what can we learn from mh17 disaster? what has changed since? joe sultana director network manager...
TRANSCRIPT
What can we learn from MH17 Disaster?
What has changed since?
Joe SultanaDirector Network Manager
Email: [email protected]
12th November 2015
Contents
The context before July 2014
The immediate reaction after the shooting down
The air traffic management consequences
Have things changed, can it happen again?
2
3
The Network Manager - Connecting the Network to deliver Improved Performance, even in abnormal circumstances
European Traffic - Jan 2014
4
5
European Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell (EACCC)
Coordinate management of response to thenetwork crisis affecting aviation in Europe
Activated when circumstances beyond normal environment of ops are evident
Members
EACCC
…
Airlines
ANSPMilitary
Airports
State focal
points
Coordinating Europe’s response in times of crises and disruption to air traffic management 6
Role of EACCC
Extreme weather
Major disruption
?NM manages the disruption
Crisis ? EACCC activatedAsh cloudAny other
disruption
Nuclear
7
EACCC Regulatory Framework
NM IREACCC
Network level
Mitigation Measures
Member State level
State focal
points
Contingency Plans
Requirement
Coordinating Supporting
Recovery Sustainability
8
Events in Ukraine Feb – Apr 2014 Feb 14 – indication that closure of Simferopol may be imminent
Mar 14 10 - Odessa and Dnepropetrovsk ACCs assume control of Simferopol ACC 28 - Russian Federation (RF) issues several NOTAMs changing location
indicators UKUR & announcing start of svc provision by RF as of 3 Apr 29 - NM telecon with ICAO, AOs and ANSPs on latest events including how
to deal with NOTAMs issued by RF without jeopardising network safety
2 Apr 14 ICAO issues a State letter drawing attention to possible safety risks in the
Simferopol FIR NM advice on Headline News to AOs to avoid the airspace and
circumnavigate Simferopol FIR due to safety concerns NM telecon with AOs and ANSPs on the situation Some AOs chose to route North of Black Sea, some route south avoiding
Ukraine
3 Apr 14 - EASA issue Safety Information Bulletin (SIB 2014-10)
9
Events in Ukraine Jun – Jul 2014
Jun 14
5 - Ukraine issue NOTAM closing some routes in
Dnepropetrovsk FIR from 06/06/2014 till 01/07/2014 between
SFC - FL260
29 – Ukraine issue NOTAM closing routes in Dnepropetrovsk FIR
from SFC-FL260 from 01/07/14 till 29/07/14
Jul 14
14 - Ukraine issue NOTAM closing routes in Dnepropetrovsk FIR
from FL260 – FL320 (resulting in closing ATS routes from SFC-
FL320)
17 Jul – MH17
10
MH17 Crisis – Network Manager’s role17 July (all times UTC)
~15.00 request for info on MH17 from KLM
UkSATSE confirmation - flight plot disappeared from radar screens
19.00 - EACCC telecon – dealing with crisis coordination response and political aspects
20.00 - NM Ops Centre (NMOC) telecon with ANSPs and AOs – tackling ops aspects:
Airspace closures Re-routings via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania in south / Poland in
north
Immediate Network Manager Actions in MH17
Applied the national NOTAMS published by Ukraine
Processed the MH17 flight plan against the valid airspace
organisation
Responded to request from KLM on information about MH17
Gathered info about what might have happened and made
assessment as to immediate risk
As Chairman of the EACCC activated the Crisis cell
Closed Ukrainian airspace as decided by Ukraine
Managed the impact of the re-routing of flights with support of
Ukraine and neighbouring ANSPs
11
The aftermath
Major traffic flow impacts, looking at solutions at network level
Address questions from EU Parliament, media, whether Network
Manager could have done more beforehand
Full participation in ICAO TF on Conflict zones
Easy-to-access portlet on airspace closures and warning with H24
ops response service
Support to safety case for partial re-opening of 4 routes over the
Black Sea
Heightened crisis in Lebanon, Syria/Iraq and now Egyptian
airspaces
12
Complementing ICAO and European activities on Aviation Risks due Conflict Zones
Key areas ensuring sharing of relevant information assessment of risk locally and regionally
Network Manager Operational input on context Flight Plan processing Up-to-date situation picture with online Closure and Warnings Map
for Europe and beyond Providing AOs with an interpretation of complex network situation Monitoring of network operations Ability to react in real time
13
List of published information through NOTAM, EASA-SIB, ICAO letters and national AIC/AIP….
….Illustrated on a map.Geographical coverage is NM area + adjacent Data are updated 24/7
NM portal protected area
Daily Flights in European NM AreaNE
Asia140
SE Asia415
1463
RussiaC Asia1460
NM area internal traffic 26548
Gulf578
923
590
Impact of crises in 2014 on traffic flows
28 November 2013
27 November 2014
Current situation in the South-Eastern Europe and the Middle East
18
FPL TRAFFIC07 AUG 2015
19
ICAO Task Force on conflict zones
NM member of Task Force on Risks to civil aviation arising from Conflict Zones (TF RCZ) established by ICAO end Jul 2014
safety and security aspects to civilian aircraft operating to, from and over conflict zones
how relevant info can be effectively collected & disseminated three meetings: two in Aug and one in Dec 2014 conclusions to ICAO High Level Safety Conf (HLSC), Feb 15
HLSC conclusion – establish a repository of risk assessment info
Operational as of Apr 2015
NM conflict zones portlet
Aviation risks
Threat to airspace usability assessment – security, operational expertise, political awareness
Mitigation measures – adequate?
Safety risk assessment methodology – still the basis
Enough information/access to threat analysis for those who have responsibility to make decision fly/no fly
Manage the situation and the consequences in particular impact of re-routings of major flows
20
Managing a « risk » airspace
Risk factors monitored, risk mitigation plans updated
Ability to react timely to changes at network level – impact beyond region
Coordination at right level between ops stakeholders
Top-down decisions must be unambiguous
Systems can be fooled by « creative » flight planning
Support those who have to make judgement calls in a complex environment
21
MH 17 Report of Dutch Safety Board
Main Air Traffic Management and Airspace conclusions:
Flight routes – none of the parties involved adequately identified the risks to civil aviation brought about by the armed conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine
Given the risk, the airspace should have been closed
Malaysian Airlines (and others) should not have selected this particular route
22
Dutch Safety Board Recommendations
Improvements at 3 Levels:
Management of airspace in states dealing with armed conflict in their territory – safety improvement
How states and operators assess risks of flying over conflict zones – safety improvement
Accountability of operators regarding their choice of whether or not to fly over conflict zones – better risk assessment
23
Obligation of the State
States must ensure that the airspace used by flights is safe Any information about risks and threats should result in advice or
warnings
Recommendation Be prepared to close airspace, coordinate with ANSP, info 3rd parties
What if there is no functioning, no ability to make risk/threat assessment, politics get in the way
24
Obligation of the airline
Operators have to do all that is possible to operate the flight safely
Airlines rely on states to provide them information about risks and threats to flying
Recommendation
Operators need to make risk assessment for whole route,
gather and share info,
timely and structured process in place for info from state,
unpredictability of armed conflict is increased risk
25
Recent experiences
Missiles from Caspian Sea to Syria
Loss of Russian MetroJet over Sinai
Potential closure of Afgan airspace
Network Manager preparation:
Sharing of available info
Scenarios prepared with ANSPs in region and others affected
Extensive briefings\teleconf with airspace users
Await decisions of states/safety risk assessments of airlines
26
Thank you for your attention
Happy to take questions
Joe SultanaDirector Network Manager
Email: [email protected]
12th November 2015