrated the

majority of Québec solidaire voters.

Identity and Vote Choice in Quebec

Two variables can help us measure the intensity of respondents’ opinions toward the

national question in Quebec. The first is an indicator of their degree of attachment toward

the two national communities of Quebec and Canada. As we have seen previously (in

Table 2), Quebecers are massively attached to Quebec and more divided in their

attachment to Canada. Another frequently used indicator looks at individuals’ exclusive,

dominant, or shared identification with these national communities. In this case, the

question asks respondents if they view themselves as only Quebecer, first Quebecer then

Canadian, equally Quebecer and Canadian, first Canadian then Quebecer, or only

Canadian. The figures show that Quebecers are split in terms of how they identify with

both Quebec and Canada. A little less than 40% of them identify first with Quebec (10%

exclusively and 27% primarily) and about the same proportion identifies first with

Canada (9% exclusively and 30% primarily). About a quarter equally identifies with both

national communities.

The results of the regression analyses for the model that includes these variables are

presented in the Appendix (Table A3) and in Table 8. Three clear conclusions can be

drawn from these results. First, including these variables considerably weakens the effect

25

of two variables: language of daily use and, especially, ideological positioning. In fact,

the latter variable is only significant for one party: Québec solidaire, a small leftist party

who only won 7% of the votes during the last elections. These results already offer some

kind of confirmation of Hypothesis 4 that the national question in Quebec dominates all

other cleavages, including left-right.

The second conclusion relates to the relative effect of the indicators measuring

attachment to and identification with Quebec and Canada. In most studies on nationalist

movements, it is the variable measuring identification with national communities that is

often used. However, the results clearly show that the variable measuring not

identification, but rather attachment to the national communities performs much better in

the example at hand (the variable measuring identification is not significant in any

model). Thus, it should be seen if this conclusion carries over into other contexts.

The third conclusion has to do more specifically with the effect of feelings of attachment

on support for political parties. From the data, two ideal-types emerge. The first consists

of voters for parties who are clearly implicated in the debate over the national question in

Quebec: the Parti québécois and the Quebec Liberal Party. For them, relative attachment

to Quebec and Canada plays a large role in support for their respective parties. This is not

the case for parties that are on the sidelines of this debate: Québec solidaire and the

Coalition Avenir Québec. Feelings of attachment towards Quebec and Canada for these

two electoral clienteles is much more divided. Taken together, the results give some

degree of confirmation to Hypothesis 3, which stipulated that the two parties most

26

directly engaged in the national debate in Quebec (i.e. the PQ and the PLQ), would

dominate this issue and profit electorally from it.

Table 8. Change in probabilities for voting models in Quebec: attachment and identification variables

PQ QS CAQ PLQ

Age 0.18*** -0.14*** -0.08 0.09*

Gender -0.00 0.01 -0.05** 0.04*

Language 0.15*** 0.06 0.33*** -0.20***

Education -0.19*** 0.11*** -0.10* 0.12**

Income -0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.01

Left-right -0.04 -0.19*** 0.05 0.10*

Moral liberalism 0.07* 0.10*** -0.12*** -0.01

Cynicism -0.10** 0.05 0.12*** -0.09**

IMPCONST 0.13*** -0.09*** -0.26*** 0.18***

Identity -0.02 -0.00 0.04 -0.08*

AttachQueb 0.41*** -0.06 -0.12** -0.16***

AttachCAN -0.45*** -0.09*** 0.12*** 0.60***

N 1076 1076 1076 1076***p≤0.01; **p≤0.05; *p≤0.10 (two-tailed tests). Entries are change in probabilities.

Cost-Benefit Analyses

The debate over the national question in Quebec tends to revolve around two questions.

The first, most often put forward by independentists, says that a sovereign Quebec would

be better able to correspond to Quebecers’ values and aspirations. This argument assumes

27

that Quebecers’ values differ from those of other Canadians and that nothing short of full

control of a nation-state would allow Quebec to act upon their supposedly different policy

preferences. The second argument, often mentioned by federalists, states that in the

modern era, it is preferable to be part of a larger economic entity, even if that means

giving up a little bit of national sovereignty.

We tested the impact of these two arguments central to the national debate in Quebec by

including two variables into our models. The first sees whether Quebecers think their

values and aspirations differ from those of other Canadians. It is a scale variable where 0

means that the respondent believes that Quebecers have very distinct priorities and 10

means that they believe Quebecers have exactly the same values as other Canadians. The

other variable is also a scale variable where 0 means that the respondent believes it is

better to belong to a larger market, even if this means a loss of sovereignty, and a 10

means that the respondent has a preference for sovereignty, even if this means belonging

to a smaller market.

The distribution of these variables is interesting. With regard to values, Quebecers are

rather split. Slightly more of them believe that they share the same values as other

Canadians (44% answered between 0 and 4 on the scale) than those who believe that they

do not (40% answered between 6 and 10 on the scale; 12% chose the middle value and

4% refused to answer). With regard to the other question, Quebecers show a rather clear

preference for a bigger market, even at the cost of autonomy: 42% of the respondents

expressed their support for this view (by responding from 0 to 4 on the scale), which

28

contrasts with only 24% who chose the opposite perspective (by responding from 6 to 10

on the scale; 19% chose the median score and 15% refused to respond).

The effect of these variables on our multivariate model is presented in the Appendix

(Table A4) and in Table 9. The results are clear. Belonging to a larger market, even if it

translates into a loss of sovereignty, has a larger impact than perceived common shared

values on Quebecers’ electoral choices. The impact of these variables related to the

national question is once again much larger for the parties at the centre of this debate, the

PQ and the PLQ, than for peripheral parties. Preferences are quite clearly divided along

partisan lines. Voters for the Parti québécois opt for more sovereignty and those for the

Quebec Liberal Party value belonging to a larger market. The data confirm once again

that the PQ and the PLQ dominate the debate over the national question and their

electoral support depends on it more so than for Québec solidaire or Coalition Avenir

Québec.

29

Table 9. Change in probabilities for voting models in Quebec: Values

and Market variables

PQ QS CAQ PLQ

Age 0.20*** -0.13*** -0.09* 0.07

Gender 0.00 0.01 -0.05** 0.03

Language 0.14*** 0.05 0.34*** -0.18***

Education -0.20*** 0.10*** -0.10* 0.13***

Income -0.03 -0.01 0.05 -0.00

Left-right -0.02 -0.19*** 0.05 0.08

Moral liberalism 0.06 0.10*** -0.12*** -0.00

MDEM -0.10*** 0.04 0.13*** -0.08**

IMPCONST 0.11*** -0.10*** -0.25*** 0.18***

Identity -0.02 -0.00 0.04 -0.07

AttachQueb 0.32*** -0.08* -0.10 -0.09*

AttachCAN -0.31*** -0.07** 0.08 0.47***

Values 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05

Market 0.22*** 0.07* -0.09 -0.18***

N 1076 1076 1076 1076


Constitutional Preferences and Vote Choice

The final dimension of the debate over the national question is the parties’ constitutional

positioning. For the past forty years, two positions have dominated the scene: remaining

within Canada (i.e. federalism) and accession the status of an independent country (i.e.

30

sovereignty). As stated before, the sovereignist stance is advocated for by the Parti

Québécois and that of the federalists by the Quebec Liberal Party. After some intense

internal debate, Québec solidaire decided to join the sovereignist cause, even if this

question was not at the centre of its political discourse. The position of the Coalition

Avenir Québec is more ambiguous. This party wishes to put the constitutional debate

aside and instead focus on strengthening the province’s political and economic position.

That said, the party’s position falls more into the federalist camp, even if the party has a

takes a more nationalist posture than the Quebec Liberal Party does when it comes to

defending Quebec’s interests and promoting its identity. In this sense, the CAQ’s position

could be associated with the quest for more powers for Quebec. However, this middle-of-

the-road position, which has long had support in Quebec, has never before been explicitly

articulated by a political party. Therefore, it is a middle-of-the-road position that is

popular, but still an orphan on the political scene.

Two variables are introduced into the model to measure the impact of constitutional

positions: support (or not) for the independence of Quebec and the support (or not) for

transferring more powers from the federal to the Quebec government (see Tables 3 and

4). The results for the models including these variables are presented in Appendix A5 and

in Table 10. Support for independence and for more powers for Quebec contribute to

increasing the chances of supporting the Parti québécois. Rejecting the independence

option contributes significantly to increasing the chances of supporting the Coalition

Avenir Québec (by 15 percentage points) but even more for the Quebec Liberal Party (by

20 percentage points). The superficial way in which Québec solidaire supports

31

independence can be seen quite clearly. First, this party is the only one for which the left-

right dimension is more important than the federalism-sovereignty dimension. In fact, if a

respondent positions themselves on the right, their probability of voting for this party

decreases by 20 percentage points). What is more is that being in support of

independence does not have a positive, but rather a negative, effect on the probability of

voting for this party (decrease of 4 percentage points). Also, the data show that the

Quebec Liberal Party receives support from not only opponents of independence, but also

those who oppose further transfer of powers to the Quebec government. This result

suggests that the Quebec Liberal Party is not only a federalist party, but also one for the

constitutional status quo.

Two additional results are worth of mention. We should first note that the most popular

position in Quebec, repatriation of more powers, does not seem to be associated with any

party. For PQ voters, this is a fallback position that is less interesting than that of

independence. The Quebec Liberal Party clientele rejects this position. Voters of

Coalition Avenir Québec are rather divided on this question (see Table 3; the effect of

this variable on party support is not statistically significant). Finally, Québec solidaire

voters seem favourable to this option, but it does not figure very high into their decision

to support this party. Thus, the position of more powers for Quebec is the most popular

position, but also one that seems to be the hardest for which to find a political home.

The last result to highlight is that constitutional preferences are more linked to support for

the PQ and the PLQ than for other parties. This result underscores the domination of

32

these parties on this issue, along with the superficial nature of QS’s support for the

sovereignist option.

Table 10. Change in probabilities for voting models in Quebec: constitutional preferences

PQ QS CAQ PLQAge 0.18*** -0.13*** -0.10* 0.10**

Gender 0.02 0.01 -0.06** 0.03

Language 0.10* 0.03 0.32*** -0.15***

Education -0.15*** 0.10*** -0.12** 0.12**

Income -0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.03

Left-right -0.01 -0.20*** 0.04 0.06

Moral liberalism 0.03 0.10*** -0.12*** 0.01

Cynicism -0.09** 0.04 0.12*** -0.07**

IMPCONST 0.09** -0.08*** -0.23*** 0.20***

Identity -0.03 -0.00 0.04 -0.05

AttachQueb 0.20*** -0.07 -0.06 -0.03

AttachCAN -0.17*** -0.08** 0.00 0.33***

Values 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00

Market 0.12** 0.09** -0.04 -0.11**

Independence 0.16*** -0.04* -0.15*** -0.20***

More powers 0.09*** 0.04* 0.04 -0.09***

N 1076 1076 1076 1076***p≤0.01; **p≤0.05; *p≤0.10 (two-tailed tests). Entries are change in probabilities.

33

Conclusion

In this paper, we have examine examined the effect of the national question on support

for the main provincial political parties in Quebec. To this effect, we discern three aspects

of this issue: defending Quebec’s interests, affirming Quebec identity, and parties’

constitutional options. We have concluded that there is a large consensus within the

province over the first two dimensions. This consensus reflects the nationalist

sensibilities of the province, thereby giving a valence issue character to these aspects of

the national question. However, constitutional options, and particularly the opposition

between federalists and sovereignists, polarize Quebec voters. Unlike the first two

dimensions, this aspect of the national question has the typical characteristics of a

positional issue.

Previous work on the effect of autonomist demands in regional and national legislatures,

notably focusing on Quebec, led us to formulate five hypotheses. The first three relate to

the notion of issue ownership. Contrary to existing work, we hypothesize that the national

question does not necessarily belong to the most nationalist party in the sub-state unit of a

country. We believe that the more consensual aspects of this question will indeed be

dominated by the most nationalist party, but that the more conflictual aspects (such as

asking for independence) actually also benefit the party who opposes this stance with the

most vigour.

The data show that this characterization adequately describes the political dynamic in

Quebec on the national question. The issue of the national question is dominated both by

34

the most nationalist party, the Parti québécois, who seem the most determined and able to

defend Quebec’s interests, and by the least nationalist party, the Quebec Liberal Party,

which represents the main opposition to the sovereignist project. Both parties benefit

from the national question being at the centre of the political debate for the past few

decades.

The key position occupied by the PQ and PLQ is explained by the importance of the

national question in Quebec. Here, the national question is a “super issue” that supersedes

all other cleavages in the province, including left and right. In fact, the only party in

Quebec able to distinguish itself on the left-right issue is Québec solidaire, a small leftist

party who won 7% of the popular vote during the last elections. In this context, it clearly

seems that the national question is the dominant cleavage in Quebec and that questions

related to the left-right division represent a niche issue instead.

The dominance of the national question in Quebec forces parties to adopt a stance

regarding this question, while taking into account public opinion. Two parties are directly

involved in the debate. The Parti québécois focuses on Quebecers’ nationalist sensibilities

in order to maximize its votes and the Quebec Liberal Party uses its federalist inclinations

among these same voters to build winning electoral coalitions. Any other party must also

find a way to insert themselves into the debate if they want to remain relevant. The first

option is to take a position in the debate. This is the route chosen by Québec solidaire,

which has joined the sovereignist camp. This behavior seems to confirm the hypothesis

that a contagion effect of the national question would affect leftist parties more than

35

rightist ones. However, one important nuance should be added. If it is true that Québec

solidaire is “officially” independentist, this contagion has not really reached its voters yet,

who mostly support this party for its leftist policies.

The other possible option when faced with such a dominant issue is to take a middle-

ground position or, at least for a short period of time, offer voters a short of truce in the

debate in order to focus on other issues. This was the strategy of the Coalition Avenir

Québec, which has a nationalist, but non-sovereignist profile. This party wants the

national question to be put aside so that the province can work on consolidating its

finances and jumpstarting its economy. This nationalist position has its fair share of

ambiguity built into it. It reflects the needs for all parties in Quebec, under threat of being

perceived by the public as not sensitive to Quebec’s aspirations, to take a position on the

national question, even if this positioning can be superficial, as in the case of Québec

solidaire, or ambiguous, as in the case of Coalition Avenir Québec.

We still need to look deeper into the impact of the national question in Quebec. However,

it is clear that the question of autonomist demands in national sub-entities cannot be

reduced to the simple category of “niche issues”. On the contrary, this question is a

mainstream issue in Quebec whose effect on political dynamics is complex. Unraveling

this complexity is useful and important for better understanding Quebec politics.

However, the questions explored of this chapter can be extended beyond the borders of

the province. Work on this theme is important not only to better measure the effect of

36

autonomist debates in general, but also (and more widely) to enrich our understand of the

effect of issues on electoral behavior.

37

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39

Appendix

A. Tables for logistic regression

Table A1. Logistic regression for vote (Model 1)

PQ QS CAQ PLQAge 1.38***

(0.31)-2.65***

(0.55)-0.47(0.32)

0.47(0.33)

Gender -0.14(0.15)

0.06(0.24)

-0.31**(0.15)

0.45***(0.16)

Language 2.40***(0.40)

1.69***(0.55)

2.24***(0.36)

-3.08***(0.25)

Education -0.86***(0.33)

1.88***(0.57)

-0.48(0.34)

0.50(0.34)

Income -0.75***(0.29)

-0.15(0.45)

0.62**(0.30)

0.30(0.30)

GcDr -1.89***(0.36)

-3.16***(0.63)

0.90**(0.36)

2.22***(0.38)

CMORAL 0.83***(0.25)

2.12***(0.52)

-0.81***(0.25)

-0.67***(0.25)

MDEM -0.59**(0.25)

1.01**(0.43)

0.91***(0.26)

-0.83***(0.26)

Constant -1.93***(0.57)

-4.85***(0.93)

-3.37***(0.57)

0.65(0.50)

Nagelkerke pseudo-R 0.21 0.29 0.14 0.37% correctly predicted 72.1% 92.7% 76.7% 77%N 1127 1127 1127 1127***p≤0.01; **p≤0.05; *p≤0.10 (two-tailed tests). Entries represent unstandardized logistic regression coefficients (with standard deviations in parentheses).

40

Table A2. Logistic regression for vote (Model 2)PQ QS CAQ PLQ

Age 1.48***(0.32)

-2.61***(0.56)

-0.68**(0.34)

0.48(0.34)

Gender -0.16(0.15)

0.04(0.25)

-0.30*(0.16)

0.53***(0.16)

Language 2.57***(0.40)

1.41**(0.56)

2.03***(0.37)

-2.90***(0.25)

Education -0.88***(0.34)

2.04***(0.60)

-0.72**(0.36)

0.64*(0.36)

Income -0.58**(0.30)

-0.43(0.47)

0.50(0.31)

0.41(0.32)

GcDr -1.84***(0.36)

-3.36***(0.66)

0.82**(0.38)

2.28***(0.38)

CMORAL 1.00***(0.26)

1.98***(0.52)

-0.97***(0.26)

-0.76***(0.26)

MDEM -0.48*(0.25)

0.89**(0.43)

0.85***(0.26)

-0.80***(0.26)

IMPCONST 1.12***(0.26)

-1.29***(0.40)

-1.73***(0.26)

1.33***(0.28)

Constant -3.21***(0.64)

-3.47***(1.01)

-1.56**(0.63)

-0.63(0.57)

Nagelkerke pseudo-R 0.24 0.30 0.21 0.40% correctly predicted 74.5% 92.7% 77.1% 78.3%N 1101 1101 1101 1101***p≤0.01; **p≤0.05; *p≤0.10 (two-tailed tests). Entries represent unstandardized logistic regression coefficients (with standard deviations in parentheses).

41


Age 1.40***(0.39)

-2.23***(0.59)

-0.52(0.35)

0.80*(0.41)

Gender 0.00(0.18)

0.17(0.25)

-0.32**(0.16)

0.32(0.19)

Language 1.18***(0.43)

0.90(0.62)

2.15***(0.37)

-1.76***(0.28)

Education -1.46***(0.40)

1.74***(0.62)

-0.64*(0.37)

1.03**(0.44)

Income -0.34(0.35)

-0.20(0.49)

0.35(0.32)

0.13(0.38)

GcDr -0.33(0.43)

-3.02***(0.73)

0.35(0.41)

0.87*(0.48)

CMORAL 0.55*(0.30)

1.66***(0.54)

-0.79***(0.27)

-0.10(0.32)

MDEM -0.77**(0.31)

0.73(0.45)

0.80***(0.27)

-0.75**(0.31)

IMPCONST 1.01***(0.31)

-1.47***(0.42)

-1.69***(0.27)

1.56***(0.32)

Identity -0.18(0.30)

-0.03(0.39)

0.24(0.30)

-0.68*(0.40)

AttachQueb 3.16***(0.58)

-0.95(0.66)

-0.80**(0.38)

-1.38***(0.42)

AttachCAN -3.43***(0.31)

-1.54***(0.47)

0.77***(0.28)

5.21***(0.42)

Constant -2.81***(0.90)

-1.28(1.22)

-1.50**(0.75)

-3.84***(0.83)


42


Age 1.56***(0.40)

-2.16***(0.59)

-0.60*(0.36)

0.63(0.42)

Gender 0.02(0.18)

0.15(0.26)

-0.33**(0.17)

0.31(0.20)

Language 1.11**(0.46)

0.76(0.63)

2.20***(0.38)

-1.64***(0.29)

Education -1.56***(0.40)

1.69***(0.62)

-0.62*(0.38)

1.19***(0.45)

Income -0.27(0.35)

-0.17(0.49)

0.33(0.32)

-0.01(0.38)

GcDr -0.17(0.44)

-3.10***(0.75)

0.31(0.41)

0.69(0.49)

CMORAL 0.45(0.31)

1.63***(0.54)

-0.77***(0.27)

-0.04(0.33)

MDEM -0.81***(0.31)

0.71(0.45)

0.83***(0.27)

-0.72**(0.32)

IMPCONST 0.86***(0.31)

-1.57***(0.43)

-1.67***(0.27)

1.64***(0.33)


-0.04(0.39)

0.24(0.30)

-0.63(0.40)


-1.26*(0.71)

-0.64(0.40)

-0.83*(0.44)

AttachCAN -2.49***(0.37)

-1.22**(0.57)

0.51(0.34)

4.29***(0.47)

Values 0.50(0.34)

-0.20(0.59)

-0.04(0.31)

-0.42(0.33)

Market 1.78***(0.42)

1.22*(0.63)

-0.58(0.38)

-1.64***(0.42)

Constant -3.79***(0.95)

-1.40(1.26)

-1.24(0.78)

-2.91***(0.87)


43


Age 1.59***(0.41)

-2.23***(0.60)

-0.67*(0.36)

0.96**(0.45)

Gender 0.14(0.19)

0.08(0.26)

-0.40**(0.17)

0.28(0.20)

Language 0.90*(0.47)

0.55(0.64)

2.13***(0.38)

-1.46***(0.30)

Education -1.31***(0.42)

1.66***(0.62)

-0.78**(0.38)

1.12**(0.46)

Income -0.13(0.36)

-0.23(0.49)

0.29(0.33)

-0.27(0.40)

GcDr -0.12(0.46)

-3.31***(0.77)

0.27(0.42)

0.62(0.51)

CMORAL 0.26(0.32)

1.60***(0.55)

-0.77***(0.28)

0.10(0.33)

MDEM -0.81**(0.32)

0.74(0.45)

0.82***(0.28)

-0.71**(0.33)

IMPCONST 0.74**(0.34)

-1.41***(0.44)

-1.51***(0.27)

1.88***(0.34)


-0.04(0.40)

0.26(0.31)

-0.45(0.43)


-1.12(0.75)

-0.42(0.40)

-0.24(0.45)

AttachCAN -1.45***(0.41)

-1.39**(0.59)

0.00(0.38)

3.20***(0.51)

Values 0.16(0.37)

-0.30(0.61)

0.01(0.32)

0.02(0.35)

Market 1.01**(0.45)

1.42**(0.66)

-0.30(0.40)

-1.09**(0.45)

Independence 1.41***(0.25)

-0.67*(0.37)

-0.98***(0.25)

-1.88***(0.43)

Power 0.76***(0.24)

0.63*(0.37)

0.24(0.20)

-0.90***(0.22)

Constant -4.14***(0.98)

-1.32(1.27)

-0.91(0.78)

-2.68***(0.90)

Nagelkerke pseudo-R 0.53 0.34 0.23 0.65% correctly predicted 83.2 92.9% 77.9% 85.0%N 1076 1076 1076 1076***p≤0.01; **p≤0.05; *p≤0.10 (two-tailed tests). Entries represent unstandardized logistic regression coefficients (with standard deviations in parentheses).

44

Data and Coding

The study was conducted among the general adult population in Quebec. The fieldwork, which started immediately after the Quebec general election of April the 7 th 2014, was performed between April the 9th to April the 16th 2014. Respondents were selected from the panel LégerWeb wich includes more than 400,000 Canadian households. The weight variable for the survey is based on the following variables: SEX, AGE, REGION and LANGUAGE, according to the latest Statistics Canada census.

Variables

Dependent Variables

PQ Dummy 1= Vote for “Parti Québécois” in Quebec elections 20140= Vote for another party

Abstentions, blank votes or missing observations are coded as missing

QS Dummy 1= Vote for “Quebec Solidaire” in Quebec elections 20140= Vote for another party


CAQ Dummy 1= Vote for “Coalition Avenir Québec” in Quebec elections 20140= Vote for another party


PLQ Dummy 1= Vote for the liberal party in Quebec elections 20140= Vote for another party


Sociodemographic variables

Age Scale Age of respondents, rescaled from (0) to (1)

Gender Dummy 1=Female; 0=Male

Language Dummy 1=Respondents who speak French at home; 0=Non-French

45

Socioeconomic variables

Education 11 point scale Highest level of education that has been completed by the respondents. Scores are rescaled from 0 (no education) to 1 (master or doctoral).

Missing observations are coded as missing.

Income 9 point scale Respondents’ household income of a 9-point level scale, rescaled from 0 (less than $8,000) to 1 ($104,000 and more).


Political Attitude

GcDr 11 point scale Respondents’ ideology of a 11-point level scale, rescaled from 0 (left) to1 (right).

Missing observations are coded as 0.5

CMORAL Scale Scores are means of two following variables:

Are you for or against marriage between people of the same sex? 0 (Against); 0.5 (missing); 1 (For)Are you for or against death penalty? 0 (For); 0.5 (missing); 1 (Against)

MDEM Scale Scores are means of three following variables:

The National Assembly of Quebec does not care much what people think: 0 (Disagree); 0.5 (missing); 1 (Agree)People like me have no say in what the provincial government in Quebec do: 0 (Disagree); 0.5 (missing); 1 (Agree)Overall, are you satisfied (e) the way democracy works in Quebec? 0 (Satisfied); 0.5 (missing); 1 (Unsatisfied)

Identity

Identity 5 point scale Respondents’ opinion on their identity varying from 1 (Only Canadian, not Quebec people) to 5 (Only Quebec people, not Canadian). Scores are rescaled from 0 to 1.


AttachQUEB 4 point scale Respondents’ level of attachment of Quebec varying from 1 (not at all attached) to 4 (very attached), rescaled from 0 to 1.

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AttachCAN 4 point scale Respondents’ level of attachment of Canada varying from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very attached), rescaled from 0 to 1.


Values

Values 11 point scale Respondents’ opinion on their distinct values varying from 1 (Same values) to 1 (Disntinct values). Scores are rescaled from 0 to 1.


Market 11 point scale Respondents’ opinion on the importance of market varying from 1 (larger market with less sovereignty) to 11 (More sovereignty with smaller market). Scores are rescaled from 0 to 1.


Political issues

IMPCONST 4 point scale Respondents’ opinion on the constitutional preferences of the party varying from 1 (not at all important) to 4 (very important). Scores are rescaled from 0 to 1.


Independence Dummy 0=Otherwise1=Opinion in favor of the independence of Quebec


Power Dummy 0=Otherwise1=Opinion in favor of more power for the National Assembly of Quebec


web viewmiller, warren e. and j. merril shanks. 1996. the new american voter. cambridge, ... ed....

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