UNCLASSIFIED

INFORMATION SYSTEMS INITIAL CAPABILITIES DOCUMENT (IS lCD)

for

JOINT TRAINING AND MAINTENANCE SYSTEM (JTAMS)

MISSION REHEARSAL SYSTEM (MRES)

ACAT: Ill

Sponsoring organization: Joint Staff/J8/Joint Requirements Office for Battle Space Awareness (JRO-BA)

Date: 27 March 01Version 1.5

Points of Contact:Service Rank Name Title Phone EmailJoint Staff LtCol J8/JRO-LOG

CIB Chief703-571-4321

Joint Staff Mr. J8/JRO-LOG Sense/Shape

703-571-1324

Joint Staff Ms. J8/JRO-LOG Shape Integrator

703-571-1234

Validation Authority: Joint Capability Board (JCB)

Milestone Decision Authority (MDA): Director, Joint Program Executive Officer for Joint Reconnaissance And Training System (JPEO-JRATS)

Joint Staffing Designator: JCB Interest

Distribution Statement: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government Agencies and their contractors for training use only. Other requests for this document shall be referred to: Director, Joint Requirements Office for Logistics Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-8000, DSN 671-5555.

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Executive Summary

Background: The Joint Reconnaissance and Autonomous Targeting System (JRATS) program is required for the successful conduct of offensive, defensive, and stability and support operations as well as the ability to fight as part of a larger formation. The system will be operated and maintained by soldiers, airmen and Marines at brigade/wing/Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) level using the JTAMS capability via the Joint Command and Control System (JCCS) display. The JCCS will be able to provide simultaneous command and control of up to three (3) Joint Unmanned Ground Vehicles (JUGV) and Firebird Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (FUAV) acting together (no more than two (2) of any one vehicle). JRATS shall have the ability to rehearse all mission packages prior to execution (JTAMS).

The Joint Training and Maintenance System (JTAMS) will provide the automated logistical support for JRATS and be displayed through the JCCS. The Joint Autonomous Reconnaissance and Targeting (JART) Initial Capability Document (ICD) provides the overall vision of unmanned, robotic warfare capabilities meeting the Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff’s vision of an Automated Battle Command Integrated (ABCI) battlefield. The following capabilities are required of JTAMS:

- On-line, timely remote operational diagnostics capabilities must be provided for all JRATS components to maximize probability of mission success.

- Capabilities are needed to do expert system analysis of mission, weather, terrain, logistics resources and to make a logistical prediction of mission success.

- Capabilities are needed to track unit-level maintenance activities and supply actions and interface with supporting in-theater retail supply systems such as the Army’s various Standard Army Maintenance Information Systems (STAMISs) and ultimately the Global Combat Support System (GCSS) for timely logistics support.

- Operational training simulator capability for mission rehearsals is required.

- There is a need for an embedded training system to help train operators of this system. Here is the JTAMS OV-1:

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Joint Training and Maintenance System (JTAMS)

OnBoard Diagnostics (OBD) System

Parts and Maintenance System (PAMS)

Mission Rehearsal System (MRES)

Training and Help System (THS)

FIGURE 1 – JTAMS OV-1

Per the JTAMS AoA, the Army TAMS system will be the starting point for designing the JTAMS. TAMS is made up of three (3) sub-systems—On-Board Diagnostic System (OBD), Parts and Maintenance System (PAMS) and the Training and Help System (THS). JTAMS will have these same three (3) systems modified to work with the Joint Command and Control System (JCCS), the Firebird Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (FUAV) and the Joint Unmanned Ground Vehicle (JUGV). In addition, JTAMS will add a fourth sub-system called the Mission REhearsal System (MRES). The MRES is an unprecedented capability to allow operators to execute mission packages in a virtual environment, as described in the ICD, draft CDD, AoA, and AS. Operators can train and identify mission caveats prior to executing the actual mission. Please see the JTAMS software architecture in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2 – JTAMS SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE

The focus of this JTAMS Mission Rehearsal System (MRES) Information Systems Initial Capabilities Document (IS lCD) is identification of future JTAMS MRES software capabilities required by users for a more capable mission rehearsal system. It will guide development and fielding of future JTAMS MRES software capabilities. Approval of the JTAMS MRES IS lCD by the Joint Capabi l i ty Board (JCB) will endorse transition of JTAMS MRES software development into the Information Technology (IT) Box approach prescribed by JCIDS and delegate oversight

UNCLASSIFIEDof JTAMS MRES software requirements to the Army lead JTAMS MRES ITMC. Development and approval of follow on JTAMS MRES Requirements Definition Packages (RDPs) and specific Capability Drops (COs) with timelines for fielding their software enhancements will occur after approval of the JTAMS MRES IS lCD. Use of the IT Box construct will support an agile and flexible development process to identify and field software capabilities when they are mature and ready to be fielded. This will result in a faster and more responsive fielding of JTAMS MRES capabilities desired by the warfighter.

Mission Rehearsal System (MRES): MRES must be able to accurately model the following missions: Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR), Fire Support, Direct Fire and Force Protection. However, the MRES application itself is unprecedented and no such existing integrated model-based system exists in the US inventory.

Fire Support, Direct Fire and Force Projection are considered to be the highest risk MRES capabilities because of the complex models that need to be created and validated or reused from existing DoD M&S assets.

ISR missions are estimated to be lower risk because of known demonstrated ISR simulation stand-alone capabilities in other DoD systems but these mission packages and models have not been integrated with other planned MRES capabilities.

Figure 1 depicts the four components of the JTAMS MRES IT Box. The JCB assigned oversight body for the JTAMS MRES IS lCD is the Chair of the Batt lespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board (BA FCB). The JTAMS MRES ITMC shall retain authority over JTAMS MRES RDP issues, including designation of JTAMS MRES Key Performance Parameters (KPPs). The JTAMS MRES ITMC will oversee JTAMS MRES software capability issues and to approve the content of all JTAMS MRES COs. Stakeholders have reviewed all original JTAMS MRES requirements and capability gaps. Consistent with JCIDS guidance for framing an IT Box program, five measures of effectiveness will be used to guide development of future JTAMS MRES requirements identified in section 3 of this IS lCD. Estimated software development & integration costs and lifetime sustainment costs for future JTAMS MRES software capabilities identified in this IS lCD are also identified for the JTAMS MRES IT Box below and are summarized in more detail in section 4.

Flag Oversight & Requirements Organization

Army Lead JTAMS MRES ITMC

KPPs1. NR-KPP2. System Availability3. Materiel AvailabilityKSAs1. Exchange of Data

Estimated Application and System

Software Development: $ 1 5.3M JPM-Information Systems

UNCLASSIFIED

Hardware Refresh and System

Enhancements and Integration Costs(Lifetime): $26.57M

JPM-Information Systems

Figure 1. JTAMS MRES Information Technology Box

Ill

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Table of Contents

1. Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Summary........................................·........••.......•.......•••••..............1

2. Joint Capability Areas ....................................................................................................................... .2

3. Capability Requirements..........•.....................................................................................................•.. .3A. JTAMS MRES Increment 1 Deferrals ......................................................................................................4B. JTAMS MRES Increment 2 Requirements...............................................................................................4

4.Capability Gaps and Overlaps ..........................................................................................••.............. .6A. Flag Level Oversight .....................................................................................................................6B. Capability Gaps .............................................................................................................................6C. Capability Overlaps .......................................................................................................................6D. Costs.............................................................................................................................................6E. Implementation Plan......................................................................................................................7

5. Threat and Operational Environment ...................................................................•.............•.....•....... .7A. Threats to be Countered................................................................................................................7B. Information Operations Threats .....................................................................................................8

6. Assessment of Non Materiel Approaches.........................................................................................8

7. Final Recommendations.................................................................................................................... .8A. Non Materiel Solutions ..................................................................................................................8B. Summary.......................................................................................................................................8

Figures, Tables, AppendicesFigure 1. JTAMS MRES Information Technology Box .............................................................................. iiiFigure 2. JTAMS MRES Capability Implementation ..................................................................................7Figure 3. JTAMS MRES High Level operational Graphic........................................................................ A-1

Table 1. JTAMS MRES Capability Requirements Matrix ...........................................................................3Table 2. JTAMS MRES Cost Summary ..............................................................................................6

Appendix A: Architecture Data .............................................................................................................. A-1Appendix B: References ....................................................................................................................... B-1Appendix C: Acronyms .........................................................................................................................C-1Appendix D: Glossary ...........................................................................................................................D-1

1. Concept of Operations (CONOPs) Summary

A. JRATS. The Unified Commands require JRATS capabilities for the successful conduct of offensive, defensive, and stability and support operations as well as the ability to fight as part of a larger formation. JRATS will be designed to confront low-end and mid-range threats that may employ both conventional and asymmetric capabilities, and be employable in small-scale contingency (SSC) operations in complex and dangerous terrain and in the attack of high value, heavily defended targets where the probability of heavy casualties exists e.g., mine fields, dense urban areas, and command and control centers. The system will be capable of being

iv

UNCLASSIFIEDprojected anywhere on the globe within 96 hours and be capable of conducting operations, immediately upon arrival without pause for preparation, to dominate and/or defeat the threat. The system will be operated and maintained by soldiers, airmen and Marines at brigade/wing/Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) level using the JTAMS capability via the JCCS display. The JCCS will be able to provide simultaneous command and control of up to three (3) JUGVs and FUAVs acting together (no more than two (2) of any one vehicle). The JUGV shall have the capability of being configured with modular mission packages for RSTA and direct fire. The FUAV will have the capability of being configured to accept a conventional 500-pound bomb, a laser guided bomb, or a Wildfire fire-and-forget missile. JRATS shall have the ability to rehearse all mission packages prior to execution (JTAMS).

B. JTAMS. JTAMS is an integral system within JRATS. JTAMS shall provide interoperable, integrated, near real time logistics management capabilities for the Joint Command and Control System (JCCS), Joint Unmanned Ground Vehicle (JUGV) and the Joint Unmanned Air Vehicle (JUAV). In addition JTAMS shall provide integrated training and mission rehearsal which allows operators to practice missions in an environment that replicates their real world operations..

C. MRES. MRES is an integral system within JTAMS. MRES shall provide integrated training and mission rehearsal which allows operators to practice missions in an environment that replicates their real world operations. MRES shall provide for stand-alone mission practice for individual systems and integrated tactical rehearsal for multiple unmanned systems.

2. Joint Capability Areas (JCAs)

a. JRATS Performance (System of Systems level).

(1) JRATS will be used in a variety of critical, high-risk warfighting situations requiring integrated and coordinated land and air operations across the spectrum of conflict. The JUGV and the FUAV components will also be capable of independent operation with the JCCS. JTAMS will constantly monitor critical sub-systems status and provide feedback to the operator at all times. JTAMS will also automatically re-order parts and supplies based on the logistics history of each platform. JRATS will be integral to the successful completion of RSTA, mine detection, vehicle recovery, maneuver, and direct and indirect fire missions with reduced casualties. JRATS also conforms to specific statutory requirements for unmanned ground and air combat vehicles.

(2) The capability to detect, track and launch a weapon to destroy a moving vehicle or fixed target shall be required. If attacking a target, a system to identify friendly units and automatically override firing commands shall be required. JRATS, via its unmanned component systems, shall be capable of performing reconnaissance in areas that are contaminated by chemical weapons or that would otherwise expose human operators to extreme risk. The following are JRATS system performance characteristics that are needed to satisfy the operational capability requirements.

(3) JRATS will have the ability to rehearse all mission via JTAMS MRES in a virtual environment. Controls and virtual video feeds will be as realistic as possible so that operators can practice and troubleshoot missions prior to their actual execution.

1. 1. Net-Ready KPP JTAMS shall fully support execution of Joint critical operational activities

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UNCLASSIFIEDidentified in the applicable Joint and system integratedarchitectures and the system must satisfy the technical requirements for transition to Net-Centric military operations to include: 1) Conduct rehearsal for force sizes commensurate with Army Corp, Marine Corps MEU, and USAF Numbered Air Force.

2) Operationally effective information exchanges in accordance with the exchange of data KSA items 1 and 2

3) Enter and Be managed on the theater component level headquarters SIPRNET network at the year of initial fielding.

1) Solution architecture products compliant with DoD Information Enterprise Architecture

2) Compliant with the DoD Net-Centric Strategy and the DoD Net-Centric Services Strategy

3) Compliant with GIG Technical Guidance (GTC) to include Standard Technical View-1 (StdV-1) and implementation guidance of GIG Enterprise Service Profiles

4) Cybersecurity requirements including availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation, and issuance of an Authority to Operate (ATO) by the Designated Approval Authority (OM).

5) Mission critical performance and cybersecurity attributes, data correctness, data availability, and consistent data processing specified in the applicable Joint and system integrated architecture views.

6) Supportability requirements to include Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module and Open Systems Architecture (OSA) design for supportability.

2. 2. System Availability JTAMS-MRES shall provide appropriate system Ao for Critical and Mission Essential (non-Critical) system capabilities.

3. 3. Materiel Availability JTAMS-MRES shall provide appropriate materiel Ao for Critical and Mission Essential (non-Critical) services.

3. Key System Attributes (KSA).

4. 1. Exchange of Data

JTAMS shall exchange data with:1) JCCS to obtain the current positions of the FUAVs and JUGVs2) OBD on the vehicles (or virtual)3) Mission Data as input by the Commander4) Weather data from the Air Force IMETS

4. Capability Gaps and OverlapsA. Flag Level Oversight. The Joint Capability Board (JCB) Chair will provide Flag oversight of all

JTAMS MRES i n i t i a l m i n i m u m capabilities issues. The JROC delegates the detailed requirements oversight of this program to the Army led JTAMS-MRES Information Technology Management Council (MRES ITMC) JTAMS MRES Requirement Definition Packages (RDPs), including Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) that support each RDP. All JTAMS MRES RDPs will be provided to the BA FCB along with sufficient supporting information to enable the BA FCB to act as the JCB agent to confirm the JTAMS MRES RDPs implement the minimum performance of the ICD and remain within the cost and schedule of the ICD approval JROCM .

(1) The JCB Chair , through the va l idat ing JROCM has delegated authority to approve all JTAMS MRES Capability Drops (COs), including composition of the CDs and planned fielding dates, to the co-leads of JTAMS-MRES Information Technology Management Council (MRES ITMC) and

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UNCLASSIFIEDProgram Executive Off icer (PEO) JRATS. All JTAMS MRES COs will be f o r w a r d e d t o t h e B A F C B w i t h i n 1 w e e k o f a p p r o v a l a n d r e v i e w e d i n a c o n s o l o d a t e d p r e s e n t a t i o n b i - a n n u a l l y . .

(2) Formal JTAMS MRES RDP Build Decisions and CD Fielding Decisions shall be approved by theJTAMS-MRES Information Technology Management Council (MRES ITMC) after completion of appropriate requirement reviews.

B. Capability Gaps. The current JTAMS MRES capability gap is the difference between capabilities currently fielded in JTAMS MRES Increment 1 and requirements identified as future capabilities identified in preceding section 3. The majority of those requirements were previously approved by the JROC for the JTAMS-MRES Information Technology Management Council (MRES ITMC). As a result of JTAMS MRES stakeholder reviews in support of this IS lCD, JTAMS MRES capabilities identified in section 3 are those that have been assessed as necessary for future JTAMS requirements..

C. Capability Overlaps. There are no conflicting or redundant program of record mission rehearsal overlaps that are either in use today, or planned for future development or employment.

D. Costs. JTAMS MRES costs are summarized in two cost categories: 1) Application and System Software Development Costs and 2) Hardware Refresh and System Enhancements and Integration costs, as indicated in Table 2. Funding for category 1 is identified in President Budget-1 for FY 1-5. Prior year costs are included in cost category 1. Funding for JTAMS MRES modernization and upgrades that will ensure JTAMS MRES remains synchronized with evolving versions of host joint systems is captured in category 2 . A recent JTAMS MRES life cycle cost estimate (LCCE) update summarized anticipated JTAMS MRES costs in both cost categories through FY15. Joint and Service host C2 system implementation and convergence strategies conforming to the DOD Joint Information Environment (JIE) mandates are the primary JTAMS MRES modernization cost drivers.

Table 2. JTAMS MRES Cost Summary ($M)

Cost CategoryPriorYears

FY1 FY2 FY3 FY4 FY5 FY6 FY7-15 TOTAL1. Application and System Software

Development Costs 0.5 5.8 2.9 2.0 1.3 1.6 1.2 15.32. Hardware

Refresh and System Enhancements and Integration Costs

0 0 0 1.5 2.8 2.9 2.8 22.87 32.87

Total 0.5 5.8 2.9 3.5 4.2 4.5 4.0 22.87 48.17

E. Implementation Plan. Figure 2 depicts a notional implementation of future JTAMS MRES capabilities among four separate Requirement Definition Packages (RDPs) with their Capability Drops (CDs). JTAMS MRES RDP-1, -2 and -3 (with their CDs 1.1 through 3.8 would identify software capabilities for development and fielding. Each JTAMS MRES RDP and their CDs, comprised of groupings of capabilities identified in section 3, would be developed and fielded based upon the following criteria: user priorities, technology readiness levels and capability interdependencies. A follow on RDP-4 (with CDs 4.1 through 4.3) would integrate existing software with the "to be developed" JTAMS MRES hardware component. Together, the JTAMS MRES RDPs and COs represent implementation of the JCIDS IT Box development approach.

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UNCLASSIFIED5. Threat and Operational Environment

A. Threats to be Countered. The level of threat varies widely from adversary to adversary. Because adversarial capabilities are constantly improving, threats to MRES continue to grow. According to Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (I0), February 2006, IO are described as the integrated employment of EW, computer network operations (CNO), mission information support operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. IO applies across all phases of an operation, throughout the range of military operation, and at every level of war. Information warfare is conducted during time of crisis or conflict (including war) to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Adversaries recognize our civilian and military reliance on advanced information technologies and systems and understand that information superiority provides the U.S. with unique advantages. Accordingly, potential foes are expected to pursue I0 to counter U.S. military superiority. Supported by intelligence exploitation, IO and cyber-terrorism constitute the major threats to GEMSIS. This can include interception, exploitation, denial, disruption and degradation of commercial and military communication links or the signal environment by terrorist groups or foreign intelligence services.

B. Information Operations Threats. The primary threat to MRES comes from I0. These threats center on CNO, incorporating computer network attack (CNA) and physical destruction, cyber-terrorism, and insider threats. Similar to the threat faced by all software and computer systems that access the DOD Information Network (DODIN), JTAMS MRES will likely be targeted by a myriad of adversaries, ranging from highly capable and sophisticated state actors to malicious individuals. These cyberspace operations threats will include exploitation by adversary intelligence and attacks with the purpose of damaging, disabling, or spoofing the system. Even if JTAMS MRES is not a direct target of adversary information operations, it could suffer incidental effects from a broader computer network or electronic attack. With the JTAMS MRES interface with host Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence (C41) systems, its access to valuable information on C4I systems make it a potential target for compromise of data, deception with or corruption of data, disruption of system operations, or actual physical destruction of equipment. Any compromise within the JTAMS MRES IS capability set may pose a threat to other systems residing on the DODIN There are an increasing number of countries whose doctrine includes the use of information warfare as part of routine military operations. Exploitation of Automated Information Systems (AIS) vulnerabilities by information operations and information warfare is likely to increase, with the intention of gaining an information advantage over us by denying, disrupting, or manipulating our information flow. Electronic attacks against computer networks offer relatively low cost, low risk, and high potential payoff, and may originate from state-sponsored and non-state sponsored attackers. Intrusion and insertion of malicious software are examples of offensive cyberspace operations. All C41 systems are threatened by electronic warfare, electromagnetic interference and effects of nuclear detonations, directed energy weapons and physical destruction with the objectives of compromising information, corrupting data, or denying service. This assessment is based on Defense Intelligence Assessment: (U) Computer Network Operations Capstone Threat Assessment (10 Capstone, Volume 10), Classified S//NF, DIA-08-1209-908.A, 9 May 2013 (S//NF).

6. Assessment of Non Materiel Approaches. The initial 2011 JRATS Baseline CapabilityAssessment (BCA) concluded that a material approach was needed to address identified capability gaps for a standardized training capability cited the need for an improved mission rehearsal and noted that the capability could best be addressed with a material solution. Non-materiel solutions alone cannot provide the desired result for a standardized, net centric capability to effectively train operators.

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UNCLASSIFIED7. Final RecommendationsA. Non Materiel Solutions. There are no viable non materiel solutions identified as either a supplement to or

a replacement for the JTAMS capabilities provided by JTAMS MRES. Continued development and fielding of the JTAMS MRES materiel solution is required to provide critical training capabilities for the warfighter.

B. Summary. JTAMS MRES requirements identified in this JTAMS MRES IS lCD have been reviewed and endorsed by JRATS stakeholders as capabilities needed to enhance current unmanned system capabilities. Continued modernization and capability enhancements to the current JTAMS MRES software baseline is the most effective, efficient and expeditious means to address current W&R capability shortfalls. Improved software capabilities fielded in JTAMS MRES capability drops will also provide the foundation to leverage future anticipated sensor inputs.

Figure 3. JTAMS MRES High Level Operational Concept Graphic

1. Figure 3 depicts the JTAMS MRES Operational View (OV)-1), a high level view of JTAMS MRES employment in the joint operational environment. It is focused on JTAMS capabilities and depicts the normal operations integration to be replicated by JTAMS MRES in response to provide common situational awareness for the joint force. .

2. The JTAMS MRES All View (AV)-1 architecture is posted at: https:l/intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/dars/jmap/_layouts/viewlsts.aspx. All supporting architecture products for the JTAMS MRES IS lCD required by CJCS 6212.01F are located at: http://jrockmds1.js.smil.mil.

3. JTAMS MRES Software Architecture is depicted Figure 4.

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Figure 4. Proposed MRES Software Architecture

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APPENDIX 8: References

1. Requirements: Provided by request to program office.

2. DOD Issuances:

a. Secretary of Defense Execution Order, Joint Information Environment, 5 December 2012.

b. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Joint Information Environment Implementation, 6May 2013.

c. DOD Cloud Computing Strategy, DOD/CIO, July 2012.

d. DOD CIO Memo, Adoption of the National Information Exchange Model with the DOD, 28March 2013.

e. Joint Staff/J6 Memo, DOD Adoption of the National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) and establishment of the Military Operations Domain, 12 April 2013.

f. DOD Directive (D) 4630.05, lnteroperability and Supportability of Information Technology andNational Security Systems, 5 May 2004.

g. DODD 5000.59, DOD Modeling and Simulation Management, 8 August 2007.

h. DODD 8000.01, Management of the Department of Defense Information Enterprise, 10February 2009.

i. DODD 8500.01E, Information Assurance, 23 April 2007.

j. DOD Memorandum, Interim Guidance for lnteroperability of Information Technology andNational Security Systems, 27 March 2012.

k. DOD Instruction (I) 3150.09, The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Survivability Policy, 17 September 2008 (with CH 1, 17 August 2009.

I. DODI 8320.02, Sharing Data, Information and IT Services in DOD, 5 August 2013.

m. DODI 8500.2, Information Assurance (lA) Implementation, 6 February 2003.

3. Joint Publications (JP)

a. JP 3-11, Operations in CBRN Environments, 4 October 2013.

b. JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, 10 June 2009.

4. Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Issuances

a. Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/ccjo_2012.pdf, 28 September 2012.

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b. CJCSI 3170.01H, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, 10 January 2012.

c. CJCSI 6212.01F, Net Ready Key Performance Parameter (NR KPP), 21 March 2012.

d. Manual for Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/JCIDS, 19 January 2012.

e. CJCS Manual 3500.04D, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), 17 August 2006.

f. Joint Capability Area (JCA), Joint Capability Area Management System,http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/cap_areas:htm, 8 April 2011.

g. 2013 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear Core Capabilities Review, Joint Staff, JROCM 151-13, 13 September 2013.

5. Other References

a. Defense Intelligence Assessment: Defense Intelligence Agency, August 2013 (S//NF).

b. Defense Intelligence Assessment: (U) Computer Network Operations Capstone ThreatAssessment (10 Capstone, Volume 10), Classified S//NF, DIA-08-1209-908.A, 9 May 2013 (S//NF).

c. JTAMS MRES Increment 2 Connectivity Solution Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Report, Army MaterialSystems Analysis Assessment Agency, 24 April 2011.

i. JPEO-CBD Guidelines for Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Verification, Validation and Accreditation(V, V & A}, 2 May 2005.

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APPENDIX C: Acronyms

ACAT AIS AO AoA ARG ATO ATP BA BCA BDC2C2PCC41CBRN CBRND CBRNCC CCJOCD CJCSI COCOMO COE COMPUSEC COMSEC CONOPS COPCPOCWMD CWMDWG DAAOARS DC DEV DIA DISR DOD DODIN DSN DT DTRA FBCB2FCB FD

Acquisition Category Automated Information System Area of OperationAnalysis of Alternatives Amphibious Readiness Group Approval to OperateAllied Tactical PublicationBattlespace AwarenessBaseline Capability AssessmentBiological DefenseCommand and ControlCommand and Control Personal ComputerCommand, Control, Communication, Computers and IntelligenceChemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Control Center

· Capstone Concept for Joint OperationsCapability. DropChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff InstructionConstructive Cost ModelCommon Operating Environment (Army) Computer SecurityCommunications SecurityConcept of Operations Common Operational Picture Capability Production DocumentCombating Weapons of Mass DestructionCombating Weapons of Mass Destruction Working GroupDesignated Approval AuthorityDefense Architecture Repository SystemDistrict of ColumbiaDevelopmentDefense Intelligence AgencyDepartment of Defense Technology Standards and Profile RegistryDepartment of DefenseDepartment of Defense Information NetworkDefense Switched NetworkDevelopmental TestDefense Threat Reduction AgencyForce XXI Battle Command Brigade and BelowFunctional Capability BoardFielding Decision

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C-2

FDD FOC GCCS-A GCCS-AF GCCS-J GCCS-M GIGGIS HazMat lAlCD IOC ISITJBC-P JCA JCB JCIDS JEM JFOC JIE JMNS JOpsCJPEO-CBDJPL JPM-IS JROCJRO-CBRNDJSCBIS JSTO JTCW JTAMS MRES . KPPLAN LANDSCAN LCCELSN M&S MAA MaxTTR MAC MAGTF MCS MDA

Full Deployment DecisionFull Operational CapabilityGlobal Command and Control System - Army Global Command and Control System - Air Force Global Command and Control System - Joint Global Command and Control System - Maritime Global Information GridGeographic Information SystemHazardous Materiel Information Assurance Initial Capability DocumentInitial Operational Capability Information System Information TechnologyJoint Battle Command PlatformJoint Capability AreaJoint Capabilities BoardJoint Capability and Integration Development SystemJoint l;:ffects ModelJoint Future Operational CapabilitiesJoint Information Environment Joint Mission Need Statement Joint Operations ConceptJoint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological DefenseJoint Priority ListJoint Program Manager Information SystemsJoint Requirements Oversight CouncilJoint Requirements Office for CBRN DefenseJoint Services Chemical and Biological Information System

· Joint Science and Technology OfficeJoint Tactical Common Operating Picture WorkstationJoint Warning and Reporting NetworkKey Performance ParameterLocal Area NetworkLandScan (Geographic Database) Life Cycle Cost EstimateLocal Sensor Network Modeling and Simulation Mission Area Analysis Maximum Time To Recover Mission Assurance Category Marine Air Ground Task Force Maneuver Control System Milestone Decision Authority

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C-3

MDS METOC MEF MNA MOC MOE MOT&E MSMTBOMF MaxTTR NAD NATO NBC NCES NCOW NGA NIEM NIPRNET NMCIN/R or N-R O&SOMF ORO OTovPASS PC PcDP FCB PJFC QoS RAM RDP RDT&E S&TSA SIPRNET SN SPAWARSTRATCOMsvTDC TED TIM

METOC Data Server Meteorological and Oceanographic Mission Essential FunctionMission Need Analysis Maritime Operation Center Measures of EffectivenessMultiservice Operational Test and EvaluationMilestoneMean Time Between Operational Mission FailureMaximum Time to Recover Normalized Absolute Difference North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nuclear Biological and Chemical Net-Centric Enterprise ServiceNet-Centric Operations and Warfare National Geospatiallntelligence Agency National Information Exchange ModelNon-Secure Internet Protocol Routing NetworkNavy Marine Corps InternetNet ReadyOperations and Sustainment Operational Mission Failure Operational Requirements Document Operational TestOperational ViewPublish and Subscribe ServicePersonal ComputerPercent Correct DetectedProtection Functional Capability Board Protection Joint Functional Concept Quality of Service (network)Reliability, Availability and MaintainabilityRequirements Definition PackageResearch, Development, Testing and EvaluationScience and TechnologySituational AwarenessSecure Internet Protocol Routing NetworkStrategic NationalSpace and Naval Warfare Systems Command (US Navy) Strategic CommandSystems ViewTheater Deployable CommunicationsThreat Environment DescriptionToxic Industrial Material

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C-4

TS UJTLusUSNORTHCOM USSOCOM USSTRATCOM W&RWMD

Top SecretUniversal Joint Task ListUnited StatesUnited States Northern CommandUnited States Special Operations CommandUnited States Strategic CommandWarning and ReportingWeapons of Mass Destruction

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APPENDIX D: Glossary

Analysis, Prediction and Production -The ability to integrate, evaluate, interpret, and predict knowledge and information from available sources to develop intelligence and forecast the future state to enable situational awareness and provide actionable information. (JCA 2.4, Joint Staff, 8 April 2011)

Battlespace Awareness - The ability to understand dispositions and intentions, as well as the characteristics and conditions of the operational environment that bear on national and military decision making by leveraging all sources of information to include Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Meteorological, and Oceanographic. (JCA 2, Joint Staff, 8 April 2011)

Command and Control -The ability to exercise authority and direction by a properly designated commander or decision maker over assigned and attached forces and resources in the accomplishment of the mission. (JCA 5, Joint Staff, 8 April 2011)

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Shape (CBRND operational element) - The command and control activity that integrates the sense, shield, and sustain operational elements to characterize chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards and threats and employ necessary capabilities to counter their effects. Also called CBRN Shape. (JP 1-02; JP 3-11)

Cyberspace Operations)- The employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. (JP 3-0) Decision Analysis and Management (CBRND/Shape Area core capability) - Provide assessments of CBRN hazards and effects to support risk-based decision making. Concept: Decision Analysis and Management Concept: The intent is to provide decision makers with a holistic view of the operational environment and enable an assessment of actual and potential impacts from CBRN hazards. It includes analysis of hazard modeling and prediction, health surveillance information analysis, CBRN sampling and sensor data, risk analysis and management, and intelligence analysis to facilitate timely operational decision making. (2013 CBRN Defense Core Capabilities JROCM 151-13, 13 September 2013)

Information Assurance (lA)- Measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. (DODD 8500.01E)

Joint Capability Areas (JCAs)- Collections of like DOD activities functionally grouped to support capability analysis, strategy development, investment decision making, capability portfolio management, and capabilities-based force development and operational planning. (JCA Taxonomy, Joint Staff, 8 April2011)

Mission Assurance Category -Applicable to DOD information systems, the mission assurance category reflects the importance of information relative to the achievement of DOD goals and objectives, particularly the warfighters' combat mission. Mission assurance categories are primarily used to determine the requirements for integrity and availability. (DODI 8500.2)

Mission Assurance Category II (MAC II) - Systems handling information considered important to the support of deployed and contingency forces. The consequences of loss of integrity are unacceptable. Loss of availability is difficult to deal with and can only be tolerated for a short time. The consequences could include delay or degradation in providing important support services or commodities that may seriously impact mission effectiveness or operational readiness. (DODI 8500.2)

Mission Essential Functions (MEF) - There are five primary MEFs performed by JTAMS MRES :

D-20

UNCLASSIFIEDSituational Awareness, Warning, Reporting, Hazard Prediction, and basic Battle Management analysis. JTAMS MRES implements these functionalities to provide an enhanced CBRN Defense capability for the warfighter.

Mission Partners - Those with whom the DoD cooperates to achieve national goals, such as other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; state and local governments; allies, coalition members, host nations and other nations; multinational organizations; non-governmental organizations; and the private sector. (DODD 8000.01)

Mission Reliability -The probability that a system will perform its required mission critical function for the duration of a specified mission under the conditions stated in the mission profile. (Defense Acquisition University)

Mitigate- The ability to minimize the effects and manage the consequence of attacks (and designated emergencies on personnel and physical assets. (JCA 7.2, Joint Staff, 8 April 2011)Planning -The ability to establish a framework to employ resources to achieve a desired outcome or effect. (JCA 7.2, Joint Staff, 8 April 2011)

Net Centric- The ability to provide a framework for full human and technical connectivity and interoperability that allows all DOD users and mission partners to share the information they need, when they need it, in a form they can understand and act on with confidence, and protects information from those who should not have it. (JCA 6, Joint Staff, 8 April 2011)

Planning - The ability to establish a framework to employ resources to achieve a desired outcome or effect. (JCA 5.3, Joint Staff, 8 April 2011)

Processing and Exploitation - The ability to transform collected information into forms suitable for further analysis and/or action by man or machine. (JCA 2.3, Joint Staff, 8 April 2008)

Protection- The ability to prevent/mitigate adverse effects of attacks on personnel (combatant/noncombatant) and physical assets of the United States, allies and friends. (JCA 7, Joint Staff, 8 April2011)

Understand -The ability to individually and collectively comprehend the implications of the character, nature, or subtleties of information about the environment and situation to aid decision-making. (JCA 5.2, Joint Staff, 8 April 2011)