wikileaks cables eritrea guardian.co

8/3/2019 WikiLeaks Cables Eritrea Guardian.co

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WikiLeaks cables: Eritrean poverty andpatriotism under 'unhinged dictator'US ambassador portrays Isaias Afwerki as part menace, part

weirdo and tastes 'aptly named' sewa at lunch with minister

Sim on Tisdal l

guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 8 December 2 010 21 .30 GMT

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Isaias Afwerki, the Erit rean president, is described as 'cruel an d defiant' in th e WikiLeaks cables.

Photograph: Geert Vanden Wijngaert/AP

Eritrea, an impoverished, mostly friendless country located at the wrong end of the Red

Sea, has become synonymous with trouble-making in the Horn of Africa region since it

wrested independence from Ethiopia in 1991 after a bitter 30-year war.

The national capital, Asmara, is an ill-kept, run-down former Italian colonial outpost

where night-time electricity cuts contribute to a sinister, cowed atmosphere. The

repressive policies and appalling human rights abuses of the authoritarian, one-party

government of President Isaias Afwerki Eritrea has never held a national election

mostly keep the population in check.

In a secret diplomatic cable written last year, the then US ambassador to Eritrea, Ronald

McMullen, appears determined to impress upon his private Washington readership just

how awful the situation really is. Weird, dysfunctional Asmara, reminiscent of an Evelyn

Waugh novel, is notorious among western diplomats as a hardship posting. McMullen

seems to be feeling the strain.

"Young Eritreans are fleeing their country in droves, the economy appears to be in a

death spiral, Eritrea's prisons are overflowing, and the country's unhinged dictator

remains cruel and defiant," McMullen writes. "Is the country on the brink of disaster?"

he asks. The ambassador answers his own question with a head- shaking "no".

Gold-mining, Isaias's latest wheeze for rescuing the economy, will not do the trick,McMullen says, any more than will a rumoured cabinet reshuffle. Yet although the

regime is "one bullet away from implosion", Eritreans' strong sense of nationalism and

their capacity to withstand great suffering and deprivation allows Isaias to cling to

power. "Any sudden change in government is likely to be initiated from within the

14.12.2010 WikiLeaks cables: Eritrean poverty an

guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec//print 1/3


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US embassy cables: Eritrea - vignettesof a failing stateguardian.co.uk, Wednesday 8 December 2 010 21 .30 GMT

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Tuesday, 15 December 2009, 11:1 9

S E C R E T ASMARA 000429

EO 12958 DECL: 12/10/2019

TAGS PGOV, MOPS, SOCI, PREF, ERSUBJECT: ERITREA'S SQUABBLING COLONELS, FLEEING

FOOTBALLERS, FRIGHTENED LIBRARIANS

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald K. McMullen for reason 1.4(d)

S u m m a r y

US ambassador gives three illustrations of how Eritrea's government is failing its people.

They include petty squabbling among military leaders over perks of the job, the

reported defection of the Eritrean national football team, and the mistreatment of

Eritreans who consort with foreigners. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

Read related article

1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Things are getting worse and worse in Eritrea . The regime is

facing mounting international pressure for years of malign behavior in the neighborhood.

Human rights abuses are commonplace and most young Eritreans, along with the

professional class, dream of fleeing the country, even to squalid refugee camps in

Ethiopia or Sudan. The economy continues to sink; exports for 2008 totaled only $14m

and vital hard-currency remittances have fallen to 43% of the 2005 level. "He is sick,"

said one leading Eritrean businessman, referring to President Isaias' mental health. "The

worse things get, the more he tries to take direct control--it doesn't work." The following

three vignettes highlight the current state of affairs in Eritrea. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) THE DEFENSE MINISTER AND THE COLONELS

--------------------------------------------

Defense Minister Sebhat Efrem convoked army colonels in late November for a three-

day conference on professional and career issues. On the second day a serious row

reportedly broke out among the conferees; the acrimony rose so high that General

Sebhat cancelled the rest of the conference and sent the quarreling colonels back to their

units. T he bone of contention? Perceived differences in the quality of the villas (often

confiscated from the original owners) given to the colonels by the regime to maintain

their allegiance.

3. (SBU) SOCCER TEAM 1 - REGIME 0

----------------------------------

Eritreans are mad about soccer. Many dusty streets in Asmara are filled with urchins

kicking an old sock stuffed with rags back and forth between goals made of piled stones.

Senior government and party officials are avid fans of the British Premier League and

sometimes leave official functions early to catch key matches. Despite tight control of the

14.12.2010 US embassy cables: Eritrea - vignettes

guardian.co.uk/world//print 1/2


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gua rdian.co.uk Guar dian News and Media Limited 201 0

domestic media, satellite TV dishes are allowed, probably so folks can watch

international soccer. Impressive numbers of senior regime officials attended the World

Cup pool draw reception thrown by the South Africa embassy last week. The BBC and

diaspora websites are reporting that the entire Eritrean national soccer team defected

after playing in a regional tournament in Kenya. If true, this will be stunning news for

the Eritrean population. Only the coach and an escorting colonel reportedly returned to

Eritrea. (One wonders why, given their likely fate.) Isaias has previously claimed the

CIA was luring Eritrean youth abroad; if the soccer team has in fact defected, he will

undoubted try to twist logic in some way to blame the United States.

4. (C) [Content removed]

----------------------------

Eritreans are fearful of associating with foreigners, as they are often grilled afterwards

by security thugs. XXXXXXXXXXXX

5. (S) COMMENT: The brittle Isaias regime is one pistol shot away from implosion.

However, Isaias is clever, very good at operational security, and two decades younger

than Mugabe. While many in Eritrea long for change, few are in a position to effect it.

END COMMENT.

McMullen

14.12.2010 US embassy cables: Eritrea - vignettes



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military," McMullen concludes.

"The Isaias regime is very good at controlling nearly all aspects of Eritrean society,"

McMullen writes, offering comparisons to Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe. "Eritrean

farmers [roughly 80% of the 5.5 million population] have long lived a knife-edged

existence due to marginal rainfall, decades of war and brigandage, and the use of Dark

Age technology. Even before last year's dreadful harvest, Unicef reckoned that 40% of

Eritrean children were malnourished. Despite this, Eritreans remain fiercely patriotic."

A more recent McMullen cable, sent last December, detects no improvements. It begins:

"Things are getting worse and worse in Eritrea. The regime is facing mounting

international pressure for years of malign behaviour in the neighbourhood ... The

economy continues to sink; exports for 2008 totalled only $14m ... 'He is sick,' said one

leading Eritrean businessman, referring to President Isaias's mental health. 'The worse

things get, the more he tries to take direct control it doesn't work.'"

Washington's list of grievances is a long one. The Eritrean government is accused of

secretly arming al-Shabaab Islamist terrorists in Somalia, offering training and support

to militant opposition forces in Ethiopia and Sudan, provoking incidents along its

disputed frontier with Ethiopia, and launching an unprovoked 2008 invasion of Djibouti.

"This man is a lunatic," the Djiboutian foreign minister, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, tells the

Americans, referring to Isaias. Another foreign official tells the regime: "All of Africa is

fed up with you." All this eventually leads, during the course of 2009, to the imposition

of punitive regional and UN sanctions.

The US view of Isaias as part menace, part weirdo is reinforced by Getachew Assefa, the

powerful head of the Ethiopian national intelligence and security service and a leading

member of the Ethiopian ruling party , sworn enemies of Eritrea. Speaking to the US

ambassador in Addis Ababa in June last year, Getachew accuses the Eritrean leader of

harbouring a "grand design" to divide Ethiopia and weaken it through terrorism. But

then he puts Isaias in an entirely different light.

"Getachew remarked that one of Isaias's bodyguards... defected to Ethiopia," the Addis

Ababa cable recounts. "The bodyguard remarked that Isaias was a recluse who spent his

days painting and tinkering with gadgets and carpentry work. Isaias appeared to make

decisions in isolation with no discussion with his advisers. It was difficult to tell how

Isaias would react each day and his moods changed constantly."

Despite its growing isolation and unswervingly awkward behaviour, Eritrea mounted an

unexpected (though short-lived) charm offensive after Barack Obama took office, the

cables reveal. In February 2009, McMullen writes that "senior Eritrean officials in

recent weeks have signalled their interest in re-engaging with the United States". This

has led to an easing of restrictions on the US embassy in Asmara, the ending of "daily

anti-American diatribes in state-owned media", and congratulatory letters to Obama

and Hillary Clinton.

But now a different kind of ordeal awaits McMullen and his unsuspecting spouse.

"Members of Eritrea's 'American Mafia' [senior party members who have lived or

studied in the US] have taken the lead in signalling interest in improved relations," the

cable relates.

"On February 7, the ambassador and his wife were invited to spend the day on the

family farm of Hagos Ghebrehewit, the ruling party's economic director ... Lunch was

served in a rocky gulch beneath a thorny acacia tree. The ambassador and his wife were

treated to grilled sheep innards served with honey and chilli sauce (but no silverware),

washed down with a sour, semi-fermented traditional drink called, aptly, 'sewa'."

In another unforeseen encounter, Eritrea's defence minister, Sebhat Efrem, turns up at

a US reception the first time he has appeared for two years. McMullen smugly notes

that the date is Isaias's birthday, "yet General Sebhat chose to spend the evening

celebrating Groundhog Day".




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McMullen makes plain to his interlocutors that the US is only interested in improved

relations if Eritrea's behaviour changes, starting with an end to "Eritrean support for

Somali extremists". Washington's requirements remain unchanged, and unsatisfied, to

this day.

His cable continues: "One senior official acknowledged limited Eritrean contact with al-

Shabaab but claimed the contact was 'infrequent and indirect'." McMullen replies that by

keeping the company it does, Eritrea puts itself in "a very perilous situation" and he

finishes with a crude warning: "Based on recent history, how do you think we would

react to a major al-Shabaab terrorist attack against the United States?"




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US embassy cables: Eritrea attempts'charm offensive' to woo Obamaguardian.co.uk, Wednesday 8 December 2 010 21 .30 GMT

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Monday, 09 February 2009, 14:53

S E C R E T ASMARA 000047

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/EX AND AF/E

EO 12958 DECL: 02/02/2019TAGS PREL, PTER, ECON, ER

SUBJECT: AN ERITREAN OVERTURE TO THE UNIT ED STATES

REF: ASMARA 35

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald K. McMullen for reason 1.4(d)

S u m m a r y

After years of isolation, Eritrea's government tried to re-engage with Washington after

the election of President Barack Obama, with sometimes unpalatable results. But the US

ambassador makes plain that until Eritrea ends its support for Somali terrorists, there

can be no normalisation of bilateral relations. Key passage highlighted in yellow.


1. (C) SUMMARY: Senior Eritrean officials in recent weeks have signaled their interest

in re-engaging with the United States in areas of mutual interest. They have done so by

loosening restrictions on Embassy Asmara (REF), by engaging in more diplomatic

interaction with embassy personnel, by ending the daily anti-American diatribes in

state-owned media, by sending congratulatory letters to President Obama and

Secretary Clinton, and by authorizing over $100,000 to support ongoing U.S. medical

volunteer programs such as Physicians for Peace. Senior officials invited the ambassador

and his wife to spend a day on a family farm, the Defense Minister attended a

representational event at the CMR, and Foreign Affairs officials tell us Isaias himself

helped draft a white paper on re-engaging the United States. Post has bluntly told key

officials that Eritrean support for Somali extremists precludes a more normal bilateral

relationship and warned that an al-Shabaab attack against the United States would

trigger a strong and swift American reaction. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) A PICNIC WITH THE "AMERICAN MAFIA"

-----------------------------------------

Members of Eritrea's "American Mafia," senior party and government officials who

speak fluent English and have lived in the United States, have taken the lead in signaling

Eritrea's interest in improved relations. On February 7, for example, the ambassador

and his wife were invited to spend the day on the family farm of Hagos Ghebrehewit, the

ruling party's economic director (and architect of Eritrea's imploding economy). Hagos,

formerly a green card holder, was Eritrea's first ambassador to the United States. Also

present were the minister of health (an American citizen), the current Eritrean

ambassador to the United States, and the party's political director, Yemane Ghebreab.

Lunch was served in a rocky gulch beneath a thorny acacia tree. The ambassador and

14.12.2010 US embassy cables: Eritrea attempts '



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his wife w ere treated to grilled sheep innards served w ith honey a nd chili sauce (but

no silverw are), w ashed down with a sour, semi-fermented traditional drink called,

aptly, "sew a." The other guests chided Hagos, only half jokingly, for his inability to run

an economy, noting that Eritrea's Coca-Cola plant and national brewery were both

shuttered.

3. (C) T HE DEFENSE MINIST ER CELEBRATES GROUNDHOG DAY

--------------------------------------------- -------

Defense Minister Sebhat Efrem attended a reception at the ambassador's residence onFebruary 2. This was the first Post invitation General Sebhat has accepted for almost

two years. He and the ambassador discussed past military to military exchanges,

training, and education. General Sebhat fondly remembers GIs from Kagnew Station

who helped tutor his math and science classes as a young student; he said he hoped

circumstances would permit a resumption of mil-mil relations. February 2 is also

President Isaias' birthday, yet General Sebhat chose to spend the evening celebrating

Groundhog Day at the CMR.

4. (C) TOUGH TALK ON SUPPORTING TERRORISM

-----------------------------------------

Despite the clear signals by party and government officials of their interest in exploring a

less antagonistic bilateral relationship, the ambassador on three occasions in recent

weeks has delivered a very straightforward and simple message: Eritrean support for

Somali extremists obviates closer t ies and Eritrea will be held accountable for any al-

Shabaab attack on the United States. The ambassador shared unclassified information

with key Eritrean authorities (including the detailed NPR report of January 28 on al-

Shabaab's recruitment and training of Minnesotans) to reinforce the seriousness and

urgency of the al-Shabaab threat. One senior official acknowledged limited Eritrean

contact with al-Shabaab, but claimed the contact was "infrequent and indirect." He

added, "If there was anything we could do to prevent a terrorist attack on the United

States, we will do it." The ambassador warned that Eritrea was in a very perilous

situation, as its support for al-Shabaab makes Eritrea at least partially responsible for

al-Shabaab's actions, yet Eritrea does not control it. "Based on recent history, how do

you think we would react to a major al-Shabaab terrorist attack against the United

States?" the ambassador asked. This seems to have driven home the point to our

Eritrean interlocutors.

5. (S) COMMENT

--------------

Eritrea's fundamental interest in re-engaging with the United States is to promote a

"balanced" U.S. approach to its border dispute with Ethiopia. Isaias views everything

through this lens. While we have delivered an unambiguously stark message oncounterterrorism, we are uncertain how this will factor into Isaias' opaque calculations.

Among Eritrean and foreign observers, there is a growing consensus that I saias is

increasingly isolating himself and marginalizing all organs of government and the party.

Can he and will he make a rational cost-benefit analysis on continued support for Somali

extremists? Isaias might listen to the rulers of Libya and Qatar; we leave it to others to

judge whether those messages would necessarily be helpful. Unlike the party, exiled

opposition, or general Eritrean populace, the military's officer corps has the wherewithal

to precipitate a sudden change. We have seen no serious cracks in its loyalty , as the

perceived external threat from Ethiopia trumps all else, but we will step up our efforts to

cultivate cordial relations with key military leaders as circumstances permit. End

Comment.

MCMULLEN




8/15




9/15

US embassy cables: Ethiopianintelligence chief gives rare interviewguardian.co.uk, Wednesday 8 December 2 010 21 .30 GMT

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Monday, 08 June 2009, 12:33

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 001318

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 06/07/2019TAGS PGOV, PINR, PREL, KPAO, ET

SUBJECT: UNDERSTANDING THE ETHI OPI AN HARDLINERS

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1 .4 (B) and (D).

S u m m a r y

The US ambassador to Addis Ababa discusses bilateral relations, democratic opposition,

and political repression and human rights with one of the country's most powerful, and

most reclusive leaders. The two men also discuss regional issues, including Somalia,

Sudan and Eritrea Ethiopia's old enemy. Key passage highlighted in yellow.


SUMMARY

-------

1. (S) In a rare meeting with the elusive head of the Ethiopian National Intelligence and

Security Service (NISS) and main hardliner within the powerful executive committee of

the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) party,

Ambassador and NISS chief Getachew Assefa discussed a wide range of regional and

bilateral issues. Getachew made clear during the four hour private meeting that Ethiopia

sought greater understanding from the U.S. on national security issues vital to Ethiopia,

especially Ethiopia's concerns over domestic insurgent groups like the Oromo Liberation

Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). He spoke at length aboutformer Addis Ababa May or-elect Berhanu Nega XXXXXXXXXXXX; VOA's biased

reporting; the dangers of former defense minister Seeye Abraha's growing authority

within the opposition; Ethiopia's views on democracy and human rights; Eritrea's role as

a rogue state in the region; and regional issues including the importance of supporting

the Transitional Federal Government and a rapprochement with Alhu Sunna Wal Jama'a

(ASWJ) as the only option for Somalia's survival; and the need for U.S. reconciliation

with Sudan. End Summary.

TOWARD A BETT ER UNDERSTANDING

-----------------------------

2. (S) T hrough the arrangements of former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia, Irv Hicks,

Ambassador met with Ethiopia's national intelligence chief, Getachew Assefa, for a four

hour private meeting on June 4. Getachew , noted for his eccentric behavior and

elusiveness, explained to the Ambassador that he w elcomes greater dialogue w ith the

U.S. Embassy, but underscored the importance of deeper U.S. understanding of

14.12.2010 US embassy cables: Ethiopian intellige



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Ethiopia's security concerns. Characterizing the U.S. relationship as sound and

expressing appreciation for the cooperation with the U.S. on special projects on

counterterrorism, Getachew emphasized that Ethiopia shares U.S. v iews on high value

targets (HVT) like Robow and al-Turki as threats to regional stability. But domestic

insurgent groups, like the OLF and ONLF, should also be treated as terrorists because

they have safe haven camps in extremist-held areas in Somalia and receive support and

assistance from the very same HVTs that the U.S. and Ethiopia are trying to neutralize.

Such support makes the ONLF and OLF accomplices with international terrorist groups,

Getachew argued. Just as Ethiopia would not meet with domestic U.S. insurgent groups,

referring to individuals and groups who would conduct bombings of U.S. government

offices, abortion clinics and advocates of racial and gender hate, Ethiopia would not want

U.S. officials to meet with Ethiopia's domestic insurgents who bomb and kill Ethiopian

officials and citizens.

3. (S) Getachew added that the GOE does conduct talks with the ONLF and OLF and

there are groups, like the Ethiopian elders, who reach out to the membership in an effort

to end the v iolence. Getachew stressed that this is an Ethiopian process by Ethiopians

and should remain an Ethiopian-led, Ethiopian-directed and Ethiopian-coordinated

process. Ambassador made clear that the U.S. Administration does not meet with the

ONLF and that the U.S. is in close consultations with Ethiopian authorities on their views

on the ONLF and OLF, and that the U.S. supports the work of the Ethiopian Elders toend the violence. Getachew noted the visit to European Capitals and Washington of

ONLF senior leaders and said they met with staffers in the U.S. Vice President's office.

The Ambassador said that we had no evidence that a meeting took place with the Vice

President's staff and stressed that the State Department did not meet with the ONLF

group. Further, the U.S. military no longer meets with alleged ONLF supporters in the

volatile Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia because of security concerns. The

Ambassador stressed that such meetings in the past was for force protection of U.S.

military civil affairs team working in the dangerous Ogaden region near Somalia, but in

the last few years there has been no contact. The Ambassador added that there should

be closer discussion between he U.S. and Ethiopia on this issue.

U.S. GIVES EXTREMISTS A VOICE AND LEGITIMACY

--------------------------------------------

ADDIS ABAB 00001318 002 OF 004

4. (S) Getachew complained pointedly that Voice of America (VOA) is biased and gives a

platform for extremist elements. XXXXXXXXXXXX

5. (S) Getachew also discussed the VOA reports covering former State Department

official Greg Stanton of Genocide Watch, who charged Prime Minister Meles of crimes

against humanity as a result of Ethiopia's incursion into Somalia in 2006. Getachew

complained that VOA Amharic reporting was biased and not even handed. He did note

that VOA English was fine. VOA Amharic service does not interview Ethiopian officials

who can refute "false assertions" espoused in the VOA interviews. Getachew praised

Germany's Deutsche Wella serv ice for its balanced and yet hard hitting reporting.

Getachew underscored that if the GOE is doing something wrong or does not have the

support of the people, news services have an obligation to highlight such problems.

Getachew said VOA, however, seeks to report only what is anti-government or lend

support for the opposition. Getachew concluded that the U.S.G., because of VOA

Amharic service is an official arm of the U.S.G., lacks neutrality in its support for the

opposition and this undercuts relations between the two countries. The Ambassador

replied that VOA is a very independent media and the U.S.G. does not have oversight

and control over the content of the reporting.

6. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX

THE OPPOSITION

--------------




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7. (S) Getachew commented on Ethiopia's opposition leadership underscoring that he

wishes to see a vibrant opposition movement, but currently, the NGO community and

foreign missions support the opposition blindly without critical analysis.

XXXXXXXXXXXX

ADDIS ABAB 00001318 003 OF 004

8. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

--------------------------

9. (S) Getachew echoed common themes advocated by the ruling EPRDF party stalwarts

from the Prime Minister to the party faithful. He stressed that the EPRDF supports

democracy and that it is the goal for the ruling party to eventually give way to other

parties of common vision in fighting poverty and a commitment to support the process of

democratization. Getachew said he would support opposition parties if they have a

better message to help Ethiopia overcome poverty, improve health care and education,

and raise the standard of living of the Ethiopian people. He added that the U.S. and

others should look at Ethiopia's democracy efforts and human rights record as a work in

progress. It will take time but Ethiopia is moving in the r ight direction that will make

Ethiopia a democratic state.

FOREIGN POLICY: ERITREA, SOMALIA, AND SUDAN

-------------------------------------------

10. (S) Getachew described Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki as "no martyr," who

sought to survive and establish himself as the predominate leader in the Horn of Africa.

Ethiopia stands in the way of Isaias' grand design and it is his goal to divide Ethiopia and

weaken it through terrorism. Getachew remarked that one of Isaias' bodyguards was in

Dubai and then defected to Ethiopia. The bodyguard remarked that Isaias was a recluse

who spent his days painting and tinkering with gadgets and carpentry work. Isaias

appeared to make decisions in isolation with no discussion with his advisors. It wasdifficult to tell how Isaias would react each day and his moods changed constantly.

Getachew added that Eritrea trains over 30 rebel groups at Camp Sawa near the Sudan

border and graduates are infiltrated into Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia to enhance

instability and target Ethiopian interests. Getachew expressed dismay with Kenya in

allowing Eritrean intel officers and military trainers who support al-Shabaab in Somalia,

to bribe their way out of Kenya and return to Eritrea. He explained the activities of

Abraha Kassa, Eritrea's elusive intel chief who directs Eritrea's Somalia operations.

11. (S) On Somalia, Getachew said the only way to support stability was through support

for the ASWJ which attracts a wide range of support from all the clans, especially those

groups in conflict with each other. The ASWJ has been effective in countering al-

Shabaab and is ideologically committed to Sufism and the defense of Islam against the

extremist salafists which form al-Shabaab. Getachew said the U.S. can best help by

supporting the ASWJ and TFG to cooperate, to pay salaries of TFG troops and support

the IGAD and African Union which are seeking to sanction Eritrea, implement a no fly

zone, and close ports used by extremist elements.

12. (S) On Sudan, Getachew urged the U.S. to engage Bashir and the Sudanese

leadership. Sudan, more than Somalia, poses the greatest threat to regional security and

stability, Getachew argued. The prospects for a civil war which destabilizes the region

would be devastating. The only country that would benefit would be Eritrea.

COMMENT

-------

13. (S) It is interesting that Getachew's description of President Isaias mirrors

Getachew's own character, as well.

ADDIS ABAB 00001318 004 OF 004




12/15


Getachew avoids speaking with foreigners and few foreigners really know him. He is not

well liked within his own agency for decisions he makes in isolation which, at times, make

little sense and are not discussed in consensus with his staff. His apparent hot temper

and reclusive habits hav e made it difficult for his staff to gauge his moods and

understand his thought process. The Prime Minister himself and other EPRDF leaders

have remarked to the Ambassador that it is difficult to talk with Getachew and to meet

with him, but that his loyalty to the EPRDF is never in question. Despite his poor

reputation, Getachew is regarded as a strong EPRDF hardliner and commands

considerable authority and influence within the powerful EPRDF executive committee

which lays down the policy for the ruling party and the government. While relations with

NISS officials below Getachew's rank are extremely cordial and, depending on the unit,

very close, the Ambassador has met with Getachew only twice in the past three years,

and other Embassy staff have also met with little success in engaging him. Even visiting

senior U.S. intel officers have not been successful in meeting Getachew. Ambassador will

pursue future meetings with Getachew but he will never be a close contact. End

Comment. YAMAMOTO




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US embassy cables: Djibouti in talks todefuse Eritrea crisisguardian.co.uk, Wednesday 8 December 2 010 21 .30 GMT

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Sunday, 20 April 2008, 17:11

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DJIBOUTI 000380

SIPDIS

SIPDISDEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/E, AND INR/AA

CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER

EO 12958 DECL: 04/20/2032

TAGS PREL, MOPS, PBTS, DJ, ER, ET

SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI F M REPORTS T ALKS UNDERWAY WI TH ERIT REA TO

DEFUSE BORDER INCIDENT

REF: A. DJIBOUTI 378 B. DJIBOUTI 377

Classified By: ERIC WONG, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I.

S u m m a r y

Senior Djibouti government officials sought meetings with Eritrean military leadersfollowing the occupation of Djiboutian territory by Eritrean troops. But foreign minister

Mahmoud Ali Youssouf is sceptical about the intentions of Eritrean president Isaias

Afwerki. Key passage highlighted in yellow.


1. (S) SUMMARY. On April 20, senior Djiboutian officials--including Djibouti's defense

minister, intelligence chief, and deputy CHOD--were involved in talks with Eritrean

military officials in an attempt to defuse tensions arising from Eritrea's establishment of

a military outpost on disputed territory at Ras Doumeira, along the Bab al Mandab

strait. According to Djibouti's foreign minister, the GODJ sought to use "quiet

diplomacy" to press Eritrea, although it believed that Eritrean President Isaias was

unpredictable, as ev idenced by Eritrea's 1994 attack on a Djiboutian outpost at the same

area. Foreign Minister Youssouf reports that Isaias opposes Djiboutian efforts to broker

discussions between Somalia's T ransitional Federal Government (T FG) and the Alliance

for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), and that Isaias also suspects that routine U.S.

military exercises in Djibouti are aimed at gathering intelligence for Ethiopia. Youssouf

said Djibouti would welcome participating in the International Contact Group on Somalia,

and planned to meet with visiting UN SRSG for Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah later in

the week. END SUMMARY.

2. (S) On April 20, Charge and GRPO met with Djiboutian Foreign Minister Mahmoud

Ali Youssouf to discuss the GODJ's April 17 complaint that Eritrea had established amilitary outpost on Djiboutian territory at Doumeira (ref A). Charge and GRPO were

accompanied by two representatives of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa

(CJTF-HOA): Embassy Djibouti Country Coordination Element (CCE) CDR James

Dickie, and CJTF-HOA Director of Intelligence (CJ-2) CAPT Kevin Frank.

14.12.2010 US embassy cables: Djibouti in talks t



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FRENCH IMAGERY SHOWS STRUCTURE ON DISPUTED TERRITORY

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3. (S) FM Youssouf presented low-resolution color photographs of Ras Doumeira dated

the afternoon of April 17, which he said had been provided by French authorities. The

photos show a manned structure and sev eral trucks at the base of a mountain; according

to FM Youssouf, the structure is an Eritrean military post constructed recently on "no

man's land" along the easternmost portion of the border between Djibouti and Eritrea,along the Bab al Mandab strait.

4. (S) While Eritrean forces had "pulled back" on the evening of April 19, FM Youssouf

expressed concern that an estimated 3,000 Eritrean troops were along the Eritrean

border with Djibouti, concentrated along three axes: from Eritrea to the Djiboutian

border towns of Daddato, Sidiha Menguela, and Bissidourou. In addition to the post at

Ras Doumeira, Eritrean forces had also recently built a coastal road from the port of

Assab to Doumeira, and had begun to reclaim the waterfront, in an apparent attempt to

construct some sort of port facility, he said.

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MIL-MIL T ALKS UNDERWAY WITH ERITREA

-----------------------------------

5. (S) In response to this "belligerent act," Youssouf said the GODJ had strengthened its

military presence at its base at Moulhoule (15 km south of Doumeira). In addition, the

GODJ had dispatched a delegation on the morning of April 20 to Moulhoule, in order to

discuss the incursion with Eritrean officials. According to FM Youssouf, GODJ

representatives included Deputy Chief of the Djiboutian Armed Forces Brigadier General

Zakaria Cheick Ibrahim, National Security Service (NSS) Director Hassan Said Khaireh,

and Defense Minister Ogoureh Kiffleh Ahmed. FM Youssouf said he had also been in

direct contact personally with the Eritrean Navy Commander, Major General Karikare

Ahmed Mohammed, whom he believed had some influence on Eritrean President Isaias.

FM Y oussouf also planned to engage the secretary-general of Eritrea's foreign ministry,

who was expected to transit Djibouti airport (from Dubai) on the evening of April 20.

6. (S) To satisfy the GODJ's concerns, Eritrean forces needed to withdraw at least 1 km

away from the demarcated border at

DJIBOUTI 00000380 002 OF 002

Mt. Doumeira, Youssouf said; adding that international law required pulling back to 5

km from the border.

7. (S) FM Youssouf noted that the GODJ sought to utilize "quiet diplomacy" to defuse

the situation, and had not yet issued any public statements on the recent Eritrean

incursion. However, he noted that the 1 994 incident, which had involved an exchange of

gunfire between Eritrean and Djiboutian forces at Ras Doumeira, reached a denouement

only when Djibouti protested to the United Nations, the Arab League, and the African

Union. Djibouti subsequently demarcated the border, while Eritrea issued a map with

altered boundaries for propaganda purposes.

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ISAIAS "A LUNATIC"; SUSPICIOUS OF ETHIOPIA AND THE U.S.

--------------------------------------------- ----------

8. (S) The Eritrean government (GSE) was "very unpredictable," Youssouf said. He

underscored that Eritrean troops had previously attacked a Djiboutian outpost at Ras

Doumeira in 1994, at the same time that the Eritrean foreign minister was visiting the

capital of Djibouti. Thus, according to Youssouf, Isaias had blindsided his own foreign

minister. "This man is a lunatic," opined Youssouf, adding, "you can't pick your




15/15


neighbors." Youssouf noted the scarcity of food and consumer goods in Eritrea, caused

by its "monopolistic, communist" state. As "waves of refugees" already crossed Djibouti's

porous borders from Somalia, Djibouti could ill afford additional refugees from conflict

between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

9. (S) Y oussouf said President Isaias had complained, at the last EU-Africa summit in

Lisbon, that there was "no terrorism in Djibouti." Isaias was deeply suspicious of

Djiboutian cooperation with the United States, claiming even to have information on

USG renditions involving Djibouti, Youssouf said. More recently, GSE officials had

expressed concern about both U.S. military exercises in Djibouti and also allegedEthiopian plans to attack Assab from Bure and to definitively remove I saias from power.

The GSE had asserted that recent U.S. military exercises in northern Djibouti (ref A)

were not intended to combat terror, but rather were intended to collect information for

Ethiopia, Youssouf said. Youssouf highlighted that the GODJ was "happy" with the U.S.

presence in Djibouti, and would continue to support the United States.

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ERITREA OPPOSED TO DJIBOUTIAN-BROKERED SOMALIA TALKS

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10. (S) Recent business talks relating to the possible construction of a massive bridge

linking Yemen to Djibouti had heightened GSE interest in Doumeira. The GSE opposed

Djibouti's ongoing efforts to broker discussions between Somalia's Transitional Federal

Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) (ref B),

Youssouf said, as the GSE sought to keep Ethiopia preoccupied in Somalia, and thus to

fracture the Ethiopian military into 3-4 fronts. Youssouf said Djibouti would welcome

participating in the International Contact Group on Somalia, and planned to meet with

visiting UN SRSG for Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah later in the week.

11. (S) COMMENT. FM Youssouf noted that no public statements from the USG were

needed yet, as Djibouti sought to press Eritrea through "quiet diplomacy." Should these

talks fail, however, the international community will have to weigh what actions, if any,

would be effective in reversing the Eritrean incursion. The recent withdrawal of UN

peacekeeping forces from the Temporary Security Zone, following more than two years

of increasing restrictions on the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), highlight

the GSE's intransigence in the face of international pressure. END COMMENT. WONG


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