villacorta ynot cuenca digests

8/10/2019 Villacorta Ynot Cuenca Digests

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Vienna Eleize B. Mantiza

SALVADOR VILLACORTA vs. GREGORIO BERNARDO

FACTS: Ordinance 22 entitled AN ORDINANCE REGULATING SUBDIVISION PLANS OVER

PARCELS OF LAND IN THE CITY OF DAGUPAN was enacted by the municipal board of Dagupan

City. The said ordinance was imposing additional requirements to that of the national law Act

496. Ordinance 22 was annulled by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and was affirmedby the Court of Appeals whose decision reads as follows:

Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law

does not require subdivision plans to be submitted to the City Engineer before the same is

submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land Registration Office or by the

Director of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of the same ordinance also

contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the latter being silent on a service fee of

PO.03 per square meter of every lot subject of such subdivision application; Section 3 of the

ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not

mention of a certification to be made by the City Engineer before the Register of Deeds allowsregistration of the subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance imposes a penalty for

its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the

City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner additional conditions.

ISSUE: Were the decisions of the CFI and CA to annul the said ordinance was correct?

HELD: Yes. To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances

amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances

could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to

prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnaping; the execution of contracts,

to forestall fraud; the validation of passports, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom ofspeech, to reduce disorder; and so on.

This advice is especially addressed to the local governments which exercise the police power

only by virtue of a valid delegation from the national legislature under the general welfare

clause. In the instant case, Ordinance No. 22 suffers from the additional defect of violating this


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Ynot vs IAC - A case Digest

RESTITUTO YNOT -petitioner; an owner of carabaos

Station Commander, Integrated National Police, Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo & the Regional Director,Bureau of Animal Industry, Region IV- respondents

Type of petition filed: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged of violation of EO 626 when he transported six carabaos in a pump boat

from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station

commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued

for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of

a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00.

Petitioner raised the issue of EOs constituitonality and filed case in the lower court. However,

the court sustained the the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be

produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the

constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the petitioner. Therefore, petitioner

appealed the decsion to IAC with the following contentions:

1. EO is unconstitutional as confiscation is outright

2. Penalty is invalid as it is imposed without the owner's right to be heard before a competent

and impartial court.

3. Measure should have not been presumed

4. Raises a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President.


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ISSUE:

Whether Executive Order No. 626-A is constitutional or not.

HELD:

Petiton is GRANTED with the following justifications:

1. Right of the petitioner to question for constitutionality is valid as theres no exigency showing

to justify the exercise of this extraordinary power of the President

2. Properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destrcution

3. Case involved roving commission and invalid delegation of powers and invalid exercise of

police power

4. Due process is violated because the owner is denied the right to be heard in his defense and

was immedeiately condemned and punish


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However, its unpaid obligations ballooned so much that by 1983, it became impossible

for it to settle its maturing and overdue accounts with various GFIs, namely, the Philippine

National Bank (PNB), Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), National Development

Company (NDC), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Land Bank of the Philippines

(LBP), and Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation (PEFLGC), now known as

the Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines.

On February 23, 1983, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction

No. (LOI) 1295,[4]

directing the creditor GFIs to convert into CDCPs shares of stock the

following: (1) all of the direct obligations of CDCP and those of its wholly-owned subsidiaries,

including, but not limited to loans, credits, accrued interests, fees and advances in any currency

outstanding as of December 31, 1982; (2) the direct obligations of CDCP maturing in 1983; and

(3) obligations maturing in 1983 which were guaranteed by the GFIs.

Thus, with the implementation of LOI 1295, respondents-GFIs became the majority

stockholders of CDCP to the extent of 70% of the authorized capital stocks. The change in the

corporations ownership was made public through various announcements.[9]

CDCP was later

renamed to PNCC to reflect the Philippine Government stockholding, and became a

government-acquired asset corporation. Consequently, the various GFIs were given seats in the

Board of Directors of PNCC and participated in the management of the company.

On May 31, 1996, more than a decade after LOI 1295 was implemented, petitioner filed a

complaint before the SEC. Petitioner averred that while PNCC issued the above specified

certificates of stock to the GFIs pursuant to LOI 1295, the GFIs however refused to cancel and

never did cancel the loans in their books as payment for the shares issued in their names by

PNCC as they considered it to be a diminution of the value of their investments. Thus,

petitioner claimed that some of the GFIs refused to accept delivery of the stock certificates

from PNCC while others were not even aware of the issuance of the certificates of stock in their

names.
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Supporting Facts:

SEC and CA rendered its Decision dismissing petitioners complaint for lack of merit and

revoking the writ of preliminary injunction issued on September 8, 1998. Thefalloreads:

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Complaint is hereby dismissed for lack of merit

and the Orders dated April 14, 1998 andSeptember 8, 1998 are hereby

revoked and set aside.[25]

The Issues

Whether or not the petitioner was denied due process and failed failure to appreciate

circumstances that would not only show denial of due process but of fraud and conspiracy in

railroading the instant case against him.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Procedural due process, in gist, is the necessity for notice and an opportunity to be

heard before judgment is rendered. Its essence is encapsulated in the immortal cry of

Themistocles to Alcibiades: Strikebut hear me first.[45]

Thus, as long as a party is given the

opportunity to defend his/her interests in due course, the party would have no reason to

complain, for it is this opportunity to be heard that makes up the essence of due process.[46]

The cardinal primary requirements of procedural due process , as gleaned by Justice

Laurel from an array of American decisions, were enumerated in Tibay v. Court of Industrial

Relations, as follows:

1. right to a hearing
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2. tribunal must considerthe evidence presented.

3. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right,

it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having

something to support its decision.

4. evidence must be substantial.

5.

The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented6. The court or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own

independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not

simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

7. The court should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a

manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues

involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.

Prescinding from the above requirements, it is thus clear that the proceedings before the SEC

SICD Hearing Panel are bound by these requirements.

No denial of due process. No evidence of fraud and conspiracy. Findings of facts of

administrative bodies accorded finality when supported by substantial evidence. LOI 1295 has

been implemented

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