5 dimensões da sustentabilidade

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The five dimensions ofsustainabilityLucas Seghezzo aa Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientficasy Tcnicas (CONICET), Instituto de Investigacinen Energa No Convencional (INENCO), UniversidadNacional de Salta (UNSa) , ArgentinaPublished online: 24 Jul 2009.

To cite this article: Lucas Seghezzo (2009) The five dimensions of sustainability,Environmental Politics, 18:4, 539-556, DOI: 10.1080/09644010903063669

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The ve dimensions of sustainability

Lucas Seghezzo*

Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientcas y Tecnicas (CONICET), Instituto deInvestigacion en Energa No Convencional (INENCO), Universidad Nacional de Salta(UNSa), Argentina

Sustainability is usually seen as a guide for economic and socialpolicymaking in equilibrium with ecological conditions. More than twodecades after the World Commission on Environment and Development(WCED) dened sustainable development and put the concept ofsustainability on the global agenda, the concrete meaning of these termsand their suitability for specic cases remains disputed. A new conceptualframework to address sustainability issues is needed. The limitations of theWCED denition could be mitigated if sustainability is seen as theconceptual framework within which the territorial, temporal, and personalaspects of development can be openly discussed. Sustainability could bebetter understood in terms of Place, Permanence, and Persons. Placecontains the three dimensions of space, Permanence is the fourth dimensionof time, and the Persons category represents a fth, human dimension. Theve-dimensional sustainability framework is arguably more inclusive,plural, and useful to outline specic policies towards sustainability.

Keywords: permanence; persons; place; sustainability; sustainabledevelopment

Introduction

Our common future, the report released in 1987 by the World Commission onEnvironment and Development (WCED) chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland,stated that development is only sustainable if it meets the needs of the presentwithout compromising the ability of future generations to meet their ownneeds (WCED 1987, p. 8). The concept of sustainable development waslaunched by the WCED as a global objective to guide policies orientated tobalance economic and social systems and ecological conditions. It is oftenrepresented with the triple bottom line of economy, environment, and society(Elkington et al. 2007, p. 1). A sustainable development triangle formed byPeople, Planet, and Prot (the three Ps), with Prot sometimes replaced by the

*Email: [email protected]

Environmental PoliticsVol. 18, No. 4, July 2009, 539556

ISSN 0964-4016 print/ISSN 1743-8934 online

2009 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/09644010903063669

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more moderate Prosperity, is common use in business and governments(European Commission 2002). The term sustainability is considered asynonym of sustainable development although, as pointed out by Dresner(2002), some distinctions between these two concepts can be identied. TheWCED paradigm of sustainable development advocates the environmental andsocial implications of economic growth must be included in the decision-making process.

It is my contention that the suitability of this paradigm to explain and solveenvironmental, social, and economic problems needs to be reconsidered. Ibegin by examining some antecedents of the concepts of sustainabledevelopment and sustainability and by identifying key points in the debatethat could be useful to analyse their validity and reliability. I also look at someaspects of the WCED denition that, in my view, represent serious limitationsto its universality and usefulness. In particular, I provide some arguments toshow that the essential anthropocentrism of the WCED denition makes it aweak conceptual framework to discuss issues of development. While thisdenition overestimates the explanatory power of economic reasoning, it doesnot pay enough attention to other, fundamental aspects of development. Toovercome these shortcomings, I propose an alternative sustainability triangleformed by Place, Permanence, and Persons (the new three Ps). To justifythis triangle, I try to show that: (a) Place, the three-dimensional physical andgeographical, but also culturally constructed space where we live and interact,should be more adequately represented in a sustainability paradigm; (b)Permanence, the fourth, temporal dimension, has been largely neglected in thesustainability debate, in spite of the widespread recognition of the potentiallong-term eects of our actions, and all the inter-generational justice rhetoric;and that (c) Persons, the fth dimension, a symbol of people as individualhuman beings and not as undierentiated members of society, has been all butexcluded from the WCED notion of sustainability.

Some antecedents and debates around sustainable development and sustainability

The notions of sustainable development and sustainability are often related toideas introduced by economists, philosophers, scientists, and writers from theeighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries, as described in Holland(2003), Lumley and Armstrong (2004), and Pepper (1996). More recentantecedents can be found in the writings of Rachel Carson, Barry Commoner,Donella Meadows, Arne Naess, Murray Bookchin, E.F. Schumacher, FritjofCapra, James Lovelock, and Vandana Shiva, among many others (Edwards2005, Nelissen et al. 1997, Pepper 1996). As discussed below in more detail,critical objections have been raised against the idea that development can everbe sustainable (Tijmes and Luijf 1995). The underlying ambiguity of theconcept of sustainable development, rather than its historical foundations, hasprobably led to its worldwide acceptance as a framework for environmentaland social action (Mebratu 1998, Mitcham 1995, Redclift 1993).

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The sustainability debate has been greatly inuenced by previous divisionsin the environmental movement between anthropocentric and non-anthropo-centric worldviews (Pepper 1996). Anthropocentrism is based exclusively onhuman-related values, and considers the welfare of mankind as the ultimatedrive for dening policies related to the environment (Norton 2005).Ecological modernisation, a recent and well-known anthropocentric (oreven technocentric) theory, postulates that technical and managerialapproaches could well solve the environmental crisis. Therefore, there wouldbe no need to radically change the present patterns of development (Baker2007). This theory is perfectly suited to the limited opportunities available,desired or permitted by political leaders and the business community (Barry2003, p. 209). As discussed below, not all anthropocentric views are necessarilytechnocentric. Non-anthropocentrism, on the other hand, rejects the idea thatnature has value only because, and insofar as, it directly or indirectly serveshuman interests (McShane 2007, p. 170). It can include radical lines likeecocentrism or biocentrism, which consider that nature has value in itself(intrinsic value). Non-anthropocentric views are relatively sceptical of large-scale technological developments and the commitment of big corporations toenvironmental matters. Radical social changes are usually advocated underthese views, and ethical issues are considered the main driving force for theprotection of nature (Mason 1999). In this context, the concept of sustainabledevelopment is regarded as just another product of the market economy thatcould never cure the crises that the market economy helps to produce.

The anthropocentrism/non-anthropocentrism debate has also been a majorfocal point of theoretical concern among environmental sociologists. A cleardistinction between the Human Exemptionalism Paradigm (HEP) and the NewEcological Paradigm (NEP) was proposed by Dunlap and Catton Jr. (1979).The HEP is based on the assumption that the physical environment is relativelyirrelevant for understanding social behaviour (humans are exempt fromnatures inuence). In contrast, the NEP points out that humans, who aresupposedly exceptional because of their possession of culture and technology,remain one among many species in the world and they are thus also inuencedby the forces of nature. Human societies can make use of nature in order tosurvive but they also have the power to exceed natures carrying capacity and,eventually, destroy it (Buttel 1987).

The relationship between nature and society can be perceived in dierentways. Awareness of these dierences is important to understand thesustainability debate. It can also be a useful tool to assess current developmentparadigms in terms of their ability to integrate, reconcile, or transcend theanthropocentrism/non-anthropocentrism dichotomy.

Limitations of the WCED denition of sustainable development

In this section, I address some characteristics of the WCED denition ofsustainable development that would represent serious theoretical and practical

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limitations that undermine its usefulness as a comprehensive conceptualframework for sustainability.

First, the WCED denition, as most of the denitions that were introducedlater, is essentially anthropocentric. The WCED report sees the satisfaction ofhuman needs as inherently conicting with environmental constraints and, as aresult, the usual sustainability triangle represents society and environment asseparate pillars. This triangle is rooted in the belief that nature and culture area dichotomy that can only be reconciled by the economy. Whether there is sucha dichotomy at all is often questioned. Merchant (1980, 2006, p. 514) resistedthe idea of nature and culture as a structural dualism and argued that suchdissociated nature could be easily dominated by science, technology, andcapitalist production. Macnaghten and Urry (1998, p. 29) also believe thatthere is no simple and sustainable distinction between nature and societybecause, to a great extent, nature is a cultural construction. The devastatinghuman consequences of environmental events like hurricanes, earthquakes,droughts, oods, and tsunamis highlight how dicult it is now to separatesocial and environmental issues (Mittman 2006, Newton 2007). Complexitytheories have also indicated the existence of hybrid systems which are neithernatural nor social (Urry 2006, p. 112). The idea of a nature/culture dichotomyand the anthropocentrism of western and westernised societies have beendenounced long ago (White Jr. 1967), but these modern conceptions have notbeen questioned by the WCED report, as indicated by Tijmes and Luijf (1995)and Dresner (2002).

The anthropocentrism of the WCED denition is in line with the notion ofweak sustainability. The dierence between weak and strong sustainabilitylies basically in the extent to which exchanges or trade-os between naturaland man-made capital are acceptable. Weak sustainability requires main-taining a non-declining stock of economic capital into the indenite future andallows unlimited substitution among natural and man-made types of capital(Norton 2005, p. 307). On the other hand, strong sustainability species limitson substitution based on the intrinsic value of some natural assets (Norton2005, p. 307). Natural capital is regarded as providing some functions thatare not substitutable by man-made capital (Cabeza Gutes 1996, p. 147).According to the WCED report, species and ecosystems must be preservedbecause they have an economic value that is deemed crucial for developmentand important to human welfare (WCED 1987, pp. 147150). The reportacknowledges conservation of nature is not only justied in economic terms(WCED 1987, p. 155). Yet the additional reasons provided (aesthetic, ethical,cultural, and scientic considerations) are markedly anthropocentric. It canthen be inferred that, for the WCED, human welfare is the ultimate reason forthe protection of natural capital.

The anthropocentrism of the WCED denition is not a critical issue forthose who advocate weak or reexive forms of anthropocentrism, which areallegedly closer to non-anthropocentric ethics than strong anthropocentrism(Barry 1999, p. 39, Norton 2008). According to Barry (1999), green politics

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should be consistent with the principles of green ideology while beingacceptable to non-greens concerned about social and environmental problems.He postulates it is not necessary to be a rights-based ecocentric to identify someabsolute limits to human action. As an alternative, an anthropocentric ethicsof use could also delineate the ethical threshold beyond which the human useof nature becomes abuse (Barry 1999, pp. 5863). Similarly, Hill Jr. (2006,331) considers an ethics of virtue is probably the only reason we need toprotect nature, and argues that commitment to metaphysics of intrinsic value isnot really required by virtuous agents to value the environment. Whatever thecase, Smith (2006) and Norton (2008) argue that the gap betweenanthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism is not so wide in practicalsituations because to them, virtuous agents and those who hold rights-basedbeliefs would tend to promote comparable policies on many environmentalissues. Even though the essential anthropocentrism and technological optimismof the WCED denition could be alleviated by more moderate positions, somenon-anthropocentric authors might still feel uncomfortable. McShane (2007,2008), for instance, without discarding Nortons convergence theory onpractical policy issues, insists that some ethical objections can still be raisedagainst strong and weak anthropocentrism alike. She identied reasons toreject anthropocentrism from the point of view of norms for feeling that gobeyond the contested idea that nature has intrinsic value (McShane 2007,p. 169). For her, anthropocentrism implies certain ways of caring cannot beapplied to non-human objects, an implication that is dicult to accept formany environmentalists (McShane 2007, p. 179). In line with this idea, Dunlap(2006, p. 325) argues that the ultimate justication for environmental concernshould be found on reasons of a more spiritual nature like those that inspiredearly environmentalism, a movement that combined a predominantlyecocentric perspective with an attempt to give a renewed answer to peoplesdeep hunger to belong to a community and have a place in it.

The theoretical motivations to protect nature are not the only thing underdiscussion. The adequacy of dierent economic and technical instruments tomeasure sustainability is also a contested issue (Beckerman 1995, Dobson1996). For that reason, practical agreements might not be so easy, evenbetween people who do agree on values. Moreover, Ziegler (2009) warns thatsuch agreements, if possible at all, will probably lead to the empowerment ofthe experts and technocrats who decide which assessment criteria andindicators should be measured. This empowerment might come at the expenseof those who believe that open discussions and (some) agreement on values are,if not indispensable, at least highly desirable before specic policies areimplemented.

Secondly, the importance of the economy is overestimated in the WCEDdenition. The WCED report makes it clear that sustainable development isfar from requiring the cessation of economic growth (WCED 1987, p. 40). Iteven goes on to say the international economy must speed up world growththat is allegedly essential to avert economic, social, and environmental


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catastrophes in large parts of the developing world (WCED 1987, p. 89).Growth should be achieved, according to the WCED, by promoting freermarkets, lower interest rates, greater technology transfer, and signicantlylarger capital ows. Although the WCED report acknowledges that growth byitself is not enough (WCED 1987, p. 44), it still makes a direct and inseparableconnection between growth and issues of poverty alleviation, equity, andincome redistribution. Advocates of ecological modernisation, who oftenpresent this theory as the operational tool of sustainable development inindustrial societies, continue to see economic growth as a central feature for ajust and equitable development (Spaargaren and Mol 1992). However, as notedby Arrow et al. (1996, p. 14), the link between growth and equity may not be sostraightforward, especially in regions where it is needed most, namely wherethe environmental costs of economic activity are borne by the poor, by futuregenerations, or by other countries. Redistribution and equity are, to a certainextent, contradictory with the primary objective of economic activity, being tomaximise economic eciency (irrespective of the initial distribution of wealth)and increase national income (which is assumed to be directly proportional tothe well-being of society as a whole) (Hanley 2000, Norgaard 1992, Ziegler2009). This contradiction implies that, unless intergenerational equity becomesa more central issue in the analysis, the economic approach used in isolationmight not be very useful to address issues of sustainability. The potentialconict between economic growth and sustainability is perhaps more sensitivein industrial societies where environmental goods and amenities will never beenough to satisfy the supposedly innite needs of individuals. This ambivalencebetween the concepts of economic growth and environmental scarcity has beenseen as a major aw of the idea of sustainable development articulated by theWCED (Tijmes and Luijf 1995). A joint criticism of both ecoscarcity andmodernization has been given by Robbins (2004). He highlighted the ethicaland practical weaknesses of these two approaches to explain and solveenvironmental and social problems (Robins 2004, p. 7). The WCED report didcall for some international reforms intended to deal simultaneously witheconomic and ecological aspects (WCED 1987, p. 90). Arguably, because itdid not fundamentally challenge the dominant economic paradigm, it did littlein practice to diminish the predominance of economistic accounts over socialand ecological concerns. The ensuing inevitability of a type of progressunderstood only as plain economic growth should be put under more scrutinyin debates about sustainability (Norgaard 1992). Yet the politically powerfulidea of progress could be recalibrated and re-appropriated, instead of rejected,in an innovative development paradigm, as advocated by Barry (1999, p. 250).

A signicant additional drawback of the inclusion of an economicdimension in the denition of sustainability is that a purely economic approachis, in some respects, incompatible with the long-term thinking required toattain inter-generational justice. This can become clearer after we take a brieflook at one of the main decision-aiding tools used by economists to analyseeconomic eciency in the public sector, namely costbenet analysis (CBA)

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(Bell and Morse 2008, Hanley 2000). Although CBA was never meant to be astand-alone method, it is still widely promoted as one of the best ways to guidethe ecient allocation of resources and to assess the feasibility (andsustainability) of projects and policies (Pearce et al. 1989). A number oflimitations, obstacles, and behavioural anomalies that undermine the validityof CBA for environmental policy making have been identied, forcingeconomists to devise a variety of coping strategies to overcome theselimitations and make it more appealing to governments and the general public(Barde and Pearce 1991, Hanley and Shogren 2005). The main ethical,philosophical, and practical objections raised against the use of CBA derivefrom the very assumptions on which the method is founded. Especiallyquestioned have been the legitimacy of valuation of some forms of nature, theacceptability of unlimited trade-os between natural and man-made capital,and the validity of discounting (Freeman III 2003, Hanley 2000, Mason 1999,Shechter 2000). Discounting is a particularly contentious issue, especially interms of intertemporal equity and distributive implications. According toHanley (2000), the assumption made by CBA that the net present value ofproducts and projects must be maximised lays potentially heavy costs on futuregenerations. In fact, at any (reasonable) discount rate greater than zero, thepresent value of damages expected far in the future could be neglected whenconfronted with present benets. This constitutes a clear, pervasive, not to sayperverse, bias in CBA tests in favour of the present generation at the expense ofthe yet unborn. As compensating future generations may be impossible as well,the possibility that the winners can compensate the losers and still be bettero with the changes produced by the project, one of the foundations of CBA, issignicantly reduced. Additional criticisms have been directed to theassumption that everybody should be eventually willing to accept some kindof compensation in exchange of environmental or social losses, an idea rejectedby strong sustainability advocates. Besides, poor people would tend to acceptlower compensations in exchange for natural goods (if they are compensated atall), and this would help perpetuate the present state of inequitable distributionof wealth. Even strong defenders of CBA consider that a sustainabilityconstraint should be used as an additional criterion to prevent the depletionof natural resources threatened by excessive exploitation (which, by their ownaccount, is encouraged by high discount rates) (Pearce et al. 1990, p. 37).Others have pointed out that CBA should not be viewed as either necessary orsucient for designing sensible public policy (Arrow et al. 1996), or thatadditional measures are always needed to ensure that projects that passed aCBA are sustainable (Hanley 2000). It could instead be argued that economictools like CBA might be more useful after, not before, other sustainabilityassessment methods have been carried out in order to reject unacceptablealternatives. In this respect, the use of multi-criteria analysis (MCA) andparticipatory approaches is steadily growing (Hajkowicz 2008, Hanley andShogren 2005). Criticism of CBA does not automatically mean a concomitantcriticism of all market-based processes. It is possible, as some authors have


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suggested, that ecological rationality could also be met within a classicalliberal framework (Pennington 2008). Yet other authors see mounting evidenceof the unsustainability of the consumer capitalist principles of inniteeconomic growth and wealth accumulation, and of the failure of ecologicalmodernisation strategies to secure sustainability (Bluhdorn and Welsh 2007,p. 198). Whatever the case, it is becoming increasingly clear that sustainabilitycannot be understood in terms of purely economic criteria (Holland 2003).

The third limitation is that space and time have been largely neglected in theWCED denition of sustainability. The idea that a clear denition of spatial andtemporal boundaries is essential to assess sustainability is not new (Bossel 2004,Chambers et al. 2000, Edwards 2005, Fresco and Kroonenberg 1992). Fruitfuldebates held over the last two decades pointed out the prominence of space andplace in environmental justice debates (Agyeman et al. 2003). The importance oftime in the complexities associated with problem solving is also acknowledged(Tainter 2006). However, when it comes to concrete cases, space and time are notalways taken into account in sustainability projects. Operational tools such assustainability indicators are usually dened only in economic, environmental,and social terms (Bell andMorse 2008).Yet, as arguedbyRosenau (2003), severalproblems resist such categorisation. A paradigm based only on those aspects willmost likely be unable to understand and explain, let alone solve, these problems.The increasing centrality of a globalised economy in the relationships betweennature and culture has also undermined the importance of specic locations,landscapes, or places as critical components of sustainability, as highlighted byEscobar (2001). He thinks a radical questioning of place is a common feature oftheories of globalisation that associate place with the limited and incompleterealm of the local, while promoting a world without frontiers understood as anabsolute and universal space. Time, in spite of all the long-term rhetoric in mostdebates about development, has not been explicitly included in the classicalsustainability triangle. The presence of an economic corner in that triangle isprobably the reason why temporal aspects have been so neglected in practice, asdiscussed above. Contrary to space, which is associated with visible and tangibleassets, time is beyond the reach of our senses and, for that reason, its pertinencewithin the environmental debate has been largely underestimated, as highlightedby Adam (1998). She proposed to pay more attention to timescapes, thetemporal dimension of our environmental problems, in order to improve ourunderstanding of their nature and impact. The inclusion of a time dimensionseems indispensable for Adambecause, from a temporal perspective, it is dicultto conceive of nature and culture as separate (Adam1998, p. 23).Conceptions oftime, as notions of space and territory, can dier greatly in dierent cultures andat dierent historical moments (Adam 1990, Bates 2006, Giddens 1984, Hubertand Mauss 1905). Time is therefore, as the concept of nature itself, a contestedand culture-dependent issue that plays an important role in the way we perceiveand dene nature (Macnaghten and Urry 1998).

Finally, personal aspects are as good as forgotten in the WCED denitionof sustainable development. The WCED report emphasises the role of human

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needs as perhaps the ultimate goal of any development policy (WCED 1987,p. 43). Yet humans cannot be equated only to their needs. Moreover, humanneeds are not only physiological. Many types of needs have been identied,such as safety, love, esteem, and the desire for self-fullment (Chuengsatiansup2003, Holden and Linnerud 2007, Maslow 1943). Most of these needs involvefeelings, felt by individuals, and cannot be catalogued as social. Whether themanagement and coordination of economic, environmental and social aspectsis the right strategy to satisfy all human needs is therefore debatable. As will bediscussed in more detail below, a development paradigm that fails to take thesefeelings into account might not guarantee that issues related to, for instance,personal happiness are incorporated in the sustainability debate.

The ve dimensions of sustainability

As discussed in the preceding section, the WCED concept of sustainabledevelopment has contradictions and limitations. Nonetheless, its release by theUnited Nations had a very powerful inuence on the worlds environmental andsocial agenda. The report was allegedly made with people of all countries and allwalks of life in mind and called for immediate action on many fronts (WCED1987, p. 23).Whether or not the ultimate purpose of theWCED report (1987) wastobeanall-encompassing theoryof social change isdicult to say.Yet itmade sureto warn us that unless we changed our attitudes, the security, well-being, and verysurvival of the planet were threatened (WCED 1987, p. 23). The academic worldseems reluctant to rethink the WCED paradigm although, as pointed out byReitan (2005), this vision of development does not appear to be working inpractice. The persistence of environmental, social, and economic problems isattributedmore to implementation decits than to intrinsic inconsistencies of theconcept itself. However, since it was released more than two decades ago, it isobvious that the WCED denition could not have taken into account recent andfruitful debates on sustainability that partly complement and partly counteract theideas in the WCED report.

Building on some of these debates, I will try to show that the limitations ofthe WCED denition of sustainable development could be mitigated ifsustainability is seen as the conceptual framework within which the territorial,temporal, and personal aspects of development can be openly discussed. Toillustrate this framework, I propose a sustainability triangle formed by Place,Permanence, and Persons (Figure 1). In such a triangle, it is possible todistinguish ve dimensions: Place contains the three dimensions of space (x, y,and z), Permanence is the fourth dimension of time (t), and the Persons corneradds a fth, individual and interior, human dimension (i). Place and Persons,the base of the triangle, represent real, objective and concrete things that existin the present time. Permanence, which is located in the upper (or the farthest)corner, is a more ideal, abstract and subjective projection of events from theother corners into the future. I turn to a more detailed explanation of themeaning I ascribe to the vertices of this new triangle.


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Place

People tend to see the environment as the place in which they live and interact.There are consequently as many environments or places as visions peoplehave of the space around them (Macnaghten and Urry 1998). Place provides animportant share of the sense of belonging and identity that are partlyresponsible for the generation of culture. It has been dened as the experienceof a particular location with some measure of groundedness . . . , sense ofboundaries . . ., and connection to everyday life (Escobar 2001, p. 140). AsEscobar suggests, the denition of any alternative development paradigmshould take into account place-based models of nature, culture, and politics.Places are much more than just empty geographical spaces. They contain whatMacnaghten and Urry (1998) call the spatialised, timed, sensed and embodieddimensions of nature. Places are therefore a source of facts, identities, andbehaviours. They incorporate notions of culture, local ways of life, and humanphysical and psychological health (Franquemagne 2007, Garavan 2007, Le2000). Place can also be constituted by a number of locations distant from oneanother. This shared territory might be an important ingredient in socialcohesion, as studies on mobility, networks and migration have suggested (Urry2002). Place is, to a certain extent, a social construct that helps people build asense of belonging to a given culture. On the other hand, it could also beargued that culture is, in turn, delineated in terms of specic places. Aperception of place as an inseparable unity constituted by the natural andcultural environments can help transcend the nature/culture dichotomyand integrate or reconcile opposite worldviews such anthropocentrism and

Figure 1. The new ve-dimensional sustainability triangle. Place: the three dimensionsof space (x, y, and z); Permanence: the fourth dimension of time (t); Persons: the fth,human dimension (i). More details in the text.

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non-anthropocentrism. It could be said that acknowledgment of localconditions, constraints, and opportunities is necessary to devise moresustainable policies (Rootes 2007). However, without explicit considerationof temporal issues, policies based only on the economic, environmental, andsocial facets of a place will exaggerate the relevance of the present time. Theconcept of Place, though essential, is hence only the restricted realm of intra-generational equity (Zuindeau 2007).

Permanence

Permanence is not only mere maintenance of present conditions. It includeschanges and improvements. As indicated by Norton (2005, p. 304),sustainability, whatever else it means, has to do with our intertemporal moralrelations. For that reason, Permanence could be seen as the main realm ofinter-generational equity. The need for long-term thinking has always beenacknowledged in the sustainability discourse. However, planning has been alltoo often relegated to a secondary role. Permanence is consequently thedimension where planning and consideration of the future eects of todaysactions and inactions are paramount. The explicit inclusion of temporal aspectsseems especially appropriate to deal with issues related to our material legacyand personal transcendence. The sense of belonging to a given place is oftenrelated to things that occurred at dierent, sometimes distant moments(Macnaghten and Urry 1998). Therefore, it can be argued the very concept ofplace is not complete until we attach to it a certain temporal component. Asindicated by Giddens (1984), time is not a mere background for action andinteraction. Instead, it is inextricably correlated with space, social institutionsand individual persons. Complementary concepts like Place and Permanenceseem pertinent within a development paradigm that intends to have local andglobal, but also far-reaching implications. Nonetheless, it has to be consideredas well that a world dened only in terms of place and permanence can be avery sad place for many people. Slavery, torture, tyranny and other humanmonstrosities so widely distributed in space and time can never be consideredsustainable (George 1999). The concepts of justice and equity, thoughessential to build a more sustainable world, are probably not comprehensiveenough to contain a number of more personal aspects. We can all be equal andhave the same access to goods and services but we can also all be equallyunhappy. For those reasons, I believe that the notion of sustainability shouldinclude a personal dimension. This dimension, however fuzzy and contestedits denition may be, seems necessary to deal with issues of identity, values,rights, happiness and well-being.

Persons

The idea of the existence of an individual person within each human being,similar yet entirely dierent to those around them, has been the subject of


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intense philosophical, psychological, and religious speculation. It has beenargued most human beings have always had a sense of corporal and spiritualindividuality (Mauss 1938, p. 6) and people have always been concerned withmeaning and the nature of existence (Macnaghten and Urry 1998, p. 95).Wilber (1998) argues the basic problem of modern societies (especially western)is not a development-related issue or even a social one. Instead, it is theabandonment, neglect, or rejection of the interior, spiritual dimensions of theworld, a situation that leaves people in a atland devoid of meaning andvalue. He believes that without some kind of marriage between modernknowledge and pre-modern wisdom the future of humanity is, at best,precarious (Wilber 1998, 410). In the same line, Radford Ruether (1971, p.214) believes modern society can still be the age of the person because men(and women) have not capitulated entirely to a one-dimensional, seculardenition of man and reality and have retained some notion of transcendentvalues which they believe apply not only to their personal lives but to the wayin which social organizations should operate as well. In her view, the modernworld has threatened the foundations of freedom and the person by seeking toeliminate the transcendent framework altogether.

In recent decades, the environmental movement has contributed to thedevelopment of personal and social identity. Environmental issues entered theinternational agenda and began to shape personal attitudes and governmentalpolicies. As time went by, condence on the ability of governments andcorporations to solve environmental and social crises somehow faded away.Research conducted by Macnaghten and Urry (1998) suggests that people areresorting more and more to their own senses in order to perceive the existenceand the gravity of environmental problems. This is allegedly due to growingdistrust towards politicians and the objectivity of others in general (includingcompanies, the media, etc.), and to a widespread perception of lack of personalagency. This shift has been interpreted as a revaluation of localized andembedded identities and might be an adequate framework to understand therelationship between nature and society from a more personal point of view.This relationship involves actions but also feelings. As indicated by McShane(2007, p. 175), feelings and moral lives are lived from the inside, in the rstperson. Therefore, we should not only care about material outputs but alsoabout the inner life of the being that produces those outputs.

As some studies have suggested, personal happiness and subjective well-being seem to be relatively disconnected from economic wealth, environmentalquality, and even social justice (Marks et al. 2006, ONeill 2008). According toDresner (2002), unhappiness is related largely to the impossibility of fulllingsocially created desires. In contrast, happiness and personal well-being havebeen associated with aspects of life such as autonomy, freedom, achievement,and the development of deep interpersonal relationships (Kahneman andSugden 2005, p. 176). The existence of projects and relationships is not onlymeaningful from a personal point of view, but also complements a purelyimpartial ethical commitment towards society (ONeill 2008, p. 138). This

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personal commitment may play a distinctive role in the pursuit of better inter-generational justice since humans have the freedom to be relativelyautonomous from both their environment and their culture, as postulated byMaslow (1954). Arguably, individuals and society can play dierent roles in thepursuit of sustainability. Barry (1999) thinks that we are not an undier-entiated humanity facing an equally undierentiated nature. He proposesa citizenenvironment perspective, as opposed to the classical societyenvironment relation, as the most appropriate standpoint from which to judgepolitically the normative standing of the non-human world (Barry 1999, pp.6165, emphasis original). Merging individuals and society into one singledimension might fail to capture the complexity of human behaviour and therelevance of personal relationships for sustainability. Explicit consideration ofpersonal aspects or personscapes in the sustainability triangle can also be seenas a challenge to the idea that nature and society are opposites. Individuals,who play a fundamental role in the generation, shaping, and maintenance ofculture, are in consequence partly responsible for the construction of a culture-dependent notion of nature. Therefore, from a personal point of view, it wouldalso be as dicult to separate nature and culture as it is to neatly separatemind and body, paraphrasing Adam (1998) on timescapes.

The idea of some connection and interdependence between humans andnature and between humans themselves, in recognising intrinsic value toothers, is a powerful political instrument with normative implications(Saravanamuthu 2006). Seeing individual persons as intrinsically valuablemight reduce the risk that sectoral (social, environmental, economic,institutional, or political) interests override the rights of minorities and citizensby considerations of public utility, as discussed in Norton (2005) and Caney(2008). Only individuals, with their morals and values, can achieve the changeof consciousness that, according to Dryzek (1987, pp. 150160), is needed toachieve an ecologically rational world free from authoritarian top-downmoral persuasion. Norton (2005) and Hill Jr. (2006, p. 331) also providedarguments against the idea individuals are always selsh and insatiableconsumers whose behaviour can only be restrained by compulsion. There aremany examples of collective institutions guided not by immediate gains but bymore altruistic aims, which have been eective in managing common resources(Folke et al. 1996, Ostrom 1990). The individualistic pursuit of prot, whichhas been usually supposed to lead to the common good (thanks to AdamSmiths invisible hand), could instead lead to environmental destruction andeconomic crisis, as pointed out long ago by Hardin (1968).

Concluding remarks

I have tried to show that the conventional idea of sustainable development hasa number of conceptual limitations and does not suciently capture somespatial, temporal, and personal aspects. To mitigate these shortcomings, Iintroduced a ve-dimensional conceptual framework arguably more sensitive


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than the traditional triple-bottom-line approach to understand the complexissues of sustainability. The new framework could be useful for both academicanalysis and policymaking. It has been based on more fundamental ontologicalcategories as those that serve as underpinning principles of the social sciencesin general (such as space, time, persons, and the relationships among them).For that reason, its potential for plurality and its adaptability to specicsettings might be higher, making it more appropriate to understand local,regional, and global processes. As discussed in Norton (2005), pluralism isunavoidable in any model, especially for facing wicked problems like thoseposed by the collision of collective and individual values and rights. Whether ornot the proposed framework is a suciently distinctive, improved frameworkfor the analysis of sustainability issues remains to be seen. The concept ofsustainability is highly contingent to cultural and natural characteristics.Therefore, agreement on a single denition is not only impossible but alsoobjectionable. Within the mutually-agreed connes of a suciently inclusiveconceptual framework, multiple meanings and site-specic denitions arepossible. Dierent visions on what sustainability is and how it should bemeasured could coexist, not only for plurality but also because dierentframeworks of analysis could give a better idea of the sustainability (orunsustainability) of processes and regions. In that sense, the new conceptualframework could augment or complement previous paradigms, instead ofreplacing them. Space, time, and human aspects are not independent from eachother and interact in complex ways. In fact, most denitions of place include acertain notion of time and the conceptualisation and use of space and timeform important cornerstones of peoples cultural identity. The vertices of thenew sustainability triangle are so closely linked to each other that it would notbe easy to deal with them in a fragmented way, as is usually the case foreconomic, environmental, and social problems.

Acknowledgements

Detailed and insightful observations from three anonymous referees were greatlyappreciated. The incisive comments of Gatze Lettinga and former colleagues ofWageningen University (The Netherlands) on early versions of this paper are alsodeeply acknowledged. I credit the lively discussions at the cafeteria of the NationalUniversity of Salta (Argentina) for some of the ideas in this paper. Many thanks toJames Champion and Tim Briggs for their grammatical input. The author is a full-timeresearcher at The National Council of Scientic and Technical Research of Argentina(CONICET) (www.conicet.gov.ar).

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5 dimensões da sustentabilidade

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