21^ NQl

Mo, "793S

POPULISM AND THE POLL TAX: THE POLITICS AND

PROPAGANDA OF SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION

IN NORTH TEXAS,

1892-1904

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of the

University of North Texas in Partial

Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

By

James T. Carawan

Denton, Texas

December, 1997

0-

Carawan, James T., Populism and the Poll Tax: The Politics and Propaganda of

Suffrage Restriction in North Texas. 1892-1904. Master of the Arts (History), December,

1997,196 pp., 21 tables, 6 maps, appendices, bibliography.

This thesis challenges the traditional interpretation of the history of Populism in

America through the use of an intensive regional study. Using precinct-level returns, this

thesis proves that, contrary to the conclusions of more general studies, voters from

predominately Populist areas in North Texas did not support the poll tax amendment that

passed in November 1902. The Populists within this region demonstrated their

frustration and distrust of the political process by leaving the polls in higher percentages

than other voters between 1896 and 1902. The Populists that did participate in 1902

reentered the Democratic Party but did not support the poll tax, which was a major plank

within the Democratic platform. This thesis also proves that the poll tax had a significant

effect in reducing the electorate in North Texas.

21^ NQl

Mo, "793S

POPULISM AND THE POLL TAX: THE POLITICS AND

PROPAGANDA OF SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION

IN NORTH TEXAS,

1892-1904

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of the

University of North Texas in Partial

Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

By

James T. Carawan

Denton, Texas

December, 1997

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my wife, Stephanie Carawan, for her loving support and

encouragement and my daugher, Sydney Carawan, for her inspiration.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Chapter

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. THE MOVEMENT TOWARD A POLL TAX: THE POLITICS AND

PROPAGANDA OF SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION IN NORTH TEXAS 13

3. THE POLL TAX AND THE POPULIST MIND 40

4. A LAST GASP: NORTH TEXAS POPULISTS AND OPPOSITION TO THE POLL TAX AMENDMENT 74

5. THE EFFECT OF THE POLL TAX IN NORTH TEXAS:

A REASSESSMENT OF THE "FAIT ACCOMPLI" THEORY 94

Appendices

I. PRECINCT-LEVEL ELECTION RETURNS, COLLIN COUNTY, 1892-1904 107

II. PRECINCT-LEVEL ELECTION RETURNS, COOKE COUNTY, 1892-1904 129

III. PRECINCT-LEVEL ELECTION RETURNS, DENTON COUNTY, 1892-1904 147

IV. PRECINCT-LEVEL ELECTION RETURNS, FANNIN COUNTY, 1892-1904 167

V. PRECINCT-LEVEL ELECTION RETURNS, POLL TAX REFERENDUM, NOVEMBER 4, 1902 183

BIBLIOGRAPHY 192

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Historians of Populism in the South often reflect upon this mass movement of

agrarians with a considerable amount of nostalgia. They view Populism through a

monolithic lens, with little separation between the leadership and constituency, and create

a picture of a reform minded mass that sought to protect all that was good and right in

America. Because both parties, Democratic and Republican, were extremely

conservative and, in the mind of the Populists, gaining equally through the political

exploitation of the Gilded Age, third party action was not only warranted but necessary to

insure the social, political, and economic well-being of the backbone of the country —

farmers.1

'John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers' Alliance and the People's Party (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1931). Hicks's work represents the foundation of the ideologically pure interpretation of the Populist movement. C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951); Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: Bryan to F. D, R. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955). While Hofstadter does not idealize the Populists, like these other historians, he derived his view of the them through the words of the leadership and the platform. In this way he arrives at the idea that Populism among other things was founded in anti-Semitism and other xenophobic ideologies. Lawrence Goodwyn, The Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). Goodwyn seeks to study Populists at the grass roots, but he arrives at a significantly different interpretation than this present study. The Populist in Goodwyn's interpretation became an especially heroic figure in American politics.

2

The typical Populist in this noble embodiment understood well the intricate

workings of the currency situation that kept him in a downward spiral of debt to his local

bank or merchant. He grasped the complexities of how a government could initiate

currency and market reform through an institution like the sub-treasury. This Populist

sought to expand the dimensions of American democracy through direct election of

United States Senators and the instruments of initiative and referendum. With these and

various other tools in its Omaha Platform of 1892 the Populist Party would put the

country back on course through justifiable government action.2

According to this interpretation the southern Populists, in order to advance their

cause, removed the cloak of southern racism. Within this movement the commonality of

class preempted the division of race, as southern Populism exposed the social conspiracy

of "white supremacy" advocated by southern politicians who used it as a tool to divide

and manipulate farmers with common interests. Due to the efforts of Populist leaders like

Tom Watson of Georgia, members of the party held the ideology of their grass roots

movement paramount over violation of established taboos and mores of their region.3

2Hicks, The Populist Revolt; Woodward, Origins of the New South', Richard Hofstadter, Age of Reform; Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise; Roscoe Martin, The People's Party in Texas: A Study in Third Party Politics (Austin: University of Texas Bulletin, 1933). Martin offers the most definitive study of Texas Populism and remains the work that most historians within this subject in Texas must use.

3C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel (New York: Macmillan Co., 1938); C. Vann Woodward, "Tom Watson and the Negro in Agrarian Politics," Journal of Southern History 4 (February-November, 1938): 14-33. Woodward in his earlier works idealized or overstated the degree to which southern Populists overlooked or ignored racial prejudice. The following books and articles chip away at this interpretation but still are founded within the basic idea that southern Populists put self interest above social interest. Robert Saunders, "Southern Populists and the Negro, 1893-1895," Journal of

3

This courageous, ideologically sound, party, comprising reform-minded

agrarians, reached its peak in 1896 when it confronted on a national scale the two major

political entities of the country. The Democratic Party in the South engaged this three way

political battle with a panoply of weapons at its disposal. They coopted major planks of

the Populist platform, manipulated black voters, and used bribery, voter fraud,

intimidation, violence, and ballot-box stuffing to achieve a political victory that, although

tainted, was in their minds justified. It was in this way that the the major political powers

of the country overcame simple farmers of the Populist Party.4

After reaching its political apogee in 1896 the Populist Party quickly

disintegrated, leaving the members of the party without a voice in America. Voter

apathy, disinterests, and subsequently, low participation characterized the political

climate of the South after the silver campaign. Although the Populist Party officially

existed up to 1908, after 1896 it ceased to be a viable force in politics in the South and

the nation.5

Negro History 54 (January 1969): 240-260; Gregg Cantrell, Kenneth and John B. Rayner and the Limits of Southern Dissent (Chicago, University of Illinois Press: 1993); Lawrence Goodwyn, "Populist Dreams and Negro Rights: East Texas as a Case Study," Journal of American History 76 (December, 1971): 1435-1456. Gregg Cantrell and D. Scott Barton, "Texas Populists and the Failure of Biracial Politics," Journal of Southern History 55 (November 1989): 659-692.

"Martin, People's Party in Texas, 231-251; Alwyn Barr, Reconstruction to Reform, Texas Politics, 1876-1906 (Austin: University of Texas, 1971), 160-175.

5V. O. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), 533-536; J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); Woodward, Origins of the New South, 321-349.

4

The Populist Party in Texas followed the same growth and decline as in other

areas of the South. The voters in the Lone Star State flocked to the movement with a

high degree of energy and dedication. They followed the Populist leaders, James

"Cyclone" Davis and H. S. P. "Stump" Ashby, from Texas and embraced the ideology

and rhetoric delivered by them. After 1896 the People's Party in Texas experienced the

disorganization and disintegration typical of the rest of the South, and the electorate, once

again like most of the South, fell into a pattern of low participation.6

What happened to the members of the People's Party who continued to participate

in politics after 1896? Did Texas Populists abandon their reform movement or did they

take this reform ideology with them into future political decisions? There is evidence

that these Populist re-entered the traditional Democratic Party of the state despite the

conservative nature of the party. Were their issues addressed in a substantive manner

within the Democratic Party or did they simply abandon their progressive mind set and

eschew of a process which had, they believed, violated them?

These are all important questions because it was during this period in southern

and Texas history that the foundations were laid for the political system that would direct

the region and the state through the first sixty years of the twentieth century. The politics

characteristic of the South in the twentieth century were essentially, conservative, white,

and solidly Democratic. This was also the case in Texas but not as late as 1900, however.

While most states in the South by 1900 had enhanced the defacto social and political

6Martin, People's Party in Texas, 113-140; Key, Southern Politics, 533-536.

5

restrictions and moved to consolidate white, Democratic, conservative control via legal

means, Texas by 1900 had not instituted any legal voting restrictions.7

In 1901 the Texas State Legislature moved to solidify its power and did so under

the guise of "reform." The lawmakers of the state devised an election reform that would

systematize the primary system of Texas and require almost all males of voting age to

have paid their poll tax months before an election in order to vote. No doubt the

Democratic politicians of Texas had witnessed the effects of such voting laws in other

states of the South since cross fertilization of social and suffrage restriction occurred from

state to state through newspapers and the interstate correspondence of southern

politicians. What the Democratic Party desired was a small, controllable, and therefore

predictable electorate. If they could not satisfy the electorate given them through the

processes of history, demographics, economics, and immigration, they would sculpt an

electorate to their own liking and needs.8

The approach taken by Texas Democrats was to utilize the high degree of voter

apathy in the state coupled with the presentation of the poll tax as a legitimate election

"reform" movement. They would appeal to the ex-Populist, reform-minded, voters who

had experienced first hand the abuse of the election process by the Democrats most

7Key, Southern Politics, 3-12; Woodward, Origins of the New South, 321-349; Lewis L. Gould, Progressives and Prohibitionists: Texas Democrats in the Wilson Era (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1993), 3-27.

8Key, Politics in Nation and State, 533-554. Key in this chapter explains how each state became a somewhat of a "petri-dish" for legal disfranchisement and how other southern states observed closely not only the effect of the methods but also the action taken by the federal government. Woodward, Origins of the New South, 321 -349.

6

blatantly in 1896. Also, the popular referendum would be presented to a vote in 1902, an

off-election year when voter interest was particularity low.

In interpreting this of era of history most historians of the South take the Populists

and the Democrats at their word. The historiography of the decade of the 1890s portrays

the Populists in Texas and the South as victims of a political process that through

corruption undermined their legitimate and ideologically sound movement. This

interpretation is the logical extension of the oratory and writings of the Party's leaders

and newspapers. The logical interpretation of the movement in Texas in 1902 comes also

from the party leadership, which at this time supported the poll tax amendment.9

Historians have also assumed that the Democrats in 1902 were also interested in

serious reform. In addition to a series of amendments proposed by ex-Governor and

reform Democrat, James Stephen Hogg, attacking big business and railroads, Democrats

presented their version of suffrage restriction as legitimate election reform. The fact that

politics in the state of Texas by this time had been limited to one party and that previous

election abuses reserved for use on enemies of the Democratic Party were being used

against fellow party members, gives credence to this idea. While the historical

consensus concludes that Democrats primarily intended to disfranchise blacks, there is

considerable debate as to whether or not they also desired to limit the voting of the part of

9Norman Pollack, The Populist Mind (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1967), xix-xlviii. This book reprints numerous Populist speeches and writings and its editor holds to an ideological pure interpretation of the movement. Cantrell and Barton, "Texas Populists and the Failure of Biracial Politics" 690-692; Goodwyn, "Populist Dreams and Negro Rights," 1435-1456; Hicks, Populist Revolt, 380-403; Martin, People's Party in Texas, 230-251.

7

the white electorate that had not six years earlier deviated from, "the party of their

fathers." The logical conclusion of the Democratic propaganda is that this new spirit of

election reform was "an offer of fair play," to a group still bitter about the abuse endured

in the heat of political battle.10

The history of this era on the surface appears very neat. Like a jigsaw puzzle all

the pieces fit perfectly and come together to create a clear, discernible picture. What

happens, however, when, in the investigation of this segment of history, one moves

beyond the surface level of research and begins to dig deeper into regions such as North

Texas where Populism and opposition to the poll tax amendment flourished?

An investigation of North Texas that goes beyond the rhetoric of the party

leadership and aggregate county election returns blurs the once neat picture. It also

reveals the limitations of studying the history of Populism and the Populists in Texas and

the South while adhering to a purely logical and ideologically sound interpretation of the

movement. For instance, analysis of precinct level voting returns reveals between that

1896 and 1900 most Populists simply left politics rather that reenter politics as

Democrats. In addition to this phenonemon there exists a discrepancy between ex-

Populist/Democratic support for Democratic candidates and support for the poll tax

amendment which suggests that, although many ex-Populists returned to the Democratic

Party by 1902, their affilitation was little more than nominal.

10Worth Robert Miller, "Building a Progressive Coalition: The Populist-Reform Democrat Rapprochement, 1900-1907," Journal of Southern History 52 (May 1986): 164-182; Cantrell and Barton, "Texas Populists," 690-692; Gould, Progressives and Prohibitionists, 3-27.

8

More recent interpretations of the Populist movement in America approach the

party from its grass roots which are often written about but seldom studied. Newer

interpretations of the Populist Party attempt to interpret the movement through this

segment of the Party that, while outnumbering the leadership of the movement, left little

for the historian to research. This new interpretation concludes that most Populists, like

those in North Texas, were not the agrarian scholars of the Jeffersonian model idealized

by those in the party. The vast majority of those who flocked to the Populist Party were

farmers of little education on small to moderately sized farms who were experiencing

extreme economic distress. There is evidence that these farmers in the last quarter of the

nineteenth century were isolated from and being left behind the rapidly changing

American society and that this isolation fostered a general distrust of authority and an

obsession with conspiracy."

These newer interpretations, while stripping away much of the nostalgia of the

earlier history of the movement, offer a more believable picture, more consistent with

historical reality. The typical Populist within this interpretation becomes less a historical

oddity and more a voter who participated in politics as most other Americans did. Their

reactions to and support of various politicians and issues did not require perfect

11 James Turner, "Understanding the Populists," Journal of American History 67 (September 1980): 354-373. Turner explores in detail the Populists distrust of authority fostered by isolation and economic hardship. C. Vann Woodward, The Burden of Southern History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960), 141-166. The latter reveals the evolution of Woodward's interpretation of the Populists from his earlier more idealistic view of the 1930s. Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, xx-xxii. Although Goodwyn arrives at a different conclusions than the present study, his idea of addressing the rank-and-file Populists is the same.

9

understanding of all the political intricacies of the era, though education was an important

element of the Populist Party and its precursor, the Farmers' Alliance. More likely,

support for candidates and issues was to a greater extent gut reactions to certian

situations. Numerous Populist politicians, in addition to presenting their party as a

defender of the agrarian ideal, exploited the powerlessness and hopelessness of the

segment of the population that was receptive to illogical and irrational solutions to their

plight.12

The typical Populist, then, was not a reform-minded, political simpleton, nor was

the typical Populist politician an ideological and political purist of the earlier

interpretation. The typical Populist was interested in reform, not for the betterment of

society, but for protection of his own interests. In this interpretation, the Omaha

Platform, the cornerstone of the Populist movement, though important, becomes an

instrument of the politics of economic and regional self-interests and an attack on the

many enemies of the Populist constituency either real or perceived. This Populist was

not necessarily a progressive minded reformer who sought the betterment of American

society. Instead he was in a very real sense an obstacle to change, and a voter obsessed

with the various interests he firmly believed exploited his labor and sought his

extinction.13

12Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, xx-xxii; Turner, "Understanding the Populists," 369-371; Woodward, Burden of Southern History, 159-166.

"Turner, "Understanding the Populists," 369-371.

10

This study interprets Populism as a movement whose rank-and-file supporters

were conspiracy sensitive, economically distressed farmers; it will explore the ways in

which they responded to this condition, especially in regard to the passage of the poll tax

amendment in 1902. The study of Populism in the twentieth century remains more

difficult than an examination of the movement's earlier period because the dominant

Democratic Party of the state by 1902 controlled most of the newspapers of North Texas

and the state and through this medium delivered extensive propaganda in support of the

poll tax amendment. While the majority of those who supported Populism at the grass

roots level left little in the way of primary sources for the historian and because most of

the local Populist newspapers had disappeared by 1900, various local newspapers, while

not advocating Populist ideology, offer gleanings that are helpful in assessing the

economic and psychological condition of the farmers in North Texas.

This study analyzes if and to what degree ex-Populists, who had returned to the

Democratic Party by 1902, supported the poll tax amendment. In light of the newer

interpretations of Populists it would appear that if ex-Populists supported any law

constructed by their old political nemesis and requiring money and onerous procedural

qualifications in order to vote, they did so in contradiction to their nature and self

interests. In early Populist platforms the party emphasized the desire for, "a free vote

and an honest count." Had Populists by 1902 abandon this desire in the hopes of

disfranchising the black voters, whom they had earlier courted in the political arena, or

did Populists support suffrage restriction in an effort to eliminate the electoral loopholes

in which they had been hung? Did they offer their support for the poll tax amendment as

11

an olive branch to their old political adversaries, who by this time held primacy in state

politics, or did they offer their support as a sign that, since they had reentered their

traditional party, their loyalties extended not only to the Democratic candidates but to the

party platform, as well?

Five counties in North Texas — Collin, Cooke, Denton, Fannin, and Grayson —

provide the locality for an in-depth examination of how rank and file Populists responded

to the proposed poll tax. These counties were chosen because of their strong political ties

to the Populist movment in the 1890s. Their responses to the poll tax issue will be

analyzed individually in relation the particular economic, racial, and political

characteristics of each. Then each will be compared to the other and placed in statewide

context.14

The purpose of this intensive local study in North Texas is to offer a more

complex picture of the political environment in Texas. Just because everything in an

argument or an interpretation seems to fit nicely, does not mean it is necessarily correct.

And while individual studies of this nature do create a more complex view of our history,

enough such studies will create a more productive and fruitful interpretation of a

particular era, region, state, or country. Not unlike the French impressionistic painters of

the eighteenth century, who practiced the technique of "pointilism" in their works,

perhaps modern historians through intensive localized studies can create a picture that,

"Complete election returns exist for all these counties except Grayson. Unfortunately, while some precinct returns appear in the local paper, The Sherman Daily Register, in many elections the precinct returns were received and printed in a piecemeal fashion and in many instances were omitted from publication. Therefore a precinct level analysis of Grayson County can not be done.

12

while close-up may appear complicated and disjointed, will at a distance enhance our

understanding and perspective of a broader historical canvass.

CHAPTER 2

THE MOVEMENT TOWARD A POLL TAX:

THE POLITICS AND PROPAGANDA

OF SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION

IN NORTH TEXAS

By 1902 the conservative Democratic Party in Texas had the complete political

control it had sought since the end of Reconstruction. Prior to the turn of the century,

however, the term "solid South" was but a dream on the horizon for the old party of the

Confederacy, and nowhere was the Democratic hold on political power more tenuous

than in Texas. As with the ties that bound slave to master, there was also a bond between

slave owners and those who aspired to be slave owners. When the shackles were

removed from the slaves of the South so, too, was some of the commonality between

slave owners and non-slave owners. Although the perpetuation of white supremacy

united much of the South in a common front, after 1865 the class distinctions that had

been suppressed for decades began resurfacing. While the perceived trials of

Reconstruction offered a brief honeymoon for the southern Democratic politician and his

constituency, almost immediately after the Compromise of 1877 fiery pockets of political

dissent began flaring up across the region. In Texas, farmers, who held sway over most

of the politics in the state, were involved in large numbers in movements such as the

Greenback Movement, the Granger Movement, and the Farmers' Alliance. For whatever

14

the reason, farmers in Texas after the Civil War began a tradition of political dissent from

the so called "party of their fathers."1

A great deal of that dissent occurred in North Texas. The People's Party appealed

to voters in this area, attracting its strongest support from poor farmers, but individuals of

great agricultural prosperity gravitated to the movement as well. In fact, three counties in

this region — Collin, Fannin, and Grayson — had strong pockets of third party support and

were among the five most productive agricultural counties in the state, Collin County

ranking first.2

Political dissent reached its apex in the 1890s when the Texas Farmers' Alliance

turned to politics and threw its support to the rising populist movement called the

People's Party. The appeal of this new third party movement embraced some of the basic

tenets of American revolutionary thought. The Populist leadership fashioned the

movement around Jeffersonian ideals, even though they advocated more government

involvement in the economy and the daily lives of Americans. The agrarian ideal, which

most farmers believed to be the best life and direction for America, was the basis for the

1 C. Vann Woodward Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), 175-290; Alwyn Barr, Reconstruction to Reform (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971), 125-175; Roscoe Martin The People's Party in Texas: A Study in Third Party Politics (Austin: University of Texas Bulletin, 1933), 11-39. Martin attests to primacy of farmer interests in Texas politics, 16. Lewis L. Gould Progressives and Prohibitionists: Texas Democrats in the Wilson Era (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1992), 3-27.

2Martin, The People's Party in Texas, 62-70. Barr, Reconstruction to Reform, 150; The McKinney Daily Courier, September 15, 1902.

15

party's platform as it sought to rectify the problems most prevalent in agricultural life,

either real or perceived.

Regardless of how or why farmers in Texas flocked to the Populist movement, its

followers in the north-central area of the Lone Star State were of the most loyal type.

Fusion efforts between the national Democratic and Populist Parties in the 1896 election

achieved little success in the uncompromising political theater of Texas Populism.

Rather than accept the fusion ticket of William Jennings Bryan of Nebraska and Arthur

M. Sewall of Maine, many Texas Populists opposed the national committee of the

People's Party and supported the "middle of the road" Populist ticket of Bryan and Tom

Watson of Georgia; thus, the presidential election in Texas offered the voter the choice of

Bryan and Sewall on the Democratic ticket, Bryan and Tom Watson of Georgia as the

Populist ticket, and William McKinley and Garret A. Hobart on the Republican ticket.3

There is evidence that Texas Populists bargained support for the Democratic and

Republican tickets on the national level in order to garner local Democratic and

Republican support for Populist candidates at the state and local level. This undermined

support for the "pure" Populist ticket in the national election, however, the Populist

candidate for governor, Jerome C. Kearby, received 238,692 votes out of the more than

one-half million casts (44 percent), and came in a close second to the winning Democrat

3Barr, Reconstruction to Reform, 161-175.

16

Governor Charles A. Culberson. No Populist candidate for governor in any other state

received such extensive support.4

After the fusion efforts of the 1896 election the Populist Party lost much of its

momentum. The organization had come close to winning the governorship but had little

substantial success in the state except the election of a few state legislators. Its lack of

success in the 1896 election was due largely to Democratic corruption of the election

process. Both the Democrats and the Populists manipulated the black vote to suit their

needs, but the former, with more power and money and therefore more influence,

engaged in more bribery, voter fraud, and stuffing ballot boxes. This election abuse in the

words of historian C. Vann Woodward, "prepared the atmosphere in which apathy and

indifference grew and spread." Understandably, then, many of those in the Populist

Party, after having committed themselves so deeply and lost in a blatant abuse of the

political system, walked bitterly away from the political arena while licking their

wounds.5

By 1902 the People's Party of Texas was but a ghost of its former self. Intra-

party disputes riddled the convention of that year as little could be agreed upon by the

party leadership. The Democrat of McKinney, in Collin County described the

fragmentation of the party in the nominating convention of 1902 held in Fort Worth:

4Ernest William Winkler, ed., Platforms of Political Parties in Texas (Austin: University of Texas Bulletin, no. 53, 1916), 648-651; Barr, Reconstruction to Reform, 161-175.

5Woodward, Origins of the New South, 346; Gould, Progressives and Prohibitionists, 6.

17

"The closing scenes of the convention were characterized by a considerable difference of

opinion, and at times the brethren were far from throwing boquets [sic] at each other . . .

at one point in the proceedings sharp words passed between 'Stumpy' Ashby, he of the

tireless middle-of-the-road faction, and National Chairman Jo A. Parker."6

The remnants of the People's Party leadership in North Texas did little else but

squabble over minuscule points within the platform, which did not take much of a stand

on anything. The Denison Herald noted that

. . .the Texas Populists, what few there are of them will find it rather disagreeable staying in the middle of the road in this kind of weather... there is no such thing as the Populist Party in Texas. There is the Allied People's Party. The new organization has never announced exactly what part of the road it will travel in. This may not be known until some suggestion of fusion comes.7

Combined with the disorganization of the People's Party was a condition of

political lethargy in the state capital. In January, 1901, the twenty-seventh state

legislature opened with little fanfare. The Dallas Morning News reported that, "one of

the old timers said tonight that he had never witnessed such absolute dearth of sensations

and fireworks in the opening of a legislature."8

With no serious third-party threat and with little public attention being focused on

politics, the conservative Democratic Party moved to solidify and protect its primacy in

6The (McKinney) Democrat August 14, 1902. The Democrat, somewhat contrary to its name, supported the Populist movement and much the success of the People's Party in Collin County can be attributed to the efforts of Walter B. Wilson, the paper's editor.

7Denison Herald, quoted in the Dallas Morning News, October 6, 1902.

8Dallas Morning News, January 9, 1901.

18

state politics by legalizing processes designed to reduce the political participation by

many Texans. By this time every southern state except Florida had instituted some form

of suffrage restriction. Texas lagged behind in this action because the relatively small

number of blacks made suffrage restriction less necessary to insure white control and

because many politicians feared raising yet another rallying cry for the Populists in the

state.9

By 1902, however, the menacing third party specter in Texas had been laid

sufficiently to rest. One Texan observed: "Politics can't get up even a simmer of

enthusiasm since the Populists died. Things in this line are so absolutely dead that the

candidates have forgotten how to speak the words, 'horny-handed sons of toil.' The Pops

know how to stir 'em up from tip to bottom and back, but some of the wary candidates of

the old organization know how to out bid 'em."10

What little excitement existed in the twenty-seventh legislature focused on some

questionable dealings of U. S. Senator Joseph Weldon Bailey and the big business

interests in Texas as well as the railroad amendments proposed by ex-Governor James

Stephen Hogg and his faction of loyal reform Democrats. With the word "reform" on the

lips of many in Austin, another group of representatives in the state legislature began a

9Barr, From Reconstruction to Reform, 193-208; Gould, Progressives and Prohibitionists, 7; Woodward, Origins of the New South, 322.

10Dallas Morning News, October 29, 1902.

19

movement toward suffrage restriction. They proposed implementation of the first voting

restrictions in Texas since Reconstruction.11

On January 10,1901 State Senator Asbury Davidson of Dewitt County and State

Representative PattNeff of McClennan County sponsored Senate Joint Resolution

Number 3, a measure to amend the portion of the state constitution that dealt with

election procedures. This resolution sought to require a poll tax payment as a prerequisite

for voting. Immediately, Senator T. F. Meece of Polk County suggested an amendment to

the resolution requiring that all taxes be paid before an individual could vote, but this was

tabled. The proposed poll tax in Texas was mild compared to other states of the South

where all taxes had to be paid and current (in some areas as far back as two years) in

order to vote. Despite the efforts of a few legislators, Davidson and Neff, the bill's

sponsors, resisted the cumulative form of the tax, perhaps because they knew that it

would not pass a popular referendum. Lawmakers in the state capital framed an

amendment that required only the payment of the already existing poll tax to be eligible

to vote. To vote in November, a voter would have to pay the poll tax by February 1 of an

election year.12

For the next month the resolution passed from Senate to House and back again.

The debate over the poll tax was not particularly spirited, but the resolution met with

some hostility in the House. On February 15, 1901, Dr. F. B. Looney of Leon County

"Barr, Reconstruction to Reform, 205.

12Texas Legislature, House Journals, Twenty-seventh Legislature, January 10, February 14,1901.

20

interrupted representative D. W. Phillips of Lampasas, while he spoke of the virtues of

the resolution. Looney asked, "whether the resolution was intended to increase revenue

or reduce the voting population." His concerns were not addressed. One representative

called for an adjournment before the final vote could be called but his request was

"howled down." Another House representative sought to circumvent the intent of the law

by not requiring the presentation of a poll tax receipt before voting. A compromise was

reached that allowed a voter to sign an affidavit stating that he had paid his poll tax but

lost the receipt. A stiff penalty would be levied on any one caught voting without having

paid a poll tax.13

The election "reform" debate in the state legislature in 1901 focused on the poll

tax issue but it was not the only election reform proposed. While most state lawmakers

addressed the issue of election abuse at the level of the voter, another proposed reform

sought to fix the problem on the campaign level. On January 10, 1901, State

Representative J. C. Murrell of Gainesville in Cooke County proposed House Bill

Number 6. Murrell, a Democrat and close associate of United States Senator Joe Bailey,

proposed penalties for the "expenditure of money or other valuable thing to secure the

nomination or election to office any officer of this state or any county or any municipality

thereof or of a Congressman or U. S. Senator." The House sent the bill to its Committee

on Amendments, which reported after a month that the resolution should not be passed.

Politicians debated the law half-heartedly and at the end of March the measure died on

13 House Journals, February 15,1901; Austin Daily Statesman, February 16, 1901.

21

the speaker's table. The Democrats were interested in "reform" that addressed the abuse

of the elections through use of the unsystematic primary system in Texas and voter fraud

and purchasing. The dominant political party of the state sought to eliminate that part of

the electorate that they believed was responsible for the abuses rather than to eliminate

those who participated in the abuse to achieve political success.14

By the end of February the poll tax resolution passed the legislature by a large

majority in the House and unanimously in the Senate. The measure was to be submitted

to a popular referendum at the mid-term elections on November 4,1902. The Democrats

made the passage of the referendum entitled "Vote to Amend Section II Article VI of the

Texas Constitution," the key party platform issue in the upcoming election.15

The Democratic press, which had little opposition after the decline of the People's

Party, began three months before the election to present the poll tax as legitimate reform.

The Dallas Morning News, the paper with the largest circulation in North Texas during

this time, offered a barrage of arguments in favor of the poll tax. It and other papers

argued that every "decent" and loyal Texan ought to support the amendment as a purifier

of the ballot, a state revenue measure, a measure to increase school funding, and as a way

14Texas Legislature House Journals, Twenty-seventh Legislature, January 10, 1901. February-March, 1901. Murrell's relationship to Bailey is confirmed in a memorial given by Murrell attesting to Bailey's integrity and denouncing the charges that Bailey was guilty of violating Texas laws dealing with foreign corporations doing business in Texas.

15Texas Legislature House Journals, Twenty-seventh Legislature, February 20, 1901; Bonham News, October 10,1902; Cooke County Election Returns, County Clerk's Office, Cooke County Courthouse, Gainesville, Texas, November 4,1902; Dallas Morning News, October, 14,1902.

22

to systematize voter registration in Texas. Proponents of the measure denied that they

wanted to disfranchise blacks and poor whites or that it was a property requirement for

voting.

The newspapers worked to allay fear on the part of those who might suspect the

Democrats of having ulterior motives, namely to reduce voting by blacks and Populists,

while encouraging loyal Democrats to come to the polls. Many argued that the first group,

blacks and Populists, although not engaged in the election abuses themselves had created

the need for the abuses. As one Democratic politician in Virginia said, "Cheating at

elections is demoralizing our whole people . . . We are deteriorating as a people, and the

principal cause of our deterioration is this idiotic nonsense about 'preserving the white

civilization' by cheating."16

The Democratic press set out to quell any fears blacks had about the poll tax.

They assured black voters in North Texas that the law was not directed toward them

exclusively nor meant to bring disfranchisement. The intent of the law in the words of

the Dallas Morning News was the "notorious . . . vicious and transitory population, white,

yellow, and black, whose vote is usually a purchasable commodity."17 A resident of

Dallas, G. J. Grasty, in a letter to the Dallas Morning News called upon black voters to

support the poll tax on the grounds that it was admininstered to all voters on an equal

basis, black and white. To those who said that it would disfranchise blacks, Grasty

responded: "it will not disfranchise any honest, self-respecting colored or white man; but

16Woodward, Origins of the New South, 327.

17Dallas Morning News, October 30,1902.

23

if you are a worthless, unreliable, dishonest fellow, with no desire to uplift your race, then

you will and ought to be disfranchised, and I say the same of the same class of white

man."18

Even some in the black leadership urged support for the poll tax. John B. Rayner,

a noted black Populist leader, advocated the passage of the tax because it was not racially

administered, unlike the restrictive primary system that had swept through most of Texas

by the turn of the century. While this viewpoint appeared to bow to the conservative

white Democratic Party, it fell within the lines of the accommodationist policies publicly

advocated by Booker T. Washington. Rayner defended his viewpoint in the Houston

Daily Post. He wrote in December of 1902: "The adoption of the amendment of our

State constitution virtually eliminates the worthless negro from politics and the ballot

box; but its adoption will not disfranchise the negro who respects his citizenship, but will

awake to patriotic activity every negro in Texas whose spark of manhood is still alive."19

The poll tax, it was argued in the Democratically controlled newspapers, offered

black voters full participation in American society and the Texas political system. The

measure was presented as an opprotunity for the black voter, by publicly supporting the

poll tax amendment and by paying his poll tax, to take a major step for his manhood and

for his race. A concerned citizen in a letter "to the colored men," wrote the following:

Now, see what they say about you: The colored race can be depended on to vote for the man who buys their votes, and the colored race can be depended on to vote against the poll tax, so they can sell out their ballots.

18Ibid., November 2, 1902.

19Houston Daily Post, December 4, 1902.

24

Now, is there any real reason why they should say that of you as a class? None whatever. You can or should vote for or against measures as your manhood suggests, and not be led in a body by some ward heeler or politician up to the poll and voted like so many slaves.20

Another argument called for blacks to support the poll tax because they received

equally from the school fund that the poll tax partially funded. "If all were required to

pay the poll tax," one writer said, "the school fund . . . for both white and black schools

could run seven or eight months in the year."21

While the Democratic press attempted to appeal to black voters on equal terms or

at least with some degree of concern toward their rights, it was difficult to hide the club

behind the carrot. At times some individuals assumed a more retributory posture toward

any opposition to the poll tax by blacks, a not altogether new approach to dealing with

black voters. Milton Park, editor of the Populist publication, The Southern Mercury, and

by 1902 Chairman of the Allied People's Party (the revised name of the People's Party)

State Committee, had issued a warning in 1896 to blacks who would offer their votes to

manipulation by Democrats. "The negroes are miserably to be blamed to let the

democrats use them in such a way If the negro does not qualify himself to be a

freeman, and act like one, the American people will become so thoroughly disgusted with

20Dallas Morning News, November 2,1902.

2'Ibid.

25

this sort of thing after a while, that they may rise in their might and take the ballot away

from him. Therefore, let the negro consider and be forewarned."22

Advocates of the poll tax issued the same sort of warning before the amendment

referendum vote in November of 1902. Even J. B. Rayner, the black Populist leader, told

black voters that whites would not tolerate black opposition to the poll tax amendment.

"The negro must also remember," he wrote, "that the Southerner was once his owner, and

that the Southerner is a chivalrous patrician, and is brave and full of resources, loves the

South with a devotion almost fanatic, and will not suffer the South to be ruled by any of

the inferior races."23

The most extreme views appeared in the Houston Daily Post a day before the

election:

The future destiny of the negro in Texas depends on how he will now vote: for if with rank and ingratitude he will not help relieve the ballot box from 144,000 whites, Mexicans, and negroes who have not been assessed, who every year fail to pay even a poll tax for their children let him beware. For mark my word not six months will pass if that amendment is defeated until Texas will make a black and white assessment roll. White children could no longer toil in the fields and shops to educate negroes, but would leave them to receive only such education as the taxes paid by their black parents would afford. This is not a threat, but a prediction from one who believes Negroes of gratitude. Our white race is greatly to blame for corrupt practices in dealing with the negro's race. Reckless and bad men have too trafficked with money for that vote and now they are corrupting the poor white vote. The time has come if ever it will come to appeal to the negro's reason and to make him choose between voting a clean ballot and being clothed with a striped jacket in the penitentiary if he sells his

22Southern Mercury, quoted in Gregg Cantrell and C. Scott Barton "Texas Populists and the Failure of Biracial Politics," Journal of Southern History, 55 (November 1989): 659-692. 691.

23Houston Daily Post, December 4,1902.

26

vote. We must either make him vote an unbought ballot or deport him or slay him for free government can not last with a depraved ballot. From the last alternative human nature revolts. Certainly this is not the time for the Negroe to consider the possible political effect of this amendment from a partisan standpoint, for the education of his children, their protection as well as his own life are involved.24

Newspapers in North Texas focused less than those in Houston or East Texas on

winning the black voter to their side of the poll tax issue because the area had a relatively

small percentage of blacks. The North Texas county in this region with one of the largest

percentage of black votes, Fannin County (10 percent), issued the most direct message to

black voters. The Bonham News warned the population of Fannin County that the

Republican Party was opposed to the amendment because, "it would deprive thousands of

worthless negroes of the voting privilege or force them to pay their pro rata to sustain the

government." Also, there were reports that organized white coercion was stepped up

before the election. In October the Bonham News reported that a group of black cotton-

pickers were "warned to leave . . . or take the consequences." The sheriff told them to

return to work and, "that due attention would be given to the white-cappers,"25

In a letter to his local newspaper C. A. Wheeler, Democratic State Senator of

District 3, which included Lamar and Fannin counties, explained that the desired effect of

24-Ibid., November 3,1902.

25United States Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States taken in the year 1910 Abstract with Supplement for Texas (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1913), 616-617; Bonham News, August 22, October 3, 1902, (italics added). The use of the term "white-cappers" is also documented by Alwyn Barr in Reconstruction to Reform, 207. Black Republican leader R. L. Smith use the term in a letter to Booker T. Washington in reference to the activities of the Ku KIux Klan.

27

the law was to eliminate the "class" of people who did not pay their poll tax and therefore

took from government without giving back. Wheeler believed that "A larger percent of

this delinquent class are ignorant, thriftless negroes." He believed, however, that if the

poll tax passed, "these delinquents who are white men will pay the tax, and also, the more

intelligent and thrifty of the colored voters."26

There is also evidence that racially motivated coercion existed in the less

ethnically diverse Collin County. From Frisco, a small farm community six miles

southwest of the county seat of McKinney, The Dallas Morning News reported that the

citizens were divided on whether or not to allow the black inhabitants of that area to

remain. As The News explained, "considerable excitement prevail [ed] [there] on account

of race feeling." The paper found that a group of about thirty citizens had informed the

blacks of the town that they would have to leave. A county petition with about twelve

signatures asked them to stay but about "100 or more sa[id] they will run them out and a

majority . . . are armed." Less than a week later some citizens of Frisco assured their

black neighbors in the McKinney Democrat that they "had no trouble with Negroes nor

do they intend to. We want the negro, for we can get no other help, and will protect him

as long as he stays in his place."27

Critical to understanding the voting in the North Texas region during the early

years of the twentieth century is the fact that not only were there few blacks in North

26Texas Legislature, Members of the Legislature of the State of Texas from 1846 to 1939 (Austin: Texas State Legislature, 1939). Bonham News, October 17,1902.

'"Dallas Morning News, September 23, 1902; The (McKinney) Democrat, September 29, 1902.

28

Texas but those who were there had stopped participating in politics. By the turn of the

century black participation in politics had declined significantly since 1896. In that

election, competition for black votes had forced Democrats, Republicans, and Populist

alike to approach the group in a somewhat more amicable mood, but as the third party

threat to conservative white Democratic rule began to disintegrate, so did the political

courtship and therefore more equal treatment of blacks. The white primary, the method

of choosing candidates in county primaries with the strict party test of being white and

Democratic, reduced competition for black votes and increasing as the turn of the century

approached competition for black votes was replaced with verbal and physical coercion.28

The Sherman Democrat reported on the reduction in black voter participation

before the 1902 election. On October 18 the paper declared that there was "little interests

among colored voters," and that out of 500 eligible voters only 60 had registered. On

October 22, 1902 the paper wrote, "True, only about 100 negroes have registered but they

can come in and register on the last day or two." This appears to have been a call to the

white citizens in Grayson County to remember to register for the upcoming election. By

October 30, when registration closed, a total of 284 black had registered for the election.

This represented a drop from the previous election when 349 blacks voted and attests to

28Jack Abramowitz "The Negro in the Populist Movement," Journal of Negro History 28 (July 1953): 257-289; Cantrell and Barton "Texas Populists and the Failure of Biracial Politics," 690; Worth Robert Miller "Building a Progressive Coalition in Texas: The Populist-Reform Democrat Rapprochement, 1900-1907," Journal of Southern History 52 (May 1986): 163-182.

29

the extremely low participation of eligible black voters the number of whom recorded in

Grayson according to U. S. Census records, was around 1,206 in 1900.29

Because of the low percentage of blacks living in North Texas and their lack of

political participation, advocates for the poll tax directed their arguments to that segment

of the population with a history of unpredictability and deviation from the Democratic

Party ~ the ex-Populists or at the least those sympathetic to the movement. For the

conservative Democratic politicians the approach was simple: Convince long time loyal

Democrats to come to the polls to support the poll tax as a major part of the party

platform and persuade those members of the party who had recently returned that the poll

tax was not intended to disfranchise them or eliminate the possibility of political dissent

in the future. In order to achieve the latter, supporters of the amendment fashioned their

campaign as one meant to bring legitimate election reform and increase state revenue,

making it the duty of every voter registered as a Democrat to vote in favor of the poll tax.

The overwhelming weight of the argument in favor of the poll tax rested on the

idea that it constituted legitimate election reform. Its advocates said that the measure was

intended to halt "the fraud.. .often perpetrated by repeaters, imported voters, vote buyers,

and other brokers in corrupt politics." Of course, Democrats spoke nothing of the fact

that much of the earlier election abuses had been perpetrated by themselves. Those who

supported this new election reform portrayed themselves as patriotic defenders who

29Sherman Democrat, October 22, 30, 1902. Bureau of the Census, Abstract of the Thirteenth Census with Supplement for Texas, 618-619.

30

believed in, "guarding the ballot box."30 They argued that enforcement of the poll tax

would make it nearly impossible to purchase votes. They reasoned:

It makes it difficult and decidedly risky to buy the purchasable gangs that have been so easily bought.... In the first case they must be bought and paid for several months before the election. No sensible person would be willing to buy a purchasable voter and wait so long for an unreliable fellow of the kind to deliver the goods.31

In conjunction with presenting the poll tax as election reform, the Democratic

press stressed that every Democrat had an obligation to support it. This was not only an

appeal to those who had never strayed from the party but also to those who had recently

returned, such as the many ex-Populists who had by this time to the Democratic Party.

The Populist Party no longer offered any promise, and the Democratic organizations of

many counties required strict party tests. If those who had supported the People's Party

in the late 1890s still had an interest in politics or simply wanted to vote a meaningful

ballot by 1902, they had to participate and vote within the Democratic Party.32

The Democratic platform of 1902 supported the poll tax, and it was openly

advocated by the Democratic candidate for governor, Colonel S. W. T. Lanham.

Democrats stressed the importance of total support of the party's candidates and platform.

A Dallas Morning News editorial read: "According to a generally accepted party rule

every Democrat is bound to vote for the poll tax amendment, just as he is bound in party

30Dallas Morning News, September 28,1902.

3'Ibid., October 25, 1902.

32Miller, "Building a Progressive Coalition," 166.

31

fealty to vote for Col. Lanham and other nominees." It continued: "The member who

asserts his right to reject this plank or that plank and to insert other planks of his own

choice is set down as a heretic."33

In order to make the poll tax measure especially difficult to oppose, state

legislators stressed the tie of the poll tax to the state school fund. Opposing the poll tax,

then, was equivalent to opposing free public schools. In a letter published in many North

Texas newspapers, John H. Reagan, ex-Confederate and "Redeemer" who first sponsored

a proposal for a poll tax in the Constitutional Convention of 1875, explained to the

public the need for a poll tax as "just and necessary." Out of the $1.50 poll tax

requirement one dollar of the tax was to go to the state public school fund and fifty cents

to the general revenue fund. This, Reagan asserted, was not being done to the detriment

of anyone. He alerted the North Texas public to the "flagrant and manifest injustice to

the school fund, to the State revenue and to the honest taxpayers," done by those who

failed to pay the existing poll tax, which before 1902 was not a requirement for voting.

He explained how much tax revenue was lost to non-payment of the poll tax and appealed

to the public's "common honesty, duty to the public and justice to the good people" to

vote in favor of the amendment.35

The campaign for support of the poll tax amendment also engaged the most

divisive issue in the South. The Democrats sought to bring those with a somewhat

33Winkler, ed., Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, 296, 333, 382, 399; Dallas Morning News, October 14, 1902.

35Sherman Daily Register, September 30,1902.

32

tenuous commitment to the party closer to the fold by urging the white citizenry to turn

their back on black voters once and for all. The movement to have the poor white farmer

finally step out of the "ditch" inhabited by both black and white farmers, at least in spirit,

was under way in earnest by the turn of the century in Texas. Advocates of the poll tax

reasoned: "That many of the poll-tax evaders are colored does not shift the responsibility

from the white voter; the latter makes the laws and if they prove ineffectual, the burden

lies with him."36

The most direct and polarizing use of race in advocating the poll tax came from

those whose had been hurt by campaign abuses. In 1898 E. G. Senter, campaign

manager for the Hogg-endorsed gubernatorial candidate Martin M. Crane, had made

advances to Populists for support. E. M. House, the master of Texas campaign

manipulation, persuaded his political confidant, Joe Bailey, to endorse another North

Texan to undermine Crane's regional appeal and managed to orchestrate early primaries

in various counties to insure the nomination of his own candidate, Joseph D. Sayers.

Senter believed that he and Crane had been the first victims of intra-party election abuses

like those used against the Populists by the Democrats in 1896.37 After a somewhat

patronizing statement expounding the virtues of Populism, Senter argued that ex-

36The reference to the "ditch" comes from a well known quote used by Woodward, Origins of the New South, 257, and was published in the Dallas Morning News, August 18, 1892. In reference to the common interests of both black and white farmers the quote read, "They are in a ditch just like we are." Dallas Morning News, October 20,1902.

37Barr, Reconstruction to Reform, 211-215; Miller, "Building a Progressive Coalition," 168.

33

Populists in 1902, "would instinctively champion any movement the tendency of which

must be to increase the potentiality of reason and to diminish the strength of baser

influences in politics." A more important effect of the poll tax in Senter's mind was

explained in the Dallas Southern Mercury in October 1902:

. . . . a more weighty reason why the poll tax amendment should be adopted is that it means the elimination of the race issue in politics and until that comes no other issue will ever be seriously and attentively considered in the South . . . . Texas can not afford to lag behind in this movement. If there be any populist who fears that his party will be a sufferer by the withdrawal of the negro from politics let them try to recall when and where the negro ever gave aid or encouragement to the populist cause.38

Although North Texas contained a relatively small number of blacks it still was

part of the South and its communities reflected southern attitudes. And while most

advocates of the poll tax downplayed the race issue as its primary intent, local utterances

illustrate that it was on many minds at that time. J. W. Riggins, mayor of Waco, hinted

at the widespread though seldom published intent of the amendment. He wrote in letter

to the editor of The Houston Daily Post: "The advocates of the poll tax amendment will

give it out that his is an attempt to get rid of 'Mr. Nigger.' But while this is what they

claim its operative real effect will be to destroy the vote of a very large, respectable,

valuable and intelligent class of people."39

While advocacy of the poll tax never entered into the Allied People's Party

platform in 1902 the leaders of the party did not oppose the amendment. Indeed, the

38Southern Mercury reprinted in the Houston Daily Post, October 31,1902.

39Houston Daily Post, November 3,1902.

34

Populist platform had vacilated from warm to hot to cool in relation to the issue of

franchise. The 1892 platform called for "fair elections and an honest count of the votes."

In 1894 the platform demanded "a free vote and an honest count." In 1896, when the

political courtship of blacks from both Democrats and Populists had reached its peak, the

People's Party platform called for "a free vote by every qualified elector without

reference to nationality, and an honest count." The Populists in 1898, in anticipation of

future retributive measures from their conservative political foes, in their state platform

demanded, "that no citizen of Texas be disfranchised in local elections because he is not a

freeholder, and we demand a purity at the ballot box, a free ballot, and a fair count." By

1900, however, any reference to elections in the party platform was stricken. The

Populist leadership, while not actively advocating a poll tax measure, at the very least

acquiesced to it and showed the Democrats by 1902 that they were receptive to

disfranchisement on a limited scale.40

Although the Populist leadership yielded their earlier position on the franchise

issue, it appears that in areas of North Texas where Populism flourished some voters

openly denounced the potential infringement on their vote. In the McKinney Democrat, a

voter from Farmersville in Collin County, a precinct that returned majorities for the all

Populist gubernatorial candidates from 1892 to 1898, warned "all lovers of liberty to

beware him who would abridge the right of franchise." He went on to explain that the

amendment would severely reduce the electorate and allow it to be easily controlled by

40Winkler, ed., Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, 296, 333, 382, 399.

35

the conservative interests of the state. He reasoned that "the fewer the participants in the

act of governing the nearer the government is to a despotism."41

Milton Park, State Chairman of the Populist Party and editor of the Dallas

Southern Mercury, despite his aforementioned warning to black voters in Texas and his

apprehension about the loyalty of the black vote and its use in politics to any party in

Texas, realized and feared the effect of a poll tax on the poor white farmers, who

comprised the heart of the Populist Party. During and after the election of 1896 the

People's Party in Texas split into two discernible factions. The "middle of the roaders"

desired to achieve political goals through continued third party action and candidates.

The "fusionists" faction of the Populist Party advocated seeking political goals within the

traditional political structure. The "fusionists," represented by James "Cyclone" Davis,

whose popularity in Texas waned after the election of 1896, and even "middle-of-the-

roader" "Stump" Ashby openly endorsed the poll tax amendment, quite possibly because

these two politicians sought their future political fortunes within the Democratic Party

after 1902. Many of the "middle of the roaders," represented by the uncompromising

Milton Park, had little use or patience for the "fusionists" whom they believed had sold

the party out and were political opportunists who had used the People's Party as merely a

vehicle for their own political gain.42

41 The (McKinney) Democrat, August 7,1902. Collin County Election Returns, County Clerk's Office, Department of Elections, Collin County Courthouse Annex, November 8,1892; November 6,1894; November 3,1896, November 8,1898 (See Appendix I).

42Martin, The People's Party in Texas, 113-140; Miller, "Building a Progressive Coaltion," 174.

36

Park, in late October of 1902, issued his personal opposition to the poll tax in a

circular issued by the Dallas Headquarters of the Populist Party. He warned against

acquiescence on the poll tax amendment and began his statement by delivering a

statement from Abraham Lincoln. "I bid the laboring people beware of surrendering a

power which they already have, and which, when surrendered, will close the door of

advancement to them and fix new disabilities upon them till all liberty will be lost," Park

then wrote:

Lincoln saw the coming evil, and with prophetic eyes he saw what would result. His prophecy is now being fulfilled. On Tuesday next, the laboring people will be called upon to vote for an amendment to our Constitution, which, if carried out, will rob them of their liberties at the ballot box. Every laboring man who loves liberty, who believes in freedom of suffrage, who prizes his rights of citizenship should vote against the poll tax amendment.43

Despite the fact that most newspapers in North Texas, except The Democrat in

McKinney, openly endorsed the poll tax amendment, opposition was expressed in the

form of letters from their readers. The most common opposition saw the poll tax as an

affront to the basic political rights of every American and predicted that the amendment

was but the first step in line of future franchise restrictions including property

requirements.

Joseph Proebstie, General Organizer of the American Federation of Labor, wrote

that the amendment "[struck] at the root of fundamental principle in our form of

government," majority rule. He called on voters in North Texas to "resent by their vote . .

43 Key, Southern Politics, 12.

37

. this Trojan horse which if it enters the ranks of liberty loving people of this county will

destroy the great aim of our constitution ~ personal liberty."44

Another concerned citizen also envisioned the poll tax as a possible watershed for

future voting qualification, including property qualifications. In a letter to The Dallas

Morning News he wrote:

I know it is denied that the poll tax amendment is a property qualification, but if this amendment should carry is it not a preface to a volume whose reading will be property qualification? The poll tax amendment strikes at the very root of fundamental principle in democratic form of government -- equal rights to all, special privileges to none ~ and should be opposed by every voter, every citizen who believes in democratic or republican form of government.45

In a passionate letter to the editor of The Dallas Morning News, J. L. Caldwell

denounced the poll tax and called on fellow citizens who were not afraid of "freedom...

to stand up against attempted restrictions of manhood suffrage." Like the Populists less

than a decade earlier, Caldwell appealed to those who valued the Jeffersonian ideals of

government. He reasoned that men guilty of numerous crimes who paid their poll tax

would not lose their suffrage but that a poor hard working farmer for failure to pay a poll

tax would be disfranchised. He wrote: "Instead, Mr. Editor, of disfranchising the

delinquent why not unsex him and stop his breed? It would be a merciful act compared

to depriving him of his sovereignty."46

44Houston Daily Post, November 2, 1902.

43Dallas Morning News, October 26, 1902.

46Ibid., October 24,1902.

38

Supporters of the poll tax answered the dissenting arguments by seeking to

reassure those who opposed that the poll tax amendment was not a tool to be used to

disfranchise. To the protests of those in North Texas who opposed the amendment,

advocates played upon the strong sense of Texas pride and patriotism found in the state.

The following argument in the Dallas Morning News became nearly a generic statement.

. . .it will tend to improve the public schools and to extend the school term . . . exclude from the ballot box a worthless, purchasable and floating element, made up largely of tramps and tools, who have done so much to disgrace certain of our elections. These considerations should move all patriotic and fair-minded Texans to stand up and be counted for the amendment.47

It appears that most of those who favored Populism and opposed the poll tax

amendment did not have a forum in which to express their views adequately. Although

local newspapers carried letters to the editor that opposed the amendment, it is quite

apparent that the lion's share of the space went to insure that the poll tax received strong

support. With the Populist party organization disintegrating, the number of local Populist

oriented newspapers dropped, as well. The Southern Mercury and the Populist leadership

at this time had shown that while they would not openly campaign in favor of the poll tax,

they at least would not rigorously oppose it. With the decline in the Populist movement,

a drop in editorial, social, and political representation of the typical Populist supporter

also occurred. The "voiceless millions of the American society" were once again without

an interpreter. North Texas election returns indicate, however, that the ex-Populists who

continued to participate in politics in the first decade of the twentieth century did wield

47Ibid., October 25,1902.

39

once again their traditional weapon of dissent to oppose measures which they believed

ran counter to their interests, the restriction of their franchise. They saw this amendment

as yet another way in which the conservative Democratic Party sought to lay them and

their issues prostrate before the political process and a way to "collect vengeance of

which [the poll tax amendment] loudly smack[ed]."48

48See Appendix V; Lawrence Goodwyn The Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), xx; Dallas Morning News, October 24,1902.

CHAPTER 3

THE POLL TAX AND THE

POPULIST MIND

Historian Worth Robert Miller presents compelling evidence that many Texans

who supported Populism in the 1890s returned to the Democratic fold by or during the

first decade of the twentieth century. When they returned, Miller argues, they carried

with them the same reform mind set that had pulled them away from the conservative

Democratic Party in the early 1890s. A reform faction of the Democratic party offered a

carrot to the old third-party dissenters in the form of railroad regulation amendments

authored by the reform Democrat James Stephen Hogg, Texas governor from 1891 to

1895 who had turned campaign strategist by 1900. Another faction of Democrats

supporting Hogg's legislation devised a system of election reforms designed to curb the

election techniques of politicians such as Joseph Bailey, a renowned campaign strategist

who became U. S. Senator in 1901. These same techniques — voter fraud, primary

abuse, buying of votes, and ballot-box stuffing — used by the Democrats against the

Populists less than five years earlier to secure Democratic power in the state were at this

time being used within the party against fellow Democrats. Miller contends that most

Populists had returned to the Democratic Party by 1902 and did so in order to support the

railroad reforms of Hogg and the election reforms of a Hogg faction, which included the

poll tax. This argument concludes that these same ex-Populists finally realized the

41

futility of reform through third party politics and pragmatically rejoined the old party as

reform Democrats.1

In The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment

of the One-Party South, J. Morgan Kousser asserts that, although "hard-core" Populists in

1902 opposed the poll tax in greater numbers than did other Texans, their numbers were

too small to make a difference. The majority of those who had supported the People's

Party in Texas in the 1890s either had returned to the dominant Democratic Party of the

state by 1902 or, as most did, simply removed themselves from the political process.

Passage of the poll tax amendment, this argument contends, did not result from a massive

groundswell of reform sentiment but occurred instead because of political apathy and the

lack of any real opposition. Kousser states that the poll tax in the Lone Star State was

"the quiet climax of a long drive by a few men, a drive that succeeded when the

opposition became dormant." The basis of Kousser's argument is that the "normal"

Populists, those that entered the People's Party in Texas in the 1890s and who stayed only

as long as the party held some degree of promise and respectability, were quick to re-enter

the Democratic Party as loyal supporters of the candidates and platform of 1902.2

While these interpretations of the movement toward a poll tax appear viable, their

usefulness in describing all parts of Texas is questionable. No study of Texas employs a

'Worth Robert Miller "Building a Progressive Coalition in Texas: The Populist-Reform Democrat Rapprochement, 1900-1907," Journal of Southern History 52 (May 1986), 163-182.

2J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1974), 200.

42

precinct-level analysis of counties where Populism and opposition to the poll tax

flourished as in North Texas. All research has been based on county-wide totals or

aggregate state totals. While the arguments presented by Miller and Kousser contain

parts that are consistent with the historical reality, their generalizations are in need of

scrutiny and perhaps adjustment. There is significant political, social, and economic

diversity within Texas counties that should not be overlooked.

Miller's argument rests on the assumption that Populism followed the logical

progression of a reform-minded movement with a definite ideology moving through

political channels and becoming more politically mature with the passage of time. By

1900 old Populists sought legislative action for their interests within the established

political mainstream, which had by this time "caught up" with Populism's progressive

philosophy. Miller thus assumes that the Populists' platform and their movement were

based on obvious and real grievances and that the desire of redress for these grievances

crystallized into a reform movement.3

Kousser's argument is founded in the interpretation of "normal" Populists. He

asserts that "normal" Populists were actually Democrats, who probably had a difficult

time straying from their traditional party and re-entered the party as soon as third party

politics proved fruitless. Those who remained loyal to Populism at any cost are described

as "hard-core" Populists. The interpretation of "normal" Populists is derived essentially

from studying the leadership and its rhetoric. In reality the "hard-core" Populists were the

grass root supporters of the Party and comprised the greatest percentage of its

3MilIer, "Building a Progressive Coalition," 168-169.

43

membership. The millions of farmers who joined the Populist ranks and were swept up

by the emotional wave of the movement have received little attention because they were

considered to be "abnormal."4

These views of the Populists give them and their movement credit for more

political and social sophistication than they actually had. While some of the Populists'

platform planks and rhetoric attacked very real problems experienced by farmers and

labor, much of the movement was a battle against enemies to agrarianism that were more

perceived than real. Many historians agree that the agrarian movement in the 1890s was a

"gut reaction" to economic hardship. This reaction materialized in attacks on amorphous

interests that ran counter to the interests of Populists, i. e., the money interests and

monopolistic power. Once historians move beyond the party leadership, however, the

movement appears much less logical and reform minded and more conspiracy sensitive

and self-centered. This latter view eliminates much of the nostalgia surrounding the

Populist movement, and it makes considerably more sense than the traditional

interpretation.5

While much of this Populist psyche has been hinted at by historians, very little

exploration into this very real mind set has been done, because historians have had no

substantial insight into the Populist mind except through that of the party leadership. The

Populist platform and its creators and the Populist newspapers have been studied

4Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics, 200-205.

5Roscoe Martin, The People's Party in Texas: A Study in Third-Party Politics (Austin: University of Texas, 1933), 11-29; James Turner "Understanding the Populists,' Journal of American History 67 (September 1980): 354-373.

44

extensively to arrive at the definition of a movement that appears much more organized

and articulate than it could have possibly been. While Populist leaders were known to

give high-minded speeches expounding the agrarians ideals of the Jeffersonian tradition

and presenting their movement as the protector of agrarian life in America, they also

dipped in the demagogue's bag of political charges and made emotional appeals that rang

well in the ears of their Populist constituency. This confluence of isolation and economic

distress was also responsible for the religiousity and emotionalism of the movement.6

C. Vann Woodward addressed the problem of what the Populist leaders said and

what they actually believed. The Populist leadership, he stressed, were not alone in their

exploitation of emotion, hate, and fear in the late nineteenth century. More importantly,

Woodward explained, although the Populist leaders may not have completely believed

everything they spoke or wrote, the rank-and-file Populists were in an economic

condition and state of mind to accept the more irrational aspects of the movement as

rational explanations of their failures and justification for their cause.7

6Norman Pollack The Populist Mind (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs -Merrill Company, Inc., 1967). The book is an excellent source of Populist ideology and rhetoric. The author holds to the ideologically pure interpretation of the movement, however. James H. "Cyclone" Davis, probably the most articulate orator and Populist politician from Texas based much of his argument in support of the People's Party and its platform on his interpretation of Jeffersonian principles. 27-29,203-226. Robert C. McMath Jr., "Populist Base Communities: the Evangelical Roots of Farm Protest in Texas," Locus-. An Historical Journal of Regional Perspectives 1 (Fall 1988): 53-63. In this artlicle McMath explores the religious content and fervor associated with the Populist movment as it evolved from the Farmers' Alliance.

7C. Vann Woodward, The Burden of Southern History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960), 141 -166.

45

The scholarship of this period reveals how little the Populist leadership actually

practiced or believed their own words. The leaders in the movement used the art of

oratory and the "quick fix" of emotional appeal to attract large audiences quickly. The

farmers of the third party movement heard much of what they wanted to hear whether or

not the arguments or the solutions to their problems made much sense. The followers in

this movement, however, undoubtedly accepted and held to the illogical and emotional

appeals because they were easier to understand and required less personal responsibility

of the farmers themselves. The pervading economic conditions of Texas farmers coupled

with their general isolation, characteristic of strong Populist precincts, created fertile

ground for a psychological state that included feelings of powerlessness and

insignificance.8

The general psychological traits of the farmers who flocked to the movement have

been described by C. Vann Woodward as, "rural provinciality, an ominous credulity, and

an obsessive fascination with conspiracy." He went on to describe many of the illogical

perceptions of the Populist movement, including an obsession with the currency issue, a

delusion-like conception of the agrarian myth, and a coming Golden Age. Woodward

also addressed in passing the idea that "there is more than a fortuitous connection

between regional proneness to Populism and isolationism."9

8Norman Pollack, The Populist Mind. Note various speeches and essays by Populist leaders reprinted in this work. Hicks, The Populist Revolt, 205-301; Woodward, Burden of Southern History, 159-161; Turner, "Understanding the Populists," 357.

9Woodward, "The Populist Heritage and the Intellectual," 154, 159,157.

46

Historian, James Turner, expanded this description of the typical Populist

supporter by illustrating the social and political isolation that characterized most

supporters of the People's Party in Texas. Turner's research examines the Populist mind

and allows the historian insight into the thinking of a farmer in the late nineteenth century

and early twentieth century. While isolation fostered distrust among the fanners in the

People's Party, it also fostered a group of people uneducated in the contemporary social

and political life of the era, leading to a general confusion which, "encouraged the

Populist tendency to rely on scapegoats and panaceas." To the Populists, "the

'plutocracy,' the 'pirates,' of the Money Power, lay behind all the farmer's troubles."10

Turner concluded:

Much of the Populist rhetoric . . . suggests that third-party men felt themselves at sea in the society in which they lived. Bewilderment appears to have bred incessant worry that more sophisticated men preyed on their naivete. Populists saw themselves as cruelly hoodwinked for years . . . A greedy plutocracy controlled the government and economy of Texas and the nation, and the money kings remained secure in their high places through their successes in duping the citizenry.11

Thus many assumptions by traditional historians about Populist positions on

issues rests on what the party's leaders advocated. Most of the Populist leaders, including

those from North Texas, supported the poll tax amendment. In the newspapers they

supported the amendment as a reform measure to eliminate the election fraud that had

ravaged their party and led to the disintegration of their movement; however, rank-and-

file Populists in North Texas did not necessarily heed or believe this propaganda. Fresh

10Turaer "Understanding the Populists," 368.

"Ibid, 369.

47

with the sting of the Democrats' salt in their eyes, most Populists would not have

supported a law that set out to fix the problem of election fraud on one level ~ those

being bought ~ and ignore the foundation of the fraud on another level ~ those doing the

buying. To a group with little trust in authority and politics in general, the idea that this

new tax measure was, "an offer of fair play," would seem to them more a joke, if it were

not so blatant an attack on the only weapon they had traditionally been able wield against

their adversaries ~ their vote.12

The election returns from five counties in north-central Texas - Collin, Cooke,

Denton, Fannin, and Grayson -- reveal information that runs counter to the idea that most

Populists returned to state politics as reform Democrats. The fact is that after 1896 most

simply avoided politics altogether. The use of precinct-level voting returns also shows

that of the many former Texas Populists who returned to the Democratic party, probably

for lack of a viable Populist platform, candidate, or organization, and due to more

stringent tests for primary participation, many deviated once again from the political

mainstream and opposed the poll tax amendment in 1902. Populists who returned to the

Democratic Party did so, but with a tenuous loyalty, and used a sort of line-item

opposition to the party's platform. Most Populists of North Texas, then, did not support

the measure as part of a state election reform movement and saw it as yet another

example of the old political system stabbing them in the back.

The same paranoia that fueled the rise of the People's Party in Texas in the 1890s

sparked resistance to a law Populists believed exploited their political naivete and would

12 Miller, "Building a Progressive Coalition," 172-173.

48

ultimately disfranchise them. Despite a barrage of Democratic propaganda expounding

the virtues of the poll tax law and the obligation of every "upstanding" citizen to support

it, the rank-and-file Populists in North Texas, even if they had returned to the Democratic

Party, resisted and opposed the attack upon their franchise.

The use of precinct level studies in the North Texas region reveals that opposition

to the poll tax, like Populism, blossomed in areas of poorer agricultural production, but

also like Populism, was not limited to them. The opposition to the poll tax resembles

very much the sources of strength for the People's party in Texas. The opposition was

diverse and took the form in many areas of a moral crusade against the old conservative

politics of the Gilded Age. The general isolation of the former Populist precincts together

with a blast of economic duress like the one that instigated the grass roots Populist

movement in 1892 also spurred the opposition to the poll tax referendum in 1902. Most

of this opposition activity, however, is obscured without the advantage of precinct-level

analysis and intensive local and regional studies.

The most significant political development after 1896 was the decline in political

participation by many Texans not just those who supported the Peoples's Party. More

stringent party tests and use of primary systems had swept through most of North Texas

by this time. Votes in the Populist precincts, however, declined more acutely than those

in predominantly Democratic areas. Table I shows the general decline in voter

participation in North Texas by using aggregate county totals from 1896-1902. It is

obvious that after the peak of political interest in the election of 1896 many Texans,

49

including those in North Texas, could not muster the enthusiasm they had previously had

for politics.13

Table I North Texas County-Wide Totals,

1896-1902 (% Increase Compared to 1896)

County 1896 1898 % Inc 1900 % Inc 1902 % Inc

Collin 9568 5126 -46% 7022 -27% 3783 -60%

Cooke 5270 2522 -52% 3806 -28% 2187 -59%

Denton 5440 2213 -59% 4182 -23% 2715 -50%

Fannin 9673 5303 -45% 7766 -20% 6108 -37%

Grayson 10173 4585 -55% 9047 -11% 5357 -47%

Totals 40124 19749 -51% 31823 -21% 20150 -50%

As an additional demonstration of this phenonemon, Table II shows the decline in

Populist precincts in Cooke County in presidential elections from 1896 to 1904. The vote

county-wide only declined by 27 percent from 1896 to 1900 and by 36 percent from 1900

to 1904. In general, Populists in Cooke County, however, displayed a more pronounced

disinterest than other voters. Strongly Populist precincts, defined as those that cast a

higher than average vote in 1894 for the Populist candidate for governor, Thomas L.

13Alwyn Barr Reconstruction to Reform: Texas Politics 1876 -1906 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971). 201. Walter L. Buenger, "From Southern to Texan: Northeast Texas, 1890-1930," Unpublished manuscript provided by author, 67-68. It must be remembered that there is a pattern of flucuation between gubernatorial elections during presidential election years and mid-term elections. Elections during presidential election years traditionally received more interests and therefore more participation.

50

Nugent, showed a much greater decline in the percentage of votes cast than did the county

as a whole. It is obvious that the voters who supported the Populist Party in 1894 and

1896 saw no real solution to their plight within the political process.14

Table II Populist Precinct Totals in Cooke County

Presidential Elections, 1896-1904 (% Increase Compared to 1896)

Populist Precincts (%Pop in '94)

1896 1900 %Inc 1904 %Inc

COUNTY-WIDE TOTALS 5228 3814 -27% 2437 -53%

POPULIST TOTALS 1035 573 -45% 337 -67%

Burton School House (65%) 157 82 -48% 47 -70%

Mount Springs (79%) 91 42 -54% 31 -66%

Burn's City (67%) 162 70 -57% 48 -70%

Bulcher (78%) 169 79 -53% 30 -82%

Woodbine (55%) 185 142 -23% 84 -55%

Bloomfield (69%) 208 117 -44% 79 -62%

Warren's Bend (59%)* 63 41 -35% 18 -71%

14Cooke County Election Returns, 1892-1906, County Clerk's Office, County Courthouse, Gainesville, Texas (See Appendix II). Hereafter any reference to Cooke County election returns will be taken from these records unless otherwise noted. The Populist precincts were determined by taking the percentages from the 1894 gubernatorial election. This offers the truest degree of Populist support because this election predates the fusion movement of 1896. The election of 1896 is used for Warren's Bend because it exhibited strong Populist leanings after this election but did not appear in election records in 1894.

51

Table III, a compilation of the Populist precinct totals in the gubernatorial races

from 1896 to 1902, helps pinpoint when the greatest Populist exodus from the polls

occurred. Although the decline of the Populist precincts in Cooke County from 1896 to

1898 appears high at 55 percent, it is in line with the general decline in voter interest

county wide. Cooke County voting as a whole dropped 52 percent. Although a decline in

votes from presidential elections to gubernatorial elections is normal this percentage

appears rather excessive due to the vast political participation in 1896.

Table III Populist Precinct Totals for Cooke County

Gubernatorial Elections, 1896-1902 (% Increase compared to 1896)

Populist Precincts 1896 1898 %Inc 1900 Inc% 1902 %Inc

COUNTY-WIDE TOTALS

5270 2522 -52% 3806 -28% 2187 -59%

POPULIST TOTALS 1371 620 -55% 748 -45% 403 -71%

Burden School House (65%)

156 127 -19% 83 -47% 43 -72%

Mount Springs (79%) 92 58 -37% 42 -54% 23 -75%

Burn's City (67%) 169 80 -53% 57 -66% 49 -71%

Live Oak (40%) 55 39 -29% 47 -15% 21 -62%

Marysville (41%) 210 100 -52% 138 -34% 75 -64%

Bulcher (78%) 171 50 -71% 77 -55% 41 -76%

Woodbine (55%) 182 61 -66% 143 -21% 70 -62%

Bloomfield (69%) 210 85 -60% 119 -43% 61 -71%

Warren's Bend (59%)

126 20 -84% 42 -67% 20 -84%

52

What is more significant, however, is the comparison between the 1898

gubernatorial election and the 1900 election, which involved national as well as state

contests. While as a whole the vote totals for Cooke County increased by 28 percent

compared to 1896, Populist area voting only rebounded by 10 percent. It appears that

although Democrats in the county sat out the gubernatorial race of 1898, many returned to

the polls in 1900 as the county as a whole voted at 72 percent of what it had in the

previous presidential election. Populists, however, with the election abuses of the 1896

election fresh in their minds remained cool to politics and elected not to participate. This

same phenomenon occurred in the other counties of North Texas, as well.

It is also significant that the majority of the Populist precincts lay in the outermost

regions of Cooke County away from the county seat of Gainseville. Map I page shows

that most are also located in the geographic region of the county known as the Cross

Timbers. This region is noted for its poor farm land and propensity for agricultural

poverty. This same region has been documented by historian Roscoe Martin as a hotbed

of Populist sentiment. The agricultural deprivation of the Cross Timbers stood in stark

contrast to the prosperity of the geographic region adjacent to it, the Grand Prairie. In this

region Populism gained very little, and more Democrats remained loyal to the party and

active in politics.15

In 1894 Lieutenant Governor (and 1898 gubernatorial candidate) Martin M. Crane

noted the contrast between the two regions within Cooke County. Although Crane and

1'Martin, The People's Party in Texas, 60-67.

Map I Cooke County

Populist Precincts

53

Cross Timbers Region Grand Prairie Region

• County Seat • Populist Precinct

Warren's Bend

Maxysville

Gamseville • Woodbine

Bum's City

Bloomfidd Live Oak

DENTON COUNTY COLLIN COUNTY

t

N

54

his campaign manager, E. G. Senter, would court Populist support by 1898, in 1894 they

held a considerible amount of disdain for the fledgling agrarian movement. He stated in a

speech in Gainseville that, "I am proud that most Democrats live in the prairie and are

prosperous. The Cross Timbers are full of Populists."16 Significantly, the same farmers

who experienced the economic distress and the geographic isolation that led them to the

Populist banner in the 1890s, would oppose the poll tax referendum in higher percentages

than the rest of the county.17

Denton County, due south of Cooke County, exhibited some of the same political

behavior as Cooke. This is due primarily to the Cross Timbers region that occupies the

central region of the county and divides the county seat (see Map II). Like their neighbors

to the north the farmers in Denton County who lived in the Cross Timbers region flocked

in greater numbers to the People's Party than those in the more affluent Grand Prairie

region. The Populists in Denton County showed the same decline in political activity, as

well.18

Table IV , a compilation of the precinct totals from 1896 to 1902, reveals that, as

in Cooke County, political participation in Denton County fell considerably. Election

16The Gainesville Signal, Oct. 31, 1894, quoted in Martin, The People's Party in Texas, 65.

17It was the Democrat Martin M. Crane's campaign manager, E. G. Senter, who approached the Populist for support in 1898 and by 1902 supported use of a poll tax and a systematized primary because he believed that he and his candidate had been victims of the same Democratic election abuses used against the Populists in 1896.

18Denton County Election Returns, 1892-1908, County Clerk's Office, Carroll Courts Building, Denton, Texas (See Appendix III). Hereafter any reference to Denton elections returns will be taken from these records, unless otherwise noted.

55

MaplI Denton County

Populist Precincts

• Cross Timbers Region Grand Prairie Region

• County Seat • Populist Precinct

COOKE COUNTY

Willow Springs

Mustang Bolivar

Demon

Waketon

Lafce School House

TARRANT COUNTY DALLAS COUNTY

t

N

56

returns show that the overall vote for the county dropped an average of 59 percent, the

most of any county in North Texas, and that the Populist precincts were in line with this

number at 57 percent. Denton's political decline differed from Cooke County in that the

county as a whole abstained from politics after 1896. This is probably due to the fact that

Denton as a county had fewer Populist precincts and the inter-party competition was

therefore less.

Table IV Populist Precincts Totals in Denton County

Gubernatorial Elections, 1896-1902

Populist Precincts 1896 1898 %Inc 1900 %Inc 1902 %Inc

COUNTY-WIDE TOTALS

5440 2207 -59% 4182 -23% 2715 -50%

POPULIST TOTALS 1461 628 -57% 1165 -20% 642 -56%

Roanoke (48%) 197 100 -49% 146 -26% 64 -68%

Bolivar (59%) 167 91 -46% 116 -31% 71 -57%

Willow Springs (62%)

111 24 -78% 55 -50% 18 -84%

Aubrey (79%) 408 156 -62% 342 -16% 205 -50%

Mustang (52%) 128 46 -64% 80 -38% 40 -69%

Lake School House (52%)

164 45 -73% 63 -62% 35 -79%

Waketon (42%) 123 49 -60% 96 -22% 59 -52%

Sanger (37%) 163 117 -28% 267 64% 150 -8%

What makes the political behavior of Denton County unique is the fact that the

county seat is split by the geographic regions of the Cross Timbers and the Grand Prairie.

57

Like their counterparts directly north in Cooke County, Dentonites in the Cross Timbers

region exhibited a greater pull toward Populism than those in the more prosperous Grand

Prairie. Despite the fact that Populist support seldom penetrated cities of 2,500 or more,

Denton with a population of more than 4,000, due to its particular geography, is an

exception to the rule. Table V shows that wards one and two, the two precincts located

within the Cross Timbers region, experienced a greater attraction to the People's Party

and not coincidentally, these two precincts would cast majority votes against the poll tax

amendment.19

Table V Populist Percentages Within the

City of Denton

Precincts 1892 1894 1896 1898

County Totals 18% 31% 30% 10%

City Totals 13% 24% 32% 18%

Ward 1 21% 30% 25% 30%

Ward 2 20% 34% 45% 21%

Ward 3 4% 14% 32% 11%

Ward 4 7% 16% 24% 8%

19Martin, The People's Party in Texas, 59-60; United States Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States taken in the year 1910 Abstract with Supplement for Texas (Washington, D. C. Government Printing Office, 1913). This abstract is extremely helpful. It gives the summation of the eleventh and twelfth census in conjunction with the thirteenth;

58

In Fannin County the decline in voter participation did not fall so clearly along

party lines as it did in Cooke and Denton County. Table VI, a compilation of the Populist

Table VI Populist Precinct Totals in Fannin County

Gubernatorial Elections, 1896-1902 (% Increase Compared to 1896)

Populist Precincts 1896 1898 %Inc. 1900 %Inc 1902 %Inc

COUNTY-WIDE TOTALS

9673 5303 -45% 7766 -20% 6108 -37%

POPULIST TOTALS 4251 2277 -46% 2958 -30% 2449 -42%

Orangeville (46%) 262 132 -50% 132 -50% 83 -68%

Monkstown (63%) 258 140 -46% 199 -23% 112 -57%

New Hope (61%) 348 236 -32% 236 -32% 137 -61%

Dodd City (40%) 315 146 -54% 255 -19% 220 -30%

Bailey (60%) 408 252 -38% 305 -25% 224 -45%

Gober (73%) 347 176 -49% 274 -21% 168 -52%

Jone's Mill (69%) 130 65 -50% 65 -50% 81 -38%

Ravenna (54%) 395 202 -49% 247 -37% 210 -47%

Trenton (49%) 305 163 -47% 227 -26% 229 -25%

Gum Springs(55%) 79 57 -28% 102 29% 86 9%

Leonard (54%) 657 309 -53% 398 -39% 406 -38%

High Prairie (55%) 171 68 -60% 68 -60% 127 -26%

Lamasco (66%) 170 117 -31% 132 -22% 129 -24%

Nobility (50%) 213 96 -55% 130 -39% 113 -47%

Randolph (65%) 193 118 -39% 188 -3% 124 -36%

59

precinct totals in the gubernatorial election from 1892-1904, shows that between the 1896

and the 1898 gubernatorial election the total votes recorded in the Populist precincts in

the county declined an average of 46 percent. The county wide average fell by only one

percentage point less. This indicates general disinterest by both Democrats and Populists

after the hotly contested state and national races of the 1896 elections.20

What is significant about the vote in Fannin county is that the expected increase in

political participation did occur in 1900, the presidential election year, however, the

Populist precincts of Fannin County, like those of Cooke County, did not record as high

an increase as did the Democratic precincts. The county totals rebounded 25 percent in

1900 and were only 20 percent below the high turnout in 1896, whereas the Populist

precincts only increased 16 percent and remained 30 percent below their 1896 totals. In

other words, Fannin County Populists stayed out of politics at a 10 percent higher rate

than did the Democrats of the county. Obviously, this denotes a more pronounced

disaffection toward politics and lack of party organization and zeal. Both probably fed

upon each other in a circle of political decline that riddled the People's Party after the

1896 election.

The sources of Populist strength in Fannin County, like other counties in this

region, were located on the outskirts of the county. With Bonham, like other county seats

in North Texas, in the middle of the county, those precincts along the county borders

were removed from the poltical, social, economic, and cultural centers of, not only their

20Fannin County Election Returns, County Clerk's Office, County Courthouse, Bonham, Texas (See Appendix IV). Hereafter any reference to Fannin County elections returns will be taken from these records, unless otherwise noted.

60

own counties, but also adjacent counties (See Map III). This isolation has been shown to

be a major impetus in generating Populist support.21

Of all the counties within this study Collin County proves to be the greatest

enigma. Its degree of Populist sentiment compared to its agricultural prosperity runs

counter to the idea that only farmers on marginal lands or those suffering economic

distress flocked to the Populist movement. In 1900 Collin County not only led the state

of Texas in agricultural wealth but also was rated the fourteenth most productive

agricultural county in the United States.22 McKinney, the county seat of Collin County,

by 1900 was rated the richest city in per capita wealth in the country.23 Despite these

achievements many farmers in Collin County favored the People's Party. Also, there has

been an idea that Populism, excluding industrial centers, rarely flourished in cities of

2,500 or more. McKinney in 1900 had a population of just over 4,000; yet in the 1896

gubernatorial election its voters split their support evenly between Democratic candidate

Charles A. Culberson and Populist candidate, Jerome C. Kearby. One of the most

obvious reasons for the unusual degree of Populist support in Collin County was the

presence of a Populist-friendly local paper, The Democrat, and its editor, Walter

Wilson.24

21Turner, "Understanding the Populists," 358.

22The (McKinney) Democrat, September 20, 1902

23 Capt. Roy F. Hall and Helen Gibbard, Collin County: Pioneering in North Texas, (Quanah, Texas: Nortex Press, 1975). 45.

24Martin, The People's Party in Texas, 58-88. It is here that Martin demonstrates the inverse proportionality of Populism and urban areas. Bureau of the Census,

61

Map III Fannin County

Populist Precincts

•County Scat • Populist Precinct

HighPraine

New Hope don Springs UilBSCO

Jane's Mill

Bonham _ _.x + DoddCity

Onmgeville

>41 Randolph

Leonard Nobility

HUNT COUNTY COLLIN COUNTY

Table VII Populist Precinct Totals in Collin County

Gubernatorial Elections, 1896-1902 (% Increase Compared to 1896)

62

Populist Precincts 1896 1898 %Inc 1900 Inc% 1902 %Inc

COUNTY-WIDE TOTALS

9568 5126 -46% 7022 -27% 3783 -60%

POPULIST TOTALS 2734 1699 -38% 1986 -27% 1130 -59%

Princeton (75%) 241 92 -62% 195 -19% 100 -59%

Snow Hill (75%) 125 82 -34% 79 -37% 56 -55%

Frankfurt (71%) 35 43 23% 59 69% 30 -14%

N.F armersville(69 %) 519 429 -17% 252 -51% 260 -50%

Verona (64%) 117 76 -35% 94 -20% 32 -73%

St. Paul (61%) 97 44 -55% 74 -24% 30 -69%

Copeville (48%) 207 113 -45% 114 -45% 93 -55%

Blue Ridge (48%) 364 253 -30% 324 -11% 137 -62%

Graybill (48%) 141 81 -43% 111 -21% 26 -82%

Lick Prairie (44%) 123 46 -63% 76 -38% 15 -88%

Pike (43%) 182 121 -34% 129 -29% 65 -64%

Josephine (42%) 121 77 -36% 118 -2% 79 -35%

Wylie (42%) 340 184 -46% 265 -22% 177 -48%

Seven Points (40%) 122 58 -52% 96 -21% 30 -75%

Thirteenth Census Abstract with Supplement for Texas-, Collin County Election Returns, 1892-1908, County Clerk's Office, Department of Elections, County Courthouse Annex, McKinney, Texas (See Appendix I). Hereafter any reference to election returns will be taken from these records, unless otherwise noted. Miller, "Building a Progressive Coalition," 166.

63

Despite its apparent exceptions to Populist trends, however, the strength of the

People's Party in Collin County lay primarily in the hinterlands. Election returns from

this county reveal much of the same political behavior as its neighbors in North Texas

with a few exceptions. Table VII shows a list of the precincts in Collin County with

heavy Populist leanings. Most of Populist strength within the county lay in the eastern

portion, bordering Hunt County (See Map IV). Like other counties voting participation

generally declined after 1896. In this particular county, between the 1896 and 1898

elections however, the overall decline was less. While the Populist precinct totals

decreased only 38 percent, the vote county-wide declined by 46 percent. Perhaps this is

the effect of less economic distress and the presence of an active and sympathetic press

within Collin County.

Populists, like other voters in Collin County in 1900, re-entered the political

process. Election returns indicate that as late as 1898 many Populist believed their

fortunes still lay within the their third-party movement. Despite a significant decline in

Populist participation (38 percent) in the election of 1898 the Populist gubernatorial

candidate, Barnett Gibbs of Dallas County (directly south of Collin County), received 28

percent of the vote. By 1900, however, with the Populist precincts and the county as a

whole voting at 73 percent of what they had been at their height in 1896, the Populist

candidate for governor, T. J. McMinn, received only 3 percent of the total county vote.

At first glance it appears that these Collin County Populists, like others in North

Texas, returned to the election process as Democrats in 1900; however, an analysis of

these precincts reveals that these voters as late as 1900 still harbored a distrust of their old

64

Map IV Collin County

Populist Precincts

• County Seat

GRAYSON COUNTY

Seven Points ! FANNIN COUNTY

Blue Ridge Pike

lick Prairie Snow HOI

Princeton Fannersville McKinney •

Graybill Copeville

Josephine St Paul

Frankfurt

DALLAS COUNTY ROCKWALL COUNTY

8

i

N

65

political adversaries. In 1898 the Populist candidate received 28 percent of the vote,

while the Democratic candidate, Joseph D. Sayers, received a vote of 71 percent. In 1900

when the Populist candidate received only 3 percent of the vote, the Democratic

candidate, Sayers, running for his second term as governor, received 75 percent of the

vote, only four percent more in an election when almost 20 percent more voters

participated than in the previous election. What happened to the other votes? Election

returns from 1900 (See Table VIII) show that Collin County Populists, rather than vote

with the political rivals they believed had wronged them in the previous presidential

election, cast a higher than average vote for the Republican candidate, Robert E. Hannay

of Waller County.

A comparison of the Populist and Republican voting from 1898 to 1900 reveals,

that although the Populist Party organization had all but disintegrated, former Populists

were still not ready to throw their support to the Democratic Party. Despite efforts by the

editor of The Democrat, Walter Wilson, to bring his own loyalty and the loyalty of the old

Populists back to the Democratic Party in 1898, he and most other ex-Populist in Collin

County did not re-enter the party until 1902 after a Democratic party test was

implemented in April of that year.25

While Collin County exhibited some unique features compared to other counties

in North Texas, there is evidence that the Populists in that county displayed some of the

same political behavior in 1900. Election returns of Collin County indicate that in the

1900 gubernatorial election (held during a presidential election) shows that the

25" Miller, "Building a Progressive Coalition", 166.

66

Democratic and Populists voters participated at almost the same percentages. Both

parties remained active in politics and even as late as 1898 Collin County cast nearly 30

Table VIII Crossover Voting in Collin County, 1898-1900

Populist Precincts

Republican Voting in

1898

Populist Voting in

1898

Republican Voting in

1900

COUNTY-WIDE % 1% 28% 22%

POPULIST PRECINCT AVERAGE 1% 41% 25%

Princeton 3% 47% 39%

Snow Hill 0% 70% 23%

Frankfurt 0% 0% 2%

N.Farmersville 1% 53% 16%

Verona 0% 49% 34%

St. Paul 0% 41% 28%

Copeville 0% 39% 18%

Blue Ridge 3% 46% 36%

Graybill 0% 38% 36%

Lick Prairie 0% 39% 33%

Pike 0% 51% 21%

Josephine 0% 31% 21%

Wylie 1% 29% 12%

Seven Points 0% 41% 24%

percent of its votes for the Populist gubernatorial candidate. By 1900, however, with the

electorate at 75 percent what it had been in 1896, Collin County delivered only 3 percent

67

of its votes to the Populist candidate, T. J. McMinn of Bexar County. What is unique

about Collin County is that in addition to many Populist not voting, the ones that did

vote, threw their support toward the Republican Party. It is reasonable to assume that

Populists within this county recognized that their third party movement had disintegrated

and, as a show of defiance, voted Republican rather that give their vote to the Democratic

Party which they believed had been responsible for their political ruin.

From 1896 to 1902 North Texas counties as a whole exhibited significant degrees

of political apathy and disaffection as indicated by election returns from this region.

Most Populists in this region, rather than participate in a process which was controlled by

a Democratic party, that had proven it would stop at nothing to insure its victory and

susbsequent preeminence in state politics, demonstrated their distrust with the political

system within Texas by simply removing themselves from it. The Populists who desired

to participate found themselves in a political quandary. Without a meaningful third-party

organization, which to this point had been the only forum in which their issues would be

addressed, they essentially had no form of protest or voice in politics. While the majority

of those who supported Populism retreated back into the farm life that had preoccupied

them before the Populist movement had lured them into political action, some remained

active in politics and did so within the Democratic Party of the state.

Despite the fact that many ex-Populists in North Texas reentered the Democratic

Party and participated as Democrats, it is unlikely, given the political tradition they had

established and the psychological condition they had exhibited, that they would be the

passive, unquestioning party members Democrats desired. Given the general state of

68

mind produced by their isolation and their history of dissent, it is likely, if an economic

condition similiar to that of the 1890s resurfaced, that the ex-Populists who remained

active in politics in 1902 would once again stray from the political mainstream. It has

already been shown how farmers in North Texas at the turn of the century experienced

and demonstrated their political isolation. What has yet to be shown is how in 1902

these same farmers experienced another relapse into the economic state which had less

than a decade earlier driven them to the Populist movement.

By many indications farmers in North Texas in the first decade of the twentieth

century experienced greater prosperity than in the decade prior. Census records indicate

that more cotton was being produced on less land and that farm land values increased

significantly in this decade. Although farm tenancy was on the rise in every county in

North Texas from 1890 to 1910, a fact that concerned many farmers of the era, the use of

this statistic as a factor in provoking political dissent has been challenged. Very likely

what drove voters to oppose or support a candidate or a measure was their immediate

personal economic interests. Though the broad interpretation of the agricultural condition

in Texas from 1900 to 1910 was positive in 1902, an immediate agricultural problem

plummeted farmers in North Texas into another disaster and rekindled the same feelings

of helplessness and powerlessness that had driven them to Populism.26

26Bureau of the Census, Abstract of the Thirteenth Census with Supplement for Texas; Thomas J. Pressly and William H. Scofield, Farm Real Estate Values in the United States by Counties, 1850-1959, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1965). James Turner in "Understanding the Populists," 364, challenges the viability of use rising tenancy rates as an indicator of Populist support.

69

Like most regions in the South the farmers of North Texas remained tied to the

pearl of southern agriculture — cotton. Despite numerous movements in the South urging

farmers to diversify, the allure of the "fleecy staple" remained. Woodward explained that

this was not only because of "traditionalism and the inertia of habit," but more

importantly, " . . . cotton was 'the' cash crop and together with the other cash crops the

only security upon which the furnishing merchant would advance credit." Although the

highest cotton production in Texas was centered in the region of East Texas, several

counties in North Texas produced cotton almost to the exclusion of anything else. Collin

County, the richest agricultural county in Texas, produced over 50,000 bales per year in

the late 1890s averaging one to two bales per acre and in 1901 that county produced

68,000 bales.27

In 1902, however, cotton production in North Texas plummeted as a result of the

boll weevil. When this disaster hit, there was no defense against this insect which fed on

the cotton boll when the plant was nearly matured. The effect in North Texas was

widespread and exacted a devastating toll economically and psychologically on the

producers of cotton.28

No county in this region was spared. The tiny black bug hobbled the cotton crop

in Collin County, the most prosperous in the state, as well as the other counties in North

"Woodward, Origins of the New South, 175-204. Quotation on page 182. Woodward gives an extremely enlightening treatment of the condition of farmers and their compulsion to cotton. Hall and Gibbard, Collin County, 46. McKinney Daily Courier, October 27,1902.

28John S. Spratt, The Road to Spindletop: Economic Change in Texas, 1875-1901 (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1955), 61-83.

70

Texas: "The boll weevil had a devastating effect on Collin cotton. Land that was

producing two bales of cotton an acre dropped to 1/4 of that." While many farmers

moved quickly to switch their crop to one safe from the boll weevil such a conversion

took time and was not nearly as profitable as cotton. In the History of Collin County:

Pioneering in North Texas, the authors wrote: "Many farmers turned their cotton land to

alfalfa and some grew wealthy, but the financial yield was a little over half of that of two

bales of cotton per acre."29

Though the effect of the boll weevil does not appear in the decennial U. S. Census

records, the local newspapers reported the ruin. A special government census agent, S. H.

Cole, reported the extreme decline in cotton production in Texas and its counties. The

production for the state on October 1,1902, put Texas cotton at 47 percent of the

previous year's crop. This made Texas cotton production last in the South, compared to

the previous year. Although Collin County, the most productive county in the state, did

not experience the same degree of economic trauma as other cotton producing counties,

its drop in 1902 was still significant. In 1901 Collin County ginned a total of 68,000

bales of cotton. In late October the census agent estimated that the total crop would be

46,000 bales, a deficit of 22,000 bales or a decline of 33 percent.30

Farmers from various towns in Collin County informed their local newspapers of

the condition of the cotton crop in the area. As early as August the farmers foresaw the

impending disaster, and by October they realized their worst fears. Most reports in the

29Hall and Gibbard, Collin County, 46.

30McKinney Daily Courier, October 7,27,1902

71

McKinney Daily Courier centered around the problem of the boll weevil and resembled

the following: "Cotton picking is the order of the day and the yield is said not to be very

good;" "the cotton crop is very short. Some of the farmers have picked their cotton over

the third time." A farmer from Lucas, seven miles south of McKinney, wrote to The

Democrat: "Crops are very light in this neighborhood, corn hardly worth gathering. It

will take from five to ten acres of cotton to make a bale. The top crop will not amount to

much." In Chambliss, ten miles northeast of the county seat, farmers reported: "The boll *

worms and sharp shooters have done considerable damage in this section." Numerous

additional reports illustrated the condition of the cotton crop and consequently that of the

farmers.31

Other counties in North Texas felt the same effects of the boll weevil. In Grayson

County, the town of Tioga reported the condition of their crop. "The farmers are still

picking cotton, although the crop will be cut short, considerably." The Van Alstyne

Leader, the local paper of Van Altysne ten miles south of Sherman, wrote, "The weather

and crop report... shows that the condition of cotton has greatly deteriorated on account

of worms and dry weather." This same paper also recorded the problem in Fannin

County. "The boll worm has about destroyed all the cotton in the community of Savoy

[ten miles west of Bonham] and the farmers say they will not make a bale on ten acres."

The rest of Fannin County did not fare much better. The Bonham News reported, "From

present prospects it will take from three to six acres to make a bale," and, "Cotton is cut

31 McKinney Daily Courier, October 16,1902; The (McKinney) Democrat, October 8,19, August 29, 1902.

72

shorter than expected by worms and drought." The town of Carson, about fifteen miles

northeast of Bonham reported that their crop "[would] be very short." A discouraged

farmer from Ector, in the western part of Fannin County, described his plight: "Every

time I look at the cotton it shows worse. I don't think the average will exceed one-fifth of

a bale per acre."32

Another report of the general condition of agriculture in Fannin County came in

from the town of Leslie. It read: " . . . the drought has stopped the ravages of the boll

worm, but not until the cotton crop was ruined. Our community will not average more

than one-fourth of a bale to the acre. Our corn is also light, and our grass is all dried up.

Stock is poor, and hard times are inevitable." 33 Of course much of what the farmers

reported could have been an exaggeration, but their accounts can be weighed against the

report of the census agent to arrive at a balanced perception of the extent of the

agricultural crisis of 1902.

Farmers living in areas that had supported Populism in North Texas in the early

part of this century experienced a greater degree of political, physical, and social isolation

than their Democratic counterparts, and in 1902 went through yet another economic

crisis. A significant number of ex-Populists had by 1902 returned to the Democratic

party and were supporting Democratic candidates. The loyalty of these prodigal

Democrats, however, was still in question. Although a great many of ex-Populists in

1,2McKinney Daily Courier, October 16, 1902. Van Alstyne Leader, August 23, 1902; Bonham News, August 9, September 5, 12, 1902.

33Bonham News, August 22, 1902.

73

North Texas simply were not participating in politics, would those that remained active in

politics, after having passed a party test and participated in elections as Democrats,

remain loyal to their professed party at the risk of undermining their own interests?

In light of the geographic, social, cultural, and political isolation that drove voters

to Populism and the fact that these same conditions existed in 1902 it appears that if ex-

Populists supported the poll tax they did so in contradiction to the political tradition they

had established as well as to their immediate particular interests. To assume that ex-

Populists supported the proposed election "reform" is inconsistent with how and why the

rank-and -file members in the party, the roots of the party, gravitated to the People's Party

in the first place. It was unlikely if not impossible that the same farmers with a tradition

of political deviation and facing economic ruin once again would have supported a

measure championed by their old political enemies and one that would take not only

money from them but quite possibly one of their basic rights as Americans: their

franchise.

CHAPTER4

A LAST GASP: NORTH TEXAS POPULISTS AND THE

OPPOSITION TO THE POLL TAX AMENDMENT

In a popular referendum election on November 4,1902, Texans voted

overwhelmingly (nearly two to one) in favor of amending their constitution to include a

poll tax as a prerequisite for voting. With passage of the poll tax amendment Texas

became one of the last southern states to pass some form of disfranchisement. Third

party dissension and a moderate number of black voters had prevented the Lone Star State

from obtaining support for a bill that had been presented four times since 1876. While

twentieth-century political trends in Texas have been characterized as essentially

conservative and solidly Democratic, precinct-level analysis of the poll tax referendum in

1902 reveals that ex-Populists resisted the restriction upon their franchise.1

Election Records from North Texas cast heavy doubt that Populists returned to the

Democratic Party as humbled opponents. Returns show that they reentered the party, but

'C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), 321-349; Alwyn Barr, Reconstruction to Reform, Texas Politics, 1876-1906 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971), 193-208; J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); Worth Robert Miller, "Building a Progressive Coalition: The Populist-Reform Democrat Rapprochement, 1900-1907 "Journal of Southern History 52 (May 1986): 163-182; V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950).

75

that on the poll tax amendment vote they strayed from the conservative Democratic

platform and therefore did not yield to the conservative political pressure of the era.

While North Texas as a whole voted at only 40 percent of its peak in 1896, a comparison

of the 1902 poll tax referendum held simultaneously with the governor's election reveals

a significant discrepancy between support for a Democratic candidate and support for the

proposed "reform" of the same party. This analysis shows that although ex-Populists and

many voters in North Texas, removed themselves from the political process by 1902, the

ex-Populists who did participate in this election voted overwhelmingly in favor of the

Democratic candidate for governor but opposed in higher percentages than other voters,

the poll tax referendum, which was a major plank within the platform of the Democratic

Party.

E. M. House, perhaps the greatest manipulator of elections in the state, supported

the Democratic gubernatorial candidate Colonel S. W. T. Lanham, a candidate described

by House as, "an upright man of fluent speech but limited ability." House with heavy

influence from Joe Bailey, U. S. Senator from Gainesville, hand-picked Lanham because

in House's words, "we could commit him to any line of policy we thought best."2 Also, it

is probably not coincidental that the Democratic movement toward election "reform" in

1901-1902 occured during on election year without a presidential election when political

interest among voters was traditionally less. A smaller electorate would be easier to

predict and control as the November election neared. Ex-Populist voters endorsed

Lanham probably because of his prohibitionist leanings and for lack of any other viable

2Barr, Reconstruction to Reform, 223, 224.

76

choice, but they rejected a platform endorsed by the old conservative Democratic Party

controlled essentially by politicians who had less than a decade earlier orchestrated the

destruction of the Populist Party in Texas.

Lanham's campaign was mild and without controversy, which was exactly the

approach the Democratic Party wanted, in order to insure that in the upcoming legislature

they could solidify their power and create the legal mechanisms necessary to thwart any

future third party uprisings. House, in a letter to Congressman Albert Burleson, attested

to this strategy. "Colonel Lanham's speech has been well received. The people want no

disturbance just at this time and that is why they like it. He has managed to say nothing

in a most convincing and masterly way and the people are pleased."3

The election records from Collin, Cooke, Denton and Fannin counties show that

ex-Populists voted for Colonel Lanham in the 1902 gubernatorial elections and, therefore,

nominally identified themselves as Democrats. Table I shows the level of Democratic

support from North Texas in 1902.

The totals from Table I demonstrate that voters in North Texas supported the

Democratic candidate for governor at a rate eleven percent higher than the state average.

In their minds, however, many voters could not forget past political abuses nor could they

completely support the platform of their old adversaries. Ex-Populist voters opposed the

3Ibid, 224.

77

poll tax referendum amendment in 1902 in significantly higher percentages than other

Democratic voters.4

Table I North Texas Support for

the Democratic Candidate for Governor November 4,1902

County Democratic Total Vote

Democratic Percentage

State-Wide 266076 74%

North Texas 12708 86%

Collin 3386 90%

Cooke 2071 95%

Denton 2323 86%

Fannin 4928 82%

Table II lists the counties and their totals for the poll tax amendment. The

opposition to the poll tax varied from county to county, as did Populist support, but with

few exceptions it flourished in precincts furthest away from the county seats in North

4The state totals are from Ernest William Winkler, ed., Platforms of Political Parties in Texas (Austin: Bulletin of the Unversity of Texas, 53, 1916). 646. All other totals taken from the following, respectively: Collin County Election Returns, 1892-1908, County Clerk's Office, Department of Election, County Courthouse Annex, McKinney, Texas; Cooke County Election Returns, 1892-1906, County Clerk's Office, County Courthouse, Gainseville, Texas; Denton County Election Returns, 1892-1908, County Clerks Office, Carroll Courts Building, Denton, Texas; Fannin County Election Returns, County Clerk's Office, County Courthouse, Bonham, Texas. Here and after all election totals dealing with specific counties in North Texas will be taken from the respective records pertaining to those counties, unless otherwise noted.

78

Texas. These isolated voters in the midst of an agricultural and economic disaster

brought on by the ravages of the boll weevil upon the cotton crop saw the poll tax for

what it was: a method by which the conservative Democratic Party of Texas, rather than

satisfy portions of the electorate who had developed a political tradition of

unpredictability, sought to carve out of the state an electorate they could satisfy and

therefore control. Like Populist support in North Texas opposition to the poll tax is

obscured when viewed from the aggregate level. But, again like Populist support,

opposition to the poll tax appears vividly in each county with the advantage of precinct-

level analysis.

Table II County-Wide Totals for the Poll Tax Amendment

in North Texas

County In Favor Opposed Total Percentage In Favor

Percentage Opposed

State Totals 233447 125703 359150 65% 35%

North Texas 9401 4418 13819 68% 32%

Collin 2361 1241 3602 66% 34%

Cooke 1738 445 2183 80% 20%

Denton 1448 1036 2484 58% 42%

Fannin 3854 1696 5550 69% 31%

In Cooke County (See Table III) the opposition fell closely along the lines of the

old Populist threat to Democratic power. While the county as a whole voted only 20

percent in opposition and was the home county of Democrat Joe Bailey, perhaps the most

79

famous political figure of the state, it was not without its strong pockets of dissension.

Table III shows clearly that support for the Democratic governor did not necessarily

equate to blind endorsement of the party or its platform. While overall the county

opposed the amendment by 20 percent the Populist precincts opposed the poll tax by 31

percent.

Table III Cooke County: Democratic/Poll Tax Amendment Vote Comparison

November 4,1902

Populist Precinct

Precinct Total

Demcratic Vote

Percent Democratic

Opposed Percent Opposed

County Wide 2202 2071 94% 445 20%

Populist Precinct Totals 412 360 87% 128 31%

Burton S. H. 44 43 98%" 6 14%

Mount Springs 28 18 64% 14 50%

Burn's City 48 45 94% 8 17%

Live Oak (Leo) 21 21 100% 11 52%

Marysville 75 75 100% 5 7%

Bulcher 45 37 82% 23 51%

Woodbine 70 63 90% 10 14%

Bloomfield 61 39 64% 44 72%

Warren's Bend

20 19 95% 7 35%

The greatest percentages of opposition appeared in areas of the county furthest to

the southwest and southeast ~ Leo, Mount Springs, Bulcher and Bloomfield ~ away from

80

Gainesville, the county seat. These areas are located within less prosperous Cross

Timbers region in addition to being geographically isolated from rest of the county.

Marysville, the Populist precinct with the smallest percentage of opposition, was located

only five miles west of the county-seat. Map I shows the precincts that exhibited strong

Populist tedencies in addition to plotting precincts created since 1892 that cast a higher

than average vote against the poll tax. Clearly geographic location away from the social,

cultural, and political hubs of the county fostered a skepticism of authority exhibited in

opposition to the Democratic disfranchising methods.5

The same precincts that cast a higher than county average opposition vote to the

poll tax, however, voted for the Democratic candidate for governor, Lanham, in

percentages consistent with the rest of the county and the region and significantly higher

than the state as a whole. As the previous table shows, Cooke County voted 94 percent in

favor of the Democratic nominee for governor while the Populist precincts cast a vote of

87 percent. The discrepancy between the poll tax vote opposition and Democratic

endorsement suggests, at best, luke warm affiliation to the Democratic Party and its

"reform" platform. While ex-Populists displayed a willingness to support a Democratic

candidate, they did not endorse all Democratic measures.

5The two German communities in Cooke County, Lindsay and Muenster, for the first time voted consistently with their counterparts in the central portion of the state. Traditionally, these two German communities voted Democratic while those further south voted Republican. Populism did not appeal to German voters because of its prohibitionist tendencies and its pronounced isolationist slant. Germans opposed the poll tax, like Populists, because, as Roscoe Martin wrote in The People's Party in Texas, 130, wrote they were, "jealous of the franchise." They saw the poll tax as merely the first step in a line of political and social infringement upon their rights which would include

81

Mapi Cooke County

Poll Tax Opposition

• Cross Umbers Region Grand Prairie Region

* County Seal ^ n,, i;,i * w t opuiwiTccinci • New Precincts with High

Opposition Id the Aril Tax

Warren's Bend

Maxysviue

GamsevOle •

8

Springs

Live Oak

DENTON COUNTY t

N

OOLLIN COUNTY

82

Denton County exhibited the greatest opposition county-wide to the poll tax

among the counties in this study. In fact, the percentages for the county as a whole and

those precincts that supported Populism are almost the same. The precincts within the

city of Denton, also, cast the highest opposition of any county seat in North Texas. Table

IV shows that two precincts within the county seat voted over 60 percent in opposition to

the amendment and the city as one political unit split the vote 50/50.

Because no newspapers from Denton from this era have survived, one can only

spectulate as to the large degree of opposition within Denton proper. While one might

assume that this would be evidence of black opposition to the poll tax, census data

indicate that in 1910 the city of Denton had only 150 black males of voting age. Table IV

shows the precinct breakdown of the city's precincts and the poll tax vote of 1902.6

Table IV City of Denton Precinct Totals for

the Poll Tax Amendment

Precincts in Denton

For the Amendment

Opposed to the Amendment

Total

Ward 1 63 35% 116 65% 179

Ward 2 73 39% 112 61% 185

Ward 3 90 59% 63 41% 153

Ward 4 148 65% 81 35% 229

Totals 374 50% 372 50% 746

6United States Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States taken in the year 1910 Abstract with Supplement for Texas (Washington, D. C. Government Printing Office, 1913), 616.

83

Opposition to the poll tax in the city of Denton very likely came from blacks and

ex-Populists. Election records from 1892 to 1900 show that precincts within the city of

Denton cast unusually high numbers of votes for Populism relative to other county seats

in this study. In fact, in 1896 ward 2 of the city cast a vote of 45 percent in favor of the

Populiists' gubernatorial candidate, Jerome Kearby, while the rest of the city voted about

30 percent for the same candidate. In 1898 this same city cast a higher than county-wide

average for the Populist candidate for governor, Barnett Gibbs. While the city of

Denton's high opposition to the poll tax amendment in 1902 may seem unusual in

comparison with other larger cities in this region, its greater support of Populism in the

1890s offers some indication of the general politics of the city and the loyalty of its

population to the Democratic Party of the state.

It is also significant that in Denton County and Cooke County the Cross Timbers

greatly affected the voting. Those voters in this less prosperous area exhibited stronger

Populist tendencies than did their counterparts within the Grand Prairie region of the

counties where the farm land is more productive (See Map II). What differs in Denton

County and what makes assumptions about the city of Denton difficult, is that, unlike

Cooke County, the Cross Timbers region bisects the county seat. While the voting in

Denton proper may seem inconsistent when compared to other county seats in the region,

it is entirely consistent with the fact that farmers in the Cross Timbers flocked in greater

numbers to Populism and also opposed the poll tax in greater percentages.

84

MapII Denton County

Poll Tax Oppoaiiiun

• • New Piecuicti with High Opposition to the Poll Tax

COOKE COUNTY.

Sliddl • Willow Springs Bolivar

Beaton

^Schoo l Hdwe

TARRANT COUNTY DALLAS COUNTY

t

N

85

The higher population in the precincts within city of Denton compared to other

precincts of the county and its higher than average opposition to the poll tax amendment

would seem to skew the analysis of the county somewhat, but if the city of Denton is

excluded from the equation one finds that opposition to the poll tax flourished in areas in

the outskirts of the county that had supported Populism and new voting precincts located

on the fringe of the county. Table V shows how voters in these precincts while showing

disagreement with the so called "reform" offered by the Democratic Party, supported the

Democratic candidate for governor in high numbers.

Table V Denton County: Democratic/Poll Tax Amendment Vote Comparison

November 4,1902

Precinct Precinct Total

Democratic Vote

Percent Democratic

Opposed Percent Opposed

County-Wide 2588 2196 85% 1036 42%

Populist Precinct Totals 642 557 87% 243 38%

Roanoke 64 61 95% 35 55%

Bolivar 71 65 92% 15 21%

Willow Springs 18 18 100% 4 22%

Aubrey 205 182 89% 65 32%

Mustang 40 37 93% 3 8%

Lake S. H. 35 30 86% 28 80%

Waketon 59 48 81% 34 58%

Sanger 150 116 77% 59 39%

86

It is also significant that the Populist precincts with the greatest percentage of

voter decline from 1900 to 1902, Mustang, located 15 miles northwest of Denton, shows

the smallest vote in opposition at 8 percent and Willow Springs only exhibited a 22

percent opposition. Tracking these two precincts shows that these two areas experienced

greater voter decline relative to the rest of the county and other Populist precincts. Voter

participation in Mustang dropped off from 124 total votes in 1896 to 40 in 1902 (a 69

percent decline) and in Willow Springs the totals for the same elections were 124 and 18,

(an 84 percent decline). The lower percentage of opposition to the poll tax amendment is

probably due to the decline in voting of ex-Populists in these areas. This suggest that the

voters in this area had quit participating in politics due to disaffection, apathy, or

resentment.

In addition to opposition of ex-Populist precincts to the poll tax amendment,

precincts created after the Populist rise to prominence and located in the far reaches of the

county also delivered opposition votes for the poll tax referendum. Map II indicates the

Populist precinct locations in addition to showing the newer precincts that cast a higher

percentage in opposition to the poll tax amendment. As in Cooke County, an isolated

condition coupled with the economic hardship of 1902 created fertile ground for the seeds

of suspicion and provoked higher than average opposition to the poll tax.

In Fannin County, where the Populist vote reached as high as 45 percent county-

wide in 1894 and 1896, opposition to the poll tax amendment flourished in areas of prior

Populist support. Table VI shows that the precincts that cast a higher than average vote

for the People's Party also opposed the poll tax in higher percentages. Like other

87

Table VI Fannin County: Democratic/Poll Tax Amendment Vote Comparison

November 4,1902

Precinct Precinct Total

Democratic Vote

Percent Democratic

Opposed Percent Opposed

County-Wide 6008 4928 82% 1696 31%

Totals 2454 1969 80% 974 40%

Orangeville 83 76 92% 6 7%

Monkstown 112 73 65% 33 29%

New Hope 137 102 74% 30 22%

Dodd City 220 193 88% 11 5%

Bailey 224 166 74% 86 38%

Gober 168 138 82% 81 48%

Jone's Mill 81 77 95% 8 10%

Ravenna 210 142 68% 62 30%

Trenton 229 185 81% 72 31%

Gum Springs 86 71 83% 33 38%

Leonard 411 356 87% 238 58%

High Prairie 127 115 91% 94 74%

Lamasco 129 98 76% 114 88%

Nobility 113 101 89% 68 60%

Randolph 124 76 61% 38 31%

counties in this region, voters on the outskirts of the county displayed their suspicions of

the Democratic party's support of the poll tax amendment in higher percentages than

voters closer to the county seat (See Map III). More important these same precincts voted

only two percent less Democratic than the county-wide average. Voters in Fannin, while

88

Map III Fannin County

Foil Tax Opposition

• Comfy Seat

• New Pracincta with High Opposition to the Poll Tax

^ Onm Springs fjHna'sco •

Jane's Mm

3 Z

Bonham _ DoddCity

Orangeville

Trcmon

Valley Creek Leonard •

Nobility •

Gober

Bailey

COLLIN COUNTY HUNT COUNTY

r N

89

participating in politics as Democrats, were not the loyal party members the party wanted

nor were they becoming the docile electorate sought by the Democrats.

In Collin County, where old Populist diehards eschewed the Democratic Party as

late as 1900, returns shows that they also returned to the party but not in the submissive

posture wanted or expected by the old party. The Populist precincts, located

predominantly on the county's eastern border (see Map IV) with Hunt County

demonstrated their nominal tie to the Democratic Party by casting a vote of 89 percent in

favor of Lanham. By these numbers it appears that the old Collin County Populists and

the ex-Populist editor of The Democrat in McKinney, Walter Wilson, had buried the

hatchet and accepted that political participation within Texas would be done within a

one-party system.

The Table VII shows that the county as a whole cast 90 percent of its votes in

favor of the Democratic candidate for governor. A comparison of the election returns for

the poll tax amendment and the gubernatorial race illustrate clearly that ex-Populist voters

in Collin County did not endorse all of the Democrats platform. Although many ex-

Populists in April had taken a party test of loyalty that read, "I, the voter of this ticket,

declare that I am a Democrat and pledge myself to support the nominee of the party,"

their affiliation with the party was at best strained and their support of the Democratic

platform was selective.

90

Map IV Collin County

Poll Tax Opposition

* County Sett # Populist Precinct • New Precincte with High

Opposition to tike Poll Tax

GRAYSON COUNTY

8 S

McKixmey •

Seven Points 1 COUNTY

• Blue Ridge Pike Valdasta £ •

LickPraiiie Altoga • Snow Hill

• Verona * • •

Princeton

Frankfort

• St Paul

Copevilte

Wyiie

DALLAS COUNTY ROCKWALL COUNTY

t

N

91

Table VII Collin County: Democratic/Poll Tax Amendment Vote Comparison

November 4,1902

Precinct Precinct Total

Democratic Vote

Percent Democratic

Opposed Percent Opposed

County-Wide 3742 3386 90% 1241 34%

Totals 1126 1004 89% 469 42%

Princeton 100 83 83% 60 60%

Snow Hill 56 52 93% 36 64%

Frankfurt 30 29 97% 5 17%

N. Farmersville 260 219 84% 79 30%

Verona 32 32 100% 2 6%

St. Paul 30 29 97% 11 37%

Copeville 92 87 95% 65 71%

Blue Ridge 137 110 80% 71 52%

Graybill 26 23 88% 20 77%

Lick Prairie 15 15 100% 2 13%

Pike 65 60 92% 28 43%

Josephine 79 69 87% 29 37%

Wylie 174 166 95% 57 33%

Seven Points 30 30 100% 4 13%

Walter Wilson, the editor of the McKinney Democrat, even appealled to his

former Populist Party members to re-enter politics within the Democratic Party when he

wrote, "in a broad sense we are all now Democrats . . . the former factions are now

practically at peace." On the issue of the poll tax, however, the voters who had supported

92

the Populist's platform of 1896 calling for, "a free vote and an honest count," once again

put their self interests before Democratic Party loyalty and obligation and opposed the

poll tax amendment in higher percentages than the rest of the county.7

Table VII also shows that Collin County as a whole opposed the poll tax by 34

percent, a percentage very close to the state average of 35 percent. The designated

Populist precincts of the county, however, opposed the poll tax by an average of 42

percent. This activity occured when the electorate of Collin County was but 40 percent of

what it had been in 1896, and the decline included the predominantly Democratic areas,

as well. Although the majority of voters in Collin County decided not to participate in the

elections of 1902, many who did were not ready to support the Democratic Party blindly

on issues they believed ran counter to their interests.

While the comparison of Democratic gubernatorial support and poll tax

opposition does not totally dispel the previous interpretation of what occured politically

in 1902, it does force an adjustment of the explanation of how and why the poll tax

referendum passed. Although election records show that voters in North Texas had by

1902 removed themselves from the political process in extremely large numbers,

precinct-level returns illustrate clearly that endorsement of the Democratic candidate and

nominal affiliation to the party did not equate to wholehearted acceptance of the party's

agenda. The idea that ex-Populists, who had by this time returned to the Democratic Party

and were participating in politics, threw their support toward all its programs is

7The [McKinney] Democrat, April 3,10,1902, quoted in Miller, "Building a Progressive Coalition," 166.

93

inconsistent with the political tradition, the psychological condition and the economic

state of the formerly highly Populist areas of North Texas.

Election returns from five counties in North Texas indicate that voters in nearly

every precinct that had traditionally supported the People's Party in higher percentages in

the 1890s were by 1902 willing to vote for Democratic candidates, but in regard to the

poll tax amendment referendum, these same voters, living in the same isolated areas on

the fringes, experiencing much of the same social and economic trauma that had lured

them into Populism not even a decade earlier, deviated, once again, from the political

mainstream of the state to protect their franchise. Passage of the poll tax in Texas, then,

does not symbolize the launching of former Populists into the accepted political currents

of the state. Opposition to the poll tax amendment represents in a fundamental way the

last gasp of a political body that the Democratic Party in Texas hoped, and in many ways

guaranteed, would never be resurrected.

CHAPTER 5

THE EFFECT OF THE POLL TAX IN NORTH TEXAS:

A REASSESSMENT OF THE "FAIT ACCOMPLI" THEORY

The poll tax referendum passed on November 4,1902, and became law as part of

the Terrell Election Law of 1903, which implemented a mandatory poll tax as a

prerequisite to voting. The state assessed a one dollar and fifty cent tax, and counties

could add as much as one dollar to this amount. The tax had to be paid by February 1 of

an election year, and the the receipt or affidavit attesting to the payment of the tax had to

be presented at the time of the vote in November.1

While most historians agree that Democrats intended to disfranchise blacks with

the poll tax, there is some debate as to whether or not they also intended it to restrict the

voting of poor whites. This thesis has argued that Democratic politicians, under the guise

of reform, sought not only political retribution against ex-Populists but also desired a

method by which they could limit and therefore better control this unpredictable element

of the state. After all, not even a decade earlier these poor whites, as members of the

People's Party, threatened Democratic primacy in Texas in a way that the black voters of

'J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 196-209; General Laws of Texas, Twenty-Eighth Legislature, 1903,132-158; Twenty-Ninth Legislature, 1905, 520-556. The Terrell Election Law of 1903 was amended in 1905 to systematize the primary system of Texas.

95

Texas never could, due to the state's relatively small black population. And key

supporters of the poll tax stated explicitly that the measure was a way to disfranchise poor

whites as well as blacks.2

Alexander Watkins Terrell, the conservative Democrat for whom the Terrell

Election Law was named, made no secret of his racial attitudes. A champion of the poll

tax in the state legislature throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century (he

presented it four times), he referred to the passage of the fifteenth amendment as, "the

blunder of the century," and stated that the primary feature of the poll tax would be to,

"collect the tax on the wooly scalp." In addition to the racial intent of the poll tax, Terrell

also realized the dual purpose of such a tax. He stated in 1883 that the tax would

eliminate those, "whose character can not be disguised... They consist chiefly of the

thriftless, idle, and semi-vagrant element of society of both races." Terrell also stated that

"though liberty required elections . . . when they are not controlled by intelligence and

patriotism they become the most terrible enemy." Obviously, Terrell, who was elected

again in 1902 to author the bill, and his supporters intended to use disfranchisement as a

double-edged sword to sculpt the electorate they wanted. It was their view that, "Whether

2C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), 321-349; Kousser, Shaping of Southern Politics, 196-209; Worth Robert Miller, "Building a Progressive Coalition: The Populist Reform Democrat Rapprochement-1907," 52 Journal of Southern History (May 1986): 163-182, 173. The first two works present the poll tax as a disfranchising weapon with the dual purpose of eliminating blacks and poor whites. The last citation by Miller states explicitly that, "the primary purpose of disfranchisement in Texas was to eliminate blacks, not white Populists."

96

universal manhood suffrage is good for the country depends entirely on the sort of men

who vote."3

One final matter of importance in studying this election "reform" is to examine its

impact on the electorate. Did the poll tax law of 1903 actually reduce the vote in areas

that were strongly Populist during the 1890s? Perhaps the most pervasive theory in

regard to the effect of the poll tax in Texas can be found in V. O. Key Jr.'s landmark

work of 1950, Southern Politics in State and Nation. In this highly influential book, Key

argued that the effect of the poll tax, although difficult to assess due to the primary

system also being used at the time, probably amounted only to the institutionalization of a

"fait accompli." In other words, the poll tax legalized and formalized what had occurred

in Texas since 1896. Because Democrats, through various means including violence,

election fraud, and intimidation, had in essence obtained their goal of political power, the

electorate by 1902 had constricted to only 40 percent of what it had been at its peak in

1896.4 Key wrote:

3 J. Morgan Kousser, Shaping of Southern Politics, 202 (first, second, and fifth quotations). Houston Daily Post, October 26,1902 (third and fourth quotations). The last quotation, found in the Houston Daily Post immediately before the poll tax referendum in 1902, came from a minority report distributed by Terrell in 1883. Many newspapers in Texas reprinted the report in its entirety before the poll tax referendum election in 1902.

4V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1950), 533-535.

97

Oddly enough those who urged an institutional change to enable them to gain power usually first win virtual control without the benefit of the procedural or organizational advantage they seek. Law often merely records not what is to be but what is, and ensures that what is will continue to be.5

Thus, he argued, the poll tax did not reduce the electorate; the reduction had already

occurred.

Table I North Texas County-Wide Totals,

1896-1902 (% Increase Compared to 1896)

County 1896 1898 % Inc 1900 % Inc 1902 % Inc

Collin 9568 5126 -46% 7022 -27% 3738 -61%

Cooke 5270 2522 -52% 3806 -28% 2187 -59%

Denton 5440 2213 -59% 4182 -23% 2715 -50%

Fannin 9673 5303 -45% 7766 -20% 6108 -37%

Grayson 10173 4585 -54% 9047 -11% 5357 -47%

Totals 40124 19749 -50% 31823 -21% 20105 -50%

Table I testifies to the apparent validity of Key's argument. Election returns in

five North Texas counties mirror the constriction of the electorate described in the "fait

accompli" theory. The aggregate county totals demonstrate the fact that large numbers of

5Ibid, 534.

98

voters in this region because of apathy, resentment, disillusionment, or, as probably was

the case, a combination of all three, had simply quit going to the polls by 1902.6

In his book, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the

Establishment of the One-Party South, J. Morgan Kousser contends that despite the fact

that Key based much of his "fait accompli" theory on the Texas electorate, "election

returns from the first decade of the century tend to undermine some contentions crucial"

to his argument. Kousser points to the decline in the already decimated black vote and

the general decline in the white vote after its passage. More importantly, Kousser, writes

that the poll tax "sealed the doom of opposition parties in Texas." He notes that in every

decade from end the Civil War to the turn of the century the Democratic Party saw a

major threat to its power, the strongest of which was the Populist movment in the 1890s.

The significance of the poll tax lies in the fact that the "recessions of 1907-08,1914-15,

1920-1921 might have bred similar protests."7

What if, however, after the passage of the poll tax, the electorate in North Texas,

as Kousser asserts, continued to shrink? It has been proven that much of the decline in

voter participation from 1896-1902 occurred in the isolated, economically distressed,

6All totals (except those of Grayson County) in Table I were derived from the following election returns: Collin County Election Returns, 1892-1904, County Clerk's Office, Department of Elections, County Courthouse Annex, McKinney, Texas; Cooke County Election Returns, 1892-1906, County Clerk's Office, County Courthouse, Gainesville, Texas; Denton County Election Returns, 1892-1908, County Clerk's Office, Carroll Courts Building, Denton, Texas; Fannin County Election Returns, 1892-1904, County Clerk's Office, County Courthouse, Bonham, Texas. The totals for Grayson County were taken from Mike Kingson, Sam Attlesey, and Mary G. Crawford, The Texas Almanac's Political History of Texas (Austin: Eiken Press, 1992), 67,273.

7Kousser, Shaping of Southern Politics, 208-209.

99

traditionally Populist areas of North Texas and that these areas also displayed a stronger

that average opposition to the poll tax amendment in 1902. Bearing this in mind, a

precinct-level analysis of the aforementioned areas is critical in assessing the effect of the

poll tax. The question is essentially this: Did the poll tax, opposed by ex-Populists,

ultimately achieve its goal of suppressing the vote of that portion of the electorate with a

tradition of dissent and unpredictability, thus eliminating the possibility of future dissent?

If so, passage and implementation of the poll tax in Texas did not represent simply a "fait

accompli," but achieved its desired effect of limiting the poor white agrarian vote that had

radicalized politics in the Lone Star State.8

Table II North Texas County-Wide Totals,

1902-1904 (% Inc Compared to 1896)

County 1896 1902 % Inc 1904 % Inc

Collin 9568 3783 -60% 4414 -54%

Cooke 5270 2187 -58% 2375 -55%

Denton 5440 2715 -50% 3106 -43%

Fannin 9673 6108 -36% 4019 -58%

Grayson 10173 5357 -47% 4932 -52%

Totals 40124 20150 -49% 18846 -53%

Table II, a continued analysis of the vote in North Texas counties from 1902 until

1904, shows that voter participation declined even more after the gubernatorial and poll

8Ibid., 207-209.

100

tax amendment elections of 1902. Although it appears that voting rebounded slightly in

some counties, it must be remembered that 1904 was a presidential election year and the

vote should have rebounded by about 30 percent if it was to adhere to its traditional

pattern of fluctuation. These totals show that in none of these counties was there much of

a "bump" in 1904 and in two counties, Fannin and Grayson, no "bump" at all.

It seems quite obvious then, that the poll tax had a real effect on the electorate, but

was this effect the result of its impact on a particular part of the electorate? Put another

way, as was the case from 1896 to 1902, did the decline of voter participation come

primarily from the strongly Populist areas, distrustful and frustrated with the political

process? The answer is no. Precinct-level analysis demonstrates that in every county in

North Texas the exodus from the poll was a universal phenomenon, not limited to one

particular group of the electorate. The poll tax created a system of requirements in order

to vote that many North Texans were not willing to, or in other cases could not, meet.

Fannin County voters demonstrated the greatest degree of nonparticipation of all

the counties within this study from 1902-1904. The table above shows that after the

election of 1902 the electorate continued to shrink by another 21 percent (compared to

1896). Once again this decline is extremely significant due to the fact that 1904 was a

presidential election year and participation should have increased compared to the off-

year elections. What is most interesting, though, is that the Populist precincts,

traditionally the precincts with the greatest decline in voting and who opposed the poll tax

in higher percentages, declined by 23 percent, only two percentage points more than the

101

Table III Fannin County Election Totals and Populist Precinct Totals after 1902

(Percent increase compared to 1896)

Precincts 1896 1902 % Inc 1904 % Inc

County-Totals 9673 6108 -37% 4019 -58%

Populist Precincts 4251 2449 -42% 1471 -65%

Orangeville 262 83 -68% 70 -73%

Monkstown 258 112 -57% 47 -82%

New Hope 348 137 -61% 53 -85%

Dodd City 315 220 -30% 180 -43%

Bailey 408 224 -45% 183 -55%

Gober 347 168 -52% 153 -56%

Jone's Mill 130 81 -38% 65 -50%

Ravenna 395 210 -47% 111 -72%

Trenton 305 229 -25% 134 -56%

Gum Springs 79 86 9% 55 -30%

Leonard 657 406 -38% 211 -68%

High Prairie 171 127 -26% 40 -77%

Lamasco 170 129 -24% 45 -74%

Nobility 213 113 -47% 52 -76%

Randolph 193 124 -36% 72 -63%

county as a whole. Quite possibly the vote in these Populist areas had dropped to a point

where only those most committed to voting were participating. Every other county in

North Texas showed the same results after the poll tax, though to different degrees.

102

The universal decline in voter participation in Cooke County resembled that of

Fannin County but with a few exceptions (See Table IV). The overall vote for the county

increased from 41 to 45 percent (4 percent), and the vote in Populist precincts was in line

Table IV Cooke County Election Totals and Populist Precinct Totals after 1902

(Percent increase compared to 1896)

Precincts 1896 1902 % Inc 1904 %

Inc

County-Totals 5270 2187 -59% 2375 -55%

Populist Precincts 1371 403 -71% 435 -68%

Burton School House 156 43 -72% 47 -70%

Mount Springs 92 23 -75% 30 -67%

Burn's City 169 49 -71% 48 -72%

Live Oak 55 21 -62% 46 -16%

Marysville 210 75 -64% 52 -75%

Bulcher 171 41 -76% 29 -83%

Woodbine 182 70 -62% 84 -54%

Bloomfield 210 61 -71% 80 -62%

Warren's Bend 126 20 -84% 19 -85%

with an increase from 29 to 32 percent (3 percent). Like Fannin County, the strongly

Populist precincts of Cooke County experienced virtually the same effect of the poll tax

and dissaffection toward politics experinced by the county as a whole. Despite the fact

that the Populist precincts had demonstrated a greater decline from 1896 to 1902 and

103

opposed the poll tax in higher percentages, by 1904 the decline in votes from this area of

the electorate had leveled off.

Election returns from Denton County (shown in Table V) demonstrate that the

entire county generally felt the negative effects of the poll tax upon the franchise. In 1904

the vote only increased by seven percent. The traditionally Populist precincts had by

Table V Denton County Election Totals and Populist Precinct Totals after 1902

(Percent increase compared to 1896)

Precincts 1896 1902 % Inc

1904 % Inc

County-Totals 5440 2715 -50% 3106 -43%

Populist Precincts 1461 677 -54% 738 -49%

Roanoke 197 64 -68% 106 -46%

Bolivar 167 53 -68% 76 -54%

Willow Springs 111 71 -36% 28 -75%

Aubrey 408 205 -50% 221 -46%

Mustang 128 40 -69% 48 -63%

Lake S. H. 164 35 -79% 40 -76%

Waketon 123 59 -52% 59 -52%

Sanger 163 150 i OO

s®

0s 160 -2%

1902 limited themselves to dedicated voters, committed to the election process. In 1904

the dramatic deficit between Populist and Democratic voting decline seems to have

abated. These Populist precincts recorded a five percent increase in participation

104

compared to the previous vote, only two percent less than the county-wide average. These

increases were substantially lower than the traditional increases characteristic of

presidential election years.

Table VI Collin County Election Totals and Populist Precinct Totals after 1902

(Percent increase compared to 1896)

Precincts 1896 1902 % Inc 1904 % Inc

County-Totals 9568 3783 -60% 4414 -54%

Populist Precincts 2734 1130 -59% 1225 -55%

Princeton 241 100 -59% 127 -47%

Snow Hill 125 56 -55% 54 -57%

Frankfurt 35 30 -14% 27 -23%

N. Farmersville 519 260 -50% 217 -58%

Verona 117 32 -73% 48 -59%

St. Paul 97 30 -69% 74 -24%

Copeville 207 93 -55% 56 -73%

Blue Ridge 364 137 -62% 198 -46%

Graybill 141 26 -82% 43 -70%

Lick Prairie 123 15 -88% 30 -76%

Pike 182 65 -64% 60 -67%

Josephine 121 79 -35% 83 -31%

Wylie 340 177 -48% 160 -53%

Seven Points 122 30 -75% 48 -61%

105

In Collin County, where the Populists had had a sympathetic press and less

economic duress, the decline in participation in strongly Populist precincts, characteristic

of every other county in North Texas from 1896 to 1902, had been less and more closely

resembled the county-wide decline in voting. Table VI shows that overall the county only

voted at 40 percent of its 1896 level and that the Populist voters tallied only one percent

better. The presidential election of 1904 reveals much of the same pattern. The county-

wide average increased by six percent over the previous election, and the Populist

precincts increased by only four percent leaving, these categories within one percentage

point of each other.

This analysis of the effect of the poll tax on the strongly Populist areas raises a

question: If ex-Populists opposed the poll tax, but intended to continue to vote, at least in

the same percentages as their Democratic counterparts, then why did they oppose it? A

historian of the earlier scholarship of Populism might say that this was evidence that the

typical Populist was a high-minded voter and opposed the poll tax on principle alone, but

this study has shown that most Populists, like many voters, did not make their decisions

on issues or politicians based on sound principle or ideology. It appears that ex-Populists

participating in politics in 1902 opposed the poll tax because it would require more

money and effort in order to vote and because it just did not seem right. This "gut

reaction" to the poll tax was consistent with the political tradition these same voters

exhibited only a few years earlier. In 1902 they remained in the same isolated areas as in

1896, and society continued to move past them as it had in 1896, but by 1902 the only

forum in which they could express their distrust was at the polls. By this time every other

106

forum had disappeared. There were no more Populist "revival" meetings, no more

Populist weeklies containing articles and letters with views to which they could relate,

and their movement by this time was not longer respectable.

While the fact remains that voters in strongly Populist areas abandoned the

political process before 1902 in higher percentages than other voters, the fact also

remains that many were still voting, though as Democrats. Those voters who dropped out

of politics demonstrated their distrust, disgust, and frustration with "the system" by

leaving it. The ex-Populists still voting in 1902 were "hard-core" voters and chose to

participate as Democrats, which at this time was the only viable and legitimate party.

Though still highly skeptical of "the system," these ex-Populists were committed to the

political process and voted regardless of the new prerequisites, which they had opposed.

While many Populists demonstrated their skepticism and frustration by abstaining from

the ballot, the ones who remained active in politics, even as Democrats, demonstrated

their skepticism and frustration through the use of the ballot by opposing such policies of

the Democratic Party as the poll tax.

APPENDIX I

PRECINCT-LEVEL ELECTION RETURNS,

COLLIN COUNTY, TEXAS,

1892-1904

107

PRECINCT-LEVEL ELECTION RETURNS,

COLLIN COUNTY, TEXAS,

1892-1904

November 8,1892/Gubernatorial Election

Precincts Reform Dem: Hogg

Bourbon Dem: Clark

Pop: Nugent

Totals % Ref Dem

% Bour Dem

% Pop

N. McKinney 423 327 218 968 44% 34% 23%

S. McKinney 373 262 263 898 42% 29% 29%

N. Farmersville 190 52 322 564 34% 9% 57%

S. Farmersville 233 77 142 452 52% 17% 31%

Anna 172 121 69 362 48% 33% 19%

Weston 403 66 83 552 73% 12% 15%

Piano 385 92 48 525 73% 18% 9%

Rockhiii 145 24 36 205 71% 12% 18%

Millwood 134 4 30 168 80% 2% 18%

Seven Points 26 38 42 106 25% 36% 40%

Blue Ridge 130 5 108 243 53% 2% 44%

Lebanon 198 12 25 235 84% 5% 11%

Decatur 159 11 50 220 72% 5% 23%

Rhea Mill 106 35 45 186 57% 19% 24%

Melissa 60 101 70 231 26% 44% 30%

Allen 240 15 60 315 76% 5% 19%

Wamble Box 39 0 58 97 40% 0% 60%

Morris S. H. 57 5 47 109 52% 5% 43%

Graybill 50 3 57 110 45% 3% 52%

Celina 97 41 40 178 54% 23% 22%

Frankfurt 19 0 8 27 70% 0% 30%

108

Precincts Reform Dem: Hogg

Bourbon Dem: Clark

Pop: Nugent

Totals % Ref Dem

% Bour Dem

% Pop

Nevada 249 5 89 343 73% 1% 26%

Pilgrim 94 1 36 131 72% 1% 27%

Nickleville 140 34 101 275 51% 12% 37%

Lick Prairie 33 2 23 58 57% 3% 40%

Valdasta 81 45 21 147 55% 31% 14%

Copeville 91 13 69 173 53% 8% 40%

Princeton 33 11 78 122 27% 9% 64%

TOTALS 4360 1402 2238 8000 55% 18% 28%

November 8,1892/Presidential Election

109

Precinct Dem: Rep: Pop: Totals % % % Cleveland Harrison Weaver Dem Rep Pop

N. McKinney 577 199 201 977 59% 20% 21%

S. McKinney 472 86 234 792 60% 11% 30%

N. Farmersville 229 15 325 569 40% 3% 57%

S. Farmersville 275 31 142 448 61% 7% 32%

Anna 225 82 63 370 61% 22% 17%

Weston 414 60 81 555 75% 11% 15%

Piano 410 69 39 518 79% 13% 8%

Rockhill 145 30 36 211 69% 14% 17%

Millwood 129 5 30 164 79% 3% 18%

Seven Points 58 18 30 106 55% 17% 28%

Blue Ridge 133 34 80 247 54% 14% 32%

Lebanon 193 26 19 238 81% 11% 8%

Decatur 153 18 47 218 70% 8% 22%

Rhea Mill 120 30 39 189 63% 16% 21%

Melissa 127 51 55 233 55% 22% 24%

Allen 220 30 66 316 70% 9% 21%

Wamble Box 40 1 56 97 41% 1% 58%

Morris S. H. 61 7 41 109 56% 6% 38%

Graybill 52 3 55 110 47% 3% 50%

Celina 126 13 40 179 70% 7% 22%

Frankfurt 18 1 7 26 69% 4% 27%

Nevada 248 8 88 344 72% 2% 26%

Pilgrim 94 7 33 134 70% 5% 25%

Nickleville 176 7 89 272 65% 3% 33%

Lick Prairie 36 1 23 60 60% 2% 38%

Valdasta 117 26 19 162 72% 16% 12%

Copeville 101 7 61 169 60% 4% 36%

110

Precinct Dem: Rep: Pop: Totals % % % Cleveland Harrison Weaver Dem Rep Pop

Princeton 39 15 70 124 31% 12% 56%

TOTALS 4988 880 2069 7937 63% 11% 26%

November 6,1894/Gubernatorial Election

111

Precinct Dem: Rep: Pop: Totals % % % Culberson Makemson Nugent Dem Rep Pop

N. McKinney 513 136 228 877 58% 16% 26%

S. McKinney 407 114 259 780 52% 15% 33%

N. Farmersville 140 4 318 462 30% 1% 69%

S. Farmersville 297 9 218 524 57% 2% 42%

Anna 164 36 66 266 62% 14% 25%

Weston 305 57 184 546 56% 10% 34%

Piano 362 9 89 460 79% 2% 19%

Rockhill 107 14 74 195 55% 7% 38%

Millwood 89 1 30 120 74% 1% 25%

Blue Ridge 127 39 154 320 40% 12% 48%

Seven Points 41 4 30 75 55% 5% 40%

Lebanon 133 7 36 176 76% 4% 20%

Decatur 106 0 59 165 64% 0% 36%

Rhea Mill 79 5 50 134 59% 4% 37%

Melissa 106 15 89 210 50% 7% 42%

Allen 150 12 59 221 68% 5% 27%

Verona 32 1 59 92 35% 1% 64%

St. Paul 29 2 48 79 37% 3% 61%

Graybill 62 5 63 130 48% 4% 48%

Celina 114 18 38 170 67% 11% 22%

Frankfurt 5 0 12 17 29% 0% 71%

Nevada 149 0 62 211 71% 0% 29%

Pike 77 3 61 141 55% 2% 43%

Wylie 144 3 106 253 57% 1% 42%

Lick Prairie 40 1 32 73 55% 1% 44%

Valdasta 71 5 41 117 61% 4% 35%

112

Precinct Dem: Rep: Pop: Totals % % % Culberson Makemson Nugent Dem Rep Pop

Copeville 109 3 104 216 50% 1% 48%

Princeton 22 12 103 137 16% 9% 75%

Snow Hill 25 1 79 105 24% 1% 75%

Josephine 56 2 42 100 56% 2% 42%

TOTALS 4061 518 2793 7372 55% 7% 38%

114

Precinct Dem: Pop: Totals % % % Culberson Kearby Dem Rep Pop

Copeville 120 87 207 58% 42% 42%

Princeton 95 146 241 39% 61% 61%

Snow Hill 38 87 125 30% 70% 70%

Josephine 80 41 121 66% 34% 34%

Levon 69 25 94 73% 27% 27%

Roseland 99 46 145 68% 32% 32%

TOTALS 5708 3860 9568 60% 40% 40%

November 3,1896 Presidential Election

115

Precinct Dem: Rep: Pop: Totals % % % Bryan McKinley Bryan Dem Rep Pop

N. McKinney 585 391 108 1084 54% 36% 10%

S. McKinney 575 348 106 1029 56% 34% 10%

N. Farmersville 243 5 162 410 59% 1% 40%

S. Farmersville 519 37 75 631 82% 6% 12%

Anna 243 113 33 389 62% 29% 8%

Weston 419 100 65 584 72% 17% 11%

Piano 471 101 36 608 77% 17% 6%

Rockhill 157 73 19 249 63% 29% 8%

Millwood 110 13 10 133 83% 10% 8%

Blue Ridge 139 111 98 348 40% 32% 28%

Seven Points 41 20 7 68 60% 29% 10%

Lebanon 256 39 18 313 82% 12% 6%

Decatur 212 13 25 250 85% 5% 10%

Rhea Mills 102 48 12 162 63% 30% 7%

Melissa 150 90 23 263 57% 34% 9%

Allen 246 47 35 328 75% 14% 11%

Verona 57 20 40 117 49% 17% 34%

St. Paul 49 11 36 96 51% 11% 38%

Graybill 76 18 46 140 54% 13% 33%

Celina 115 24 12 151 76% 16% 8%

Frankfurt 32 3 2 37 86% 8% 5%

Nevada 202 9 34 245 82% 4% 14%

Pike 96 16 64 176 55% 9% 36%

Wylie 223 48 64 335 67% 14% 19%

Lick Prairie 68 13 41 122 56% 11% 34%

Valdasta 89 75 15 179 50% 42% 8%

Copeville 150 4 54 208 72% 2% 26%

116

Precinct Dem: Bryan

Rep: McKinley

Pop: Bryan

Totals % Dem

% Rep

% Pop

Princeton 107 48 84 239 45% 20% 35%

Snow Hill 44 10 69 123 36% 8% 56%

Josephine 96 9 14 119 81% 8% 12%

Levon 69 3 20 92 75% 3% 22%

Roseland 112 30 9 151 74% 20% 6%

TOTALS 6053 1890 1436 9379 65% 20% 15%

November 8,1898/Gubernatorial Election

117

Precinct Dem: Rep: Pop: Totals % % % Sayers Bailey Gibbs Dem Rep Pop

N. McKinney 437 3 64 504 87% 1% 13%

S. McKinney 336 23 115 474 71% 5% 24%

N. Farmersville 194 6 229 429 45% 1% 53%

S. Farmersville 277 1 152 430 64% 0% 35%

Anna 196 0 57 253 77% 0% 23%

Weston 213 1 69 283 75% 0% 24%

Piano 228 1 28 257 89% 0% 11%

Rockhill 68 0 24 92 74% 0% 26%

Millwood 54 0 16 70 77% 0% 23%

Blue Ridge 129 7 117 253 51% 3% 46%

Seven Points 34 0 24 58 59% 0% 41%

Lebanon 104 1 16 121 86% 1% 13%

Decatur 105 0 14 119 88% 0% 12%

Rhea Mills 46 0 9 55 84% 0% 16%

Melissa 141 1 13 155 91% 1% 8%

Allen 88 0 17 105 84% 0% 16%

Verona 39 0 37 76 51% 0% 49%

St. Paul 26 0 18 44 59% 0% 41%

Graybill 50 0 31 81 62% 0% 38%

Celina 50 0 15 65 77% 0% 23%

Frankfurt 43 0 0 43 100% 0% 0%

Nevada 82 3 18 103 80% 3% 17%

Pike 59 0 62 121 49% 0% 51%

Wylie 130 1 53 184 71% 1% 29%

Lick Prairie 28 0 18 46 61% 0% 39%

Valdasta 83 0 14 97 86% 0% 14%

Copeville 66 3 44 113 58% 3% 39%

118

Precinct Dem: Rep: Pop: Totals % % % Sayers Bailey Gibbs Dem Rep Pop

Princeton 46 3 43 92 50% 3% 47%

Snow Hill 25 0 59 84 30% 0% 70%

Josephine 53 0 24 77 69% 0% 31%

Levon 34 0 10 44 77% 0% 23%

Roseland 80 0 15 95 84% 0% 16%

Lucas 70 0 33 103 68% 0% 32%

TOTALS 3614 54 1458 5126 71% 1% 28%

November 6,1900/Gubernatorial Election

119

Precinct Dem: Rep: Pop: Totals % % % Sayers Hanney McMinn Dem Rep Pop

N. McKinney 514 175 7 696 74% 25% 1%

S. McKinney 421 176 13 610 69% 29% 2%

N. Farmersville 195 41 16 252 77% 16% 6%

S. Farmersville 436 77 13 526 83% 15% 2%

Anna 208 58 11 277 75% 21% 4%

Weston 317 81 12 410 77% 20% 3%

Piano 363 61 1 425 85% 14% 0%

Rockhill 112 36 2 150 75% 24% 1%

Millwood 78 6 3 87 90% 7% 3%

Blue Ridge 183 117 24 324 56% 36% 7%

Seven Points 70 23 3 96 73% 24% 3%

Lebanon 178 21 2 201 89% 10% 1%

Decatur 139 6 5 150 93% 4% 3%

Rhea Mills 87 32 2 121 72% 26% 2%

Melissa 154 50 4 208 74% 24% 2%

Allen 147 36 0 183 80% 20% 0%

Verona 54 32 8 94 57% 34% 9%

St. Paul 51 21 2 74 69% 28% 3%

Graybill 61 40 10 111 55% 36% 9%

Celina 89 10 1 100 89% 10% 1%

Frankfurt 58 I 0 59 98% 2% 0%

Nevada 182 9 0 191 95% 5% 0%

Pike 93 27 9 129 72% 21% 7%

Wylie 223 33 9 265 84% 12% 3%

Lick Prairie 47 25 4 76 62% 33% 5%

Valdasta 96 35 0 131 73% 27% 0%

Copeville 89 20 5 114 78% 18% 4%

120

Precinct Dem: Sayers

Rep: Hanney

Pop: McMinn

Totals % Dem

% Rep %

Pop

Princeton 109 77 9 195 56% 39% 5%

Snow Hill 55 18 6 79 70% 23% 8%

Josephine 91 25 2 118 77% 21% 2%

Levon 58 7 0 65 89% 11% 0%

Roseland 93 10 0 103 90% 10% 0%

Lucas 135 17 3 155 87% 11% 2%

Altoga 41 82 8 131 31% 63% 6%

Climax 51 35 13 99 52% 35% 13%

TOTALS 5278 1520 207 7005 75% 22% 3%

1900 Presidential Election

121

Precinct Dem: Bryan

Rep: McKinley

Pop: Park

Totals % Dem

% Rep

% Pop

N. McKinney 485 204 6 695 70% 29% 1%

S. McKinney 398 21 10 429 93% 5% 2%

N. Farmersville 196 44 5 245 80% 18% 2%

S. Farmersville 435 77 7 519 84% 15% 1%

Anna 207 90 10 307 67% 29% 3%

Weston 298 85 10 393 76% 22% 3%

Piano 364 61 0 425 86% 14% 0%

Rockhill 96 57 2 155 62% 37% 1%

Millwood 79 6 2 87 91% 7% 2%

Blue Ridge 187 123 14 324 58% 38% 4%

Seven Points 71 23 2 96 74% 24% 2%

Lebanon 181 22 0 203 89% 11% 0%

Decatur 138 9 5 152 91% 6% 3%

Rhea Mills 81 32 2 115 70% 28% 2%

Melissa 143 54 4 201 71% 27% 2%

Allen 146 37 0 183 80% 20% 0%

Verona 60 37 1 98 61% 38% 1%

St. Paul 54 23 3 80 68% 29% 4%

Graybill 65 41 8 114 57% 36% 7%

Celina 86 14 1 101 85% 14% 1%

Frankfurt 58 1 0 59 98% 2% 0%

Nevada 182 9 0 191 95% 5% 0%

Pike 96 27 7 130 74% 21% 5%

Wylie 218 43 8 269 81% 16% 3%

Lick Prairie 49 27 2 78 63% 35% 3%

Valdasta 95 59 1 155 61% 38% 1%

Copeville 96 21 1 118 81% 18% 1%

122

Precinct Dem: Bryan

Rep: McKinley

Pop: Park

Totals % Dem

% Rep %

Pop

Princeton 107 93 10 210 51% 44% 5%

Snow Hill 51 21 6 78 65% 27% 8%

Josephine 91 26 2 119 76% 22% 2%

Levon 58 7 0 65 89% 11% 0%

Roseland 92 15 0 107 86% 14% 0%

Lucas 136 18 1 155 88% 12% 1%

Altoga 39 83 8 130 30% 64% 6%

Climax 52 36 12 100 52% 36% 12%

TOTALS 5190 1546 150 6886 75% 22% 2%

123

1902 Gubernatorial Election

Precinct Dem: Prohib: Lantham Carroll

Pop: Mallett

Totals % Dem

% % Pro Pop

N. McKinney

S. McKinney

N. Farmersville

S. Farmersville

Anna

Weston

Piano

Rockhill

Millwood

Blue Ridge

Seven Points

Lebanon

Decatur

Rhea Mills

Melissa

Allen

Verona

St. Paul

Graybill

Celina

Renner

Nevada

Pike

Wylie

Lick Prairie

Valdasta

Copeville

291 3 42 336 87% 1% 13%

262 4 24 290 90% 1% 8%

219 2 22 243 90% 1% 9%

252 0 8 260 97% 0% 3%

134 11 23 168 80% 7% 14%

182 1 28 211 86% 0% 13%

274 5 21 300 91% 2% 7%

46 2 6 54 85% 4% 11%

45 0 0 45 100% 0% 0%

110 0 27 137 80% 0% 20%

30 0 0 30 100% 0% 0% 72 0 4 76 95% 0% 5%

58 0 1 59 98% 0% 2% 47 0 9 56 84% 0% 16%

104 2 6 112 93% 2% 5% 62 0 9 71 87% 0% 13% 32 0 0 32 100% 0% 0% 29 0 1 30 97% 0% 3% 23 0 3 26 88% 0% 12% 89 0 1 90 99% 0% 1% 29 0 1 30 97% 0% 3%

124 2 10 136 91% 1% 7% 60 0 5 65 92% 0% 8%

166 3 8 177 94% 2% 5% 15 0 0 15 100% 0% 0% 53 0 15 68 78% 0% 22% 87 1 5 93 94% 1% 5%

124

Precinct Dem: Prohib: Pop: Totals % % % Lantham Carroll Mallett Dem Pro Pop

Princeton 83 0 17 100 83% 0% 17%

Snow Hill 52 0 4 56 93% 0% 7%

Josephine 69 0 10 79 87% 0% 13%

Levon 52 0 1 53 98% 0% 2%

Roseland 58 0 5 63 92% 0% 8%

Lucas 49 0 3 52 94% 0% 6%

Altoga 27 4 16 47 57% 9% 34%

Climax 48 0 0 48 100% 0% 0%

Culleoka 53 1 21 75 71% 1% 28%

TOTALS 3386 41 356 3783 90% 1% 9%

November 8,1904/GubernatoriaI Election

125

Precinct Lanham Lowden Totals % Dem

% Rep

N. W. McKinney 226 36 262 86% 14%

S. W. McKinney 147 55 202 73% 27%

S. E. McKinney 164 79 243 67% 33%

N. E. McKinney 89 54 143 62% 38%

Allen 88 18 106 83% 17%

Lucas 44 2 46 96% 4%

Lick Priarie 19 11 30 63% 37%

Culleoka 44 29 73 60% 40%

Princeton 66 61 127 52% 48%

Altoga 25 48 73 34% 66%

N. Farmersville 191 26 217 88% 12%

S. Farmersville 193 1

12 205 94% 6%

Climax 25 23 48 52% 48%

Verona 28 20 48 58% 42%

Snow Hill 47 7 54 87% 13%

Melissa 112 27 139 81% 19%

Anna 135 46 181 75% 25%

Westminster 53 21 74 72% 28%

Valdasta 46 32 78 59% 41%

Weston 214 57 271 79% 21%

Roseland 36 12 48 75% 25%

Celina 110 39 149 74% 26%

Piano 250 31 281 89% 11%

Renner 26 1 27 96% 4%

Murphy 74 3 77 96% 4%

Dump 27 4 31 87% 13%

126

Precinct Lanham Lowden Totals % Dent

% Rep

Wylie 150 10 160 94% 6%

Rhea Mill 30 25 55 55% 45%

Prosper 94 24 118 80% 20%

Frisco 91 13 104 88% 13%

Lebanon 81 11 92 88% 12%

Millwood 37 6 43 86% 14%

Levon 42 0 42 100% 0%

Copeville 51 5 56 91% 9%

Nevada 118 9 127 93% 7%

Josephine 62 21 83 75% 25%

Blue Ridge 134 64 198 68% 32%

Graybill 30 13 43 70% 30%

Pike 48 12 60 80% 20%

TOTALS 3447 967 4414 78% 22%

127

November 8,1904/Presidential Election

Precinct Dem: Parker

Rep: Roosevelt

Totals % Dem % Rep

N. W. McKinney 226 36 262 86% 14%

S. W. McKinney 146 35 181 81% 19%

S. E. McKinney 163 82 245 67% 33%

N. E. McKinney 90 53 143 63% 37%

Allen 87 19 106 82% 18%

Lucas 44 2 46 96% 4%

Lick Priarie 19 11 30 63% 37%

Culleoka 44 29 73 60% 40%

Princeton 66 64 130 51% 49%

Altoga 25 48 73 34% 66%

N. Farmersviile 189 27 216 88% 13%

S. Farmersviile 193 12 205 94% 6%

Climax 25 22 47 53% 47%

Verona 27 22 49 55% 45%

Snow Hill 44 7 51 86% 14%

Melissa 109 29 138 79% 21%

Anna 135 47 182 74% 26%

Westminster 53 21 74 72% 28%

Valdasta 47 32 79 59% 41%

Weston 215 57 272 79% 21%

Roseland 36 11 47 77% 23%

Celina 110 39 149 74% 26%

Piano 249 32 281 89% 11%

Renner 26 1 27 96% 4%

Murphy 74 3 77 96% 4%

Wylie 149 7 156 96% 4%

Rhea Mill 30 26 56 54% 46%

128

Precinct Dem: Parker

Rep: Roosevelt

Totals % Dem % Rep

Prosper 94 24 118 80% 20% Frisco 92 13 105 88% 12% Lebanon 80 11 91 88% 12% Millwood 38 6 44 86% 14% Levon 42 0 42 100% 0% Copeville 53 5 58 91% 9% Nevada 116 9 125 93% 7% Josephine 61 21 82 74% 26% Blue Ridge 133 65 198 67% 33% Graybill 30 13 43 70% 30% Pike 45 13 58 78% 22% TOTALS 3405 954 4359 78% 22%

APPENDIX II

PRECINCT-LEVEL ELECTION RETURNS,

COOKE COUNTY, TEXAS,

1892-1904

129

PRECINCT-LEVEL ELECTION RETURNS,

COOKE COUNTY, TEXAS,

1892-1904

130

November 8,1892/Gubernatorial Election

Precinct Reform Dem: Hogg

Bourbon Dem: Clark

Pop: Nugent

Totals % Ref Dem

% Bour Dem

% Pop

Gainseville: Prec. 1

177 164 17 359 49% 46% 5%

Prec. 2 127 157 46 332 38% 47% 14%

Prec. 3 249 208 52 512 49% 41% 10%

Prec. 4 305 184 149 642 48% 29% 23%

Dexter 177 23 86 286 62% 8% 30%

Walnut Bend 29 5 17 51 57% 10% 33%

Burden School House

40 8 92 140 29% 6% 66%

Mount Springs 158 2 51 211 75% 1% 24%

Burn's City 50 3 95 148 34% 2% 64%

Rosston 110 21 23 154 71% 14% 15%

Live Oak 37 4 6 47 79% 9% 13%

Marysville 94 3 70 167 56% 2% 42%

Bulcher 56 2 93 151 37% 1% 62%

Moss's Store 64 5 8 77 83% 6% 10%

Valley View 97 29 47 173 56% 17% 27%

Eta 148 9 2 159 93% 6% 1%

Callisburg 208 34 45 287 72% 12% 16%

Woodbine 82 11 71 164 50% 7% 43%

Reed 21 3 6 30 70% 10% 20%

Muenster 66 61 6 133 50% 46% 5%

131

Precinct Reform Bourbon Totals % % % Dem: Dem: Pop: Ref Bour Pop Hogg Clark Nugent Dem Dem

Bloomfleld 62 31 85 178 35% 17% 48%

Warren's Bend 39 1 1 41 95% 2% 2%

TOTALS 2396 968 1068 4442 54% 22% 24%

November 6,1894/Gubernatorial Election

132

Precinct Dem: Culber-son

Rep: Makem-son

Pop: Nugent

Totals % Dem

% Rep

% Pop

Gainseville: Prec. 1

235 13 43 292 80% 30% 15%

Prec. 2 202 11 60 275 73% 18% 22%

Prec. 3 236 40 122 401 59% 33% 30%

Prec. 4 326 22 213 565 58% 10% 38%

Dexter 143 4 76 223 64% 5% 34%

Walnut Bend 64 0 30 94 68% 0% 32%

Burden School House

35 10 84 129 27% 12% 65%

Mount Springs 16 0 61 77 21% 0% 79%

Burn's City 40 5 90 135 30% 6% 67%

Rosston 123 2 24 149 83% 8% 16%

Live Oak 28 0 19 47 60% 0% 40%

Marysville 85 0 59 144 59% 0% 41%

Bulcher 35 0 127 162 22% 0% 78%

Moss's Store 36 1 14 51 71% 7% 27%

Valley View 144 6 69 219 66% 9% 32%

Era 150 1 42 193 78% 2% 22%

Callisburg 161 3 53 217 74% 6% 24%

Woodbine 56 19 90 165 34% 21% 55%

Reed 27 0 5 32 84% 0% 16%

Muenster 138 0 2 140 99% 0% 1%

Bloomfield 50 5 123 178 28% 4% 69%

Warren's Bend 33 2 18 53 62% 11% 34%

Lindsay 36 0 1 37 97% 0% 3%

TOTALS 2399 144 1425 3968 60% 10% 36%

November 3, 1896/Gubernatorial Election

133

Precinct Dem: Pop: Totals % % Culberson Kearby Dem Pop

Gainseville: Prec. 1 243 150 393 62% 38%

Prec. 2 208 132 340 61% 39%

Prec. 3 341 222 563 61% 39%

Prec. 4 431 313 744 58% 42%

Dexter 223 55 278 80% 20%

Coesfield 79 21 100 79% 21%

Burton School House 62 94 156 40% 60%

Mount Springs 27 65 92 29% 71%

Burn's City 61 108 169 36% 64%

Bloomfield 73 137 210 35% 65%

Rosston 122 18 140 87% 13%

Leo 44 11 55 80% 20%

Felker 38 3 41 93% 7%

Freemound 44 8 52 85% 15%

Marysville 136 74 210 65% 35%

Bulcher 65 106 171 38% 62%

Sivel's Bend 77 20 97 79% 21%

Warren's Bend 52 74 126 41% 59%

Valley View 166 94 260 64% 36%

Era 200 32 232 86% 14%

Callisburg 279 62 341 82% 18%

Woodbine 89 93 182 49% 51%

Reed 33 2 35 94% 6%

Muenster 201 12 213 94% 6%

Lindsay 70 0 70 100% 0%

TOTALS 3364 1906 5270 64% 36%

November 3,1896/Presidential Election

134

Precinct Dem: Bryan

Rep: McKinley

Pop: Bryan

Totals % Dem

% Rep % Pop

Gainseville: Prec. 1

235 129 31 396 59% 33% 8%

Prec. 2 220 99 21 342 64% 29% 6%

Prec. 3 355 185 29 572 62% 32% 5%

Prec. 4 443 185 130 762 58% 24% 17%

Dexter 220 21 41 282 78% 7% 15%

Coesfield 79 1 20 100 79% 1% 20%

Burton School House

67 18 72 157 43% 11% 46%

Mount Springs 26 10 55 91 29% 11% 60%

Burn's City 66 22 74 162 41% 14% 46%

Bloomfield 91 40 77 208 44% 19% 37%

Rosston 127 7 11 145 88% 5% 8%

Leo 45 1 9 55 82% 2% 16%

Felker 38 2 0 40 95% 5% 0%

Freemound 49 2 0 51 96% 4% 0%

Marysville 147 6 54 207 71% 3% 26%

Butcher 88 11 70 169 52% 7% 41%

Sivel's Bend 72 15 12 99 73% 15% 12%

Warren's Bend 57 0 6 63 90% 0% 10%

Valley View 180 37 46 263 68% 14% 17%

Era 209 4 21 234 89% 2% 9%

Callisburg 289 22 34 345 84% 6% 10%

Woodbine 98 28 59 185 53% 15% 32%

Reed 32 1 1 34 94% 3% 3%

Muenster 200 4 3 207 97% 2% 1%

Lindsay 69 0 0 69 100% 0% 0%

TOTALS 3502 850 876 5238 67% 16% 17%

November 8,1898/Gubernatorial Election

135

Precinct Dem: Sayers

Pop: Gibbs

Totals % Dem

% Pop

Gainseville: Prec. 1

162 7 169 96% 4%

Prec. 2 125 10 135 93% 7%

Prec. 3 157 14 171 92% 8%

Prec. 4 293 44 337 87% 13%

Dexter 122 17 139 88% 12%

Coesfield 42 1 43 98% 2%

Burden School House

55 72 127 43% 57%

Mount Springs 39 19 58 67% 33%

Burn's City 44 36 80 55% 45%

Bloomfield 48 37 85 56% 44%

Rosston 63 7 70 90% 10%

Leo 28 11 39 72% 28%

Hood 29 0 29 100% 0%

Freemound 24 1 25 96% 4%

Marysville 82 18 100 82% 18%

Butcher 18 32 50 36% 64%

Sivel's Bend 28 6 34 82% 18%

Warren's Bend 20 0 20 100% 0%

Valley View 144 30 174 83% 17%

Era 122 14 136 90% 10%

Callisburg 122 6 128 95% 5%

Woodbine 50 11 61 82% 18%

Putte's Store 20 0 20 100% 0%

Muenster 123 0 123 100% 0%

136

Precinct Dem: Sayers

Pop: Gibbs

Totals % Dem

% Pop

Lindsay 51 0 51 100% 0%

Hemmings 37 25 62 60% 40%

Tyler Bluff 18 9 27 67% 33%

Dye School House 16 13 29 55% 45%

TOTALS 2082 440 2522 83% 17%

November 6,1900/Gubernatorial Election

137

Precinct Dem: Rep: Pop: Totals % % % Sayers Hannay McMinn Dem Rep Pop

Gainsevilie: Prec. 1 240 43 0 283 85% 15% 0%

Prec. 2 175 43 0 218 80% 20% 0%

Prec. 3 262 116 0 378 69% 31% 0%

Prec. 4 261 48 0 309 84% 16% 0%

Prec. 5 202 60 0 262 77% 23% 0%

Dexter 186 9 0 195 95% 5% 0%

Coesfield 76 0 0 76 100% 0% 0%

Burton School House 73 10 0 83 88% 12% 0%

Mount Spring 32 10 0 42 76% 24% 0%

Burn's City 48 9 0 57 84% 16% 0%

Bloomfield 69 46 4 119 58% 39% 3%

Rosston 91 10 3 104 88% 10% 3%

Leo 42 0 5 47 89% 0% 11%

Hood 55 9 0 64 86% 14% 0%

Freemound 32 0 0 32 100% 0% 0%

Marysville 135 3 0 138 98% 2% 0%

Bulcher 59 12 6 77 77% 16% 8%

Sivel's Bend 53 0 0 53 100% 0% 0%

Warren's Bend 42 0 0 42 100% 0% 0%

Valley View 178 33 0 211 84% 16% 0%

Era 143 9 0 152 94% 6% 0%

Callisburg 220 19 0 239 92% 8% 0%

Woodbine 99 44 0 143 69% 31% 0%

Myra 67 0 0 67 100% 0% 0%

Muenster 200 1 0 201 100% 0% 0%

Lindsay 89 1 0 90 99% 1% 0%

138

Precinct Dem: Sayers

Rep: Hannay

Pop: McMinn

Totals % Dem

% Rep

% Pop

Hemmings 51 6 0 57 89% 11% 0%

Tyler Bluff 23 0 0 23 100% 0% 0%

Dye School House 35 9 0 44 80% 20% 0%

TOTALS 3238 550 18 3806 85% 14% 0%

November 6,1900/Presidential Election

139

Precinct Dem: Bryan

Rep: McKinley

Pop: Park

Totals % Dem

% Rep % Pop

Gainseville: Prec. 1 236 49 0 285 83% 17% 0%

Prec. 2 174 43 0 217 80% 20% 0%

Prec. 3 262 117 0 379 69% 31% 0%

Prec. 4 262 49 0 311 84% 16% 0%

Prec. 5 195 62 0 257 76% 24% 0%

Dexter 186 9 0 195 95% 5% 0%

Coesfield 73 10 0 83 88% 12% 0%

Burton School House 73 9 0 82 89% 11% 0%

Mount Spring 33 9 0 42 79% 21% 0%

Burn's City 70 0 0 70 100% 0% 0%

Bloomfield 70 47 4 117 60% 40% 3%

Rosston 89 10 3 99 90% 10% 3%

Leo 42 0 5 42 100% 0% 12%

Hood 55 9 0 64 86% 14% 0%

Freemound 31 1 0 32 97% 3% 0%

Marysville 135 4 0 139 97% 3% 0%

Bulcher 62 17 1 79 78% 22% 1%

Sivel's Bend 52 7 0 59 88% 12% 0%

Warren's Bend 41 0 0 41 100% 0% 0%

Valley View 179 32 0 211 85% 15% 0%

Era 141 9 0 150 94% 6% 0%

Callisburg 220 19 0 239 92% 8% 0%

Woodbine 98 44 0 142 69% 31% 0%

Myra 63 6 0 69 91% 9% 0%

Muenster 199 1 0 200 100% 1% 0%

Lindsay 88 1 0 89 99% 1% 0%

140

Precinct Dem: Bryan

Rep: McKinley

Pop: Park

Totals % Dem

% Rep % Pop

Hemmings 49 6 0 55 89% 11% 0%

Tyler Bluff 23 0 0 23 100% 0% 0%

Dye School House

34 9 0 43 79% 21% 0%

TOTALS 3235 579 13 3814 85% 15% 0%

November 4,1902/Gubernatorial Election

141

Precinct Dem: Lanham

Rep: Burkett

Totals % Dem

% Rep

Gainseville: Prec. 1 188 10 198 95% 5%

Prec. 2 88 8 96 92% 8%

Prec. 3 143 6 149 96% 4%

Prec. 4 144 10 154 94% 6%

Prec. 5 138 4 142 97% 3%

Dexter 117 2 119 98% 2%

Coesfield 45 0 45 100% 0%

Burton School House 43 0 43 100% 0%

Mount Spring 18 5 23 78% 22%

Burn's City 45 4 49 92% 8%

Bloomfield 39 22 61 64% 36%

Rosston 60 7 67 90% 10%

Leo 21 0 21 100% 0%

Hood 37 1 38 97% 3%

Freemound 26 2 28 93% 7%

Marysville 75 0 75 100% 0%

Bulcher 37 4 41 90% 10%

Sivel's Bend 40 2 42 95% 5%

Warren's Bend 19 1 20 95% 5%

Valley View 128 7 135 95% 5%

Era 99 4 103 96% 4%

Callisburg 133 3 136 98% 2%

Woodbine 63 7 70 90% 10%

Myra 59 3 62 95% 5%

Muenster 146 0 146 100% 0%

Lindsay 73 0 73 100% 0%

142

Precinct Dem: Lanham

Rep: Burkett

Totals % Dem

% Rep

Hemmings 20 0 20 100% 0%

Dye School House 27 4 31 87% 13%

TOTALS 2071 116 2187 95% 5%

November 8,1904/Gubernatorial Election

143

Precinct Dem: Lanbam

Rep: Lowden

Totals % Dem

% Rep

Gainseville: Prec. 1 186 16 202 92% 8%

Prec. 2 99 23 122 81% 19%

Prec. 3 153 75 228 67% 33%

Prec. 4 147 36 183 80% 20%

Prec. 5 151 52 203 74% 26%

Dexter 69 4 73 95% 5%

Coesfleld 39 1 40 98% 3%

Burton School House

33 14 47 70% 30%

Mount Spring 17 13 30 57% 43%

Burn's City 39 9 48 81% 19%

Bloomfield 45 35 80 56% 44%

Rosston 37 9 46 80% 20%

Leo 25 1 26 96% 4%

Hood 24 4 28 86% 14%

Freemound 17 5 22 77% 23%

Marysville 51 1 52 98% 2%

Bulcher 19 10 29 66% 34%

Sivel's Bend 47 4 51 92% 8%

Warren's Bend 19 0 19 100% 0%

Valley View 141 17 158 89% 11%

Era 83 9 92 90% 10%

Callisburg 123 14 137 90% 10%

Woodbine 61 23 84 73% 27%

Myra 70 10 80 88% 13%

Muenster 112 9 121 93% 7%

144

Precinct Dem: Lanham

Rep: Lowden

Totals % Dem

% Rep

Lindsay 72 2 74 97% 3%

Hemmings 24 0 24 100% 0%

Tyler Bluff 10 0 10 100% 0%

Dye School House

22 14 36 61% 39%

Delaware Bend 11 0 11 100% 0%

Hayes 18 1 19 95% 5%

TOTALS 1964 411 2375 83% 17%

November 8,1904/Presidential Election

145

Precinct Dem: Parker

Rep: Roosevelt

Totals % Dem

% Rep

Gainseville: Prec. 1 184 17 201 92% 8%

Prec. 2 100 23 123 81% 19%

Prec. 3 151 75 226 67% 33%

Prec. 4 145 36 181 80% 20%

Prec. 5 151 52 203 74% 26%

Dexter 68 73 141 48% 52%

Coesfield 38 2 40 95% 5%

Burton School House

33 14 47 70% 30%

Mount Spring 17 14 31 55% 45%

Burn's City 37 11 48 77% 23%

Bloomfield 44 35 79 56% 44%

Rosston 37 9 46 80% 20%

Leo 25 1 26 96% 4%

Hood 24 4 28 86% 14%

Freemound 17 5 22 77% 23%

Marysville 50 1 51 98% 2%

Bulcher 19 11 30 63% 37%

Sivel's Bend 47 4 51 92% 8%

Warren's Bend 18 0 18 100% 0%

Valley View 139 19 158 88% 12%

Era 82 9 91 90% 10%

Callisburg 122 15 137 89% 11%

Woodbine 61 23 84 73% 27%

Myra 70 10 80 88% 13%

Muenster 110 10 120 92% 8%

146

Precinct Dem: Rep: Totals % % Parker Roosevelt Rep

Lindsay 72 2 74 97% 3% Hemmings 24 0 24 100% 0% Tyler Bluff 10 0 10 100% 0% Dye School House

22 14 36 61% 39%

Delaware Bend 11 1 12 92% 8% Hayes 18 1 19 95% 5% TOTALS 1946 491 2437 80% 20%

APPENDIX III

PRECINCT-LEVEL ELECTION RETURNS,

DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS

1892-1904

147

PRECINCT-LEVEL ELECTION RETURNS

DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS

1892-1904

148

November 8,1892 Gubernatorial Election

Precinct Reform Dem: Hogg

Bour Dem: Clark

Pop: Nugent

Totals % Reform Dem

% Bour Dem

% Pop

Denton: Ward 1 142 111 66 320 44% 35% 21%

Ward 2 89 141 57 289 31% 49% 20%

Ward 3 127 106 9 245 52% 43% 4%

Ward 4 136 110 19 269 51% 41% 7%

Pilot Point 227 236 62 525 43% 45% 12%

Lewisville 213 110 36 359 59% 31% 10%

Little Elm 139 25 64 228 61% 11% 28%

Roanoke 101 59 20 180 56% 33% 11%

Double Oak 88 13 6 107 82% 12% 6%

Bolivar 69 36 57 162 43% 22% 35%

Christal 75 16 7 98 77% 16% 7%

Lloyd 44 20 31 95 46% 21% 33%

Willow Springs 28 7 38 73 38% 10% 52%

Wests 194 10 67 271 72% 4% 25%

Aubrey 50 16 76 142 35% 11% 54%

Mustang 69 10 26 105 66% 10% 25%

Lake School House 65 8 43 116 56% 7% 37%

Garza 81 18 4 103 79% 17% 4%

Argyle 54 50 9 113 48% 44% 8%

149

Precinct Reform Dem: Hogg

Bour Dem: Clark

Pop: Nugent

Totals % Reform Dem

% Bour Dem

% Pop

Parvin 142 13 21 176 81% 7% 12%

Waketon 68 10 29 107 64% 9% 27%

Justin 54 9 6 69 78% 13% 9%

Sanger 50 19 23 92 54% 21% 25%

TOTALS 2305 1153 776 4234 54% 27% 18%

November 8,1892/Presidential Election

150

Precinct Dem: Rep: Pop: Totals % % % Cleveland Harrison Weaver Dem Rep Pop

Denton: Ward 1 207 43 64 315 66% 14% 20%

Ward 2 162 58 57 279 58% 21% 20%

Ward 3 194 31 8 236 82% 13% 3%

Ward 4 211 19 17 251 84% 8% 7%

Pilot Point 344 122 57 523 66% 23% 11%

Lewisville 239 80 33 352 68% 23% 9%

Little Elm 133 0 57 190 70% 0% 30%

Roanoke 194 2 22 218 89% 1% 10%

Double Oak 110 5 4 119 92% 4% 3%

Bolivar 112 7 52 171 65% 4% 30%

Christal 79 7 0 86 92% 8% 0%

Lloyd 97 0 29 126 77% 0% 23%

Willow Springs 51 6 32 89 57% 7% 36%

Wests 37 0 63 100 37% 0% 63%

Aubrey 208 12 64 284 73% 4% 23%

Mustang 54 11 24 89 61% 12% 27%

Lake School House 72 3 43 118 61% 3% 36%

Garza 65 19 4 88 74% 22% 5%

Argyle 109 1 8 118 92% 1% 7%

Parvin 58 8 22 88 66% 9% 25%

Waketon 79 3 27 109 72% 3% 25%

Justin 59 1 6 66 89% 2% 9%

Sanger 70 1 21 92 76% 1% 23%

TOTALS 2944 439 714 4097 72% 11% 17%

November 6,1894/Gubernatorial Election

151

Precinct Dem: Culberson

Rep: Makem son

Pop: Nugent

Totals % Dem

% Rep

% Pop

Denton: Ward 1 154 10 70 235 66% 4% 30%

Ward 2 174 15 98 289 60% 5% 34%

Ward 3 125 4 22 154 81% 3% 14%

Ward 4 202 3 41 250 81% 1% 16%

Pilot Point 234 24 53 311 75% 8% 17%

Lewisville 106 0 58 164 65% 0% 35%

Little Elm 91 0 32 123 74% 0% 26%

Roanoke 57 0 53 110 52% 0% 48%

Double Oak 77 0 25 102 75% 0% 25%

Bolivar 49 4 77 130 38% 3% 59%

Christal 69 0 13 82 84% 0% 16%

Lloyd 38 15 21 74 51% 20% 28%

Willow Springs 19 0 31 50 38% 0% 62%

Wests 214 0 69 283 76% 0% 24%

Aubrey 25 4 111 140 18% 3% 79%

Mustang 49 0 62 111 44% 0% 56%

Lake School House 49 1 55 105 47% 1% 52%

Garza 91 0 39 130 70% 0% 30%

Argyle 37 0 6 43 86% 0% 14%

Parvin 154 0 33 187 82% 0% 18%

Waketon 38 0 27 65 58% 0% 42%

Justin 55 0 14 69 80% 0% 20%

Sanger 62 0 37 99 63% 0% 37%

W. Pilot Point 133 46 42 221 60% 21% 19%

TOTALS 2302 126 1089 3517 65% 4% 31% November 3,1896/Gubernatorial Election

152

Precinct Dem: Culberson

Pop: Kearby

Totals % Dem

% Pop

Denton: Ward i 308 104 412 75% 25%

Ward 2 215 179 394 55% 45%

Ward 3 166 78 244 68% 32%

Ward 4 268 85 353 76% 24%

E. Pilot Point 200 104 304 66% 34%

Lewisville 316 165 481 66% 34%

Little Elm 197 46 243 81% 19%

Roanoke 156 41 197 79% 21%

Double Oak 142 13 155 92% 8%

Bolivar 98 69 167 59% 41%

Christal 68 14 82 83% 17%

Lloyd 132 35 167 79% 21%

Willow Springs 76 35 111 68% 32%

Wests 38 63 101 38% 62%

Aubrey 315 93 408 77% 23%

Mustang 75 53 128 59% 41%

Lake School House 122 42 164 74% 26%

Garza 70 42 112 63% 38%

Argyle 109 45 154 71% 29%

Parvin 92 37 129 71% 29%

Waketon 96 27 123 78% 22%

Justin 91 7 98 93% 7%

Sanger 94 69 163 58% 42%

W. Pilot Point 150 153 303 50% 50%

Slidell 52 25 77 68% 32%

Drop 66 9 75 88% 12%

Krum 69 26 95 73% 27%

TOTALS 3781 1659 5440 70% 30%

November 3,1896/Presidential Election

153

Precinct Dem: Rep: Pop: Totals % % % Bryan McKinley Bryan Dem Rep Pop

Denton: Ward 1 322 71 22 416 77% 17% 5%

Ward 2 218 127 47 394 55% 32% 12%

Ward 3 162 76 3 244 66% 31% 1%

Ward 4 272 61 15 352 77% 17% 4%

E. Pilot Point 219 60 12 291 75% 21% 4%

Lewisville 305 100 50 455 67% 22% 11%

Little Elm 205 24 15 244 84% 10% 6%

Roanoke 175 24 3 202 87% 12% 1%

Double Oak 150 3 6 159 94% 2% 4%

Bolivar 111 11 45 167 66% 7% 27%

Christal 72 9 4 85 85% 11% 5%

Lloyd 134 11 23 168 80% 7% 14%

Willow Springs 86 11 8 105 82% 10% 8%

Wests 46 15 40 101 46% 15% 40%

Aubrey 319 51 42 412 77% 12% 10%

Mustang 77 16 36 129 60% 12% 28%

Lake School House 136 8 19 163 83% 5% 12%

Garza 72 25 16 113 64% 22% 14%

Argyle 109 38 5 152 72% 25% 3%

Parvin 94 5 27 126 75% 4% 21%

Waketon 108 11 7 126 86% 9% 6%

Justin 95 3 4 102 93% 3% 4%

Sanger 98 32 29 159 62% 20% 18%

W. Pilot Point 166 116 16 298 56% 39% 5%

Slidell 57 17 6 80 71% 21% 8%

Drop 66 3 6 75 88% 4% 8%

Krum 70 21 3 94 74% 22% 3%

154

Precinct Dem: Rep: Pop: Totals % % % Bryan McKinley Bryan Dem Rep Pop

TOTALS 3944 949 509 5402 73% 18% 9%

November, 1898/Gubernatorial Election

155

Precinct Dem: Sayers

Pop: Gibbs

Totals % Dem

% Pop

Denton: Ward 1 132 4 136 97% 3%

Ward 2 102 27 129 79% 21%

Ward 3 105 13 118 89% 11%

Ward 4 182 16 198 92% 8%

Pilot Point 165 3 168 98% 2%

Lewisville 134 24 158 85% 15%

Little Elm 100 2 102 98% 2%

Roanoke 84 16 100 84% 16%

Double Oak 40 3 43 93% 7%

Bolivar 71 20 91 78% 22%

Christal 33 1 34 97% 3%

Lloyd 58 6 64 91% 9%

Willow Springs 23 1 24 96% 4%

Wests 22 6 28 79% 21%

Aubrey 137 19 156 88% 12%

Mustang 43 3 46 93% 7%

Lake School House 36 9 45 80% 20%

Garza 32 10 42 76% 24%

Argyle 57 1 58 98% 2%

Parvin 27 4 31 87% 13%

Waketon 47 2 49 96% 4%

Justin 50 1 51 98% 2%

Sanger 104 13 117 89% 11%

W. Pilot Point 108 5 113 96% 4%

Slidell 19 9 28 68% 32%

Drop 32 6 38 84% 16%

Krum 40 0 40 100% 0%

156

Precinct Dem: Pop: Totals % % Sayers Gibbs Dem Pop

TOTALS 1983 224 2207 90% 10%

November 6,1900/Gubernatoriai Election

157

Precinct Dem: Rep: Pop: Totals % % % Sayers Hannay McMinn Dem Rep Pop

Denton: Ward 1 226 0 2 229 99% 0% 1%

Ward 2 192 93 4 291 66% 32% 1%

Ward 3 162 0 2 167 97% 0% 1%

Ward 4 242 0 0 246 98% 0% 0%

Pilot Point 209 39 0 248 84% 16% 0%

Lewisville 303 111 0 414 73% 27% 0%

Little Elm 150 26 1 177 85% 15% 1%

Roanoke 106 40 0 146 73% 27% 0%

Double Oak 85 0 0 85 100% 0% 0%

Bolivar 101 15 3 119 85% 13% 3%

Chris tal 49 5 0 54 91% 9% 0%

Lloyd 109 18 0 127 86% 14% 0%

Willow Springs 52 3 0 55 95% 5% 0%

Wests 64 11 0 75 85% 15% 0%

Aubrey 282 60 3 345 82% 17% 1%

Mustang 65 15 0 80 81% 19% 0%

Lake School House 51 6 6 63 81% 10% 10%

Garza 58 33 0 91 64% 36% 0%

Argyle 82 23 0 105 78% 22% 0%

Parvin 70 6 1 77 91% 8% 1%

Waketon 83 13 0 96 86% 14% 0%

Justin 101 24 0 125 81% 19% 0%

Sanger 193 68 6 267 72% 25% 2%

W. Pilot Point 152 76 0 228 67% 33% 0%

Slidell 27 16 1 44 61% 36% 2%

Drop 36 3 5 44 82% 7% 11%

Krum 87 19 0 106 82% 18% 0%

158

Precinct Dem: Rep: Pop: Totals % % % Sayers Hannay McMinn Dem Rep Pop

Ponder 52 5 1 58 90% 9% 2%

Plainview 28 2 0 30 93% 7% 0%

TOTALS 3417 730 35 4182 82% 17% 1%

November 6,1900/Presidential Election

159

Precinct Dem: Rep: Pop: Totals % % % Bryan McKinley Park Dem Rep Pop

Denton: Ward 1 160 76 2 239 67% 32% 1%

Ward 2 189 96 4 291 65% 33% 1%

Ward 3 157 64 0 224 70% 29% 0%

Ward 4 230 48 0 282 82% 17% 0%

Pilot Point 206 40 0 246 84% 16% 0%

Lewisville 301 114 6 421 71% 27% 1%

Little Elm 150 29 1 180 83% 16% 1%

Roanoke 104 43 0 147 71% 29% 0%

Double Oak 85 0 0 85 100% 0% 0%

Bolivar 104 16 3 123 85% 13% 2%

Christai 49 5 0 54 91% 9% 0%

Lloyd 107 19 0 126 85% 15% 0%

Willow Springs 48 5 0 53 91% 9% 0%

Wests 63 13 2 78 81% 17% 3%

Aubrey 282 65 6 353 80% 18% 2%

Mustang 62 17 0 79 78% 22% 0%

Lake School House 51 7 0 58 88% 12% 0%

Garza 58 33 0 91 64% 36% 0%

Argyle 82 24 1 107 77% 22% 1%

Parvin 70 7 2 79 89% 9% 3%

Waketon 84 16 0 100 84% 16% 0%

Justin 99 24 6 129 77% 19% 5%

Sanger 190 71 0 261 73% 27% 0%

W. Pilot Point 149 76 1 226 66% 34% 0%

Slidell 27 16 5 48 56% 33% 10%

Drop 34 3 0 37 92% 8% 0%

Krum 87 21 0 108 81% 19% 0%

160

Precinct Dem: Bryan

Rep: McKinley

Pop: Park

Totals % Dem

% Rep % Pop

Ponder 51 6 0 57 89% 11% 0%

Plainview 26 3 0 29 90% 10% 0%

TOTALS 3305 957 39 4301 77% 22% 1%

November 4,1902/Gubernatorial Election

161

Precinct Dem: Rep: Totals % % Lanham Burkett Dem Rep

Denton: Ward 1 150 30 180 83% 17%

Ward 2 135 54 189 71% 29%

Ward 3 151 8 159 95% 5%

Ward 4 209 24 233 90% 10%

Pilot Point 116 25 141 82% 18%

Lewisviile 225 47 272 83% 17%

Little Elm 79 24 103 77% 23%

Roanoke 61 3 64 95% 5%

Double Oak 44 9 53 83% 17%

Bolivar 65 6 71 92% 8%

Stoney 32 8 40 80% 20%

Lloyd 59 9 68 87% 13%

Willow Springs 18 0 18 100% 0%

Wests 141 4 145 97% 3%

Aubrey 182 23 205 89% 11%

Mustang 37 3 40 93% 8%

Lake School House 30 5 35 86% 14%

Garza 44 3 47 94% 6%

Argyle 61 10 71 86% 14%

Parvin 30 0 30 100% 0%

Waketon 48 11 59 81% 19%

Justin 59 3 62 95% 5%

Sanger 116 34 150 77% 23%

W. Pilot Point 76 35 111 68% 32%

Slidell 16 4 20 80% 20%

Drop 23 0 23 100% 0%

Krum 64 10 74 86% 14%

162

Precinct Dem: Lanham

Rep: Burkett

Totals % Dem

% Rep

Ponder 34 0 34 100% 0%

Plainview 18 0 18 100% 0%

TOTALS 2323 392 2715 86% 14%

November 8,1904/Gubernatorial Election

163

Precinct Dem: Rep: Totals % % Lanham Lowden Dem Rep

Denton: Ward 1 151 32 183 83% 17%

Ward 2 166 44 210 79% 21%

Ward 3 154 31 185 83% 17%

Ward 4 437 18 455 96% 4%

Pilot Point 139 36 175 79% 21%

Lewisville 176 61 237 74% 26%

Little Elm 84 23 107 79% 21%

Roanoke 86 20 106 81% 19%

Double Oak 52 1 53 98% 2%

Bolivar 65 11 76 86% 14%

Stoney 34 9 43 79% 21%

Lloyd 61 17 78 78% 22%

Willow Springs 28 0 28 100% 0%

Wests 31 7 38 82% 18%

Aubrey 193 28 221 87% 13%

Mustang 45 3 48 94% 6%

Lake School House 33 7 40 83% 18%

Garza 57 8 65 88% 12%

Argyle 52 17 69 75% 25%

Parvin 28 2 30 93% 7%

Waketon 45 14 59 76% 24%

Justin 68 7 75 91% 9%

Sanger 118 42 160 74% 26%

W. Pilot Point 140 54 194 72% 28%

Slidell 12 12 24 50% 50%

Drop 22 0 22 100% 0%

Krum 69 22 91 76% 24%

164

Precinct Dem: Rep: Totals % % Lanham Lowden Dem Rep

Ponder 4 1 5 80% 20%

Plainview 28 1 29 97% 3%

TOTALS 2578 528 3106 83% 17%

November 8,1904/Presidential Election

165

Precinct Dem: Rep: Totals % % Roosevelt Parker Dem Rep

Denton: Ward 1 151 32 183 83% 17%

Ward 2 162 45 207 78% 22%

Ward 3 153 32 185 83% 17%

Ward 4 238 20 258 92% 8%

Pilot Point 139 36 175 79% 21%

Lewisville 176 61 237 74% 26%

Little Elm 83 24 107 78% 22%

Roanoke 85 20 105 81% 19%

Double Oak 51 1 52 98% 2%

Bolivar 65 11 76 86% 14%

Stoney 33 9 42 79% 21%

Lloyd 59 17 76 78% 22%

Willow Springs 28 0 28 100% 0%

Wests 31 7 38 82% 18%

Aubrey 192 29 221 87% 13%

Mustang 45 3 48 94% 6%

Lake School House 33 7 40 83% 18%

Gaza 56 9 65 86% 14%

Argyle 52 14 66 79% 21%

Parvin 28 2 30 93% 7%

Waketon 44 15 59 75% 25%

Justin 67 7 74 91% 9%

Sanger 119 41 160 74% 26%

W. Pilot Point 140 54 194 72% 28%

Slidell 11 12 23 48% 52%

Drop 22 0 22 100% 0%

Krum 69 22 91 76% 24%

166

Precinct Dem: Rep: Totals % % Roosevelt Parker Dem Rep

Ponder 44 1 45 98% 2%

Plainview 28 1 29 97% 3%

TOTALS 2404 532 2936 82% 18%

APPENDIX IV

PRECINCT-LEVEL ELECTION RETURNS,

FANNIN COUNTY, TEXAS

1892-1904

167

168

PRECINCT- LEVEL ELECTION RETURNS,

FANNIN COUNTY, TEXAS

1892-1904

November 8,1892/Gubernatorial Election

Precinct Reform Dem: Hogg

Bourbon Dem: Clark

Pop: Nugent Totals

% Reform Dem

% Bourbon Dem.

% Pop

Bonham 626 684 331 1641 38% 42% 20%

Savoy 336 57 30 423 79% 13% 7%

Orangeville 107 20 116 243 44% 8% 48%

Ladonna 438 151 232 821 53% 18% 28%

Honey Grove 530 444 67 1041 51% 43% 6%

Monkstown 105 62 36 203 52% 31% 18%

New Hope 119 18 174 311 38% 6% 56%

Dodd City 337 159 172 668 50% 24% 26%

Bailey 130 3 175 308 42% 1% 57%

Gober 101 19 153 273 37% 7% 56%

Jone's Mill 66 5 23 94 70% 5% 24%

Ravenna 126 96 118 340 37% 28% 35%

Trenton 118 33 115 266 44% 12% 43%

Gum Springs 38 6 39 83 46% 7% 47%

Leonard 224 37 213 474 47% 8% 45%

Dial 67 22 17 106 63% 21% 16%

High Prairie 59 12 63 134 44% 9% 47%

Lamasco 57 0 85 142 40% 0% 60%

Nobility 82 5 55 142 58% 4% 39%

169

Precinct Reform Bourbon % % Dem: Dem: Pop: Reform Bourbon % Hogg Clark Nugent Totals Dem Dem. Pop

Randolph 68 15 88 171 40% 9% 51%

TOTALS 3734 1848 2302 7884 47% 23% 29%

November 8,1892/Presidential Election

170

Precinct Dem: Rep: Pop: Totals % % % Cleveland Harrison Weaver Dem Rep Pop

Bonham 1023 374 293 1690 61% 22% 17%

Savoy 345 67 26 438 79% 15% 6%

Orangeviile 111 32 103 246 45% 13% 42%

Ladonna 495 116 214 825 60% 14% 26%

Honey Grove 735 259 64 1058 69% 24% 6%

Monkstown 115 116 35 266 43% 44% 13%

New Hope 140 57 162 359 39% 16% 45%

Dodd City 460 69 159 688 67% 10% 23%

Bailey 134 10 153 297 45% 3% 52%

Gober 119 0 142 261 46% 0% 54%

Jone's Mill 69 0 22 91 76% 0% 24%

Ravenna 164 67 113 344 48% 19% 33%

Trenton 127 25 112 264 48% 9% 42%

Gum Springs 40 0 42 82 49% 0% 51%

Leonard 226 40 207 473 48% 8% 44%

Dial 67 23 15 105 64% 22% 14%

High Prairie 71 5 61 137 52% 4% 45%

Lamasco 55 6 86 147 37% 4% 59%

Nobility 83 0 55 138 60% 0% 40%

Randolph 79 7 84 170 46% 4% 49%

TOTALS 4658 1273 2148 8079 58% 16% 27%

November 6,1894/Gubernatorial Election

171

Precinct Dem: Rep: Pop: Totals % % % Culberson Makemson Nugent Dem Rep Pop

Bonham 531 108 156 795 67% 14% 20%

Savoy 305 27 69 401 76% 7% 17%

Orangeviile 113 24 119 256 44% 9% 46%

Ladonna 455 70 336 861 53% 8% 39%

Honey Grove 553 115 218 886 62% 13% 25%

Monkstown 78 3 140 221 35% 1% 63%

New Hope 121 4 199 324 37% 1% 61%

Dodd City 384 18 269 671 57% 3% 40%

Bailey 137 2 210 349 39% 1% 60%

Gober 83 2 226 311 27% 1% 73%

Jone's Mill 30 0 67 97 31% 0% 69%

Ravenna 178 10 217 405 44% 2% 54%

Trenton 121 17 134 272 44% 6% 49%

Gum Springs 31 0 38 69 45% 0% 55%

Leonard 158 35 231 424 37% 8% 54%

Dial 64 1 35 100 64% 1% 35%

High Prairie 69 0 85 154 45% 0% 55%

Lamasco 49 1 113 163 30% 1% 69%

Nobility 71 4 102 177 40% 2% 58%

Randolph 74 1 113 188 39% 1% 60%

Valley Creek 44 2 91 137 32% 1% 66%

S. Bonham 340 43 302 685 50% 6% 44%

TOTALS 3989 487 3470 7946 50% 6% 44%

172

November 3,1896/Gubernatorial Election

Precinct Dem: Rep: Pop: Totals % % % Culberson Kearby Dem Rep Pop

Bonham 592 381 973 61% 39%

Savoy 408 149 557 73% 27%

Orangeville 131 131 262 50% 50%

Ladonna 609 478 1087 56% 44%

Honey Grove 854 451 1305 65% 35%

Monkstown 92 166 258 36% 64%

New Hope 134 214 348 39% 61%

Dodd City 224 91 315 71% 29%

Bailey 177 231 408 43% 57%

Gober 131 216 347 38% 62%

Jone's Mill 79 51 130 61% 39%

Ravenna 192 203 395 49% 51%

Trenton 174 131 305 57% 43%

Gum Springs 40 39 79 51% 49%

Leonard 315 342 657 48% 52%

Dial 77 42 119 65% 35%

High Prairie 92 79 171 54% 46%

Lamasco 57 113 170 34% 66%

Nobility 107 106 213 50% 50%

Randolph 68 125 193 35% 65%

S. Bonham 398 307 705 56% 44%

Ector 119 68 187 64% 36%

Windom 140 56 196 71% 29%

Lannius 131 162 293 45% 55%

TOTALS 5341 4332 9673 55% 45%

November 3,1896/PresidentiaI Election

173

Precinct Dem: Rep: Pop: Totals % % % Bryan McKinley Bryan Dem Rep Pop

Bonham 597 316 43 956 62% 33% 4%

Savoy 432 107 38 577 75% 19% 7%

Orangeville 134 56 68 258 52% 22% 26%

Ladonna 658 298 130 1086 61% 27% 12%

Honey Grove 898 267 78 1243 72% 21% 6%

Monkstown 134 88 42 264 51% 33% 16%

New Hope 164 69 119 352 47% 20% 34%

Dodd City 232 49 34 315 74% 16% 11%

Bailey 175 124 71 370 47% 34% 19%

Gober 143 61 23 227 63% 27% 10%

Jone's Mill 85 22 19 126 67% 17% 15%

Ravenna 213 94 89 396 54% 24% 22%

Trenton 174 66 60 300 58% 22% 20%

Gum Springs 53 9 21 83 64% 11% 25%

Leonard 345 218 75 638 54% 34% 12%

Dial 77 29 21 127 61% 23% 17%

High Prairie 102 12 58 172 59% 7% 34%

Lamasco 74 6 88 168 44% 4% 52%

Nobility 109 22 82 213 51% 10% 38%

Randolph 76 77 33 186 41% 41% 18%

S. Bonham 420 162 113 695 60% 23% 16%

Ector 123 58 9 190 65% 31% 5%

Windom 146 37 17 200 73% 19% 9%

Lannius 140 83 73 296 47% 28% 25%

TOTALS 5704 2330 1404 9438 60% 25% 15%

November 8, 1898/Gubernatorial Election

174

Precinct Dem: Rep: Pop: Totals % % % Sayers Gibbs Dem Rep Pop

Bonham 550 55 605 91% 9%

Savoy 208 50 258 81% 19%

Orangeville 70 62 132 53% 47%

Ladonna 388 146 534 73% 27%

Honey Grove 614 86 700 88% 12%

Monkstown 75 65 140 54% 46%

New Hope 115 121 236 49% 51%

Dodd City 136 10 146 93% 7%

Bailey 104 148 252 41% 59%

Gober 71 105 176 40% 60%

Jone's Mill 45 20 65 69% 31%

Ravenna 111 91 202 55% 45%

Trenton 100 63 163 61% 39%

Gum Springs 38 19 57 67% 33%

Leonard 154 155 309 50% 50%

Dial 53 16 69 77% 23%

High Prairie 53 15 68 78% 22%

Lamasco 33 84 117 28% 72%

Nobility 53 43 96 55% 45%

Randolph 45 73 118 38% 62%

S. Bonham 200 121 321 62% 38%

Ector 77 11 88 88% 13%

Windom 94 15 109 86% 14%

Lannius 75 118 193 39% 61%

Valley Creek 53 69 122 43% 57%

Sash 11 16 27 41% 59%

TOTALS 3526 1777 5303 66% 34%

175

November 6,1900/Gubernatorial Election

Precinct Dem: Rep: Pop: Totals % % % Sayers Hanney McMinn Dem Rep Pop

N. Bonham 586 162 0 748 78% 22% 0%

Savoy 234 71 1 306 76% 23% 0%

Orangeville 102 20 10 132 77% 15% 8%

Ladonna 645 178 12 835 77% 21% 1%

Honey Grove 789 170 2 961 82% 18% 0%

Monkstown 113 75 11 199 57% 38% 6%

New Hope 259 63 13 335 77% 19% 4%

Dodd City 220 34 1 255 86% 13% 0%

Bailey 216 51 38 305 71% 17% 12%

Gober 197 44 33 274 72% 16% 12%

Seles 78 5 0 83 94% 6% 0%

Ravenna 158 82 7 247 64% 33% 3%

Trenton 170 46 11 227 75% 20% 5%

Carson 76 23 3 102 75% 23% 3%

Leonard 271 67 60 398 68% 17% 15%

Dial 85 1 0 86 99% 1% 0%

High Prairie 138 17 23 178 78% 10% 13%

Lamasco 89 36 7 132 67% 27% 5%

Nobility 81 32 17 130 62% 25% 13%

Randolph 108 80 0 188 57% 43% 0%

S. Bonham 385 156 4 545 71% 29% 1%

Ector 126 43 0 169 75% 25% 0%

Windham 157 14 1 172 91% 8% 1%

Lannius 135 53 12 200 68% 27% 6%

Valley Creek 96 41 0 137 70% 30% 0%

Sash 39 4 7 50 78% 8% 14%

Mulberry 83 30 1 114 73% 26% 1%

176

Precinct Dem: Sayers

Rep: Hanney

Pop: McMinn

Totals % Dem

% Rep % Pop

Ely 103 36 5 144 72% 25% 3%

Fulp 109 4 1 114 96% 4% 1%

TOTALS 5848 1638 280 7766 75% 21% 4%

November 4,1902/Gubernatorial Election

177

Precinct Dem: Rep: Totals % % Lanham Burkitt Dem Rep

N. Bonham 555 96 651 85% 15%

Savoy 169 47 216 78% 22%

Orangeville 76 7 83 92% 8%

Ladonna 417 72 489 85% 15%

Honey Grove 645 99 744 87% 13%

Monkstown 73 39 112 65% 35%

New Hope 102 35 137 74% 26%

Dodd City 193 27 220 88% 12%

Bailey 166 58 224 74% 26%

Gober 138 30 168 82% 18%

Seles 77 4 81 95% 5%

Ravenna 142 68 210 68% 32%

Trenton 185 44 229 81% 19%

Carson 71 15 86 83% 17%

Leonard 356 55 411 87% 13%

Dial 44 0 44 100% 0%

High Prairie 115 12 127 91% 9%

Lamasco 98 31 129 76% 24%

Nobility 101 12 113 89% 11%

Randolph 76 48 124 61% 39%

S. Bonham 282 117 399 71% 29%

Ector 113 37 150 75% 25%

Windham 141 14 155 91% 9%

Lannius 114 17 131 87% 13%

Valley Creek 76 34 110 69% 31%

Sash 43 4 47 91% 9%

Mulberry 39 21 60 65% 35%

178

Precinct Dem: Rep: Totals % % Lanham Burkitt Dem Rep

Ely 56 13 69 81% 19%

Fulp 77 1 78 99% 1%

Dewitt 130 1 131 99% 1%

Bentonville 58 22 80 73% 28%

TOTALS 4928 1080 6008 82% 18%

179

November 8,1904/Gubernatorial Election

Precinct Dem: Rep: Totals % % Lanham Lowden Dem Rep

W. Bonham 233 35 268 87% 13%

Savoy 117 35 152 77% 23%

Orangeville 57 13 70 81% 19%

Ladonia 246 52 298 83% 17%

N. Honey Grove 201 34 235 86% 14%

Monkstown 32 15 47 68% 32%

Ivanhoe 43 10 53 81% 19%

Dodd City 162 18 180 90% 10%

Bailey 135 48 183 74% 26%

Gober 108 45 153 71% 29%

Seles 58 7 65 89% 11%

Ravenna 77 34 111 69% 31%

Trenton 105 29 134 78% 22%

Carson 39 16 55 71% 29%

Leonard 173 38 211 82% 18%

Dial 58 4 62 94% 6%

Telephone 38 2 40 95% 5%

Lamasco 28 17 45 62% 38%

Nobility 39 13 52 75% 25%

Randolph 44 28 72 61% 39%

S. Bonham 179 39 218 82% 18%

Ector 65 32 97 67% 33%

Windom 99 7 106 93% 7%

Lannius 83 13 96 86% 14%

Valley Creek 37 26 63 59% 41%

Sash 22 2 24 92% 8%

Mulberry 28 19 47 60% 40%

180

Precinct Dem: Rep: Totals % % Lanham Lowden Dem Rep

Ely 69 19 88 78% 22%

Fulp 49 1 50 98% 2%

Dewitt 68 16 84 81% 19%

Edaube 37 11 48 77% 23%

Anthony 26 4 30 87% 13%

Bonham 205 53 258 79% 21%

Danner 21 8 29 72% 28%

S. H. G. 210 28 238 88% 12%

Bantram 14 1 15 93% 7%

China Grove 29 13 42 69% 31%

TOTALS 3234 785 4019 80% 20%

181

November 8,1904/Presidential Election

Precinct Dem: Rep: Totals % % Parker Roosevelt Dem Rep

W. Bonham 229 37 266 86% 14%

Savoy 114 35 149 77% 23%

Orangeville 56 14 70 80% 20%

Ladonia 243 53 296 82% 18%

N. Honey Grove 201 34 235 86% 14%

Monkstown 32 15 47 68% 32%

Ivanhoe 41 11 52 79% 21%

Dodd City 161 18 179 90% 10%

Bailey 132 49 181 73% 27%

Gober 102 47 149 68% 32%

Seles 57 7 64 89% 11%

Ravenna 77 34 111 69% 31%

Trenton 103 29 132 78% 22%

Carson 35 18 53 66% 34%

Leonard 171 37 208 82% 18%

Dial 58 4 62 94% 6%

Telephone 38 2 40 95% 5%

Lamasco 24 18 42 57% 43%

Nobility 38 13 51 75% 25%

Randolph 46 29 75 61% 39%

S. Bonham 175 39 214 82%- 18%

Ector 64 32 96 67% 33%

Windom 99 7 106 93% 7%

Lannius 83 13 96 86% 14%

Valley Creek 35 26 61 57% 43%

Sash 22 2 24 92% 8%

Mulberry 28 19 47 60% 40%

182

Precinct Dem: Parker

Rep: Roosevelt

Totals % Dem

% Rep

Ely 69 19 88 78% 22%

Fulp 49 2 51 96% • 4%

Dewitt 68 16 84 81% 19%

Edaube 37 11 48 77% 23%

Anthony 26 5 31 84% 16%

Bonham 204 53 257 79% 21%

Danner 21 8 29 72% 28%

S. H. G. 208 29 237 88% 12%

Bantram 14 1 15 93% 7%

China Grove 29 13 42 69% 31%

TOTALS 3189 799 3988 80% 20%

APPENDIX V

PRECINCT-LEVEL RETURNS,

POLL TAX REFERENDUM,

NOVEMBER 4,1902

183

PRECINCT-LEVEL RETURNS,

POLL TAX REFERENDUM,

NOVEMBER 4, 1997

184

COLLIN COUNTY RETURNS

Prencinct For Against Voter Turnout

Percentage For

Percentage Against

N. McKinney 238 73 311 77% 23%

S. McKinney 208 65 273 76% 24%

N. Farmersville 156 79 235 66% 34%

S. Farmersville 172 77 249 69% 31%

Anna 84 74 158 53% 47%

Weston 114 83 197 58% 42%

Piano 242 45 287 84% 16%

Rockville 40 6 46 87% 13%

Millerwood 24 19 43 56% 44%

Blue Ridge 59 71 130 45% 55%

Seven Point 24 4 28 86% 14%

Lebanon 44 30 74 59% 41%

Decatur 33 26 59 56% 44%

Rhea Mills 40 10 50 80% 20%

Melissa 92 10 102 90% 10%

Allen 44 17 61 72% 28%

Variana 30 2 32 94% 6%

St. Paul 17 11 28 61% 39%

Graybill 8 20 28 29% 71%

185

Prencinct For Against Voter Turnout

Percentage For

Percentage Against

Celina 57 28 85 67% 33%

Renner 25 5 30 83% 17%

Nevada 100 35 135 74% 26%

Pike 37 28 65 57% 43%

Wylie 117 57 174 67% 33%

Lick Priarie 15 2 17 88% 12%

Valdasta 33 25 58 57% 43%

Copeville 36 65 101 36% 64%

Princeton 34 60 94 36% 64%

Snow Hill 20 36 56 36% 64%

Josephine 46 29 75 61% 39%

Levon 31 21 52 60% 40%

Roseland 49 12 61 80% 20%

Lucas 21 25 46 46% 54%

Altoga 16 38 54 30% 70%

Climax 16 37 53 30% 70%

Culleoka 39 16 55 71% 29%

TOTALS 2361 1241 3602 66% 34%

MAJORITY VOTES

1120

186

COOKE COUNTY RETURNS

Precincts For Against Voter Turnout

Percentage For

Percentage Against

Gainesville: Ward 1 180 19 199 90% 10%

Ward 2 79 23 102 77% 23%

Ward 3 125 28 153 82% 18%

Ward 4 132 20 152 87% 13%

Ward5 117 25 142 82% 18%

Dexter 110 7 117 94% 6%

Coesfield 43 2 45 96% 4%

Burton 38 6 44 86% 14%

Mt. Springs 14 14 28 50% 50%

Burns 40 8 48 83% 17%

Bloomfleld 17 44 61 28% 72%

Rosston 47 17 64 73% 27%

Leo 10 11 21 48% 52%

Hood 33 2 35 94% 6%

Freemound 26 1 27 96% 4%

Marysville 70 5 75 93% 7%

Bulcher 22 23 45 49% 51%

Sivel's Bend 41 1 42 98% 2%

Warren's Bend 13 7 20 65% 35%

Valley View 121 13 134 90% 10%

Era 94 10 104 90% 10%

Callisburg 111 21 132 84% 16%

Woodbind 60 10 70 86% 14%

Myra 59 2 61 97% 3%

Muenster 91 43 134 68% 32%

Lindsay 11 61 72 15% 85%

Hemmings 12 10 22 55% 45%

187

Precincts For Against Voter Turnout

Percentage For

Percentage Against

Dye School House 22 12 34 65% 35%

TOTALS 1738 445 2183 80% 20%

MAJORITY VOTES 1293 80% 20%

188

DENTON COUTNY RETURNS

Precinct For Against Voter Turnout

Percentage For

Percentage Against

Denton: Ward 1 63 116 179 35% 65%

Ward 2 73 112 185 39% 61%

Ward 3 90 63 153 59% 41%

Ward 4 148 81 229 65% 35%

E. Pilot Point 100 54 154 65% 35%

W. Pilot Point 64 54 118 54% 46%

Lewisville 127 102 229 55% 45%

Little Elm 32 66 98 33% 67%

Roanoke 33 35 68 49% 51%

Double Oak 35 10 45 78% 22%

Bolivar 38 15 53 72% 28%

Stoney 25 5 30 83% 17%

Lloyd 52 13 65 80% 20%

Willow Springs 13 4 17 76% 24%

West School House 16 2 18 89% 11%

Aubrey 135 65 200 68% 33%

Mustang 43 3 46 93% 7%

Lake School House 9 28 37 24% 76%

Gaza 30 12 42 71% 29%

Argyle 38 34 72 53% 47%

Parvin 23 4 27 85% 15%

Waketon 21 34 55 38% 62%

Justin 46 10 56 82% 18%

Sanger 90 54 144 63% 38%

Slidell 8 14 22 36% 64%

Drop 7 17 24 29% 71%

Krum 47 20 67 70% 30%

189

Precinct For Against Voter Turnout

Percentage For

Percentage Against

Ponder 30 7 37 81% 19%

Plainview 12 2 14 86% 14%

TOTALS 1448 1036 2484 58% 42%

MAJORITY VOTES 412

FANNIN COUNTY RETURNS

190

Precinct For Against Voter Turnout

Percentage For

Percentage Against

Bonham 555 142 697 80% 20%

Savoy 127 69 196 65% 35%

Orangeville 57 6 63 90% 10%

LaDonna 410 40 450 91% 9%

Honey Grove 654 50 704 93% 7%

Monkstown 54 33 87 62% 38%

Ivanhoe 81 30 111 73% 27%

Dodd City 184 11 195 94% 6%

Bailey 117 86 203 58% 42%

Gober 93 81 174 53% 47%

Selfs 59 8 67 88% 12%

Ravenna 103 62 165 62% 38%

Trenton 97 72 169 57% 43%

Carson 49 33 82 60% 40%

Leonard 138 238 376 37% 63%

Dial 34 1 35 97% 3%

Telephone 16 94 110 15% 85%

Lamasco 22 114 136 16% 84%

Nobility 37 68 105 35% 65%

Randolph 75 38 113 66% 34%

S. Bonham 243 111 354 69% 31%

Ector 95 24 119 80% 20%

Windom 123 22 145 85% 15%

Lannius 100 31 131 76% 24%

Valley Creek 22 79 101 22% 78%

Sash 32 15 47 68% 32%

Mulberry 25 25 50 50% 50%

191

Precinct For Against Voter Turnout

Percentage For

Percentage Against

Ely 46 24 70 66% 34%

Fulp 73 5 78 94% 6%

Dewitt 95 49 144 66% 34%

Bentonville 38 35 73 52% 48%

TOTALS 3854 1696 5550 69% 31%

MAJORITY VOTES

2158

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