yilmaz, i - mw state, law, civil society and islam in contemporary turkey

8/9/2019 Yilmaz, I - MW State, Law, Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary Turkey

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Rigid approaches, rhetoric and discourses have recently been replaced bymore analytical, flexible and tolerant ones. Fethullah Glen and his faith-basedmovement are pioneering examples in this regard. This civil movementsdiscourse and practice of Anatolian Islam have also had transformativeinfluences on society in general, and state Islam and political Islam, inparticular, with regard to views on the relation of religion and politics,modernity, the West and inter-civilizational & inter-cultural dialogue.

State Islam: Lausannian Islam (Lozan Islam)From a sociological point of view, we can speak of the Turkish state(s)

in the plural as we do vis--visIslam(s) in Turkey. From the perspective of

secularism, the attitude of the state towards religion, it is obvious that there hasnot been a monolithic, uniform or linear pattern. This may be due to the factthat different interests, power groups, elite, and segments within the state havetheir different agendas, visions and ideas with regard to role of Islam withinsociety, if not within politics. From time to time, the emphasis of the state onthis role of Islam changes in accordance with conjecture, socio-politics andgeo-politics.

The official state religion of Islam and the folk Islam of the Anatolian

tribal people and villagers differed considerably, even in the Ottoman State.Popular religious practices had become institutionalized in the form of Sufiorders. As the many parts of the country were settled, the leaders of theseorders linked ordinary people to the rulers. Islam was the mediating linkbetween local-level society and the political structure. Local people sharedreligion with the elite and religion provided the cultural fund that shapedpolitical legitimacy. Thus, a universe of discourse was established throughIslam, but affiliation and, of course, Islamic practices differed for the ruling

elite and for the masses.

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Secularist reform of republican efforts can be traced back to the Ottomanperiod. The area of public life falling under Islamic religious jurisdiction wasgradually reduced, thus causing a de factosecularization of the principalinstitutions of the state. The need for reform in the Ottoman state was firstrecognized in the 17th century, when the states strength began to wane.Reforms of that century were generally indigenous attempts, and mainlycentered on strengthening the authority of the central government. However,after the 18th century, reform efforts took on a different tone as the Ottoman

state opened its doors to the West.Ottoman intellectuals and statesmen came to look at Westernization


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Ottoman reformers was to Westernize the Ottoman military, educational,legal, and political institutions. To do this, they had to overcome Islams all-encompassing and omnipotent power in the country that stems from the factthat Islam had penetrated into all substructures of the countrys socio-politicalsystem. The reformers dilemma was apparent. On the one hand, an increasingnumber of them came to believe that the states salvation rested in theacceptance of Western technology and Western institutional forms. Yet, no onecould come up with a formula as to how Western technology and institutionswould be adapted to an Islamic society without accepting Western civilizationitself. This led to the construction of dual institutions. Rather than destroyingtraditional institutions, the 19th century reforms constructed new ones that

were to co-exist alongside traditional ones.It was after the Ottoman states collapse and the subsequent founding

of the Turkish Republic in 1923 that this duality was finally resolved in favorof totally accepting Western civilization. The Republican elites passion formodernization, seen as an escape from backwardness, translated itself intoa total dislike and distrust of all things associated with the ancient regimeand the old way of life. Topping the long list of suspect establishments werereligion and religious institutions. The culture associated with religion and

religiosity, such as dress code, was also deemed antithetical to contemporarycivilization.

Founders of the Republic believed that there was not enough time towait for the slow process of evolution. Secularism was implemented througha series of decisive steps taken to disestablish Islam from its role in law andeducation, and as the official religion of the state. Today, the preamble ofthe Constitution reads:

The recognition that no protection shall be afforded to thoughts or

opinions contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle of theindivisibility of the existence of Turkey with its State and territory,Turkish historical and moral values or the nationalism, principles,reforms and modernism of Atatrk and that, as required by the principleof secularism, there shall be no interference whatsoever of the sacredreligious feelings in State affairs and politics.

Although the Turkish state called its attitude toward religion laicism,an intellectual inheritance from the French Third Republic, there are certainlysome elements that make the Turkish application unique. One of the most

conspicuous of these elements is that the legal positivist Turkish state hasassumed a role of a secular mujtahid and has been interpreting Islam in


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The Republican elite have:

. . . claimed that true expression of religion could be found through

the use of Turkish prayer, a language that all could understand, throughtranslating the Koran into Turkish, rather than Arabic. They also drewhistorical parallels, asserting that their revolution mirrors the Protestantbattles against Papism in its dislike of intermediaries and direct accessto the faith for all. Thus, it was cleansed religion, without mysticism,

without saints, and without independent religious institutions that wasaimed at. It was also one closely controlled.4

To subordinate religion to the political establishment, the state has long triedto create its own version of Islam. In the state version of Islam, there is alreadyno conflict between the religion and Turkish modernity that covers the modernnation-state, secularism, democracy and no public role for religion. The raisondetreof the Directorate of Religious Affairs has been to createa tailor-made national modern Turkish-Islam, definitely suppressing thetransnational links and role, cut off from all international and transnational ties,specific and limited to the nation-states official borders that were drawn withthe Lausanne Treaty of 1924 between Turkey and the European powers. Article27 of the Lausanne Treaty reads:

No power or jurisdiction in political, legislative or administrative mattersshall be exercised outside Turkish territory by the Turkish Governmentor authorities, for any reason whatsoever, over the nationals of aterritory placed under the sovereignty or protectorate of the otherPowers signatory of the present Treaty, or over the nationals of aterritory detached from Turkey.

Although, it has been claimed that the state in Turkey has tried to make

religion a private belief that does not affect the public sphere with its adamantsecularization ideology, this is not entirely true. The state has tried to makereligion a helping hand.5 This idea of religion has formulated religion interms of its responsibility for the moral health of the nation. 6 Theoreticalfoundations of this mentality can be traced back to Durkheim, who influencedAtatrks intellectual mentor Ziya Gkalp, translator of Durkheims worksinto Turkish.

Durkheims main thesis was that religion plays a significant role in unitingsociety. In his view, any coherent society must be at base a religious collectivity.

He conceived the integral nature of religion as the ceremonial and expressiveglue that binds any social organization together. Religion as societys worship


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people get together. It is the life of the group over and above the lives of theindividuals who make up the group.

Gkalp had systematically advocated the domination of Turkish culturewith forms of Western civilization rather than importing institutions as they haddeveloped in the West. His sociological orientation, taking a nation as apolitical and cultural unity, helped him in his advocacy of Turkism. Atatrksmovement and Gkalps ideas closely interacted in that Kemalism was affectedby Ziya Gkalp in the formulation of nationalism as a principle, and Gkalpwas affected by Kemalism, which rejected any ambition beyond the borders ofthe new Turkey.7

So, in this Durkhemian mentality, an approved version of Islam, Lausannian-

Islam (Lozan Islam), could and should play a public role within the borders ofthe Turkish Republic. Thus, the main task of the Directorate has been to controland to shape Islam in accordance with the needs of the secular nation-state tothe effect of creating a secular, modern, national, official Lausannian-Islam.

The application of laicism in Turkey has taken a slightly different form inthat religious affairs in Turkey have been placed under the auspices of the stateand justification for doing so has been explained in reference to Turkeysspecial and unique circumstances.8 To those aware that laicism as a concept

espouses the idea that religion and state are kept distinct and separate, thisTurkish version of laicism would appear to be self-contradictory. The Kemalistlite however, thought that if religion and state are non-separable componentsin Islam, then the best way to keep Islam out of public and political life wouldbe to place it under the control and supervision of the state. Thus, Article24/4 of the constitution reads:

Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conductedunder State supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and

moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary andsecondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shall besubject to the individuals own desire, and in the case of minors, to therequest of their legal representatives.

As a result, religious institutions were linked to state bureaucracy. Then,the state started to interfere in religious affairs during the Republican era. Oneof the instruments of this interference and control has been the Directorateof Religious Affairs. Rona Aybay explains why there was a need for the

establishment of this state apparatus:

th f t th t th Offi f R li i Aff i hi h d l l ith


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by certain peculiarities of Turkish society, such as the fact that theoverwhelming majority of the population is Muslim together with theeconomic and moral power possessed by the religious foundations

which were inherited from the Ottoman Empire.9

The Directorate of Religious Affairs was established in 1923 at the instigationof the members of the Grand National Assembly as a replacement of theOttoman Ministry of Religion. In later constitutions prepared after the coupdetatsof 1960 and 1980, its place in the system was re-confirmed. Now, the1982 constitution provides that the Directorate is directly responsible to thePrime Minister and has no direct contact with daily politics.10 Article 136 ofthe Constitution reads:

The Department of Religious Affairs, which is within the generaladministration, shall exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, inaccordance with the principles of secularism, removed from all political

views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and integrity.

Soon after the establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the statetried to put all Islamic activities under the auspices of this organ. As a result,religious institutions are linked to state bureaucracy, and lack autonomy. As

Shankland portrays it, the Republican elite believe their ultimate task (is) topreserve the Republic and its borders. This means that, if necessary, it is fullyprepared to use orthodox Islam as a bulwark against communism or as ameans of achieving harmony in the community.11 The establishment of theDirectorate of Religious Affairs with a substantial budget and over 80 thousandemployees is a result of the understanding of this Turkish type of laicism.

The Directorate has an extensive organization. It controls all 86,000mosques and employs the imams, muftis and muezzins, who are then salariedemployees of the state. The mufti acts as a local link between the believerand the state; he also administers the imams attached to every mosque anddistributes sermons and other materials sent to them from above. The imamsare not just part of an administrative structure; they are also ideologicallysubject to the decisions made by their superiors in the announcements thatthey make and the sermons that they preach. This tight supervisory structureleaves imams with little leeway to create their own interpretation of religion.12The teachers, textbooks, and curricula of all religious schooling are under thedirect supervision of the Director-General of Religious Education, a separate

office of the Ministry of Education.


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state formed a judicial system based on Islamic principles as well. The judiciary,organized as a network of judges (qadi) was one of the essential powers ofthe Ottoman regime.

Later, this practice was institutionalized and the position ofSheikh al-Islamemerged as an authority that approved or refused the Sultans rulings accordingto Islamic principles. Sheikh al-Islam issuedfatwas to determine the policiesof the Ottoman administration.

Albeit secular, the Turkish Republic has set up an ijtihadcommittee, theDirectorate of Religious Affairs High Council of Religious Affairs, HCRA. Thepervasiveness of Islamic law in Turkish society is so evident that the stateneeded to respond to its socio-legal reality by establishing this committee. This

organ of the state has a somewhat awkward status. While the state does notofficially recognize Muslim law and arguing for its application is a criminaloffense, the HCRA bases its arguments on officially non-recognized Islamiclegal and jurisprudential sources. This committee endeavors to producefatwasto the questions put to it. The HCRA responds to the socio-legal reality byexercising ijtihadand also by employing takhayyur.

The Diyanet published a book offatwas in 1995: Fatwas on ContemporaryProblems. This book by the HCRA is an important indication of the extension

of the religious domain to the social domain. It is a consequence of the factthat the Diyanet itself could not limit its functions as before to theadministration of religious personnel of the secularist state. It thus began toextend its functions to advise the public on problems of daily life throughfatwas. In its introduction, the authors justify their book by referring to theconstitution of the Religious Affairs Administration:

. . . in order to prevent the misguidance of our society by those withinsufficient knowledge, and hence preventing the exploitation of societys

religious feelings for various purposes, the duty and authority for thereligious enlightenment of society and the resolution of the religiousproblems of daily life, is given to the (HCRA).

Obviously, HCRAfatwas look like an attempt by the state to regain religiouscontrol over the public. A fatwawebsite of the HCRA is in service, too: theDirectorate of Religious Affairs FatwaSite.13

When a financial crisis erupted last year, the Directorate prepared a Fridaysermon to discourage the faithful from using U.S. dollars and this sermon was

delivered as it is obligatory by imams in the 86,000 or so mosques of Turkey.Krat Bumin of Yeni afak made fun of the states move by making reference


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purpose of personal or political influence, or for even partially basingthe fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the Stateon religious tenets.

One can cite several examples of the states attitude. In every Friday sermon,there is another official concern that needs to be underlined. In Eid al-adha,the faithful are not allowed to donate the skin of the animal that they sacrificeto anyone they want. According to the states ijtihad, they have to give it to thestates Turkish Air Institution. It is a punishable offense to donate the skin tonon-state organizations.14

The Survival of Unofficial Civil Islam in the PublicSphereThe state under the reins of the Kemalists assumed that cultural change

could be imposed from above through the force of law. One of the majorexpected changes was the secularization of society. In Republican epistemology,religion is imprisoned in the conscience of the individual and in places ofworship in society and is not allowed to mix with and interfere in public life.15Article 24 of the constitution says:

Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief andconviction. Acts of worship, religious services, and ceremonies shallbe conducted freely, provided that they do not violate the provisionsof Article 14.

No one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in religiousceremonies and rites, to reveal religious beliefs and convictions, orbe blamed or accused because of his religious beliefs and convictions.

Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conductedunder State supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture

and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primaryand secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shallbe subject to the individuals own desire, and in the case of minors, tothe request of their legal representatives.

No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religiousfeelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever,for the purpose of personal or political influence, or for even partiallybasing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order ofthe State on religious tenets.

However, it is now recognized that the place and influence of civil Islam inTurkish social life has not changed a great deal. With Atatrks death in 1938,


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renewed Islamic sentiment. Competitive political parties meant that differentinterests could be voiced in the public sphere, which also meant givingconcessions to Islamic revivalism. Islamic schools were opened and privatereligious instruction was allowed.16

Even though civil Islam has been officially removed from public life, it isstill deeply rooted in the minds and hearts of the Turkish people. Although thestate has kept an eye on former religious leaders, their successors and religiousfunctionaries, they have regained something of their influence in public life byattracting the masses into their religious atmosphere.17 The Kemalist ideology,which had national, secular and modern elements, could not fill the gap thatcivil Islam was supposed to have forcefully vacated. The state, through its

secular policies and programs of Westernization, threatened the value systemof the Muslim people in the country without providing, at the same time, asatisfactory and all-encompassing ideological framework that would have massappeal and was capable of replacing civil Islam.18 Bifurcation between the liteand the masses made it difficult for the Kemalists to carry out their reformsfrom above.19

Atatrk wanted to make religion a private concern, but unanticipatedsocial consequences soon caught up with him. As the boundaries of the

private enlarged in Turkey, an unforeseen development occurred. Privateeveryday life has increasingly been given new richness and variety; religionhas become a central focus of life and acquired a new power. Religion hasreceived a new lift from the privatizing wave; private religious instruction,Islamic fashion in clothes, manufacturing and music, Islamic learned journals,all of them aspects of private life, have made Islam pervasive in a modernsense in Turkish society, and have worked against religion becoming a privatebelief.20

As a recent study on Turkey reconfirmed (t)he vibrancy of Islam isremarkable in almost all areas of Turkish life . . . This Islam is neither areplacement for, nor an alternative to, the modern world: it is an integral partof life.21 Even though the Kemalist system has survived, the situation todaydiffers in this, and other ways, from that future envisioned by many of theRepublics founders.22 It was the introduction of democracy in late 1940s thatprovided the key link between rulers and ruled. As campaigning for votesbegan, in spite of the repeated emphasis on ensuring that politics and religionwere henceforth to be separate, politicians were hardly able to resist the offer

to support for Islamic mores as a way of attracting votes.23

The changes observed at the social level are even more significant. One


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Friday prayer and work, dar al-Islam, fasting and traveling by train, the stockexchange, taxes, hallmeat, marrying non-Muslims, alaq, court divorce,polygamy, nationalism, unemployment benefits, inflation, interest, customstaxes, bribery, depositing money in banks in non-Muslim countries, sellingalcohol in non-Muslim countries, gambling in dar al-harb, sterilization, plasticsurgery, using perfumes, abortion, ijtihad, military service, organ transplantation,prayers (salt) on buses, VATs, mortgages, European Union, golden teeth,alcohol in medication, eau de cologne, interest, inflation, insurance, feminism,nikah, and fertility clinics. In addition tofatwabooks, many newspapers havefatwacolumns. Recently, the number of Turkishfatwasites on the internet hasincreased. Also, through various popular newsgroups and e-mail discussion

lists, Turkish Muslims solicit information about what Islam says about anyparticular issue.

With the explosive growth of Islam in society in recent decades, someindicators suggest that it is practically impossible to keep the distance betweenthe civic domain and the religious any longer. The growing popularity ofofficially unrecognized Islamic orders and communities in every segment ofsociety in recent decades is one of these indicators. In this regard, it is alsoworth mentioning that a recent survey found that 14.1% of Turkish people

have accounts with interest-free Islamic finance institutions, despite the factthat such financial institutions carry no state guarantee for any losses, asopposed to mainstream banks.24

Civil Islam: Glen and His MovementFethullah Glen is an Islamic scholar, thinker, writer, and poet. He has

inspired many people in Turkey to establish educational institutions thatcombine modern sciences with ethics and spirituality. His efforts have resulted

in the emergence of the Glen movement, a faith-inspired collectivity whoseboundaries are extremely loose and difficult to specify. The actual numbers ofGlens millions of followers and sympathizers is not exactly known, but it isagreed that it is the largest civil movement in the country. Glen is nowdescribed as an opinion leader in Turkey.25 Most importantly, it is claimed,Glen has made himself a most likely candidate for religious leader of thenew Turkey.26 Indeed, he is at times referred to in newspapers as theunofficial civil religious leader of Turkey.27

Glens discourse has had and will have major influences on the future shape

of Turkey and its region. His discourses transformative influences firstly andmainly can be observed in his movement. At a second level, this transformation


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Glen sees diversity and pluralism as natural facts. He wants thosedifferences to be explicitly professed. He believes that the dissemination offaith through persuasion is the only method to spread it to the civilized world.Tolerance is the magic word and practice.28

Glen is of the firm opinion that Turks have interpreted and applied theseconcepts in such a way that it could be called Turkish Islam.29 He states that:

The Hanafi understanding and Turkish interpretation dominates morethan three-fourths of the Islamic world. This understanding is very dearto me. If you like you can call this Turkish Islam. Just as I see no seriouscanonical obstacle to this, I dont think it should upset anyone.30 TheTurkish nation interpreted Islam in the areas open to interpretation . . . it

attained a very broad spectrum and became the religion of great states.For this reason, I think the Turkish Muslimness is appropriate. Anotheraspect of this is that in addition to profound devotion to the Quran andSunnah, the Turks always have been open to Sufism, Islams spiritualaspect.31 Turkish Islam is composed of the main, unchanging principlesof Islam found in the Quran and Sunnah, as well as in the forms that itsaspects open to interpretation assumed during Turkish history, together

with Sufism . . . This is why Turkish Islam always has been broader,deeper, more tolerant and inclusive, and based on love.32

By making reference to the Turkish-Islam of the Seljuks and Ottomans andtheir practices of religious pluralism, he underlines that:

(T)he Muslim world has a good record of dealing with the Jews: therehas been almost no discrimination, and there has been no Holocaust,denial of basic human rights, or genocide. On the contrary, Jews havealways been welcomed in times of trouble, as when the Ottoman Stateembraced them after their expulsion from Andalusia.33

A legally pluralist system existed at these times as well. Glen is alsotolerant of internal Muslim legal and cultural pluralism. In this context, forinstance, he posits that Alawis definitely enrich Turkish culture andencourages Alawis to move from an oral culture to a written culture in orderto preserve their identities.34 He stresses that Alawi meeting or prayer housesshould be supported. In our history, a synagogue, a church, and a mosquestood side by side in many places.35

In Glens philosophy, secularism is not understood as a non-Muslim wayof life. The separation between the sacred and profane and its projection onto

social life is accepted. The rejection of the sacred is not accepted. Glen arguesthat Islam and the secularity of the state could be compatible. He emphasizes


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Glen argues that democracy, in spite of its shortcomings, is now the onlyviable political system, and people should strive to modernize and consolidatedemocratic institutions in order to build a society where individual rights andfreedoms are respected and protected, where equal opportunity for all is morethan a dream. According to Glen, mankind has not yet designed a bettergoverning system than democracy.36

Glen also maintains that as a political and governing system, democracyis at present the only alternative left in the world. His understanding ofdemocracy in its current shape is not an ideal that has been reached buta method and a process that is being continually developed and revised.37

He argues that (i)ts a process of no return that must develop and mature

. . . Democracy one day will attain a very high level. But we have to wait forthe interpretation of time.38 Glen powerfully states that:

Democracy has developed over time. Just as it has gone through manydifferent stages, it will continue to go through other stages in the futureto improve itself. Along the way, it will be shaped into a more humaneand just system, one based on righteousness and reality. If humanbeings are considered as a whole, without disregarding the spiritualdimension of their existence and their spiritual needs, and withoutforgetting that human life is not limited to this mortal life and that allpeople have a great craving for eternity, democracy could reach its peakof perfection and bring even more happiness to humanity. Islamicprinciples of equality, tolerance, and justice can help it do just that. 39

He does not see a contradiction between Islamic administration anddemocracy. As Islam holds individuals and societies responsible for their ownfates, people must be responsible for governing themselves. The Quranaddresses society with such phrases as: O people! and O believers! The dutiesentrusted to modern democratic systems are those that Islam refers to society

and classifies, in order of importance, as absolutely necessary, relativelynecessary, and commendable to carry out. People cooperate with one anotherin sharing these duties and establishing the essential foundations necessary toperform them. The government is composed of all of these foundations. Thus,Islam recommends a government based on a social contract. People elect theadministrators, and establish a council to debate common issues. Also, societyas a whole participates in auditing the administration.40

Islam, for Glen, is not a political project to be implemented. It is a

repository of discourse and practices for the evolution of a just and ethicalsociety. He strongly states that:


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to choose the type and form of government according to time andcircumstances.41

Because he is critical of the instrumentalization of religion in politics, heconstantly criticizes discourses, rhetoric, practices and policies of politicalIslam in Turkey.

Thus, Glen, while encouraging everybody to participate in elections,does not name specific parties or candidates. He gives guidelines by whichto judge candidates, such as honesty, being truly democratic, being suitablefor the job, the socio-political conditions and so on. In any party, one couldfind such candidates. At the end of the day, if every voter behaves in thismanner, all the elected will be in tune with Glens ideals, regardless of party

affiliation. Most importantly, as he does not categorically affiliate with anyof the parties, they will always be hopeful and will try to earn his sympathy.Moreover, his supra-party discourse could easily attract people from all walksof life.

Regarding an Islamic state, Glen is in favor of a bottom-up approach anddesires to transform individuals, an ideal that cannot be fulfilled by force orfrom the top.42

As noted above, he advocates an Anatolian-Islam or Anatolian-Sufism that

puts an emphasis on tolerance and Turkish modernity as an alternative toSaudi or Iranian versions or images, emphasizing that this discourse of Islamis not in contradiction to the modern world. His discourse represents a kind ofmoderate Islam, even though he strongly rejects such a definition, as in hisview, Islam is already moderate.

In a written response to questions from The New York Times, he said, hewas not seeking to establish an Islamic regime but did support efforts toensure that the government treated ethnic and ideological differences as a

cultural mosaic, not a reason for discrimination.43

Glens discourse utilizesMustafa Kemal as a commonly appreciated Turkish figure and polishesKemals aspects that are in tune with Glens ideal of a golden generation.

Democratic Leftist Prime Minister, as he then was, Blent Ecevit has beensupportive of Glen and his activities, going so far as to praise them on occasion.When he attended the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2000, he emphasizedin his speech the importance of Glen schools all over the world and how theseschools contribute to Turkish culture.44 When receiving the Journalists andWriters Foundations representatives at his office, he reiterated that he supportsthese schools because he believes that they are spreading Turkish culture toan extent not even accomplished by the 600 year old Ottoman State 45


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the elections heavily, Deniz Baykal quit as the leader; some time later hereturned to politics saying that he and his discourse had changed and hewas re-elected leader. Now he defends an Anatolian tolerance, pays respect tothe Ottomans and religious scholars of the past, and speaks warmly regardingissues of religion.46 He argues that he wants to come to power in this worldwhile desiring to go to heaven in the hereafter.47 He says he admires theunderstandings of Rumi, Yunus Emre, Hac Bekta, and Yesevi and finds theirideas progressive and revolutionary.48 Baykal calls his new politics Anatolianleftism in an interview by liberal Hrriyet columnist Cneyt lsever at aprogram of the Glen movements Samanyolu TV on April 24, 2001. It isobvious that most of these ideas are what Glen has been promoting for

more than 30 years. Baykal, when asked if he had been saying these before,replied that (the ideology of) social democracy has come to this point veryrecently.49 Indeed, this transformation process began some ten years ago atthe grassroots level. Ordinary people had already left their ideological campsof the pre-1980s and had been tolerant of each other; this is what has forcedBaykal to change as a receptive leader.

Most scholars agree that Glen continues a long Sufi tradition of seekingto address the spiritual needs of people, to educate the masses, and to provide

some stability in times of turmoil. Like many previous Sufi figures (includingthe towering thirteenth-century figure, Jalal al-Din Rumi), he is suspected ofseeking political power. However, any change from this apolitical stance willfirstly harm his movement.50 Even though Glen consistently reiterates that hehas no political agenda, that he is against the instrumentalist use of religion inpolitics, that his emphasis is on the individual and so on, the militarist elitewho see themselves as the staunch guardians of the regime regard Glen andhis movement as a potential threat to the state. Those fears seemed confirmed

two years ago when television stations broadcast excerpts from videocassettesin which he seemed to urge his sympathizers to patiently and secretlyinfiltrate the government.51 He had also made some vague statements thatwere somewhat critical of the Turkish establishment. Glen said his words hadbeen taken out of context, and some altered; he said he had counseledpatience to sympathizers faced with corrupt civil servants and administratorsintolerant of workers who were practicing Muslims.52 Statements and wordswere picked with tweezers and montaged to serve the purposes of whoeverwas behind this, he said.53 The militarist elite remains suspicious and claims

that he seeks to gain political power over state institutions, including the army.The reason why Glen employs such vague language on certain issues is


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To sum up, Glen has achieved autonomy from state power and been ableto mobilize a large segment of society; he is of Islamic background with whichthe laicist state has felt uneasy, and he will always be depicted as a potentialthreat by some.54

As we already noted above, Glen sees diversity and pluralism as naturalfacts; he wants those differences to be explicitly professed. Glen is anadamant supporter and promoter of inter-faith dialogue. He argues that thereis no rule requiring that the style used in the Qur an (in order to express theobstinacy and enmity of some Jews and Christians toward truth) should alsobe used for every Jew or Christian in every era; the verses condemning andrebuking the Jews and Christians are either about some Jews and Christians

who lived in the time of the Prophet Muhammad or their own Prophets.55

In his view, believers must communicate with all kinds of thought andsystems. Like Rumis compass, such a person is like a compass with one footwell-established in the center of belief and Islam and the other foot withpeople of many nations.56 To this end, Glen pioneered the establishment ofthe Journalists and Writers Foundation in 1994, the activities of which promotedialogue and tolerance among all strata of society.

Glen has been quick to respond to the challenges and opportunities of

globalization and his dialogical efforts should be evaluated in this context aswell. He has been supportive of Turkeys accession to the European Union.57He says, If both Europe and Turkey could come to a mutually acceptableagreement, the future could be promising. But this demands intelligent peoplewith one eye on the larger world and one eye on their own world.58

He has also encouraged Turkish people to migrate to these countries inorder to be honorary representatives and ambassadors of Turkey. In Glensdiscourse, realism has an important place. He frequently states that the United

States of America is currently the leader in the international arena and is abetter alternative compared to other non-democratic countries, such as Russiaor China.59

The Influence of Glens DiscourseGlens discourse is not only rhetoric; in praxis too he encourages all his

followers to realize his ideals. After espousing Glen as an intellectual leader,his followers adapt themselves to his discourse and follow his ijtihads, eventhough he does not label them as ijtihad.

Glens followers have established many educational charitable trustsand foundations and some have companies that provide educational services.60


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The Glen movement is generally deemed to be moderate and can beconsidered modern in the sense that it espouses a worldview centeredaround the self-reflexive and politically participant individuals ability to realizepersonal goals while adhering to a collective identity, and seeks to shape localnetworks and institutions in relation to global discourses of democracy, humanrights, and the market economy.62 In stressing the links between Islam,reason, science, and modernity, and the lack of an inherent clash between Eastand West, the Glen movement promotes education at all levels and appealsto a growing number of Turks.63

The movement tries to bring in all scholars and intellectuals regardless oftheir ethnic, ideological, religious and cultural backgrounds. The Journalists

and Writers Foundation also works as a think-tank for related issues. TheAbant Platform is a result of the attempt to find solutions to Turkeys problemsby bringing together scholars and intellectuals of all colors. This platform is thefirst of its kind in recent Turkish history, where intellectuals could agree todisagree on such sensitive issues as laicism, secularism, religion, and reasonrelations. The Foundation organizes Abant Conventions annually. Everyconvention ends with a declaration. In 1998, the theme was Islam andsecularism; in 1999 Religion and state relations and in 2000, the topic was

The democratic state within the framework of rule of law.The 1998 Abant Declaration attempts to redefine the meaning of laicism in

accordance with the way it is practiced in Anglo-Saxon cultures. Moreover, theDeclaration reinterprets Islamic theology to respond to modern challenges. Itwas underscored in the declaration that revelation and reason do not conflict;individuals should use their reason to organize their social lives; the stateshould be neutral on beliefs and faiths prevalent in society; governance of thestate cannot be based on the dominance of one religious tradition; secularism

should expand individual freedoms and rights and should not exclude anyperson from the public sphere.Glens discourse and practice have received the support of a number

of well-known liberal intellectuals, such as the journalists Mehmet Altan, AliBayramoglu, Mehmet Barlas, Etyen Mahcupyan, Mehmet Ali Birand, GulayGokturk, Taha Akyol, Cuneyt Ulsever and Cengiz Candar, who argue that thesolution to Turkeys problems depends on reaching a consensus. Moreover,scholars who were deemed radical Islamists now fully support Glensthought and practice.

The movements schools are virtually the only Turkish presence in manycountries, a fact acknowledged by the Turkish intelligentsia. zdem Sanberk,


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that should be supported by the state because you have a Turkish presence inthese countries.64 It must be noted that until the movement established theseschools, there was no mention of such an international project, even in theory,by the state, think tanks, research centers, or academics.65

Changes in Political Islam: FromMilli GrS toAK Parti

Erkakans Milli Gr(The National Outlook Movement) has been thenotable representative of political Islam in Turkey.66 This movement successivelyestablished the National Order (26 Jan 197014 Jan 1971), the NationalSalvation (11 Oct 197212 Sept 1980), the Welfare (19 July 198316 Jan 1998),

the Virtue (17 Dec 199722 June 2001) and Felicity (Saadet) Parties (20 July2001present). With the exception of the existing Felicity (Saadet) Party, allothers were shut down by the Kemalist establishment.

Until 1998, the Movement was under the influence of Middle Easternpolitical Islam to a certain extent, and its ideology was based on the binaryopposition of West versus East. Its perception of the West was influenced byelements such as colonialism, injustice, oppression and Christianity. An especiallystrong emphasis on the Wests Judeo-Christian heritage was an important part

of the movements discourse. The political and economic worldview of themovement was heavily centralist.

The movement was initially opposed to Turkeys European Unionmembership, saying that Turkey was more attached to the Islamic countriesand the European Union was a Christian Club.67 The Movements leader,Erbakan, used to belittle supporters of Turkeys EU membership as naveimitators of the West. The movement had opposed Turkeys EuropeanUnion membership for three decades. The National Salvation Party argued

in the 1970s that Turkey should not attempt to join the European EconomicCommunity, since this would merely perpetuate its role as an economicunderling of Western-Christian capitalism.68 The Welfare Party that wasestablished in 1983 and closed by the Constitutional Court in 1998 emphasizedthat it will end close association with the West, starting closer cooperation withthe surrounding Islamic states.69 Erbakan even sought to implement thesepolicies during his brief tenure as prime minister in 1997.

Over the years, the Milli Grmovement has been transforming itself andduring the last decade it has been observed that the party of the movement,

first Welfare and after its closure Virtue, has moved from the religious rightto the center right, representing the interests of the periphery that includes


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Grputs a special emphasis on faith, morality and virtue, claiming that newgenerations had to be patriotic and self-sacrificing people equipped with thelatest know-how so that Turkey would carry the torch in the scientific,technological and civilizational races.70 As the Popes underline in their bookTurkey Unveiled, very few if any of the senior members of the movement andits party are clerics; most are young Western-educated intellectuals.71

After the post-modern coup of February 28, 1997, the Movement evolvedinto the Virtue Party; this party emphasizes democracy, the rule of law andadvocates joining the European Union.72 The party has been forced toreconsider modernity, democracy and multiculturalism as universal valuesrather than seeing them as extensions of Western domination.73 In parallel with

the emergence of a new Anatolian capitalist class74 and with efforts to evolveinto a mass political party, slogans now include pluralist society, basic rightsand liberties, more democracy, privatisation, decentralization andglobalisation.75 The party completely eliminated its discourse against Westernvalues and institutions, though it did not employ an Erbakan-style anti-Westerndiscourse.76 In its election manifesto of April 18, 1998, the party pledged thataccomplishing the goal of Turkeys accession to the European Union isfundamental.77 Moreover, the partys chairman stated that strategic and defense

relations with the U.S. should continue, extending to economic cooperationand investment.78

The Virtue party was socially conservative, culturally nationalistic, free-market oriented, not anti-Western, and was seeking a centrist image.79 Partyrepresentatives frequented Western capitals to convince the Western powerelite that they are more democratic than the Islamists and that they were infavor of the European Union.80

The fundamental incompatibility between secular and religious worldviews

is no longer automatically assumed in Millli Gr

circles.

81

An Anglo-Saxondiscourse of secularism is now espoused: religion will not interfere in theaffairs of the state while the state will not interfere with religion. The chairmanof the Virtue Party, M. Recai Kutan, admits that they did not seek dialogue andco-operation with other groups in society. He also declares that Islam will notbe a source for legislation; instead, logic and science will mold publicpolicies.82 Virtue Party members include highly educated, upper-class modernfemale members of the parliament, such as Nazl Ilcak and Prof. OyaAkgnen, who do not wear headscarves. This has never been the case with

parties that preceded the Virtue.These younger generations, in spite of the movements tradition, argue that


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changing and transforming as well, coming closer to Nursi and Glens line onthe issues of state-religion-society relations.

Changes in State Islam: Post-Lozan Islam(Post-Lausannian Islam)

Inter-religious dialogue at the state level has only started taking placeafter the criticisms made against the Directorate by laicist circles on the basisthat while an unofficial leader with no authority, i.e., Fethullah Glen, wasdealing with inter-religious dialogue and even paying a visit to the Pope in theVatican, the Directorate was ultimately inactive.89 The underlying psychologyof this reaction was that Republican laicists did not want religion to be out of

control.90 After a while, the Directorate totally renewed its discourse andstarted including elements of inter-religious dialogue. Before, although therewas not anything counter to these themes in the discourse of the Directorate,there was not any mention of them either. These themes were irrelevant forthe state-sponsored Turkish religion. Only recently did the Directorateestablish a unit for inter-religious dialogue. It is true that the Directorate hashad a division dealing with extra-territorial affairs, but this divisions activitiesonly cover Turkish citizens in the West. Very rarely would imams sent abroad

help Turkish citizens learn the language, let alone the culture, of the respectivecountry, making dialogue with people other than Turks virtually impossible.Another factor that forced the Directorate to change its vision is Turkeys bidto join the European Union. It is expected that the Directorate could add aTurkish flavor to European Islam and adapt Turkish Islam to the new polity.

The Directorate is currently trying to get ready for the European Union,and are aware that they will have the mission of representing a moderateand tolerant Islam.91 Moreover, authorities voice their desire to reinterpret

Islam in the face of the challenges of modernity, new developments of the age,Muslims living in non-Muslim Western territories, inter-religious dialogue, andpeaceful co-existence and emphasize that the Directorates future activities willaddress such issues.92

The Directorate has a very busy schedule of activities with regard to dialogue.In 1998, while there was only one session regarding dialogue in the SecondReligion Congress (Ikinci Din Surasi) in the year 2000 (other than establishinga Directorship for Inter-religious Dialogue), the Directorate organized twomajor programs on the theme: International European Union Congress May

27 in Istanbul and Religion Meeting In the Year 2000 Faith and ToleranceAge May 1011 in Tarsus (one of the former centers of Eastern Christianity).93


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Fuller and Paul Henze are pupils (murid) of Glen.99 It is also alleged byYeniHayatjournal that Anatolia will be Christianized and that Glens group ishelping the Christians in this mission.

In the same context, the main theme of a book written by a retired generalis that entering the European Union is a plot to disintegrate Turkey.100 This viewis supported by a marginal Maoist weekly, Aydinlik, which nowadays seeks toally itself with the army. The weekly regularly raises the issue and claims thatentering the European Union will only help reactionary forces and Kurdishseparatists. On September 22, 2000, the chief writer of the daily, Dogu Perincek,alleged again that entering the European Union means a divided Turkey.101

As Yavuz rightly underlines, the state-invented Sevres syndrome (that the

West is about the partition of the country) is still used in some circles.102 Asa result, from time to time, liberal democrat individuals such as Meral GezginEris, Chairwoman of the Economist Development Foundation (IKV), needto urge anti-EU people to give up their paranoia that the EU will dividethe country.103 Several influential columnists in the Turkish mainstream mediakeep writing about the virtues of joining the EU, hoping to convince the deepstate circles.104

Concluding remarks: Transformation of TurkishIslamsKemalist criticism of Ottoman Islam basically stemmed from an understanding

that religion had played a negatively conservative role in the socio-politicalstructure of the Ottoman Empire. Another rationale of these criticisms has itsroots in the perception of the structural relationship between religious andpolitical authority in traditional societies. Religious institutions have oftenstood as symbols of the former regimes in the eyes of revolutionary leaders.

Said more precisely, they have conceived of religion as a threat to theirmodernist movement and revolutions. Surprisingly, the roles have recentlychanged. Now, most practicing Muslims advocate Turkeys accession to theEuropean Union, once perceived to be a Christian club, and believe that theCopenhagen criteria are amr bil marf(ordering the good),105 while the roleof conservatism is now left to the Kemalist and deep state elite.

Moreover, activist Muslims either take the lead, as in the example ofthe Glens faith-based movement, or adapt themselves to the new Muslimdiscourse on these issues, as in the example of the political Islam of MilliGr. Even the state gives a response for whatever reason, unknowinglytransforming itself in the lines of the civil discourse. This is very observable


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As sociologist Nilufer Gle aptly puts it, Muslim identity is in a processof normalization, making the transformation from being Islamist to Muslim,106strongly showing that buzzwords such as fundamentalism, and catchyphrases such as Samuel Huntingtons rhyming West versus Rest and DanielLerners alliterative Mecca or merchanization are of little use in understandingthis reformation.107 Factors such as enthusiasm for joining the EU, civil societysgrowth, the independent media, telecommunications technology, satellites, theinternet, globalization, foreign encouragement and support, and the role ofreligious leaders are all dynamically interlinked and intertwined in transformingTurkish society, despite the resistance of the forces of conservatism. Further,the renewal of the religious or faith-based discourse has a major role to play.

Endnotes1. Michael King, Introduction. In Michael King (ed) Gods law versus state

law: The construction of Islamic identity in Western Europe(London: Grey Seal, 1995),115, 3.

2. Aziz Al-Azmeh, Islams and modernities. 2nd ed. London (New York: Verso,1996), 1.

3. June Starr, Law as metaphor: From Islamic courts to the palace of justice(NewYork: State University of New York Press, 1992), 56.

4. David Shankland, Islam and Society in Turkey(Huntingdon: The Eothen Press,1999), 23.5. Michael King, op. cit., 91114, 105.6. Ibid., 106.7. Emre Kongar, Turkeys cultural transformation. In Gnsel Renda and C. Max

Kortepeter (eds) The transformation of Turkish culture, the Atatrk legacy(The KingstonPress. Inc: Princeton, New Jersey, 1986), 1968. http://www.kongar.org/aen_tr.php

8. Ali Yaar Sarbay, Kemalist ideolojide modernlemenin anlam: Sosyo-ekonomikbir zmleme denemesi. In Ersin Kalaycoglu and Ali Yaar Sarbay (eds) Trk siyasalhayatnn geliimi. (Istanbul: Beta, 1986), 189204, 200.

9. Rona Aybay, Administrative Law. Ansay T. and Wallece D. (eds) Introduction toTurkish Law, (Ankara, 1978), 5384, 58.

10. Shankland, op. cit., 29.11. Ibid., 9.12. Ibid., 29.13. www.diyanet.gov.tr/dinibilgiler/dinibil.html.14. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupc/ca/cag/Part2.htm; www.yenisafak.com.tr/

kbumin.html on 8/28/2001.15. erif Mardin, Turkey: Islam and westernization. In: Carlo Caldorola (ed)

Religions and societies: Asia and the Middle East(Berlin et al.: Mouton Publishers, 1982),171198, 180.

16. Starr, op. cit., 1718.17. Erwin I. J., Rosenthal, Islam in the modern national state(Cambridge:
http://www.kongar.org/aen_tr.phphttp://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupc/ca/cag/Part2.htmhttp://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupc/ca/cag/Part2.htmhttp://www.kongar.org/aen_tr.php


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20. erif Mardin, Religion and social change in modern Turkey: The case ofBediuzzaman Said Nursi(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 229.

21. Shankland, op. cit., 15, 5451.

22. Ibid., 17.23. Ibid., 35.24. See Anar Anketi March 2001, www.anararastirma.com.tr.25. Enis Berberoglu, Hurriyet, 10 August 2000.26. Blent Aras, Turkish Islams Moderate Face, Middle East Quarterly,

September 1998, 27.27. Avni zgrel, Radikal, 2 March 2001.28. Ali nal and Alphonse Williams, Advocate of Dialogue: Fethullah Glen(Fairfax,

VA: The Fountain, 2000), 254268.29. Ibid., 5458.

30. Ibid., 52.31. Ibid., 56.32. Ibid., 43.33. Ibid., 243.34. Ibid., 6770.35. Ibid., 6770.36. See in detail, Ihsan Yilmaz, Muslim laws, politics and society in modern

nation-states, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), chapter 8.37. Fethullah Glen, A Comparative Approach to Islam and Democracy, SAIS

Review, Volume XXI, No. 2 Summer-Fall 2001, 133138, 134.38. nal and Williams, op. cit., 150.39. Ibid., 137.40. Gulen, op. cit., 135136.41. Ibid., 134.42. Ebru Altnoglu, Fethullah Glens Perception of State and Society(Istanbul:

Bosphorus University, 1999), 102.43. Douglas Frantz, New York Times, 25 August 2000.44. Zaman, 23 February 2000.45. Ibid.46. Baykal, Aksiyon, 7 April, 2001.47. Zaman, 7 February 2001.

48. Aksiyon, 7 April 2001.49. Ibid.; On the other hand, this change was found so radical by some party

members that they were very quick to leave the party, encouraged and led by Ismet Inonusson Erdal Inonu.

50. Altnoglu, op. cit., 102.51. Frantz, Douglas, New York Times, 25 August 2000.52. Ibid.53. Ibid.54. On this the Economist reported, Turkeys generals, who consider themselves the

guardians of their countrys secular tradition, have their doubts. In the powerful National

Security Council, where they can often squeeze Turkeys elected politicians into reversingdecisions, they have repeatedly growled that Mr. Glens main goal is to overthrow the

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stepped in against a civilian government in 1980, urged Islamic groups to resist extremeleft-wingers. Mr. Glen was then touted as a moderate fellow who combined his religionwith a healthy dose of Turkish nationalism and capitalist spirit. Through his schools, Irans

influence in the former communist Muslim republics could be stemmed. Mr. Glen was evenreceived by Pope John Paul in 1998, Islamic Evangelists, The Economist, Vol. 356,Issue 8178 (7 August 2000), 52.

55. Unal and Williams, op. cit., 260.56. Ibid., 206.57. Ibid., 189.58. Ibid., 58.59. Ibid., 192.60. Europe: Islamic evangelists, The Economist, 8 July 2000.61. Nicole Pope, An Ottoman empire of the mind, www.turkeyupdate.com/

merv.htm, 1998.62. Hakan Yavuz, The assassination of collective memory: The case of Turkey,The Muslim World, 89:34, 1999, 195.

63. Dale F. Eickelman, Inside the Islamic Reformation, Wilson Quarterly22,No. 1, Winter 1998, 82.

64. Douglas Frantz, New York Times, 25 August 2000. The Economist alsoreports that Now the brotherhood is spreading its wings beyond Turkey and theformer Soviet republics, where it already has nearly 300 schools. It also has Africa,South Asia and even Australia on the list. Mustafa Kemal Sirin, who runs the schoolsin Russia, says that, since opening four years ago, they have won a string of inter-schoolcompetitions in English and physics. There are no religious classes in our schools, he addsfirmly. We promote Turkey and Turkish culture. Last week, a report circulating within thegovernment that collated the views of Turkish ambassadors in former Soviet Central Asiasaid that the schools did indeed enhance Turkeys role abroad, Islamic Evangelists, TheEconomist, op. cit., 52.

65. The movements potential importance in strengthening Turkeys position in theinternational arena has been noted by scholars. In this regard, Fuller and Candar proposethat the Glen movement can play a strong and important role of positively representingTurkey in the Muslim world, and demonstrating the moderate character of Turkish Islamand Islamism that denies neither democracy or good ties with the West, Cengiz Candar;Graham E. Fuller, Grand geopolitics for a new Turkey, Mediterranean Quarterly,

V. No. 1 Winter 2001, 2238). They also put that Turkish Islamists can assist in moderatingother Islamist movements in the region and in supporting reconciliation through its ownsuccessful mode, ibid.

66. This being said, it must be underlined that the political Islam of thismovement is specific to Turkey and could be regarded as moderate when compared withthe other representations of political Islam in the Muslim world, see Sahin Alpay, 19September 2000.

67. Ergil Ergil, Identity crises and political instability in Turkey. Journal ofInternational Affairs. Fall 2000.

68. Serif Mardin, Religion and politics in modern Turkey. James P. Piscatori (ed)

Islam in the political process(Cambridge: Cambridge UP), 152.69. Hakan Yavuz, Search for a new social contract in Turkey: Fethullah Glen, the

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72. See for instance, http://www.iviews.com/scripts/articles/stories/default.cfm?id=7188&category_id=40. Cengiz Candar describes this militarys intervention as a post-moderncoup, Cengiz Candar, Sabah, 28 June 1997.

73. Yavuz Cleansing, op. cit.74. Cuneyt Ulsever, one of the prominent liberal thinkers in Turkey and a columnistof the dailyHurriyet, contends that pioneers of the transformation within the practicingMuslim section of society are these Anatolian capitalists and the followers of Glen,Interview with Cuneyt Ulsever, 4 June 2000, Zaman.

75. See in detail the partys election pledges on these issues, Fazilet Partisi: Secimbeyannamesinde ilkeler-hedefler, (Principles and goals in the election manifesto) 18 April1999. Ankara: Virtue Party.

76. Ergil, op. cit.77. Fazilet Partisi: Secim beyannamesinde ilkeler-hedefler, (Principles and goals in

the election manifesto) 18 April 1999. Ankara: Virtue Party, 17.78. M. Recai Kutan, Fazilet Partisi Genel Baskani M. Recai Kutanin secimbeyannemsi basin toplantisi(The Virtue Party Chairman M. Recai Kutans press conferenceon the election manifesto), March 20 1999, (Istanbul: The Virtue Party), 23.

79. Yavuz , Search, op. cit., 127.80. Ergil, Identity, see for such a recent visit by the Party Chairman Kutan and his

colleagues to the European capitals, Turkish dailes, last week of September 2000; see forexample Yeni Safak, 23 September 2000 at www.yenisafak.com.tr/p3.html.

81. Heper, Islam, op. cit. These changes come into reality in spite of the movementscharismatic and natural leader, Necmettin Erbakan. Recent comments and discussions in theTurkish media shows that while there has been a consensus that Erbakan and his discoursehave not changed, people in his movement do not now share his worldview and discoursein totoand that they openly criticize his discourse, if not he as person. This is mostobservable in the tensions betweenyenilikciler(renewers) and gelenekciler(traditionalists,Erbakans very close circle), see Turkish dailies 1820 September 2000.

82. Heper, Islam, op. cit.83. Interview with Eyup Can, Zaman.84. Yavuz, Search, op. cit., 128.85. Nese Duzel, Interview with Abdullah Gul, Radikal, 5 May 2000 at

http://mirror.radikal.com.tr/2000/06/05/turkiye/01ben.shtml86. Ali Bulac, Zaman, 4 June 2000.

87. See for such a comment, Sahin Alpay, Siyasal Islam, Milliyet, 19 September 2000.88. Yavuz, Search, op. cit., 129.89. See for such a criticism levelled against Glen, Necip Hablemitoglu, Yeni Hayat,

N. 52.90. See for such a comment, Asim Yenibahar, Diyanet Baskani neden papayi ziyaret

etti? (Why the Director of Religious Affairs visited the Pope?), Akit, 20 June 2000. Yenibaharsuggests that it is not difficult to conceive that some power elite sent the Director to theVatican in response to Glens visit.

91. Interviews with Abdullah Ayan, Responsible Member of Interreligious Dialogueof the Directorate High Council for Religious Affairs (Din Isleri Yuksek Kurulu) and Yusuf

Kalkan, Head of Foreign Affairs, as he then was, Ankara, August 16, 2000.92. I had an opportunity to have a long discussion with Yusuf Kalkan on these issues

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