canada cp aff answers - michigan7 2013 achm

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***Canada CP AffModermatt, Kevin P. , Grace P. , Aron B ., and Jarrod A.

Index

***Canada CP Aff ....................................................................................................................................... 1Cant Solve Generic .................................................................................................................................... 2Cant Solve Cuba ....................................................................................................................................... 11Cant Solve Mexico ................................................................................................................................... 12

Cant Solve Venezuela .............................................................................................................................. 15Perms ......................................................................................................................................................... 17

AT: Soft power .......................................................................................................................................... 23AT: Conflict Resoulation ......................................................................................................................... 26

AT: diversification .................................................................................................................................... 27Overstretch DA ......................................................................................................................................... 28Impact D .................................................................................................................................................... 29

China japan ........................................................................................................................................... 30Korea ...................................................................................................................................................... 32

Asia war ................................................................................................................................................. 33Latin America ....................................................................................................................................... 35Climate ................................................................................................................................................... 37

Bmd turn ................................................................................................................................................... 40


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Cant Solve Generic

Resource nationalism takes out the cp.Jordan 12Mining Journalist at the Globe and Mail, (Pav, In Latin America, nationalism stumps Canadian mining companies, Jul. 11 2012,http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/latin-american-business/in-latin-america-nationalism-stumps-canadian-mining-companies/article4405034/)//A-Berg

Bolivian President Evo Morales has revoked the mining rights of Vancouver-based South American Silver Corp., the latest blow to foreignminers operating in Latin America amid a growing wave of resource nationalism. The decision toexpropriate the Canadian companys Malku Khota silver mine was the second for Bolivia in a month, highlighting the increasing risks todeveloping mining and energy assets in the mineral-rich region. From expropriations in

Venezuela, Bolivia and Argentina to violent opposition in traditionally mining-friendly jurisdictions suchas Peru and Chile, the rising political tensions pose a riskto a decade-long bonanza mining companies have enjoyed.Resource nationalism is not just about expropriation, said Alan Hutchison, an expert in mining and energy securitiesand corporate law at Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP who specializes in Latin American matters. It is the role and the stake that thegovernment is going to take in any resource project and I think you are seeing that on the rise

with the continued high commodity prices.

Uncertainty prevents solvency.Brickman, 08 Barry, President, North West International Ltd., WESTERN CANADA AND LATIN AMERICA EXISTING ANDPOTENTIAL COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS, August 1, 2008, http://www.wd.gc.ca/images/cont/11103-eng.pdf)//A-Berg

Venezuelais a country of vast economic potential but there are challenges. Thebusiness climate is turbulent anduncertain, particularly for private capitaland foreign direct investment. Oil and gas agreements haverequired renegotiation including higher royalties and a requirement forjoint venture relationships

with the state-ownedoil and gas company. The government is unlikely to move towards full state control of the economy, but thepotential for further nationalisation in strategic sectors may curb private investment. EDC seesopportunities in all sectors but most particularly in oil and gas, agriculture/food, and health, as well as in information and communication technologies(particularly rural). Canada and Venezuela have signed a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) and a double taxationagreement. The government will continue to use the states wealth of energy resources as leverage to deepen diplomatic and co mmercial relations with

countries it considers friendly within and outside the region. Connections with Cuba are strong. Venezuela helped Argentina during its financial travailsand now holds 70% of Argentina's debt. Venezuela is making sophisticated foreign investments, for example in the pharmaceuticals area.42


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EnviornmentCanadian mining operations are destructive to the environment

Whalen 11COHA Research Associate (Daniel, Hidden Hegemony: Canadian Mining in Latin America, July 25, 2011,

http://www.coha.org/hidden-hegemony-canadian-mining-in-latin-america/)//A-BergThe Negative Effects of Canadian MiningAround the World Canadian industries operating abroad have always benefitted frompositive perceptions of the nations practices resulting from the aforementioned halo effect.[xvii ] However, in truth, Canadian mining often hasdrastic consequences for local environments and communities; thus, recent activities, in reality, stand to dampenthis image. Across the globe, Canadian mining companies destroy landscapes, contaminate theenvironment, and disturb the lives of locals. Meanwhile, the Canadian government does little, if anything, to holdthese companies accountable for their exploits. In effect, environmental groups recognize that Canadian mining firms arejust as bad as the most ruthless of American companies.[xviii] To illustrate, one Canadian gold mining company, Goldcorp, maintains mines in thefollowing Latin America nations: Mexico, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. Goldcorp represents just one of

the many Canadian mining companies in Latin America, yet its mines have been associated withnumerous infractions, including the destruction of archaeological sites, acid mine drainage,

water resource depletion in drought-prone areas, polluting water resources with copper andiron, high levels of arsenic and lead in local inhabitants, mercury poisoning, pipeline bursts, and

disregarding the pleas of locals.[xix] The Effects of Mining on the Environment Depletion of water resources andcontamination are the principal negative ramifications of mining, in addition to physicaldestruction.Mining companies often forcibly monopolize water resources, as many mining techniques require large amounts of water. As aresult, local communities are left with a profound shortage or impaired quality of water . For example,Goldcorps Marlin mine in Guatemala uses approximately 2,175,984,000 liters per year compared to the 153,300 used by an average North Americancitizen or the average 13,505 liters used by an African citizen.[xx] The problem is exacerbated in areas that receive as little as 150 mm of rainfall peryear such as northwest Argentina, where the joint venture Alumbrera mine operated by Goldcorp, Xstrata and Northern Orion depletes the alreadyprecarious water supply, leaving locals in desperation.[xxi] Water pollution has a more detrimental and long-lasting effect on the environment than

water depletion.Acid Mine Drainage(AMD), the most common form of mining contamination, occurs when sulfides housed in the rock areexposed to air during excavation, forming sulfuric acid. This acid runs off into nearby streams and lakes, polluting thesurrounding watershed. The acid dissolvesother heavy metalsit encounters such as copper, lead, arsenic,zinc, selenium and mercury, which further pollute the surface and ground water of theregion.[xxii] AMD can continue for thousands of years after the mine is closed, as illustrated by a 2,000-year-old mine in Great Britain thatcontinues to produce AMD today. Goldcorp mines have been associated with AMD in four Latin American countries: Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala,

and Argentina.[xxiii] Cyanide, used to extract gold and silver from the surrounding rock, makes large-scale processingpossible,butwhen released into the environment, it can have serious consequences. On average, 70 tons of waste is created inthe processing of 1 ounce of gold. At Goldcorps San Martn mine in Honduras, an average of .78 ounces of gold is extracted f rom every ton of ore, and

an enormous amount of rock must be moved. When chemically treated rock and ore, known as mine tailings, spill during transport, the watersupply can become contaminated with cyanide.[xxiv] Though mining companies report that cyanide is broken down bysunlight and transformed into a nontoxic form, it frequently harms, or even kills, aquatic life.[xxv] At the La Coipa mine in Chile, a formerGoldcorp holding, mercury as well as cyanide was discovered in groundwater as a result of mine seepage. Blood samples taken fromthe local communitypopulation near Goldcorps San Martn mine in Honduras registered high levels of mercury, leadand arsenic.[xxvi] False Hope and Canadian Bill C-300 The Canadian mining industrysoperations in Latin

America have unquestionably harmed the surrounding environments and communitiesandinfluenced the policies of the host nations.[xxvii] Despite this, the Canadian government refuses to enforce anytype of human rights regulations outside of Canadian territory; instead, the government supports the mining industry bothfinancially and politically regardless of its practices. Several enlightened segments of the Canadian government took a stand against the governmentspolicy with respect to foreign mining practices, but to no avail. The parliamentary Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs and International Trade

issued a report calling for reforms regarding mining in foreign countries. However, the government responded stating that no precedent for prosecutingor regulating practices outside of the Canadian territory currently exists. The government established a round-table to address the issue, viewed bymany critics as an ineffective stalling tactic. [xxviii]

Canada destroys Latin America fills it with corruption, violation ofhuman rights, and severe damage of the environmentStudnicki-Gizbert & Bazo 13, 3/11- Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert: is Associate Professor at the Department ofHistory and Classical Studies at McGill University. His research focuses on the social and environmental history of natural resourceextrac-tion in Latin America. This includes the environmental history of colonial mining, early Iberian discourseson thetransformation of nature, and the historical geography of mining in Mexico. He coordinates theMcGill Research Collective for the


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Investigation of Mining in Latin America (MICLA).Fabiola Bazo: is Adjunct Professor in the Latin American Studies Program atSimon Fraser University. Her research interests include extractive industries and social conflict, the rise of punk music in Peru as apolitical voice for disenchanted youth in the 1980s, and the role of social media as a catalyst for political change. She writes oncurrent affairs in Peru (Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert & Fabiola Bazo March 11, 2013, The emergence of transnational naturalcommons strategies in Canada and Latin Americahttp://academia.edu/3235720/The_Emergence_of_Transnational_Natural_Commons_Strategies_in_Canada_and_Latin_America)//GP

After the Lost Decade in the 1980s, Latin America is back in businessor so we are told. The region is

currently experiencing sustained growth, attracting inflows of foreign directinvestment (FDI) since 2002, circumventing global trends when FDI worldwide shrunk by 15 per cent in 2008. Beside theUnited States, Canada has become a leading pursuer of gold and other strategicminerals in Latin America. During the 19911995 period, the number of properties owned byCanadian companies increased dramatically. Properties in Mexico almostquintupled(52 to 244), and in Peru and Argentina the numbers also skyrocketed (from 3 to 98 in Peru and from 0 to 97 inArgentina) (Lemieux1995). Canadian mining corporations operated some 1,500 projects across the continent in 2007 (Mining

Association of Canada2007,22).3High commodity prices and government policies favouringderegulation, privatisation, free trade and investment, especially in mining andhydrocarbons, have contributed to the investment frenzy. Policies aimed atattracting foreign capital in extractive industries include new mining codes,liberalised regulatory regimes and favourable institutional arrangements. The newmining codes implemented in the 1990s lifted foreign capital restrictions and entitled individuals, irrespective of nationality, to

invest. They also provided subsidiary rights to other natural resources such as waterand generous concession timelines.Mining concessions often enjoy legal pre-eminence over other forms of land tenure on the principle that the development ofmineral resources is in the public interest.4Fourteen Latin American miningnations overhauled their regulatory regimes with the help of the World Bank,advisors from the industry and development organisations such as the CanadianInternational Development Agency (Chaparro Avila2002).5As a part of the changes in land tenure, communallands were privatised by the Fujimori administration in Peru in the 1990s and integrated into potential mining concession as part of

their servitude (Szablowski 2007,46). The duration of mining concessions was also extended from 20 to 50 years.In arecent meeting, theConfederacin Nacional de Comunidades del Per Afectadas por la Minera (CONACAMI)

denounced the contemporary boom in transnational mining as a pillageof our

natural commons, a phrase that neatly captures the opposition between

neoliberal and communitarian natural resource regimes(CONACAMI2011). Pillageconnotes colonial and neocolonial forms of extraction. It refers to the waydominant discourses have represented minerals as treasures to be disinterred orotherwise appropriated and set to external ends . The multinational mining corporations of today echothe Spanish conquistadores and the British and American enclaves and monopolies from the early twentieth century. If theneoliberal reforms of the 1990s ushered in the latest cycle of extraction,contemporary post-neoliberal states such asEcuador, Bolivia andVenezuela have beenunable or unwilling to make a clear break from this model(Gudynas2012).Henry Veltmeyer'sarticle conceptualises such changes by situating them within the newimperialism of contemporary forms of capitalist

development. In Latin America, he argues, these changes unfolded in two successivestages: a first wave of foreign investment expansion primarily directed atacquiring the assets of state enterprises with minimal transfer of capital or

technology, followed by a second wave focused on direct investment in naturalresources. These changes set out a neoliberal regime of resource extraction, a

revival of the liberal regimes established across the continent in the latenineteenth century.Within this regime, the state positions itself as the facilitating agent oftransnational capitalist forms of extraction of natural resources, supporting their sale on theglobal market. By doing so, however, it simultaneously sets itself in opposition to the communities directly affected by these

operations.Today, mining concessions comprise hundreds of millions of hectares,accounting for large swaths of territory: over 20 per cent of Mexicoand Ecuador; and 5 to18per cent of Colombia, Chile and Peru (The Dominion, July 5, 2007; La Jornada, August 8, 2011; El Espectador, January 12, 2011).
http://academia.edu/3235720/The_Emergence_of_Transnational_Natural_Commons_Strategies_in_Canada_and_Latin_Americahttp://academia.edu/3235720/The_Emergence_of_Transnational_Natural_Commons_Strategies_in_Canada_and_Latin_Americahttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#CIT0007http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#CIT0008http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#EN0003http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#EN0003http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#EN0004http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#EN0004http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#CIT0002http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#EN0005http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#CIT0011http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#CIT0011http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#CIT0003http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#CIT0003http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#CIT0005http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#CIT0005http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#CIT0003http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#CIT0011http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#EN0005http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#CIT0002http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#EN0004http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#EN0003http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#CIT0008http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#CIT0007http://academia.edu/3235720/The_Emergence_of_Transnational_Natural_Commons_Strategies_in_Canada_and_Latin_Americahttp://academia.edu/3235720/The_Emergence_of_Transnational_Natural_Commons_Strategies_in_Canada_and_Latin_America


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According to Veltmeyer, up to 70 per cent of the Mexican concessions used to explore andextract minerals belong to Canadian firms. In Argentina, almost 30 million hectares in 23 provinces areunder foreign concessions, with another 13 million hectares still available. Large-scale mining has generated significant staterevenue and growth in urban sectors, with mines employing technologies that involve extensive use of land to create open pits.

However, it has also heightened environmental risks, especially deforestation andthe contamination of water, which are becoming a source of socio-environmental

conflicts in the rural and remote communities where these resources are found. Inmost instances, the areas in concessions are also among the poorest, with limitedinfrastructure (water and energy supply, roads), populated by indigenous people

who traditionally use superficial land for subsistence farming.6As a mitigating strategy,mining companies have mobilised resources in developing new forms of governance, with the support of governments andinternational development agencies, most especially the development of CSR frameworks. These initiatives rely on voluntary codes

and self-regulation. In Latin America, CSR practices have positioned the Canadian miningindustry as modern and sustainable, promising a new form of mining, differentfrom the American,British or Spanish mining of previous generations and centuries.While CSRhas legitimated transnational mining for certain audiences, it has been ineffective

in addressing issues raised by the affected communities. Karyn Keenan argues that the

Government of Canada's CSR framework and the federally appointed office of the

CSR Counselor have demonstrated an inability to carry out independentinvestigations of alleged corporate violations of various sets of rights (human,

labour, environmental or indigenous).The politics of natural resources havemoved to the grassroots level. Since late 1990s, an increasing number of social andenvironmental conflicts protests have arisen around large private miningand oilprojects across Latin America. Over 160 mining conflictshave been accounted by the ChileanObservatorio de Conflictos Mineros de America Latina(OLCA), information which is available online on the group's site.7 McGillUniversity's Research Group Investigating Canadian Mining in Latin America(MICLA) has documented over 80 involving a mining corporation registered andcapitalised in Canada as listed on its website .8 These mobilisations againstextractive industries have focused on land and water rights, indigenous claims to

self-determination and territorial rights and, lastly, environmental damage .The

majority of these conflicts concerns gold mines, a metal used mostly as a reserve a medium of exchange, rather than an industrialinput, as North and Young point out in their article.Veltmeyer argues that environmental

devastation and corruption in the management of a resource, due to

circumvention of mining legislation by local authorities, ensured the plunder ofthe region's natural resources.A 2008 report by Mexico's Auditor General exposedthat the fees paid for the concessions to mine were well below the costs of theadministrative procedures involved and not reflective of the volumes ofnonrenewable mineral resources extracted during the period 2005 to 2010. As thenumber of social conflict rises in communities directly affected by these operations, governments and private firms have takenrepressive measures to control or neutralise them.9Luis ngel Saavedra examines the environmental destruction wrought byTexaco now Chevron during its 28 years of operation in Ecuador (19641992) and the tireless efforts to make this companyaccountable in United States courts. As in the Mexican case, the opposition to transnational oil companies in Ecuador was provokedby unfulfilled promises made to local communities. According to Saavedra, only 10 per cent of oil company representatives

honoured their verbal commitments to local indigenous communities in the Ecuadorian province of Orellana. This gave rise todemands by indigenous communities asking that companies write and sign documents to guarantee the compliance ofcommitments. In time, organised resistance grew against these types of extractive activities. Saavedra also examines the unexpectedsocial mobilisation (and subsequent criminalisation of) citizens' organisations against three mining projects operated byEcuacorriente (a Sino-Canadian company) and the Canadian companies Iamgold and Kinross.The rise of judicial harassment in theEcuadorian provinces with mining projects has resulted in over 360 social leaders taken to court, where they have been accused ofcrimes such as sabotage, injury and robbery. In the past, these cases were brought up by companies, but since 2008, allegations have

been brought up by government officials in what Saavedra calls the criminalisation of social protest. The initiation oftrials and repressive measures against individuals opposed to extractive activitieshave resulted in the violation of human and ecological rights. Using the methodology of theEcuadorian Human Rights Ombudsman, Saavedra distinguishes two types of criminalisation:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#EN0006http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#EN0006http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#EN0006http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#EN0007http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#EN0008http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#EN0009http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#EN0009http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#EN0009http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#EN0008http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#EN0007http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2013.767193#EN0006


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primary and secondary. Primary criminalisation refers to the elaboration of legislation andtypification of inadmissible social behaviour(sabotage, terrorism, rebellion, obstruction of publicspace, illicit association) in the penal code to deter social protests.Secondarycriminalisation is de facto and creates delinquents in the realm of publicopinion. It uses media statements and representations that contain elements of classism, racism andsexism.According to Liisa North and Laura Young, only a handful of mining companies have been driven out of Latin

American due to malpractice. Further, in all these cases, local solidarity and organisational capacity have formed the basis forinformed and widespread opposition. Protests leading to greater public awareness about the issues and successful politicalmobilisation may have convinced some governments to alter their paths. However, it has proven difficult for these governments tosue corporations to protect their nationals or to establish regulations that run counter to the trade and investment treaties thatfavour companies.

Canadas corruption in Latin America violates their human rights net worse than the affKeenan, 10- is Program Officer at the Halifax Initiative, a coalition of Canadian civil society organizations that focuses onpublic financial institutions. She has worked directly with indigenous communities in Latin America that are affected by mining, oil,and gas operations (Canadian Mining: Still Unaccountable North American Congress on Latin America,https://nacla.org/article/canadian-mining-still-unaccountable)//GPOn November 27, 2009, Mariano Abarca Roblero was shot dead outside his home in Chiapas, Mexico. Abarca was a well-known

community activist who led local opposition to a mining operation near his home. The aptly named Payback mine is owned by aCanadian company, Blackfire Exploration. Mexican police have arrested three men in connection with Abarcas death, one of whomis currently employed by the company. The other suspects are former Blackfire employees, and allegations have surfaced that thecompany repeatedly bribed local authorities to quell local dissent. The Mexican government temporarily halted Blackfiresoperations after Abarcas killing, citing environmental violations at the mine site. According to media reports, the company hasthreatened to sue the Mexican government under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for damages incurred as aresult of the mine closure. In Canada, civil society organizations have requested a government investigation of Blackfire underlegislation that bars Canadian citizens from bribing foreign public officials.Unfortunately, as remarkable as these events may

sound, they are not as uncommon as one might expect. Not only do Canadian mining operations inLatin America cause significant environmental damage, but they are alsoassociated with social disruption and human rights violations, and generateconflict with and among local communities.1 Those who oppose mining operationsare often harassed and intimidated.2 In recent months, several critics of Canadian miningcompanies have been murdered in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico .3 Moreover,

according to a former cabinet minister from Argentina who recently testifiedbefore Canadian Parliament, Canadian mining companies unduly influence thelegislative process in her country.4(Canadian mining company Barrick Gold refutes her testimony on itswebsite.)Local communities have responded to the arrival of Canadian miningcompanies with a variety of strategies aimed at protecting their land andresources. Some of these efforts have yielded positive results. For example, an overwhelming majority of local residents inTambogrande, Peru, opposed the extraction of a gold deposit located underneath their town, as proposed by Manhattan Minerals, ajunior Canadian mining company. The municipal government convened a referendum on the project so that local perspectives wouldbe considered in decision-making concerning the project. Ninety-eight percent of registered voters rejected the project, which was

eventually turned down by the Peruvian government.Unfortunately, Tambogrande is an anomaly. In most cases,

communities are marginalized from the decision-making over mining projects in

their areas. Moreover, host governments are often unwilling or unable to effectively

regulate the operations of transnational companies in their territories.Communities arecommonly denied access to meaningful mechanisms of legal redress in their countries regarding the damages they suffer as aconsequence of poorly regulated mining operations. Several mining-affected populations have turnedto international mechanisms to voice their grievances. For example, indigenouscommunities affected by the Marlin mine in Guatemala brought complaints beforethe World Banks Compliance Advisor Ombudsman and the Canadian NationalContact Point.However, the non-binding recommendations that are produced bythese offices are of limited impact.Other populations affected by Canadian miningoperations have sought redress through the Canadian judicial system.
https://nacla.org/article/canadian-mining-still-unaccountable)/GPhttps://nacla.org/article/canadian-mining-still-unaccountable)/GP


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Representatives of indigenous communities in Guyana filed a suit in a Canadiancourt after a tailings dam failure caused massive environmental contamination ata Canadian mine in their country.The Canadian court refused to hear the case,arguing that Guyana was the appropriate legal forum. The Guyanese judicialsystem proved equally ineffectual. Now Ecuadoran plaintiffs are testing theCanadian legal system once again, suing the Canadian mining company Copper

Mesa, its directors, and the Toronto Stock Exchange in association with deaththreats and assaults committed against community members who opposed thedevelopment of a copper mine.Several Latin American governments have takensteps to better regulate the mining industry. But these efforts are often stymied. Forexample, the Argentine Congress unanimously passed legislation to protect that countrys glaciers from mining activities. Largetracts of the Andean cordillera on the countrys Chilean border have been included in mining concessions granted to Canadiancompanies. President Cristina Fernndez de Kirchner vetoed the legislation, according to some sources, in response to pressure from

Canadian mining interests.5 In other cases, governments are penalized when they

strengthen environmental and health protections in relation to mining

operations . For example, Canadian mining company Pacific Rim responded to the

Salvadoran governments decision not to issue permits for the companys ElDorado project by suing it for damages under the Dominican RepublicCentral

America Free Trade Agreement(DR-CAFTA).*Nowhere is the Canadian miningsectors presence felt overseas more acutely than in Latin America . The region is the singlemost important destination for Canadian mining capital, surpassing by a wide margin Africa, the industrys second choice. In2008, more than half of Canadian mining companies global assets were located inLatin America, at a value close to $57 billion(all values throughout this article are in Canadian dollars).6The Canadian government is an important partner with this flagship industry,actively supporting mining companies overseas operations through the provisionof both financial and political backing.This state support takes various forms. Extractive companies (mining,oil, gas) are the single greatest recipient of backing from Export Development Canada (EDC), a state-owned Crown corporationthat provides financing and insurance to facilitate Canadian exports and overseas investments. In 2008, EDC facilitated Canadianbusiness in the Latin American extractive sector worth more than $4 billion and is poised to expand its support for the Canadian

mining industry in the region.7 With new offices in Santiago and Lima, EDC now has a permanent presenceinBrazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru, countries that, together with Argentina, were the top five destinations for Canadian mining

capital in Latin America from 2002 to 2008.8Meanwhile, the Canada Pension Plan, a publicly administered fund to which mostworking Canadians are legally required to contribute, holds equity worth about $2.5 billion in publicly traded Canadian miningcompanies that operate in developing countries.9 And the Canadian Trade Commissioner facilitates access to foreign markets forCanadian mining companies. For example, Manhattan Minerals obtained its interest in the Tambogrande mine concession shortlyafter participating in a Team Canada trade mission to Peru.Canadian embassies also provide valuable political backing. TheCanadian ambassador to Guatemala published an opinion piece in a local paper, praising the Canadian mining industry, whenindigenous communities expressed opposition to the Canadian-owned Marlin mine. In Peru, communities frustrated withoperations at the Antamina mine blocked an access road to the mine site.10 Days later, an article appeared on the front page of theCanadian Embassy website showcasing Antamina and praising its achievements as a socially responsible company. According to arepresentative of Canadian company Corriente Resources, whose operations in Ecuador have been associated with violent conflict

and allegations of human rights abuse, the Canadian Embassy in Ecuador has worked tirelesslyto affect [sic] change in the mining policyincluding facilitating high-levelmeetings between Canadian mining companies and President Rafael Correa.11Corriente Resources participated in one such meeting, during which the Canadian ambassador expressed the government of

Canadas concerns regarding changes to Ecuadors regulatory framework.*The challenges created by

Canadian mining companies international operations are not unique . A vibrantinternational debate is under way concerning the responsibility of home countries for the overseas activities of their transnationalcompanies. Home countries are those jurisdictions in which transnational companies incorporate, raise capital, and receive public

backing. In Canada, this debate has focused on the federal governmentsresponsibility regarding the international operations of the Canadian extractivesector. Canada currently falls short in two respects. First, it lacks an effective legalor policy framework to regulate the overseas operations of Canadian extractivecompanies.Applicable legislative provisions are extremely limited in scope.And the Canadiangovernments policy of corporate social responsibility for the extractive sector,


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described below, is unlikely to have a positive impact . Second, non-nationals who areadversely affected by the overseas operations of Canadian extractive companiesface daunting barriers in accessing the Canadian legal system.

Canada shouldnt do the plan violate human rights and non-existent

environmental standardsWhalen, 11-Council on Hemispheric Affairs Research Associate (Daniel Whalen, 7/25/11, Hidden Hegemony: CanadianMining in Latin America, COHA, http://www.coha.org/hidden-hegemony-canadian-mining-in-latin-america/#sthash.6ZZMHvFu.dpuf)//GPCanadas mining industry is the largest in the world, with a sizable presence in thedeveloping world.In Latin America, Canadian mining companies are ofteninvolved in environmentally destructive and socially irresponsible practices.One

Canadian mining company, Pacific Rim, is accused of killing activists opposed to its

ongoing mining activities in El Salvador .To date, the Canadian government has nottaken measures to hold its mining industry to human rights and environmentalstandards abroad.A grassroots protest in Peru, which unfortunately turned

violent, may represent a policy shift with regard to foreign mining on indigenous

lands.Canadas mining industry is the largest in the world, and in 2004 its world market share accounted for 60 percent of all mining companies. In fact, the entire Latin American region is second onlyto Canada in terms of the breadth of its mining exploration and development activity.[i] In what some call the halo effect, Canadian industries have beenperceived as the more conscientious alternative to their U.S. equivalents . SinceCanadian industries are understood to have socially responsible practices,especially in contrast to those of American companies, they are typically welcomedabroad.[ii]Nonetheless, recent accusations that the Canadian mining companyPacific Rim played a role in the death squad killings of anti-mining activists in El

Salvador has brought this reputation into question, while further investigation into

the Canadian governments regulation reveals that the government has mandatedno true restrictions on its industrys mining practices abroad. Left to its own accord, theCanadian mining industry has no problem destroying landscapes, uprootingcommunities, and even resorting to violence to promote its interests; for this reason, only governmentregulation can affect true change. A recent move by the Peruvian government to protect citizens near the city of Puno demonstrates that Latin American governments may finally be willing and able to regulateCanadian mining companies operating within their nations.The Evolution of Canadian Mining in Latin AmericaIn the p eriod from 1990 to 2001, mineral investment in Latin America increased by 400 percent,

and by 2005, the region was receiving 23 percent of total worldwide exploration investments. The Canadian mining industrys share of theLatin American market is the largest of any country, at 34 percent in 2004.[iii] However, even with asubstantial flow of Canadian investment in the mining sectors of these countries,

living standards have not tangibly improved for those in proximity of the mines,

despite the image portrayed by the mining industry.For a large part of the 20th century, the majority ofthe mineral wealth in Latin America was government property

Canada poisons Latin America worsens the lives of the localsWhalen, 11-Council on Hemispheric Affairs Research Associate (Daniel Whalen, 7/25/11, Hidden Hegemony: CanadianMining in Latin America, COHA, http://www.coha.org/hidden-hegemony-canadian-mining-in-latin-america/#sthash.6ZZMHvFu.dpuf)//GPThe Negative Effects of Canadian Mining Around the WorldCanadian industries operating abroad havealways benefitted from positive perceptions of the nations practices resultingfrom the aforementioned halo effect.[xvii] However, in truth, Canadian mining oftenhas drastic consequences for local environments and communities; thus, recent

activities, in reality, stand to dampen this image . Across the globe, Canadian mining

companies destroy landscapes, contaminate the environment, and disturb the

lives of locals. Meanwhile, the Canadian government does little, if anything, to hold
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these companies accountable for their exploits. In effect, environmental groups recognize that Canadianmining firms are just as bad as the most ruthless of American companies.[xviii]To illustrate, one Canadian gold mining company,Goldcorp, maintains mines in the following Latin America nations: Mexico, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Brazil,

Chile, and Argentina. Goldcorp represents just one of the many Canadian mining companies in LatinAmerica, yet its mines have been associated with numerous infractions, includingthe destruction of archaeological sites, acid mine drainage, water resourcedepletion in drought-prone areas, polluting water resources with copper and iron,high levels of arsenic and lead in local inhabitants, mercury poisoning, pipeline

bursts, and disregarding the pleas of locals.[xix]The Effects of Mining on the EnvironmentDepletion of water resources and contamination are the principal negativeramifications of mining, in addition to physical destruction. Mining companies often forcibly

monopolize water resources, as many mining techniques require large amounts of water. As a result, local communities

are left with a profound shortage or impaired quality of water . For example, GoldcorpsMarlin mine in Guatemala uses approximately 2,175,984,000 liters per year compared to the 153,300 used by an average NorthAmerican citizen or the average 13,505 liters used by an African citizen.[xx] The problem is exacerbated in areas that receive as little

as 150 mm of rainfall per year such as northwest Argentina, where the joint venture Alumbrera mine operated by Goldcorp,Xstrata and Northern Orion depletes the already precarious water supply, leaving locals indesperation.[xxi]Water pollution has a more detrimental and long-lasting effect onthe environment than water depletion. Acid Mine Drainage (AMD), the most common form ofmining contamination, occurs when sulfides housed in the rock are exposed to air during excavation, forming sulfuric acid. Thisacid runs off into nearby streams and lakes, polluting the surrounding watershed.The acid dissolves other heavy metals it encounters such as copper, lead, arsenic,zinc, selenium and mercury, which further pollute the surface and ground water ofthe region.[xxii]AMD can continue for thousands of years after the mine is closed, as illustrated by a 2,000-year-old mine inGreat Britain that continues to produce AMD today. Goldcorp mines have been associated with AMDin four Latin American countries:Mexico,Honduras, Guatemala, and Argentina.[xxiii]Cyanide, used to extract gold andsilver from the surrounding rock, makes large-scale processing possible, but when released into the environment, it can haveserious consequences. On average, 70 tons of waste is created in the processing of 1 ounce of gold. At Goldcorps San Martn mine inHonduras, an average of .78 ounces of gold is extracted from every ton of ore, and an enormous amount of rock must be moved.When chemically treated rock and ore, known as mine tailings, spill during transport, the water supply can become contaminatedwith cyanide.[xxiv] Though mining companies report that cyanide is broken down by sunlight and transformed into a nontoxic form,it frequently harms, or even kills, aquatic life.[xxv]At the La Coipa mine in Chile, a former Goldcorp holding, mercury as well as

cyanide was discovered in groundwater as a result of mine seepage. Blood samples taken from the localcommunity population near Goldcorps San Martn mine in Honduras registeredhigh levels of mercury, lead and arsenic.[xxvi]False Hope and Canadian Bill C-300The Canadianmining industrys operations in Latin America have unquestionably harmed thesurrounding environments and communities and influenced the policies of thehost nations.[xxvii] Despite this, the Canadian government refuses to enforce any type ofhuman rights regulations outside of Canadian territory; instead, the governmentsupports the mining industry both financially and politically regardless of itspractices.Several enlightened segments of the Canadian government took a stand against the governments policy with respectto foreign mining practices, but to no avail. The parliamentary Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs and International Trade

issued a report calling for reforms regarding mining in foreign countries. However, the government respondedstating that no precedent for prosecuting or regulating practices outside of theCanadian territory currently exists.The government established a round-table to address the issue, viewed by

many critics as an ineffective stalling tactic.[xxviii]Canadian Bill C-300, also known as the Responsible Mining Bill, provided aglimmer of hope for increased accountability of Canadian mining industry practices in the developing world. The bill would have

ensured compliance with the stringent international environmental practices the Canadian government claims to uphold, aswell as reaffirmed Canadas commitment to human rights. Additionally, the bill would haveoutlined environmental standards for the Canadian extractive industry, provisions for grievances to be brought before the ministersof Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and public reporting of any dismissed complaint in the Canada Gazette.[xxix]Accordingto Bill C-300, any government funding for Canadian extractive companies abroad would be contingent upon compliance with theaforementioned standards and would require confirmation by the local Canadian embassy. C-300 was the legal apparatus to ensureacceptable practices by Canadian mining firms abroad. Although C-300 passed on the second reading in 2009, the bill ultimatelyfailed to pass the final vote in the House of Commons on October 27, 2010 .[xxx] This was an unfortunate victory for the Canadian

mining industry, and was yet another sign that the current Conservative government does not
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support human rights and environmental health, at least not when Canadasextractive industry could see its profit margin adversely affected in any way.However,the government holds that it does in fact support human rights in developing nations through the controversial IMF and World Bank

structural adjustments plans.[xxxi] In spite of Canadas rather flattering reputation for highmoral standards, at least in comparison to the U.S., Canadas support for humanrights appears quite dubious at times. Ottawa refused to sign the United Nations Draft Declaration on theRights of Indigenous Peoples that requires consent from indigenous groups before any projects can commence on their land.Canada, along with Australia, called for revision, which significantly slowed the process and ultimately blocked its passage.[xxxii]The failure of this declaration was a certain victory for the Canadian mining industry in Latin America, which conducts its businessalmost exclusively on inhabited territory.
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Cant Solve Cuba

Canada fails at engaging with Cuba --- heres the laundry list.Wylie, 10- Associate Professor in Political Science at McMaster University, Ph.D in Political Science from University of Massachusetts,Amherst, (Lana, Reassessing Canadas Relationship with Cuba in an Era of Change, October 2010, http://www.opencanada.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Reassessing-Canada%E2%80%99s-Relationship-with-Cuba-in-an-Era-of-Change-Lana-Wylie1.pdf)//A-BergCanadian companies have been among the investors that responded to this opening in Cuba. Some Canadian companies see Cuba as a key opportunity

since the American embargo prevents competition from their business rivals in the United States. Yet many Canadian companies arehesitant about investing in Cuba because ofthe special difficulties related to Cubas economic systemand the complications that arise from the tension between Havana and Washington. Thestructure of the Cuban economy poses unique problemsfor foreign investors. The centrally plannedeconomy is complicated by a dual monetary system: most domestic exchangesfor average Cubans takeplace within the peso economy,butforeigners, including foreign investors, must operate in a separatesystemwith a different currency, the Cuban convertible peso (CUC), that is pegged to US dollars. The existence of a largeinformal economy that operatesmainlybeyond state control further complicates the situation.However, Ral Castro has taken steps to address some of the issues with the Cuban economy. For example, in early 2010, he appeared to be acting on

his earlier announcement that the government would slowly phase out the two-tier currency system as more stores and restaurants began to conductbusiness in the peso system.56 Thebusiness culture in Cuba presents additional impediments. Since Cubanshaveoperated largely outside the capitalist system for decades, they aresometimes unfamiliar with common business practicesand norms. This presents a challenge for the Cubans who are now attempting to do business with foreign companiesand oftencreates headaches for the companies involved in negotiationswith the Cubans. Other complicationsaredirectly related toCubas approach to foreign investors. Although there are laws governing foreign investment projects,every investment inquiry is dealt with individually, which has led to inconsistent applications ofthe law.57 Thus it is often difficult to predict if a project will acquireinitial approvaland, even ifapproval is given, whether the decision will be reversed at a later date. A number of foreign firmsclaimthat approved projects have been stalled or cancelled without warning. For example, a Canadian company,Cuban Canadian Resorts International, had an agreement to develop luxury beachfront condominiums in Cuba that was approved by the ExecutiveCommittee of the Council of Ministers and signed by Vice-President Carlos Lage in 1998. The company also had Cubas minister of tourism, theminister of finance, and the minister of foreign investments onside.58 Despite this level of approval, in 2000 the Cuban government declared that it

would not allow foreign ownership of condominium projects; this put an abrupt end to the pro ject, which had been well under way. Furthercomplications arise from the fact that the Cuban government retains control over the hiringdecisions, wage rates, and other labour matters on all joint venture projects. When the Cuban economyencounters difficulty, these hurdles are likely to be intensified, creating even more headaches for foreign investors . Forinstance, recent economic troubles in Cuba have created additional problems for foreign investors, as some report having troubletransferring profits out of the country oreven having their funds in Cuba frozen.59 As well as dealing with the uniquechallenges related to the Cuban economy and investment policies, foreign investors must contend with obstructionsemanating from Washington. The United States has imposed an embargo against Cuba since the early days of the Revolution and assuch has tried to discourage other countries from doing business with the embargoed state. However, in the 1990s, this dissuasion became moreexplicit. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 forbade subsidiaries of US companies in other countries from trading with Cuba. The Cuban Liberty andDemocratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, known as the Helms-Burton Act, further complicates foreign business ventures in Cuba. Helms-Burtontargets companies accused of trafficking in property that was formerly owned by US citizens (including the property of Cubans who have sinceacquired American citizenship).


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NAFTA relationship, now almost a decade old; the watershed democratic election of Vicente Fox as Mexicos president in 2000, and hisadministrations advocacy of closer North American cooperation; a continental focus following the events of September 11: allthese have broughtgreater attention to the ties between Canada and Mexico. Before the NAFTA era and it is worth recalling that NAFTA originated as a bilateralMexican initiative with the United States to which Canada had reacted coolly Professor Laura Macdonald observed: there were hardly anyMexican experts in Canada. Hardly anyone was interested in Mexico. We had this big mountain between us, the United States, an d we couldnt peer

over that big mountain to see each other.48 Or if Mexico was noticed it was usually in comments like the following: Canada and Mexico, asthe saying goes, have only one common problem between them. This problem, of course, is their relationship withthe United States.49Even today, there is a tendency for such longstanding separate if parallelbilateral

preoccupations to come to the fore . It is harderto sustain political engagement on the still-developingCanada-Mexicoand trilateral agenda. Antonio Ocaranza, Director of Public Strategies Inc., described to the Committee in Mexico City adifficult paradox: Mexico and Canada cooperationis most effective if it plays a significant role in each countrys relationship withthe United States. At the same time, it is the significant weight of the United States which impedes Mexico andCanada from being more effective in developing their bilateral relationship.50 A bit of history providessome context for the current state of the relationship. Prior to the 1990s, Canadas relations with Mexico (and indeed with L atin American countries inthe rest of the hemisphere) were both very limited and overshadowed by each countrys particular bilateral focus on the Unite d States. As severalscholars describe that period: While it is undoubtedly unfair to expect an equivalent relationship tothat experienced with the United States, it isnonetheless notable that bilateral Canada-Mexico ties remained underdeveloped, at best, or ignored, at worst.51 Canadas 1990 decision to become afull member of the Organization of American States (OAS), fo llowed by Canadas joining the Mexico-U.S. trade negotiations, which then led to thetrilateral NAFTA, signalled a major policy shift. NAFTA, in particular, carried the relationship to a new level. Writing before the election of PresidentFox and the activist diplomacy pursued by his Foreign Minister Jorge Castaeda, Julian Castro Rea, a professor with both the Centre for Research onNorth America at the Universidad Autnoma de Mxico and the University of Alberta, put it this way: NAFTA helped Canada and Mexico discover eachother after many decades of a relationship that one could characterize as polite indifference. The last five years have wit nessed an unprecedenteddeepening of Canada-Mexico relations. Mexico and Canada now cooperate in a wide variety of issues that extend far beyond trade and include acomprehensive agenda that is assessed yearly by joint ministerial teams. Canada has become the most immediate alternative for Mexican desires to

diversify its foreign relations, away from its overwhelming priority on the United States.52 Early evidence of a post-NAFTA widening and deepening ofthe bilateral agenda was the Declaration of Objectives for the Canada -Mexico Relationship and Action Plan signed by the two heads of governmentin June 1996. As well, notwithstanding the effects of Mexicos financial crisis of the mid -1990s, bilateral trade and investment posted impressive growththrough the last half of the decade.53 While Canada-Mexico trade is still a very small part of total NAFTA trade, the statistical tables in Chapter 2 showa more than five-fold increase in this trade since 1990. Indeed, the value of Canadas exports to Mexico increased by 93% from 1997 to 2001, c omparedwith an increase of 44% in the value of Canadas exports to the United States over the same period. Priority export sectors identified by the Canadiangovernment in regard to Mexico have included advanced manufacturing and information technologies, agricultural modernization, automotiveproducts, and oil and gas equipment and services. Beyond these burgeoning commercial ties, there has also been significant growth in civil-societylinkages with Mexican NGOs, and in cooperation in the fields of higher education, training and research. In terms of people-to-people exchanges,DFAIT Assistant Deputy Minister for the Americas Marc Lortie told the Committee: Now almost one million Canadian tourists tr avel to Mexicoannually, with over 180,000 Mexicans visiting Canada. Canadian educational institutions host over 10,000 Mexican students annually, and 11,000seasonal Mexican agricultural workers come to Canada.54 Parliamentary exchanges with Canada, begun formally in 1975, have intensified too, andthere is increased potential to benefit from these exchanges, given the push for democratic reforms within Mexico and the greater role being assumed

by the Mexican Congress, in matters, inter alia, of foreign policy. Despitesuch advances, Wood and MacLean, writing at the end of the 1990s,observed severalremainingobstaclesto be overcome in realizing a closer and fuller Canada-Mexicorelationship.55 The firstand most obvious of these is the large gap in the level of development between thetwo countries. This is a persistent problem that is manifested in socio-economic and regional

inequalities within Mexicothat have grown despite the aggregate trade and investment gains promoted by NAFTA. Thesepoliticaland social, as well as economic, development challenges are perceived as holding Mexico back from being a fullNorth American partner. They surfaced as a repeated and underlying concern during the Committees meetings in Mexico City in March2002. Canadian policy towards Mexico has gone some way towards responding. As Marc Lortie stated to the Committee: Mexico no w sees Canada as avaluable partner in its efforts to address its many and deep-seated social, political, and economic challenges. Cooperation on governance has providedthe new focus to bilateral relations. Canada is clearly committed to helping Mexico reform it s government institutions so that it may addressoverriding concerns of poverty and regional disparity. In addition, CIDA, primarily through the Partnership Branch, has disbursed an average of $7million per year in Mexico over the past three years. This includes the Canada Fund for local initiatives, with $500,000 in annual funding for grassrootsprojects, most of which is disbursed in the poorest states in southern Mexico.56 A strong message conveyed by many Mexicans is that NAFTA has leftunfinished business.57 Equally, Mexicans would welcome increased Canadian partnerships (private-sector and non-governmental as well asgovernmental) in working, both bilaterally and trilaterally, to address Mexicos development challenges from an increasingly integrated North

American regional perspective. Two more subtle obstaclesto closer relations were identified by Wood and MacLean: the lack of adeep understanding between the two countries at a broadly social and cultural level; and historicdivergences in foreign policy goals, notably in the lack of a common security agenda and insensitive areas such as human rights. The first may be gradually overcome through the educational initiatives and people-to-

people exchanges noted above (including more Canadians learning Spanish;58 unlike the United States, Canada does not have a large population ofMexican or Hispanic origin), improved communications and media links, and more public diplomacy, including regular contacts among Canadian andMexican legislators. The second issue of closer cooperation and coordination in international affairs has taken on a new light under the Foxadministration and since September 11, 2001. Mexico was already a convert to trade liberalization and has now signed ten free trade agreements with31 countries including those of the European Union. With regard to other multilateral arenas (and it should be noted that Mexico is currently serving atwo-year term on the UN Security Council), under Foreign Minister Jorge Castaeda, there has recently b een a pronounced shift away from Mexicostraditionally non-interventionist posture towards a position much closer to Canadas. As Castaeda has stated: We are convinced that it is in Mexicosbest interest to adapt itself to the new rules-based international system that is gradually emerging. We therefore now subscribe to the argument that

certain principles are universal and beyond the sovereignty of the state.59 In continental security matters, however, Mexico has neverenjoyed the decades-old closely integrated relationship that Canada has had with the UnitedStates through NATO and NORAD. Mexicos relationship with the United States along its northern border has also been a thornyone given issues such as illegal immigration and drug trafficking. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, Mexicos border region which has


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been its most economically dynamic even though still beset by social and environmental problems quickly felt the negative effects of new U.S.security measures,60 a situation with which Canadians can certainly empathize. While Canadian officials have tended to see the resolution of Canada-U.S. border access concerns as a separate bilateral discussion, the Mexican government has suggested the goal of a more comprehensive NorthAmerican approach to securing continental borders without jeopardizing the growing volumes of trade and travel within the NAF TA area. For themoment there are two bilateral tracks. Canada was first off the mark in negotiating a 30- point Smart Border accord with the U.S. in December 2001.Mexico was, however, able to use that as a model in pursuing its own 22- point Smart Border agreement with the United States, which was signed bypresidents Bush and Fox in Monterrey in March 2002 at the time of the UN Summit on Financing for Development.


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Cant Solve Venezuela

Venezuela says no to the CP, and even if they dont Canada wontinvestGraham 13- foreign minister of Canada from 2002 to 2004, (Bill, Canada-Venezuela reset isnt yet in the cards, Mar. 0 8 2013,http://m.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/canada-venezuela-reset-isnt-yet-in-the-cards/article9519784/?service=mobile)//A-Berg

And so with his death, it might seem like an opportune time to push the reset button on Canada-Venezuelan relations. But that is unlikely,at least for a while. For the moment, it is difficult to foresee anyimmediate change in the domestic or international policies of Venezuela that would bring aboutsuch a rapprochement, especially with no likely electoral change in the near future. To begin with, Canadians business ingeneral will continue to be discouraged by years of the regimes anti-business rhetoric andactions.And even if the opposition is elected, it will take a number of years to overcome theperceived problems in the judiciary or even for foreigners to feel safe on the mean streets of Caracas, one of themost dangerous cities in the world. In the international sphere,

there is even less likelihood that the Canadiangovernment would go out of its way to seek to establish closer ties, at least for a while. In recent years, Ottawa hassigned free-trade agreements with many states Colombia, Panama, Chile, in particular that have no affinity for Mr. Chavezs Bolivarian vision,exported by its commandante and endorsed by hemispheric outliers.

Venezuelas relationship with Iran and anti-business policiesprevents CP solvencyGraham, 3/8/13Foreign Minister of Canada from 2002 to 2004, former Minister of national Defence (Bill, 8 March 2013,Canada-Venezuela reset isnt yet in the cards, The Globe and Mail,http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/canada-venezuela-reset-isnt-yet-in-the-cards/article9519784/)//KP

Foreign Minister of Canada from 2002 to 2004 Served as Minister of Foreign Affaris, Ministerof National Defence HugoChavez was an extraordinary individual, a player on the hemispheric ifnot global stage. Unpredictable as he was charismatic, Mr. Chavez was the joker in the Latin American pack of cards. In other words,

he was just the kind of leader who causes headaches for governments like Canada s,both with his policies and his persona. At the 2001 Summit of the Americas, the question was What would Chavez do? This wasearly in George W. Bushs presidency and rioters were in the streets of Quebec City; things could have gone badly. But primeminister Jean Chrtien, an old hand at wrangling egos, mollified him by putting him next to Brazilian President Fernando HenriqueCardoso, who kept his Venezuelan counterpart under control. That time, it worked. Things didnt go as well for me as foreignminister at the 2004 Summit in Monterrey, Mexico, when I expressed Canadian policy critical of Mr. Chavez while he was sittingnext to me. He was surprisingly quiet for someone normally so verbose, but he looked at me with the fierceness of a man who had

both instigated and survived coups dtat.And so with his death, it might seem like an opportunetime to push the reset button on Canada-Venezuelan relations. But that isunlikely, at least for a while. For the moment, it is difficult to foresee any immediate change inthe domestic or international policies of Venezuela that would bring about such arapprochement, especially with no likely electoral changein the near future. To begin with,Canadians business in general will continue to be discouraged by years of the regimes anti-business rhetoric and actions. And even if the opposition is elected, it will take a number of

years to overcome the perceived problems in the judiciary or even for foreigners tofeel safe on the mean streets of Caracas, one of the most dangerous cities in the world. In the internationalsphere, there is even less likelihood that the Canadian government would go out ofits way to seek to establish closer ties, at least for a while. In recent years, Ottawa has signed free-tradeagreements with many states Colombia, Panama, Chile, in particular that have no affinity for Mr. Chavezs Bolivarian vision,

exported by its commandante and endorsed by hemispheric outliers. Canada has quite a bit on its plateworking with these receptive jurisdictions without expending energy in trying tobring about a better relationship with Venezuela. That role is perhaps best left to Brazil, a neighbourand self-perceived hegemon, as Mr. Cardoso demonstrated in Quebec City. In recent years, another powerful irritant
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has poisoned Venezuelas hemispheric relations: its role as a host to Iran in theAmericas.In recent years, Mr. Chavez made a point of cultivating close relations withIran as a part of his anti-Americanism and oil strategy to the point where it isalleged that Venezuela furnished passports to Hezbollah operatives. These actionshave provoked a vigorous U.S. response, one manifestation of which is a recent House of Representativesbill, the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act yet another extraterritorial extension of American legislative jurisdiction,

and making specific reference to Canada and Mexico. Canadas present relations with Iran are at a lowpoint in any event, but this is an unneeded complication in relations with both the United States and Venezuela. Untilthis potentially explosive issue is resolved to the satisfaction of both Washingtonand Ottawa, it is hard to see why any Canadian government would seek to makeserious overtures to Venezuela. Mr. Chavez is dead, but the joker he dealt us liveson.


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Perm


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generic


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do both

Perm: have Canada and the US do the plan togetherActionPlan 11- Canadas Economic Action Plan (Joint Action Plan for the Canada-United States Regulatory CooperationCouncil, http://actionplan.gc.ca/en/page/rcc-ccr/joint-action-plan-canada-united-states-regulatory)//Modermatt

On February 4, 2011, Prime Minister Stephen Harper and President Barack Obama announced the creation oftheCanada-United States Regulatory Cooperation Council (RCC) to increase regulatory transparencyand coordination between the two countries. Regulation plays an important role in both our countries.Effective regulations protect our health, safety and the environment whilesupporting growth, investment, innovation and market openness. Canada and theU.S. each have well-developed, independent regulatory regimes and regulatorydepartments and agencies with experience, expertise and skill in their respectivefields, that support each of our domestic and legal policy requirements. While ourregulatory systems are very similar in the objectives they seek to achieve, there is value in enhancing the mechanisms in place tofoster cooperation in designing regulations or to ensure alignment in their implementation or enforcement. Unnecessary regulatorydifferences and duplicative actions hinder cross-border trade and investment and ultimately impose a cost on our citizens,

businesses and economies. Given the integrated nature of our economies, greater alignmentand better mutual reliance in our regulatory approaches would lead to lower costs

for consumers and businesses, create more efficient supply chains, increase tradeand investment, generate new export opportunities, and create jobs on both sidesof the border. The RCC will undertake efforts to better align the regulatory environment between Canada and the UnitedStates through a variety of tools such as enhanced technical collaboration, mutual recognition of standards and joint work sharing,in an effort to address root causes of regulatory misalignments, develop lasting solutions and avoid future misalignments from

developing. This initial Joint Action Plan seeks to foster new approaches to regulatoryalignment and serve as a template for future efforts at Canada-U.S. coordination. Council members agreed to the RCC's Terms of Reference,1 which established the mandate, principles and structure of the RCC andwill guide the work of the RCC throughout its mandate. Nothing in this Joint Action Plan is intended to give rise to rights orobligations under domestic or international law.

Perm do both stability and democracy promoting polices are

stronger when cooperating with CanadaInter-American Dialogue 12 leading US center for policy analysis, exchange, and communication on issues inWestern Hemisphere affairs (April 2012, Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America, The Inter-AmericanDialogue, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)//KP

The democratic outlook in the Americas is on balance positive, particularly when compared with previousperiods and to the rest of the world. Free, competitive elections are regularly held and, happily, the massivehuman rights violations associated with earlier periods ofauthoritarian rule have passed. Nonetheless,there are fundamental challenges that, if unaddressed, could spread and become far more serious.These problems need to be dealt with collectively through established regional mechanisms.

Among these is the defense of democracy, an important area for greater cooperation among theUnited States, Canada, and Latin America. Today, threats to democratic rule from the actions of the military, asoccurred in the June 2009 coup in Honduras, are rare. More commonly, elected executives, once in office, centralize power andassume increasing control of critical institutions, public and private. Checks on presidential authority are, thereby, weakened oreliminated. Governments in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Ecuador have all followed this pattern, undermining press freedom and

other basic rights. Although the Inter-American Democratic Charter calls for collective action to preventand repair such transgressions, they have, in fact, been met with relative silence. Indeed, the charter has rarely beeninvoked. This inaction stems from the lack of consensus in the hemisphere about what constitutes violations of democraticprinciples and how best to respond to them. The charter should be reformed to establish mechanisms for redress when electedexecutives run roughshod over independent institutions.

Perm do both solves Canada and the U.S. have the same interestsEk and Fergusson 4/5 Specialist in International Relations; Specialists in International Trade and Finance (Carl Ek, IanF. Fergusson, 5 April 2013, Canada-U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/96-397.pdf)//KP


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In 2007, Prime Minister Harper declared that the Americas are a critical foreign policy priority forCanada, and committed to deepening and broadening Canadas engagement in the region. Since then, Canada has sought toexpand its presence throughout the region while reinforcing bilateral ties and strengtheningregional organizations. The Conservative governments current objectivesfor the hemisphere closelyalign with those of the Obama Administration, with both countries advancing policies designedto reinforce democratic governance, increase economic prosperity, and enhance regional

stability and security. Background and Analysis Although Canada has long been active in the region , its commitment tosustained engagement in inter-American relations is relatively recent. Throughout the 20th century, Canadaforged strong diplomatic and commercial ties with many Latin American and Caribbean countries. Nevertheless, it generally did not consider theregion to be a top foreign policy priority. Authoritarian governance and widespread poverty fueled negative perceptions of the region and led Canada tofocus its attention elsewhere. According to a number of analysts and former officials, Canada was also reluctant to engage extensively in hemisphericaffairs out of concern that it could be drawn into disputes with the United States, which had traditionally played a dominant role in the region


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cuba


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do both

Perm do both unilateral Canadian action cant solve the net benefitthe U.S. will punish themDade 2/20/13 senior fellow at the University of Ottawas School of International Development (Carlo Dade, 20 February2013, On Cuba, Canadahas no choice but to walk Washingtons tightrope, The Globe and Mail,http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/on-cuba-canada-has-no-choice-but-to-walk-washingtons-tightrope/article8878654/)//KP

As hard as it may be to believe, one of the most difficult foreign files for any Canadian government tomanage is the Cuba file. The importance of Cuba, throughout the hemisphere, is as a symbol.The country isof marginal, if any, economic interest and is not a real security threat to anyone in the hemisphere larger than, say, Grenada. The

importance of Cubain the rest of the hemisphere is that it serves as a reminder of centuries of Americanbullying and degradation.It is hard to overstate the degree of visceral anger that U.S. policy toward Cuba elicits in theregion. It is also a subject with which any Latin American government, even one of the few right-of-centre governments such as

Colombia, earns cheap points at home and with its neighbours by symbolically kicking the United States. In Canada, Cubaserves a different purpose: It is a symbol of what distinguishes Canada from the United States. MostCanadians strongly disagree with U.S. policy toward Cuba and find it offensive. Instead of anger, though, Canada is more ofte n

embarrassed for its neighbour. The U.S.also sees no need to afford Canada the same slack it affords Latin

American countries on Cuba. Twice each year the U.S. embassy in Ottawa has to certify thatCanada is, more or less, in compliance with the1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, also known asHelms-Burton, which requires the United States to penalize any foreign companies that do business with Cuba. (Canadiancompanies are among the largest international investors in Cuba). The gist of the exercise is to demonstrate that, despiteclearly violating the intent if not the letter of Helms-Burton, Canada is doing enough otherthings to push reform in Cuba to earn a pass from direct sanction by the U.S. The exercise isessentially a series of winks and nods on each side followed by a round of beers. And each year theState Department and congress go along with this while the Canadian government grumblingly counts its blessings. Canada hasof course vociferously opposed Helms-Burton, has challenged it under NAFTA, and has adoptedlaws to counter it.In this it has international law and public opinion on its side. But should the Americans decide to takeunilateral action, that combination would prove as effective in defending Canadian interests on Cuba as it did on softwood lumber.

As has been seen time and again, all it takes is one member of the U.S. congress (such as a member of the easily-riled congressional Cuba lobby) to raise a fuss, and Canada is left with nothing but a wink and a nod to

cover its privates while the bone-chilling breeze of U.S. unilateralism flaps around it. Yes, coolerheads would prevail eventually. But a lot of damage would be done in the meantime. The fine line that Canada walks onCuba is an object lesson on the Faustian bargain that the country has struck to enable it to get rich and fat off of easy and privileged

access to the U.S. market. Criticize the government if you will,but what choice does Canada really have? Beforeanswering, think of the $1-billion in daily trade across the border. Canada can, does and will havedifferences with the United States. But it has to pick its fights carefully, and Cuba is not on thatlist. Making that reality clear to the rest of hemisphere, while explaining how much we do manage to differ from the U.S., is crucial.It appears that this is what the government belatedly did with Foreign Affair Minister John Baird trip to the region.


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AT: Soft power

Alt causes to Canada soft powerMatthews 10(Kyle, The GPS report: A blueprint for operationalizing strategic change, June 23, 2010, http://opencanada.org/foreign-exchange/the-gps-report-a-blueprint-for-operationalizing-strategic-change/)//A-Berg

The report describes in detail the withering of Canadas soft power throughthe continual disinvestment inour diplomatic corps, the shuttering of embassiesand high commissions, the failure to leverage ourmulticultural communitiesin a strategic manner, and the transformation ofour civil service intoa cowering armyofbureaucratsthat focuses too much on departmental interests rather than advancing the national interest. We have entered a new century thatwill require forward-looking and bold leadership to navigate a world of both opportunity and danger.

Reliance on soft power has made Canada irrelevantRobson,John 04- columnist and commentator with Sun Media, is also an InvitedProfessor at the University of Ottawa(Reliance on 'soft power' made Canada irrelevant, 3/1/04,http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Reliance+on+%27soft+power%27+made+Canada+irrelevant&rft.jtitle=Times+-+Colonist&rft.au=John+Robson&rft.date=2004-03-01&rft.pub=Infomart%2C+a+division+of+Postmedia+Network+Inc&rft.spage=A.6&rft.externalDocID=572689181)//ModermattWhat ever happened to soft power? Its advocates seem to be flourishing professionally. But what have they to say about the affairs ofthe day, such as nuclear proliferation or Haiti? On nuclear proliferation, we all know now that the Americans, and almost everyoneelse, badly overestimated Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. But we also know now they badly underestimated the internationaltrade in nuclear materials to rogue states (and most Western governments still would if the American invasion of Iraq had notfrightened Libya's Col. Gadhafi). You can't just chant "BUSH LIED!" History, as is its wont, has moved on. What shall we do? Weneed better intelligence or, if we decide that's not really possible, some plan for dealing with inherently inadequate intelligence. Yet

Canada basically doesn't do foreign intelligence. We also need some sort of firm plan for dealing withnuclear proliferation. Even in Europe, the realization that biting America's ankles doesn't qualify is painfully sinking in and policy ischanging. In a story I don't recall seeing in Maclean's, in late January, Germany's foreign minister told Britain's Daily Telegraph that

of course there were no plans for a European superstate. Two days later, "senior German officials" told the Telegraph the quarrelwith the U.S. over Iraq had been "catastrophic" for Germany and Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder had become "a prisoner" of FrenchPresident Jacques Chirac's anti-war campaign. (Also, the implosion of its fledgling democracy makes Russia an increasinglyunsuitable third partner.) Moreover, while many Canadians seem to regard the American concern with militant Islamism as redneckxenophobia, in France they have voted to ban headscarves in schools while the ultra-liberal Netherlands is trying to expel thousandsof illegal immigrants and Denmark is undertaking immigration reforms openly aimed at radical imams. Such policies put thosegovernments at risk from terrorism that won't be diminished by insulting George Bush especially since, unlike Canadians, they don'tsecretly know the U.S. must defend them no matter what. The New York Times, not exactly pro-Bush, recently noted that despite"headlines around the world about how American credibility has been reduced to tatters," its allies are now seeking to work moreclosely with the U.S. to keep WMDs out of the hands of rogue states. Even Hans Blix now says, "We Europeans cannot simply resistforceful action by the United States and leave it at that. We have to take positive action also. We have to push the United States touse international organizations to face threats to our common security." Right. We must face the threats, not deny them. And only

the U.S. has the hard power to do so.Yet Canada's government dithers on whether to make atypical "all aid short of help" offer on missile defence involving neither money norsites, while our foreign minister pushes hard for a treaty to ban weapons in space.The high-tech U.S. military relies on satellite communications, which it must protect from bad guys who laugh at treaties. We're

trying to make sure it can't.And we will fail. So far soft power looks like weakness. Whatabout Haiti? It should be the ideal spot for a kinder, gentler Canadianintervention. First, it's in serious need not of a clean military operation to oust the

villains but of some of the sensitive nation-building liberals tend to favour.Second, such an intervention would have the quality appealing to liberals of havingalmost no relevance to our national interest, unless you believe (a) all failed statesare breeding grounds for terror and (b) we as well as the Americans arethreatened if terror comes to North America. Third, Haiti is a French-speakingnation, and we have a francophone regiment. But we can't do it. We haven't got the ships or the planes, and the Van Doos, as


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horribly overextended as everyone else in our military, just left for Afghanistan. On the TV news last week, the prime minister saidwe were monitoring the situation in Haiti closely and were concerned. In other words, we're impotent and frustrated. I'm not surethey give Nobel Peace Prizes for that. There was a time when leftists were prone to expansive, even daffy visions of remaking theworld. But they knew, as only a few like historian Jack Granatstein now seem to, that such plans require even more robust military

capabilities than realpolitik is likely to. In his excellent new book Who Killed the Canadian Military? Granatstein says

that because "soft power" meant military neglect, "Canada has ceased to matter

internationally." Ooops. Lloyd Axworthy promised us a world transformed, not ignored. Well? What can "soft power" doon nuclear proliferation, or even Haiti? Guys?

8/13/2019 Canada CP Aff

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