anthro answers - michigan7 2014

7/26/2019 Anthro Answers - Michigan7 2014

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anthro

[T]here can be no doubt that any useful knowledge in medicine or surgeryis abundantly worth the lives of the animals destroyed to obtain it.

-John Call Dalton, 1875


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no rights

To be human is, primarily, to embrace that we are human with strengths and weaknesses,and that our humanity is preordained to seek the Truth, Good and Beauty as part of our humanity.

To be human is to be an agent of peace, ustice, and reconciliation in our community or society.To be human is to be heroic and generous in an unobtrusive way, free from any selfish motive,

with no media to show the litany of our good deeds. To be human is to have time to listen to the storyof a grieving soul, to give hope to the hopeless, to give love to the unloved.!

-Danny Castillones Sillada


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2ac - no rightsAnimals cant have rights -- lack the capability to have the same moral

judgment as humansCohen 86, professor at the "niversity of #ichigan #edical $chool, %ew &ngland 'ournal of #edicine ()arl, The )ase for the"se of *nimals in Biomedical +esearch! -/0123014, http/55spot.colorado.edu56heathwoo5phil-788,$pr895cohen.pdf:55dodo

* right, properly understood, is a claim, or potential claim, that one party may e;ercise against another. The

target against whom such a claim may be registered can be a single person, a group, a community, or (perhaps: all humankind. The

content of rights claims also varies greatly/ repayment of loans, nondiscrimination by

employers, noninterference by the state, and so on. To comprehend any genuine right fully, therefore,we must

know who holds the right, against whom it is held, and to what it is a right. *lternative sources of rights

add comple;ity $ome rights are grounded in constitution and law (e.g., the right of an accused to trial by ury:egel:< human membership in an organic moral community (Bradley:< the development of the human

self through the consciousness of other moral selves (#ead:< and the underivative, intuitive

cognition of the rightness of an action(?richard:. #ost influential has been @mmanuel Aants emphasis on the

universal human possession of a uniCuely moral will and the autonomy its use entails. >umans confront choices that

are purely moral< humans33but certainly not dogs or mice33 lay down moral laws,for others and for

themselves. >uman beings are self3legislative, morally autonomous.Animals(that is, nonhuman animals, the ordinary sense of

that word: lack this capacity for free moral judgment. They are not beings of a kind capable of e;ercising orresponding to moral claims.*nimals therefore have no rights, and they can have none. This is the core of the

argument about the alleged rights of animals. The holders of rights must have the capacity to comprehend

rules of duty, governing all including themselves. @n applying such rules, the holders of rights must recogniDe possible

conflictsbetween what is in their own interest and what is ust. Enly in a community of beings capable of self3restricting moraludgments can the concept of a right be correctly invoked. >umans have such moral capacities. They are in this sense self3legislative,

are members of communities governed by moral rules, and do possess rights.*nimals do not have such moral

capacities. They are not morally self3legislative, cannot possibly be members of a truly moral community, and therefore cannotpossess rights. @n conducting research on animal subects, therefore, we do not violate their rights, because they have none to

violate. To animate life, even in its simplest forms,we give a certain natural reverence. But the possession of

rights presupposes a moral status not attained by the vast maority of living things . =e must not infer,therefore, that a live being has, simply in being alive, a FrightF to its life. The assertion that all animals, only because they are alive

and have interests, also possess the Fright to lifeF is an abuse of that phrase, and wholly without warrant. @t does not followfrom this, however, that we are morally free to do anything we please to animals . )ertainly not. @n our

dealings with animals, as in our dealings with other human beings,we have obligations that do not arise from

claims against us based on rights. +ights entail obligations, but many of the things one ought to do are in no way tied toanothers entitlement. +ights and obligations are not reciprocals of one another, and it is a serious mistake to suppose that they are.@llustrations are helpful. Ebligations may arise from internal commitments made/ physicians have obligations to their patients notgrounded merely in their patients rights. Teachers have such obligations to their students, shepherds to their dogs, and cowboys totheir horses. Ebligations may arise from differences of status/ adults owe special care when playing with young children, and

children owe special care when playing with young pets. Ebligations may arise from special relationships/ the payment of my sonscollege tuition is something to which he may have no right, although it may be my obligation to bear the burden if @ reasonably can


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my dog has no right to daily e;ercise and veterinary care, but @ do have the obligation to provide these things for her. Ebligationsmay arise from particular acts or circumstances/ one may be obliged to another for a special kindness done, or obliged to put ananimal out of its misery in view of its condition33although neither the human benefactor nor the dying animal may have had a claim

of right. ?lainly, the grounds of our obligations to humans and to animals are manifold and cannot

be formulated simply. $ome hold that there is a general obligation to do no gratuitous harm to sentient creatures (theprinciple of nonmaleficence:< some hold that there is a general obligation to do good to sentient creatures when that is reasonablywithin ones power (the principle of beneficence:. @n our dealings with animals, few will deny that we are at least obliged to act

humanely33that is, to treat them with the decency and concern that we owe, as sensitive human beings, to other sentient creatures.To treat animals humanely, however, is not to treat them as humans or as the holders of rights.

!mpossible to evaluate all forms of life e"ually -- benefits ofspeciesism out#eigh -- cures diseases saves livesCohen 86, professor at the "niversity of #ichigan #edical $chool, %ew &ngland 'ournal of #edicine ()arl, The )ase for the"se of *nimals in Biomedical +esearch! -/0123014, http/55spot.colorado.edu56heathwoo5phil-788,$pr895cohen.pdf:55dodo

@ am a speciesist. $peciesism isnot merely plausible< it is essential for right conduct, because those who will

not make the morally relevant distinctions among species arealmost certain, in conseCuence, to

misapprehend their true obligations. The analogy between speciesism and racism is insidious. &very sensitive moral

udgment reCuires that the differing natures of the beings to whom obligations are owed be considered. @f all forms of

animate life33or vertebrate animal life33must be treated eCually, and if therefore in evaluating a research program thepains of a rodent count eCually with the pains of a human,we are forced to conclude(-: that neither humans nor

rodents possess rights, or (7: that rodents possess all the rights that humans possess . Both alternatives

are absurd.Het one or the other must be swallowed if the moral eCuality of all species is to be

defended. >umans oweto other humansa degree of moral regard that cannot be owed to animals.$ome humans take on the obligation to support and heal others, both humans and animals, as a principal duty in their lives< thefulfillment of that duty may reCuire the sacrifice of many animals. @f biomedical investigators abandon the effective pursuit of theirprofessional obectives because they are convinced that they may not do to animals what the service of humans reCuires, they will

fail, obectively, to do their duty. +efusing to recogniDe the moral differences among species is a sure path

to calamity. (The largest animal rights group in the country is ?eople for the &thical Treatment of *nimals< its co3director,@ngrid %ewkirk, calls research using animal subects fascism! and supremacism.! *nimal liberationists do not separate out thehuman animal,! she says, so there is no rational basis for saying that a human being has special rights. * rat is a pig is a dog is a

boy. TheyIre all mammals.!: Those who claim to base their obection to the use of animals in biomedical research on their reckoning

of the net pleasures and pains produced make a second error, eCually grave. &ven if it were true33as it is surely not33that the pains ofall animate beings must be counted eCually, a cogent utilitarian calculation reCuires that we weigh all the conseCuences of the use,

and of the nonuse, of animals in laboratory research. )ritics relying(however mistakenly: on animal rights may

claim to ignore the beneficial results of such research, rights being trump cards to which interest and advantagemust give way. But an argument that is e;plicitly framed in terms of interest and benefit for all over the long run must attend also to

the disadvantageous conseCuences of not using animals in research, and to all the achievements attained and attainable only

through their use. The sum of the benefits of their use is utterly beyond Cuantification. The elimination

of horrible disease, the increase of longevity, the avoidance of great pain, the saving of lives, and

the improvement of the Cuality of lives (for humans and for animals: achieved through research

using animals is so incalculably geatthat the argument of these critics, systematically pursued, esablishes not theircondusion but its reverse/ to refrain from using animals in biomedical research is, on utilitarian grounds, morally wrong. =henbalancing the pleasures and pains resulting from the use of animals in research, we must not fail to place on the scales the terrible

pains that would have resulted, would be suffered now, and would long continue had animals not been used. &very disease

eliminated, everyvaccine developed, every method of pain relief devised, every surgical procedureinvented,every prosthetic deviceimplanted33 indeed, virtually every modern medical therapy33is due, in part or in whole, to

e;perimentation using animals. %or may we ignore, in the balancing process, the predictable ,gains in human (andanimal: well3being that are probably achievable in the future but that will not be achieved if the decision is made now to desist fromsuch research or to curtail it. #edical investigators are seldom insensitive to the distress their work may cause animal subects.

Epponents of research using animals are freCuently insensitive to the cruelty of the results of the restrictions they would impose."ntold numbers of human beings33real persons, although not now identifible3would suffer grievously as the conseCuence of thiswell3meaning but short3sighted tenderness. @f the morally relevant differences between humans and animals are borne in mind, andif all relevant considerations are weighed, the calculation of long3term conseCuences must give overwhelming support for biomedicalresearch using animals.


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$he rights of animals cannot be compared to the civil rightsmovement- humans and non-humans cannot have the same rights

%olacheck &chmahmann '([Javid +. $chmahmann is a partner in the firm of %utter,#cKennan L Mish. Kori '. ?olacheck is an associate in the firm of %utter, #c)lennan L Mish, #*

The )ase *gainst *nimal +ights, Boston )ollege &nvironmental *ffairs Kaw +eview

http/55lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu5cgi5viewcontent.cgiarticleN-07Lconte;tNealrLsei3redirN-LrefererNhttpO*O7MO7Mscholar.google.comO7MscholarOMhlOJenO71COJ

O7277proponentsO7BofO7BanimalO7BrightsO7277O71btnGOJO71asPsdt

OJ-O727)7O71asPsdtpOJQsearchNO77proponentsO78animalO78rightsO77]

* conviction and often stated belief among animal rights theorists is that the precepts of their

movement, like others once despised and reected, will gain currency over time, and that

Fanimal rights [are] the logical progression in the evolution of natural rights theories.F 213 It isstandard, indeed almost mandatory, preface to writings by animals rights activists to allude to the ridicule with which the ideas of early

abolitionists and suffragettes were received.214 >uman attitudes towards animals, the movement that seeks to

endow animals with civil rights tells us, are analogous to the archaic attitudes once e;pressed

about women and *frican3*mericans, that the former are Fthemselves childish, frivolous and short-

sighted; in a word, they are big children all their life long-a kind of intermediate stage between the child and the full-grown man,21! and thelatter a clownish, simple creature, at times even lovable within its limitations, but straightly foreordained to walk within the "eil.21# Those

who e;press reservations about the concept of civil rights for animals implicitly are warned

thereby that as the concept of FrightsF continues to e;pand e;ponentially to include more

categoriesofbeing21$-and %rofessor &tone goes so far as to mention humanoids, computers, and so forth as potential beneficiaries of therights concept he advances21'-their opposition to the process will, in time, come to seem (uaint, if not distasteful, as archaic as does that of the

most patriarchal misogenist or chauvinist race theorist. The analysis that eCuates animal rights with the rights of

women and *frican3*mericans is as inappropriate as the eCuation is distasteful, and the

progression upon which those who make it rely is not ine;orable. )or one thing, it is not necessarily

true that because history is replete with e;amples of obduracy and ignorance in making political

distinctions, there is no credibility to the distinctions now made between animals and humans.

*hile it may be true that in the conte+t of the relatively brief span of merican history the e;perience of women and *frican3

*mericans has been one of ascending from subordination to relative political empowerment, itdoes not follow that political empowerment is a constantly e;panding process, destined

eventually to empower not only animals but even other entities not yet fully identified. ne legal

writer postulates that as a general proposition, a refusal to recognie rights is a dubious position to take in merica .... 21/ @t is doubtful,

however, that such a postulation is true. There are many claimed FrightsF which, particularly so

in the *merican political tradition, are roundly refused because they have no grounding in

morality, culture, or history or because they conflict with other valued rights. )ar from substantiating an

argument that history suggests an inevitable empowerment of animals, history, in fact, suggests the opposite. Mor one thing, human

history abounds in instances of enslavement and liberation, and the political fortunes of women

have varied from cultures that are matriarchal to those with prevailing attitudes Cuite different.

%osociety, however, has ever politically empowered living animals,with the possible e;ception of )aligulas +ome.

%or should ours do so now. *nimals are not politically empowered under our current array ofanimal laws.nimals do not possess legal rights as that term is used by %rofessor 0hristopher &tone;22 animals cannot

institute legal actions< and courts do not consider animals harms and benefits in granting and

denying legal relief. @nstead, our lawsproperly seek to ensure that people treat animals in a way that is consistentwith

human interests3including interests in the preservation of our environmentand esthetic

sensibilities


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)hile #e should avoid the unnecessary suffering of animals #e dontneed to morally justify the use of animals -- the relationship bet#een

humans and animals are based in biology -- morals cant apply tothem*icoll + Russell ,, ?rofessor of @ntegrative Biology at Berkeley L Jepartment of ?hysiology3*natomy at Berkeley, ?h.J.in physiology from $tanford ()harles $. L $haron #., =hy *nimal &;perimentation #atters/ The "se of *nimals in #edical+esearch!, ed. &.M. ?aul L '. ?aul, p. -193-10:55dodo

Mrom an evolutionary perspective, attempts to find moral ustification for the use of animals on the basis

ofour Fmoral superiorityF or otherwise are unnecessary, and the arguments against such ustifications

are nonsensical.=e are essentially like all other organisms whose fundamental goals in life are

to eat, survive, and reproduce. Eur adaptive advantage3our intellect, with all that it entails3has enabled

us to be e;ceptionally successful at realiDing these fundamental goals . @t has also enabled us to achieve

many things that no other animal can even imagine, including science, technology, the arts, and so on. Because of their

idiosyncratic philosophicalbeliefs, animal advocates would deny us the ability to use our adaptive

advantagein certain ways/ namely, to use animals for our benefit, particularly in pursuits that involve

acCuiring knowledgeabout the functions and malfunctions of living creatures, including ourselves.*nimal advocates

have an unbalanced obsession with the use of animals in biomedical research. This is illustrated by ourcontent analysis of twenty3one of the maor books on animal rights that are devoted to describing how humans e;ploit animals.

%early two3thirds of the total pages of these books emphasiDe concern about animals use in research and teaching, even though only

about 8. percent of the animals used by humans are employed for this purpose. 08 The relationships that develop

between or among different species(e.g., symbiotic or parasitic: are a result of evolution. $ince these

relationships are based in biology, it is nonsensical to moraliDe about themand to advocate

FrightsFfor animals, or even for eCuality among the species. *ccordingly, the only code of morality that could be rationallyapplied to relationships between other species and ourselves is that of contractualism, as we discussed in $ection @. >owever, given

that animals are not capable of understanding the moral concepts needed to engage in a

contractual agreementwith humans, approaching human3animal interactions from a contractualist

perspective leads to the conclusion that moral theoriDing about human duties to animals is a

pointless enterprise. The foregoing arguments in this essay illustrate that, from the perspective of Jarwinian theory, the

e;ploitation of some species of animals by others is not an appropriate topic for moral concern ,especially when the e;ploiting animals need to engage in this activity in order to survive. This generaliDation applies to the humananimal as well as to other predatory species. >owever, although the evolutionary viewpoint would hold that the human use ofanimals per se is not worthy of moral consideration, the humane perspective reCuires that how we use animals is of moral concern.The unnecessary or unustified suffering of animals, including humans, should always be avoided.


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animal have no rightsRRevidence specific to animal testing


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an i mals have no rightsAnimals cant have rights -- rights are a human concept and animals

cant be evaluated in the same #ay*icoll + Russell ,, ?rofessor of @ntegrative Biology at Berkeley L Jepartment of ?hysiology3*natomy at Berkeley, ?h.J.in physiology from $tanford ()harles $. L $haron #., =hy *nimal &;perimentation #atters/ The "se of *nimals in #edical

+esearch!, ed. &.M. ?aul L '. ?aul, p. -243-18:55dodo

$imply defined, rights are ust and fair claims(to anything3life, liberty, power, privilege, etc.: that belong to

persons, as groups or individuals by law or tradition. "nderstanding rights in their various manifestations is notsimple, however. *s philosopher )arl )ohen has cogently written/ The differing targets, contents, and sources of rights, and their

inevitable conflict, together weave a tangled web. %otwithstanding all such complications, this much is clear about rights in general/they are in every case claims, or potential claims, within a community of moral agents ... [i.e.,] among beings who actually do, or can,

make moral claims against one another. Thus, it is clear that animals cannot have rights/ they cannot claim

them. The concept of FrightsF is a creation of the human mind that was invented to promote

harmony and5or to reduce conflictin comple; social, political, economic, and legal interactions. *ccordingly, there are

no FnaturalF or FGod3givenF rights. The granting or claiming of rights has significant ethical

ramifications that can be understood only by beings with the capacity to reason and to make

moral udgments.=hen persons claimthe rightsto which they are entitled, they must accept the

associated obligations. Mor e;ample, individuals who claim the right to freedom of e;pression must

refrain from abusing that right by slandering other people . ?eople who do not meet their moral obligations can

lose their rights. @n our society, they may lose their property, their freedom, and even their life. Thus, the claiming of rights

is not without cost. Ebviously, animals cannot have rightsof the kinds that are accorded to normal

human beings.*nimals can neither claim rights nor accept the responsibilities that are

associated with having them. The concept of rights has meaning only in a community of moral

agents. Therefore, only humans can have rights.2 These conclusions are supported by considering how rights and

moral codes might be applied to animals. )ontributors to a recent anthology, The Great *pe ?roect/ &Cuality Beyond

>umanity, argue that allspecies of the great apes should be given moral standing eCual to that of

human beings.1 @f this suggestion wereto be implemented, then nonhuman apes would need to be

given special status because their behavior cannot be udged by the moral standards that apply

to normal human beings. Mor e;ample, Goodall reported in a -499 article that adult male and femalechimpanDees have been observed killing and eating infant chimps on numerous occasions in different

reserves in )entral *frica.9 $hould these animals have been tried for infanticide and cannibalism @f they

had,would they have been entitled to a trial by a ury of their peers =hat would those peers be )ould a

nonchimpanDee ape(i.e., a human: have served as the presiding udgeat such a trial >ow could we have

communicated with the animals to inform them of their rights Ebviously, if apes or other animals were given rights

or considerations eCual to those we accord to normal human beings, we could not hold them

accountable to the same moral standardsto which we hold humans.

$here is an inherent difference bet#een inherent value and the ability

to have rights

.ender /arnack 0eone '6[Javid L Bruno series editors *ndrew professor of &nglisheastern Aentucky "niversity, *nimal rights opposing views 73]

The Ebscurity of @nherent Salue @nherent value is a key concept in +eganIs theory. @t is the bridge between the plausible claim that

all normal, mature mammals3human or otherwise are subects of a life and the more debatable claim

that they all have basic moral rights of the same strength . But it is a highly obscure concept, and its

obscurity makes it ill3suited to play this crucial role. inherent value is defined almost entirely in

negative terms, @t is not dependent upon the value which either the inherently valuable

individual or anyone else may place upon that individuals life or e;periences @t is not


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(necessarily a function of sentience or any other mental capacity, because,+egan says, some entities

which are not sentient (e.g., trees, rivers, or rocks: may, nevertheless, have inherent value. @t cannot attach to anything

other than an individual< species, eco3systems, and the like cannot have inherent value. These are

some of the things which inherent value is not, But what is it "nfortunately, we are not told. @nherent value appears as a

mysterious non3natural property which we must take on faith. +egan says that it is a postulate that subects3of3a3life have inherent value, a postulate ustified by the fact that it 8ds certain absurdities which he thinks follow from a purely

utilitarian theory. But =hy is the postulate that subects3of3a3life have inherent value @f the inherentvalue of a being is completely independent of the value that it or anyone else places upon its

e;periences then why does the fact that it has certain sorts of e;periences constitute evidence

that it has inherent value @f the reason is that subects3of3a3life have an e;istence which can go better or worse for them,

then why isnIt the appropriate conclusion that all sentient beings have inherent value, $ince they would all seem to meet

that condition $entient but mentally unsophisticated beings may have a less e;tensive range of possible satisfactions and

frustrations,but why should it follow that they haveor may haveno inherent value at all @n the

absence of a positive account of inherent value, it is also difficult to grasp the connection between being

inherently valuable and having moral rights. @ntuitively, it seems that value is one thing, and

rights are another. @t does not seem incoherent to say that some things e.g.. mountains, rivers,

redwood trees are inherently valuable and yet are not the sorts of things which can have moral

rights. %or does it seem incoherent . to ascribe inherent value to some things which are notindividuals, e.g., plant or animal species, though it may well be incoherent to ascribe moral

rights to such things.

$he line for granting rights is rationality- you cannot reason #ith non-

humans


+easoning with *nimals *ristotle was not wrong in claiming that the capacity to alter oneIs

behavior on the basis of reasoned argument is relevant to the full moral status which he

accorded to free men. Ef course, he was wrong in his other premise, that women and slaves their nature cannot reason wellenough to function as autonomous moral agents. Mind that premise been true, so would his conclusion that women and slaves are

not Cuite the moral eCuals of free men. @n the case of most non3human animals , the corresponding

premise is true. @f, on the other hand, there are animals with whom we can (learn to: reason ,

then we are obligated to do this and to regard them as our moral eCuals. Thus, to distinguish

between the rights of persons and those of most other animals on the grounds that only people

can alter their behavior on the basis of reasoned argument does not commit us to a perfectionist

theory of the sort *ristotle endorsed. There is no e;cuse for refusing to recogniDe the moral eCuality of some people on

the grounds that we donIt regard them as Cuite as rational as we are, since it is perfectly clear that most people can

reason well enough to determine how to act so as to respect the basic rights of others (if they

choose to:, and that is enough for moral eCuality. But what about people Uwho are clearly not rational @t is

often argued that sophisticated mental capacities such as rationality cannot be essential for the

possession of eCual basic moral rights, since nearly everyone agrees that human infants andmentally incompetent persons have such rights,even though they may lack those sophisticated mental capacities.But this argument is inconclusive, because there are powerful practical and emotional reasons

for protecting non3rational human beliefs reasons which are absent in the case of most non3

human animals. @nfancy and mental incompetence are human conditions which all of us either

have e;perienced or are likely to e;perience at some time. =e also protect babies and mentally in competentpeople because we care for them. =e donIt normally )are for animals in the same way, and when we doe.g., in the case of much3

loved petswe may regard them as having special rights by virtue of their relationship to us.=e

protect them for only for their sake but also for our own, lest we be hurt by harm done to them. +egan holds


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that such side effects are irrelevant to moral rights, and perhaps they are. But in ordinary usage there is no sharp line between moral

rights and those moral protections which are not rights. The e;tension of strong moral protections to infants

and the mentally impaired in no way proves that non3human animals have the same basic moral

rights as people.

1iscussions on animals rights are infinitely regressive no line as to

#here #e stop giving rights as environmentalists #ont stop atsentience.ender /arnack 0eone '6[Javid L Bruno series editors *ndrew professor of &nglisheastern Aentucky "niversity, *nimal rights opposing views 0]The inadeCuacy of the anti3cruelty view provides one practical reason for speaking of animal rights.*nother practical

reason is that this is an age in which nearly all significant moral claims tend to be e;pressed in

terms of rights. Thus, the denial that animals have rights, however carefully Cualified , is likely

to be taken to mean that we may do whatever we like to them provided that we do not violate

any human rights. @n such a conte;t. speaking of the rights of animals may be the only way to persuade many people to take

seriously protests against the abuse of animals.=hy not e;tend this line of argument and speak of the rights

of trees. mountains, oceans, or anything else which we may wish to see protected from

destruction $ome environmentalists have not hesitated to speak in this way, and, given theimportance of protecting such elements of the natural world, they cannot be blamed for using

this rhetorical device.But, @ would argue that moral rights can meaningfully be ascribed only to entities which have some

capacity for sentience. This is because moral rights are protections designed to protect rights holders

from harms or to provide them with benefits which matter to them. Enly beings capable of

sentience can be harmed or bene fitted in ways which matter to them, for only such beings can

like or dislike what happens to them or prefer some conditions to others. Thus, sentient animals,

unlike mountains, rivers, or species, are at least logically possible candidates for moral rights.

This fact, together with the need to end current abuses of animalse.g., in scientific research

and intensive farmingpro3 vides a plausible case for speaking of animal rights.


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animals 3 human4ther animal species commit acts of violence to other nonhumans --

yet they arent placed in the same moral standard as humans are*icoll + Russell ,, ?rofessor of @ntegrative Biology at Berkeley L Jepartment of ?hysiology3*natomy at Berkeley, ?h.J.in physiology from $tanford ()harles $. L $haron #., =hy *nimal &;perimentation #atters/ The "se of *nimals in #edical

+esearch!, ed. &.M. ?aul L '. ?aul, p. -173-1:55dodo

*ccording to animal rightists, only the human animal is immoral for e;ploiting other species ,

because we do not need to do so and we are moral agents. Theyalso allegethatwe could useso3called

Falternatives to animalsF for biomedical research and that we do not need to consume animals

for food or clothing, or to satisfy our other needs. Thus, we could choose to live a Fcruelty3freeF lifestyle if we had

the proper moral fiber. The fact that the so3called crueltyfree lifestyle is an illusion has been discussed by us previously.21*nimal

advocatesalso argue that when predators kill and eat other species, they are ustified in doing so

because, unlike us, they have no alternative food sources.29 >owever, these beliefs3that only human

behavior toward other animals should be udged morally, and that we are the only natural

predator that could abandon a predatory lifestyle3contradict the central tenet of the *K*+#

philosophy, the claim that #e are 5just like other animals.F@n fact, virtually all human

behavior is udged against moral standards, particularly our treatment of our own kind and other animals. @n

contrast, no one can rationally udge the behavior of any nonhuman species against any moral

standards. This difference between other creatures and us nullifies the argument of *K*+#ists

that there are Fno morally relevant differences between humans and nonhuman animals.F *nimalactivists also maintain that we are especially cruel and destructive to our own kind and to other species. Mor e;ample, $inger stated/=e rarely stop to consider that the animal who kills with the least reason to do so is the human animal. ... Throughout their history

they [human beings] have shown a tendency to torment and torture both their fellow human beings and their fellow animals beforeputting them to death. %o other animals show much interest in doing this. 20 This undocumented, sweeping condemnation ofhumanity shows an obvious (possibly willful: ignorance of biology. %umerous e;amples of cruelty by animals toward other animals

can be cited. Mor e;ample, even when well fed, the domestic cat is notoriously ruthless to the small

mammals and birds that it kills< itoften does so after tormenting them and inflicting increasingly

serious inury. @n fact, it has been estimated that the FrecreationalF hunting by domestic cats in the "nited

Aingdom kills about -88 million small birds and mammals each year . 24 @n the "nited $tates, cats areestimated to kill at least . million songbirds each day. (@: The ".$. figure alone amounts to more than -.1billion songbirds each year, which e;ceeds the current number of animals used each year for biomedical research in the "nited

$tates (about 72 million: by several orders of magnitude.1- Thus, it would seem that if *K*+#ists were genuinely

interested in minimiDing animal suffering, they would advocate the e;termination of the

domestic cat. $hrikes, or Fbutcherbirds,F capture small animals and impale them, often while

they are still alive, on thorns and barbsin their territory to display their hunting skillsto females.17 The

great homed owl and wild mink are both known to kill , in a murderous frenDy, more animals than they

can eat. 1 Ercas, or killer whales, have been observed tormenting and brutaliDing (seemingly Fplaying withF:

sea3lion pups until they are dead before eating them.1 =alter >oward has reported other e;amples of animal

brutality to animals. 12 Memale cougars and mountain lionsoften inure several sheep in a flock so that

their cubs can learn to kill prey animals. The death of these sheep is not swift or merciful. Kike such cubs, canids such

aswolves or coyotes are not efficient killers of large prey animals. >ence, they usually begin toconsume their prey while it is still alive and conscious. $imilar acts of cruelty, when committed

by humans, are considered to be grossly immoral, but animal advocates arelargely silent

about these e;amples of cruelty to animals by animals$ome interspecies e;ploitation does not involvepredation. #any species of animals, including numerous types of birds and fish, practice a form of nonconsumptive e;ploitation

called brood parasitism, whereby the parental instincts of a foreign species are e;ploited to raise the young of the e;ploitingcreature.11 This form of e;ploitation often occurs at the e;pense of the e;ploited species young. )uckoos and cowbirds are the mostcommonly known e;amples of species that practice brood parasitism, FvictimiDingF various species of songbirds such as reedwarblers.19 To try to udge the behavior of these animals by our moral standards would be ludicrous. They are simply acting outtheir instinctive behaviors. Brood parasitism, for e;ample, is an adaptation that gives its practitioners a significant reproductive


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advantage. By e;ploiting unwitting foster parents, they can produce more offspring during each breeding season than they could ifthey were obliged to care for their own young. This is clearly behavior that is advantageous from an evolutionary standpoint, thoughbeyond the pale of moral consideration.

Animals are inherently different than humans -- comple7ity of mindsself-e7perience and morals

orrison ,, ?rofessor at the $chool of Seterinary #edicine at the "niversity of ?ennsylvania< a Mellow of the )enter on%euroscience, #edical ?rogress, and $ociety at George =ashington "niversity< and $ecretary General of the =orld Mederation of$leep +esearch $ocieties. >e has written numerous articles on the neurological aspects of sleep and on the animal rights movement,and in -44- he received the $cientific Mreedom and +esponsibility *ward of the *merican $ociety for the *dvancement of $cience.

(*drian +., =hy *nimal &;perimentation #atters/ The "se of *nimals in #edical +esearch!, ed. &.M. ?aul L '. ?aul, p. 2732:55dodo

*s a utilitarian, $ingerdoes not actually subscribe to the idea of rights< he does, however, support the aims of the animal rights

movement.-8 >e and the rest of the movement see speciesism as analogous to racism .-- To all but a few

people3those captured by the e;tremes of the animal rights movement3the eCuation of speciesism with racism

seems to trivialiDe bigotry. #ost people sense a duty to their fellow man that supersedes

obligations to other species.*mong theseduties is the relief of human suffering, an obvious

obective of biomedical research employing animals< this research is clearly ac3 ceptable to most people. +emarkably, however, it is not acceptable to everyone< if it were, there would be no need for this volume. =hy do most of the

rest of us set humans apart #ichael *. Mo;, a )anadian philosopher, -7 put forth what @ consider to be clear and sensible reasons,

although he would Cuickly come to reect his own arguments on the urging of a radical feminist friend. - >umans are

uniCue, Mo; originally argued, in many obvious ways. >umans brain comple;ity leads to the

sophisticated use of language/ consider $hakespeares plays versus the simple sign language that humans laboriously

teach apes. Murthermore, humans use intricately fashioned tools , even making tools to make other

obects. @ would add that those who try to draw other species(the great apes in particular: into our foldby

emphasiDing their intellectual abilities demean those animals. Their abilities are but shadowsof

our own< they cannot come close to us intellectually.=e should appreciate those creatures in their

own right3as wonderful creations of nature, not as defective humans. * recent editorial in the %ew $cientistapproached this Cuestion from another direction/ "nfortunately, it has become fashionable to stress that chimpanDees and humans

must have staggeringly similar psychologies because they share 40. per cent of their J%*. But this misses the point/ genomes

are not cake recipes. * few tiny changes in a handful of genes controlling the development of the

[cerebral] corte; could easily have a disproportionate impact.* creature that shares 40. per

cent of its J%* with humans is not 40. per cent human , any more than a fish that shares, say, 8 per cent ofits J%* with us is 8 per cent human.' Murthermore, we have a concept of ourselves that goes well beyond a chimps ability to ape

itself in a mirror.=e can see ourselves Fas independent individuals with our own integrity, sense of

purpose, and worth.=e have a concept of our own lives3their origin, duration, self3guided direction, and

terminus in death3of world history, and of the limitless reaches of time and space beyond the self. ... >umans are the beings

who because of their acute sense of self e;perience an;iety, guilt, despair, shame, remorse,

internal conflict, pride, hope, triumph, and so many other emotion3laden states .F -2 Enly with such

capacities can a being be called FcruelF or FhumaneF in its actions. #y cat, playing with a dying mouse, cannot be

udged cruel. But were @ to torture the mouse to death, @ would be considered cruel. >uman

beings may permissibly kill only when we do so respectfully,for a defined purpose, andmost importantly3as

painlessly as possible.*nything else is cruel. (The duck hunter who follows the rules of his craft merits my respect< he whoshoots at a passing crow for fun is a cad.: Ef course, definitions of Fdefined purposeF and FpainlesslyF may well differ amongreasonable people. >owever, @ cannot include in this group those who would deny uses that are beneficial to suffering human beings.

Ence we have an animal, a group of animals, a species, or even an entire ecosystem within our

control, then, of course, we have a great obligation to it. Juring my early years as a researcher, when we lacked acentraliDed animalcare facility with veterinarians and a full3time staff, @ hired veterinary students to provide food and water to theanimals and clean their cages. %evertheless, @ never left for home without personally visiting my animal colony to make sure that

each cat had sufficient water and food, and that none was in distress.


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9alue to life are fundamentally different in humans and non-humansdue autonomy


=hen the Salue of Kife @s the )entral@ssue =here pain and suffering are the central issue, most of us tend to

think of the human and animal cases in the same way thus, cruelty to a child and cruelty to a dogare wrong and wrong for the same reason. ?ain is pain< it is an evil, and the evidence suggests that it is as much an evil for dogs

as for humans. Murthermore autonomy or agency or the lack thereof does not seem a relevant factor

here, since the pains of rionautonomous creatures count as well as the pains of autonomous ones.%either the child nor the dog is autonomous, at least in any sense that captures why autonomy is such an immensely important value< but the pains of

both child and dog count and affect our udgments of rightness and wrongness with respect to what is done to them.=here the value of

Kife is the central issue, however we do not tend to think of3the human and animal cases alike.

>ere, we come down in favor of humans, as when we regularly e;periment upon and kill

animals in our laboratories for (typically: human benefit < and a main ustification reflective

people give forgive humans such advantage invokes directly a different value between human

and animal life. *utonomyor ncy is now, moreover, of the utmost significance. since the ercise of autonomy by

normal adult humans is one of thecentral ways they make possible further, important

dimensions of value to their lives. *rguably. even the e;tended ustification of animal suffering n say medical research may make

indirect appeal to the un eCual value thesis. Though pain remains an evil, the nature and $iDe of some benefit

determine whether its infliction is ustified in the particular cases. %othing precludes this

benefit from accrual to human beings, and when it does. we need an independent defense of the appeal to benefit thiskind of )fl$). Mor the appeal is typically invoked in cases where those who suffer are those who benefit, as when we go to the dentist, and in the

preferring instance human beings arc the beneficiaries of animal suffering. ?ossibly the uneCual value thesis can provide

the reCuisite defense/ what ustifies the infliction of pain it anything does. -2 the appeal to benefit/ hot whatustifies use of the appeal in those cases where humans are the beneficiaries of animal suffering is. arguably. that human life is more volatile thou

animal life. Thus, while the uneCual value thesis cannot alter the character of pain, which remains an

evil, and cannot directly, independently of benefit, ustify the infliction of pain, it can, the

suggestion is, anchor a particular use of the appeal to benefit.


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focus on ho# #e use animals insteadAnimals should not be mal treated but that does not #arrant e"ual

rights #ith humans:o7 ;8[ F*nimal KiberationF/ * )ritiCueR #ichael #ichael Mo; taught nineteenth3centuryphilosophy, e;istentialism, environmental ethics, and other courses in the department from-411 to 7882 &thics, Sol. 00, %o. 7 ('an., -490:, pp. -813--0

http/55aeitis.org5temp5794494.pdf]

%ow how can the above entailments be defended @ cannot give full treatment to this important topic here,

but @ should like to suggest that only autonomous beings, as ust described, can and do belong to

a moral com3munity, which is the sort of social group within which(and only within which: such concepts

as those of rights and duties have any meaning and application. Mor it is only in a community of interacting

autonomous beings of this sort that there can be the kind of mutual recognition reCuired for

these concepts to evolve and be understood.Ebligations and rights, as well as the moral discourse generated bythese and ancillary notions, are functions of mutual recognition and accountability and are, conseCuently, inapplicable outside the

conte;t specified. @t should be made clear that the foregoing is not an attempt merely to legislate

concerning the kinds of beings which Cualify as possessor of moral rights . +ather, my analysis s meant tosuggest that, since the only species we know of that has developed the concepts of rights and obligations (and the institutionsassociated with them: is >omo sapiens, there must be something about this peculiar sort of social being that accounts for thephenomenon in Cuestion. *nd my argument is that the relevant features of humans (other than their capacity to suffer and enoy:

that e;plain why they have rights are their possession of a certain kind of consciousness,

particular cognitive and linguistic abilities, and the capacity to comprehend, undertake, and

carry out obligations and to e;pect the same of like beings . The considerations taken up briefly here shouldsuffice to show that regarding the cognitive capacities of human beings as relevant to the Cuestion of possessing moral rights is nottantamount to invoking some simplistic notion of humans rationality to settle a vastly more comple; set of issues, as proponents of

animal rights freCuently suppose. $inger and +eganust conveniently leave the capacities @ have mentioned

out of the picture or else systematically misunderstand and underrate their significance.@ conclude,

then, that it is difficult to see how an argument for ascribing specifically moral rights to animals can get started.*nd if it

cannot get off the ground, then there also appears to be no case for saying either that animals

ought not to be treated as means to human ends, provided that they are treated in as humane amanner as possible in the process, or that they have a right to life. But it seems to me that the overall obligation toprevent or minimiDe animal suffering should suffice as a moral basis for prohibiting the atrociousc onditionso f crowdinga ndconfinementt hat prevailo n modern Ffactory farms,F for drastically curtailing the use of animals in e;cruciating but pointless

e;periments in product testing, and for ending other inhumane practices (in slaughtering, trapping, the keeping of pets, hunting,

racing, and so on:. "ndoubtedly animals should not be maltreated. They should not be made to suffer

needlessly or e;cessively.F $inger and +egan are surely correct to single out animals capacity to suffer as the reason why we

should treat them humanely. But it is no more clear how this e;tends moral rights to them than how our

dawning ecological sense that we ought not to waste natural resources and systematically ravage

the environment would establish moral rights for trees, lakes, or mineral deposits . =hat should be

said is that we have an obligation to avoid mistreating animals,but that this is an obli3gation without a

corresponding right on the part of the beings affected by our behavior. 7 The argument presented thus far

undercuts $ingers surely e;aggerated claim that philosophers have felt the need to posit Fsome basis for the moral gulfthat is commonly thought to separate humans and animals, but can find no concrete difference

that will do this without undermining the eCuality of humans. . . F ($, pp. 711319:. @t is difficult to see how$inger can maintain the position that there is no Fmoral gulfF separating humans from animals when he also makes the following

(clearly speciesist: remark/ F@t is not arbitrary to hold that the life of a self3aware being, capable of

abstract thought, of planning for the future, of comple; acts of communication, and so on, is morevaluable than the life of a being without these capacitiesF ($. p. 7:. Mor once it is admitted that certain forms of life are inherently

more valuable than others (valuable to whom, incidentally, if not to humans:, then it has already been conceded that

the allegedly Fmore valuableF beings have a greater claim to life, pleasure, and freedom from
http://aeitis.org/temp/2379979.pdfhttp://aeitis.org/temp/2379979.pdf


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suffering than those lacking the capacities in Cuestion.*nd it becomes highly problematic how $inger can go onfrom there to defend such views as that animal pleasure and pain are both Cualitatively and Cuantitatively the same as those of

humans and that their capacity for enoying life is the same.


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ans#ers to


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at< marginal cases/umans have morals inherently in them #hile animals never had

them in the first placeCohen 86, professor at the "niversity of #ichigan #edical $chool, %ew &ngland 'ournal of #edicine ()arl, The )ase for the"se of *nimals in Biomedical +esearch! -/0123014, http/55spot.colorado.edu56heathwoo5phil-788,$pr895cohen.pdf:55dodo

@f having rights reCuires being able to make moral claims, to grasp and apply moral laws, then

many humans3the brain3damaged, the comatose, the senile33 who plainlylack those capacities

must be without rights. But that is absurd.This proves [the critic concludes] that rights do not depend

on the presence of moral capacities. This obection fails< it mistakenly treats an essential feature of humanity as though

it were a screen for sorting humans. The capacity for moral udgment that distinguishes humans from

animals is not a testto be administered to human beings one by one. ?ersons who are unable, because of

some disability, to perform the full moral functions natural to human beings are certainly not for that

reason eected from the moral communityThe issue is one of kind. >umansare of such a kind that they may

be the subect of e;periments only with their voluntary consent. The choices they make freely must be

respected.*nimals are of such a kind that it is impossible for them, in principle, to give or withhold

voluntary consent or to make a moral choice.

)hat humans retain #hen disabledanimals have never had.

entally disabled human beings cannot be labeled e"uivalent to

animals -- animals are not considered tragic beingsJouble bind 33 either animals canIt be on the same level as humans, or animals will be

considered tragic beings, this thought process forces anthropocentric values, seeing as animals

can only be beings that cannot recogniDe the fullness of life ( :

*icoll + Russell ,, ?rofessor of @ntegrative Biology at Berkeley L Jepartment of ?hysiology3*natomy at Berkeley, ?h.J.in physiology from $tanford ()harles $. L $haron #., =hy *nimal &;perimentation #atters/ The "se of *nimals in #edical+esearch!, ed. &.M. ?aul L '. ?aul, p. -183-1-:55dodo

RR modified for ablest language ( ask #hat term it should be modified too=== :

$inger and other advocates for animals argue that we should give special consideration to animals

that lack the cognitive capacities of normal adult and subadult humans because we give such

consideration to classes of humans whose physical and5or mental abilities are no greater than

those of many mammals, such as chimpanDees, pigs, or dogs.0 $uch classesof humans, often referred to as

Fmarginal cases,F include normal infants andmentally retarded or mentally disabled(i.e., brain3damaged:

individuals. @ncluding these groupsin this category runs counter to the innate inclination of all social

animals, and of many or most nonsocial animals, to protect their young and to favor their own

kind over other species.*ny social species that did not showsuch a preference for its own kind

would soon become e;tinct, because the survival of such species is strongly dependent on mutual support. #entally

retarded or disabled individuals have suffered a tragedy because they cannot realiDe the full

potential in life that normal human beings can e;perience. By contrast, apes, dogs, or pigs withcognitive capacities comparable to those of a mentallyretarded or disabled human are not tragic

beings. The families ofretarded or brain3damaged individuals also suffer from the tragedythat befell their loved

ones. To regardretarded or disabled persons as subhuman, as some animal activists suggest, would

compound this tragedy. Murthermore, what degree of mental retardationwould a person have to

display before being consigned FeCual3to3animalsF status)rossing the gap that we maintain between our ownspecies and others would place this udgment on the proverbial slippery slope. )ohen addresses the issue of rights and the mentally

impaired in this way/ FThe capacity for moral udgment that distinguishes humans from animals is not


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a test to be administered to human beings one by one. ?ersons who are unable, because of some disability, toperform the full moral functions natural to human beings are certainly not for that reason eected from the moral community. F4


19/51

at< animals have feelings$he ability to care for ones young does not automatically give a right

to animals -- animals dont have the inherent morals found in humansCohen 86, professor at the "niversity of #ichigan #edical $chool, %ew &ngland 'ournal of #edicine ()arl, The )ase for the"se of *nimals in Biomedical +esearch! -/0123014, http/55spot.colorado.edu56heathwoo5phil-788,$pr895cohen.pdf:55dodo

This criticism misses the central point. @t is not the ability to communicate or to reason, or dependence on

one another, or care for the young, or the e;hibition of preference, or any such behavior that

marks the critical divide. *nalogiesbetween human families and those of monkeys, or between human communities

and those of wolves, and the like, are entirely beside the point. ?atterns of conduct are not at issue.*nimalsdo indeede;hibit remarkable behavior at times. )onditioning, fear, instinct, and intelligence all contribute to

species survival. embership in a community of moral agents nevertheless remains

impossiblefor them. *ctors subect to moral udgment must be capable of grasping the generality of an ethical premise in a

practical syllogism. >umans act immorally oftenenough,but only they33 never wolves or monkeys333can discern,

by applying some moral rule to the facts of a case, that a given act ought or ought not to he performed . The

moral restraints imposed by humans on themselves are thus highly abstract and are often in

conflictwith the self3interest of the agent.

)ommunal behavior among animals, even when most intelligent and

most endearing, does not approach autonomous moralityin this fundamental sense. Genuinely moral acts have an

internal as well as an .e;ternal dimension. Thus, in law, an act can be criminal only when the guilty deed, the actus

reus, is done with a guilty mind, mens tea. %o animal can ever commit a crime< bringing animals to criminal

trial is the mark of primitive ignorance. The claims of moral right are similarly inapplicable to them. Joes a lionhave a right to eat a baby Debra Joes a baby Debra have a right not to be eaten $uch Cuestions, mistakenly invoking the concept ofright where it does not belong, do not make good sense. Those who condemn biomedical research because it violates Fanimal rightsFcommit the same blunder.

Animal behavior doesnt correlate to pain -- self-preservation/arrison ', professor at Bond "niversity (?eter, Jo *nimals Meel ?ain!, ?hilosophy Sol. 11, %o. 722, pg. 71379, 'anuary-44-, )ambridge "niversity ?ress on behalf of +oyal @nstitute of ?hilosophy, '$TE+:55dodo

The argument based on Upain behavioursI is the most intuitive. )on3sidered in isolation, however, it is the least compelling. &ven

the simplest representatives of the animal kingdom e;hibit rudimentary Upain behavioursI . $ingle3celled organisms, for e;ample, will withdraw from harmful stimuli. @nsects struggle feebly after they have been inadvertently

crushed underfoot.Het few would want to argue that these behaviours resulted from the e;perience of

pain.)ertainly we show little sympathy for those unfortunate ants which are innocent casualties of an afternoon stroll, or thecountless billions of microorganisms destroyed by the chlorination of our water supplies. Mor all practical purposes we discount the

possibility that such simple forms of life feel pain, despite their behaviours. @n more elevated levels of the animal kingdom there arealso instances of Upain behavioursI which undoubtedly occur in the absence of pain. $ome parent birds, for instance, will feign inury

to lure predators away from their young. The converse is also true.*nimals might have sustainedconsiderable tissue

damage, but display none of the signswhich we imagine would usually attend such trauma. This is because immobility

is the best response to certain kinds of inury.- ?ain behaviours, in any case, can be ably performed by non3living entities. @f we

were to construct a robot which was devoid of speech, y et was to have an active and independent

e;istence, it would be necessary to programme it with mechanisms of self3preservation . Ef the many

obects it might encounter, it would need to be able to detect and respond to those likely to cause it most harm. ?roperlyprogrammed, such a machine would manifest its own Upain behaviourI. @f we lit a fire under it, it would struggle to escape. Vfit founditself in a dangerous situation from which it could not e;tricate itself (say it fell into an acid bath: it would attempt to summon aid

with shrill cries. @f it were immobiliDed after a fall, it might, by facial contortions, indicate that it was damaged. But this Upain

behaviourI would convey nothing about what it was feeling,for robots, on most accounts, can feel nothing.*ll

that could be learned from such behaviour was how well the robot had been programmed for

self3preservation. -iutatis mutandis, the Upain behavioursI of animals demonstrate, in the first instance, how

well natural selection has fitted themfor encounters with unfriendly aspects of their environment. Mor neither

animals, nor our imaginary robot, is Upain behaviourI primarily an e;pression of some internal


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state. @ think these e;amples are sufficient to show that the argument from behaviours alone is fairly weak. But the reason we areinclined to deny that simple animals and computers feel pain is that despite their competent performance of Upain behavioursI,

their internal $tructure is sufficiently dissimilar to our own to warrant the conclusion that they

do not have a mental life which is in any way comparable. *nimals closely related to the human species,however, possess at least some of the neural hardware which in human beings is thought to be involved in the e;perience of pain. @t

might be that the behavioural argument is stronger when considered together with the second argumentthat based on the affinityof nervous systems.

Animals e7hibit pain behavior -- method of survival/arrison ', professor at Bond "niversity (?eter, Jo *nimals Meel ?ain!, ?hilosophy Sol. 11, %o. 722, pg. 231, 'anuary-44-, )ambridge "niversity ?ress on behalf of +oyal @nstitute of ?hilosophy, '$TE+:55dodo

?ain is a mental state, and mental states reCuire minds. Eur inCuiry, then, is in part an investigation of the selective advantageconferred by the possession of a mind. * mindIs reflection on its own activities, amongst other things, enables us to predict thebehaviour of other human beings, and to a lesser e;tent, animals. By reflecting upon our reasons for behaving in certain ways, andby assuming that our fellow human beings are similarly motivated, we can make predictions about how they are likely to behave in

certain situations. But more than this, by ascribing consciousness and intelligence to other organisms we can also make predictionsabout how they will behave. $uch ascriptions, whether they have any basis in fact or not, can thus help the human species survive. *s>. $. 'ennings remarked almost ninety years ago, if an amoeba Uwere as large as a whale, it is Cuite conceivable that occasions mightarise when the attribution to it of the elemental states of consciousness might save the unsophisticated human from destruction thatwould result from lack of such attribution.I7I *long with human self3awareness then, came a tendency to attribute a similar

awareness to other creatures. That animals might have beliefs, mental images, intentions and pains likeour own could be nothing more than a useful fiction which gives us a shorthand method of

predicting their behaviour. There is, then, some value in the belief that animals suffer pain, for it provides a reasonablyreliable guide to how they will behave. But it is not an infallible guide. @f, for e;ample, we were to pit ourselves against a chess3playing computer, the best strategy to adopt would be to act as if the machine were a skilled human opponent, possessed of certain

intentional statesa desire to win, particular beliefs about the rules, and so on. >owever, there might be occasions when it would bebetter to adopt another attitude towards the computer. Ket us imagine that the computer was programmed to play at three levelsbeginner, inter mediate, and advanced. $et at the UbeginnerI level, the computer might show itself to be vulnerable to a basic UfoolIsmateI, so that whenever this simple gambit was used, it inevitably lost. * human opponent could thus he confident of heating thecomputer whenever he or she wished. %ow this e;ploitation of the computerIs weakness would result from the adoption of Cuite a

different stance. %o longer would the computer be treated as if it had desires and beliefs (or more importantly as if it had the abilityto acCuire new beliefs:, for a human opponent in the same situation would Cuickly learn to counter the UfoolIs mateI. @nstead,

predictions of the computerIs behaviour would be based on the way it had been designed to operate. Thus, our wildebeest, on

an intentional account, should e;hibit Upain behaviourI. Enly when we adopt a Udesign stanceI (the

animal was UdesignedI by natural selection to behave in ways which would enhance the survival of the species: do we get areasonable e;planation of why it dies in silence.77 The general point is this. The ascription to animals of

certain mental states usually enables us to predict their behaviour with some accuracy (such

ascription increasing our own chances of survival:. But there will always be instances where this intentional

model will break down and e;planations which refer to selective advantages will be preferred .

Animals dont have morals -- behavior is based on the best chance for

survival/arrison ', professor at Bond "niversity (?eter, Jo *nimals Meel ?ain!, ?hilosophy Sol. 11, %o. 722, pg. 130, 'anuary-44-, )ambridge "niversity ?ress on behalf of +oyal @nstitute of ?hilosophy, '$TE+:55dodo

*nother reason for attributing pain e;periences only to human beings is to do with free3will and

moral responsibility. =hile there has been some dispute about whether animals ought to be the obect of our moral concern,we do not usually consider animals to be moral agents.*nimals are not generally held to be

morally responsible for their own acts, and notwithstanding some rather odd medieval udicial practices, animals

do not stand trial for antisocial acts which they might have committed.=hat is absent in

animalswhich is thought to be crucial to the committing of some wrong is the mens reathe evil intent.

*nimals are not morally responsible for the acts they commit because while they may have

behavioural dispositions, they do not have thoughts and beliefs about what is right and wrong,nor can they, whatever their behavioural disposition, form a conscious intent. Er at least, $o we generally believe. *nimals, in short,are not Ufree agentsI, and this is why they are not regarded as being morally responsible. But what does the determined nature of


21/51

animal behaviour have to do with pain $imply this, that if animalsI behaviours are causally determined, it makes no sense to speakof pain as an additional causal factor. Ene way of seeing the force of this is to e;plore some of the conte;ts in which we use the term

UpainI. There are many ways we have of talking about pain which e;clude animals. )onsider thefollowing/ (-: UMor the long3distance runner, it is a matter of mind over matter. >e must break through the pain barrierI. (7: UThehunger striker finally succumbed and diedI. (: U&ven though she knew it would mean a horrible death at the stake, she refused to

recantI. (: UThe pain became unbearable. >e cried outI. @f we attempt to substitute animals for the human

agents in these statements, the result becomes complete nonsense . Eur inability to fit animals into the logicof these e;pressions is not merely because animals are not (contingently: long3distance runners, or hunger strikers, or religious

martyrs. The key lies in statement (:.=e must ask/ Jo animals ever find pain unbearable, and,=hat

reasons could they have for bearing it )onsider this sentence in which a suitable substitution might be made. UThemanIs hand reached into the flames, and was immediately withdrawn with a cryI. =e could easily substitute UapeI for UmanI here andthe statement will retain its sense. But what about this/ The man plunged his hand into the flames again, knowing that only hecould reach the valve and stem the flow of petrol which threatened to turn the sleepy village into an inferno.I %ow the

substitution becomes impossible, for what could conceivably cause the ape to plunge its hand back into the flames%othing, @ suspect, for apes do not have reasons for bearing pain. %ow it may seem unsatisfactory to proceed on the basis of certainlinguistic practices to make some claim about how things really are. (This, @ suspect, is why *nselmIs ontological argument alwaysleaves one feeling a little uneasy.: But the e;clusive nature of the grammar of UpainI, or more correctly of Ubearing painI, reveals theuniCue province of pain. ?ain operates as one kind of reason which free agents are bound to take into consideration when they

decide on a particular course of action. ?ain can be borne if there are reasons. But an animal never has reasons either

to bear pain, or to succumb to pain. *nd if pain never need be brought into the sphere of reasons

the mindthen there is no need for it, Cua unpleasant mental event , at all. Thus, while it isundeniable that animals sense no;ious stimuli and react to them, these stimuli only need be

represented as unpleasant mental states if they are to become the bodyIs reasons in the conte;t

of other reasons. Enly as various degrees of unpleasantness can they be taken seriously amongst reasons, and this is onlynecessary in the mind of a rational agent. *nother way of thinking about this is to consider the attributes of the long3distance

runner, the hunger striker, the martyr, the hero of the sleepy village. =e could say that they had mental strength, great courage, or

moral character. But we would never predicate these of animals. The wildebeest dies silently and does not

endanger the herd. But does it die courageously Joes it bear the pain to the end Joes it have a reason for remaining silent

%o, because it does not have a choice.*ll wildebeest behave in this fashion. *nd if it does not have a choice,there is no reCuirement for the dismemberment of its body to be represented mentally as pain. ?ain is the bodyIs representative in

the mindIs decision3making process. =ithout pain, the mind would imperil the body (as cases of insensitivity to pain clearly show:.But without the rational, decision making mind, pain is superfluous. *nimals have no rational or moral considerations which mightoverrule the needs of the body. @t is for this reason that Jescartes referred to pain, hunger and thirst as Uconfused modes of thoughtI,

which can only be predicated of creatures which can think.W


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at< singer3rtc of -ismsRacism3&e7ism isnt founded in the nature of different species -- the

difference bet#een humans and animals is different from the #aypeople vie# others in a different race or gender

Cohen 86, professor at the "niversity of #ichigan #edical $chool, %ew &ngland 'ournal of #edicine ()arl, The )ase for the"se of *nimals in Biomedical +esearch! -/0123014, http/55spot.colorado.edu56heathwoo5phil-788,$pr895cohen.pdf:55dodo

The first error ts the assumption, often e;plicitly defended, that all sentient animals have eCual moral standing. Between a dog and a

human being, according to this view, there is no moral difference< hence the pains suffered by dogs must be weighed no differentlyfrom the pains suffered by humans. To deny such eCuality, according to this critic, is to give unust preference to one species overanother< it is Fspeciesism.F The most influential statement of this moral eCuality of species was made by ?eter $inger/ The racistviolates the principle of eCuality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of his own race when there is a clash betweentheir interests and the interests of those of another race. The se;ist violates the principle of eCuality by favoring the interests of his

own se;. $imilarly the speciesist allows the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of members of other species.

The pattern is identical in each case. This argument is worse than unsound< it is atrocious. @t draws an

offensive moral conclusion from a deliberately devised verbal parallelism that is utterly specious .+acism has no rational ground whatever. Jiffering degrees of respect or concern for humans for no

other reason than that they are members of different races is an inustice totally without

foundation in the nature of the races themselves.+acists, even if acting on the basis of mistaken factual beliefs,do grave moral wrong precisely because there is no morally relevant distinction among the races. The

supposition of such differences has led to outright horror. The same is true of the se;es, neither se; being

entitled by right to greater respect or concern than the other . %o dispute here Between species of

animate life, however between(for e;ample: humans on the one hand and cats or rats on the other33

the morally relevant differences are enormous , and almost universally appreciated. >umans engage in

moral reflection< humans are morally autonomous< humans are members of moral

communities, recogniDing ust claims against their own interest. >uman beings do have rights< theirs is amoral status very different from that of cats or rats.


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at< nervous systemsAnimals react to behaviors #ithout having the mental capacity to

understand #hat it means/arrison ', professor at Bond "niversity (?eter, Jo *nimals Meel ?ain!, ?hilosophy Sol. 11, %o. 722, pg. 7937, 'anuary-44-, )ambridge "niversity ?ress on behalf of +oyal @nstitute of ?hilosophy, '$TE+:55dodo

Jescartes, in his #editations (-1-:, Cuite correctly pointed out that there is no necessary logical relation between propositions

about mental states and propositions about physical states. =e may doubt the e;istence of our bodies, but not our minds. *disembodied mind is a logical possibility. )onversely, there is no logical impropriety in imagining bodies behaving in Cuite comple;ways, without those behaviours being necessarily accompanied by relevant mental processes. Eur robot, for e;ample, would fit the

bill, and indeed for Jescartes, animalstoowere merely automatons, albeit organic ones. Ef course from the factthat there is no logical connection between mental states and physical states it cannot be inferred that no contingent connection ispossible. Jescriptions of mental and physical states may be linked in a number of ways, and it is upon such linkages that the secondargument for animal pain depends. The most compelling evidence of connection between the physical state of the brain and themental life of the individual comes from instances of brain pathology or brain surgery. The fact that damage to the cerebral corte;

can reduce individuals to a UmindlessI state would suggest that observable brain states cause mind states, or at the very least are anecessary condition of mind states. #ore specifically, neurologists have had some success in identifying those parts of the brainwhich seem to be responsible for particular conscious states. our e;perience of pain, for e;ample, seems to be mediated through acomplicated physical network involving the neospinothalamic proection system (sensory aspects of pain:, reticular and limbic

structures (motivational aspects of pain:, and the neocorte; (overall control of sensory and motivational systems:. (@t may be

significant that this latter structure we share only with the primates.*n argument could be made on this basisalone that the e;perience which we designate UpainI is peculiar to us and a few primate species .:

But despite such well3 established connectionsbetween observable brain structures and more elusive mental

states, it would be rash to attempt to predict the mental states of individuals on the basis of the

presence or absence of certain structures, or even on the basis of the physiological status of those structures.2 Thewell3known literature on the psychology of pain illustrates that the same stimulus may prove intensely painful to one individual, andbe of little concern to another. The use of placebos to control pain, the influence of hypnosis or suggestion to influence pain

perception, national differences in pain thresholds, all such aspects of the psychology of pain illustrate that the presence of certainbrain structures and reCuisite sensory inputs are not sufficient conditions for the prediction of mental states. %ot only does thepsychology of pain afford instances in which the same neural hardware might give rise to a variety of different conscious states, butthe human brain itself e;hibits an amaDing ability to generate certain mental states in the absence of the relevant physical structures.

?hantom pain is perhaps the most obvious e;ample. *mputees freCuently report awareness of a limb which has been recentlyamputated. @n a minority of cases a phantom limb may become an ongoing source of severe pain. Eften the pain is located in a Cuitespecific part of the missing appendage. *n even more compelling illustration of the generation of certain mental states in the

absence of appropriate structures comes from 'ohn KorberIs engaging paper U@s Hour Brain +eally %ecessarvI ?aediatric neurologistKorber reports on a number of individuals with hydro cephalusa condition which resulted in their having virtually no cerebral

corte;. The most intriguing case cited by Korber is that of a mathematician with @X of -71. * brain scan revealed that this young manhad, in KorberIs words, Uvirtually no brainI. The supratentorial part of the intracranial cavity contained only a thin layer of braintissue, between one and two millimetres thick, attached to the skull wall. %o Uvisual corte;I was evident, yet the individual, who by allaccounts should have been blind, had above average visual perception. @t is likely that the functions which would normally have

taken place in the missing cerebral corte; had been taken over by other structures. )ases such as this show that certain aspects ofhuman consciousness have a tenacity which confounds our understanding of the link between brain structure and consciousness.KorberIs discoveries are a striking e;ample of the fact that an advancing neuroscience, far from establishing concrete links betweenbrain states and mental states, is actually deepening the mystery of how the brain is causally related to human consciousness. @t need

hardly be said thatwhen we cross the species boundary and attempt to make proections about

animalsI putative mental lives based on the structures of their nervous systems we are in murky

watersindeed. Two further e;amples illustrate this. The brains of birds, such as they are, do not contain a

Uvisual corte;I.Thus if we are to argue that similar brain structures give rise to similar e;periences, then it is unlikely that

the visual e;periences of birds will be Cualitatively similar to our own . En the other hand, the behaviour ofbirds would seem to indicate that they can UseeI. =hile we assume from the behaviour of birds that their visual e;perience of theworld is much the same as ours, if we are committed to the view that like mental states are generated by like brain stuctures, we arebound to admit that this assumption is unfounded. =e might of course be tempted to revert to the first argumentthat

behaviour, not structure, gives the correct cues to mental states. But this seems to commit us to

the view that computers, flies, and amoebas have states of consciousness like our own . *notherillustration which concerns visual e;periences is the much3 discussed phenomenon of Ublind3sightI.9 *s we have already mentioned,

the UvisualI or striate corte; is thought to be necessary for human vision. @ndividuals suffering from damage to the striate corte; maylose sight in part of their visual field. Karry =eisenkrantD and his colleagues have carried out a number of e;periments on one suchindividual who claimed to be blind in his left field of view. $imple shapes were presented to this subect in his blind field of view.


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Though he denied being able to see anything, the subect could, with reasonable consistency, describe the shape of the obect andpoint to it. @n each instance he insisted that his correct response was merely a guess. &;amples of blindsight indicate, amongst otherthings, that it is possible to have visual e;periences of which we are unaware. The blind3 sight phenomenon thus opens up the

possibility that there might be non3conscious e;periences to which we can nonetheless respond with the appropriate behaviour,I

Blindsighted individuals can learn to respond as if they see, even though they have no conscious

awareness of seeing anything. The significance of this for a discussion of animal behaviours is

that animals might respond to stimuli as if they were conscious of them, while in fact they are

not.Thus birds which lack the human apparatus of conscious vision (as do blindsighted subects: might not simply haveCualitatively different visual e;periences as suggested above, they might not have conscious visual e;periences at all. @t may beconcluded that an animalIs e;perience of stimuli which we would find painful might be Cualitatively different (that is, not painful: or

may even be non3conscious.*nimals might react to such stimuli by e;hibiting Upain behaviourI and yet

not have that mental e;perience which we call UpainI, or perhaps not have any conscious

e;perience at all. $o far our discussion of neural circuitry and how it relates to putative mental states has focused upon theinability of contemporary neuro science to bridge the gap between brain and mind. UThere are those, of course, who have assertedthat it is impossible in principle to bridge that gap. @t is significant that Thomas %agel, one of the chief spokes men for this group,has alluded to animal consciousness to make his point. @n the seminal paper U=hat is it Kike to be a BatI %agel leads us into thesubective world of the bat. These curious mammals, he reminds us, perceive the e;ternal world using a kind of sonar. By emitting

high3pitched sCueals and detecting the reflections, they are able to create an accurate enough image of their environment to enablethem to ensnare small flying insects, while they themselves are air borne. %agel points out that we might observe and describe indetail the neurophysiology which makes all this possible, but that it is unlikely that any amount of such observation would ever giveus an insight into the batIs subective e;perience of the worldinto what it is like to be a bat. *s %agel himself puts it/ Mor if the facts

of e;periencefacts about what it is like for the e;periencing organismare available only from one point of view, then it is amystery how the true character of e;perience could be revealed in the physical operation of that [email protected] %agel thus asserts thatthe construction of subective e;periences from the observation of brain states is in principle impossible.I Mor our present purposesit is not necessary to enter into the argument about whether mind states are reducible to brain states. $uffice it to say that there issufficient confusion about how brain structure and function relate to mental states to rule out any simple assertion that animal

nervous systems which resemble our own will give rise to mental states like ours. @t seems then, that pain, a mental state, can beneither perceived nor inferred by directing the senses on to behaviours or on to the brain itself. But what of the third argument foranimal painthat based on evolutionary theory


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at< evolutionary theoryAnimals react to behaviors #ithout having the mental capacity to

understand #hat it means/arrison ', professor at Bond "niversity (?eter, Jo *nimals Meel ?ain!, ?hilosophy Sol. 11, %o. 722, pg. 732, 'anuary-44-, )ambridge "niversity ?ress on behalf of +oyal @nstitute of ?hilosophy, '$TE+:55dodo

&volutionary theory provides the most convincing case for animal pain. Because evolution stresses continuities in the biological

sphere, it breaks down the distinction between human and animal. Thus any special claims made on behalf of the human racethatthey alone e;perience pain, for e;amplereCuire ustification. Before e;amining how, in evolutionary terms, we might ustifytreating >omo sapiens as a uniCue case, we ought to consider first how animal pain might conceivably fit into the evolutionaryscheme of things. %atural selection UdesignsI animals to survive and reproduce. *n important sort of adaptation for organisms to

acCuire would be the ability to avoid aspects of the environment which would reduce their chances of survival and reproduction.?ain, we might suppose, plays this adaptive role by compelling organisms to avoid situations in their world which might harm them.This view of the matter receives some measure of support from cases of individuals born with a congenital insensitivity to pain. $uchunfortunate people freCuently inure themselves Cuite severely in their early childhood, and must be taught how to avoid inflictingdamage upon themselves. That such a condition can lead eventually to permanent disability or death would suggest that pain has

considerable adaptive value for human beings at least:*nimalswhich were similarly insensitive to damaging

stimuli, we might reasonably infer,would have little chance of survival. Het there are difficulties with this

interpretation. $trictly, it is not pain(real or imputed:which is the adaptation, hut the behaviour which is

elicited when the damaging stimulus is applied. Those who are insensitive to pain are not disadvantaged by theabsence of unpleasant mental states, but by a lack of those behavioural responses which in others are prompted by pain. =e tend tolose sight of the primacy of behaviour because we get caught up in the con notations of Ue;pressionI. That is to say, we consider someanimal behaviours to be e;pressions of a particular mental state. &ven Jarwin, who should have known better, was guilty of thisinfelicity when he spoke of the Ue;pression of the emotions in man and animalsI. $uch locutions are misleading because they suggestthat certain aspects of animal behaviour are arbitrary outward signs which signify some conscious state. But the simplest application

of the theory of natural selection would only allow that such behaviours as violent struggling, grimacing and

crying out, serve some more direct purpose in enhancing an animalIs chances of survival and

reproduction. (Jarwin admittedly stressed the communicative aspects of these signs.: To e;ploit another e;ample which @ have

drawn upon in another conte;t, a wildebeest which is being torn apart by dogs will die in silence,while a chimpanDee will

screech out in response to some trivial hurt like a thorn puncturing its foot.I2 @t seems that the chimp

gives e;pression to its pain, whereas the wildebeest does not. Het neither e;presses its pain.

+ather, each behaves in a way likely to enhance the survival of the species . The chimpanDee

communicates either to warn its conspecifics, or to sum3 mon aid. The wildebeest remains silentso that others will not be lured to their deaths . @t is the behaviour, rather than some hypothetical mental

state,which adapts the organism.

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